80261387 Asprec v Itchon

ASPREC V ITCHON 15 SCRA 921, SANCHEZ, April 30, 1966 NATURE Petition for review FACTS -Private respondent Jacinto Hernandez (Hernandez) filed an administrative complaint against Cleto Asprec for unprofessional conduct with the Respondent Board of Examiners for Surveyors. Allegedly, Hernandez and Asprec entered into an agreement wherein Asprec would survey Hernandez’ lot in Camarines Sur and would deliver to the latter a plan approved by the Director of Lands w/n 3 months after completion of the survey, and procure the issuance of a CTC to the lot w/n 6 months after the plan’s approval. However, even if Hernandez paid the agreed amount, Asprec did not deliver the plan, and the alleged plan duly delivered and approved was for one Damian Alhambra, and the plan submitted was merely a certified copy of the plan. It should also be noted that during the proceedings in the Board of Examiners, Asprec/his counsel had many times been absent, late, sick…which caused the delay of the proceedings. -Respondent Board: For Hernandez: (1) no actual survey of the land made; (2) money was paid; Asprec was guilty of deceit and thus violated the Code of Ethics for surveyors, his certificate of registration as private land surveyor REVOKED and required to be surrendered. -Asprec filed petition with the CFI of Camarines Sur for certiorari to annul the orders revoking his surveyor’s certificate of registration; mandamus to compel the Board to conduct a formal hearing of the complaint against him; and prohibition, to stop execution of the orders to surrender said certificate. The preliminary injunction prayed for was rejected below -CFI: dismiss with costs ISSUES 1. WON Asprec was denied due process in not being able to participate in the hearing 2. WON the proceedings before the Board, being quasi-criminal in nature, was valid granted Asprec absented himself from it 3. WON the decision of the Board rendered upon a motion for judgment on the pleadings valid (other issues were more on Civpro than Admin so not included) HELD 1. NO Ratio. Presence of a party at a trial is not always the essence of due process. Really all that the law requires to satisfy adherence to this Constitutional precept is that the parties be given notice of the trial, an opportunity to be heard. Reasoning. Petitioner has had more than ample opportunity to defend himself before the Board. As he and counsel did not appear at the last and stipulated date of hearing, he cannot look to the law or to a judicial tribunal to whipsaw the Board into giving him a new one. He cannot raise his voice in protest against the act of the Board in proceeding in his and his counsel's absence. And this because without cause or reason, without any excuse at all, counsel and client have chosen to shy away from the trial. 2. YES Ratio. Where the respondent in a petition for contempt failed to appear on the date set for the hearing, of which he was previously notified, it was held that he was not deprived of his day in court when the judge ordered him arrested unless he pay the support he was adjudged to give, he having been given an opportunity to be heard. Similarly, the defendant's failure to appear with the counsel of his choice at the trial, notwithstanding repeated postponements and the warning that failure to so appear would be deemed a waiver of the right to present evidence in his defense and the case will be submitted for decision on the evidence submitted by the prosecution, was a sufficient justification for the court to proceed and render judgment upon evidence before it. 3. YES

Ratio. A rule so long respected, because it is buttressed upon reason and authority, is that technical rules of court practice, procedure and evidence are not to be applied with rigidity in administrative proceedings. We should have in mind the nature of administrative bodies, the character of the duties they are required to perform, the purposes for which they are organized, the persons who compose them. Here, we are concerned with members of a board of surveyors — technical men but not necessarily trained law men. In this posture, it is quite reasonable to assume that their proceedings may not be conducted with that degree of exactness or with such scrupulous observance of the complex technical rules expected in a legal battle before a court of justice. Their acts should not be measured by the same yardstick exacted of a judge in a court of law. So much leeway is given an investigating administrative body. Reasoning. The plan allegedly made by Asprec was not the plan of an original survey but a mere copy from another plan. Both the plans were submitted to the Board. So it is, that when counsel for Hernandez manifested that all the evidence against petitioner was submitted to the Board and that for that reason he was resting his case, he evidently had in mind the admissions in the pleadings and the plans and decisions and report here noted. And, the motion for judgment on the pleadings was a mere follow-up of the manifestation just adverted to. As the trial court well observed, counsel for respondent Hernandez did not present a motion for judgment on the pleadings in the strict sense of the word, but "a motion which for lack of another expression, he called a motion for judgment on the pleadings." Lack of observance of this technicality which does not quarrel with a fair concept of justice should be overlooked. Disposition. Upon the view we take of this case, the decision is hereby affirmed. Costs against petitioner.

