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Dvoretsky
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Yusupov . Secrets of Creative Thinking
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Volume 26 of the ongoing series
Editorial board GM Victor Korchnoi GM Helmut Pfleger GM Nigel Short GM Rudolf Teschner
2009 EDITION OlMS
m
Mark Dvoretsky and Artur Yusupov
Secrets of Creative Thinking School of Future Champions 5 Edited and translated by Ken Neat
2009 EDITION OlMS
m
4
Books by the same authors:
Mark Dvore1sky. Artur Vusupov. School of Future Champions Vol. 1: Secrets of Chess Training
ISBN 978-3-283-00515-3
Available
Vol. 2: Secrets of Opening Preparation
ISBN 978-3-283-00516-0
Available
Val. 3: Secrets of Endgame Technique
ISBN 978-3-283-00517-7
Available
Vol. 4: Secrets of Positional Ploy
ISBN 978-3-283-00518-4
Available
Vol. 5: Secrets of Creative Thinking
ISBN 978-3-283-00519-1
Available
ISBN 978-3-283-00416-3
Available
Mark Dvore1sky. School of Chess Excellence Vol. 1: Endgame Analysis Vol. 2: Tactical Ploy
ISBN 978-3-283-00417-0
Available
Vol. 3: Strategic Play
ISBN 978-3-283-00418-7
Available
Vol. 4: Opening Developments
ISBN 978-3-283-00419-4
Available
Bibliographic information published by Die Deutsche Bibliothek Die Deutsche Bibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data is available in the internet at http://dnb.ddb.de.
© 2009 Edition Olms AG Willikonerstr. 10 . CH-8618 Oe1wil a. S./Zurich E-mail:
[email protected] Internet: www.edition-olms.com All rights reserved. This book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not. by way of trade or otherwise, be lent. re-sold, hired out or otherwise circulated in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser. Printed in Germany Editor and translator: Ken Neat Typeset: Arno Nickel . Edition Marco, D-10551 Berlin Printed by: Druckerei Friedr. Schmucker GmbH, D-49624 Loningen Cover: Eva Konig, D-22769 Hamburg
ISBN 978-3-283-00519-3
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5
Co nte n ts Preface (Mark Dvoretsky) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 PART I
THE CALCU LATION OF VARIATIONS
The Tech nique of searching for and taking Decisions (Mark Dvoretsky) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Wandering through the Labyrinth (Mikhail Krasenkow) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Visual I magi nation and the Calculation of Variations (Beniamin Blumenfeld) PART II
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
35
INTUITIVE DECISIONS
The Development of Chess I ntuition (Mark Dvoretsky) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 I n Jazz Style (Sergey Dolmatov) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 PART III
PRACTICAL EXP E DIENCY IN THE TAKIN G OF DECISIONS
Practical Chances in a Chess Game (Beniamin Blumenfeld) Does it pay to sharpen the Play? (Vladimir Vulfson)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
78
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85
Thoug hts about a Book (Mark Dvoretsky) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 PART IV
ATTACK
Missed Brilliancy Prizes (Artur Yusupov)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
115
Long-d istance Dispute (Mark Dvoretsky) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 33 Attacks with opposite-sided Castl ing (Mark Dvoretsky) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 38 PART V
DEFENCE
Practical Exercises in the Taking of d ifficult Decisions (Igor Belov) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 53 Virtuoso Defence (Mark Dvoretsky) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 65 What l ies behind a Mistake (Mark Dvoretsky) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 77 PART VI Analysis of a Game (Mark Dvoretsky) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 82 Creative Ach ievements of Pupils from the School (Artur Yusupov) I ndex of Players and Analysts I ndex of Openings
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1 91
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204
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6
Mark Dvoretsky
P reface Vou now have in your hands the con I clud ing, fifth book in the series School of Future Champions, based on material from the Dvoretsky-Yusu pov school for talented young chess players. Our small school fu nctioned for only th ree years ( 1 990-1 992 ). Between ten and fifteen youngsters attended the sessions. Nearly all of them began studying with us at the age of 1 2 -1 5. I can mention with pride that five years later eight of our pupils became grandmasters - some of them very strong and world-renowned . Here are their names: Alexey Alexandrov, Vasily Emel i n , I n na Gaponenko, l Iakha Kadymova , Sergey Mov sesian , Ella Pitem, Peter Svidler and Vadim Zviagintsev. I am sure that in the near futu re Vladimir Baklan and Peter Kiriakov will also become grandmasters. ( They have! Trans lator. ) Hardly any other junior chess school can boast of such a high 'pass rate'. -
I n listing the ach ievements of the school, I nevertheless clearly real ise that the pupils' successes have been forged mainly by the players themselves and their permanent trainers. For example, did we have time to teach much to the futu re three-times Rus sian champion Peter Svidler during those th ree ten-day sessions of the school (the 2nd, 4th and 6th ) in which he participated? Of cou rse, the main components of Svidler's successes are his enormous talent and the aid of his splendid trainer Andrey Luki n . Yusu pov a n d I saw o u r role as being t o give an impetus to the fu rther development of the young players. To help them to understand themselves, their virtues and deficiencies, and to outl ine plans for the futu re. To discuss the problems they encou nter in
chess and the ways to overcome the m . To demonstrate the main d i rections and meth ods of chess improvement. And that is a l l . Not s o m u c h , b u t also n o t s o l ittle. The pupils' results confirm that this was the correct approach and that on the whole we solved our objective successfu lly. I nciden tally, it was at a session of the school that I advised Peter Svidler to seek Lukin's help. Our books reflect the same approach . We have not tried to write textbooks, with a full and exact coverage of a particu lar topic. The aim was to provide readers with high qual ity material and a va riety of ideas for i ndependent th inking and independent work in the g iven directio n . Moreover, not only our own ideas, but also the ideas of other experts (in particular, trainers working to gether with us at the school). Clearly, such a way of presenting the material demands of the readers a creative (and at times critical) attitude to the text being stud ied and is not su itable for those who like ready-made prescriptions. To judge by the popularity of our books, such an approach su its very many players. Not all the problems discussed in this book are purely chess problems - they lie some where between chess and psychology. Th inking at the board and the ways of taking decisions i n a variety of situations - this, in brief, is its main content. Many of the examples offered are very complicated and not straig htforward , and demand a deep penetration into the position, ingenu ity, and bold, risky actions. Therefore, compared with the preced ing vol umes, the present book is less instructional and more problem atic and creative.
Preface
The arrangement of the lectu res and arti cles in the d ifferent parts of the book is to some extent arbitrary, si nce their topics are closely interconnected . For example, the discussion of the accu rate and deep calcu lation of variations i n the fi rst part of the book is merely a prelude, and it will be continued right to the end of the book. The calculation of variations is not every th ing - during the course of a game a player is obl iged not only to calculate , but also to guess. The problem of developing intuition has hardly been discussed seriously in chess literatu re . I am not a professional psychologist and do not claim to have written anyth ing scientific, but I hope that my practical ideas and recommendations on this will prove useful to the readers. Many players make the serious mistake of devoting all their free time excl usively to the study of opening theory. After all, errors made in the later stages of play have as much influence on results as poor i n itial organ isation of the game. Specific playing deficiencies which , given desire and persist ence can and should be elimi nated , are typical of players of any standard . I n order to emphasise this idea , the book critically analyses the play not only of young masters and candidate masters, but also of such top-class g rand masters as Artur Yusupov (he does this h imself in the chapter 'M issed brilliancy prizes' ) and Garry Kasparov. Opening theory develops very rapidly and therefore opening books are sometimes out of-date even before they are published ,
lLl
7
whereas successful observations and con clusions relating to chess playing in general retain their value for many years. The reader will be able to see this for himself by reading two articles by the Soviet master Beniamin Blumenfeld, a subtle analyst of chess psy chology, wh ich were written several decades ago. Don't be put off by his writing style, which is somewhat archaic by present-day standards - it is the author's thoug hts that are most important, and they are still modern . One of my earlier books School of Chess Excellence 2 - Tactical Play was devoted to problems of attack and defence. But these topics are inexhaustible and I hope that the fresh material analysed here in appropriate chapters will be useful to you . I n the traditional concluding chapter Yusupov analyses some games by pupils from the schoo l . In previous books he mainly fo cused on instructive mistakes, but this time the g randmaster decided to demonstrate some creative achievements by the j u n iors. The book concludes with a brill iant game by Vadim Zviagintsev, which the experts judged to be the best of all those publ ished in Informator No.62. It is extremely ra re for young players to have such an honour conferred on them , since the opin ions of the jury members are strongly influenced by names and titles. I wish our readers the same competitive and creative successes as those ach ieved by our best pupils. I hope that you will be hel ped by the ideas derived from the books in the series School of Future Champions.
8
PART I The Ca l c u l ati o n of Va ri ations Mark Dvoretsky
T he Tec h n ique of search i n g for a n d tak i n g Decisions
W chess? We look for promising possi
hat d o we d o throughout a game of
bil ities, compare them, calcu late variations, endeavour to neutral ise the opponent's counterplay, and so on. All this is a creative process - here there are no ready-made prescriptions. And yet there are rules and ways of thinking which somehow help us to organ ise this process and i ncrease its reliabil ity, avoid simple mistakes, save think ing time - in short, improve the qual ity of the decisions we take . Qu ite a lot has been written on this topic. For example, in his book Think Like a Grandmaster Alexander Kotov shared his ideas on the tech nique of calculating varia tions. I would also draw you r attention to an interesting article by M i khail Krasen kow included in the present book, and also the far-from-obsolete articles by the Soviet master Beniamin Blumenfeld, a subtle re searcher into the psychology of chess th inking . The problem of contemplating a move has always interested me. Many of my articles are devoted to it, and also many chapters in earlier books . I have made a detailed study of certain methods of taking decisions (for
example, the question of 'prophylactic think ing'), and have covered others only in very general terms. I am unable to formulate an accu rate scheme for optimal thinking at the board (I am sure that in principle it does not exist), but I will give you certain pieces of advice which , I hope, will come in useful in futu re competitions. You should fi rst try to solve the exa mples yourself - this will be qu ite good practical training and at the same time you will gain a better feeling for the benefit of using the recom mended tech nique for taking deci sions. The ideas which we will examine can be arbitrarily d ivided into two parts: 1 ) Methods of search ing for a move and the calculation of variations; 2) Ways of saving time and effort, and rational thinking . The technique of searching for a move and the calculation of variations 1. Candidate moves. G rand master Kotov was probably the fi rst to single out this way of calculating variations. He recommended that you should immediately decide on all
ctJ
The Technique of searching for and taking Decisions
the possible candidate moves, do this not only on the first, but also the sub sequent moves, and not only for your self, but also for the opponent. If you read
the afore-mentioned article by Krasenkow, you will see that this rule (and , however, this also applies to su bsequent ru les) is by no means always appl icable . Nevertheless, for many situations this is very good advice. Why is it so important to use the 'candidate moves' ru le? Firstly, it helps you to organise rationally the analysis of varia tions, to accurately pick out those con tinuations which should be calculated. Alexa nder - E uwe
Notti ngham 1 936
34 "e4? ':'xb4 with the threat of 35 . . ... b 1 + , or 3 4 "a7? ':xb4 3 5 ':xg7 ll b 1 + 3 6 c;t>g2 fld5+, but 34 'tli'c6 ! is perfectly possible (34 . . . .l:l xb4 35 l:[xg7 ! , 34 .. :iIi' b 1 + 35 c;t>g2 "xb4 36 "xf6 ! , or 34 . . . d3 35 c;t> g2!? d2 36 l:tcd7). I do not think it is so necessary to calculate all these variations accu rately - it is suffi cient merely to realise that the opponent retains possibil ities of a defence. The point is that Black has one more resou rce available: simply to advance his passed d pawn , al lowing l:! xg7, and defend the h7point with the q ueen from b 1 . This is the most forcing and therefore the most tempt ing path - clearly it is the one that should be considered fi rst of a l l . It is important to verify whether or not the opponent has a per petual check. If not, then this is what should be played , since here Black gains an overwhelming material advantage . And if it does not prove possible to avoid perpetual check, then he can retu rn to a more thorough study of the other conti nuations. 33 . . .
Black is two pawns up, but the enemy pieces are very active. The g7-pawn is attacked . If he defends it by 33 . . . 'ii' b 1 + 34 c;t>g2 'ifg6, then after 35 ];tcd7 d3 36 'ifd5 (36 'ii'x a6 !?) Wh ite regains the d-pawn and soon succeeds in transposing into a drawn ending with three pawns agai nst two on one wing . 33 .. :if d5 34 'ili'xd5 1:[xd5 35 l:[ed7 has roughly similar conseq uences. The attempt to play for an attack with 33 . . . .l:.d5 (hoping for 34 ':xg7?l:!xg7 35 l:!xg7 'ifb 1 + 36 c;t>g2 ':h5) is refuted by 34 %:tc8 ! . Finally, after 33 . . Jlb8 it is unfavourable for Wh ite to reply
9
d3!
It is important to choose the accu rate move order. In the event of 33 . . . 'ii' b 1 +? 34 �g2 d3 Wh ite acq u i res an additional possi bil ity: 35 1:[cd7! d2 36 J:ixd8 (or even 36 lixg7!? ':xd7 37 l:txg8+ c;t>xg8 38 'ifc8+) 36 . . . l:txd8 37 'ifd7 ! , lead ing to a draw. But now 34 ':'cd7 is pointless, since after 34 . . . d2 the pawn queens with check. 34':xg7
1:txg7
35':xg7
'ili'b1 +
The next move will be 36 . . . d2. It is here that one must concentrate on determining the candidate moves . Wh ite has two ways of conti nuing his attack: 37 :g4 (th reatening mate on g7) and 37 'iff? (with the idea of 38 ':g8+ or 38 lixh7+). I n addition , his king can move to either g2 or h2. Four branches are obtained , and each of them must be calculated before 33 . . . d3 is played . We will beg in with the queen move to fl.
10
�
The Tech n ique of searching for and taking Decisions
a) 36 �h2 d2 37 'iff7 'iff5 ! . Now 38 l:txh7+ is not possible, since the rook is captu red with check, while 38 l:tg4 is met by 38 . . . 'ii'xf2+ 39 �h3 'iff1 + 40 �h2 'ifh 1 + ! (or 40 . . . 'ii'e 2+ 4 1 � h 3 'ifxg4+ ! ) . b) 3 6 � g 2 d2 37 'iff7 . Now 3 7 . . . 'iff5? is bad : 38 l:[xh7+! 'ifxh7 39 'ifxf6+ 'ifg7 40 'ifxd8+ and 41 'ifxd2 with two extra pawns for Wh ite , while 37 . . . d 1 'if? 38 :g8+! ':'xg8 39 'ifxf6+ leads to perpetual check. Black wins by interposing the check 37 . . . 'ii'e 4+ ! . I n the event of 38 �h2 'iff5 we transpose into the previous variation . If 38 f3 the simplest is 38 . . . 'ifxf3+! 39 �xf3 d 1 'if+ with a rapid mate, although it is also possible to play 38 . . . 'ii'e 2+ 39 �h3 'ili'f1 + 40 �h2 'ii' h 1 + ! 4 1 �xh 1 d 1 'ii' + 4 2 �h2 l:td2+ (or 4 2 . . . 'ilfd2+ 43 �g 1 'ife3+ 44 �g2 l:.d2+ 45 �h3 'ifh6+) 43 �h3 'ifh 1 + 44 �g4 h5+! 45 �f4 .:td4+ 46 �e3 'ii'g 1 + . Now let us examine the rook move to g4. c) 36 �g2 d2 37 :g4 'ii' h 1 + ! 38 �xh 1 d 1 'ii' + and 39 . . . 'ilfxg4. d ) 36 �h2 d2 37 ':'g4
39 'iff7 d 1 'if 40 'ii'xf6+ �h7 4 1 'ii'e 7+ (after 41 'iff7+ �h6 42 'ii'f4+ �g7 43 'ilfe5+ Black has both 43 . . . �h7 44 'ili'e7+ �h6 - cf. below, and 43 . . . �f7 44 'ikf4+ �g8 45 'ii' c4+ 'ifd5) 4 1 . . . �h6 42 'ii' h 4+ (42 'ilfe3+ �h5! 43 'ife5+ g5, and the checks come to an end , or 43 'ife7 'ifd4! ) 42 . . . 'ifh5, and the rook cannot be taken because the queen is pinned. Now it is clear that after 36 �g2 d2 37 .1:.g4 the reply 37 . . . 'ili'g6? is insufficient for a win - only 37 . . .'tIi' h 1 + ! is correct. It remains to add that in the game after 36 �h2 d2 Wh ite resig ned . Thus by determining the candidate moves beforehand we ensure that our calcu lation of variations is accu rate and rel iable. But the 'search function ' of this proced ure is even more important. It enables a typical mistake to be avoided , one wh ich is repeat edly made by nearly all players - delving immed iately into the calculation of those conti nuations which first come to mind. I n this case some strong possibil ities may be missed , resulting in a mass of time and effort being spent in vai n . By concentrat ing on a search for all the available candidate moves, we sometimes find resources, the existence of which we initially did not even suspect.
Najdorf
-
Kotov
Mar del Plata 1 957
The h 1 -sq uare is controlled by the wh ite queen, and Black fails to win with 37 . . . 'ifg 1 +? 38 � h 3 ! 'iff1 + 39 � h4 . The only possibil ity is 37 . . . 'ifg6! 38 l:[xg6 hxg6. Let us verify whether White can g ive perpetual check with his lone queen .
The Tech n ique of searching for and ta king Decisions
It is immed iately apparent that the h7-pawn can be captured with check: 21 �xf6 �xf6 22 'ii'x h7+ 'itf8 . Here there is noth ing to calculate - it is a matter of assessing the resulting position . It is not possible to give mate (the bishop on f6 securely defends the kingside), and Black retains some positional compensation for the lost pawn in view of his control of the c-file and the weakness of the d4-pawn . Another, more tempting continuation , is 2 1 ttJ g4 . We easily find the variation 2 1 . . . �xb3? 22 ttJ xf6+ �xf6 23 'iVxh7+ 'itf8 24 'iWh8+! �e7 25 'iVxg7 and wins. If 21 . . . h6?! there follows 22 ttJ xh6+, and the captu re of the knight leads to mate (22 . . . 'itf8 ! is more tenacious, although after 23 �xd5 'iVxd 5 24 ttJ g4 ttJ g8 25 ttJ e5 Black's position is difficult). But we will not jump to conclusions candidate moves should be sought not only for ourself, but also the opponent, and this mea ns we must check whether we have taken all the defensive resou rces into account. We find the only defence: 2 1 . . . 'itf8! . The h7-pawn can b e captu red in various ways , but noth ing is completely clear. For example, in the variation 22 ttJ xf6 ..ixf6 23 ..ixf6 'ii'xf6 24 'iVxf6 gxf6 25 ..ixd5 exd5 26 .l:[xh7 'itg8 the activity of the black rooks on the open c- and e-files is a concern . Of course, no one has given us a guarantee that we can achieve more than the win of a pawn . The knight move to g4 looks very strong, especially if we notice the possibil ity after 21 . . . 'itf8 of conti nuing the attack by 22 i. h6!? (however, it is sti ll an open question whether it is possible to checkmate the opponent in the variation 22 . . . ttJ xg4 23 ..ixg7+ 'itxg7 24 'iWxh7+ 'itf6 25 'ili'h4+ 'itf5). Nevertheless, after a slight delay (perfectly excusable - the moves 21 ..ixf6 and especially 21 ttJ g4 are really too tempting) let us remember about the 'candidate moves' principle and look for new possibili ties for Wh ite .
11
It turns out that he has two more ways of conducting the attack: a ) 21 � d 1 (with the idea of 22 ..i h5); b) 21 ..i c2 (with the threat of 22 ..ixh7+ and the key variation 2 1 . . . l:txc2 22 ..ixf6 ..ixf6 23 'iWxh7+ and 24 'iVxc2). The second way is more forcing, and is the one which must be checked in the fi rst instance . 2 1..ic2 ! !
:xc2
21 . . . g6 22 ..i xf6 and 2 1 . . . h6 22 ..ixh6 are both bad for Black, while if 2 1 . . . 'itf8 , then either 22 ..i h6! or 22 ..ixh7 ttJ xh7 23 'ii' h 5! is decisive. 22 ..ixf&
h&
2 3 'iWh 5 !
..ixf&
23 . . . :f8 2 4 ..i xg7 . 24 'ili'x f7+
'it'h7
24 . . . 'it h8 25 11xh6+ ! gxh6 26 ttJ g6 mate . 25 .l:r.xh &+!
�xh &
2 & 'iii' g & mate
The winning combi nation (pointed out by Igor Zaitsev) immediately resolves the ques tion about the strongest conti nuation of the attack, and none of the remaining conti nua tions needs to be analysed . You see that it is important not only to determine the complete list of candidate moves, but also to establish the optimum order in which they are considered.
It would have been much simpler to fi nd the combi nation if there had been an obvious lack of promising possibilities for Wh ite . But in the g iven instance there were such possi bil ities, and they immed iately drew our attention . In such conditions, even if you are an excellent tactician, it is easy to miss the move 21 ..ic2 ! ! . A well-developed search technique ('candidate moves') significantly improves our chances of success. But no technique will save a player if he does not possess sharp combinative vision. This quality must be trained and
12
�
The Tech nique of searching for and ta king Decisions
developed, by regularly solving appro priate exercises.
I n the game Miguel Najdorf played the weaker 2 1 i.d 1?1. The opponent could have parried Wh ite's threat by playing his king to a safer square: 21 . . . �f8 ! (22 i.h5 ttJ e4! ) , or by defending the weak f7 -point beforehand with 21 .. J:tc 7! (22 i.h5?! ttJ xh5 23 'iYxh5? i.xg5). But Kotov carelessly repl ied 2 1... iia5 ?, and after 22 i.h 5 ! The attack became irresistible. There followed 22 . . . l:.ed 8 (22 . . . ttJ xh5 23 'it'xh5; 22 . . . l:.f8 23 i.xf6 i.xf6 24 i.xf7+ l:txf7 25 iixh7+) 23 i.x f7+ �f8 24 i.h6 ! ttJe 8 25 iif4 i.f6 26 i.xg7 + �e7 27 i.xe 8 i.xg7 28 lIxh7 Black
resig ned . Dvorets ky - Butnoryus
Dubna 1 970
Fortunately for me, my opponent made his move without checki ng the variations. 16 . . .
ttJe4 ?
It is clear that the exchange h a s to be sacrificed ( 1 7 ttJ 4f3? ttJ xd2 1 8 ttJ xd2 dxc4 is completely bad), but in what way? If a list of all the candidate possibilities is established , it is not at all difficu lt to find the strongest of them : a ) 1 7 l:.xe4 dxe4 1 8 ttJ xe4; b) 1 7 ttJ xe4 i.xe 1 1 8 'iVxe 1 dxe4 1 9 iixe4; c) 1 7 ttJ xe4 i.xe 1 1 9 cxd5. I n the fi rst two cases one can speak only about some compensation for the lost exchange, but in the third case a double edged position arises and it is not clear to which side preference should be give n . A s you see, sometimes w e look n o t for candidate moves, but for candidate pos sibilities - short variations, the first moves of which may coincide. 17 ttJxe4!
i.xe 1
1 8 cxd5!
The wh ite pieces dominate in the centre, and in add ition the d5-pawn prevents the normal development of the knight at b8. 18 . . .
i.b4
1 8 . . . i.a5!?
I had played the opening stage badly and now Black could have gained an excellent position with the simple 1 6 . . . dxc4 ! 1 7 bxc4 ttJ c6, forcing 1 8 ttJ 4b3 or 1 8 ttJ 4f3 ( 1 8 ttJ xc6? i s bad : 1 8 . . . bxc6 1 9 l:.e2 'iVd3 with the th reats of 20 . . . 'it'xh3 and 20 .. .l:I d8). However, this is not yet a win, but 'merely' an excellent position . Black can try for more by playing his knight to e4 , but then he is beh ind in development, and therefore the consequences must be carefully calculated .
19 ttJf3 !
l:.e 8
2 0 iid4
i.f8
What does Black want now? Of course, to bring out his knight to d 7 . Can this be prevented? 2 1 ttJe5 !
iib6?!
2 1 . . . ttJ d7? 22 ttJ xd7 iixd7 23 ttJ f6+! would have lost immed iately. 21 .. .f5 came into consideration, but after 22 ttJ g3 'iVf6 23 f4 Wh ite would have retained the advantage . 22 'iVd3
There is noth ing that Black can move . If 22 . . . ttJ a6, then 23 ttJ d7 and 24 ttJ f6+ is decisive .
ttJ
The Tech n ique of searching for and ta king Decisions
It should be said that, despite the obvious virtues of my position, my mood was far from optimistic. At the tournament of young masters in Dubna I was playing terribly badly, making constant oversig hts, which were explained mainly by a lack of self control and a q u ite u njustified haste i n the taking of decisions. In the previous game with one hasty move I had thrown away a practically winning position , and in the present game I had messed u p the opening. It was pure l uck that my opponent had so cheaply conceded the in itiative . 'Yes' , I thought, ' I stand wel l , of cou rse, but I'll probably have a 'fit' and make some blunder. Alright, whatever he plays, on my reply I will spend at least five m i n utes ! I have an enormous reserve of time, and I should make use of it. ' After a long think Alg is Butnoryus played : 22 . . .
f6
13
twenty-five m i n utes , I worked out a winning combination . I ncidentally, i t was only one of two possible combi nations. The other, perhaps even more spectacular one: 23 ttJc4! "dS 24 ttJxf6+ gxf6 25 Wxg6+ ..t.g7 26 ..t.xf6 'ifxf6 27 .xeS+ 'iifS 2S l:te 1 with four pawns for the piece , in fact remai ned unnoticed . So that the candidate moves were neverthe less not determined as well as possible. 23 d6!
l:txe5?
If 23 . . .fxe5 I was intending 24 ttJf6+! (no win is apparent after 24 ttJg5 ttJd7) 24 . . . gxf6 (24 . A�f7? 25 ttJxeS �xeS 26 Wxg6+ �dS 27 .g5+ ! ) 25 .xg6+ �hS 26 WxeS Wxd6 27 l:tc1 We7 2S WcS . Black is tied hand and foot, but it is not easy for Wh ite to make progress. After 2S . . . �gS (defending against g4-g5) he does not have 29 ':c7? because of 29 . . . ttJa6. Even so, objectively Black's position remains d ifficult, as is shown by the fol lowing variation : 29 l:td 1 a5 (what else?) 30 ..t.c1 ! (of course, not 30 ':dS? ttJc6 ! ) 3 0 . . .•c 5 (the th reat was 3 1 ..t. h6 a n d 32 ..t.xfS ; if 30 . . . �f7 Wh ite has both 31 ..t.a3!? ttJc6! 32 .xaS .xa3 33 'iix b7+ ttJe7 34 .e4 with advantage, and also the unhurried 31 ..t.e3 ! ) 31 We6+ �g7 32 ..t. h6+! �xh6 33 'iixf6+ �h7 34 .f7+ ..t.g7 (34 . . . �hS 35 :dS ; 34 . . . �h6 35 h4) 35 .f5+ �gS 36 UdS+ ..t.fS 37 "g6+ �hS 3S 'ili'f7 . 24..t.xe5
fxe5
25 'ili'c4 +
�h7
2 6 .c 8
.d4
26 . . . ..t.xd6 27 ttJg5+ with mate . I even felt u pset. ' It's all clear: I take on g6, he develops his knight on d7, and then I can have a think. But now, why do I need to spend these five m i n utes?' But there was noth ing to be done: I 'd g iven my word . In order not to be bored, I began analysing other possibil ities apart from 23 ttJxg6 (there you are - candidate moves! ) . And as a result, after th inking not for five but for
27 ttJg 5 +
I n h i s joy Wh ite also conceives a rook sacrifice. And although this leads to a forced mate , in principle such a 'combi nation for the sake of a combination' (an expression of grandmaster Vladimir Pavlovich Simag i n ) hardly meets with approva l . After all, the elementary 27 l:.e1 (with the th reats of .xfS and 'ili'xb7) would have forced Black to
14
�
The Technique of searching for and taking Decisions
resig n . The best way to the goal is always
A. Wotawa
the simplest way!
1 938
27 . . .
�h6
2 8lDf7+
�h7
2 9 Wxf8
'it'xa 1+
3 0 �g2
lDc6
3 1 Wxa 8
g5
32 lDxg5 +
�g6
33 We 8+1
Black resigned . 2 . What might I not have seen? Some times during the calculati ng process a search again has to be made for candidate moves (someti mes we simply forget to determine them at the right time, and also there is not always confidence that the l ist of possibil ities found is exhaustive). If the variations are not working out in your favour, it makes sense to go back and ask yourself: 'What else can there be in the position ; what idea might I not have noticed?' A similar additional check, but this time search ing for resou rces for the opponent, is worth carry ing out if the prospects, by contrast, seem too rosy. Try as often as possible to cast off the burden of variations calculated earlier and look at the position with new eyes . Such a method often gives excel lent results .
There is another aspect to this rule. Don 't be in a hurry to go too deeply into your calculations . If problems arise, demand ing a deep verification, don 't be in a hurry to start this . First ask yourself how essential it is, and whether it is possible to improve your earlier play or that of the opponent. New ideas at the start of a variation are far more important than subtleties at the end, which have far less of an influence on the play.
I once invited Artur Yusupov to try and solve the fol lowing study.
Yusupov thought for a long time, unsuc cessfully trying to fi nd a saving line for Wh ite in the labyrinths of the d ifficult rook end game. 'Stop calculating!' I said to h i m finally. ' Look at the position and think what you might not have seen here . ' Artur i m med iately found the solutio n . 1 e4 11
fxe4
2 �g7
lIh5
3 �g6
:e5
4 �f6
lle 8
5 � f7
The king makes a perpetual attack on the rook. 3 . Should you check your calculations? Another of Kotov's principles - that you should go through each of the branches of the 'calculation tree' only once - is dubious, in my view. This is possible only for the purely tech n ical checking of variations, but we are not only calculating them, but also at the same time looki ng for the strongest moves. They do not always come to mind immed iately, and sometimes this is i n principle not possible, without a prel iminary
ctJ
The Technique of search ing for and ta king Decisions
analysis of the positio n . Suppose that the variations do not work because of some deta i l , and here it dawns on us that an apparently poi ntless i ntermediate move can be included , adding this deta i l .
15
We will fi nd the solution if we think about 3 l:[xc6 (instead of 3 �b8) i n the last variation. U nfortu nately, it does not work, but the idea ca n be improved. 1l::td 5 +! !
f5
We already know that this is the only move . F.
B o n dare n k o AI. K u zn etsov ,
1 977
2 l::td 1!
..txa4
Here too , as we established in our prelimi nary calculation , Black has no choice - if the a4-pawn is left alive, Wh ite easily wins the bishop endgame. 3 l::tc 1
..tc6 +
4 .:txc6!
h 1'it'
5 ..tf7+
�g5
6 f4+1
gxf3
7 l::tg 6 +
�h5
8l::tg 8+
�h6
9 l:th 8+
Thus it is not often that one consistently has to calculate one variation after another right to the end. I recommend another order of action. A fter deciding on the range of How to stop the enemy pawn? I n the event of 1 ..td5 ..txd7 2 a5 Black has time to play his bishop to f3 : 2 . . . ..tb5 3 �b7 ..te2 4 a6 i.f3 5 ..txf3 gxf3 6 a7 h 1 'it' with the advantage. I nterposing the check 1 l::t d 5+ (with the idea of 1 . . . �g6? 2 l::t d 6+ and 3 i.d5) will be met by 1 . . .f5! 2 l:bf5+ �g6. For example: 3 lIh5 �xh5 4 ..td5 ..txa4 fol lowed by the bishop manoeuvre to f3 , or 3 i.d5 �xf5 4 a5 �e5 5 ..tb7 ..tf7 6 a6 ..td5, and Black wins. There only remains 1 lid 1 , but then 1 ... ..txa4! 2 I1c1 ..tc6+ 3 �b8 h 1 'it' with a drawn bishop ending. This is apparently the best available to Wh ite , but only apparently. Let's not be in a hurry to agree a d raw, but try to devise someth ing. Here, of course, we have to use our imagination, but our accurately per formed preparatory calculating work will also be used .
candidate moves, first make a rapid appraisal - check them supe rficial/y. The preliminary conclusions will almost cer tainly come in useful in the subsequent calculation . Possibly you will be able to assess how promising this or that con tinuation is, and establish a rational order of the subsequent analysis. Per haps (as, for example, i n the Najdorf-Kotov game) one move will prove so strong, that the others will simply not have to be calculated. 4. Reg ister the res ults of your ca lcula tions , and end the variations with a
defi n ite concl usion. Sometimes an abso lutely clear concl usion is needed , such as we made when analysing the move 33 . . . d3! in the Alexander-Euwe game. There the exact result (wi n or draw) had to be establ ished - term inating the calculation half way with the conclusion 'unclear' would
16
�
The Technique of searching for and taking Decisions
have prevented the correct decision from being reached .
or b7. For this he must first defend his knight by . . . b6-b5.
But an exact evaluation is by no means always req uired. For example, you come to the concl usion that a position is reached by force, but it is d ifficult to evaluate additional calculation is required . If it will be necessary, you ca n carry it out later, directly from the critical position , without repeating work that has been done earlier. This is the point of reg istering in your mind the conclu sions on variations that have already been stud ied .
I n this way we find the solution of the position for Wh ite.
5. Prophylactic thinking. Often it is useful to begin considering a position with the question: 'What does the oppo nent want; what would he play if it were him to move ? ' Readers who are familiar with my earl ier books will probably need no convincing about the exceptional value of the abil ity to th ink prophylactically. Even so, I will g ive one more example. Lerner - Lukin USSR 1 977
21 a4! Th reatening, among other things, 22 .tf1 . If 21 ... b5 there follows 22 .tf1 ! (22 axb5 .txb5 23 .tf1 is also not bad ) 22 . . . .tc8 (22 . . . lIc8 loses after 23 liJd4 liJxe5 24 f4 liJxg4 25 l:ixe7) 23 'iif4 a6 24 .txc4 bxc4 25 'iix c4, and Wh ite emerges a pawn up. The question arises , is it not possible to reach the same position by playing 2 1 .tf1 (and if 21 . . . b5, then 22 a4)? Wh ich move order is more accurate? Here we have to concentrate on a search for resources for the opponent. We will probably g ive prefer ence to the pawn move after in reply to 2 1 .tf1 we d iscover the unexpected sortie 21 . . . 'ii a 3!. I n the game Konstantin Lerner did not think about prophylaxis, and simply played 21 lIad 1 ? ! . His opponent replied 2 1 . . . b5! , not fearing 22 lId7 .tc8 ! 23 ':xe7 (23 e6 .txd7 24 exd7 'iix e 1 + 25 liJxe 1 lIxe 1 + 26 .tf1 lId8) 23 . . . .txg4 24 lIxa7 .txf3 25 .txf3 liJxe5 with approximate equality.
6. What is the drawback to the oppo nent's move? If the opponent makes an unexpected move which is uncomfort able for you, ask yourself this question. A logical answer sometimes helps you to understand where to look for a chink in the opponent's idea, and how best to combat it.
Ciocaltea - Liberzon Netanya 1 983 What does Black want? The advance of the f-pawn will only weaken his position . It is far better to include his bishop in the play via c8
(see diagram)
The Technique of search ing for and taking Decisions
17
Threatening 1 9 'iWh5 and 20 lLlg6 mate. 18 . . .
g 6 ?1
1 8 . . . l1f6 is better. Now the a 1 -h8 d iagonal is weakened . How can White exploit this? 19 c4 1
d4
1 9 . . . dxc4? is not possible on account of 20 �xc6. Having forced the opponent to seal the queenside, White has freed his hands for active play on the kingside. His advantage is now undisputed . 2 0 'ilke2 lLlb6 21 b3 %1be 8 22 'iWf2 lLlc 8 23 �f3 :xe1 24 :xe1 :e 8 25 ':'xe 8 'ii'xe 8 26 g4! lLld6 27 gxf5 lLlxf5 (27 . . . gxf5 came into 16 . . .
:a b 8
Let u s apply 'prophylactic th inking' a n d ask ourselves what Black wants. Obviously, to play . . . b7-b5 and press on the b2-pawn. How can th is be prevented? 17 l1c11
Now if 1 7 . . . b5 there follows 1 8 axb5 .l:txb5 1 9 :c2 . Then the bishop will go to c1 , securely defending the pawn , and the rook will switch to the open file, to e2. An excellent idea! Let us now consider for Black what may be a minus featu re of the opponent's plan. With the rook on c2 there is . . . d5-d4 with the th reat of . . . �b3. However, Wh ite replies c3c4; the sealing of the queenside is probably to his advantage. There is another drawback: after :c2 the a4-pawn is vulnerable. How can this factor be exploited? If we refrain from . . . b7-b5, the rook is doing nothing on b8. 1 7 . . . l:tbe8 suggests itself, and if 1 8 :c2 - 1 8 . . . lLld8 ! . And i f Wh ite tries 1 8 � e 3 b 6 1 9 l:lc2?, then our first idea goes into operation: 1 9 . . . d4! (with gain of tempo) and then . . . �b3. 17 . . .
lLlc 8?1
Another way of attacking a4 ( 1 8 :c2 lLlb6), but a less successful one. What is the drawback of Black's move? The knight moves away from the kingside, where it was needed for defence. 18lLlg51
consideration , intend ing 28 'ii'g 2 lLlb4! 29 'ii' h 3 lLlxd3 30 lLlxf5 lLlxf5 3 1 'ii'xf5 'iWg6 32 'ii'g 4 'ii'f6 ) 28 �e4 lLle3 ? (28 . . . lLlce7 was more tenacious) 29 �xc6! bxc6 30 lLle4 lLlg4 ?! 3 1 'ii'g 2 lLlh6 32 'ii'g5 'ii'f8 33 'ii'xc5 'iVxc5 34 lLlxc5 Black resigned . 7. W hat do I wa n t to ach ieve? Also a usefu l question. Clarify your aims: do you want to exchange a couple of pieces, seize an important square, prevent some active possibility of the opponent, or something else? A logical analysis of the position may suggest the direction for further calculation. Kotkov - Dvore tsky
Moscow Championship 1 972
18
�
The Tech nique of searching for and taking Decisions
Black is a sound pawn to the good . It is tempting to beg in active play immediately with 54 .. .1:[a3+. This move is probably good enough to win , but even so it seemed un method ical to me. The black king is stuck on the edge of the board and for the moment is not taking part in the play. Here is a sample (although, of cou rse , not forced) variation , in which this factor tells: 55 c;t>d2 tDxd4? 56 tDxd4 l1d3+ 57 c;t> c2 l:txd4 58 1:Ie1 ! , and it is Wh ite who wins. Black would like first to bring his king closer, so that if necessa ry it ca n su pport the c pawn or stop the enemy e-pawn . Therefore I began checking the exchange of rooks . 54 . . .
l:tb5 !
If 55 :a 1 +, then 55 . . . c;t> b 7 - the king has approached the centre, whereas Black will always have the check along the 3rd rank. The only question is what happens if the opponent exchanges on b5 and then cap tures the d5-pawn with his knight. Try to fi nd the answer. Moreover, this answer should be convincing and comparatively straig ht forward . The initial position is too good for Black, for h i m to afford the slig htest risk.
60 . . .
tDa5 !
6 1 e7
tDc4 +
62 c;t>e2
tDd6
This entire episode is also instructive as regards the tech nique of converti ng an advantage. It is clearly more comfortable playing with the king on b7. Since the opponent does not have the right to ex change rooks, by choosing 54 .. J:tb5 Black makes life easier for hi mself. For the sake of this it is worth exerting yourself and calculat ing a forcing variation , especially if you are able to do this qu ickly and accu rately (the calculation took me about th ree min utes). I think that now the followi ng idea will become clearer: good technique is largely based on concise and accurate tactical play.
It only remains to show how the game concluded . 54 . . . l:tb5 1 55 lIa 1+ c;t>b7 56 c;t>f2 l:tb2 57 c;t>e3 Itb3 + 5 8 c;t>f2 lIb2 59 c;t>e3 l::tb 3 + (the
sealed move).
55 1:ixb5
c;t>xb5
56 tDc3 +
c;t>b4
Another element i n the conversion tech nique - in winning positions you should not force events before the adjournment of the game. However, with the switch ing to time controls without adjournments, natu rally this rule has lost its sign ificance.
57 tDxd5+
c;t>b3
6 0 'ifilf2 h4 61 e 6 c;t>c7 (th is is where the
5 8 e6
I n the event of 58 'itd2 tDxd4 the outcome is obvious . Now 58 . . . tDe7!? is possible, but first it is better to examine a more forcing continuation - the win of the knig ht. 58 . . .
c3
59 tDxc3
c;t>xc3
60 d5
After qu ickly reaching this position in my calcu lations, I experienced a moment of fright, since I couldn't see how to stop the pawns. 'But where should my knight go to?' Of course, to d6, and if possible with gain of tempo. The route for it immed iately became clea r.
conseq uences of Black's 54th move are felt! ) 62 ]::ta 8 h3 63 l:tg 8 tDe7 64 lIh 8 c;t>d6 65 tDg 1 c3 66 c;t>e3 c2 + (another way was 66 . . . l:t b 1 67 tDe2 h2 68 :xh2 c2 69 c;t>d2 c1 'i1i'+ 70 tDxc1 ltb2+) 67 c;t>d2 l:tg3 ! (but not 67 . . . l:t b 1 ? 68 tDe2 h2 69 tDc1 ! ) Wh ite resigned . Let us now tu rn to another, no less well stud ied aspect of the tech nique of ta king decisions.
The Tech n ique of searching for and taking Decisions
Principles of rational, economic thinking
First, the most general ru le. When you are thinking about your move, your ob jec tive is not to calculate all the varia tions to the end and obtain an exhaustive impression of the position. You have only one ob jective: to take the correct decision, to make the best move. Try, as far as possible, to minimise the expendi ture of time and energy. You should calculate only the minimum number of varia tions needed for the taking of the correct decision.
How can this be ach ieved? Here are a few considerations. With what to begi n the calculation? In Krasen kow's article you will fi nd some interesti ng ideas about this, although some times they d iffer from my recommendations. You have the right to choose those which seem to you to be more correct. 1.
If there is a tempting continuation , forcing the play, then, of course, it makes sense to beg in your calculation with it (as, for example, in the analysis of the Alexa nder Euwe game). Generally speaking, it is a dvisable to immediately begin consid ering forcing moves, such as exchanges, win of ma terial or, on the contrary, sacrifices. It is often easier to calculate a specific variation than to assess the consequences of a quiet continuation.
I was once chatting with M i khail Kats , a famous draug hts trainer, who had prepared a whole constellation of lady world champi ons. He told me that he trains his pupils in the fi rst insta nce to check all possible piece sacrifices. As a result, it is extremely rare for them to miss unexpected combinations. If you sense tha t a combinative idea you have foun d is probably correct, it makes sense first to examine the opponent's
CZJ
19
weakest replies (again remember the Alexander-Euwe game: this was the order i n which we operated , when studying the position after Black's 35th move). After qu ickly checking the simplest variations and thereby restricti ng the extent of the calcula tion , perhaps red ucing it to just one or two directions, it is then psychologically easier to concentrate all your efforts on them. You will already know for sure that the opponent has noth ing else. But if you suspect that the combination does not work, immediately concentrate on the best defence. If it refutes the
combi natio n , this is sufficient, and the opponent's other resou rces do not have to be studied. Obviously, these recommendations are not set in stone. Va rious situations arise, and sometimes you have to act q uite d ifferently in them . But as a guideline, applicable to the majority of cases, these pieces of advice make sense. 2 . 'Emergency exit'. H ere I will not give any examples, but will simply explain the idea.
Su ppose that a complicated position has arisen , and it is unclear whom it favours. After beg i n n i ng the calculation of a compli cated combi natio n , you notice that at some point you can , if you wish, force perpetual check, or, say, an equal endgame. You have the right to stop here and decide - very well , I ' l l go in for the combi nation! I have a perpetual check, and there are also some attacking possibil ities. I will not bother to ca lculate them - this ca n be done later, and at the worst I will force a draw. The 'emergency exit' , enabling you to avoid the prel iminary calculation of the most critical conti nuation, does not necessarily have to be a forced draw. It is sufficient to notice for yourself the possibil ity at some point of making a move, even a second-rate one, but one which according to your
20
\it
The Technique of searching for and ta king Decisions
assessment is nevertheless qu ite accept able. A few moves later it will be far easier for you to decide whether to go in for the main variation , or satisfy you rself with the 'minimum wage'. 3. The method of elimi nation. Often i t is not necessary to make an accurate calculation of the intended continuation; it is sufficient merely to sa tis fy yourself that it makes sense, it cannot be immedi ately refuted, the remaining moves are bad and all the same you have nothing better. In this way you can sometimes save a mass of time and energy. Players
sometimes forget about this method of choosing a move or do not use it properly. In 1 973-75 I worked with Valery Chekhov, preparing him for the world j u n ior champion ship. We devoted a lot of attention to improvi ng his method of taking decisions, and in particu lar on savi ng thinking time (at that time Chekhov invariably used to get into ti me-trouble). An instructive episode oc cu rred in one of our training games. Dvoretsky - Chekhov Moscow 1 974 Reti Opening 1 liJf3
liJf6
2 g3
g6
3 b3
�g7
4 � b2 It was no accident that Valery asked me to employ this particular variation (the theory of which I did not then know). This was how Alexander Koch iev, his main rival in the forthcoming elimi nation tou rnament, l i ked to play with Wh ite. It should be said that, although apparently unpretentious, such opening set-ups are qu ite venomous. If Black does not have a clear pla n , he can q u ickly end up in a strategically d ifficult position - it is sufficient to commit a couple
of imperceptible inaccu racies. This is what happened , for example, in the very important game Yusupov-Zapata , played in the 1 977 World J u n ior Champion ship in I n nsbruck. The Col umbian Alonso Zapata played splendidly in the second half of the tournament (6 poi nts out of 7) and won the si lver medal. The only defeat that he suffered towards the fi nish was against the future champion . But see how easily Yusupov gained this win . 4 . . . d 6 S d 4 0-0 6 �g2 liJbd7 (if Black i s intending . . . e7-e5, i t is better to play this immediately, and to answer 7 dxe5 with 7 . . . liJfd7) 7 0-0 eS?! (7 .. J:teS!?; 7 . . . c6 !?) 8 dxe S liJg4 9 liJc3 dxeS (9 . . . liJgxe5 is better) 1 0 liJd2 :e 8 (if 1 0 .. .f5 there would have followed 1 1 e4 , but this would possibly have been the lesser evil ) 1 1 liJc4 liJ b6 1 2 liJxb6! cxb6 ( 1 2 . . . axb6 1 3 'iix dS l1xdS 1 4 J:r.fd 1 , and 1 4 . . . :eS is not possible because of 1 5 liJd5) 1 3 'it'xd8 :xd8 1 4 l:tad1 �fS (it is already hard to offer Black any good advice) 1 S �xb7 l:tab8 1 6 e4 �d7 1 7 �dS, and su bsequently Wh ite converted his extra pawn . 4...
0-0
Sometimes even such a natural move as castl ing can turn out to be a loss of time. The most accu rate move order is 4 . . . d6! (intend ing 5 . . . e5) 5 d4 c5! . The point is that Wh ite has to reckon seriously with 6 . . . cxd4 7 liJxd4 d5, and after 6 c4 it is possible to play either 6 . . . cxd4 7 liJxd4 d5 S �g2 dxc4, or 6 . . . liJe4 with the unpleasant th reat of ? . . . 'it'a5+ (if the moves 4 . . . 0-0 5 �g2 are included , White can simply castle here). Also, nothing is given by 6 dxc5 'iWa5+ 7 liJbd2 'it'xc5 (th reatening S . . . liJg4 ; bad is S a3 0-0 9 �g2 liJg4! 1 0 liJe4 liJxf2 ! ! ) S �d4 'it'h5 (S . . . Vc7 is also good ) 9 �g2 liJc6 1 0 �b2 � h 3 . Another version o f t h e same idea is 4 . . . c5! (th reatening 5 . . . d5) 5 c4 d6! (intending 6 . . . e5) 6 d4 liJe4 ! . S �g2
cS
The Tech n ique of searching for and taking Decisions
6 c4
lDc6
7 0-0
d6
I n such positions . . . e7-e5 is an unpleasant positional threat, si nce the bishop at b2 is shut out of play. It can be activated only by e3-e3 and d2-d4, but this is d ifficult to carry out. 8 d4
lDe4
9 lD bd2 The game Korch noi-Gl igoric (USSR v. Yu goslavia Match 1 956) went 9 e3 .i.g4 1 0 'iVc1 .i.xf3 1 1 .i.xf3 lDg5 1 2 .i.xc6 bxc6 1 3 dxc5 dxc5 1 4 .i.xg7 �xg7 1 5 f4 lDe4 1 6 lDc3 ( 1 6 'ili'c2 was stronger) 1 6 . . . 'iVd3 with equality. 9. . .
.i.f5
In the event of 9 . . . lDxd2?! 1 0 'ili'xd2 (Keres Szabo, Hastings 1 954/55) the pin on the a 1 -h8 d iagonal is eliminated , and Wh ite aims to gain a spatial advantage by d4-d 5 . 1 0 lDh4 1 ?
ttJ
21
exchange on f5) secures Wh ite a positional advantage. This means that there remains only 1 0 . . . lDxd2 . When I played 1 0 lDh4, I was intending to consider whether it was possible to spoil the black pawns by interposing the exchange on f5. Suppose the complications after 1 1 lDxf5 lDxf1 1 2 lDxg7 should prove to be in my favour thanks to the strong bishop on b2 . But, of cou rse, I did not bother to calculate the variations beforehand and I merely satisfied myself that the simple 1 1 'ili'xd2 was qu ite possible ('emergency exit' ! ) . Generally speaki ng, t h e idea o f 1 1 lDxf5 looks d u bious, and, as we have already mentioned , this means that we should immed iately concentrate on looking for the simplest refutation . Don't be in a hu rry to study the position where Black is the exchange up (even if it is in his favour after 1 2 . . . cxd4 ! ) - first ask yourself the q uestion about candidate moves. I saw the reply 1 1 . . . lDxc4 ! , with which Black retains a sound extra pawn , and I immediately terminated my calculation. Thus 11 'ili'xd2 is forced. Most probably the opponent should not al low d4-d5 (although 1 1 . . . .i.d7 is in fact possible). He has to choose between 1 1 . . .cxd4 1 2 lDxf5 gxf5 1 3 .ltxc6 bxc6 1 4 .i.xd4 and 1 1 . . . lDxd4 1 2 lDxf5 lDxf5 1 3 .i.xb7. Which of these positions is preferable for Black? Here it is not calcula tion that is requ i red, but a correct positional assessment.
The knight on e 4 is attacked . H o w would you conti nue as Black? What position would you go in for? Sharp attempts such as 1 0 . . . d5? 1 1 cxd5 'i'xd5 1 2 g4 or 1 0 . . . lDg5?! 1 1 lDxf5 gxf5 1 2 e3 (with the idea of 'ili'h5) are obviously inferior. 1 0 . . . lDf6? is also bad - the seizu re of space by d4-d5 (immed iately or after the
I think that the second continuation is correct. Wh ite will have to lau nch an attack on the kingside by h2-h4-h5 or possibly f2f4-f5. But the chances of such an attack succeeding are du bious - there are not many pieces left on the board . At the same time Black is ready for an immediate counterattack on the queens ide by the advance of his a-pawn. Objectively the chances here are roughly eq ual. The capture on d4 with the pawn is less
22
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The Technique of searching for and taking Decisions
good , since pawn weaknesses are created in Black's position. Wh ite's superior pawn structu re guara ntees h i m a slight but endu ing advantage . B u t what happened in t h e game? After I played 1 0 li:)h4, Chekhov sank i nto thought. For a couple of min utes I checked the consequences of 1 0 . . . li:)xd2 1 1 li:)xfS. Then, having convinced myself (in his time ! ) that this could not be played , I simply began strolling around - after a l l , there was noth ing more to th ink about, and it was my opponent who faced a choice . Ten mi nutes passed , then a fu rther ten minutes, and I began to grow slig htly i rritated. What was he th inking about? By the method of elimination it is not d ifficult to establish that the exchange of knig hts is obligatory - why then waste time? 10 . . .
point you spend too much time and energy, you do not have sufficient for the solving of subsequent problems. Wd7 1 6 Wf4 1 7 :ad 1 Threatening 1 8 %:tdS with the win of a pawn . 17 . . .
'ire6
1 8 I:tfe1 The opponent has to reckon not only with l:[dS, but also with the opening of l i nes: e2e4 . If 1 8 . . . Wf6 there follows 1 9 lidS eS 20 Wd2 (from this variation it is understandable why 1 8 e3?! would have been less accu rate). 18 . . .
f6
li:)xd2
1 1 'ili'xd2 Obviously I made my move instantly, after which Chekhov again sank into thought for some twenty-five m i n utes. Apparently he had still not come to a defin ite conclusion, or else new doubts had arisen and he again began trying to solve a problem over which he had racked his brains earl ier. It stands to reason that to spend almost an hour on a not very complicated problem was pure wasteful ness. And also he did not solve it in the best way. 11 . . .
cxd4? !
1 2 li:)xf5
gxf5
1 3 �xc6
bxc6
14 �xd4
i.. x d4?!
14 . . . eS 1 S i. b2 We7 was preferable. 1 5 Wxd4
c5?
Now Black's position becomes d ifficult. He should have chosen between 1 S . . . Wd7, intending ... e7-eS, and 1 S ... e6, preparing . . . d6-d S . However, weak play on the part of my opponent was not surprising - if at some
1 9 l1d5 This previously plan ned move, win ning a pawn , I made without thinking, and this was a mistake. Stronger was 1 9 e4! fxe4 20 :xe4 Wf? (20 . . . Wd7 21 We3 with two threats: 22 :xe7 and 22 WxcS) 2 1 Wg4+ �h8 22 Wd 7 . 19 . . .
a5?
1 9 . . .We4 20 l:[xfS Wxf4 21 llxf4 as was more tenacious. In the endgame the ad vance of the a-pawn promises Black some cou nterplay. But in the m iddlegame it is of l ittle use - in reply Wh ite launches an attack on the king.
The Tech n ique of search ing for and taking Decisions
20 ':'xf5
a4
21 e4
axb3
22 axb3
':'fb8
23 :e3 White has a strateg ically won position. He intends to open l ines on the kingside by g3g4-g5 . After t h e g a m e I , naturally, asked Chekhov what he was th i n king about for so long on the 1 0th move . 'What do you mea n ' , he replied, ' I was choosing what to do next . '
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23
I n t h e 3rd part o f t h e book School o f Chess Excellence 1 - Endgame Analysis I de scribed an interesting form of training - the playing of stUdies. In this way you can develop you r imagination and tech nique of calculating variations , and, in particu lar, learn to make skilful use of the method of elimi nation.
H . Kasparian 1 950
'But wasn't 1 0 . . . tL'lxd2 forced?' 'Yes. ' 'After making i t , was there a n y risk that you could lose q u ickly?' 'No.' 'Well then, make a move and then th i n k later, when you are indeed a t t h e cross roads. It is far easier to choose if the position is already on the board - there is less likelihood of an oversight. Besides, on the way it is possible that you will also be able to th ink during my time - if you had captu red on d2 immediately, I would still have had to check 11 tL'lxf5 . ' It was strange, b u t a t t h e time these ideas were new to Chekhov; he was completely unfamiliar with ways of saving time, such as the method of elimination. However, such a mistake in thinking is very common, and it is repeated by many players. An analysis of the typical mistakes made by Chekhov in the taking of decisions hel ped us almost to eliminate his previously typical wild time scrambles and to g reatly improve his practical playing strength . In the follow ing year, 1 975, he successfully came through the qual ifying events and then won the esteemed title of world j u n ior champio n .
It is u n l i kely that the wh ite knight will escape alive from the trap. The attempt to save it with the help of the bishop is easily parried : 1 ..i d5? tL'lf4 (not immed iately 1 . . . e6? 2 e5+ or 2 ..ixe6 �xe6 3 tL'lg6) 2 ..i c4 e6 3 �g3 ..id6 and 4 . . . �g7. It looks tempting to play 1 �xh3 �g7 ( 1 . . . ..i g7 2 e5+) 2 �g4 tL'lf6+ 3 �f5 , but Black can react fa r more strongly: 1 . . . tL'lf4+ 2 �g4 e5! followed by . . . ..i g7. Here Wh ite has no cha nces at all. What then can he do? Only 1 e5+ �g7 offers some hope, and now either 2 ..if3 tL'lf4 3 �g3, or 2 �xh3 �xh8 3 �g4 tL'lg7 4 �g5, trying to exploit the temporary lack of harmony in the placing of the opponent's pieces. Of course, we must qu ickly d iscover l ittle traps which make l ife easier for us in certain variations, for example: 2 �xh3
24
�
The Technique of searching for and ta king Decisions
lLlf4+ 3 �g4 lLld3 4 lLlg6! or 3 . . . lLle6 4 lLlf7 ! �xf7 5 .i.d5 with a draw. Thus our first move is clear. 1 e5+ 1
�g7
What now? After 2 .i.f3? lLlf4 3 �g3 the black knight acquires the additional square g2. After 3 . . . lLlg2! 4 �xh3 lLle3 the defen sive resources are exhausted . Black also wins by 3 . . . lLle6 4 lLlf7 �xf7 5 .i.d5 h2 6 �xh2 .i.g7. This means that the pawn must be captured immed iately. �xh8 2 �xh31 2 . . . lLlf4+ leads to an immed iate draw after 3 �g4 lLle2 (we already know the replies to 3 . . . lLld3 and 3 . . . lLle6) 4 �g5 �xh8 5 �g6 with the irresistible threat of 6 �f7 (5 . . . �g8 6 .i.d5+). 3 �g4
lLlg7
4 �g5 Now Black must have a long think, since it is not at all easy to convert his extra knig ht. During this time we too will calculate variations. In the event of 4 . . . �g8 5 �g6 the only way to strengthen the position is by 5 . . . e6 6 �f6 .i. b4 . Now 7 .i.c8? �f8 is a mistake, since if 8 .i.xe6 .i.e7+ the bishop is lost, while after 8 .i.d7 .i.e 7 + 9 �g6 .i.d8 1 0 .i.c8 .i. h4 (zugzwang) 1 1 .i.d7 Black places his king on e7 with gain of tempo, consoli dating his forces. The e6-pawn must be attacked along another d iagonal . As I Iya Odessky pointed out, Kasparian's sugges tion 7 .i.a6? loses to 7 . . . lLle8+! 8 �xe6 lLlc7+, and therefore the correct way is 7 .i.f3! �f8 8 .i.g4 .i.e7+ 9 �g6 .i.h4 1 0 .i. h 3 , when Black is unable t o strengthen his position . Noth ing is changed by 4 . . . �h7 5 .i.e4+ �g8 6 �g6. It only remains to try and bring out the knight from g7. 4. .
.
5 �g6
Si nce 6 �f7? lLld8+ is not possible, Wh ite must move his bishop, renewing the threat of �f7 . The opponent repl ies 6 . . . lLld8, and then we play 7 e6 ! . But where should the bishop be moved to? If 6 .i.c6? Black repl ies either 6 . . . lLld8 with gain of tempo, or 6 . . . .i.xe5 7 �f5 lLld4+. 6 .i.a8? lLlc7, 6 .i.e4? lLlc5, 6 .i.f3? lLld4 and 6 .i.g2? lLlf4+ are all unsuitable. There only remains 6 .i.c8 or 6 .i. h 1 . But after 6 .i.c8? lLld8! 7 e6 �g8 the black knight will come into play via c6 or b7. The bishop must defin itely remain on the long d iagonal . 6 .i. h 1 ! !
lLld8
7 e6!
.i. b2
8 .i.d51 8 .i.a8? lLlxe6 9 �f7 lLlc7 . 8. . . 9 �h6
9 . . . �g8 1 0 �g6 �f8 1 1 �h7 does not help . An amusing picture : Black's knight and king are arrested i n their own camp! 10 �g6
.i.d2
1 1 .i. h 1 ! ! Again the only safe square for the bishop.
lLle6+
11 . . .
.i.g7!
1 2 .i.d5!
S . . . lLld8 6 .i.d5 (intending 7 e6) 6 . . . e6 7 .i.xe6! lLlxe6 8 �f7 is hopeless for Black.
.i.a3 .i.e 1 +
.i.e3
The draw has become obvious. This is roughly how a player can reason ,
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The Tech n ique of searching for and taking Decisions
when playing the position from Genrikh Kasparian's study. You will see that it is not essential to analyse lengthy and complicated variations 'to the end' - it is far more important to check accurately the necessary short variations, endeav ouring in so doing to take account of all the significant playing resources both for yourself, and the opponent.
4. Compa rison. This is a rather subtle method . Sometimes you quickly choose a move, only because you see that the situation arising after it is nowhere worse, and is in some places better, than after another possible continuation. For
example, in this way the accu rate move order (33 . . . d 3 ! , rather than 33 . . . Wb 1 +?) was determ ined in the Alexander-Euwe game. Let us consider the followi ng study. F. Bondarenko, M . Liburkin 1 950
25
any serious importance , it is clear what he should play - why allow the opponent an additional defensive resou rce? 1 tLl h41 When you are considering you r move in a practical game, there is no need to ascerta i n h o w t h e g a m e should end. Based on a comparison of your two possibilities, you qu ickly place your knight on h4, and let you r opponent try t o fi nd a way t o save h imself. During this time you will gain a better understanding of the resulting variations. 1 . . .
'iii' g 1
2 tLlf3+
'iii' g 2
3 lLlxh2
'iii' x h2
If now the wh ite king heads towards the a7pawn, Black will shut it in by rush ing to c7 with his king. How can this be prevented? 4 e5!
.i.xe5
5 'iii' e 6! !
'iii' g 3
6 'iii' d 7
'iii'f4
7 'iii' c 8
The bishop turns out to be in the way of its own king. I should mention that in the event of 4 . . ..i.c3 (instead of 4 . . . .i.xe5) 5 e6 .i. b4 6 'iii' e 5 'iii' g 3 7 'iii' d 5 'iii' f4 8 'iii' c 6 'iii' e 5 9 'iii' b7 'iii' d 6 it is now the king that h i nders the bishop: 1 0 e7! and wins. From this last variation it is clear that the tempo gai ned by Black after the i ncorrect 1 lLle1 ? .i.c3! is vitally important for h i m : 2 lLlf3 'iii' g 2 3 lLlxh2 'iii' x h2 4 e5 'iii' g 3 5 e6 .i.b4 6 'ii.? e 5 .iofa (or 6 . . . 'iii' g 4) 7 'iii' d 5 'iii' f4 a 'iii' c6 'iii' e 5 9 'iii' b 7 'iii' d 6 1 0 'iii' x a7 'iii' c7 with a draw. Wh ite has two moves: 1 lLl h4 and 1 lLle1 . I n the event o f 1 . . . 'iii' g 1 2 lLlf3+ 'iii' g 2 3 lLlxh2 there is no d ifference between them . How ever, after 1 lLle1 .i.c3! White must play 2 tLlf3 , when 2 . . . 'iii' g 2 leads to the same position, but with the black bishop on c3. Even without calculating whether this has
5. Don't calculate ultra-complicated vari ations for too long - i n these cases rely on i ntuition. Often we encou nter irrational situations, in which it is practically impossi ble to establish the truth with in a restricted time. Even if, after spending a mass of energy, you find the correct move, the price
26
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The Tech nique of search ing for and taking Decisions
may prove to be too high - for subseq uent decisions you will most probably not have sufficient time and strength . In which cases does it make sense to spend a lot of time when considering a move ? When you realise that an exact solution may be found to the problem facing you and that it will decisively innuence the further course of the game. In other words - at key moments (it is very important to be able to determine them). Or if you do not see any continua tion that is in the least acceptable, and you must devise one.
The time of our lectu re has come to an end .
I recommend that you should not restrict yourself to the advice that has been g iven develop it further, by working out new rules for you rself. Analyse examples illustrating the rational tech nique of seeking and taking decisions, try solving special training exer cises, and analyse your own actions in the cou rse of tournament battles. I hope that you will become i nterested in this way of working on chess. And indeed , only on chess? After all, rationa l , clearly organ ised thinking comes in useful in any wal k of l ife.
I n conclusion , here are a few rather d ifficult exercises for independent solving .
Exercises
1 . Wh ite to move
2. assess 1 'ifh5
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The Technique of search ing for and taking Decisions
3. White to move
27
4. Black to move
Sol utions 1 . Berg - Hort (BieI 1 985). Black has the advantage, since his king is more active. The main threat is . . . �d6-c6b5. A very important cou nter-chance for Wh ite is the pawn break g3-g4 ! . But at the present moment it is clearly inappropriate . It can be carried out only with the king on the e-file, from where i n one move it ca n stop either of the opponent's passed pawns - on the c- or the g-file. The most natu ral king move 1 �e3? turns out to be the weakest, since after 1 . . . �c6! 2 94 hxg4 3 f5 gxf5 4 h5 f4+ ! , as it is easy to see, Black is the fi rst to queen a pawn. It also does not help to play 2 �d2 �b5 3 g4 (3 �c3 f5) 3 . . . hxg4 4 f5 g3 or 2 �e2 �b5 3 g4 f5! . Thus the drawback to the king's position on e3 is that it comes under the tempo-gaining check . . . f5-f4+. Having established this, Wh ite chose 1 �e2? (intending the drawi ng variation 1 . . . �c6? 2 g4! hxg4 3 f5). But after 1 . . . �dS! he unexpectedly found himself in zugzwang. The conseq uences of 2 �e3
�c6 are already known to us, and 2 �d2 �c6 is no better, while if 2 �e1 , then 2 . . . c3 is decisive . The game went 2 g4 hxg4 3 fS g3! 4 fxg6 g2 S �f2 �e6 6 g7 �f7 , and Wh ite resigned in view of 7 b5 c3 8 b6 c2 9 b7 g 1 'i1i'+ ! 1 0 �xg 1 c 1 'ii' + . A n d yet a way t o save t h e g a m e does exist. 1 �e1 ! 1
�c6
1 . . . �d5 2 �e2! leads to the familiar zugzwang position , but with Black to move. After 2 . . . �c6 there follows 3 g4 ! , while if 2 . . . �d4 , then not 3 g4? f5 4 gxf5 gxf5 5 �d2 c3+ 6 �c2 �c4 7 b5 �xb5 8 �xc3 �c5 , but simply 3 �d2! with a draw. 2 g4!
hxg4
Noth ing is g iven by 2 .. .f5 3 gxf5 gxf5 4 �d2. 3 fS 4 hS
gxfS g3
4 . . . c3 5 h6 c2 6 �d2 is similar. S h6 6 �f2 7 h7 8 h8'i1i'
g2 c3 c2 g1 'i1i'+
28
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The Tech nique of searching for and taking Decisions
9 �xg 1
cH W+
1 0 �f2 The position is a d raw. Pawn endings are an excellent testing ground for training in the technique of calculating variations!
2. Bobrov - Platonov (Chernovtsy 1 963). 1 1i'h5 This was played in the game. 1 . . .
..txg5
2 ..te4
..t h61 1
Black can not get by without this move: if 2 . . . 'ii'c 7(a7), 2 . . . ':c7 or 2 . . . nd7 there follows 3 f7 . It is very important to clarify immedi ately which continuation of the offensive Wh ite will choose: 3 'ii'x h6 or 3 1i'f5 . I n the event of 3 1i'f5 it is hopeless to play 3 . . . .l:!.c7? 4 f7 llxf7 5 'ii'xf7 . However, Black fi nds the pretty defence 3 . . . l:td7!! 4 'ii'x d7 (4 f7 llxf7 5 1i'xf7 'ii' c7! , but not 5 . . . ':'c7?! 6 "f6+ ..tg7 7 1i'f5 and 8 ..txc2) 4 . . . ':c7 ! , and Wh ite's attack peters out (whereas after 4 . . . 'ii'c 7? 5 li d 1 ! ..tf8 6 1i'xc7 ':xc7 7 ':c1 the game becomes equal). 3 1i'xh6
':c7 ! !