VINTA MARITIME V NLRC (Basconcillo) 284 SCRA 656, PANGANIBAN; January 3, 1998 NATURE Special civil action of certiorari FACTS - Leonides C. BASCONCILLO, filed a complaint with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Workers’ Assistance and Adjudication Office for illegal dismissal against Vinta Maritime Co., Inc. and Elkano Ship Management, Inc. - The employers alleged that he was dismissed for his gross negligence and incompetent performance as chief engineer of the M/V Boracay. They claim that he was given fair warning and enough opportunity to explain his side, not to mention all the chances given to him to improve his substandard work performance before he was dismissed. - The employee denied the allegations against him; contrary to his employer’s claim, he was actually surprised when he was told of his dismissal. This occurred after he had a verbal altercation with a British national, regarding the lack of discipline of the Filipino crew under the engineer’s supervision. No inquiry or investigation, however, regarding his supposed incompetence or negligence was ever conducted; neither was private respondent furnished with a notice or memorandum regarding the cause of his dismissal. - POEA considered the case submitted for resolution by mutual agreement of the parties after submission of their respective position papers and supporting documents. POEA Administrator Achacoso ruled that private respondent was illegally dismissed. - On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the POEA. ISSUE/S 1. WON trial is indispensable in administrative proceedings 2. WON the employee was illegally dismissed HELD 1. NO Ratio Although bound by law and practice to observe due process, administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial powers are nonetheless free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements.

DUE PROCESS- Cardinal Primary Rights - In labor cases, this Court has consistently held that due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or a right to be heard. The requirements of due process are deemed to have been satisfied when parties are given the opportunity to submit position papers. The holding of an adversarial trial is discretionary on the labor arbiter and the parties cannot demand it as a matter of right. - These rules equally apply to cases filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Adjudication Office. Proceedings before a POEA hearing officer are non-litigious, although they are still subject to the requirements of due process. Reasoning Petitioners were given their chance to be heard. Their answer, position paper and supporting documents had become parts of the records and were considered by the POEA and by the NLRC. 2. YES Ratio Where there is no showing of a clear, valid, and legal cause for the termination of employment, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal. Verily, the burden is on the employer to prove that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause. - Due process, the second element for a valid dismissal, requires NOTICE and HEARING. The employer must furnish the worker with two written notices before termination can be legally effected: (1) notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought and (2) subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him. Disposition Petition is DISMISSED.

BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC. V CIR (RURAL TRANSIT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION) 86 SCRA 27; MUÑOZ-PALMA; October 30, 1978 NATURE Petition for certiorari FACTS -In 1958 the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. was in the transportation business and operated what was then known as the "Rural Transit". -In that year, the Rural Transit Employees Association went on strike and the dispute between the management and the union reached the Court of Industrial Relations, which immediately ordered the strikers to return to work and the management to take them back under the terms and conditions existing before the dispute arose. -While the labor dispute was pending with the CIR, Bachrach filed a "Petition for Authority to discharge driver Maximo Jacob from the service” for alleged violations of the Motor Vehicle Law resulting in damage to property and injuries to third parties, the latest of which resulted in the "total destruction of bus 170" of the company. -The Rural Transit Employees Association denied the charges and alleged that the last incident was due to a mechanical defect of the bus which was beyond the control of the driver Jacob -During the hearing of Bachrach’s petition, Mr. Joseph Kaplin, general manager of Rural Transit, was presented as the lone witness -After Mr. Kaplin concluded his direct testimony, the hearing was scheduled for another date for purposes of cross-examination of the witness. The case was reset on various dates but Mr. Kaplin failed to appear because he had left for abroad. -The employee's association filed a motion praying that: (a) the testimony of Mr. Joseph Kaplin be stricken from the records (b) the petition of the Company for authority to dismiss Maximo Jacob from the service be denied: and (c) the Company be ordered to reinstate Maximo Jacob immediately with backwages from June 9, 1961 up to the date of his actual reinstatement. -The CIR dismissed the company's petition, lifted the suspension of driver Jacob, and ordered his reinstatement with backwages -Bachrach's motion for reconsideration having been denied, it filed the instant Petition for certiorari ISSUE WON the CIR erred in ordering the dismissal of