O f course, not 3 . . J:td7? 4 f7 ':xf7 5 l:txf7 . But now if 4 f7 Black wins by 4 . . . ':'xf7 5 ':xf7 .l:!.d 1 + 6 �g2 'ii'g 8+. After 4 ..txc2 1i'b7+ Wh ite resigned . Conclusion : the tempti ng combination 1 1i'h5? is incorrect. Wh ite should have simply played 1 l:th5, retaining a strong attack. 3. Jansa A.Sokolov ( I nterzonal Tourna ment, BieI 1 985). -
Wh ite wants to place his bishop on g5, and the only question is whether to do this i m med iately or after a prel iminary exchange of pawns on the queens ide. There are arg u ments in favour of both decisions, and therefore the main thing here is not so much the choice itself, so much as its justification,
the ideas beh ind the move you choose . The game went 1 9 axb5 axb5 ( 1 9 . . . exf4? 20 bxc6 is bad for Black) 20 ..tg5 b4! 21 ..txf6 bxc3 (otherwise 22 lLld5 with advan tage) 22 ..txe7 1i'xb3 (22 . . . �xe7? 23 'iVxc3) 23 cxb3 �xe7 24 bxc3 ':a3! 25 b4! (25 .l:!.b1 lib8) 25 .. Jlxc3 26 ':c1 lixc1 27 ':xc1 �d7 with equal ity. I n stead of 20 ..tg5 Wh ite should have considered 20 ..td2 ! ? , for example, 20 . . . b4 (20 . . . 0-0 2 1 ..tg5!?) 2 1 lLld5 (the b4-pawn is under attack) 2 1 . . .lLlxd5 22 exd5 ..ta4 23 1i'xb4 'ii'x b4 24 ..txb4 l:tb8!? 25 ..ta3 ..txc2 26 ':c1 ..tf5 27 ':c7 (or 27 . . .f4 f6) 27 . . . ..td7!? with a favourable endgame for White. Now let us analyse the i mmed iate 19 ..tg5. 1 9 ..tg5!?
b4? !
20 ..txf6
bxc3
21 ..txe7
'ii'x b3
No better is 2 1 . . .•xe7 22 .xc3 ..txa4 23 1i'a3 . 2 2 cxb3
�xe7
23 bxc3 In contrast to the variation which occu rred i n t h e game, t h e a-file is closed a n d Wh ite retains his extra pawn . Let us check whether the avoidance of the pawn exchange allows the opponent new possibil ities. He can try 1 9 . . . lLld7 in the hope of 20 ..txe7? lLlc5! 21 'ii' a 2 (2 1 1i'b4 a5!) 2 1 . . . �xe7 with a good game. However, interposing the exchange 20 axb5! places Black in a d ifficult position: 20 . . . ..txg5 2 1 bxc6 o r 2 0 . . . axb5 2 1 ..txe7 lLlc5 2 2 'ii' b4 . He should probably choose 1 9 . . . bxa4! 20 'ii'x b7 ..txb7. It is hardly possible to claim any advantage after 21 lLlxa4 ':c8 22 lLlc3. It looks more promising to play 21 ..txf6 gxf6 22 lLlxa4 , when White's chances in the endgame are preferable (22 . . . .:c8 23 lLlc3 followed by ':d2 and lLld 1 -e3). He is given more problems by a bold pawn sacrifice: 21 . . . ..txf6!? 22 ':xd6 ..te7 23 ':'b6 0-0-0 24
ttJ
The Technique of searching for and ta king Decisions
ttJxa4 l:td4 (worse is 24 . . . .:.d2 25 �f1 ! ) 25 l:ta 1 l:td2 (the wh ite rook is no longer defending the e4-pawn ), or 25 b3 �c7 26 c3 l:td2 , and the position is not easy to evaluate. 4. Timoshchenko - Vaganian (USSR Championship, First League, Baku 1 977). The h6-pawn is attacked . It can be de fended by the king, but the active continua tions 20 . . . .i.xh3 and 20 . . . 'it'g3 should also be considered . Rafael Vaganian decided on a combination, without fully calculating all its consequences. 20 ... �xh3? 2 1 'ii'x h6 (th reatening both 22 'iVxh3, and 22 ttJg5) 21 . . . 'it'g3 22 'it'xh3 'iVxf2+ (22 . . . .ltxf2+ 23 �f1 �xe 1 24 ':'xe 1 is unsatisfactory for Black) 23 �h1 �g7 (23 . . . 'it'xc2 24 ttJg5!). The th reats 24 . . . l:.h8 and 24 . . . 'ilfxc2 look dangerous, but Wh ite launches a counterattack. 24 l:tf1 ! 'fi'xc2 25 ttJg5 �f2 (25 . . . ':h8 26 �xf7+ �g8 27 l:th7!) 26 'fi'h7+ �f6 27 'it'h41
29
l:th8 28 lhf2+. Black resigned in view of 28 . . . 'ilfxf2 29 ttJh7+ and 30 'iVxf2 . Also bad was 20 . . . �h7? 2 1 :e5! with two threats: 22 l:txd5 and 22 : h 5 . There were two roughly equ ivalent possibili ties available to Black:
�g7 ! ?
20 . . . 2 1 �e5 21 :ad 1 ? �xh3. 21 . . .
�c6 II
20 . . .
'iVg3 ! ?
21 ttJd41 2 1 'ilfxh6? does not work because of 2 1 . . . �xf2+ 22 � h 1 �xe 1 23 ttJg5 'ilfh4 or 23 I1xe1 ':fe8. 21 . . .
'ilfh4
In both cases Black stands worse , but it is perfectly possible for h i m to put up a successfu l defence.
30
� Mi khai l Krasen kow
Wa nderi n g th ro u g h the Labyri nth
W chess , one of the main elements of a
hen choosing a move in a game of
player's reasoning is the calculation of variations. The abil ity to carry this out deeply and accurately in conditions of restricted time on the clock is an important component of playing strength . Here a major role is played by the organ isation and discipline of the calculation. A major expert in this field, the author of the theory of calculating variations, with which any strong player should be familiar, was grandmaster Alexan der Kotov (all the subsequent citations will be from his book Think Like a Grandmaster) . The basic concept of Kotov's theory is the analysis tree. 'In any position we depict all the possible variations in the form of an "analysis tree ", in which the variations and sub-variations are presented in the form of branches and twigs '. Kotov d isti ngu ishes different types of calculation trees : bare tru nk (one variation or branch ), bush (many short variations) and thickets (mass of long, complicated variations). Accord ing to Kotov, the main rule of calculation is that 'a player should. . . work through each branch only once. No turnings, no returnings! Only in certain isolated cases, in especially compli cated positions, should a grandmaster check once again a selected variation. But, as a rule, he does not rush up and down the calculation tree '. I should mention that the analysis tree is essentially created during the analysis process itself; i . e . we are talking about a defi nite order in which it is produced . I n reply to the second important question : how t o construct the very nodes o f the tree,
i.e. decide on the moves which need to be considered in every specific position , Kotov formulates the following ru le: 'When we beg in the calculation of varia tions, first we must mentally list and pre cisely establish all the possible candidate moves in the g iven position . . . After deter m i n i ng and listing them, we then beg in calcu lati ng in tu rn one variation after an other. ' Of course, this appl ies not only to the initial position, but also to any position arising during the calculation , where one of the sides has a choice. Thus all the possible candidate moves are determined before hand , once and for all, before the calcula tion of the given position . Here the i n itial data is provided by general considerations, i ntuition , and so on. On the whole, these two rules of Kotov are appl icable to the majority of practical calcu lations, and the abil ity to follow them, until they become automatic, sign ifies a colossal advance in a chess player's thinking . However, these rules also have sign ificant drawbacks, which appear mainly in compli cated , unclear positions. I nternational mas ter Boris Zlotn ik, who has made a study of this question, has this to say: '1. In complicated positions it is extremely difficult to determine immediately all the candidate moves at the very start of the thinking process, and in reality they appear when a player delves into the position. '2. The correct move - a nuance in the calculation of one variation - often "sur faces" in the calculation of another, and therefore in difficult situations a repeated calculation is inevitable. '
Wa ndering through the Labyrinth
Here is a very simple example, illustrating Zlotn i k's first remark: Alexander - Marshall Cambridge 1 928
After calculating the variation 1 l:tf4 exf4 2 gxf4, to which Black repl ies 2 . . . dxc3 , con trolling the g 1 -sq uare, we arrive at the idea of first moving the knight: 1 ttJd5 or 1 ttJa4! (and then 2 .l:.f4). The move 1 ttJa4! is in fact the quickest way to wi n . But without the calculation of the (albeit elementary) varia tion with 1 lif4, it is not clear for what reason it should be included in the list of candidate moves . The second remark characterises such featu res of human thinking as the work of the su bconscious and association . Another significant defect of Kotov's theory becomes apparent: he ignores the problem of the order in wh ich candidate moves should be considered , assu ming that this 'depends on the character and habits of each player and the peculiarities of the position. ' Of cou rse , if, as Kotov impl ies, all ca ndidate moves must be examined , the order in which this is done is not of great sign ifica nce. But in fact in many cases, in the interests of economy, the calculation of a number of candidate moves may be omitted , if this of no
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importance for the taking of a decision . And th is can often be decided on the basis of the calcu lation of other candidate moves. In this case the order of consideration plays a major role. I n the present article an attempt has been made to suggest (and illustrate with an example) a more complicated calculation algorithm (true, a not very formalised one), which is effectively used (sub-consciously) by many players in complicated positions (of the 'th icket' type). 1 . Decide on the aim of the calcu lation , i . e . the criteria by which we will assess the variations we calculate, whether they satisfy us or not. This may be, for example, achieving a decisive material advantage; enhancing a positional advantage; gaining equal play; putti ng up resistance in a bad position , and so on. The aim should be realistic, i . e . based on an assessment of the position and intu itive considerations. If there is sufficient time for calculation , the aim may be raised somewhat; if there is little time, it may be lowered. 2 . Search for ideas to ach ieve the aim, choose appropriate candidate moves and (very important) determine their order of priority, i . e . select those which are most likely to prove successfu l . 3 . Calcu late variations ( a s deeply a s possible) i n thei r order o f priority (begin ning with those which seem most appropri ate for achieving the aim). Here each time there is a choice, the calculation order is also determined by the priority of the possible moves (in connection with the aim). 4. If a contin uation leading to the set aim is found, what happens next depends on how much time there is on the clock: if there is insufficient, the main part of the calcula tion may be concluded here (sti ll necessary is the 'Blu menfeld check' - cf. point 8 below); but if there is still time in hand , the
32
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Wa ndering through the Labyrinth
aim can be refi ned (raised ), and the set of candidate moves which have not yet been examined also refi ned , and the calculation continued; if the new aim is not achieved , then stick with the continuation fou n d . 5 . I f , as a result o f t h e calculation a path leading to the aim is not found, the fu rther actions also depend on the clock situation . I f time i s short, the a i m should b e lowered, the set of candidate moves corrected, and the calculation continued . In this case the new aim will often be satisfied by one of the variations already exami ned or it will be comparatively simple to fi nd an appropriate conti nuatio n . The only thing you must avoid is making a move 'in the dark' , without calculation. 6. If, however, there is sti l l plenty of time, and your intu ition suggests that the aim should be achievable (a strong player should trust his intuition more, since it is an accu mulation of his chess understanding), then you can (and shou ld) deli berately go in for a ' repeat' calculation of certain varia tions. For this you have to fi nd new ideas for achieving your a i m . I n accordance with th is, new ca ndidate moves and 'candidate varia tions' are fou n d . I should explain what is meant by this. During the fi rst stage of the calculation , against many conti nuations you will already have found the only or the strongest repl ies for the opponent, and forced series of moves. Often a new idea , a candidate move, is found not in the i n itial position , but after a series of moves, which together with it comprises a 'candidate variation ' . After this there begins the calcu lation of new possibil ities (point 3) the second stage of calculation (it can happe n , although rarely, that t h i s cycle w i l l also proceed a third time). -
Generally speaking, a repeat calculation is a shortcoming, therefore it is desirable to encompass all the ideas for ach ievi ng the aim i n the fi rst stage of the calculation .
However, a s we have seen above , this is not always possible. 7. It may happen that, while calculating one of the variations, a new idea appears, a candidate move u n related to this variation . I n this case its priority should be estab lished , but you should not start examining it until you have completed the calculation of the variation you were working o n . An exception may be made when it is immedi ately obvious that the new idea is better than the conti nuation being exami ned (but not simply of higher priority). 8 . One of the major th i n king deficiencies of many players is 'chess bli ndness', the overlooking of elementary replies by the opponent of 1 -2 moves. To tackle this evil in the calculation of variations there exists the 'Blumenfeld ru le' (Kotov also talks about it): after concluding your calculation and taking a decision , pause and look at the position with the fresh 'eyes of a novice': is the plan ned move a blunder, lead ing to immed iate d isaster? Only after ascertaining that it is not a blunder can it be made on the board . But if a mistake is d iscovered , the calculation of variations will have to be renewed . In this case you should normally lower the aim of the calculation , and aim for simpl ification, since the bad oversight is evidence the player is un prepared for a complicated battle . Most strong players are well aware o f the Blu menfeld ru le, but. . . in the heat of the battle they often forget about it. I should l i ke to illustrate what I have said with an extract from one of my own games. I regard the winning manoeuvre found in it as one of my best creative achievements.
Wa ndering through the Labyrinth
Lagunov - Krasen kow Dnepropetrovsk 1 985
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I I I . 23 . . . 'ii' a4 24 ..td2 (but not 24 b3? 'iVa5), and nothing is apparent. IV. 23 . . . 'ii'g 4 24 ..td2. V. 23 ... 'ii' e 5 24 ..te3. I n the last two variations Black's possibil ities are obviously exhausted .
The poor placing of the wh ite pieces and the weakness of the back rank suggested to Black that he should look for a forced wi n , i.e. a major w i n o f material (the a i m o f the calculation). The idea is to combine attacks on the bishops with a threat of invad ing on the back rank. In order of priority the candidate moves were determined : I. 23 . . . 'ii'd 1 ; I I . 2 3 . . . 'ii' b4 ; I I I . 2 3 . . . 'ii'a4 ; IV. 2 3 . . . 'ii'g 4; V. 23 . . . 'ii'e 5, and the fi rst stage of the calculation was beg u n . I . 2 3 . . . 'ii'd 1 2 4 '>itf1 1 ) 24 . . . 'ii'g 4 25 ..td2 'ii' c4+ 26 'ii'e 2, and there is nothing; 2) 24 ... 'ii' h 5 25 ..td2; a ) 25 ... 'ii'x h2 26 f3! 'ii' h 1 + 27 '>itf2 'ii' h 4+ 28 '>itf1 'ii'c4+ 29 'ii'e 2; b) 25 . . . 'ii' b 5+ 26 '>itg 1 'ii'x b2 27 ..te3 'ii'c3 28 'ii'f 1 or 27 ... 'ii' b4 28 'ii'c 1 .:tc7 29 'ii' d 1 ; 3) 24 . . . 'ii'a4 25 ..td2 'ii' b 5+ 26 '>it g 1 - cf. 2b). In these variations Black merely wins a second pawn - the goal is not ach ieved . I I . 23 . . .'iIi'b4 24 'ii'c 1 'ii'c5 (24 . . . :tc7 25 'ii' d 1 ) 25 ..tc2 .:tc7 26 'ii' d 2! f6 27 ..tb3! or 27 ..tf4 ! , and Black does not ach ieve anyth ing.
Thus the first stage of the calculation did not g ive the desired solution . If Black had been short of time here , he would have had to make a correction to his goal (for example, look for the best version of winning a second pawn). I n cidentally, then the candidate move VI . 23 . . . 'ii'x b2 (wh ich clearly does not satisfy the i n itial maxi mum goal) would have been included in the exami nation , and B lack would have had to choose from 1 .2a, 1 .2b and VI . But, fortunately, there was sufficient time (in the tou rnament the 'good old' time limit of 2Y:z hours for 40 moves was being used ), and Black decided to look for new ideas. He conceived the idea of rearranging the queen beh ind the rook; in this case the move ..t b 1 -c2 , defending the d 1 -point, must not be allowed . The following candidate variations emerged : 1 ' . 23 . . . 'iVd 1 24 '>itf1 'ii' a4 25 ..td2 .:td6; I I ' . 25 . . . l:td5; I I I ' 25 . . . .:td4; IV'. 2 3 . . . 'ii' a4 2 4 ..td2 :Id6 ; V' . 24 . . . .l:.d5; V I ' . 24 .. J�d4; VI I ' . 2 3 . . .'iIi'd 1 2 4 '>itf1 'ili' h 5 25 ..td2 'ii' b 5+ 26 '>itg 1 l:td6; VI I I ' . 26 . . . l:td5; IX'. 26 . . . l:td4 (in each case with the threat of .. .'it'd7). The fi rst three were qu ickly rejected i n view of 26 'iVe2 , the last three - if only because of 27 �c3, and in the remaining cases this was found: IV'. 23 ... 'iVa4 24 .id2 .l:td6 25 'ii'e2 ! (25 '>itf1 ? 'iVb5+ 26 'iIIe2 'ili'xb2 27 .id3 'iIId 4) 25 .. .'iIi'd7 26 ..te1 or 25 . . . 'iIi'a6 26 'ili'e 1 (weaker is 26 'ii'e 3 'ii' b 6 ! ) , intending ..tc3 and .ic2 , when everyth ing is defended . V' . 24 . . . l:td5 25 .ie4! and then 26 .if3, si nce 25 . . . 1:[e5? 26 �xh7+ is not possible. VI ' . 24 . . . l:td4 25 'iVe2 (25 '>itf1 is weaker in view of 25 .. :iIi'b5+ 26 'ili'e2 'ili'xb2 27 ..td3
Wa ndering through the Labyrinth
'ifxa2 , or, more accu rate, 25 .. :ii'a6+! 26 �g 1 'ifd6) 25 .. .'ii' d 7 26 �e1 or 25 .. .'ii' a 6 26 'ili'e3! . I n none o f these variations is i t apparent how Black can win . Thus the second stage of the calculation also failed to produce a result. So, should the calcu lation be cu rtailed and the maximum goal abandoned? I neverthe less decided to keep looking. And like a flash of lightening an idea occu rred to me. 23 . . . 'ii' a4 24 �d2 .l:[d6 25 'ilke2 'ilkd4 ! ! .
impossible to find, without first calculating nu merous variations and delving i nto the labyrinth of d ifferent attacks and defences . On the other hand, the fu rther calcu lation (already the third stage!) is not complicated . With the wh ite q ueen on e2, the invasion of Black's on d 1 is decisive: 26 � e 1 'ifd 1 27 'ili'e4 f5 or 26 'ii' b 5 l:td8 27 � e 1 'ili'd 1 28 'ili'a5 b6. The entire th ree-stage calculation (together with the verification) took exactly an hour. U nfortunately, in the game after 23 . . . 'ifa41 24 �d2 :td6! the player from Novosibirsk played 25 �f1 (?) and after 25 ... 'iIi'b5+ he resigned. Alas, Black's main idea remai ned off-stage . . . I am proud to say that, of the many strong players (grandmasters and masters) to whom I have shown this position, only one has been able to find the solution independ ently.
Yes, the idea o f return ing with the queen i s not a t a l l obvious. I think i t would have been
I am not suggesting at all that my proposed algorith m is appl icable to all complicated positions. At the same time, like any other method of organ ised th inking, it can g ive good resu lts when it has entered a player's subconscious and he follows it automati cally. But this can be achieved only by special training, to which , alas, few players g ive sufficient attentio n .
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B e n iam i n B l u m enfeld
Visual I mag i nati on a n d t h e Calcu lation of Va riations
M time studying the opening. A knowl
Moscow Championship Semi-Final
Hence the conclusion: the elimination of shortcomings in the thinking process is at least as important as a complete knowledge of the opening.
I n this position Black placed his bishop en prise, by playing 1 ... .i. e4?
ost chess theoreticians spend their
edge of the opening certainly plays an important role in over-the-board play, but nevertheless not a decisive one. Even in the last Alekhi ne-Euwe match ( 1 935), despite Euwe's enormous amount of opening prepa ration and Alekh ine's d u bious opening ex periments , there were only a few games where a loss was exclusively the result of a badly-played opening. At any event, in most games the outcome depended , or could have depended , on insufficiently deep play in the later stages of the game by one player, and often by both .
In expressing the hope that the chess press and chess organ isations will raise the question of investigative work in this field , we assume that the thoug hts of over-the board players about methods of elimi nating mistakes and improving the qual ity of chess th inking may be important, if only as material for futu re research . For a fi rst test we have chosen the fol lowing topic.
Blu menfeld
-
Zhivtsov
This blunder particularly staggered me, because my young opponent's play in this game, and in the tournament in genera l , created a good impression, he was not in time-trouble, and he thought about his faulty move for qu ite a long time. As I d iscovered from a conversation with him after the game, he rejected 1 . . . .i.h3 (1 . . . �b7 2 ttJg4) 2 'ii'x h3 'ii'x e5 3 'ili'xh6 'ii'e 1 + 4 :xe 1 gxh6, when the advantage is rather with Wh ite, who has bishop for knight with a pawn majority on the queenside. I n making the move in the game, he thought that the bishop could not be taken in view of the variation 1 . . . .i.e4 2 .i.xe4 'it'xe5 3 .i.h7+ cJ;lxh7 4 'ii'x e5 ttJd3+ regaining the q ueen ,
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Visual I m agination and the Calculation of Va riations
but he overlooked that after 2 .i.xe4 the rook on a8 was attacked .
Sergeev - B l u menfeld
Moscow Championship Semi-Final
At first sight it seems inexplicable how the player with Black saw qu ite a long way in the two g iven variations and at the same time he overlooked an obvious attack after Wh ite's very first move. As fa r as I can judge from my own experience in similar cases, the cause of this mistake was as fol lows: when the player with Black calculated the variation 1 . . . .i.e4 2 .i.xe4 etc. , in his mind he did not place the bishop from c2 onto the e4-square, but as though held it in mid-air, aiming for the h7point, in order to give check and win the queen by a d iscovery. The mental movement of the bishop can be expressed as follows: from c2 the bishop is aiming for h7, where it will be released , and it is realised that on the way to h7 there is a halt at e4 , but this halt at e4 is not made in the visual imagi nation . Such mistakes are not uncommon in practical play. This occu rs especially often whe n , i n con sidering a variation, i n your visual imagina tion you forget to move a piece or remove a captu red piece, and in your mind the piece incorrectly remains on its in itial square. It should be mentioned that in most cases such mistakes are the result not of weak ness of visual imaginatio n , but either of nervous haste, or of insufficient intensity of wil l . After mentally making a move , you ought promptly to fix the change in your visual imagination , but instead you often make the move as the result of a conversa tion with yourself, or by reproducing the move notation in your mind, or else, although you make the spatial movement in you r mind, it is without fi rmly fixing the position after the move in your visual imaginatio n . Here is another example.
This position was reached in a game played in the last round of the same tournament. A draw was sufficient for me, in view of my tournament position . It is well know that playing for a draw is not so easy: aiming for simplification and a fear of complica tions can have an adverse effect.
Here I played 1 . . . tbd4 . I spent more than half an hour on this move, since I was uncertain how to conti nue: Wh ite is th reat ening to exchange the fianchettoed bishop by .i.h6. I did not want to waste time movi ng my rook from f8 , especially since it may come in usefu l on the f-file to su pport the . . . f7-f5 advance. In general I realised that Wh ite has a clear plan of attack on Black's castled position involving the advance of his f-pawn , and possibly also his g-pawn , and I did not see any sufficiently convincing way of opposing this. Not knowing what to do, I deferred the decision by playing 1 . . . tbd4. When I made my move, I was sure that, in view of the threat of . . . tbxf3+ followed by . . . tbe5 etc. , my opponent would reply 2 �h2, and to myself I gloomily thought: what am I going to do then, since 2 . . .• a5 3 .th6 .txh6 4 'iVxh6 tbxc2? 5 tbg5 tbf6 6 tbd5 is bad for me. Here I several times kept
Visual I magi nation and the Calcu lation of Va riations
retu rning to the thought: ' It's a pity that after 1 . . . lL'ld4 2 'ifi>h2 lL'lxf3+ 3 �xf3 lL'le5 4 �g2 �xh3 he captu res on h3 with the king (and not the bishop), and I ca n't derive anyth ing from the exposed position of his king ' . I n the game (after 1 . . . lL'ld4) Wh ite replied 2 lL'ld1 ? and here I thought for five whole min utes before I saw that with 2 . . . lL'lxf3+ etc. I cou ld win a pawn . I spent these five minutes hesitati ng over what plan to choose, without reach ing any conclusion , and to take a rest from these gloomy thoughts I retu rned to the previous one: ' It's a pity that after 2 . . . lL'lxf3+ 3 .i.xf3 lL'le5 4 .i.g2 .i.xh3 he captu res with the king ' , when suddenly I saw that he couldn't capture with the king , since it was at g 1 , not at h2. Thus during these five min utes, in my mind his king was not at g 1 , where I could see it with my own eyes, but at h2, i . e . the square to where I had earlier moved it in my visual imag ination, in anticipation of my oppo nent's reply. It is qu ite possible that if after 2 ttJd 1 I could have easily decided on some thing else, and had not retu rned to thoug hts of 'it's a pity' etc. , I would not in fact have played 2 lL'lxf3+ with the win of a pawn . ...
The especially interesting point about this case is that I played 1 . . . lL'ld4 based on the threat of winning a pawn , but after movi ng the wh ite king in my mind when considering the variation , I forgot to put it back, and then the impression created by my visual imagi nation h i ndered the objective perception of the square occupied by the king. Th is explanation of the above occu rrence is not the only one. The following explanation is also possible: when I was considering 1 . lL'ld4 , I decided that si nce Wh ite replies 2 �h2, it means that 2 . . . lL'lxf3+ does not give anyth ing, and this prepared conclusion remai ned in my m i n d , although the prereq uisite move (2 'ifi>h2) was not made. .
.
Of course, it is hard to decide which explanation is correct in a specific instance.
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At any event, as far as I can judge from my own experience, moments occu r when the impression created by visual imagination displaces reality. Although such occurrences are rare , it can be considered a regular phenomenon that moves made mentally when considering one variation h i nder the correct visualisa tion of a position reached in another variation. It is clear that the greater the number of variations and the longer they are, the greater the possibility of a mistake.
The followi ng should also be borne in m i n d . I n a l o n g variation , each move m a d e in the mind leads to a position which is increas ingly removed from real ity, and therefore the impression becomes fainter and fainter. Even though a player with an especially strong visual imagination is sure that he can picture correctly in his mind a position reached as a result of a long variation , he can not be sure that the defin ite weakness of the impression will not influence the correct evaluation of the position, reached at the end of the variation. With every player it happens that, after calcu lating a variation correctly, he cannot decide whether or not it is advantageous for h i m , which , as fa r as I can judge from myself, is mainly explained by the fact that the pictu re in his mind is insufficiently clear. A chess player's think ing involves his visual imagination. Therefore, the clearer and more vivid the visual picture, the easier and more accurately his thinking works and the more fruitful it is. There is another danger involved with long variations: the mental strain of working out a long variation is so great, because of the need, move after move, to record the changes with the visual imagination, that tiredness resulting from the strain may tell later in the game.
Every over-the-board player should be
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Visual I mag ination and the Calcu lation of Va riations
clearly awa re of the role of visual imagina tion and the dangers inevitably involved in the calcu lation of variations, and he should d raw appropriate conclusions, taking ac cou nt, of cou rse, of his degree of visual imagi natio n . F o r our pa rt, w e can d raw t h e followi ng concl usions: A fter a move by the opponent you should begin thinking not with prepared conclu sions, made beforehand, but as though anew, beginning by visually impressing the resulting position on your mind.
However strongly developed your visual imagi nation , it is qu ite obvious that the impression in you r mind will be weaker than the visual perceptio n . Therefore, when your opponent makes a move, even one that is expected, you should never (except, of course, in extreme time trouble) without thinking immediately make the prepared reply to the expected move: after all, this reply was prepared when the given position was in your imagination; it is qu ite possible that now,
when after the opponent's move this posi tion is d i rectly perceived with all its featu res, i . e . including the opponent's move , as a result of the greater cla rity of the picture there will also be new ideas. A strict internal discipline should be observed when considering variations; in particular, you should not rush men tally from one variation to another, returning several times to the same one, but first establish an order for consider ing the varia tions applicable to the specific situa tion, and then gradually move in your mind from one variation to another; moreover, when considering each varia tion, after each move make the appropria te move in your mind, fix it with you visual imagination, and at the end of the variation make a summary, and only after this turn to the next variation.
The establishment of the order of con sideration should be based on aiming for a possible reduction in the number and length of variations. First you should examine wha t seems on first impression to be the most dangerous reply to the proposed move and only if a defence is found against this dangerous reply should you examine whether or not there is a more veiled reply. In exactly the same way, if within a few moves a variation should give a clear, decisive advantage, it is pointless to lengthen in your mind the details of converting the advantage. If your next move is absolutely forced, and the branches (variations) begin after your move and the opponent's reply, for the moment it is too early to delve into the variations: after your forced move and the opponent's reply the visual picture will be clearer, and it will be easier to calculate varia tions. This also applies to a case where in a variation tha t is, say, eight moves long, after the first few moves a forced return to the initial position is possible (repetition of moves). In this case you are recommended, without thinking for long, to make the first few moves, in order then to work out the variations to the end, and if they prove unfavourable, then return to the initial position by repeating moves. In positions which are not sharp, where there cannot be forced varia tions, calcu lation should be restricted to a few short variations for better revealing the fea tures of the position. If there is a possible choice between two continuations, producing roughly the same effect (equality, advantage, deci sive advantage), you should prefer the continuation which involves less vari ational calculation, and hence, the smaller danger of a mistake. This principle should
Visual I magination and the Calculation of Va riations
be fi rmly adhered to, rejecting any kind of 'romanticism' . If, for example, there is choice between liqu idating into a pawn endgame with an extra pawn and a certain wi n , and a mu lti-move mating combi nation with branches, it is more sensible to choose the fi rst continuatio n : there have been instances in tou rnaments where a player annou nced mate in a few moves then lost the game, since the mate proved to be fictitious. Our arguments, especially the last one, will certainly be opposed by supporters of chess 'beauty' . In our opinion, the calculation of variations is only a necessary technique, and if this technique can be simplified or made easier, so much the better. The
beauty of chess lies in its inner logic and richness of ideas, for the revealing of which in most cases a deep penetration into the position is sufficient, calculation being needed only to check the correctness of the ideas. Chess is a pu rposefu l game: you
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should aim to ach ieve the desired result with the maximum certainty. This is why we consider our argu ment to be correct. The importance of visual impressions for chess thinking is so great, that a defi n ite role is bound to be played by factors aiding visual perception, such as: appropriate lighting during play, the correct correlation between the board and the pieces, and a colouring of the pieces that is easy on the eye . From my own experience I know that if during a simu ltaneous d isplay the lighting is poor, the pieces are pai nted an irritating colour, or the board is not correctly propor tioned , the result of the d isplay even against weaker players will be worse than in a d isplay against stronger players but with more favourable cond itions for visual per ception . I th i n k that chess organ isations should consult with experts on physiology and psychological testing, and, in accord ance with their d i rectives, develop a stand ard type of chess equ ipment.
40
� PART I I I ntu itive Dec i s i o n s Mark Dvoretsky
T he Devel opment of C h ess I ntu iti on
I players with a un iversal style, who perform
t i s extremely rare to come across chess
with identical success in any type of position . One such player was Bobby Fischer, and - in his best years - Boris Spassky. Normally all players, including outstanding grand masters, have various playing defects . It is very important to try and elimi nate them in good time, to 'tig hten up' the backward aspects of your play, without, of course, abandoning your natu ral style. Players are trad itionally divided into combi native and positional . At one time it was comparatively simple to disti nguish players by this criterion , but now things are d ifferent - hardly any purely positional or purely combinative players rema i n . Besides, such a d ivision talks only about the manner of play, and not about thinking pecu liarities. It is insufficiently informative as regards choos ing the direction and content of training req uired by a player. To me it seems more productive to distinguish a player by the type of thinking which dominates in his ap proach to the taking of decisions intuitive or logical.
Grand masters with an intu itive approach , such as Jose Raul Capablanca , M ikhail Tal ,
Tigran Petrosian a n d Anatoly Karpov, have a keen feeling for the slig htest nuances of a position and possess sharp combinative visio n . They are weaker in the planning of a game, in strategy, they do not especially like calculating variations, and they make mis takes in calculation . At the opposite extreme we fi nd, for exam ple, Akiba Rubinstein, M i khail Botvinnik, Lajos Portisch and Garry Kasparov. They find deep plans in the opening and the su bseq uent stages, their thinking is disci pli ned , and they calcu late variations accu rately. But occasionally they miss unex pected tactical ideas, sometimes they are excessively direct, and they sense insuffi ciently keenly the turni ng-poi nts of a game. Of cou rse , all this is merely an approximate scheme. Usually the 'diagnosis' I give to a player with whom I am working (i rrespective of whether it is a candidate master or a g randmaster) includes many more different parameters . Even so, from the methodologi cal point of view this classification seems to me to be very usefu l . F o r a chess player i t is a great stroke of fortune to possess a natu rally well-devel oped intuition . But, as Alexander Alekh ine poi nted out, this can also harbour a serious psychological danger.
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The Development of Chess I ntuition
Along with the obvious advantages given by a quick grasp of situation, the ability to see almost simultaneously the whole array of tactical features contained in any compli cated position (economy of thinking and, as a consequence, self-belief), almost insepa rably linked are temptations: a player may easily arrive at the faulty opinion that those good moves, which on acquaintance with the position he sees immediately - or almost immediately - are definitely the best, and as a result of this his play loses just as much in depth as it gains in ease. This gradual rejection of seeking the absolute best, and being satisfied only with good moves, is unfortunately (for the art of chess) characteristic of the present phase of Capablanca 's career. (From a famous arti cle by Alekh ine 'The 1 927 New York tournament as a prologue to the battle in Buenos Aires for the world championship' . ) For players with an intuitive type of th inking it is advisable to do training in the solving of strategic problems (for example, involving choice of plan at the transition from opening to middlegame). It is usefu l for them to test their strength in exercises with the compli cated calculation of variations, demanding perseverance and concentratio n . At one time I suggested that Alexander Chern i n should work in t h i s directio n . Soon he made sign ificant prog ress , qu ickly progressing from an ordinary master to a strong g rand master, and a participant in a Candidates tournament for the world championship. Things are more complicated with the development of i ntuition . Sometimes play ers and even their trainers do not know how to approach this problem. In this lectu re I will share certain thoug hts, based on my train ing experience. Chess intuition is the abil ity easily and qu ickly - and sometimes immed iately - to grasp the essence of a position, the most important ideas contai ned in it, and to
41
assess the promise of particular conti nua tions. I ntuitive insight enables the lengthy and complicated calculation of variations to be avoided , makes our searches easier, and suggests where the solution may be h idden . A serious study of chess, of its playing methods, and a thoughtful analysis of various specific situations significantly develops and enriches our intuition. I will
not attempt to demonstrate this argument it is illustrated in the first part of my book School of Chess Excellence 1 - Endgame Analysis, in the chapter "The benefit of 'abstract' knowledge". I also recommend that you read the article by Eduard Gufeld ' How to develop intuition' from his book My Life in Chess. Throughout a game we rely (to a g reater or lesser extent, and with varying degrees of success) on our intuitio n . It d isplays itself in the most varied forms. Think of certain concepts which we constantly use: 'positional feeling', 'spirit of the position ' , 'combinative vision', 'sense of danger' , 'feeling for the in itiative' - even from their verbal expres sion it is obvious that these are d ifferent man ifestations of the intu itive perception of the game. I n principle, it would be useful to discuss each of these sepa rately, but this is a topic for a special investigatio n . Stra ngely enoug h , in chess l iteratu re intui tion is often simply taken to mean the abil ity to decide on a sacrifice of material that does not lend itself to exact calculation . Essen tially this confuses the concepts of risk, because of the impossibility of calculating the variations to the end, and intuition .
(see diagram)
42
�
The Development of Chess I ntuition
Sueti n - Bagi rov 3 1 st USSR Championship, Leningrad 1 963
But some players would probably have approached the problem d ifferently, indeed intu itively. For example, M i khail Tal , after assessing a few variations, would al most certainly have qu ickly decided : the sacrifice was promising (not correct, but promising) and decided to go in for it. Or, on the contra ry, he would have judged its conse quences to be in Black's favour and played differently. 1 8 'ii'x g7+ ! ?
�xg7
1 9 il.xf6+
Vlad imir Bagirov has just played 1 7 ... il.e7d6! . ' Normal ' conti nuations lead to piece exchanges and Black obtains an excellent position. Neither 1 8 il.xd6 l1xd6 ( 1 9 'iVxd6?? il.xg2+ ) nor 1 8 lIxf6 il.xe5 1 9 .:txc6 'iVxb2 ! is dangerous for h i m . Alexey Suetin writes: 'What was I to do ? I did not wish to go in for simplification. It was here that I was at tracted and as though entranced by a queen sacrifice. I feverishly calculated the varia tions. The hands on my clock inexorably advanced, but the calculations became more and more complicated. I had to reconcile myself to a draw, or, relying on my intuition, take a risk. ' From the commentary it is clear that Suetin spent a long time trying to calculate the sacrifice exactly, but he was unable to do so. Of course, his bold decision contains an element of intu itive assessment, but only an element. I n principle, he acted not intui tively, but by calculation . And this was probably correct - Black obtains too g reat a material advantage (queen for just one minor piece). Any unforeseen defensive resource , enabling the immed iate threats to be parried , may immed iately decide the outcome in Black's favour.
'Now came the turn for my opponent to think. As was later discovered, this was perhaps the decisive point of the game. Where should the king move to: h6 or g6? 8agirov thought for a whole hour, and also played most probably by intuition. ' A strange conclusion, wou ldn't you agree: 'thought for a whole hour, and played by intu ition '?! In fact Black tried to calculate everyth ing exactly, but he was unable to do so and he made a mistake . Where does intuition come in here? We see that Suetin talks about it, clearly having no idea what it means. I n cidenta lly, as was shown by Andre Lil ienthal, the sacrifice was i ncorrect and would have been refuted by 1 9 . . . �g6 ! ' If 20 il. d 3 there is t h e strong reply 20 . . . il.e7! , attacking the bishop on d3. For example, 2 1 il.xe7 ':xd3 2 2 :g5+ � h 6 2 3 cxd3 ':e8! 24 il.f6 ':'e6 (or 24 . . . 'iVf2). The main variation is 20 l:1af1 'ife3! 2 1 il.d3 �h6 ! ' If White now follows Tal's recommen dation 22 ltJd 1 'iVd2 23 .:t5f2 (23 ltJf2 ':g8), then 23 . . . 'iVxf2 ! 24 .:txf2 .:tde8 25 il.c3 f5! with advantage to Black. 22 il.xd8 ':xd8 23 ':xf7 (23 l:tf6+ �g7 24 l1xf7+ �g8 25 il.xh7+ �h8, and the attack is parried) 23 . . Jtd7 24 ltJd5!? (24 : 1 f6+ �g5 25 .:tf5+ �h4 ! ) 24 . . . il.xd5! 25 l:txd7 il.xg2+! 26 �xg2 'ifg5+ 27 �f3 'iff4+ 28 �e2 'ifg4+ , or 25 l:t 1 f6+ 'iti>g5 26 l:1f5+ 'iti>h4
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The Development of Chess I ntuition
27 l:[xd7 'ii'c 1 + 28 �f1 (28 :tf1 �xg2+ 29 �xg2 'iVg5+) 28 . . . �xg2+ ! 29 �xg2 'ii'x c2+, and Black wins. 19 . . .
�h6?
20 l:taf1 ! Wh ite i ntends 2 1 l:[h5+ �g6 22 l:[h4 with the th reats of 23 �d3+ and 23 �h5+.
25 .td3+
43
l::t x d3?!
In time-trouble Vlad imir Bag irov h u rries to simpl ify the position. A q u ite understandable decision , although by no means forced. Suetin g ives the variation 25 ... �g7 26 ':xf7+ �g8 27 .tc4 �h8 28 l:.7f5 .te8 29 lDd5 with dangerous threats, but instead of 28 . . . .te8? Black has the stronger 28 . . . h4 or 28 . . . l:ld2. 26 cxd3? I nterposing the check 26 l1f6+! would have placed Black in a d ifficult position. He would have had to allow the captu re on f7 with check, since after 26 . . . �g5?! 27 :t 1 f5+ �g4 28 cxd3 he can not play 28 .. :iix d3? 29 ':f4+ 'it>g5 30 h4 mate. 26 . . .
'ii'x d3
27 1:.f6+
�g5
28 ltxf7
h4
29 �g1
'iVe3+
30 l:l7f2 20 . . .
'ii'e 3?
A fu rther mistake, after which Black's posi tion becomes anxious. In the event of 20 . . . .te7 White could either force a draw by 24 l:th5+ �g6 25 l:tg5+, or play on with 2 1 i.xe7 f6 (2 1 . . . :tg8!?) 2 2 i.xf6 l:[xf6 23 l:txf6+ �g7 24 1tf7+ �h8 25 �d3 'iVxb2 with chances for both sides. The sharp battle would qu ickly have ended peacefully after 20 . . . .txg2+!? 21 �xg2 1:g8+ 22 �h 1 l:tde8 23 :h5+ (23 .tf3 'ii' a 6) 23 ... �g6 24 :tg5+ �h6. The immediate 20 . . . :tde8 !? was also possible. 21 l:th5+
�g6
22 l:th4!
.tf4!
The only defence. 23 llhxf4 23 l:tfxf4 'iVc1 + 24 i.f1 did not work because of 24 . . . h5! 25 lDe2 'iVxc2. 23 . . .
h5
23 .. :ifh3 24 lDe4! 24 �xd8
l:[xd8
30 . . . Now White gains a decisive advantage. It was essential to open up the position of the enemy king by 30 . . . h3! 31 gxh3 i.f3 or 31 . . . �h4 with a probable draw. 31 lDe2 ! �h6 32 lDf4 a5 33 l:[d1 a4 34 h3 �h7 35 lDd5? (35 lDh5) 35 ... 'ii'c 5? (35 . . . i.xd5 3 6 l:[xd5 'iVc1 + 3 7 l:tf1 'ii'x b2 ) 36
44
�
The Development of Chess I ntuition
liJf6+ �g7 37 a3 �g6 3S liJg4 �h7 39 :e1 'ii'd 6 40 liJe3 �g6 41 liJf5 "dS 42 %1e6+ (in Sueti n's opin ion , 42 liJe7+ �g7 43 :e6 was even stronger) 42 . . . �f7 43 liJd4+ 'it>g7 44 :1e4 �d7 45 liJf3 �f5 46 l:td4 'ili'eS 47 ':xh4, and Wh ite grad ually converted his material advantage. Let us retu rn to the problem that Wh ite faced. Deliberating over this type of irra tional problem is one way of develop ing intuition. Think a little about the
position and try to 'guess' whether or not the sacrifice is correct, and whether it should be made . Clearly, here you can 't get by without calcu lating some variations. When training your intuition, you should aim not to calculate everything 'to the end', but, after checking some minimum number of varia tions, come to a definite conclusion as soon as possible. After then checking you opinion with the 'answer', you will see whether you were searching in the right direction, and whether or not at the very start you missed some ideas impor tant for the taking of the decision evaluative or specifically tactical.
I n just this way you can try to choose the correct square for the black king on the 1 9th move . You will fi nd several examples of this type (with the help of the index of themes) in the afore-mentioned series School of Chess Excellence. The success of Wh ite's attack in this example was mainly based not on purely chess factors (objectively the queen sacri fice was incorrect), but psychological fac tors , which must be taken into account when you intu itively assess how prom ising a problematic decision is. What told was the surprise effect (Bagirov had stud ied the position after 1 7 . . . �d6 in his home prepara tions, but had not noticed the q ueen sacrifice). But the main thing was Bag irov's style of play. He was a strong positional
player, but in complicated tactical situations he was usually much weaker. I was once able to exploit this factor. Dvoretsky - Bagi rov USSR Championship, First Leag ue, Tbilisi 1 973 Alekhine Defence 1 e4 liJf6 liJd5 2 e5 3 d4
d6
4 c4
liJ b6
5 exd6
cxd6
6 liJc3 7 h3
g6
S liJf3 9 �e2
�g7 0-0
1 0 0-0
liJc6 �f5
1 1 �e3
d5
12 c5
liJc4
1 3 �xc4 14 'ili'a4
�d3
dxc4
This is one of the well-known variations of the Alekh ine Defence, on which Bag irov was an expert. Later ga mes convinced me that Black ach ieves equal ity by 14 . . . e51. 1 5 l:[fd 1 'ili'a5! Now if 1 5 . . . e5? there follows 16 d5 liJd4? ! 1 7 liJe 1 I . Bad is 1 5 . . .f5? 1 6 d5 liJe5 1 7 liJg5! (or 1 7 liJe 1 ! ) 1 7 .. .f4 1 8 �d4! (but not 1 8 �xf4 l:txf4 1 9 liJe6 'iVb8 20 liJxf4 liJf3+ 2 1 gxf3 'iVxf4). 1 6 . . .f4 (instead of 1 6 . . . liJe5) also does not help: 1 7 .l:l xd3 ! ! cxd3 1 8 dxc6 fxe3 1 9 cxb7 exf2+ 20 'it>f1 (now it is clear why the exchange was given up) 20 . . . l:tb8 2 1 'iVc4+ �h8 2 2 c6. 1 6 'iVxa5
liJxa5
1 7 liJe1
�f5
1 S l:r.ac1 1 8 d5! is stronger, as I later played against W. Martz (Wij k aan Zee 1 975). 1S . . . liJc6!
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The Development of Chess I ntuition
1 9 g4
iLd7
20 dS
lLl b4
45
26 . . . b5 27 ':'xb3 a5? 28 lLld3, and after the rook moves - 29 lLlxb5. 27 nxb3
bS
2s lLld3
l:tSe7
29 na3
hS
29 . . . a5 30 lLla2 l:txc1 + 3 1 lLldxc1 a4 came into consideration . The pawns are block aded , but at least they would have advanced a little further. 30 gxhS 30 f3 was safer, or even 30 lLle2 ! ? hxg4 3 1 hxg4 iLxg4 3 2 l:txc7 ':xc7 3 3 lLld4 iL d 7 34 ':a5. 30 . . .
gxhS
31 h4 If 2 1 a3, then 2 1 . . . lLla6 followed by 22 . . . l:tac8, and the c5-pawn is very weak. Generally speaking, now Black is excellently placed . Taking account of this factor, and also my opponent's style of play, I decided to go in for great complications, by provoking Bagirov into making a piece sacrifice. 21 b3 1 ? lLlxa2 ! ? 21 . . . cxb3 2 2 axb3 e 6 ! was simpler, with a roughly equal game, but the temptation proved too strong . 22 lLlxa2
exb3
23 lLle3
lIfeS?!
My reckoning proves justified - Black immed iately commits a serious inaccu racy. Bagirov was hoping to prevent 24 iLd4, but he fails to ach ieve this aim. Stronger was 23 . . . a5 24 iLd4 a4 (24 . . . e5 25 dxe6 iLxe6 is also possible) 25 iLxg7 'iti>xg7 26 ':'b1 l:tfc8 27 lLld3 :a5! (i ntend ing . . . .:.xc5 or . . . iLb5) with chances for both sides. 24 iLd41
iLxd4
2S :xd4
':xeS
31 . . .
iLfS?!
It is not clear why Black avoids 3 1 . . . a5! 32 lLla2 ':'xc1 + 33 lLldxc1 a4 (with the th reat of 34 . . . .:tc4) 34 lLld3 iLf5 (34 . . J�c4? 35 lLle5). By playing 35 lLle5! Wh ite retains some winning chances, but no more than that. We see that in a complicated position Bagirov acts unsurely. Usually he avoids situations of this type, he has insufficient experience in them, and so here his intuition lets him down . 32 lLle2
lIxe1 +?
Now Black's position becomes hopeless. 32 . . . iLxd3 33 ':xc7 l:txc7 34 l:[xd3 a5 suggests itself. I n the endgame, passed pawns should be advanced ! 33 lLldxe1
l:te7
34 lLl b3
iLe4
3s lLl bd4
iLxdS
36 lLlxbS
lle4
37 lLlbd4!
:e7
37 . . . e5 38 l:ta51 .
26 l:tb4 26 lLld3 seemed less accu rate to me on account of 26 . . . b2! 27 lLlxb2 l:tac8 . 26 . . .
Here too 31 lLle2 or 31 lLla2 came into consideration .
:aeS
3S 'iti> h2
eS?!
39 l:taS!
exd4
40 ':'xdS
l:te2
46
�
The Development of Chess I ntuition
'oii> g 4.
41 tDxd4
lIxf2+
42 'oii> g 3
1:td2
47 . . .
'oii> g S
43 llg5+
'oii>fS
4S l::t h 6
a4
44 tDf5
a5
49 .l:ta6
.l:.a2
45 l:txh5
'oii> g S
46 l:tg5+ The sealed move. This was an appropriate moment to adjourn the game: Wh ite's position is certainly won . but now he needs to decide on a plan for converting his advantage. and this is best done i n home analysis. 46 . . .
'oii> fS
50 'oii> g 4
a3
51 'oii> h 5
f6
5 1 . . . : a 1 52 'oii> h6 would have come to the same thing . 51 . . . 'oii> h7 52 .l:ta7 l::t f2 ! was the most tenacious. but even then Wh ite would have won by 53 .l:.xf7+ 'oii> h 8 54 'oii> g 6 (54 'oii> h 6!? 'oii> g 8 55 'oii> g 6 :g2+ 56 'oii> f6 with the th reat of 57 tDe7+) 54 . . .1lg2+ 55 'oii> h 6 'oii> g 8 56 :a7 a2 57 h5 1:tb2 58 tD h4 'oii> f8 59 tDg6+ 'oii> e 8 60 tDe5! (preparing 61 'oii> g 5) 60 . . . .l:.g2 61 tDd3 and 62 tDb4 . 52 l:ta7!
l::t a 1
53 'oii> g 6
:g 1 +
54 'oii> xf6
1:ta1
55 tDh6+
'oii> h S
56 tDf7+ Black resig ned . I rrational problems. with wh ich you can check and sharpen your i ntuition . do not necessarily i nvolve material sacrifices. Kaspa rov - Karpov 47 llh5 I n itially it seemed to me that 47 h5 would decide matters more simply. for example: 47 . . . l:.d 1 48 'oii> g 2 .l:td2+ 49 'oii> h 3 lId1 50 tDg3 (the a5-pawn is attacked ) 50 . . . a4 51 h6 l:td6 52 h7. But then I d iscovered that after 47 .. .1ld 1 48 'oii> g 2 Black has 48 . . .f6 ! 49 l:tg6 (49 h6 l:td7 ! ) 49 . . . .l:td7! (but not 49 . . . 'oii> f7? 50 1:[g7+ 'oii> e 6 51 h 6 ! ) . The exchange of rooks after 50 .l:txf6+ .l:.f7 leads to a draw. but otherwise. by playing 50 . . . .l:ta7. Black gains counter-chances . I ncidentally. Black needs to interpose 47 . . . .l:.d 1 ! . since after the immed iate 47 .. .f6 48 l::t g 6 l::t d 7 White wins easily by 49 l:txf6+ :If7 50 :Ixf7+ 'oii> xf7 5 1 tDd4 (or 5 1 tDd6+) 5 1 . . . a 4 5 2 tDb5 'oii> f6 53
World Championship Match . Moscow 1 984/5. 6th Game
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The Development of Chess I ntuition
Black is a pawn u p , but the activity of the wh ite pieces more than compensates for this small material deficit. It is clear that now the knight must be advanced . But where to : f5 or c6? On c6 the knight attacks the a7-pawn , restricting the black rook's mobil ity. From f5 , on the other hand, it controls the d6-square and prepa res the advance of the passed pawn . Wh ich is more important? To calcu late the variations at the board is completely impossible - after some approximate esti mations you have to trust your intuition. In his book The Test of Time Garry Kasparov several times draws the attention of the readers to the fact that in complicated situations his intu itive perception of the position proved correct. He is obviously proud of his own intu itio n , and considers it one of his strong poi nts . But it is clear that any top player can boast of n umerous examples of the correct solving of d ifficult problems. In order to make an objective judgement about the degree to which intuition is developed , it is more important to follow how often it lets a player down . For example, in sharp positions the young Mikhail Tal nearly always acted in the strongest way, fi nding the attacking re sou rces that were most dangerous for his opponent. Whereas, as a careful study of Kasparov's play revealed to me, his i ntuition is far from faultless. Even in his best games, at some point he often 'miscued ' and gave his opponents additional chances (wh ich , however, they did not always exploit). That was also what happened i n thi � example. Kasparov 'guessed wrong' and missed a wi n . Later he did not sense the moment when it was now time to force a draw, and in the end he lost. You will find the game in an addendum to the lectu re. A correct i ntu itive perception of the situation helps a player to spend his time rationally,
47
and suggests when he needs to concen trate and carefully check variations, or where , on the contrary, for one reason or another there is no point in delving into a detailed calculation . Tal
-
Dvoretsky
42nd USSR Championship, Len i ngrad 1 974
21
.
.
.tfS ! ?
.
'The move in the game involves a clever trap ' (Tal). I was very much hoping that the ex-world champion would be tempted by the possibil ity of beg i n n ing an offensive against my king by 22 .txe5 .txa2 23 .t a 1 ! (threatening not only the capture of the bishop, but also the deadly 24 'iVc3) 23 . . . 'iVb3 (the only defence) 24 'iVd2 . The variations would appear to be in his favour. Such an attack would have been fu lly in keeping with Tal's style. 'After some hesitation, I decided not to open the sluices for the black pieces', writes Tal . 'A nd I acted correctly: after 2 2 .txe5 Black had prepared 22 .tb3!!, not only securing opposite-colour bishops, but also regaining the pawn!' . . .
22 llb1 !
'iVd7
23 l:ed 1
.txd6
48
�
The Development of Chess I ntuition
24 cxd61 Subsequently Wh ite method ically converted his positional advantage. Many years later I retu rned to the analysis of the position and ca me to the conclusion that 22 . . . �b3 (in reply to 22 �xe5) was not as strong as I thought. The pawn is indeed regained , but Wh ite still retains the adva n tage in the middlegame with opposite colour bishops, by continuing 23 axb3 ':'xe5 24 f4 ':'xc5 (or 24 . . . :ee8 25 e5) 25 �c4. On the other hand, in the variation 22 . . . �xa2 ! ? 2 3 � a 1 'ii' b 3 24 'ii'd 2 it i s not possible to demonstrate an advantage for Wh ite . I thought that 24 . . . ':'xe4 was refuted by 25 .tf3 1be 1 + 26 ':'xe 1 (26 'ii'x e 1 ! 'ii'e 6 27 'ii' b4 is stronger) 26 . . . �g7 27 �xg7 'it>xg7 28 ':'a 1 , and Black loses a piece, but instead of 26 . . . �g7? he has 26 . . . �xc5 ! ' Even more important is the fact that after 24 . . . �xc5! 25 'ii'g 5 Black parries both th reats 26 'ifxc5 and 26 'iff6 with the simple move 25 . . . �e7 ! . Tal d i d not delve into these variations, because for this there was no need . The basis of his decision was a correct evalua tion of the situation on the board . I ndeed , why go in for complications, in the calcula tion of which it is easy to go wrong, if all the opponent's pieces are condemned to pas sivity and Wh ite's obvious advantage can be retai ned by simple means?
essence of the position: to determine the most important problem (positional or tactical) which has to be solved, to sense the correct direction of our searches, and to perceive the desirability or unde sirability of a particular operation. It is
clear that a well-developed intu ition assists in perceiving th ings rapidly and correctly. You may have heard the classic story of how some grand masters, absorbed in a d ifficult analysis, asked the advice of Smyslov. After a l ittle thought, Vasily Vasil ievich remarked : 'The rook should be placed on the fifth rank'. The recommendation seemed tQO abstract, but with in a short time Smyslov repeated : 'Ah , if only the rook was on the fifth ! ' They began looking in this d i rection and soon real ised that Smyslov was absol utely right. Examples of this sort of assessment can be found by studying the commentaries to games, especially those written by players with an intuitive style. N i mzowitsch - Capablanca New York 1 927
It is now time to move away from wild combinative complications and talk about quiet positional problems or the compara tively simple tactical tasks which we are obl iged to solve at al most every step. I n some books you can read that the process of assessing a position consists in determining and weighing up all the positional factors wh ich affect it. This is ru bbish ! - in fact the greater part of such work is performed subconsciously. The art of as sessment is the ability to grasp the
Jose Raul Capablanca writes: 'White is at last ready to liberate his position by means of b2-b4 followed by �b2. Black on the other hand, as a result of simple and logical development, has the control of both
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The Development of Chess I ntuition
the open files with his rooks and is also ahead in time. It is now time to turn his advantage to account before White is able fully to develop his game. ' 20 . . . 'iWe51 'A finesse to gain time in bringing the queen into the battle. Black wants to take posses sion of the second row with one of his rooks and to do that he needs the co-operation of the queen. The text move aims at prevent ing b2-b4 at once, which would be an swered by 21 . . . .i.d6 22 g3 "fie4, and Black will obtain possession of the second rank. ' As you see , Black's main aim is formulated - the occu pation of the 2nd ran k (it is also clear what Wh ite wants - to complete his development and beg i n exchanging rooks). Without specific analysis it is d ifficult to foresee wh ich of the two sides will be more successfu l in carrying out their plans. But at least it is clear what they need to a i m for. 21 93 'ii' d 5! 22 b4
.i.f8
23 .i. b2
'ii'a 2!
49
(Alekh ine) 2S . . . aS! he would have had to seek salvation in a heavy piece endgame a pawn down . A sample variation is 26 bxaS bxaS 27 l:txc8 l:[xc8 28 :d 1 .i.xa3 29 .i.xa3 'iWxa3 30 'iWa6 'iWc3 . 2S 11ad 1 ! as 26 .i.d4! is stronger: 26 . . . axb4 27 axb4 .i.xb4 28 .i.xb6, or 26 . . . 'iWxa3 26 bxaS 'iWxaS (the reply is the same after 26 . . . bxaS) 27 :a 1 , regaining the pawn . 25 . . .
:c2
26 'iWa6?1 Another error by N imzowitsch in his percep tion of the position : he does not sense that his queen should be participating in the defence of the kingside. 26 "fif1 or 26 'iWd 1 (with the idea of 27 ':e2) suggests itself. The move i n the game allows Capablanca to include his second rook in the attack along the 2nd rank.
24 l:ta1 ?! Alexander Alekhine suggested 24 J:[bd 1 ! ::lxd 1 (if immediately 24 . . . aS, then 2S J:.xd8 J:txd8 26 .i.d4 ! ) 2S ':xd 1 . After 2S . . . aS 26 bxaS bxaS (26 . . . .i.xa3 27 'ii' a 6 ! ) Alekh ine conti nues 27 'ii' a 6? l:tc2 28 l:td8 l:txb2 29 l:I.xf8+ with perpetual check, or 28 . . . 'ii'x b2 29 'ii'd 6 with a draw. As Harry Golombek poi nted out, in this variation Black wins by 28 . . . 'ii' b 1 + ! 29 �g2 "fixb2 . 27 l:.d2! is correct, and if 27 . . . .i.xa3, then either 28 'ii'd 1 ! , or 28 'ii' a 6! J:[f8 (28 .. Jlb8 29 'ii' x aS ! , and the bishop a t b 2 is immune) 2 9 'ii'x aS 'ii'b 1 + 30 �g2 .i.xb2 (30 . . . 'ii'e 4+ 31 f3) 3 1 'i'b4 . 24 . . .
'ii' b3
25 .i.d4?! It is surprising , but Aaron N imzowitsch does not real ise that he should seek salvation by exchanging rooks. However, after 2S l:.ac1
26 . . . 27 .i.xe5 28 'ii' b 1?
e5! l:tdd2
By this point all the commentators had already written Wh ite off, but to me his position seems defensible, despite the inaccuracies committed earl ier. The queen should have been retu rned to the defence: 28 'ii'f 1 (in the event of 28 :f1 ? Black spectacu larly decides matters with 28 . . . 'ii'x e3! 2 9 .i.f4 l:.xf2 ! ) . Alekh ine gives the
50
�
The Development of Chess I ntuition
variation 28 . . . "d5 29 �d4 "h5! 30 h4 (otherwise 30 . . . l:txf2) 30 . . ...f3, and after 3 1 l:.ac1 ':'xf2 the g3-pawn is under attack. This is why instead of 29 �d4? Wh ite should play 29 �f4! 'ii' h 5 (29 . . ...f3 30 l:.ec 1 ! ) 30 h4 "f3 31 l:tec 1 ! or 30 . . . h6 3 1 e4 ! , retaining good chances o f a d raw. 28 . . .
:txf2
29 g4
'ili'e6
30 �g3
l:txh2 !
30 . . ... xg4 was less good because of 3 1 l:.f1 . 3 1 "f3 3 1 �xh2 'ili'xg4+ 32 � h 1 "h3 with unavoid able mate . 31 . . .
1:1 hg2+
32 'ii'x g2
':'xg2+
33 �xg2
"xg4
34 l:tad 1
h5
35 1:1d4
"g5
36 �h2
a5
37 .:te2
axb4
38 axb4
�e7
39 l:te4
�f6
40 l:tf2
"d5
41 1:[e8+
�h7
Wh ite resigned . For the development of intu ition , various types of training games are usefu l , forcing you to ta ke a decision quickly, without careful thought. At the fi rst session of our school, g randmas ter Yusu pov recommended that you should play 'guess the move'. Take a good game by a grand master, with detailed comments by him, and after the opening start trying to guess his moves, al lowi ng you rself very little time for the whole game (for example, half an hour). Then compare your sugges tions with the g rand master's moves and his comments.
At one time Sergey Dolmatov and I played an i nteresting type of game, aimed at developing endgame i ntuitio n . An issue of Informator was opened (the 'endgame' section) and some random number was named . The ending with this number was set up on the board . Dolmatov played for the side which with correct play could (accord ing to the assessment given in the book) gain a d raw in an inferior position, or a win in a superior one. He would fi rst ponder over the position for five m i n utes, then the clocks would be started and we would play a blitz game, with the trainer using the analysis published in the book. Sometimes an additional ru le was introduced : at one point of the game, which Dolmatov considered to be the most important, he had the right to stop the clock and think for a further five minutes. If desired , you can try this with a friend (using two d ifferent issues of Infor mat�r) in this case each of you in tu rn performs the role of the trainer. -
However, the best way of training the rapid perception of position proved to be the game which I will now describe. U nfortu nately, it cannot be played without a trai ner or partner and without a previously pre pared selection of special exercises. (How ever, now this problem is nevertheless resolvable with the help of a computer training program I have prepared ). The clock is set, and you have , say, 1 5 minutes to the time contro l . During this time you have to fi nd the correct solutions to five d ifferent positions. The first position is set up on a board , and the clock is started . After taking a decision, you make a move on the board and stop the clock. The second position is set up, and so on. All five positions have to be solved before your flag falls. The exercises (positional or tactical ) are not too d ifficult, a n d do not demand deep calculation . Some of them are on the easy side, some are rather more d ifficult.
The Development of Chess I ntuition
You must use your time in the most economical way, to avoid reaching the last exercises already in severe time-trouble. But it is dangerous to play too qu ickly - it is easy to make a stupid mistake. You win, if you correctly solve all five exercises otherwise you fail to a g reater or lesser extent. Another form of the same game, which I in fact used with Dolmatov, Yusupov and other grandmasters whom I was training, is even more effective . Slightly more time is al lowed : 20-25 m i n utes ( 1 5 m i n utes only for grandmasters and strong masters). We play in exactly the same way, but if an exercise is solved incorrectly the clock hand is ad vanced by one third of the i n itial time reserve (with a 1 5-minute control - by 5 minutes , with a 20-min ute control - by 6% min utes, and so on). Success i n the 'series' means getting through all five positions without losing on time. You will see that
51
under such rules you can win even if you make one mistake . With two mistakes, this is u n l i kely (too l ittle time for thought re mains) and with three mistakes it is simply impossible. Play stops as soon as the time li mit is exceeded . It is also possible to win 'ahead of schedule' - if for the last one or two positions you have a time reserve which is g reater than the possible penalty for an incorrect but instant answer. I n this case it is no longer necessary to solve them. But play can also be continued after losing on time - u ntil you have gone through all five positions. It makes sense to do this if the ru les of the game envisage (with the a i m o f raising t h e seriousness and responsibil ity of the decisions take n ) some kind of 'penalty' for a loss, depending on the nu mber of additional m i nutes used . Now try solving one such 'series' .
Exercises
1. White to move
ltJ
2. Black to move
52
�
The Development of Chess I ntuition
4. White to move
3. Wh ite to move
5. White to move
The Development of Chess I ntuition
lD
53
Sol uti ons 1 . Smyslov - Gurgenidze (34th USSR Championsh i p , Tbilisi 1 966/67). 4S h4! The black pawn must be fixed on the vul nerable h5-sq uare , in order then to attack it with the bishop, and possibly create a dangerous passed pawn on the h-file. It is hardly possible simultaneously to hold two weaknesses - on a7 and h5. Wh ite is bound to win . I n the game there followed 4 S �dS? h 4 ! 46 i.. e2 lLlf8 47 �e4 (if the a7-pawn is captu red , Black shuts the king in the corner by . . . �c7) 47 ... �gS 48 �dS �f6 49 i.. g 4 lLlg6 with an obvious draw. After a passed g pawn is created, Black can give u p his kn ight for it, if his king is then able to retu rn to b8. 2. lohlesen - Belavenets (correspondence 1 974-79). 2S . . .
:t8xe6!
26 dxe6
'it'f3 ! !
White resigned . Usually the answer consists of just one move , but sometimes the solution contains two or more moves. I n such cases I make my reply, again press the clock butto n , and so on, u ntil the entire solution is reprod uced on the board . 3. Beliavsky - C hern i n ( I nterzonal Tourna ment, Tu nis 1 985). In the event of 2 1 'iVxc4 dxc4 Black would not stand badly. 21 'iVb4! Wh ite has in mind 21 . . . lLlxc3 22 %:txc3 (22 'iVxc3 !?) 22 . . . 'iVxb4 23 axb4 llxe2 24 %:tc7 1:lb8 25 l:Ixb7 and wins, or 22 . . . 'ii'xe2 23 l:!.c7 l:Iab8 24 'iVxd6 with strong pressure.
He also has the advantage after 21 . . . 'ii'x b4 22 axb4 lLlf6 23 e3 lIe7 24 lLle2 g5 25 i.. c8 ! . I n the game there followed 21 . . . aS!? 22 'ii'x bS lLlxc3 23 'iVxc4 dxc4 24 bxc3 l:.ab8 2S i.. d 71 l:1e7 26 i.. a 4 i.. d S 27 g4! g6 28 f3 fS 29 gxfS gxfS 30 �f2 �f7 31 �g3 �f6 32 �f4 i.. f7 33 1:[g1 i.. g 6 34 h4, and Wh ite converted his extra pawn . 4. M i les - Makarychev (Oslo 1 984) . Wh ite would like t o attack t h e opposing queenside pawns with his q ueen , but fi rst he must suppress the opponent's counterplay on the kingside. 37 'ii'c6? i.. x g3 38 �xg3 'ii'g 1 + would be premature. 37 lLlf1 ? 'iVb2 is pointless, while if 37 lLle2? there follows 37 . . . 'ii' e 1 ! , and 38 'iVxe5+?? loses to 38 . . . i.. f6 . 37 lLlh1 ! ! Threatening to gain an advantage b y 38 'ii'c6. For example, 37 . . . i.. e 7 38 'iVc6 i.. d 6 39 lLlg3, intend ing h4-h5 . In the game there followed 37 . . . 'iVb2 38 'iVc6 'iVb1 ? (38 . . . i.. g 5! 39 �f3 'iVb 1 40 lLlg3 'iVd 1 + 4 1 �g2 'ii'd 8 was necessary) 39 'iVxc7 'iVe4+ 40 �h2 hS 41 'ii' c 6 'iVc2 42 gxhS 'iVfS 43 'iVg2 ! ? 'ii'x hS 44 cSI , and Wh ite won . S . P i nter - Larsen ( I nterzonal Tournament, Las Palmas 1 982). Wh ite is planning action on the kingside. However, the hasty 25 �f2? ru ns into the exchange sacrifice 25 . . . .l:.xg5! 26 fxg5 lLlg6, when the position becomes unclear. 2S i.. h41 The threat of the exchange sacrifice is neutralised . If 25 . . . lLlg6 Wh ite has 26 i.. f6 , and otherwise he plays �f2 and i.. f3 , concentrating his forces on the kings ide and preparing g3-g4.
54 �
The Development of Chess I ntuition
25 . . . �e8 26 �f3 1tJd7 27 'itf2 �g6 28 l:. h 1 'it f7 2 9 �g5 " a 5 3 0 g 4 1 'itg8? ( 3 0 . . . fxg4 was more tenacious) 31 �f6 .l:tf7 32 gxf5 exf5 33 �h51 1tJxf6 34 exf6, and Black had no defence. Experience has shown that, if it is taken seriously, such training is exceptionally usefu l , simultaneously developing several skills that are important for a chess player: It improves i ntuition, the abil ity to qu ickly and correctly grasp both the tactical and the strateg ic details of the position . It cu ltivates the procedure for consider i n g a move - the habit of i m mediately determining the candidate possibil ities avail able, and also the opponent's main th reats . Without this, success when playing is not possible - with time restricted, errors will be inevitable. It develops resol uteness. There is simply no time for the careful checking of variations - you have to trust yourself and boldly take decisions. It helps i n the battle with time-trouble, since you constantly have to mon itor the expenditure of time. It assists the acq u i ring of good form before an event. Your reactions and q u ick th i n king are improved , without emotional fatigue setting in, since this type of game is lively and spontaneous. I n conclusion I should like to un ite the main ideas expressed in this lectu re i nto a kind of instruction gu ide for independent work in this field .