Bachrach's petition to discharge Maximo Jacob HELD NO Ratio The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right which is part of due process. Reasoning -CIR did not err in ordering the dismissal of Bachrach's petition to discharge Maximo Jacob. Petitioner presented only one witness, Joseph Kaplin, to prove its case against driver Jacob. The witness failed however to appear at the scheduled hearings for his crossexamination for the simple reason that he left for abroad. Having been deprived, without fault on its part, of its right to cross-examine Kaplin, respondent association was entitled to have the direct testimony of the witness stricken off the record. -In Ortigas Jr. v. Luftansa German Airlines, 1975, this Court held inter alia: Oral testimony may be taken into account only when it is complete, that is, if the witness has been wholly cross-examined by the adverse party or the right to cross-examine is lost wholly or in part thru the fault of such adverse party. But when cross-examination is not and cannot be done or completed due to causes attributable to the party offering the witness, the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered incompetent. -The right of a party to cross-examine the witness of his adversary is invaluable as it is inviolable in civil cases, no less than the right of the accused in criminal cases. The express recognition of such right of the accused in the Constitution does not render the right thereto of parties in civil cases less constitutionally based, for it is an indispensable part of the due process guaranteed by the fundamental law. ... Until such cross-examination has been finished, the testimony of the witness cannot be considered as complete and may not, therefore, be allowed to form part of the evidence to be considered by the court in deciding the case. -Inasmuch as the testimony of Joseph Kaplin is stricken off the record and the contents of Exhibits "1" to "8-F" are hearsay, and there is no other evidence which substantiates the charges against Maximo Jacob, the dismissal of the company's petition to discharge Jacob from its service is in order. Disposition Petition is dismissed.

UP BOARD OF REGENTS V. CA (AROKIASWAMY WILLIAM MARGARET CELINE) G.R. No. 134625; MENDOZA; August 31, 1999 NATURE Petition for review FACTS -Private respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine is a citizen of India and holder of a Philippine visitor’s visa. she enrolled in the doctoral program in Anthropology of the University of the Philippines College of Social Sciences and Philosophy (CSSP) in Diliman, Quezon City. -After completing the units of course work required in her doctoral program, private respondent went on a two-year leave of absence to work as Tamil Programme Producer of the Vatican Radio in the Vatican and as General Office Assistant at the International Right to Life Federation in Rome. She returned to the Philippines to work on her dissertation entitled, "Tamil Influences in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines." -Dr. Realidad S. Rolda, chairperson of the U.P. Department of Anthropology, wrote a letter to Dr. Maria Serena Diokno, CSSP Associate Dean and Graduate Program Director, certifying that private respondent had finished her dissertation and was ready for her oral defense. She was allowed to give an oral defense. -After going over private respondent’s dissertation, Dr. Medina informed CSSP Dean Consuelo Joaquin-Paz that there was a portion in private respondent’s dissertation that was lifted, without proper

acknowledgment, from Balfour’s Cyclopaedia of India and Eastern and Southern Asia (1967) and from John Edye’s article entitled "Description of the Various Classes of Vessels Constructed and Employed by the Natives of the Coasts of Coromandel, Malabar, and the Island of Ceylon for their Coasting Navigation" in the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland Journal. -Nonetheless, private respondent was allowed to defend her dissertation. Four (4) out of the five (5) panelists gave private respondent a passing mark for her oral defense by affixing their signatures on the approval form. -The CSSP College Faculty Assembly approved private respondent’s graduation pending submission of final copies of her dissertation. -The University Council met to approve the list of candidates for graduation for the second semester of school year 1992-1993. The list, which was endorsed to the Board of Regents for final approval, included private respondent’s name. -Dean Paz sent a letter to Dr. Milagros Ibe, Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs, requesting the exclusion of private respondent’s name from the list of candidates for graduation, pending clarification of the problems regarding her dissertation. -Dean Paz’s letter did not reach the Board of Regents on time, because the next day, the Board approved the University Council’s recommendation for the graduation of qualified students, including private respondent. Two days later, private respondent graduated with the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Anthropology. -Dr. Medina formally charged private respondent with plagiarism and recommended that the doctorate granted to her be withdrawn. -Dean Paz formed an ad hoc committee to investigate the plagiarism charge against private respondent. Meanwhile, she recommended to U.P. Diliman Chancellor, Dr. Emerlinda Roman, that the Ph.D. degree conferred on private respondent be withdrawn. -In a letter Dean Paz informed private respondent of the charges against her. -The CSSP College Assembly unanimously approved the recommendation to withdraw private respondent’s doctorate degree and forwarded its recommendation to the University Council. The University Council, in turn, approved and endorsed the same recommendation to the Board of Regents on August 16, 1993. -Meanwhile, in a letter, U.P. Diliman Chancellor Emerlinda Roman summoned private respondent to a meeting on the same day and asked her to submit her written explanation to the charges against her. -During the meeting, Chancellor Roman informed private respondent of the charges and provided her a copy of the findings of the investigating committee. Private respondent, on the other hand, submitted her written explanation in a letter. -Another meeting was held between Chancellor Roman and private respondent to discuss her answer to the charges. A third meeting was scheduled but private respondent did not attend it, alleging that the Board of Regents had already decided her case before she could be fully heard. -BOR withdrew degree -TC dismissed petition for mandamus filed by Arokiaswamy. CA reversed ordering BOR to restore her doctoral degree. ISSUE WON Arokiaswamy was denied due process HELD NO. Reasoning In this case, the trial court dismissed private respondent’s petition precisely on grounds of academic freedom but the Court of Appeals reversed holding that private respondent was denied due process. It said: It is worthy to note that during the proceedings taken by the College Assembly culminating in its recommendation to the University Council for the withdrawal of petitioner’s Ph.D. degree, petitioner was not given the chance to be heard until after the withdrawal of the degree was consummated. Petitioner’s subsequent letters to the U.P. President proved unavailing. As the foregoing narration of facts in this case shows, however, various committees had been formed to investigate the charge that

private respondent had committed plagiarism and, in all the investigations held, she was heard in her defense. Indeed, if any criticism may be made of the university proceedings before private respondent was finally stripped of her degree, it is that there were too many committee and individual investigations conducted, although all resulted in a finding that private respondent committed dishonesty in submitting her doctoral dissertation on the basis of which she was conferred the Ph.D. degree. Indeed, in administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one’s side of a controversy or a chance to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A party who has availed of the opportunity to present his position cannot tenably claim to have been denied due process. In this case, private respondent was informed in writing of the charges against her and afforded opportunities to refute them. She was asked to submit her written explanation, which she forwarded. Private respondent then met with the U.P. chancellor and the members of the Zafaralla committee to discuss her case. In addition, she sent several letters to the U.P. authorities explaining her position. It is not tenable for private respondent to argue that she was entitled to have an audience before the Board of Regents. Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in the courts of justice. It is noteworthy that the U.P. Rules do not require the attendance of persons whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board of Regents. Disposition Petition for mandamus DISMISSED

ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING CO. V. CA (SEC. OF AGRI AND NATURAL RESOURCES) G.R. No. L-49711; AQUINO; November 7, 1979 NATURE Petition for review FACTS -This is a mining case. The petitioners appealed from the second decision of the Court of Appeals, reversing its first decision and holding that it was improper for Benjamin M. Gozon, as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, to affirm his own decision as Director of Mines. -The Court of Appeals further held that the trial court's judgment, confirming the Secretary's decision, should be set aside and that the Minister of Natural Resources should review anew the decision of the Director of Mines "and, thereafter, further proceedings will be taken in the trial court". The antecedental proceedings are as follows: (1) In Mines Administrative Case No. V-227, Director Gozon issued an order dated October 5, 1960 wherein he dismissed the case filed by the petitioners or protestants (Zambales Chromite Mining Co., Inc. or the group of Gonzalo P. Nava). In that case, they sought to be declared the rightful and prior locators and possessors of sixty-nine mining claims located in Santa Cruz, Zambales. On the basis of petitioners' evidence (the private respondents did not present any evidence and they filed a demurrer to the evidence or motion to dismiss the protest), Director Gozon found that the petitioners did not discover any mineral nor staked and located mining claims in accordance with law. In that same order, Director Gozon ruled that the mining claims of the groups of Gregorio Martinez and Pablo Pabiloña, now the private respondents-appellees, were duly located and registered (pp. 224-231, Record on Appeal). (2) The petitioners appealed from that order to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. While the appeal was pending, Director Gozon was appointed Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Instead of inhibiting himself, he decided the appeal, DANR Case No. 2151, on August 16, 1963 as if he was adjudicating the case for the first time. Thus, Secretary Gozon exercised appellate jurisdiction over a case which he had decided as Director of Mines. He acted as reviewing authority in the appeal from his own decision. Or,