INS TRUCTIONS Recommendations for exercises aimed at the development of intuition
1 . Carefu lly fol low your feeli ngs and try as often as possible to predict the reply beforehand. To learn to guess, you must constantly try guessing . 2. Don't be restricted by you r fi rst i mpression - follow the changes in your feeli ngs as your delve i nto the position. The truth can be sensed at various stages of the th i n king process. Even so, try to do this as soon as possible. 3. After ascertai n i ng the objective truth, don't forget to compare it with your guesses. It is usefu l to record which ideas and rules were the most importa nt and decisive for the given position , and to what extent you took account of them in you r prel iminary assumptions. 4. A very wide range of i ntu itive feeli ngs is possible. Not necessarily the best move ; perhaps some evaluative considerations, the desirability of this or that operation, sense of danger, and so o n . 5. Comparative assessments are usually more valuable than absol ute ones. Con clusions such as 'the position is drawn ' or 'the opponent is hopelessly placed ' are rather crude and are often no help when seeking a solution . More subtle conclu sions, relating to a comparison of d ifferent moves , plans and ideas, possible pros pects , eval uation of d ifficu lties and dangers on the path to the goal, are fa r more important. 6. In your calcu lation ta ke i nto account not only purely chess factors , but also competitive ones. Tournament position , reserve o f time a n d strength , opponent's personality, the probabil ity of him making mistakes, and so o n .
The Deve lopment of Chess I ntuition
lZJ
55
7. 'Meta-intuitive' decisions are very important. For example, can you trust your intuition in the g iven instance; does the position lend itself to precise calculation and how advisable is such a calculation ; how much time should you supposedly spend on considering a move.
positions wh ich do not lend themselves to accurate calculation . Devise training exer cises and games which demand that you take intu itive decisions. It possibly makes sense to play games with a shortened time control, study the games of intu itive players , and so o n .
8. Analyse your actions. If necessary, correct the recommendations given and work out new rules.
1 0. Don't expect an i m mediate resu lt, but remain confident about your ultimate success. Purposeful actions in this d i rec tion will defi n itely held to develop your i ntuition . As a result your play will become more spontaneous, confident, rapid and assured .
9. Look for topics and ways of working on chess that have the maximum effect on the development of i ntuition. Try quickly guessing the reply in comparatively simple situations, and, by contrast, i n
Adden d u m
Kasparov - Karpov World Championship Match , Moscow 1 984/S , 6th Game Queen 's Indian Defence 1 d4 liJf6 2 c4 e6 3 liJf3 b6 4 g3 i.a6 5 b3 i.b4+ 6 i.d2 i.e7 7 i.g2 0-0 8 0-0 d5 9 liJe5 c6 10 i.c3 liJfd7 11 liJxd7 liJxd7 1 2 liJd2 ':c8 13 e4 b5 The consequences of 1 3 . . . cS were exam ined by Artur Yusu pov at the second session of our school - cf. the game Yusupov-Sax, Rotterdam 1 989, which is analysed in Secrets of Opening Preparation p.4S. Incidentally, our analysis of the clash be tween Kasparov and Karpov will be based on a deep analysis by Yusu pov, published the day after the conclusion of the game in the newspaper Sovietsky Sport. 1 4 :e1
dxc4
1 5 bxc4
liJ b6?!
1 S . . . bxc4 is better.
1 6 cxb5? The fi rst (but by no means last) occasion when Kasparov's positional feeling let him down . 1 6 cS! would have led to an advantage for Wh ite : 1 6 . . . liJa4 1 7 'ii'c2 (with the threat of 1 8 eS! ) 1 7 . . . eS 1 8 liJb3 (KarpovVan der Wiel, Amsterdam 1 986), or 1 6 . . . b4 1 7 i.b2 liJc4 1 8 liJxc4 i.xc4 1 9 'ii'c2 i.bS 20 a3.
56
�
The Development of Chess I ntuition
16 . . .
cxbS
1 7 lIc1
..ta3
1 7 . . . b4 !? was also not bad . lLla4
1 8 lIc2 1 9 ..ta1
':xc2
20 'iVxc2
'iVaS?1
20 . . .'iVe7! was stronger, not only preparing 21 . . . lIc8, but also preventing d4-dS. 21 "d 1 !
then either 26 "eS "f8 27 ..te4 , or 26 ':e3!? lLlc3 (26 . . ...d6 27 ..th3 ':f8 28 ..tfS ) 27 ..txc3 "xb3 (the bishop is invulnerable because of the weakness of the 8th rank) 28 ..te4! lIxc3 (28 . . . g6 29 "eS) 29 ..txh7+ �f8 30 ..td3! and wins. 2S . . . 26 lLlxd4
'iVxd4 lLlxa2
26 . . . ..tf8 and 27 . . . b4 was more cautious.
I n the event of the immed iate 2 1 dS Wh ite would have had to reckon with 2 1 . . . lIc8 22 'iVd3 (22 'iVd 1 lIc1 ) 22 . . ...tf8 or 22 . . . lLlb2. He wants to play lLlb3, and only then d4-dS. 21 . . .
:tc8?
Black should have chosen between 21 . . . ..tb2 22 lLlb3 "b4 and 2 1 . . . lLlc3 22 ..txc3 ! ? (22 lLlb3 'iVb4 23 "c2 nc8 , but, of cou rse, not 23 . . . lLlxa2? 24 %1e3) 22 . . ... xc3 23 lLl b 1 "as 24 lLlxa3 "xa3 2S "b3 (2S dS!?) however, i n both these cases Wh ite would also retain somewhat the better chances. 22 lLlb3
"b4
23 dS
exdS
24 exdS
lLlc3
Yusu pov showed that 27 lLlfS! would have led to a decisive advantage for Wh ite. I n reply 2 7 . . . g6? 28 d 6 gxfS 2 9 d7 is bad for Black. If 27 . . . ..tf8 , then 28 d6 is again very strong , for example, 28 . . . l:td8 29 lLle7+ �h8 30 ..teS (30 lLlc6 ':'xd6 3 1 ':'e8 is also good ) 30 . . . lLl b4 3 1 .11 e 4 . If 27 . . . ':'c1 , then 28 %bc1 ..txc1 29 d6 ..tgS 30 h4 ..tc8 (30 . . . ..td8 3 1 lLle7+ �f8 32 lLlc6 �e8 33 ..t h 3 ! ) 31 hxgS ..txfS 32 ..tc6 �f8 33 ..td4 lLlb4 34 ..txbS.
2S .d4?! I th i n k that it was not essential to exchange the q ueens - playing d i rectly for an attack with 2S 'iVhS! was stronger. If 2S . . . lLlxa2,
I nterposing 27 . . . ..t b4!? is more tenacious. White simply replies 28 :e2. The exchange sacrifice 28 ... lLlc3 29 ..txc3 ..txc3 30 lLle7+ �f8 31 lLlxc8 ..txc8 does not save Black he also loses a pawn after 32 d6 ..tb4 (32 . . . b4 33 lIe7; 32 . . . ..te6 33 ..tdS) 33 ..tc6 ..te6 34 d7 �e7 3S ..txbS. It remains to check 28 . . . lLlc1 29 lIe4. a) 29 . . . lLlb3 30 ..tb2! (the tempting 30 ..txg7? ! , hoping for 30 . . . lIc1 +? 31 ..tf1
'ZJ
The Development of Chess I ntuition
l:txf1 + 32 �g2 ! , allows Black to hold on by 31 . . . lLld2! 32 .l:txb4 .l:tc1 + 33 �f1 .i.c8 ! ) 3 0 . . . .i.f8 3 1 d6 lLlc5 3 2 lLle7+ �xe7 3 3 l::tx e7 with a won position; b) 29 . . . lLld3 30 �f1 �f8 3 1 lLle7+ (there is another way to the goal: 3 1 d6!? lLlc5 32 lLle7+ .i.xe7 33 .l:txe7 .l:td8 34 .i.c3 ! ) 3 1 . . . .i.xe7 32 l::t x e7 b 4 33 d6 with the th reats of 34 .i.xd3 .txd3 35 d7, 34 l:txa7 and 34 l::te 3; c) 29 . . . .tf8 30 d6 b4 (in the event 30 . . . lLlb3 3 1 d7 l:tc1 + 32 .tf1 .l:td 1 both .i.d4 and 33 lLl h6+ wi n ) 31 lLlh6+! gxh6 1:.g4+ .i.g7 33 .l:txg7+ �f8 34 .i.d5 lLle2+ �g2 lLlc3 36 .l:txf7+ �g8 37 .txc3 bxc3 l:txa7+ �f8 39 l:txa6 c2 40 d7 c1 'iV dxc8'it'+ 'it'xc8 4 2 .l:ta8.
of 33 32 35 38 41
Now let us see what happened i n the game. 27 lLlc6?
.i.c51
If 27 . . . �f8? the simplest solution is 28 .i.d4! (with the threat of 29 l:ta 1 ) 28 . . . lLlc1 29 d6. 27 . . . .i.d6? is also a mistake in view of 28 i.e5! l:te8 29 l::t a 1 .txe5 30 .l:txa2 �b7 (30 . . . .i.c8 31 .l:te2 f6 32 f4 .i.g4 33 l:te4) 3 1 l:txa7 .i.xc6 3 2 dxc6 �f8 3 3 .i. h 3 ! .l:te7 34 i.d7, and Black has to g ive up his bishop for the mighty pawn .
57
.i.b7?! 2 9 d 6 .i.xc6 3 0 .i.xc6 l:txc6 3 1 d7 .i.e7 32 .i.f6! gxf6 33 .l:txe7 l:td6 34 .l:te8+ �g7 35 d8'it' 1:.xd8 36 .l:txd8 a5 37 �f1 Black is in danger of losing the resulting endings) 29 l::t a 1 lLl b4 30 lLlxb4 .txb4 with eq uality; 28 lLle7+ (probably the most dangerous try) 28 . . . .i.xe7 29 ':xe7 b4! (29 . . . .l:tc1 +? 30 .i.f1 �f8 31 ':xa7 is bad for Black) 30 h4! lLlc3 3 1 d 6 (3 1 ':xa7 .i.c4 3 2 d6 lLlb5) 3 1 . . . .i.b5 32 ':'xa7 l:r.d8! (32 . . . �f8? 33 .l:tb7! with the th reat of 34 d7 and 35 .i.xc3 ; 32 .. J:tb8? 33 d7 l:td8 34 .i.h3 with advantage to Wh ite) 33 l:[b7 .i.e8 34 ::'xb4 lLlb5 35 .i.e5 f6! (35 . . . �f8 36 .i.d4 ! , and Black has a d ifficult position) 36 .i.d5+ �f8 (weaker is 36 . . . .i.f7 37 ':xb5 fxe5 38 .i.e4) 37 .i.b2 ':xd6! with a draw. 28 . . .
:a8
29 �d4
.i.xd4
30 lLlxd4
�f8
31 d6 31 1: a 1 lLlb4 32 lLlc6 lLlxc6 33 dxc6 .i.c8 is advantageous to Black.
28 .i.h3?1 A natu ra l , but in fact dubious move. It soon transpires that the bishop has moved onto an inferior d iagona l , whereas the black rook, on the contrary, moves to a better positio n . However, White no longer h a d a win: 28 .i.d4 .i.xd4 29 lLlxd4 (29 lLle7+? �f8 30 ltJxc8 .i.xc8 31 d6 .i.f6 or 31 . . . .t c5 32 .tc6 i.e6) 29 . . . ':c1 !? 30 .l:txc1 lLlxc1 3 1 d6 �f8 32 d7 (32 lLlc6 .i.c8 ! ; 32 .i.h3 .i. b7 ! ; 32 .i.c6 g6! ) 32 . . . �e7 33 lLlc6+ �xd7 34 lLl b8+ �c7 35 lLlxa6 �b6, and the two connected passed pawns fully compensate Black for the lost piece; 28 .i.e5 .l:te8! (after both 28 . . . lLl b4?! 29 d6 ltJd3!? 30 .l:te2 lLlxe5 3 1 lLle7+ �f8 32 lLlxc8 i.xc8 33 l:txe5 .i.xd6 34 .l:txb5 and 28 . . .
31 . . .
lLlc3 !
It was already possible to secure a draw by 3 1 . . . .l:td8 32 d7 .tb7 33 lLlxb5 �c6. But Karpov keen ly sensed that as a result of the opponent's uncertain actions the situation
58
�
The Development of C hess I ntuition
had changed in his favour, and he decided to play for a win . Kasparov, on the other hand , d i d not sense the impending danger. He should have forced a draw by choosing 32 SLg2 ! l:td8 33 �c6 (with the threat of 34 d7) 33 . . . SLc8 34 liJxb5. It was also possible to play 32 d7 SLb7! (defending against 33 liJc6 or 33 �g2) and now, for example, 33 liJf5 .l:r.d8 34 ':e8+ (if 34 liJxg7? or 34 liJd6? there is the simple 34 . . . �c6) 34 .. Jbe8+ 35 dxe8'iV+ 'iti>xe8 36 liJd6+ 'iti>d8 37 liJxb7 'iti>c7 - the two black pawns are at least as strong as the piece. The unexpected move 33 l:t a 1 ! , found by Vadim Zviagintsev, is safer. The point is that if 33 . . . a6 there follows the pretty stroke 34 liJc6! SLxc6 35 llxa6. The interesting try 33 . . . a5 encounters the intermed iate move 34 lla3! (weaker is 34 ':'xa5 'iti>e7) 34 . . . b4 35 :txa5. Black does best to agree a draw after 33 . . . 'iti>e7 34 :e1 + 'iti>f8 (but not 34 . . . 'iti>d6? 35 1:.e8 'iti>c7 36 liJc6 ! ) 35 ':'a 1 . Of course, the order of the moves can also be changed : 32 1:. a 1 SLb7 33 d7. 32 liJc6?
�b7!
A draw results from 32 . . . b4 33 d7 (or 33 liJxb4 SLb5) 33 . . . b3 34 d8'iV+ .uxd8 35 liJxd8 SLd3. 33 SLg2
:e8 !
Possibly Kasparov was hoping for 33 . . . b4? 34 d7 b3 35 liJb8! 1:.xb8 36 SLxb7 b2 (36 . . . l:td8 37 � c6) 37 �c8, and White wins. But Karpov's sense of danger is equal to the occasion . 34 liJe5
34 l:ta 1 SLxc6 35 �xc6 1:.e6 36 1:.xa 7 was more tenacious, although the endgame after 36 . . . l:txd6 37 �d7 1:.b6 can hardly be held. 34 . . .
f6 1
35 d7 There is no longer any way of saving the game: 35 SLxb7 l:txe5! 36 1:. a 1 b4 37 l:lxa7 b3 and 35 liJd7+ 'iti>f7 36 1:.a1 SLxg2 37 'iti>xg2 'iti>e6 were equally bad . 35 . . .
lld8
36 �xb7
fxe5
37 �c6
'iti>e7?
A time-trouble mistake. There was an easy win by 37 . . . e4! 38 lla 1 'iti>e7 (38 . . . liJe2+ 39 'iti>f1 liJd4 is also possible) 39 llxa7 'iti>d6 40 l:ta6 'iti>c7 41 'iti>f1 b4 . 38 .ltxb5!
liJxb5?!
Ka rpov d id not have sufficient time to check the variation 38 . . . 'iti>d6! 39 SLd3 1:.xd7! 40 SLxh7 a5. 39 llxe5+
'iti>xd7
40 l:txb5
'iti>c6
41 1:.h5? 41 11e5! was stronger, and if 41 . . . 1:.a8, then 42 1:.e6+ 'iti>c5 43 lle7 a5 44 1:.xg7, also attacking the h-pawn . 41 . . .
h6
42 11e5
lla8
The sealed move. 42 . . . 1:.d5 was also good . The ending is rather i nteresti ng, but here we will cut th ings short, since from this point it was a contest not in the abil ity to fi nd the strongest conti nuations at the board , but in quality of adjournment analysis. Black won on the 70th move.
ltJ
59
Serg ey Dol matov
I n J azz Style
I games, in which a tense battle developed
should like to show you a few o f m y own
from literally the first few moves - already in the opening or at an early stage of the middlegame. In them there was a sharp and usually a very unconventional battle for the initiative. All the games were played many years ago, when I was making my fi rst steps i n the world of top-class chess - this is no accident. Youth is typified by an absence of stereotypes, by optimism, and by a bel ief i n one's own powers (sometimes excessive, involving an underestimation of the oppo nent). I nteresting, vivid games often result from fl ig hts of imag inatio n , not burdened by experience and knowledge, from in ner freedom , not stifled by rules. With the yea rs, alas, this 'flippancy' is usually lost. The abil ity to think unconventionally is an important qual ity for achieving victory over a strong opponent. This is d ifficult to learn and probably impossible to teach . Try to develop this ability in you rself, by analysing the early games of those outstanding players who made a name for themselves at a young age. Players such as Boris Spassky, M ikhail Tal and Alexey Shirov. . . Their ideas evoke naivety and spontaneity; they were gener ated not in the q u iet of thei r study, but directly at the board . At times they do not stand up to strict mathematical verification , but it proved so d ifficult to refute these ideas that the opponents went wrong . I have taken the l i berty of comparing this easy, improvised playing manner with jazz, a type of music which is still popu lar today.
Dolmatov - Lerner All-Un ion Qualifying Tou rnament, Daugavpils 1 978 Philidor Defence 1 e4
eS
2 lZJf3
d6
3 d4
exd4
4 tLlxd4
lZJf6
S lZJc3
i.. e 7
I suspect that this was already the extent of my theoretical knowledge. But this factor did not bother me: after all, in the resulting position it is not hard to make common sense moves. For the moment a sound cou rse can be followed : develop the pieces and fight for the centre - there are no dangers to be feared . 6 ..ie2
0-0
7 0-0
l:teS
7 . . . tLlc6!? S f4
..ifS
9 ..if3 Wh ite has obtained a strong centre . Even now I have no complaints about his open ing strategy. 9. . .
tLla6
1 0 l:te1
c6
If 1 0 . . . lZJc5,then 1 1 lZJb3 tLlxb3 1 2 axb3 is good . 1 1 ..ie3 (see diagram)
60
�
In Jazz Style
I placed my rook on e1 so that if 1 1 . . . lDc5 I could defend the e-pawn with the simple bishop retreat 12 i.f2 . After 1 2 . . . lDe6 1 3 'iVd2 Wh ite brings his queen's rook to d 1 and only then begins th inking about his fu rther plans: whether to break through in the centre with e4-e5, or prepare a pawn offensive on the kingside with h2-h3 and g2-g4 . My opponent did not want to defend patiently and he decided to beg in an immed iate battle in the centre. 11 . . .
d5?!
12 e5
c5?
It would have been better for Black to restrict hi mself to the modest knight retreat 1 2 . . . lDd7. Can you believe in the success of Black's mil itary operation, begun with his bishop on c8 and his knight on a6? You can't? Then you have to find a refutation . l:[xe3 1 3 exf6 The 'point' of my opponent's idea! cxd4
14 ':'xe3 (see diagram)
For the moment I am the exchange u p , but I have two pieces en prise. If either of them should be captu red, the material advantage will pass to Black. He was only expecting
1 5 'iVxd4 i. c5 and was hoping to exploit the pin on the g 1 -a7 d iagonal (it is not clear, however, whether this is possible after 1 6 'iVd2 ) . Konstantin Lerner clearly underesti mated my reply. 1 5 i.xd5! Now both pieces are invul nerable in view of 1 6 �xf7+, and 1 5 . . . 'iVxf6 1 6 lDe4 is bad for Black. I n order to defend his queen , he must develop his bishop from c8 , but where? It is immed iately clear that any bishop move has its drawbacks: 1 5 . . . i.d7 1 6 'iVh5 g6 1 7 i.xf7+, 1 5 . . . i.e6 1 6 l:1xe6, or 1 5 . . .i.g4 1 6 'iVxg4 dxe3 1 7 i.xb7. 15 . . .
i.f5
1 6 :e5
i.g6
have removed one of my pieces from attack, but it is more d ifficult to deal with the second - any knight move is answered by 1 6 . . . gxf6. However, as was shown by Dvoretsky, it was nevertheless possible to play 1 7 lDe4 ! , since if 1 7 . . . gxf6 there is the pretty stroke 1 8 11e8 ! . 1 7 fxg7
'ii? x g7
I n the event of 1 7 . . . i.xg7 1 8 'iVxd4 it all immed iately becomes clear. f6
1 8 lDe4! 1 9 'ii'x d41 (see diagram)
ttJ
In Jazz Style
23 . . .
61
liJd7
24 'ith1 ! In such cases variations should already be calculated to the end . To make things easier, I recommend that you beg in your calculation with moves to which the oppo nent has only one reply. Thus the queen check on e6 looks tempting, but you will have to analyse not only 24 . . . 'itg7, but also 24 . . .liJf6 and 24 . . . 'iVf6 , and it is possible to overlook . . . 'iVb6+. The king move, renewing the threat of .l:!.e3, does not leave the opponent any choice. A pictu resque position! The centre is com pletely occupied by wh ite pieces . After the capture of the rook, even if a mate can not be found, Wh ite will later regain the material by captu ring the b7-pawn with his bishop. 19 . . . .i.xe4 If 1 9 . . . fxe5 20 'iWxe5+ 'it h6, then either 21 g4 or 21 liJf6 . An interesting variation was found by Dvoretsky: 1 9 . . . liJb4!? 20 .l:!. d 1 liJxc2 2 1 'iWf2 fxe5 22 ii'xc2 exf4 23 'it'c3+ 'it'h6 24 nd3 (24 liJf6 ! ? ) 24 . . . llc8 25 l:th3+ i. h5 26 'iVd2 'iVxd5! (the only defence against the mating threats) 27 'ii'x d5 l:[c1 + 28 'it>f2 ':c2+ 29 'iVd2 ! (otherwise it is not possible to h ide from the checks) 29 . . . .l:!.xd2+ 30 liJxd2, and Wh ite should be able to convert his exchange advantage. 20 'iVxe4
liJc5
My opponent was counting on this intermedi ate move. 20 . . .fxe5 was hopeless: 21 'ii'x e5+ 'ii'f6 (2 1 . . . 'it g6 22 'iWe6+) 22 ii'xf6+ 'itxf6 23 .i.xb7. 21 'ii'f3 22 'ii'g 4+
fxe5
Black has nevertheless won a piece, but his king can not escape from the mati ng attack. 22 . . . 23 11e1 !
'ith6
All Wh ite's forces must take part in the assault! He is threatening both 24 l:[xe5 and 24 J:te3.
24 . . .
.i.c5
24 . . . exf4 25 'ii'xf4+ is completely bad for Black. 25 .l:!.d1 ! The rook manoeuvre to h3 is agai n threat ened , but there is the additional possibil ity of captu ri ng the b7-pawn with gain of tempo. 25 . . .
liJf8
26 .i.xb7 Black resigned . The following example, like the previous one, is a fai rly lig ht-hearted game, with the rapid crushing of the opponent's position . I ncidentally, don't be su rprised that I am not showing you any of my lost games. Of course, they should be carefully studied, to disclose the causes of the mistakes made, but at the moment why should I spoil my mood by remembering failures? Dolmatov - Franzoni World J u n ior Championsh ip, G raz 1 978 Sicilian Defence 1 e4 c5 2 liJf3
e6
3 d4
cxd4
4 liJxd4
liJf6
5 liJc3
liJc6
6 .i.e2
62
�
I n Jazz Style
This is rarely played (the usual continua tions are 6 4Jdb5 and 6 4Jxc6 bxc6 7 e5). In offering to go into the Scheveningen (6 . . . d6), White allows the bishop move to b4 , after which he has to sacrifice a pawn. I analysed this sharp variation with my trai ner Mark Dvoretsky and then I successfully employed it a couple of times. I don't know why no one plays this now - in my opin ion , here Wh ite obtains a very promising position . 6...
iLb4
7 0-0
iLxc3
8 bxc3
4Jxe4
9 iLd3
9. . .
of the game. 10 cxd4 1 0 iLxe4!? came into consideration, but I was hoping to transpose into my analysis after 1 0 . . . d5 1 1 iLa3. 10 .
.
.
4Jf6
Wh ite is a pawn down , and for the moment he also has no attack, but he has the two bishops and a defi n ite advantage in space and development. I n add itio n , as I recall, there was a healthy optimism, a confidence in my powers, which is of no small impor ta nce in such situations. However, such a position is one that I would also happily play now. Wh ite's in itiative is enduring , and it is not easily neutral ised . 'ii'a 51? 1 1 iLg5
4Jxd4
This was the extent of my knowledge. I knew that 9 . . . 4Jxc3?! was dangerous in view of 1 0 'ii'g 4 or 1 0 'ii'e 1 and I had only analysed 9 . . . d5. I was aware of only one game on this theme, Geller-Khasin (25th USSR Championsh ip, Riga 1 958), which continued 1 0 iLa3 'ii' a 5 1 1 'ii' c 1 4Jxd4 1 2 cxd4 iLd7 1 3 ':' b 1 iLc6 1 4 iLb4 'ii'c7 1 5 'ii' a 3 a5 1 6 iLxe4 dxe4 1 7 c4 f6 1 8 iLd6 'ji'd7 with roughly equal chances. I don't remember exactly how I was intend ing to improve Wh ite's play, but there was a way - you can look for it you rself. Later I successfully employed it against Sergey Gorelov, but, unfortunately, I have not retained the score
12 f4! A non-routi ne decision (with the bishop on g5 it is not usual to place the pawn on f4), but apparently the correct one. White should not hu rry with the exchange on f6 . By advancing his f-pawn , he i ncludes his king's rook in the attack. In the event of 1 2 . . . 'i!Vb4 1 would have g iven up a second pawn by 1 3 f5 . 12 . . .
b6
1 3 iLxf6 But now is an appropriate moment for the
ltJ
In Jazz Style
exchange - thanks to it Wh ite will be able to gain a tempo by 1 4 Wf3 . 13 . . .
gxf6
1 4 'it'f3
lIbS
14 . . . Wd5 1 5 Wxd5 exd5 1 6 1:[ae 1 + ..ti>f8 1 7 Iif3 would have led to an inferior endgame for Black. For the moment he is not ready so openly to sound the retreat. 1 5 f5
�b7
1 6 ..te4!
the enemy q ueen from the long d iagona l . Wxc4 2 0 c41 21 fxe6
dxe6
21 . . . Wxe6 was more tenacious. 22 Wf41 A double attack on f6 and b8. But couldn't it have also been made without the d iverting pawn sacrifice? l::t b7
22 . . . 23 ':'c1 !
It is important to kill the opponent's hopes associated with counter-pressure on the g2point. With just the heavy pieces on the board , Black's position is d ifficult, since his king is under attack and his rooks are separated . 16 . . .
�xe4
1 7 Wxe4
Wd5
1 S Wh4
':gS
For me there is someth ing mysterious about this game: all the time Black seemi ngly makes good , logical moves, but his position imperceptibly becomes hopeless. Why this happens, where the defence can be im proved , I myself do not know! 1 9 :f2
63
Iig5
How should Wh ite conti nue his offensive?
This is the point! Now all my pieces are participati ng in the attack. Wh ite's threats are irresistible. 23 . . .
'it'd5
24 Wxf6
:e7
25 'ili'hS+ Black resigned . Dolmatov
-
Flesch
Bucharest 1 98 1 Caro-Kann Defence c6 1 e4 2 d4
d5
3 exd5
cxd5
4 c4 Against the Caro-Kann I employ only the Panov Attack, and qu ite successfully - I have already scored nu merous wins with it. 4. . .
liJf6
5 liJc3
e6
6 liJf3
..tb4
7 ..td3
The pressure on g2 is restricting my forces . I t is important, even for a moment, t o divert
I n my game with Andrey Kharitonov (qualify ing tournament for the World Ju nior Champi onsh ip, Sochi 1 978) 7 cxd5 exd5! was played . At that time the theory of the 6 . . . �b4 variation was only just being developed , and the recaptu re on d5 with the pawn came as a su rprise to me. I won a good game, but from the opening I had noth i n g . From then on I began playing 7 .td3, transposing into one of the variations of the N i mzo-I ndian
64 �
In J azz Style
Defence. The resulting positions suit me perfectly well , so that I myself cannot understand why I altogether avoid the q u ite reasonable move 1 d4. 7. . .
dxe4
8 i.xe4
0-0
9 0-0
i.xe3?1
1 0 bxe3
"ike7
tioned game against Speelman) Wh ite has an enormous lead i n development, giving him more than sufficient compensation for the sacrificed pawn . 11 . . .
lLl bd7
The opponent is hoping after 1 2 c4 b6 1 3 i.g5 i.b7 to arrange his pieces in accord ance with Ka rpov's scheme, but I do not al low h i m this opportun ity. 1 2 i.a31 An u nusual development of the bishop for the g iven opening variation. I n his youth a chess player has less dogma and more energy - it can be easier for h i m to devise a fresh idea . When he becomes older, he already knows exactly what was played earlier in similar cases, and this knowledge sometimes prevents an unprej udiced ap proach to the position .
In the late 1 970s the world champion Anatoly Karpov successfully practised the plan involving the exchange of the b4bishop for the knig ht, and the development of the knight at d7 and bishop at b7. Janos Flesch is aiming for a similar set-up, but he carries it out i naccu rately - the premature exchange on c3 increases Wh ite's possibili ties. He should have begun with either 9 . . . b6 or 9 . . . lLl bd7. I n cidentally, the knight move was made against me by Jonathan Speelman in a game which I demonstrated at the 2nd session of the school (cf. Secrets of Opening Preparation p . 78). 1 1 i.d3! A natu ral and logical move - the bishop was under attack. I have to admit that at the time I did not even consider the reply 1 1 . . . 'ilt'xc3 (now my optimism has dimin ished some what, and probably I would nevertheless try to calculate it). After 1 2 i. f4! (but not 1 2 i.g5 lLlbd7, transposing i nto the afore-men-
I have managed to discover the main weakness in the opponent's position - the vulnerable d6-square. I ncidentally, also after the normal development of his bishop at g5, later White often tries to exploit the same weakness with the manoeuvre i.g5-h4-g3! . 12 . . .
':'e8
The usual square for the rook in this variation (Karpov also used to place it here). It would have been better to play it to d8, but the opponent did not anticipate my idea . 1 3 lLld21 What to do now? The knight is aiming for d6, and after 1 3 . . . "ikxc3 14 lLlc4 Black is in danger of losing his queen . He should probably have chosen the cool-headed 1 3 . . . b6 , although after 1 4 lLlc4 i.b7 1 5 lLld6 Wh ite has an obvious advantage. 13 . . .
ltd8
14 "ikf3 I n the event of 1 4 lLlc4 lLlf8 Black would have covered the d6-sq uare, and so I activate my queen , fi nally defending the c3pawn and preventing the development of the bishop at b7.
ttJ
In Jazz Style
14 . . .
lLlf8
What would you now play as W hite?
1 8 � h4
65
f5?!
It is probable that many would have played this - it is hard to endure such intense pressure for long. Even so, it would have been better to be patient, and refrain from weakening the position. 19 �c2
lLlb6
20 � b3
�d7
21 �g3 Before taking the f5-pawn it is useful to improve the placing of the bishop. It is amusing that i n the end it has nevertheless moved to g3, its lawfu l square in this variation.
1 5 lLle4! A typical idea ! In such cases it is useful to exchange the opponent's few developed pieces - then your lead in development is easier to exploit. An analogy with ice hockey can be drawn : if a player has to leave the rink, an advantage of five players against four is appreciable, but neverthe less not decisive. If a further pair is removed , it becomes much harder to de fend with th ree against four, and with two against three it is probably almost impossi ble.
21 . . .
'iVc6
22 'ifxf5
'iVxc3
23 �e5! White defends the d4-pawn and parries the th reat of 23 .. :ii'xb3, after which 24 'ifg5 is now decisive . 23 . . . The q ueen returns to the defence. 24 'ifh5
.l:tac8
How should the offensive be conti nued?
Of course, Wh ite's move was also based on more concrete considerations; in particular, he was aiming to h i nder the development of the bishop on ca . But a knowledge of general rules, such as the one just men tioned , usually makes it easier for us to take a decision and suggests where it should be sought. 15 . . .
lLlxe4
1 6 �xe4
lLld7
A dismal spectacle - the opponent's pieces rush from place to place. He obviously wants to play 1 7 . . . lLlf6, but of course, I do not allow th is. 17 �e7 1
1:[e8
25 f4! Usually I find it hard to decide on changes in the pawn structu re - I prefer to play with the pieces. But here I made a pawn move - it
66
�
In Jazz Style
really is very strong . Wh ite is threatening not only to include his rook via f3, but also to play f4-f5. 25 . . .
g6
25 . . . i.c6 is bad in view of 26 'ifg4! 'ife7 27 i.xe6+, while if 25 . . . tDc4, then 26 i.c2 is decisive . After the move in the game Wh ite forcibly destroys the opposing defences . 26 'ifh4
'ife7
27 i. f6
'iff7
28 f51
tDd5
29 fxg6
'iVxg6
30 lIf3
tDxf6
Black is forced to give up his quee n , which is equ ivalent to resignation .
tious opponents. We crossed swords in the very first round and I was able to q u ickly crush him with Black. It was a double-round event, and soon our second meeti ng took place - with the same result. Dolmatov - Larsen Amsterdam 1 980 Caro-Kann Defence 1 e4 c6 Of course, Larsen had no suspicion of how dangerous it was to play this opening against me. 2 d4
d5
3 exd5
cxd5
4 c4
tDf6
31 1:.g3
�g7
32 1:[f1
IU8
5 tDc3
e6
33 ':xg6+
hxg6
6 tDf3
i.b4
34 'ifg5
l:.c6
7 i.d3
dxc4
35 'ili'e51
l:.b6
8 i.xc4
0-0
36 g4
l:.b5
9 0-0
a6
37 d51 Black resigned. Note that, after gaining a material advan tage, Wh ite did not relax the pressure , but looked for the most d i rect and energetic way to wi n . Sometimes in such situations, feeling that the work has already largely been done, a player relaxes and beg ins playing carelessly. As a result the opponent is able to set up a defence and even gain cou nter-chances. The following game (played the previous year) developed in similar fashion . The same opening, and the same energetic exploitation of the opponent's opening inac cu racies. At the time I was an international master, and I was participati ng for the first time in a strong g randmaster event, whereas Bent Larsen was one of the favourites . Sometimes the experienced g randmaster tended to underestimate young and ambi-
I didn't know anyth ing about this move. Later I established that it makes sense to prevent . . . b7-b5 by playing 1 0 a4 ! ? , as in the Queen's Gambit Accepted . But at the time I did not want to weaken the b4-square and I devised another idea. 10 a3!?
ttJ
In Jazz Style
Also prophylaxis against . . . b7-b5, only more refined . In the event of 1 0 . . . iLe7 1 was intending to retreat my bishop to a2 in advance and to meet the flank advance 1 1 . . . b5 with the central cou nter 1 2 d5! . If instead 1 0 . . . iLxc3 1 1 bxc3 b5, then after 1 2 iLd3 the threat of 1 3 a4 is unpleasant. Even so, this last variation looks the most log ical reaction to Wh ite's plan. After the exchange on c3 the move a2-a3 is a waste of time: the pawn should either be left on a2, or moved to a4 . At the 1 982 Zonal Tourna ment in Yerevan , Lev Psakhis prepared well for his game with me and went in for this positio n . There followed 1 2 .. :iVd5 1 3 a4 i. b7 1 4 'iVe2 l:tc8 1 5 axb5 axb5 1 6 l:ba8 i.xa8 1 7 iLd2 ltJe4 1 8 iLxe4 'iVxe4 1 9 'iVxb5 i.d5 20 l:te 1 'iVg6 21 'iVe2 ltJc6, and Black had sufficient compensation for the sacri ficed pawn . The game soon ended in a draw. Of course, at the board , with the clock ticking away, it is far harder than in home preparation to make a sober assessment of a position. Therefore if you are able to think up a sensible idea such as 1 0 a3, the practical chances of it succeed ing are very considerable, even if a solution to the problem facing the opponent does in fact exist. 10 . . .
iLe7
1 1 iLa2
b5?!