to use another analogy, he acted as trial judge and appellate judge in the same case. ISSUE WON Gozun correctly reviewed his own decision HELD NO. Reasoning Secretary Gozon acted with grave abuse of discretion in reviewing his decision as Director of Mines. The palpably flagrant anomaly of a Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources reviewing his own decision as Director of Mines is a mockery of administrative justice. The Mining Law, Commonwealth Act No. 137, provides: "SEC. 61.Conflicts and disputes arising out of mining locations shall be submitted to the Director of Mines for decision: "Provided, That the decision or order of the Director of Mines may be appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources within thirty days from the date of its receipt. "In case any one of the parties should disagree from the decision or order of the Director of Mines or of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the matter may be taken to the court of competent jurisdiction within thirty days from the receipt of such decision or order; otherwise the said decision or order shall be final and binding upon the parties concerned." (As amended by Republic Act No. 746 approved on June 18, 1952). Undoubtedly, the provision of section that the decision of the Director of Mines may be appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources contemplates that the Secretary should be a person different from the Director of Mines. In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce, the reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case. That is the obvious, elementary reason behind the disqualification of a trial judge, who is promoted to the appellate court, to sit in any case wherein his decision or ruling is the subject of review (Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court; secs. 9 and 27, Judiciary Law). A sense of proportion and consideration for the fitness of things should have deterred Secretary Gozon from reviewing his own decision as Director of Mines. He should have asked his Undersecretary to undertake the review.Petitioners-appellants were deprived of due process, meaning fundamental fairness. Disposition Order of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources SET ASIDE

RIVERA V CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 240 SCRA 43; VITUG; JAN 4, 1995 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - Petitioner Rivera was the Manager of Corporate Banking Unit I of the Land Bank of the Philippines ("LBP"). On the basis of the affidavits of Lao and Perez, petitioner was charged by the LBP President with having committed the following offenses: "(1) Dishonesty; "(2) Receiving for personal use of fee, gift or other valuable thing, in the course of official duties or in connection therewith when such fee, gift, or other valuable thing is given by any person in the hope or expectation of receiving a favor or better treatment than that accorded other persons; "(3) Committing acts punishable under the Anti-Graft laws; "(4) Pursuit of private business vocation or profession without the permission required by Civil Service Rules and regulations; "(5) Violation of Res. 87-A, R.A. No. 337; resulting to misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service."

- Rivera allegedly told Perez, the Marketing Manager of Wynner which had a pending loan application with LBP, that he could facilitate the processing, approval and release of the loan if he would be given a ten percent (10%) commission. Rivera was said to have subsequently received a P200,000.00 commission out of the P3,000,000.00 loan proceeds from the LBP. From Lao, who had substantial investments in Wynner, Rivera supposedly likewise received the amount of approximately P20,000.00 pocket money for his trip to the United States, as well as additional funds for his plane ticket, hotel accommodations and pocket money for still another trip to Hongkong. - Rivera was further charged with, among other things, having served and acted, without prior authority required by Civil Service Rules and Memorandum Circular No. 1025 of the Office of the President of the Philippines, as the personal consultant of Lao and as consultant in various companies where Lao had investments. He drew and received salaries and allowances approximately P20,000.00 a month evidenced by vouchers of Edge Apparel, Inc., J & M Clothing Corporation, and JME Trading Corporation. - Once the charges were filed, Rivera was placed under preventive suspension. After a formal investigation, the LBP held Rivera guilty of grave misconduct and acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service in accepting employment from a client of the bank and in thereby receiving salaries and allowances in violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII, of the Revised Civil Service Rules. He was also found to have transgressed the prohibition in Section 3, paragraph (d), of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019, as amended). The penalty of forced resignation, without separation benefits and gratuities, was thereupon imposed on Rivera. On appeal, the decision was modified by the Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB") which held Rivera guilty only of committing acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The LBP filed a motion for the reconsideration of MSPB's decision. In its resolution, the MSPB denied the motion. - Rivera and the LBP both appealed to the CSC. The CSC dismissed the appeal of Respondent George Rivera, finding him guilty of Grave Misconduct for which he is meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service. Rivera filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CSC denied in its Resolution No. 94-1276. - Petitioner averred that the CSC committed grave abuse or discretion in imposing the capital penalty of dismissal on the basis of unsubstantiated finding and conclusions. The SC Court resolved to dismiss the petition for petitioner's failure to sufficiently show that CSC acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing its questioned resolution. Rivera filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court's dismissal of the petition, now strongly asserting that he was denied due process when Gaminde, who earlier participated in her capacity as the Board Chairman of the MSPB when the latter had taken action on LBP's motion for reconsideration, also took part, this time as a CSC Commissioner, in the resolution of petitioner's motion for reconsideration with the CSC. ISSUE WON petitioner was denied due process when Gaminde, who earlier participated in her capacity as the Board Chairman of the MSPB when the latter had taken action on LBP's motion for reconsideration, also took part, this time as a CSC Commissioner, in the resolution of petitioner's motion for reconsideration with the CSC HELD YES. - In Zambales Chromite Mining Company vs. Court of Appeals, the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources was set aside by this Court after it had been established that the case concerned an appeal from the Secretary's own previous decision he handed down while he was yet the incumbent Director of Mines. Calling the act of the Secretary a "mockery of administrative justice," the Court said: “In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce, then reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it

would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case." - Given the circumstances in the case at bench, it should have behooved Commissioner Gaminde to inhibit herself totally from any participation in resolving Rivera's appeal to CSC if we are to give full meaning and consequence to a fundamental aspect of due process. The argument that Commissioner Gaminde did not participate in MSPB's decision of 29 August 1990 is unacceptable. It is not denied that she did participate, indeed has concurred, in MSPB's resolution of 03 March 1994, denying the motion for reconsideration of MSPB's decision of 29 August 1990. cdrep Dispositive Resolution set aside, case remanded to CSC

AMERICAN INTER-FASHION CORPORATION v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, GARMENTS & TEXTILE EXPORT BOARD & GLORIOUS SUN FASHION GARMENTS MANUFACTURING CO. (PHILS.), INC. 187 SCRA 409; GUTIERREZ, JR.; May 23, 1991 Nature: Appeal Facts: - GLORIOUS was found guilty of dollar-salting and misdeclaration of importations by the GTEB and, as a result of which, the export quotas allocated to it were cancelled. Soon after the rendition of the GTEB decision, GLORIOUS filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court, contending that its right to due process of law was violated, and that the GTEB decision was not supported by substantial evidence. - Giving credence to the allegations of respondent GLORIOUS, the Court issued a resolution ordering GTEB to conduct further proceedings in the administrative case against respondent GLORIOUS. - However, GLORIOUS filed a manifestation of its intention to withdraw the petition which the Court granted - GLORIOUS filed another motion to dismiss with prejudice, which was duly noted by the Court in a resolution. - More than 2 years later, GLORIOUS filed with the GTEB a petition for the restitution of its export quota allocation and requested for a reconsideration of the GTEB decision dated April 27, 1984. - GLORIOUS again alleged that the charges against it were not supported by evidence. - Moreover, it alleged that the GTEB decision canceling its export quotas was rendered as a result of duress, threats, intimidation and undue influence exercised by former Minister Roberto V. Ongpin in order to transfer GLORIOUS' export quotas to "Marcos crony-owned" corporations De Soleil Apparel Manufacturing Corporation [DSA] and AIFC. - GLORIOUS further alleged that it was coerced by Mr. Roberto Ongpin to withdraw its petition and to enter into joint venture agreements paving the way for the creation of DSA and petitioner AIFC which were allowed to service GLORIOUS' export quotas and to use its plant facilities, machineries and equipment. - GTEB denied the petition of GLORIOUS. An appeal was then taken to the Office of the President. - At this point, AIFC sought to intervene in the proceedings and filed its opposition to GLORIOUS' appeal claiming that the GTEB decision has long become final, and that a favorable action on the appeal would result in the forfeiture of the export quotas which were legally allocated to it. - The Office of the President ruled in favor of GLORIOUS, finding the proceedings before the GTEB in 1984 irregular, and remanded the case to GTEB for further proceedings. - The MR of AIFC was subsequently denied. Issues: 1. WON the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION and