1 1 . . . ltJc6 was better. 1 2 d5! What should Black do now? He does not want to al low the captu re on e6 - for the entire game he will have to defend a clearly inferior position. 12 . . .
exd5
1 3 ltJxd5
iLb7?
Black should have exchanged knig hts: 13 ... ltJxd 5 . Larsen was afraid of the reply 1 4 'iVxd5 ( 1 4 iLxd5 i s weaker i n view of 14 . . Jla7 with the th reat of 1 5 . . J:td7). The
67
q ueens have to be exchanged : it is too risky to play 1 4 . . . :a7 1 5 iLf4 ( 1 5 'iVh5!?) 1 5 . . . l::t d 7?! 16 'iVh5 with strong pressure on Black's kingside. After 14 . . . 'iVxd5 1 5 iLxd5 lla7 1 6 �f4 Black cannot play 1 6 . . . iLb7? 1 7 �e3, and 1 6 . . J:td7 1 7 iLxf7+ ':xf7 1 8 iLxb8 is also unfavourable. He has to agree to a permanently inferior endgame by 1 6 . . . �e6 1 7 iLxe6 fxe6 . Even so, this would have been the lesser evil : objectively Black can hope for a draw. 'But why play cautiously against a boy? ' , the g randmaster probably thought. 1 4 ltJxe7+
'iVxe7
1 5 iLg5 The two bishops in an open position ensure Wh ite an overwhelming adva ntage. I only have to make natu ral attacki ng moves and make sure that the opponent does not escape from the trap into which he has fallen. 15 . . .
ltJbd7
1 6 :e1
'iVc5
1 6 . . . 'iVd8 was more tenacious. 17 iLe3 Of course, not 1 7 l:tc1 ? iLxf3 . 17 . . .
'iVf5
1 7 . . . 'iVh5 was comparatively better, al though after 1 8 ltJg5 'iVxd 1 1 9 l::t a xd 1 Black has a d ifficult endgame.
68
�
In Jazz Style
1 8 lLlh4!
24 'ii'd 4!
The q ueen is al most trapped . Of course, the routine 1 8 lLld4? was weaker because of 1 8 . . ...g6. Black's next move is effectively the decisive mistake - only the retu rn of the queen to e5 promised chances of saving the game. 18 . . .
'ii'e 4?
1 9 �95
'ii'c 6
20 l:[c1
'ii' b6
21 .i.e3 The game has tu rned out to be very amusing. My dark-square bishop moves backwards and forwards, each time with gain of tempo. 21 . . .
'ii'd 8
22 lLlf5 As you can see, since the 1 6th move only Wh ite has been playing. The opponent's q ueen has wandered round the entire board and finally retu rned to its i n itial square d8, but during that time I have included all my pieces in the attack. 22 . . .
..te4
23 lLld6
..tg6
The bishop has moved to the defence of the f7-point. Wh ite's position is won , of course, but I suggest you try to find the way that I found in the game.
Complete dominatio n ! There is no need to pick the fru it - it will fal l of its own accord . First deprive the opponent of any sensible moves, and then finish him off. It was even a pity for me to make the next few moves, as I wanted simply to enjoy the ideal arrange ment of the white pieces - I am no longer able to improve it. 24 . . .
'ii' b 8
It was not in vain that I had developed my 'prophylactic th inking' - I immed iately real ised that Black was i ntend ing 25 . . . .l:.d8 . I had to calculate a wi n n i ng variation to the end (when the opponent's possibil ities are so restricted, this is very easy). I n fact it was time to win the point and leave for home. 25 f4!
':d8
26 f5
..th5
27 h3
lLl b6
28 'ii'x b6
'ii'x b6
29 ..txb6
l:.xd6
30 .i.e3 It is after accurate moves such as these that the opponent usually capitulates (after other moves by the bishop Larsen would still have been able to consider 30 . . . :d2). Black resigned . By now you will probably have gained the impression that I can win only with Wh ite. Therefore I will show you a game in which I had the black pieces. Van der Sterren - Dolmatov Amsterdam 1 979 Reti Opening 1 lLlf3 d5 2 b3
�g4
3 ..t b2
lLld7
3 . . . ..txf3 would have led to a completely unexplored position - these I try to avoid. Black's plan, which had already many times
llJ
In Jazz Style
brought me success, is simple: . . . e7-e6, ... c7-c6, ... lLlgf6 , . . . �d6, . . . 0-0, . . . :te8 and at some point . . . e6-e5. 4 c4
e6
5 e3
lLlgf6
6 �e2
�d6
6 . . . c6 is perhaps slightly more accurate, when after the exchange on d5 Black can captu re with the c-pawn . 7 cxd 5 1 ?
exd5
S lLlxd4 A typical idea in the Reti Open ing - the knight is aiming for f5 . S. . .
�xe2
9 'ii'x e2 What would you now play?
69
playing without prejudices is typical of youth . It would seem to be a pity to leave the opponent with a strong bishop on the long d iagonal. A matu re player would possibly not have risked such an exchange (which means he would have rejected 9 . . . �e5). I n fact, Black's solid position in the centre and the slight vul nerability of the opponent's set up, which has been weakened by f2-f4 , secure me good counterplay. 1 1 �xd4 In the event of the anti-positional 1 0 exd4+? Black gains the advantage with 1 0 . . . 'ii'e 7 1 1 'ii'x e7+ �xe7 1 2 �a3+ �d8 1 3 0-0 l:te8 1 4 lLlc3 lLlb8! followed by 1 5 . . .lLlc6 . 11 . . .
c5
1 2 � b2
0-0
1 3 0-0
J:teS
1 4 'ii'd 3?! It would have been better to place the q ueen at f3 . 14 . . .
'ii' b 6
Wh ite will soon have to reckon with both . . . d5-d4, and . . . c5-c4 . 1 5 lLlc3 But what to play now?
Of cou rse, one can simply castle, but after 10 lLlf5 Wh ite will stand a little better. I did not want to concede the in itiative to my opponent, and I chose the conti nuation that was the most critica l , but also slig htly risky. 9 . . .
�e5!
10 f4 I also had to reckon with 1 0 �a3, and if 1 0 . . . c5, then 1 1 f4! �c7 1 2 lLlf5. I was planning 1 0 . . . lLle4 ! . 10 . . .
�xd4
I must once agai n remark nostalgically, that
You don't have to look immed iately for any brilliant idea . First see whether or not the problem (the d5-pawn is attacked ) can be
70
�
I n Jazz Style
solved by any normal move that is useful to you . 15 . . . 1:[ad8! All my pieces are now in play. After 1 6 lLlxd5 lLlxd5 1 7 'ii'x d5 lLlf6 (or 1 7 . . . lLle5 1 8 'ii'e4 lLld3) Black regains the pawn and stands better. 1 6 l:tab1 Just in case, my opponent decided to defend against . . . c5-c4 . But I am ready to advance not only my c-pawn, but also my d pawn . See how useful it is to have several strategic th reats in reserve, without h urrying to carry out any one of them! 16 . . .
'ifc6
1 7 l::tf3
d4!
Now is the time! With his last move Paul Van der Sterren demonstrated his desire to beg in a flank attack, and I meet it with a th rust in the centre, which , however, de manded accu rate calcu lation. There was also another tempting possibil ity: 1 7 . . . lLle4!? Then bad is 1 8 lLlxd5? 'ifd6 with a decisive pin on the d-file, but after 1 8 lLlxe4! dxe4 1 9 'ifc3 f6 20 :g3 Wh ite would have retained an acceptable positio n . I already wa nted more . cxd4
1 8 exd4 1 9 lLlb5
1 9 lLle2 lLlc5 20 'ii' c4 'ife4 21 1:[e1 d3 22 'ifxc5 'ifxe2! is bad for Wh ite. [In fact, after 23 1i.xf6 'ifxe 1 + 24 1lf1 or 23. . . gxf6 24 :!g3+ h 1
86
c 7 31 "'xh8 leads to an i mmed iate draw: 31 . . ....c5+ ! (but not 31 . . . l:.d2? 32 'iWe5+ and 33 11f2 ) 32 'iii> h 2 "'d6+ 33 'iii> g 1 "'c5+ 34 11f2 l:td2 35 ]1f1 lLlg3 36 "'f6 lLlxf1 37 "'xf7+ 'iii> b 8 38 'iii> x f1 l:.xf2+ 39 "'xf2 "'xc3 . But the attempt to play on with 30 l:.xfS?1 gxfS 31 "'a8+ 'iii> c 7 32 "'xh8 proved even worse in view of 32 .. . 'iWe4 1 . After 33 1:.f1 %:td2 34 'iWg7 peace was nevertheless concluded , although Black's position is now somewhat better. An exami nation of Sanakoev's showed that he is characterised tendency to choose pretty moves , this is sometimes at the expense qual ity.
games by this even if of their
Engel - Sanakoev An niversary Tou rnament of the Romanian Chess Federatio n , 1 976-79
undoubtedly have to be taken seriously, but even so I th ink that the commentator sign ificantly exaggerates the danger threat ening h i m . F o r example, after t h e natural 2 4 . . .llc8!? Sanakoev g ives 25 hxg6 fxg6 26 'iWh3 i.d5 27 'iii> b 1 ! , preparing 28 lLlxd5 . However, Black gains the advantage if instead of 26 . . . i.d5?! he chooses the sharp 26 . . . b4! 27 'iWxe6+ 'iii> f8 28 l:tc4 bxc3 ! 29 ':xc7 cxd2+ 30 'iii> x d2 ':'cxc7 31 'iii> c 1 i.c5 32 'ii'x e5 'iii> g 8. Generally speaking , the knight is well placed at c3 - from here it prevents Black from conven iently supporting his e6-point by . . . i.d5, and in some cases it can go to e4 . Therefore 24 . . . b4 !? suggests itself. Sanakoev thinks that after 25 lLld 1 l:tc8 26 lLle3 Wh ite has a clear adva ntage (i ndeed , any min ute now the knight will jump to g4). But why let the knight out from d 1 ? I n stead of 25 . . . .:tc8 Black has the Significantly stronger 25 . . . i.c5 ! ? 26 'iVh3 i.d5. Now the rook is intending to go to c8 , in the event of 27 hxg6 fxg6 Black has everyth ing safely defended , in reply to lLle3 there always follows . . . i.xe3, while the consequences of 27 i.xb4 i.xb3 (27 . . . i.xb4 28 l:txb4 l::t c8 also comes into consideration) are uncer tai n . It is clear that Black has the right to go i n for this. 25 . . . i.e 7! would appear to be even stronger. Wh ite can not play 26 lLle3? i.xg5, and 26 hxg6 ':xd2! is also unfavourable for h i m . But after 26 i.e3 the knight can no longer go to e3, and Black calmly plays 26 . . J::tfd8 , i ntending 27 . . . l:txd 1 + or 27 . . . 'iWa5 . T h e above considerations are prosaic. By contrast, the solution found by Sanakoev was highly spectacu lar. 24 . . .
'Only an immediate counterattack can save Black', writes Sanakoev. Wh ite is i ntending 25 'iWh3 followed by 26 hxg6. His th reats
i.a3 ! ?
Now White loses immed iately after 2 5 .:. 1 h 2 ? ':xd2! 26 l:txd2 'iWxc3 . If 25 bxa3 Black was intending 25 .. J:txd2 ! 26 'iii> x d2 l:td8+ 27 'iii> c 1 'ii'x c3 28 'iii> b 1 lId2 29 'ii'c 1 i.xf3 30 : 1 h3 11e2 with advantage. How-
ttJ
Thoughts about a Book
101
ever, Wh ite's play can b e improved b y 30 hxg6! (instead of 30 l::t 1 h3?) 30 . . . iLxh 1 (in the event of 30 . . .fxg6 3 1 l:t 1 h3 Black no longer has 31 . . . .:e2?? because of 32 l:txh7) 3 1 gxf7+ 'itt xf7 32 l:txh7+, for example: 32 . . . 'itt g 6 33 l:txh 1 e4 34 J:th6+ 'itt x g5 35 I:txe6 e3 36 'ifg 1 + 'itt f4 37 J:te4+! 'itt xe4 38 'iVg4+ 'itt d 5 39 'ifd7+ with perpetual check.
would have hardly allowed his opponent 'off the ropes' so soo n . But what told here, apparently, was the magic of a pretty move , forci ng h i m to convi nce h imself that after other continuations Wh ite would gain the advantage.
In the game there followed 25 lDb1 1! . Here Sanakoev resisted the temptation to again play 'for brilliancy' : 25 . . . J:txd2? ! 26 lDxd2 'iVc3. In the event of 27 bxa3?! l:tc8 28 'ifd 1 l:td8! the game ends in a draw after both 29 'itt b 1 I:txd2 30 'ifc1 iLxf3 31 hxg6! (we have already seen this position in our analysis of the 25 bxa3 variation), and 29 hxg6!? l:txd2 30 gxf7 + 'itt f8 31 .l:txh 7 .l:txd 1 + 32 l:txd 1 . Stronger is 27 'ifd3! iLxb2+ 28 'itt b 1 iL a 1 29 'iVxc3 iLxc3 30 lDe4 iLxe4 31 fxe4 - here it is Black who would have to fight for a d raw.
6th USSR Championsh i p , 1 963-65
A. Zaitsev - Sanakoev
25 ... iLc51 26 'ifh3 'ifc61 27 hxg6 'ifxf3 1 28 gxh7+ 'itt h8 29 'ifxf3 iLxf3 , and in the endgame Black had an obvious advantage , which he successfully converted . Zviagi ntsev also hit on the move 24 . . . iLa3. But he was not sure about his choice , since he calculated that Wh ite could force a draw, and he wondered whether instead he should play the complicated position after 24 . . . b4 !? 25 hxg6!
':xd2 !
26 ':'xh7
'ii'x c3 !
27 :h8+
'itt g 7
28 I:t1 h7+ 28 l:t8h7+ is just the same. 28 . . .
'itt x g6
29 ':'h6+
e3 (33 'Ot>d3? i.xa6+ 34 1:txa6+ l:txa6 35 lhd8 l:txa2 ) 33 . . . d4+ 34 cxd4 l::t a 3+ 35 'Ot>e4 i.xa6 36 lba6 ! l:txa6 37 l::t x d8 :xa2 38 l::t d 6+ 'Ot>b5 39 l:txe6 tlxg2 40 'Ot>d5 Black resig ned . Black lost without a fig ht. So what about our considerations regard i n g his hopes of cou nterplay, and the 'unstrategic' nature of Wh ite's decision - were these merely empty words?
29 l1xa6 l:!.fc8 30 1:tbb6 Itxc3 31 � b5 i.xb5 32 l::1 x e6+ 'Ot>f7 33 axb5 is qu ite probably not lost. Zviagintsev suggested playing 23 .. .f6!? (in stead of 23 . . . l:te8). I will show some of the variations that we found together.
No, we based these on objective factors in the position and therefore we have the right to assume that Black could have defended much more tenaciously. Here are some considerations which will ease the search for a plan of defence. Firstly, the loss of the a6-pawn should not be fea red , especially if at the same time the bishops are ex changed . Secondly, it is important to pre vent the wh ite king from making its way to the centre. A) 24 l:tbb8 l::t e 8 25 i.xa6 i.d7 26 l1xe8+ i.xe8, and if 27 l:tc8, then 27 . . . l:ta7. B) 24 l:tb3 fxe5 25 fxe5 l::1 f8 ! , and the rook restricts the mobil ity of the king , while also creating the threat of 26 . . JH5 . C) 24 i.xa6 l:te8 25 i.xc8 l:texc8 26 .uxc8 .ll x c8 27 l:tb7+ 'Ot>f8 28 exf6 gxf6 29 J:txh7 l:txc3 - in the rook endgame Black retains real hopes of savi ng the game. The same assessment appl ies to the position arising after 25 l:tb3 fxe5 26 fxe5 i.xa6 27 l::t xa6 :ec8 (27 . . . f7 ! ? ) 28 l:tbb6 l:txc3 29 J::1 x e6+ f7 . I n stead of the insipid 26 ... h6? Black should have tried 26 .. J:tf8 ! , intend ing 27 �xh7 d4! 28 c4 ! (28 cxd4?? l::t c 1 mate) 28 . . . l:txc4 29 l:ta7+ d8 30 h3 l:tc1 + ! ? 31 'Ot>h2 l:tc7 , and of Wh ite's advantage only memories re mai n . If 27 h3 there is the satisfactory reply 27 . . . l:tf4 ! ? , and also the rook endgame arising after 27 . . . h6 28 a4!? (28 �xa6? i.xa6 29 l:txa6 l:tf5; 28 .ll b b8 l:te8) 28 . . . �d7
D) 24 i.xa6 l:te8 25 �d3!? fxe5 26 fxe5 i.d7 (26 . . . l:txc3 27 ':a7+ is dangerous for Black) 27 l:txe8+ (27 l:ta3 l:tec8 28 J:tbb3 also comes into consideration) 27 . . . i.xe8 28 l:tb3. Here Wh ite's advantage is sign ifi cant, although the outcome still remains unclear. Another possible approach to the defence (with which, to tell the truth, the analysis should have beg u n ) i nvolves the captu re of
Thoughts about a Book
the c3-pawn in one version or another. Let us retu rn to the position after Wh ite's 22nd move. I n reply to 22 . . . 0-0 !? Sanakoev g ives the variation 23 1:[a8 i.. d 7 24 1:[bb8 1:[xb8 (24 .. Jlcc8 25 l:txc8 i.. x c8 26 e7 leads to an i m med iate draw. He should probably play 49 h5 c;i;>e7 50 c;i;>e5, but I do not see how he can win after 50 . . . c4 5 1 h6 c;i;>f8 52 c;i;>d4 �e2 53 �e4 c;i;>f7 ! .
Sanakoev analysed the variations arising after 45 .. .'�e5 46 g3 c;i;>f6 4 7 �xh5 �g8 48 i.d 1 c;i;>e5 49 h5 and showed that Wh ite wins. And yet Vadim's i ntuition d id not deceive him: Black can save h imself by playing 45 . . . c;i;>e5 46 g3 f4+ ! ! 47 gxf4+ c;i;>f6 48 �d5 (48 �xh5 � c2 ) 48 . . . �c2 . Wh ite is not able to convert his material advantage. He is tied down by the fact that his b-pawn is on a square of the colour of his bishop. And if his king goes to c3 , the opponent gains the opportu n ity for a cou nterattack on the opposite wing.
After rejecting 4 2 d 5 ? ! (as w e see, with some justification), Zviagi ntsev chose an other plan for converting the advantage, based , however, on the same idea of trapping the black rook as was carried out in the game by Sanakoev. 42 c;i;>f2 1 .l:tg4 43 �e2 ':xh4 44 �f3 c;i;>d6 (it is a pity to give up the c6-pawn) 45 b4! (intend ing 46 lld 1 and 47 c;i;>g3 ; the immedi ate 45 ':d1 is inaccu rate because of 45 . . . c5! ) 45 ... f4 (45 . . . .:h1 46 .l:tc2 l:[b1 47 l:txc6+ c;i;>d7 48 l:tb6).
In a new edition of his book Sanakoev disagreed with my opin ion , and suggested the variation 49 c;i;>d2 �g6 50 c;i;>c3 c;i;>f5 5 1 'it;>c4 ! . The resulting position is i ndeed won : 5 1 . . . c;i;>xf4 5 2 c;i;>xc5 c;i;>g3 53 b 4 � d 3 (53 . . . � e 8 5 4 �c6) 5 4 �c4 � e 4 55 b 5 'it;>xh4 5 6 b 6 i.b7 (otherwise 57 �d5) 5 7 i.d5 i. a 6 5 8 c;i;>c6 h 4 59 �c4 . Black's play c a n b e improved b y 49 . . . �f5!? 50 c;i;>c3 �g4 5 1 �e4 (51 c;i;>c4 �d 1 52 c;i;>xc5 i.xb3 ! 53 �xb3 c;i;>f5) 51 . . . �e2 ( 5 1 . . . �e6) 52 i. d3 �d 1 (52 . . . �g4) 53 c;i;>c4 c;i;>e6. It is even simpler to play 49 . . . � b 1 ! 50 c;i;>c3 c;i;>f5 51 c;i;>c4 �a2(c2 ) 52 c;i;>xc5 �xb3 with a draw. In the position from the last d iagram there is another interesting way of defending , also
I n itially the central breakth rough seemed to be correct: 46 d5?! cxd5 47 llxd5+ c;i;>c7 48 .l:tb5 (a drawn bishop ending arises after 48 ':xh5 ':xh5 49 �xh5 �e4! 50 �xf7 c;i;>b6) 48 . . . �g6 49 c;i;>g 1 ! with good chances of success. Alas, a more carefu l verification reveals that by playing 48 . . . �d3! (instead of 48 . . . �g6) 49 l::t b 7+ c;i;>d6 50 %:txf7 c;i;>e6!
1 14
�
Thoughts about a Book
51 l:tf8 xh7 25 lDg5+ A) 25 . . . �h6 26 'ili'xf4 f6 (26 . . . �g6 27 'ili'g3) 27 'ii' h 4+ �g6 28 'ii' h 7+ �xg5 29 'ili'xg7+ �h5 30 l1d5+! with mate; B) 25 . . . �g8 26 'ili'h4 l:[e8 27 'ifh7+ �f8 28 'ii' h 8+ �e7 29 'ii'x g7 J:r.f8 30 lDh7 .i.d7 3 1 'ii'f6+ �e8 3 2 'ii'xf4 with a winning position. However, the natural attacki ng move in the game is an equally good alternative. 23 . . .
h6
At this point I had only five min utes left on my clock. I saw that my plan ned combi na tion would guarantee Wh ite perpetual check, and I was hoping for someth ing else to tu rn up. 24 lDf6+? To Wh ite's great an noya nce, immed iately after the game he easily d iscovered a decisive strengthening of the attack. He should have included the bishop i n the offensive by 24 �c2 ! , when the opponent would have had no defence against the threat of 25 lDf6+. He would have faced a d ismal choice fro m : A) 2 4 . . . b 6 25 lDf6+ gxf6 ( 2 5 . . . �h8 26 'iVg5) 26 'ili'xh6 1:[e8 27 �xg6; B ) 24 . . . lDf4 25 lDf6+ �h8 26 'iVxf7! �d7 27 l:txh6+; C ) 24 . . . e5 25 lDf6+ �h8 (25 . . . gxf6 26 l::t g 3 f5 27 lbg6+ fxg6 28 'iVxg6+ �h8 29 'ii'x h6+ �g8 30 .i.b3+) 26 l::t g 3, and now: C 1 ) 26 . . . �e6 27 ':xg6 fxg6?! (27 . . . 'ii'e 3 28 lDg4) 28 'irxg6 �g8 29 lDxg8 (29 :d7! )
2 9 . . . �xg8 3 0 'ili'h7+ �f7 3 1 .i.b3+ �f6 32 .:tf1 + ; C 2 ) 26 . . . e 4 27 �xe4 ( 2 7 ':xg6? fxg6 28 'ifxg6 �f5 ! ) 27 . . . lDf4 28 'irxf7! �g4 29 'ii'e 7; C3) 26 . . . lDf4 27 'ili'xe5 (27 l:.xg7! �xg7 28 'ili'xe5 is more qu ickly decisive) 27 . . . lDg6 28 �xg6 fxg6 29 l:txg6 b5 30 l::t x h6+ gxh6 31 1:[d7; C4) 26 . . . 'iff2 27 l::t x g6 'iVf4 (27 .. .fxg6 28 'ii'x g6 'ii'x c2 29 'ii'xc2 gxf6 30 'ii'g 6) 28 lDd5 fxg6 29 lDxf4 gxh5 30 lDg6+ �g8 31 .i.b3+. In all the variations Black is unable to avoid a qu ick mate or heavy loss of material , whereas Wh ite's prematu re combination allowed Vasily Ivanchuk to retain the bal ance. 24 . . .
gxf6
24 . . . �h8? would have lost to 25 'iVg5! e5 26 l:txh6+ gxh6 27 'ii'x h6 mate . 25 'ii'x h6
':e8
26 1:[g3 Now if 26 .i.c2 Black has the reply 26 .. .f5, lead ing to perpetual check after 27 'iVh7+ �f8 28 'ii' h 6+. 26 . . .
'ii'f2 !
By the irony of fate, it is the inclusion of the queen that saves the game. (Remember how much effort Wh ite made to shut this important piece out of the game . ) Attempts by Black to play for a win, taking account of the opponent's time-trouble, would most probably have boomeranged . 26 . . . b6 27 l:td4! 'irc7 28 :g4 is completely bad for him. If 26 . . . b5, then after 27 l::t f 1 ! 'iVd4 28 l::t x g6+ fxg6 29 'ii'x g6+ �f8 30 'ifh6+ if he wishes Wh ite can force perpetual check, since 30 . . . �e7 is unfavourable because of 3 1 'ii'g 7+ � d 6 3 2 l::t d 1 . Now, however, Black has parried the th reat of h2-h4, and Wh ite has noth ing better than to reconcile himself to a draw. 27 l::t x g6+
fxg6
ctJ
M i ssed Brilliancy Prizes
28 "xg6+
�f8
29 "h6+
�f7
30 "h7+
�f8
31 "h8+ Draw. Yusu pov - H u bner lilburg 1 987 Slav Defence 1 d4 dS 2 liJf3 liJf6 3 c4 dxc4 4 liJc3 c6 S a4 �fS 6 e3 e6 7 �xc4 � b4 8 0-0 liJ bd7 9 liJh4 �g6 1 0 liJxg6 hxg6 1 1 f4 ( 1 1 h3) 1 1 . . . liJdS ( 1 1 . . ...a5; 11 ... 0-0) 12 �d2 ( 1 2 liJe4 ! ? "e7 1 3 liJg5) 1 2 . . ...a S 1 3 "e1 liJSb6 14 �b3 cS 1 S I1d1 cxd4 16 liJ bS �xd2 1 7 ':'xd2 liJcs 1 8 � c2 l:.d8 1 9 exd4? ! ( 1 9 1bd4 "xe 1 2 0 ':'xe 1 i s sounder, and if 20 . . J:1xd4 2 1 exd4 liJcxa4 , then 22 d5).
121
The accepta nce of the sacrifice would have lost: 20 .. .fxg6 21 "xe6+ �f8 22 f5. How ever, 20 . . . O-O !? 2 1 �d3 a6 was more circu mspect, since the obvious 22 f5? exf5 (but not 22 . . . axb5? 23 f6 or 23 fxe6) 23 .l:txf5 (hoping for 23 . . Jld5? 24 .l:r.xf7 ! ! ) is refuted by 23 . . . liJxb2 ! . 21 �xf7 Wh ite can no longer stop halfway (2 1 �d3 a6 22 f5 axb5 23 fxe6 f6 24 Wg3?! Wxd2 will not do). Both players become carried away by the wild compl ications, with not the slig htest impression of where they will be able to escape from them. 21 . . .
�xf7
The consequences of 2 1 . . . Wxb5 22 Wxe6+ �f8 23 �g6 Wd7 24 lle2 "xe6 25 ':'xe6 liJd5 26 ':'fe 1 liJf6 were unclear. I think that after 27 g3 or 27 :e7 Wh ite has sufficient compensation for the sacrificed piece. 22 fS
eS
Black would have lost after both 22 . . . llhe8 23 fxe6+ �g8 24 e7, and 22 . . ...xb5 23 "xe6+ �f8 24 f6 Wd7 (or 24 . . ...xf1 + 25 �xf1 ':'e8 26 "d6+ �f7 27 llf2 ) in view of 25 fxg7+ �xg7 26 Wf6+ �g8 27 _g6+.
Wh ite has somewhat overestimated his chances, and now the cool-headed 1 9 . . . O-O ! could have set h i m serious problems. Instead of this Robert H u bner falls in with his opponent's idea . 19 . . .
liJcxa4
20 �xg6 A practically forced move , leading to an abrupt sharpening of the play. 20 . . .
�e7
23 f6 The immed iate 23 Wxe5 was a serious alternative. The following variations do not
1 22
�
M issed Brilliancy Prizes
exhaust all the possibil ities in the position , o f course, but they show how strong Wh ite's attack is: A) 23 .. Jlhe8 24 tDd6+ ; B) 23 . . . 'ii'x d2 24 f6! (24 'ii'e 6+ 'iti>f8 2S f6 l:r.d7! ) B 1 ) 2 4 . . . gS 2S tDd6+ ! .l:.xd6 (2S . . . 'iti>g6 26 'iVe4+ 'iti>h6 27 tDfS+ 'iti>g6 28 f7) 26 'ii'e 7+ 'iti>g6 27 'iVg7+ 'iti>hS 28 'ii'x h8+; B2) 24 . . . 'iti>g8 2S fxg7 ':h6 (2S .. Jbh2 26 'ii'e 6+ 'iti>h7 27 g8'ii' + ':'xg8 28 l:tf7+ :g7 29 'ii'fS+ 'iti>h8 30 .:tf8+ ':'g8 31 'ii'f6+ 'iti>h7 32 l:tf7+ ) 26 'ii'e 7, and Wh ite wins; C ) 23 . . . tDdS 24 'ii'e 6+ 'iti>f8 2S f6 g6 26 :e2 C 1 ) 26 . . . 'ii' b 6 27 'ii'g 4 'iti>f7 28 'ii' g S!? (intending 29 1:[e7+ ), or immed iately 28 1:1e7+! tDxe7 29 fxe7+ 'iti>xe7 30 'ii'g S+ 'iti>d7 31 l:If7+ 'iti>c8 (31 . . . 'iti>c6 32 .l:.f6+) 32 'ii'e S! with the decisive th reats 33 tDxa7+ and 33 1:1c7+;
less finds new ways to strengthen the attack. The threat is 27 1:1e7+ , for example: 26 . . . 'ii'x bS 27 1:1e7+ 'iti>f8 28 'ii'x g6 'ii'x f1 + 29 'iti>xf1 tDxe7 30 'ii'g 7+ with mate. 26 . . .
lId7
27 1:1e7+
tDxe7
27 . . . ':xe7 28 fxe7+ (28 'ii'x dS+ ! ) 28 . . . tDf6 is hopeless in view of 29 'ii'e S with the decisive threat 30 tDd6+. 28 fxe7+
'iti>e8
29 'ii'e 5 29 l:tf6 was probably even stronger. 29 . . .
1:1xe7
30 'ii'x h8+
C2) 26 . . . 'ii' b4 27 f7 'iVe7 28 'ii'g 4 'ii' h 4 (28 . . . tDe3 29 'iVxg6 or 29 'it'f4) 29 l1e8+! 1:1xe8 30 fxe8'if+ 'iti>xe8 31 tDd6+ 'iti>d8 32 'it'c8+ 'iti>e7 33 ':'f7+ 'iti>xd6 34 'ii'd 7 mate ; C3) 26 . . . 'ii'x bS 27 f7 'ii'x e2 (27 . . . 'ii'd 7 28 'ii'e S! 1:1h7 29 'ii'e 8+) 28 'ii' x e2 tDab6 29 'ii'e S with advantage to Wh ite . The conti nuation in the game is probably just as good and in many cases it leads to a simple transposition of moves. 23 . . .
96
If 23 . . . gS there follows 24 'ii'x eS with a strong attack. 24 'ii'x e5 24 dxeS!? 'ii'x d2 2S e6+ 'iti>f8 ! 26 e7+ 'iti>f7 27 exd8tD+ 'ii' x d8 28 'ii' b4! was also interest i n g , with the th reats of 29 tDd6+ or 29 b3. 24 . . .
tDd5
25 1:1e2
'ii' b 6
If 2S . . . 'ii'x bS 26 'ii'e 6+ 'iti>f8 27 f7 'ii'x e2 28 'ii'x e2 with advantage to White. 26 'ii' 9 51 Although in time-trouble, White neverthe-
After making this move , Wh ite, who was in moderate time-trouble, timidly offered a draw, wh ich my opponent sensibly ac cepted . G reat was my astonishment, when i n subsequent analysis I discovered that in the concluding position I was a pawn up! I had been material down for so many moves and was so happy to regain it, that I did not even notice that I was now ahead ! Of course, the sou nd extra pawn determines the eval uation of the position, and after the natural 30 . . . 'iti>d7 31 'ii' h 3+ 'ii'e 6 32 'ii'x e6+ l:t.xe6 33 b3 even my tech nique should have sufficed for a w i n .
ttJ
M i ssed Brilliancy Prizes
Yusu pov - Anand Linares 1 99 1 Queen 's Pawn Opening 1 d4 ttJf6 2 ttJf3 e6 3 e3 b6 4 ..i d3 ..i b7 5 0-0 d5 6 ttJe5 ttJbd7 7 f4 g6 8 b3 ..ig7 9 ttJd2 e5 1 0 ..i b2 0-0 1 1 'Wf3 1 ttJe8 1 2 'Wh3 ttJd6 13 ttJdf3 .:te8
1 23
strai ned 1 6 . . . .:tcB ! ? was less in keeping with the temperament of my opponent, who very rarely avoids compl ications. 17 ttJxh71
ttJxh7
1 8 ttJxg6 1 B ..i xg6 was weaker because of the simple 1 B . . . ttJfB . 18 . . .