2. WON the final judgment constitutes res judicata on the ground that the final judgment in was a judgment on the merits. Held: 1. NO. In finding that GTEB proceedings were irregular, the OP didn’t commit GAD as GTEB indeed violated the right to due process of Glorious. GTEB failed to disclose evidence used by it in rendering the resolution against Glorious Sun. The decision penned by Deputy Executive Secretary Magdangal B. Elma and the resolution penned by Acting Deputy Executive Secretary Mariano Sarmiento II are not tainted in the slightest by any grave abuse of discretion. They outline in detail why the private respondent was denied due process when its export quotas were cancelled by GTEB The findings are supported by the records. RATIO: Evidence on record must be fully disclosed to the parties. 2. NO. - The dismissal of the first petition was clearly based on a technical matter rather than on the merits of the petition. Hence, the dismissal of the petition with the factual issues hanging in mid-air cannot, under the circumstances, constitute res judicata. Reasoning: - For a judgment to be a bar to a subsequent case, the following requisites must concur: . . . (1) it must be a final judgment; (2) the court which resolved it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be identity between the two cases, as to the parties, subject matter and cause of action. - The well-entrenched principle is that "a judgment on the merits is one rendered after a determination of which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon preliminary or final or merely technical point." (Deang v. IAC). - The protestation of Glorious Sun of non-disclosure of evidence had been effectively remedied by the subsequent accommodation by the GTEB of its request for copies of the relevant documents. - The petitioner claims that the subsequent disclosure of the documents by GTEB to Glorious Sun in 1987 cured the defect of non-disclosure of evidence in 1984 under the constitutional provision of due process enunciated in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. CIR and other subsequent cases. - The documents used by the GTEB in its 1984 decision and referred to in the 1987 decision as being "intact" relates to what the GTEB labeled as Documents used by GTEB and "Additional Documents" which, as earlier discussed, were either not disclosed to Appellant for being privileged or unmarked as exhibits or not presented in evidence. - At any rate, the conclusions of GTEB as to the excessiveness of Appellant's import prices drew a controverting statement from its own Raw Materials Importation Regulation Division, - Findings of administrative agencies are accorded respect and finality, and generally should not be disturbed by the courts. This general rule, however, is not without exceptions. - As recently reiterated, it is jurisprudentially settled that absent a clear, manifest and grave abuse of discretion amount to want of jurisdiction, the findings of the administrative agency on matters falling within its competence will not be disturbed by the courts. - Specifically with respect to factual findings, they are accorded respect, if not finality, because of the special knowledge and expertise gained by these tribunals from handling the specific matters falling under their jurisdiction. - Such factual findings may be disregarded only if they "are not supported by evidence; where the findings are initiated by fraud, imposition or collussion; where the procedures which lead to the factual findings are irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when grave abuse of discretion arbitrarines or capriciousness is manifest." (Mapa v. Arroyo, 175 SCRA 76 [1989]) - In the case at bar, the petitioner was never given the chance to present its side before its export quota allocations were revoked and its officers suspended. While it is true that such allocations as alleged by the Board are mere privileges which it can revoke and cancel as it may deem fit, these privileges have been accorded to petitioner for so long that they have become impressed with property rights especially since

not only do these privileges determine the continued existence of the petitioner with assets of over P80,000,000.00 but also the livelihood of some 700 workers who are employed by the petitioner and their families . -Finally, American Inter-Fashion is hardly the proper party to question the Malacañang decision. It was incorporated after the incidents in this case happened. It was created obviously to be the recipient of export quotas arbitrarily removed from the rightful owner. It was sequestered precisely because of the allegation that it is a crony corporation which profited from an act of injustice inflicted on another private corporation. Dispositive: MFR is GRANTED. The instant petition is DISMISSED. The question decision and resolution of the Office of the President are hereby AFFIRMED. Separate Opinion FELICIANO-concurring: I concur in the result reached by the Court, that is, that petitioner American Inter-fashion Corporation has failed to show any grave abuse of discretion or act without or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent Office of the President in rendering its decision in OP Case No. 3781 dated 7 September 1989.

PEFIANCO V. MORAL 322 SCRA 439; BELLOSILLO; Jan 19, 2000 NATURE Petition for review of decision of CA FACTS - Sec Pefianco of DECS seeks to nullify CA decision. - Ex-Sec Gloria filed complaint against Moral, Chief Librarian of National Library for dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The complaint charged respondent Moral with the pilferage of some historical documents. - DoJ Special Prosecutor represented Sec Gloria in the administrative case. Moral was represented by her private counsel. Sec Gloria issued resolution finding Moral guilty. She was ordered dismissed. - Moral did not appeal but filed a Petition for Production of DECS Investigation Committee Report. Her petition was twice denied. - Moral instituted an action for mandamus and injunction before regular courts against Sec Gloria praying that she be furnished a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee Report and that the DECS Secretary be enjoined from enforcing the order of dismissal until she received a copy of the said report. - Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus case principally for lack of cause of action, but the trial court denied his motion. Thus, he elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on certiorari. CA sustained TC. - Sec Gloria filed instant petition. Sec Gloria was replaced by Sec Pefianco. ISSUES 1. WON the order of the TC is proper 2. WON Moral is entitled to a copy of the Report HELD 1. NO. - Section 3, Rule 16, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure mandatorily requires that the resolution on a motion to dismiss should clearly and distinctly state the reasons therefor. - The challenged Order of the trial court dated 23 April 1997 falls short of the requirements prescribed in Rule 16. The Order merely discussed the general concept of mandamus and the trial court’s jurisdiction over the rulings and actions of administrative agencies without stating the basis why petitioner’s motion to dismiss was being denied. - Judges should take pains in crafting their orders, stating therein clearly and comprehensively the reasons for their issuance, which are necessary for the full understanding of the action taken. Where the

court itself has not stated any basis for its order, to be very strict in requiring a prior motion for reconsideration before resort to higher courts on certiorari may be had, would be to expect too much. Since the judge himself was not precise and specific in his order, a certain degree of liberality in exacting from petitioner strict compliance with the rules was justified. 2. NO. - Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its main objective. It does not lie to require anyone to fulfill a discretionary duty. It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that petitioner should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. - In her petition for mandamus, respondent miserably failed to demonstrate that she has a clear legal right to the DECS Investigation Committee Report and that it is the ministerial duty of petitioner DECS Secretary to furnish her with a copy thereof. - Primarily, respondent did not appeal to the Civil Service Commission the DECS resolution dismissing her from the service. By her failure to do so, nothing prevented the DECS resolution from becoming final. - Moreover, there is no law or rule which imposes a legal duty on petitioner to furnish respondent with a copy of the investigation report. On the contrary, it was held in Ruiz v. Drilon that a respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled only to the administrative decision based on substantial evidence made of record, and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented against her during the hearings of the investigation committee. Respondent no doubt had been accorded these rights. - More importantly, the DECS resolution is complete in itself for purposes of appeal to the Civil Service Commission, that is, it contains sufficient findings of fact and conclusion of law upon which respondent’s removal from office was grounded. Disposition Petition is granted.

NAPOLCOM V POLICE CHIEF INSPECTOR LEONARDO BERNABE G.R. No. 129914; PARDO; May 12, 2000 NATURE Appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS - A newspaper published an article saying that Bernabe headed a syndicate encashing treasury warrants of PC soldiers, policemen, firemen and jail personnel who were already dead, on awol, suspended and separated from the service. - President Ramos instructed the DILG Secretary to conduct an investigation and prosecute respondent if necessary. The Secretary referred the directive to the PNP Director General, who ordered the Criminal Investigation Service Command to investigate the charges. - Respondent was informed of the article and S/Supt. Romeo Acop ordered him to explain through affidavit. - Respondent submitted his affidavit alleging that all the cases against him were either dismissed by the Ombudsman or pending resolution, except one which was pending before the Sandiganbayan involving the encashment of 7 treasury warrants. CICS Director Angel Quizon submitted to the Chief, PNP, a memorandum confirming respondent’s allegations. - By command of the Police Deputy Director General, respondent was suspended from the police service for 90 days. Subsequently, he was given notice of complaint/charge and order to answer within 5 days from receipt of the complaint. - Respondent filed a motion for bill of particulars. - The CICS submitted a manifestation asserting that the technical procedures obtained in the regular courts are strictly applicable to administrative proceedings; hence, the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to enable respondent to file an intelligent answer.

- The Summary Dismissal Hearing Officer issued a resolution recommending for respondent's dismissal from the PNP service. The PNP Inspector General concurred with the recommendation of the Summary Dismissal Officer. - The Chief PNP ordered the dismissal of respondent from the police service because of heading a payroll syndicate, unexplained assets or wealth, and falsification of public documents (falsified his transcript of records with PUP) - Respondent appealed to the NAPOLCOM National Appellate Board, which sustained the summary dismissal of respondent from the PNP. - Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review challenging his dismissal from the police service on the ground of lack of due process and the unconstitutionality of Section 42, R. A. 6975. - After due proceedings, the CA promulgated its decision upholding the constitutionality of Section 42, R. A. 6975, but setting aside the decision of the National Appellate Board for failure to comply with the due process requirement of the Constitution. ISSUE WON the CA erred in setting aside the decision of the National Appellate Board, National Police Commission, on the ground that respondent was denied due process in the conduct of the investigation of the charges filed against him HELD YES, the requirements of due process were sufficiently complied with. Ratio Due process as a constitutional precept does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Reasoning - Record shows that respondent was given notice of the complaints/charges against him and an opportunity to answer. He submitted an affidavit answering point by point the charges against him. He even appealed from the decision of the Chief, PNP dismissing him from the police service to the National Appellate Board, and submitted a memorandum. Consequently, he was given more than adequate opportunity to explain his side. Hence, there was no violation of his right to procedural and substantive due process. Disposition Petition GRANTED.