'We7
1 B . . . .:tcB 1 9 .:tf3 c4 was risky in view of 20 ttJe7+ 'Wxe7 2 1 'iVxh7+ 'it?fB 22 ..ig6 :edB 23 .:tg3 or 23 ..ia3 with a strong attack. However, possibly Black should have de cided on 1 B .. .fS!? 1 9 ..ixg7 'it?xg7. Then 20 I1f3 ttJf6 21 I1g3 leads to a repetition of moves: 21 . . . ttJfe4 (2 1 . . . ttJg4? 22 ttJeS! and wins) 22 ..ixe4 ttJxe4 23 ttJeS+ ttJxg3 24 'Wxg3+ 'it?fB 2S ttJg6+, while 20 'Wg3 'Wf6 2 1 ttJeS+ 'it? h B 2 2 ttJd7 'Wc3 2 3 ttJeS leads to an unclear position . 1 9 .1:.f3 Both players have practically completed the mobil isation of their forces and Wh ite switches to determined actio n . However, Black too has prepared well for the oppo nent's attack, by erecting powerful defen sive l i nes. Possibly I should have preferred the restra ined 1 4 l1ad 1 ! ? , but I was already seized by a creative mood . 1 4 ttJg5
ttJf8
1 5 dxe5 A standard exchange, opening the long diagonal for the bishop. 15 . . .
bxe5
1 6 :ad1 ! By including the rook in the game and offering a piece sacrifice , Wh ite g reatly sharpens the position. It was not possible to calculate all the variations, but it seemed to me that a couple of pawns and the in itiative would provide sufficient compensation . 16 . . .
f6
Anand accepts the challenge. The re-
ttJe4
1 9 . . . c4 was dangerous in view of 20 ttJe7+ .:txe7 21 ..ixh7+ (2 1 'Wxh7+ 'it?fB 22 ..ig6 is weaker) 21 . . . 'it?fB 22 :g3 c3 23 ..i a3 fS 24 :g6 with an attack. 20 ..i xe4
dxe4
21 :g3 The rook joins the offensive against the weakened position of the black king. Natu rally, the opponent tries to create counterplay along the now open d-file. 21 . . .
l::t a d8
22 ':xd8
'Wxd8
23 'Wg4 23 'WhS? is wrong , since after 23 . . . 'WdS (23 . . . 'Wd2 !? 24 h3 'ii'xc2) White has to reply 24 ttJeS, and 24 . . . l:te7 Ieaves Black with too many defensive resources. 23 . . .
'Wd5
Here Black also had other possibil ities. I n the event o f 2 3 . . . 'Wd2 White would have played 24 h4 and if 24 .. :ii'xc2 , then 2S ttJfB %:te7 26 ttJxh7 'ii'x b2 27 'Wg6 1:[f7 2B hS ..i dS 29 h6 with a decisive advantage, while after
1 24
�
M issed Brilliancy Prizes
24 . . .f5 there would have followed 25 'it'h5 'ife 1 + 26 'ifi>h2 'ifxg3+ 27 'ifi>xg3 i.xb2 28 tDe5 11e7 29 'it'd 1 with the better game. 23 .. .f5 came into consideration. After 24 'ifh5 tDf6 25 tDe7+ l:be7 (25 . . . 'it'xe7 is weaker in view of 26 i.xf6) 26 i.xf6 'it'd2 27 h3 (27 ':'xg7+ ':'xg7 28 'it'e8+ leads to perpetual check) 27 . . . 'it'e 1 + 28 'ifi>h2 'it'xg3+ 29 'ifi>xg3 i.xf6 30 'ifi>f2 Wh ite, in my view, has somewhat the better chances.
to demonstrate the correctness of his attack. However, he has available another, stronger conti nuatio n , which occu rred to me only after the game. Wh ite should pursue the knig ht: 25 tD h 7 ! . As shown by the variations given below, Black now has to solve some d ifficult problems: A) 25 . . . ':'d8 26 tDxf6+ i.xf6 27 i.xf6 'it'd 1 + 28 'it'xd 1 ':'xd 1 + 29 'ifi>f2 - the piece is regained and White should win; B) 25 ... 'iVd2 26 h4 'iVe 1 + 27 'ifi>h2 'ii'x g3+ 28 'iVxg3 tDxh7 29 h5 with a winning position; C) 25 . . .f5 26 tDf6+! (26 'it'e2 i.xb2 27 ':'xg5+ 'ifi>f7 28 c4 'it'd3 29 c4 'it'd3 30 'it'xb2 'it'xe3+ is unfavourable for Wh ite, but he ca n consider 26 'iVh5 tDf3+ 27 'iVxf3 ! exf3 28 ':'xg7+ 'ifi>h8 29 :d7+ e5 30 ':xd5 i.xd5 31 tDf6 ':'d8 32 i.xe5 with a favourable endgame) 26 . . . i.xf6 27 'it'h5 C 1 ) 27 . . . i.xb2 28 'it'xe8+ 'ifi>h 7 29 h4! with a big advantage (less is promised by 29 'iVh5+ 'ifi>g8 30 l::t x g5+ 'ifi>f8 31 h3);
24 h4 The most natu ral development of the game. Wh ite makes an escape square for his king and includes his rook's pawn in the offen sive. But at the same time he had a more camouflaged way of conducti ng the attack. I rejected 24 tDf8 ! ? in view of 24 . . . tDg5 (24 . . . .:.e7 is weaker because of 25 tDxh7 'ifi>xh7 26 i.xf6). I ndeed , now noth ing is promised by 25 fxg5 f5 26 'it'h5, since Black repl ies not 26 . . . ':'xf8 (in view of 27 g6 i.h6 28 i.d4! cxd4 29 'it'xh6 'ifd7 30 g7 and wins), but either 26 . . . 'ifi>xf8 , or 26 . . . i.xb2. I n the fi rst case 2 6 . . . 'ifi>xf8 2 7 i.xg7+ 'ifi>xg7 2 8 'ifh6+ 'ifi>f7 2 9 'iff6+ leads to perpetual check, but it is possible to play for a win by 29 g6+ 'ifi>e7 30 h3. More i nteresting is 26 . . . i.xb2! 27 tDh7 'ifi>g7 28 'ifh6+ (or 28 c3 i.xc3 29 tDf6 .:th8 30 tDxd5 l:Ixh5 31 tDxc3 i.c6) 28 . . . 'ifi>f7, when it is not easy for Wh ite
C2) 27 .. J:td8 28 i.xf6 (weaker is 28 'iVg6+ 'ifi>f8 29 'iVxf6+ 'ifi>e8 30 ':'xg5 'iVd 1 + 3 1 'ifi>f2 l::t d 2+! 32 'ifi>g3 ':'xg2+! 33 'ifi>xg2 'it'f3+ with perpetual check) 28 . . . 'iVd 1 + 29 'it'xd 1 ':'xd 1 + 30 'ifi>f2 ':'d2+ 3 1 'ifi>e 1 l:txc2 32 fxg5, and the endgame is most probably won . 24 . . .
'iVf5
If 24 . . .f5 , then 25 'it'h5. 25 'it'd1
'iVd5
26 'it'94
'it'f5
It appears that things will end i n a repetition of moves, especially since I was already in my customary time-trouble. 27 'ifd1
'it'd5
28 'ife2 1 After plucking up cou rage , Wh ite decides to play on. Now it is not easy for the opponent to find a useful move. Thus if 28 . . . 'it'd6 there follows 29 'it'g4 ':'d8 30 'ifi>h2 ':'d7 3 1 tDe5
It:J
M issed Brilliancy Prizes
(31 h5 f5) 3 1 . . . :e7 (bad is 3 1 . . . fxe5 32 ..txe5 'ile7 33 ..txg7) 32 h5 'ili'a6 33 h6 with a powerful attack. wh ile if 28 . . . ..tc6. then 29 h5 �f7 30 'ilg4 :g8 31 h6. The continuation in the game hardly makes a sign ificant change to the position. 28 . . .
..te8
29 h5 This pawn acts as a battering-ra m . breaking up the nearly coordi nated black pieces. 29 . . .
�f7
30 'ilg4 Another way of concluding the attack was suggested by Dvoretsky: 30 h6! ..txh6. and now either 3 1 liJe5+ fxe5 32 'ilh5+. or 3 1 c4 'ild3 32 Wh5. 30 . . .
liJg5!
32 'ile2
1 25
..txb2
32 . . . 'iid 6 33 ..txg7 Wxg3 34 ..tf6 was no better. 33 e4
Wd6
34 'ilxb2
e51
underestimated this move . Of cou rse. 34 . . . 'ii'x g3? would have lost immed iately to 35 'ii'f6+ 'itt g 8 36 'ii' h 8+ 'itt f7 37 'ii' h 7 mate. But now my pieces lose coord i nation . wh ich not only makes it more d ifficult to convert the material advantage. but also hands the in itiative to my opponent. Discouraged by this tu rn of events. Wh ite loses the thread of the game. 35 11h3?1 An unsuccessful manoeuvre . 35 �h2 was better. in order to answer 35 .. .f4 with 36 exf4 exf4 37 'iif2 e3 38 Wxf4+ 'ilxf4 39 liJxf4 e2 40 liJxe2 ':xe2 41 g6+ �g7 42 :g5. retaining good winning chances. It is possible that 35 'ii c 1 I ? � preventing the . . . f5-f4 breakth roug h . is even stronger. 35 . . .
f4
36 l:t h4 The consequences of the exchange sacri fice were unclear: 36 exf4 ..txh3 37 liJxe5+ �g8 38 gxh3 Wd 1 + 39 �f2 :d8 40 �g3 %:td2 4 1 'iia 3. 36 . . .
Vishwanathan Anand defends very resou rce fully. The counter-sacrifice of a piece is his best practical chance . Unfortu nately. fatigue and shortage of time were already begin ning to affect Wh ite's play: instead of looking for the strongest conti nuation he satisfied h imself with 'the bird in the hand'. 3 1 liJe5+! fxe5 32 fxg5 was correct. The strong connected passed pawns qu ickly decide the outcome. for example: 32 .. J:td8 33 h6 'iid 1 + 34 'iix d 1 ':xd 1 + 35 �h2. 31 fxg5?1
f5
fxe3
1 26
M issed Brilliancy Prizes
9 ttJe5 .l::t e 8
37 'it>h2? In time-trouble White conclusively loses his bearings and makes a blu nder. 37 'iVe2 ! was correct. I n this case he would at least not have been in danger of losi ng, as the following variations show: 37 . . . 'iVd2 38 'it'f1 + ; 3 7 . . . 'iVd4 38 h6! i.f5 3 9 h7 i.xg6 40 h8'iV l:Ixh8 4 1 .l::t x h8; 37 . . . 'iVd3! 38 'iVf1 + ! 'it>g8 39 'iVf6 (39 h6 'iVxf1 + 40 'it>xf1 'it>h7 41 ttJxe5! l:txe5 42 g6+ 'it>h8! leads to an unclear endgame) 39 . . . e2 40 'iVh8+ . 37 . . .
i.f5!
38 'iVe2 In ti me-trouble it was completely impossible to find the last chance , later pointed out by Dvoretsky: 38 b4! ! cxb4 (38 . . . 'iVd2?! 39 'iVa3 with the dangerous th reat of 40 'ii'x a7+) 39 c5! 'ii'x c5 (39 .. .'iVd4 40 'ii b 3+) 40 .l::t f4! ! exf4 4 1 'iVf6+ with perpetual check. 38 . . .
'ii'd 2
39 'iif1
'it>e6
40 .:txe4
i.xe4
Wh ite resigned . Although in this game Wh ite did not gain any reward for his boldness, I was not seriously upset to have lost half a point by avoiding a d raw. My annoyance would have been far g reater if, after agreeing to a repetition of moves, I had then d iscovered a win. From my experience I can assu re the reader that playing for a win in such situations more often brings success than d isappoi ntment, and, in any case , more creative satisfaction that the prematu re termination of the fight. Yusupov - Gulko Novgorod 1 995 Nimzo-Indian Defence 1 d4 ttJf6 2 c4 e6 3 ttJc3 i.. b4 4 e3 0-0 5 i.d3 d5 6 ttJf3 c5 7 0-0 b6 8 cxd5 exd5
This game was played in the last round of a tou rnament i n which I performed very badly and was a complete outsider. Therefore even if only at the finish I wanted to score a first win . I cannot say that I was prepared for the variation chosen by my opponent, but the character of the play was more or less familiar to me: after all, the N i mzo-I ndian Defence is firmly established in my open ing repertoire. Black's somewhat mysterious 9th move is q uite simply explained : he wants to retain the option of playing . . . i.c8a6 without loss of time. (After the i m med iate 9 . . . i.a6 Wh ite has the un pleasant 1 0 ttJc6!). But now, without particular effort, I was able to find an idea which, although not original, was q uite sensible, and, as it later tran spired , was also a novelty. 1 0 ttJe2 ! After 1 0 i.d2 Black is able to carry out his idea : 1 0 . . . i.a6, when 1 1 ttJc6? ttJxc6 1 2 i.xa6 i s now bad in view of 1 2 . . . cxd4 1 3 i.b 7 dxc3 1 4 bxc3 ttJa5! 1 5 i.xa8 i.c5. This variation , l i ke a nu mber of others , is taken from Boris Gulko's comments in Informator NO.63. But 1 1 i.xa6 ttJxa6 1 2 'it'a4 'iVc8 1 3 .l::t a c1 'iVb7 1 4 'iVc6 .l:tab8 leads to equality (Portisch-Spassky, Candidates match , Ge neva 1 977).
ttJ
M i ssed Brillia ncy Prizes
1 27
The point of the move in the game is clear: the knight is switched to g3, where it not only controls e4 , an especially important square in this variation, but is also ready to join the attack on the opponent's king via f5 . The slight loss of time is fully compensated by the fact that Black, in view of the dangerous position of his dark-square bishop, can not maintain the tension in the centre and is forced either to exchange on d4 , thereby releasing the opponent's dark sq uare bishop, or rel ieve the pressure in the centre by advancing his c-pawn . 10 . . .
c4
In the event of 1 0 . . . cxd4 1 1 exd4 .i.a6 1 2 .i.xa6 liJxa6 Black did not l i ke 1 3 .i.g5. 11 .i.c2
.i.d6?1
A loss of time, wh ich aggravates Black's difficulties . After the natu ral 1 1 . . . .i.b7 G u l ko was afraid of 1 2 b3!? Even so, this was the lesser evil and Black could have defended with 1 2 . . . cxb3 1 3 .i.xb3 .i.d6. 12 f41 A standard idea . Such a set-up is good if, as in the game, Wh ite is able to control the e4square . It was illog ical to begin play on the queenside: 1 2 b3 b5 1 3 a4 cxb3 1 4 .i.xb3 b4 with chances for both sides. 12 . . .
b5
1 3 liJg3
liJbd7?1
Black allows the opponent additional possi bil ities. 1 3 . . . .i.b7 was more accu rate . 1 4 Wf3 I decided not to deviate from the basic pla n . T h e alternative 1 4 e4 !? would have led to unclear play after 1 4 . . . liJb6 1 5 liJc6!? ( 1 5 liJxf7 'it>xf7 1 6 e5 .i.g4 1 7 Wd2 'it>g8 is unconvincing) 1 5 . . .Wc7 1 6 e5 .i.g4 (Gulko gives 1 6 . . . liJfd7 1 7 exd6 Wxc6 1 8 liJf5 'it>h8 19 Wg4 g6 20 liJh6) 1 7 Wd2 'ii' xc6 1 8 exf6. 14 . . .
.i.b7
1 5 .i.d2
.i.f8?1
1 5 . . . liJf8!? was more logica l .
1 6 a41? An i nteresting and somewhat unexpected decision . Wh ite is looking for more than the standard development of the attack by 1 6 liJf5 g6 1 7 'ii' h 3 gxf5 1 8 .i.xf5 . By weakening the opponent's q ueenside he introduces new motifs into the play. 16 . . .
b41 ?
The critical conti nuatio n . After 1 6 . . . a 6 1 7 liJf5 g6 1 8 Wh3 gxf5 1 9 .i.xf5 liJb6 20 ':f3 Wh ite has a strong attack. 17 a5 Of course, not 1 7 liJxc4? ':c8 1 8 b3 .i.a8, and White loses a piece. 17 . . .
':c8
Possibly 1 7 . . . c3 should have been tried . Apparently Black d id not like 1 8 a6 .i.xa6 1 9 ':xa6 cxd2 20 'ii'e 2 Wc8 2 1 .i.f5 'ii' b 7 22 ':fa 1 , but 1 8 . . . cxb2 1 9 ':a2 .i.c8 came into consideration . 1 8 a6
.i.a8
1 9 liJf5
c3 1 ?
1 9 . . . liJe4? is incorrect: 20 .i.xe4 dxe4 2 1 'ii'g 4, a n d 2 1 . . . g6? is not possible because of 22 liJxd7. And i n the event of 1 9 . . . g6, thanks to his provocation on the queenside, Wh ite has acquired a new motif: 20 .i.xb4!? gxf5 (20 . . . .i.xb4 2 1 liJh6+ 'it>g7 22 liJhxf7 We7 23 'ii' h 3) 2 1 Wg3+ .i.g7 22 .i.xf5 . 20 bxc3
g6
1 28
� 21 'ifh31
M issed Brillia ncy Prizes
b3!
Accepting the knight sacrifice looks terribly dangerous. I n the event of 21 . . . gxf5 22 �xf5 lLlb6 23 l:tf3 .i.g7 24 :g3 c;i;>f8 25 cxb4 (or 25 c4!?) Wh ite already has three pawns for the piece with a dangerous in itiative. Gulko tries to gain at least some counterplay. 22 .i.xb3
lLle4
At the cost of two pawns Black has managed to establish his knight in the centre. Although objectively his cou nterplay is insufficient, he has set his opponent some serious practical problems, by sharply chang ing the situation on the board . After 22 . . . gxf5 23 'ii'xf5 it would have been much easier for Wh ite to conduct the attack. 23 lLlxf7 ! O f course, t h i s is t h e correct conti nuation, since now the black king is forced to go for a walk. Not 23 .i. e 1 lLlxe5 24 fxe5 gxf5 25 'ii'xf5 l:tc7, and Black can defend . 23 . . .
c;i;>xf7
24 'ii'x h7+
c;i;>e6
g reat. Another weakness of the author made itself felt: as soon as I make a couple of attractive moves, I feel the desire to create a 'masterpiece ' . Alas, excessive emotions during play have damaged me on many occasions. 25 'ii'g 8+?! I n a joint analysis after the game we establ ished that Wh ite should have played 25 'ifxg6+ 'iff6 26 lLlg7+! (26 'ifg8+ 'iff7 27 'ii'xf7+ c;i;>xf7 28 .i.e1 lLlxc3 is unclear). If now 26 . . . �xg7, then 27 'ifxe4+ c;i;>d6 (27 . . . c;i;>f7 28 �xd5+) 28 'ife5+! and wins. 26 . . . c;i;>e7 27 'ii'xf6+ lLldxf6 28 lLlxe8 lLlxd2 29 lLlxf6 c;i;>xf6 30 .i.a4 lLlxf1 31 c;i;>xf1 l:txc3 is more critica l , but after 32 c;i;>e2 (32 .:tb1 !? .i.c6 33 .i.xc6 l:txc6 34 c;i;>f2 is also strong) 32 .. .l:tc4 (or 32 . . . �a3 33 :b1 .i.c1 34 .l:.b3) 33 g4 Wh ite has a clear advantage. Now, however, he simply has insufficient reserves to gain more than perpetual check. 25 . . . 26 g4+
c;i;>xf5
Noth ing was given by 26 'iff7+ in view of 26 . . . 'ii'f6 27 'it'xd7+ 'ife6. 26 . . .
�f6
27 f5 I was pinning g reat hopes on this move . 27 �e 1 was bad because of 27 . . . c;i;>e7 28 .i. h4+ lLldf6 29 'iVxg6 l:txc3 . 27 . . . .i.g7!
The critical moment of the game. Wh ite saw the correct continuation , but he was unable to evaluate correctly the endgame arising in the main variation . I n add ition , he was g ripped by creative feelings: the temptation to drag the king out even fu rther was too
A sober assessment of the position : Black forces a draw. 27 . . . gxf5?! 28 ':'xf5+ c;i;>e7 was too risky in view of 29 .i.xd5! (not 29 'iVf7+ c;i;>d6 30 :xd5+ c;i;>c7) 29 . . . .i.xd5 30 'ii'x d5. Now both 30 . . . lLlef6 3 1 'iff3 �d6 32 e4! lLlxe4 33 .i.f4+ c;i;>c6 34 ':e1 ! or 34 'ii'e 2! (but not 34 .i.e5 lLlxe5 35 dxe5 because of 35 . . . .i.c5+ 36 c;i;>f1 'ifd5), and 30 . . . lLld6 3 1 l:taf1 ! 'ifb6 (31 . . . lLlxf5 3 2 l:txf5 'ifc7 33 e4 c;i;>d8 34 lIxf8 lIxf8 35 .i.g5+ leads to mate) 32 l:[f7+ c;i;>d8 33 c4 'ifxa6 34 .i.a5+ .:tc7 35 l:t 1 f6! g ive Wh ite a prom ising position . There was
also the i nteresti ng
move
ttJ
Missed Brilliancy Prizes
27 . . . Wb6 !? - it is impossible to predict how, with both players short of time, it would all have then ended . 28 fxg6+ 28 Wh7 :g8 29 Wxg6+ �e7 30 'ii' e 6+ �f8 3 1 �c1 does not work because of 3 1 . . . liJg5 (or 31 . . . �f6 32 �a3+ �g7) 32 �a3+ liJc5 33 Wg6 �xd4 . 28 . . .
1 29
opponent, who in the event of a win would obta i n chances of fi rst place . 1 d4 d6 2 e4 liJf6 3 liJ c 3 g6 4 f4 � g 7 5 liJf3 c5 6 � b5+ �d7 7 e5 liJg4 8 �xd7+ Wxd7 9 d5 dxe5 1 0 h3 e4 1 1 liJxe4 liJf6 1 2 liJxf6+ �xf6 1 3 0-0 0-0 1 4 �e3 ! ? liJa6 1 5 liJe5 Wd6
�xg6
Now White repeats moves several times in order, after reach ing the time control, to check the variations accu rately and once again convince h imself that the win , alas, has already been missed . 29 Wf7+
�h7
30 Wf5+
�g8
31 Wf7+
�h8
32 Wh5+
�g8
33 Wf7+
�h8
34 Wh5+
�g8
35 �xd5+
�xd5
36 Wxd5+
�h8
37 Wh5+
�g8
38 Wf7+
�h8
There is no point in giving White chances by 38 . . . �h7?! 39 :f5 liJdf6 40 :aa5 Wxa5 4 1 :xa5 liJxd2 4 2 g5. 39 Wh5+
�g8
40 Wf7+
�h8
Draw. In concl usion I will give yet another example of a spoiled attack, in which , however, it all ended happily for the author. Yusu pov - Adams Dortmund 1 994 Pirc-Ufimtsev Defence This game was also played in the last round, and I wanted to win it without fai l , in order to improve my tournament result somewhat. The game was even more important for my
Wh ite played the open ing confidently, which was mainly explai ned by the fact that the entire variation and this particular position had already occu rred in my game with Vlastimil Hort from the German Team Championsh ip. It is probable that M ichael Adams simply did not know about this game, which was played a few months before Dortmund. 1 6 liJg4 A standard idea in this variation . From g4 the knight su pports the attack well and at a conven ient moment it is threatening to go to h6. 16 . . .
�xb2
1 7 llb1
�g7
18 f5 An important move in Wh ite's plan. The regaining of the pawn can wait (if 1 8 l:txb7 there would have followed 1 8 .. .f5), it being far more important to develop his in itiative on the kingside and secure the h6-square for the knight.
1 30
� 18 . . .
M issed Brilliancy Prizes
lDc7?!
In the afore-mentioned game Hort played more strongly: 1 8 . . . lDb4 ! ? 1 9 c4 lDxa2 20 ':xb7 lDc3, trying to create counterplay. The move in the game is rather passive, and Wh ite gains the opportun ity to dictate the fu rther cou rse of events. He now has perhaps too wide a choice :
A) 1 9 c4 bS;
20 . . .
exf6
20 . . . i.xf6 was weaker in view of 2 1 ':xf6 lDxf6 22 'iix d6 exd6 23 lDxf6+ �g7 24 lDg4! with a winning position . h5 21 c4 22 lDh6+
B) 1 9 f6 exf6 20 i.f4 'it'd8 ; C ) 1 9 lDh6+!? i.xh6 20 i.xh6 l:.fd8 2 1 c4 ; D) 1 9 i.f4!? i.d4+! (as shown by Adams, dangerous is 19 . . . 'it'd8 20 i.xc7 'it'xc7 21 d6 'ii'd 7 22 dxe7 i.d4+ 23 � h 1 'it'xe7 24 f6 with an attack) 20 'iix d4 cxd4 21 i.xd6 exd6 22 l:txb7 l:tac8 (22 . . . lDxdS 23 f6 followed by lDh6+ - Black's f7 -point is weak), and if 23 f6? hS - however, after 23 lDf6+ �g7 24 fxg6 fxg6 (24 . . . hxg6 2S a4 ! ? , and if 2S . . . a6, then 26 lDd7) 2S lDe4 l:txf1 + 26 �xf1 the advantage remains with White . During the game my choice was mainly between this last continuation , which seemed to me to be not too clear, and the text move . 1 9 l:.xb7!
But not 22 lDf2? in view of 22 . . . 'iig 3 23 i.xcS lDf4 . 22 . . .
lDxd5
�h7
23 lDf5 Wh ite has not managed to win a piece , but he completely destroys the opponent's pawn cha i n . 23 'ii'x dS 'iix dS 24 cxdS i.xh6 2S ..txcS would also have led to a better endgame for h i m . 23 . . .
gxf5
Although in the variation 23 . . . 'ii' c6 24 'iix dS 'ii'x dS 2S cxdS gxfS 26 i.xcs Black is nominally a pawn up, the endgame with tripled pawns will hardly afford him any pleasure. 24 cxd5
The start of a forcing operatio n . Black's reply is compulsory, since 20 i.f4 is threatened . 19 . . .
20 f6! The point of Wh ite's idea is to exploit the opposition of the queens.
�g8
25 1:.xf5 2S i.f4 ! ? 'ii'a 6 26 'ii' b 1 was interesting, not paying any attention to the f-pawns and concentrating all efforts on the advance of the passed pawn . 25 . .
.
26 'ii' b 1
'ii'a 6 1:.fe8
I was expecting 26 . . . 'ii'e 2 , after which 27 i.f2 is the simplest way to retain the advantage. 27 i.xcs l:[fc8 28 1:.b2 is also possible, only not 28 d6? 1:.xcS 29 ':xcS 'ii'e 3+ 30 � h 1 'ii'x cs 3 1 l::t b 8+ l::t x b8 32 'ii'x b8+ � h 7 33 d7 in view of 33 . . . 'ii' c 1 + (transposing moves does not work: if 33 . . . i.h6? Wh ite has 34 'ii' b 1 + , winning) 34 �h2 i.h6 3S d8'ii' i.f4+. The continuation in the game also parries the obvious threat of 27 ':xhS.
CZJ
M i ssed Brillia ncy Prizes
32 'iVb1
�g8
33 l:txe5
fxe5
34 'it'b8+
�h7
1 31
35 'iVc7
I had no doubts about the assessment of the position , but in the calculation of variations I began to get confused . Everywhere I i mag ined some kind of counterplay for the opponent. As a result I decided to play as simply as possible, by analogy with the 26 . . . 'iVe2 27 �f2 variation . Of course, Wh ite should have exerted h imself a little and ascertai ned that after the simple 27 �xc5! Black's minimal activity does not cause any great problems: after 27 . . . 'iVa5 there follows 28 � b4 . a6 29 :Xxh5, while if 27 . . . liac8 28 d6. The sharpest continuation 27 . . .1le2 leads after 28 .l:1b8+ (28 l:xh5? l:txg2+) 28 .. Jtxb8 29 'iVxb8+ �h7 30 l:txh5+ �g6 3 1 lih4! to an easy win .
It was on this move that I was pinning my hopes. 35 d6 'iVd3 (35 . . . �f6 ) 36 'ii c7 �g6 (36 . . . c4 37 'iVxf7 'ii'x d6 38 'iix h5+ 'iVh6 is also possible) 37 d7 �f6 is not dangerous for Black. Since now, apart from the ad vance of his passed pawn , Wh ite is also threatening the f7-pawn , I was feeling optimistic, u ntil I noticed a defence. Of cou rse, my opponent also found it - Adams does not miss such chances! 35 . . .
'iix a2 1
36 'it'xf7
'ifb1 +
This is the point! The queen switches to the kingside with gain of tempo. 37 � h2
'iVg61
38 'iVxa7 U nder the impression of his poor play in the tech n ical stage, Wh ite takes a sensible practical decision - he wants to red uce to the minimum the probabil ity of losing the game. The bolder 38 'iic 7 'iVf5 would have left the opponent's passed pawn alive. 38 . . .
c4
39 'iVc7
2 7 �f2? Wh ite reckoned that after the practically forced exchange of rooks his passed pawn would decide the outcome, but he over looked a strong defensive manoeuvre by the opponent. 27 . . .
:e5
28 l:.b8+
lixb8
29 'iVxb8+
�h7
30 'iVb1 A usefu l device. To avoid time-trouble, Wh ite repeats moves. 30 . . .
�g8
31 'it'b8+
�h7
39 . . .
'it'd3?
1 32
�
M issed Brillia ncy Prizes
Upset by the cou rse of the game, which did not leave h i m any chances of first place i n the tournament, Adams was unable to concentrate fully on the fight for a draw and he made this natu ral but losing move almost without th inking . Meanwhile Black had a way to save the game. After 39 . . . 'ii'f5! ! 40 .ig3 'ii'e4 41 d6 (4 1 'ii'f7 also leads to a draw) 4 1 . . . h4 or 40 .ie3 'iVe4 4 1 .ig5 'iVxd5 (4 1 . . . c;t;>g6 42 d6 .i f6 43 .ixf6 'iff4+ 44 c;t;>g 1 'ilVe3+ 45 c;t;>f1 'iVd3+ is also possible) 42 .if6 'ii'g 8 43 .ixe5 c;t;>h8 44 .ixg7+ 'ii'x g7 45 'ii'xc4 'ii'e 5+ Black should gain a draw. 40 d6
e3
40 . . . c;t;>g6 41 d7 .if6 was rather more tenacious, although after 42 .i b6 Black's position is d ifficult. My opponent obviously
overlooked Wh ite's 42nd move. 41 d7
e2
42 .ie3 ! Black's downfall is caused by the fact that his king is on the same rank as the wh ite queen, and if he moves his bishop there is a decisive discovered check. 42 . . .
'ii'x e3
43 'ii'x e2+
e4
44 'ii' e 7! The simplest. There is no point in calculat ing the more complicated 44 d8'ii' .ie5+ 45 g3 (wh ich , however, was also sufficient for a win) when there is a simple solution . Black resigned.
CD
1 33
Mark Dvoretsky
Lon g -d i sta n ce D i s p ute
S sacrifice?
hould I take a risk? Should I make a Questions such as these qu ite often have to be solved . It is clear that here there is not and can not be a general prescription . The best that readers ca n be advised to do is refer to books and articles in which this type of situation is analysed . Test them on yourself - try, by deeply analysing the position, to decide how you would act in this or that case , and then check your reasoning with the commentator's conclu sions. By acti ng in this way, you will not only develop your tech nique of calculating varia tions, but also learn to determ ine intu itively the degree of acceptable risk. I should like to show you the analysis of a sharp position, which occu rred in a game of the Soviet master Vlad imir Simagin (he became a grandmaster much later). Eleven years later (without having any knowledge of that previous game) the same position was obtai ned by Bobby Fischer. The opin ions of Simagin and Fischer d iverged . You have the opportun ity to make a choice , to decide which player's handling of the position was more correct. Shamkovich - Simagin Leningrad 1 95 1 GrOnfeld Defence tLlf6 1 d4 2 c4 g6 3 tLlc3
d5
4 tLlf3
i.. g 7
5 'it'b3
dxc4
6 'it'xc4
0-0
7 e4
i.. g4
8 i.. e 3
tLlfd7
9 'iVb3
i.. xf3
Black wants to develop his knight at c6 , but the immediate 9 . . . tLlc6 ru ns into 1 0 'iVxb7 tLla5 1 1 'it'a6 , as in the game Polugayevsky Simag i n , played in Leningrad in the 1 960 USSR Championship (however, after 1 1 . . . c5 1 2 dxc5 l1b8, according to the Encyclopae dia of Chess Openings, the position is unclear). The prel iminary exchange on f3 , elimi nating one of the defenders of the d4-point, does not leave Wh ite time to captu re the pawn on b7. However, it also has its drawbacks, and therefore the main theoretical conti nuation became 9 . . . tLlb6. 10 gxf3
tLlc6
1 1 1:[d1 ? Now Simagin's idea proves justified . As later practice showed , by playing 1 1 O-O-O ! Wh ite gains an advantage. 11 . . .
e5
1 2 dxe5 1 2 d5?! tLld4 is unfavourable for Wh ite. 12 . . .
tLlcxe5
1 3 i.. h3 Leonid Shamkovich plays aggressively, hop ing to exploit the pin on the knight at d7. I n the event o f 1 3 i.. e 2 Black has the excel lent reply 1 3 . . . 'it'h4 ! , and if 14 f4 , then 14 . . . tLlg4. 13 . . .
tLlxf3+!
1 3 . . . 'it'h4! ? 14 i.. x d7 l:tad8 would also have g iven Black a good game. 1 4 �e2
1 34
�
Long-d i stance Dispute
If 1 4 'iti>f1 Simagin g ives the variation 1 4 . . . lDfe5! 1 5 i.. x d7 lDxd7 1 6 'iVb5 c6 1 7 'ili'xb7 i.. xc3 (the immed iate 1 7 . . .'iVh4! is no worse) 1 8 bxc3 'ili'h4 ! . Now 1 9 'iVxd7 lIad8 is not possible, while after 1 9 lIxd7 both 1 9 . . . .:tab8 and 1 9 . . . 'iVxe4 are strong . 14 . . .
lDfe5
1 5 i.. x d7 If 1 5 ':'xd7, then 1 5 . . . 'iIi'h4! ( 1 5 . . . lDxd7 1 6 l:td 1 is less good ). 1 5 f4 'iVh4 1 6 i.. x d7 lDxd7 1 7 lixd7 'iVg4+ will also not do. 15 . . .
lDxd7
1 6 'iVb5
c6
1 7 'ili'xb7
l:tb8
1 8 'ili'xd7 Of course, not 1 8 'iVxc6? l:txb2+ 1 9 'iti>f1 'iVh4 ! . 18 . . .
lIxb2+
19 'iti>f1
I n the game Evans-Fischer (USA Champi onship 1 962/63) Black d id not risk going in for the complications and he restricted h imself to the simple 1 9 . . . 'ii'x d7 20 l:1xd7 i.. x c3 . A draw became practically inevitable. 21 l:txa7 :te8 22 .l:.a4 i.. b4 23 i.. d4 ':c2 24 l:.xb4 c5 25 i.. x c5 ':'xc5 26 'iti>g2 ':c2 27 a4 l:td8 28 'iti>g3 ':'a2 29 ':c1 %1dd2 30 I:tf1 l:td3+ 31 f3 %:tda3 32 ':'d1 l1xa4 33 l::t d 8+ 'iti>g7 Draw. Simagin acted differently. He decl ined the d raw offered at that moment and sacrificed a piece. 19 . . .
'ili'f6 ! !
I n fact, i t is also not easy to refute the move 1 9 . . . 'iVh4? ! . 20 'ii' x c6? (or 20 'ili'd3?) is bad in view of 20 . . . 'iIi'h3+ 21 'iti>e1 'iVf3 , attacking the rook and threatening mate after 22 . . . i.. x c3+. I f 2 0 lDa4?! Black can reply 20 . . . l:txa2 21 lDc5 i.. h6 22 'ifd3 'ili'h3+ 23 'iti>e1 i.. x e3 24 'iVxe3 'ii'x e3+ 25 fxe3 .:1fb8 with sufficient cou nterplay. The strongest conti nuation is 20 lDe2 ! 'ili'xe4 21 ':g1 (weaker is 21 lDg3 'ili'f3 22 ':c1 f5! ) 21 . . . l:txa2 2 2 ':'c1 ! ? , intending 23 'ili'xc6 or 23 'iVg4 followed by 'ii' c4 . Wh ite success fu lly consolidates and retains an advantage. Fischer considered the sacrifice made in the game to be completely incorrect. But Simagin tried to show that Black's combi nation leads to a win. I th ink that the truth l ies somewhere in between . Let us examine some varia tions.
Here is the position in which I invite you to take a decision for Black. He has a choice between regaining the knight, transposing into a roughly equal ending, and the attempt to attack a piece down by either 1 9 . . . 'iVh4 (from here the queen controls the h3-square and attacks the pawn on e4), or 1 9 . . . 'iVf6 (aiming at the weak f3-square). Which would you prefer?
1 . 20 lDa4? This is what Shamkovich played in the game. After 20 .. J::txa 2 21 lDc5 'iVf3 22 'iti>g1 (22 1:[g 1 'ii' e 2+ 23 'iti>g2 'ili'xe3) 22 ... i.. h6! Black's attack became irresist ible. There followed 23 i.. d 4 'ili'xd 1 + 24 'iti>g2 'iVd2 25 'iVd6 i.. e 3! 26 lDd7 'ili'xf2+ 27 'iti>h3 'iVg2+, and Wh ite resigned . II. 20 lDe2? 'iVf3 21 lDg3 i.. h61 It is apparently not possible to defend the wh ite king, for example: 22 i.. x a7 (noth ing is changed by 22 i.. c5 ':c2 23 i.. x a7 lla8! 24
Long-d i stance Dispute
4:J
1 35
l:.e 1 .l:t.xa2) 22 . . . l:ta8! (threatening 23 . . . .l:t.xa7) 23 :e 1 (23 i.c5 i.f8 24 i.e3 ':'axa2 ; 23 l:.a 1 l:1xf2+! 24 i.xf2 i.e3) 23 . . . l:.xa2 24 i.c5 i.d2! 25 l:1b1 l:ta 1 26 'ii' b 7 i.c3! with the decisive threat of 27 . . . l:txb 1 + 28 'ii'x b 1 :a 1 (analysis by Simag i n ) .
The only q uestion is whether Black should be satisfied with a d raw, or whether he has the right to continue the attack with 21 ... c5! ? Simagin thinks that he does. He g ives the variation 22 l:tg3 'ii' h 1 + 23 l:tg 1 'it'xh2 24 1:Ig2 'ifh 1 + 25 J:tg 1 'ifh4! with an attack.
III. 2 0 i.d4 ! ? 'it'f3
Wh ite can play more strongly: 22 1i.xc5! 1i.xc3 23 'ii'd 31 'iff6 24 1:Ig3 . By allowing the opponent to restore material equal ity, he activates his forces. 24 . . . 1i. b4?? loses im mediately to 25 1i.d4, and Black resig ned (McLellan-Kokori n , correspondence 1 968).
20 . . . 'it'h4 is weaker in view of the excellent reply 21 ttJ d 5 ! , pointed out by F ischer. Then 21 . . . i.xd4? 22 ttJe7+ is completely bad . After 2 1 . . . 'il'xe4 22 ttJe7+ 'iti>h8 23 i.xg7+ 'iti>xg7 24 'iVd4+ (24 :g 1 ) 24 . . . 'ii'x d4 25 J:txd4 Wh ite should be able to convert his piece advantage. But even here Black is by no means doomed - he plays 21 . . . cxd5 22 1i.xb2 i.xb2 23 'il'xd5 'il'h3+ 24 'iti>e2 'ii'g 4+ with a probable d raw.
24 . . . 1i.e5 25 ':'f3
21 :g1 21 'iti>g 1 ? will not do because of 21 .. Jlc2 or 2 1 . . . c5 .
It was because of this variation that Fischer rejected the piece sacrifice. But this was wrong - after a l l , if Black wishes, he can force a draw by 21 . . . l:tc2 ! ? 22 l:tg3 (forced) 22 . . . 'ifh 1 + 23 1:[g 1 'ii'f3 . It is also probably a draw in the endgame arising after 23 . . . 'ifxh2 24 ttJe2 'ifh5 25 'ifg4 'ifxg4 26 J:txg4 l:td8 27 'iti>e1 l:txe2+ 28 'iti>xe2 i.xd4 29 1:Ig5 'iti>f8 30 l:tc5 1i.xc5 31 l:txd8+ 'iti>e7.
25 . . . 'ii' h 4 suggests itself, when 26 1i.xf8? 'it'xh2 27 ':'d2 .l:t. b 1 + 28 'iti>e2 'ii'g 1 29 l:t d 1 lIb2+ 30 l:. d 2 l:t b 1 leads only t o a d raw. However, the simple move 26 h 3 ! , pointed out by Larry Evans, sets Black insuperable d ifficulties. For example: 26 . . . :tfb8 (26 . . . l:.c8? 2 7 'it'd7 ':xc5 2 8 'it'xf7+) 2 7 'ii' d 5! ( Evans suggested 27 ':'xf7!? 'iti>xf7? 28 'iVd7+ 'iti>g8 29 'it'e6+, but Black has a tougher defence: 27 . . . l1c2! 28 'it'xc2? 'ii'x h3+ 29 'iti>e2 'iti>xf7 with equal ity; however, after 28 i.e7! 'it'h5 29 ':'f3 White retains the advantage) 27 . . . i.f4! 28 e5! with a winning position (only not 28 i.d6? ':xf2+! 29 ':'xf2 'it'xh3+ with a draw). I have been able to fi nd a way of strengthen ing the attack: 25 ... 'it'g5 ! ! 26 1i.xf8 1i.xh2 27
1 36
\t>
Long-distance Dispute
'ito>e1 , and now not 27 . . . 'ii'g 1 +? 28 'ii'f 1 'ii'g 4 (28 . . .''' g 5 29 .i.h6! 'ii'x h6 30 'ii'c4) 29 .i.h6! 'ii'x e4+ 30 .i.e3 'ii'xf3 3 1 l1d8+ 'ito>g7 32 .i.d4+ 'ito>h6 33 .i.xb2 , but 27 ... .i.c7 ! ! with the th reats 28 . . . 'ito>xf8 and 28 . . . 'ii'g 1 + 29 'ii'f 1 .i.a5+. 28 .ltb4 'ii' g 1 + 29 'ii'f 1 'ii'g 4 leads to a repetition of moves. The clever move 28 .i.g7 ! ? would be justified after 28 . . . 'ito>xg7+? 29 "'c3+ i.. e 5 30 .l:txf7+ ! ! , but Black plays 28 ......g 1 + 29 Wf1 .i.a5+ 30 .i. c3 'ii'g 4 31 i.. x a5 'iVxf3 32 .i.d2 We4+ 33 'ii'e2 (33 .i.e3 'ii' b4+ ) 33 ... Wh 1 + with perpetual check. IV. 20 lId3 ! ? 'ii'f3 . The less accu rate move 20 .. Jlc2?! is justified after 2 1 ltJe2?! 'ii'f3 22 ltJg3 .l:tb8! (22 . . . .l:txa2 or 22 . . . h5 is weaker because of 23 .i.d2; if 22 . . . .i.h6 there follows 23 'ii'd 4 with the threat 24 .i.xh6) 23 l:.b3 lIxb3 24 Wd8+ (24 axb3 h5) 24 . . . .i.f8 25 axb3 l1b2 26 'ito>e1 h5, and the in itiative is seized by Black. I n the variation 2 1 .i.d2 l:txd2 22 l:txd2 'ii'x c3 23 .l:t g 1 ! followed by ':g3 a position slig htly better for Wh ite is reached . (23 'ito>g2?! suggests itself, but this encou nters the u npleasant reply 23 . . . We5 ! , when defend ing the e4-pawn is awkward : 24 'ii'x c6? Wg5+, or 24 :e1 ? Wg5+ and 25 . . . .i.c3). 2 1 ltJd 1 ! Wf3 22 .l:tg 1 'ii'xe4 23 l:td2 l:txd2 24 'ii'x d2 is more promising for White - the compensation for the piece is probably insufficient. 2 1 'ito>g1 ! (see diagram)
The natural 2 1 :g 1 ? is incorrect in view of 2 1 . . . .i.xc3 22 .l:txc3 l:tfb8 (th reate n i n g 23 . . . l:txf2 + ! ) 23 Wxc6?! (more tenacious is 23 i.. d 2 Wd 1 + 24 'ito>g2 'ii'x d2 25 'ii'x d2 :txd2 with an extra pawn for Black in a double rook endgame) 23 . . . .l:.d8 24 1:.c1 'ii'e 2+ 25 'ito>g2 Wxe3, and Black wins (Simag i n ) .
After t h i s S i m a g i n exami ned 2 1 . . . .i.xc3?! 22 l:txc3 l:tbb8 (an unexpected retreat: Black creates the threat of 23 . . . .l:tfd8) 23 l:tc1 .:tfd8 24 'ii'xc6? l:td 1 + 25 J:[xd 1 Wxd 1 + 26 'ito>g2 'ii'g 4+ 27 'ito>f1 l:td8! and wins. However, instead of the captu re of the c6-pawn , 24 'ii'c7 ! is far stronger. By retu rn ing with his queen to g3, Wh ite parries the attack. Black stil l retains some in itiative, but it should g radually evaporate. Black's prospects are hardly improved by other attempts on the 22nd move : 22 . . Jie2 23 'ii'd 1 ! Wg4+ 24 'ito>f1 'ii'f3 25 lId3! l:txf2+ 26 i.. xf2 Wxh 1 + 27 .i.g 1 ; 22 . . . :t.fb8 23 l:txc6 l:t b 1 + 24 .l:tc1 l:txc1 + 25 .i.xc1 . The exchange on c3 is bad - instead 21 ... lIc2 ! can be recommended . In reply 22 .ltd2? is a mistake in view of 22 . . . ':xd2 ! . After 2 2 .lt c5?! Wf4 23 Wd6 Black achieves a favourable ending by 23 . . . 'ii' x d6! 24 .i.xd6 1:.d8 25 ltJd 1 .lte5. I n the event of 23 'ii'e 7 Black's resou rces are illustrated by the following curious variation : 23 . . . Wg4+ 24 l:tg3 'ii' c8 ! 25 'ii'x a7 (25 . . . l:te8 was th reat ened ) 25 . . . l:td8 26 ltJa4 l:txa2 27 'ito>g2 'ii'e6 28 :e1 'ii'e 8! followed by 29 . . . l:ta8, and the knight at a4 is lost. 22 .ltxa7 !? is possible, although after 22 . . . l:tc1 + 23 ltJd 1 Wxe4 24 .i.e3 l:t a 1 Black retains qu ite good counter-chances.
Long-dista nce Dispute
The same assessment applies to the posi tion arising after 22 �d 1 ! ? Wxe4 (or 22 . . . 1:[e2 23 �d2 Wxe4 24 h3 c5). Here the outcome remains u nclear. V. 20 l:tc1 ! This move, suggested by the Brazilian g randmaster Gilberto M i los, may cast dou bts on Simagin's bold idea. Having defended his knig ht, at the same time Wh ite does not al low the reply 20 . . JIc2 , wh ich gave the opponent counterplay after 20 l::t d 3 . He is not afra id of 20 . . . l:1d8 in view of 21 'ii' h 3, while in the event of 20 . . . .th6 he can choose between 2 1 Wh3 and 2 1 'it'xa7 l:txf2+ 22 �xf2 �xc1 23 Wd4 . There only remains 20 . Wf3 21 �g1 ! (but, of course, not 21 1:[g 1 ? .txc3 22 1:[xc3 l:fb8), when 2 1 . . . .th6 22 'ii'd 1 is hopeless, while 21 . . . .txc3 2 2 1:[xc3 leads to a situation favour able for White, familiar to us from the 20 l:ld3 variation . ..
I t is time to s u m u p . I n the long-d istance dispute between Simagin and Fischer, it is Simag i n who was the more correct, al-
ctJ
1 37
though he overestimated his position. One can argue about the analytical correctness of the piece sacrifice, but from the practical point of view it is certainly justified . The probabil ity of the opponent fig uring out the complications and finding all the strongest moves at the board is pretty smal l . Wh ite is in far more danger - after the slig htest inaccu racy the attack will become i rresist ible. It is curious that Bobby Fischer, a fig hting player who always aimed only for a wi n , did not risk sacrificing the piece and satisfied h imself with a d raw. The American grand master valued clarity, did not l i ke to lose control of what was happen ing on the board , and therefore mistrusted irrationa l , intu itive sacrifices o f material. I n t h i s respect his style d iffered sign ificantly from that of brill iant chess artists such as Vlad imir Simag i n , M ikha il Tal and Alexey Shirov, for whom risk, involving problematic sacrifices, is natu ral and usua l .
1 38
� Mark Dvoretsky
Attacks with oppos ite-s i ded Castl i ng
M th is topic - after a l l , it is discussed in
ost of you will probably be familiar with
many books about the middlegame. It is u n l i kely that I will be able to say anyth ing new, and in fact I am not aiming for th is. We will simply analyse a few games, in the cou rse of which we will recal l some impor tant features, typical of positions with castling on opposite sides, and do some training on their practical appl ication . Geo rgad ze - Dvorets ky
USSR Spartakiad , Moscow 1 967 French Defence e6 1 e4 2 d4
d5
3 lhc3
lhf6
4 e5
lhfd7
5 f4
c5
6 lhf3
lhc6
7 dxc5 This move does not promise Wh ite any advantage. The critical continuation is 7 �e3 ! ' 7. . .
.ltxc5
7 . . . lhxc5 is also not bad . 8 .lt d3
f6
B . . . O-O? is a mistake because of the standard bishop sacrifice 9 .ltxh7+! -.txh7 1 0 lhg5+. The move in the game is perfectly logical - I prepare castl ing and at the same time exchange the strong central pawn on e5. Black has also played d ifferently here: B ... lh b4 or B ... a6 followed by 9 ... Wc7. I don't like the knight move - White simply retreats his bishop to e2, but he can also allow the
exchange on d3 and recaptu re with the c pawn. Should two tempi be wasted in the open ing, even for the sake of exchanging the opponent's strong bishop? 9 exf6
lhxf6
1 0 'iVe2
a6
could simply have castled, but I was attracted by a positional trap. The tempting 1 1 f5?! would have allowed Black to advantageously sacrifice a pawn : 1 1 . . . e5! ( 1 1 . . . 0-0 is also not bad ) 1 2 lhxe5 lhxe5 ( 1 2 . . . lhd4 ! ? ) 1 3 \!kxe5+ -.tf7 , and the wh ite king , which is caught in the centre, comes under a dangerous attack. 11 .ltd2
0-0
1 2 0-0-0
'ii'c 7
With opposite-sided castling the two players usually conduct pawn storms on opposite wings, trying as soon as possi ble to weak the enemy king's defences.
From this point of view the move 1 2 . . . b5! seems logica l . I thought that Wh ite would reply 1 3 g4 b4 1 4 lha4 .ltd6 1 5 g5, and if 1 5 . . . lhh5 - 1 6 lhe5. Alas, this conclusion is i ncorrect in view of a l ittle combination : 1 6 . . . lhxf4! 1 7 .ltxf4 lhxe5 1 B �xe5 'iVxg5+. Having failed to calculate the variation to the end, I decided to make a preparatory move, strengthening Black's position in the centre. I n principle, also a sound idea : don 't forget about control of the centre even when sharp wing attacks are in progress.
1 3 g4
b5
Of course, the captu re of the g4-pawn was not even considered .
ltJ
Attacks with opposite-sided Castl ing
1 39
variation 1 8 . . .t'Dxf4? 1 9 i.xf4 l:lxf4 20 t'Df6+ i.xf6 21 gxf6 ':'xf6 22 h5) is refuted tactically: 1 8 . . . dxe4! 1 9 i.xe4 t'Dg3 ! . And if 1 8 %1df1 ? ! (with the idea of 1 9 t'Dg3) there is the un pleasant reply 1 8 . . :ii'c7 ! . 1 8 . . . t'Dxf6 1 9 gxf6 lIxf6 2 0 h 4 e 5 ! (otherwise Wh ite's attack becomes dangerous) 21 fxe5 l:lf2 22 'ii' e 1 i.g4, and now Wh ite must either sacrifice the exchange by 23 h5, or choose 23 i.e3 'ii' c5 24 i.xd4 'fixd4 25 l:Id2 :xd2 26 'ii' xd2 , parting with the e5-pawn , but in retu rn retaining attacking possibil ities. 14 l:tdf1 ?! Question : what would you now play as Wh ite? With opposite-sided castling one must act as energetically as possible, trying at any cost to seize the initiative. Here the slightest delay is usually fatal.
The principle itself is perfectly clear, but sometimes it is not easy to fol low it. For example, the attempt to undermine the enemy centre by 14 f5?! exf5 1 5 g5 is bad in view of 1 5 . . . t'De4 1 6 t'Dxd5 'fif? I th i n k that the correct continuation was the sharp 1 4 g5! t'Dh5 1 5 t'De5 ! . Now it is extremely dangerous to accept the pawn sacrifice: 1 5 . . .t'Dxf4 1 6 i.xf4 ':xf4 1 7 t'Dxc6 'ii'xc6 1 8 'fih5 ( 1 8 :hf1 ! ? or even 1 8 i.xh7+ !? also comes into consideration) 18 . . . g6 19 i.xg6 hxg6? 20 'fixg6+ �h8 2 1 lLlxd 5 . Tamaz Georgadze was probably concerned about the reply 1 5 . . . g 6 ! , after which the weakness of the f4-pawn is very percepti ble. In sharp situations with opposite sided castling, for the sake of the initiative you sometimes have to go in for positional or material concessions, and you should not be afraid to do this. Let us
continue 1 6 t'Dxc6 'ii' xc6 1 7 t'De4! i.d4 1 8 lLlf6+ ! ' The attempt to prepare this check, by playing 1 8 h4? (wh ich is justified in the
A seemingly sensible move - Wh ite sup ports his f4-pawn in advance and vacates the d 1 -square for the retreat of his knig ht. But even such a m i n i mal delay is already sufficient for Black to be the fi rst to lau nch his assault. Here I should like to take the opportun ity to quote an idea of Alexander Kotov regarding mutual attacks with opposite-sided castl ing, which he thought was important. 'When beginning a pawn storm, you should bear in mind that it is of a forcing nature and you should calculate it as accurately as you would calculate a combination '. I don't agree with Kotov's idea . I ndeed , the outcome in such cases sometimes hangs by a thread , and depends on a single tempo. The calculation of variations plays an important role, but nevertheless not the lead ing one - it helps specific problems to be solved , but usually (as in the given game) it does not enable the fate of an attack to be accu rately determined before hand . Therefore you should not be too carried away by calculation, and, of cou rse, you must not be restricted to it. It is important to sense the spirit of the position , and to be able to assess intu itively the prospects of the two sides, whatever d i rec tion events may take. 14 . . .
b4
1 40
Attacks with opposite-sided Castl ing
1 5 ttJd1
�d6
16 ttJ e5
b3!
This is far stronger than the prim itive captu re on e5, which would have led to unclear play. Black solves his main strateg ic problem - he weakens the pawn defences of the enemy king . 1 7 axb3 1 8 'ii'e 1
ttJd4
Here I made perhaps my only serious mistake in the game - after a long think I accepted the draw offered by my opponent. Such mistakes should be analysed , to understa nd why they were made. There may be purely chess reasons, as wel l as psycholog ical ones, or sometimes these and others are interwove n . First t h e purely chess reason. I n calculating the variations, I decided that the following position would most probably arise: 1 8 . . . ttJxb3+ 19 'it>b1 ttJxd2+ 20 'ii'x d2 �xe5 21 fxe5 'ii'x e5 22 :e 1 ? ! (22 g5 is stronger, forcing the retreat of the knight to d7) 22 . . . ttJe4 23 �xe4 dxe4 24 .l:.hf1 �b7.
Black is a pawn u p , but it is doubled , and the wh ite knight is ready to occupy the excellent blockading square e3. I was not sure that the advantage was on my side here, and I did not find anyth ing better. Therefore I ag reed a draw.
Where did the mistake lie? In the assess ment of the fi nal position . I did not take into account the weakness of the f3-square (if the wh ite pawn had been on g2, the position would indeed have been unclear). As soon as the knight goes to e3, the rook will immediately occupy the f3-point. There it will exert unpleasant pressure on the oppo nent's position , and the exchange on f3 is completely hopeless for Wh ite. Of course, when you look at the diagram it all seems obvious, but during a game you may miss someth ing at the end of a long variation . However, is this any justification? It is important to think about how to avoid such mistakes in the futu re . If in the process of calculating you sometimes do not have a very clear impression of the position (a part of the board falls out of your field of view, you forget the exact placing of certain pieces, and so on), special training is needed. As often as possible you should analyse positions which interest you without moving the pieces, look through games printed in books or magazines without using a board, and play blindfold with other players.
And now about the psychological reason for my mistake. At that time I was a young and inexperienced player, but I played (on the j u n ior board ) in the same team as such g reats as M ikhail Botvi n n i k and Vasily Smyslov, and, understandably, I was very anxious and afraid of letting the team down . As a result I spent an un usually long time checking and re-checki ng variations, and by the point when peace was ag reed I had less than half an hour for the remaining 23 moves. I ncidentally, after the game I showed Botvinnik the fi nal position and the possibili ties in it which I had considered . After asking how much time I had remaining, the ex champion said that I had done right to agree a draw.
l2J
Attacks with opposite-sided Castl ing
Even s o , i t is clear that a cool-headed , self confident player would never have accepted a draw offer in such a position. If he was not satisfied with the concluding position of the va riation calculated , he would have care fully looked for an improvement earl ier. And he would surely have found that the simple 20 . . . .1l.b7! (instead of 20 . . . �xe5?! ) guaran tees Black a g reat advantage in view of the th reats of 21 . . . d4, 21 . . . ttJe4 and 21 . . . .1l.xe5 . You must tirelessly develop your fight ing spirit, resistance to disturbance, and ability not to lose your composure in any situation, even the most complicated, and not to give in to strong opponents. Without this you won 't achieve any great success in chess. A striving at important moments to act with particular care and safety often has an adverse affect on a chess player's actions. A fter all, he betrays his custom ary mode of behaviour and thinking, and this is rather dangerous.
Why? ! I will give a simple analogy. Anyone fi nds it easy to walk along a log wh ich is lying on the grou n d . But if that same log is placed across a sheer d rop, then an unprepared person will most probably fal l . On t h e grou nd, when there is no danger, our movements are largely automatic, and they are d irected by our sub-conscious, which does this q uite wel l . But over the sheer drop our fear of fal l i ng forces us to control every step, to try and avoid the slightest mistake. As a result, the natural combination of conscious and sub-conscious is d isrupted , and an unusual mode is always more difficult to follow.
141
Bronstein - Dvoretsky USSR Championsh ip, First League, Odessa 1 974 French Defence 1 e4
e6
2 d4
d5
3 ttJc3
ttJf6
4 e5
ttJfd7
5 f4
c5
6 ttJf3
ttJc6
7 dxc5
.1l.xc5
8 a3?! I n my view, this is anti-positiona l . I will explain why: 1 ) In the opening you should qu ickly develop the pieces , not wasting time on insign ifica nt pawn moves. 2) It is difficult for Wh ite to castle kingside, and i n the event of queenside castl ing the advance of the a-pawn will make it easier for Black to open li nes for the attack. It is extremely dangerous to go in for a position with opposite-sided castling, if there are defects in the pawns covering your king.
Wh ite wants his bishop to feel comfortable at d3, without having to fear an attack by the knight from b4 . But he pays too high a price for th is. 8. . .
0-0
9 .1l.d3
f6
1 0 exf6
ttJxf6
1 1 'iWe2
a6
1 2 .1l.d2
.1l.d7
I delay the advance of my b-pawn , to avoid 'frightening' my opponent. If 1 2 . . . b5 he would probably have answered 1 3 ttJd 1 . 1 3 0-0-0
b5
1 4 g4? ! This cou nterattack on the kingside is clearly too late. It was better to play 14 ttJe5. 14 . . .
b4
1 42
� 1 5 axb4
Attacks with opposite-sided Castl ing
lLlxb4
did not satisfy Black. In the middlegame his advantage is far more sign ificant. l:txd4 24 lLlxd5 25 lLlc3
�f4+
26 'ifi>b1
�d2
26 . . . l::t d 2 27 'ili'e4 nb8 was tempting, but after 28 'ili'xf4 I did not fi nd a way of mating the opponent. 27 l:[d1
�xc3
28 bxc3
l:l b8+
29 'ifi>c1
The defects of the move a2-a3 are now obvious. Black has opened l i nes on the queenside and gai ned the advantage. 16 g5?! Pawn advances often lead to the creation of weaknesses in your own position. If in return you obtain a strong attack, it is worth going in for this. But if the attack does not succeed, the weaknesses will tell. I n the g iven instance it is clear that only
Black will be attacki ng, so why weaken the f4-pawn? 16 . . .
lLlxd3+
1 6 . . . lLlg4 is also possible, as well as the immed iate 1 6 . . . lLl h 5 , si nce the bishop sacri fice on h7 is not dangerous. 17 cxd3 If 1 8 'ifxd3 the simplest reply is 1 8 . . . lLlg4 . 17 . . .
lLlh5
18 d4
�d6
1 9 lLle5
lLlxf4
20 -txf4
':'xf4
21 h4
'ili'c7
22 lLlxd7
'ili'xd7
23 l:tde1
:e8 1
Of course, going into an endgame a pawn up by 23 . . . l:txd4 24 'ifxe6+ 'ili'xe6 25 l:1xe6
A very simple l ittle exercise: suggest the most accu rate continuation of the attack. I did not want to exchange a pair of rooks. This can be avoided with the help of a simple tactical idea . 29 . . . 'ili'c6 1 30 'iVc2
l:la4
31 l:[hg1
l:r.a3
3 1 . . . 'ifb6 was also strong . 32 'ifi>d2 33 'ifd3
'ili'c4 l:1b2+
34 'ifi>e1 Or 34 'ifi>e3 lbc3 . Now the exchange on d3 followed by a check on the 1 st ran k would have won a rook, but the move made by me leads to a forced mate . 34 . . .
'ili'xh4+
ltJ
Attacks with opposite-sided Castling
35 'ii'g 3 3S :g3 'ii' h 1 + 36 'ii'f 1 'iVe4+. 35 . . . 'ii'e4+ Wh ite resigned . Even great players have bad days, when they play below their usual strength . Appar ently David Bronstein had such a day - and so victory came to me easily. Here is another 'light' game. Maryasin - Dvoretsky Kiev 1 970 Pirc-Ufimtsev Defence 1 e4
g6
2 d4
..tg7
3 tLlc3
c6
4 ..tc4
d6
5 'ii'f3
e6
6 ..te3 Here 6 .1i.f4 and 6 tLlge2 have also been played . 6. . .
tLlf6
7 0-0-0
1 43
To be honest, I did not sacrifice the pawn , but simply blundered it, and so a q uestion mark is attached to my move. But the exclamation mark added to it reflects the fact that Black nevertheless gains some (although probably insufficient) positional compensation for the lost pawn . With opposite-sided castling it is very impor tant to be the first to begin an attack. For the sake of rapidly opening lines in the vicinity of the enemy king it sometimes makes sense to sacrifice a pawn.
In the su bsequent stage of the game my opponent played uncertainly, and the ad vantage gradually passed to me. 9 ..ta4
'ii'c 7
1 0 h4 1 0 g4 came into consideration , intending 1 1 g S tLl h S 1 2 tLlge2 followed by 1 3 tLlg3 . 10 . . . 11 ..tg5?! 12 ..t e3 1 3 g4 1 4 'ii' x g4
h5! tLlh7 tLld7 hxg4 tLldf6
Of course, h4-hS can not be allowed - the h pawn must be securely blocked . When preparing an attack on one wing , don't forget about necessa ry prophylaxis on the opposite wing. 15 'ii' g 2
tLlh5
1 6 tLlge2 1 7 tLlg3
�b8 tLl7f6
1 8 tLlxh5? Wh ite is hoping to l ift the blockade, by transferring his other knight to g3, but he does not have time for this. 1 9 ..tgS was stronger, with the idea of 20 .1i.xf6 tLlxf6 2 1 h S . And 1 9 e S dxeS 2 0 'ii'xc6 also came into consideration . 18 . . .
tLlxh5
7. . .
b5?!
1 9 tLle2
8 .1i.xb5!
0-0
20 c3 21 ..t b3
c5 "a5
8 . . . cxbS? 9 eS is hopeless for Black.
.1i.a6
1 44
�
Attacks with opposite-sided Castl ing
31 �e2
22 lId2
Wh ite wa nts to consolidate, by playing �f3, 'it'f1 and �g2 . But during this time I am able to blow up the enemy centre. 31 . . .
'it'e4+ !
32 �f3 If 32 lId3, then 32 . . . �xd4 ! , while if 32 �e1 there follows 32 . . . 'ifb5! (intending si mply to advance the a-pawn), and 33 'it'f1 ? 'ifb 1 + followed by 34 . . .'it'xe4 is bad for Wh ite.
How should Black continue the attack? To me it seemed d ubious to go chasing the a2-pawn : 22 . . . c4 23 �c2 'it'xa2 24 � b 1 (th is is why t h e opponent played 2 2 lI d 2 the b2-pawn is now defended) 24 . . . 'it'a 1 25 ttJg3. Wh ite h imself is threatening to lau nch an attack, for example, after 25 . . . ttJxg3 26 fxg3! followed by h4-h5 . However, if I had n 't been too lazy to calculate fully the variation 25 . . . l:tb3! 26 ttJxh5 ':xc3+ 27 bxc3 l;lb8 28 �d 1 l:txb 1 + 29 �e2 ':xh 1 30 ttJxg7 �xg7, lead ing to a great advantage for Black, I could have gone in for it. 22 . . .
�xe 2 1 ?
I preferred not t o block l ines on the q ueens ide, but on the contrary, to open them immediately. 23 ':xe2
exd4
24 exd4
lIxb31
Such sacrifices do not requ i re any calcula tion . It is clear that now only Black has winning chances. 25 axb3
'it'a 1 +
26 �d2
'it'xb2+
27 �e1
'it'a 1 +
28 �d2
'it'b2+
29 �e1
'it'xb3
30 :td2
:te8
32 . . .
d5
33 e5
�xe5!
34 'iff1
�f6
35 'ifxe4
lIxe4
36 �e2? 36 ': a 1 was essential , with the idea of doubling rooks on the 7th rank as soon as possible. After the move in the game Black wins without any d ifficulty. 36 . . . ttJg7 37 lIa1 ttJf5 38 lIxa7 �xd4! 39 lIa8+ �g7 40 �f4 �e3 (40 . . . �xf2 ! ? 41 �e5+ f6) 41 lId3 lIxf4 42 J:txe3 ttJxh4 43 ];t e7 g5 (the fu rther play proceeds in accordance with a well-known endgame principle formulated by N imzowitsch : 'the col lective advance') 44 lIaa7 �g6 45 l;ld7 ttJf5 46 lIab7 f6 47 ':b8 ttJd4+ 48 �e3 �f5 49 lIf8 e5 50 ':xd5 l:tf3+ 51 �d2 l:1xf2+ 52 �e3 ':f3+ 53 �d2 �e4 54 11d7 g4 55 :g8 f5 56 ':e8 ':a3 57 ':de7 ttJf3+ White resigned. Pawns attacking the enemy king position can not themselves g ive mate. The aim of a pawn storm is to open lines for the pieces. Mainly for the queen and rooks, although it is not uncommon for an important role in the attack to be played by the minor pieces.
I n the fol lowing game the main hero was my dark-square bishop. After occupying the long d iagonal as early as the second move, it su bsequently d id not i n fact move from its
ttJ
Attacks with opposite-sided Castl ing
post. But its influence on the development of events was enormous .
Dvoretsky - Khramtsov Moscow 1 970 Simagin-Larsen Opening 1 b3
e5 tLlc6
2 .i. b2 3 e3
d5 .i.d6
4 .i.b5 5 f4
Of cou rse, the opponent can not be allowed to set up a powerful pawn centre u n h i n dered . The attack on the other side by c2c4 looks steadier, but I several times successfully employed the more risky move in the game. 5. .
1 45
1 3 . . . tLle4! 1 4 tLle2 fS , and Black seized the in itiative. Alanakian-Dvoretsky (Moscow 1 97 1 ) : 1 2 .i.xc6!? bxc6 1 3 a4? ! ( 1 3 'ii'f4) 1 3 . . . aS 1 4 'ii'fS .l:.fe8 ( 1 4 . . . 'ii'd 6) 1 S 1:[ae 1 1:[ad8 1 6 1:[e2 cS 1 7 'ii'x eS 1:[xeS 1 8 1:[ef2 c6 1 9 1:[fS 1:[de8 20 h3 1:[8e7 21 1:[xeS 1:[xeS 22 1:[f4 �f8 23 g4 �e7 with a good endgame for Black. 7. . .
.i.xf3
8 'ii'xf3
tLlf6
I n correct is 8 . . . e4? 9 'ii'g 3 f6 1 0 tLlc3 .f7 1 1 tLlxd S ! , as i n the game Dvoretsky-Makarov (Moscow 1 970). There followed : 1 1 . . . 0-0-0 ( 1 1 . . .• xdS 1 2 .i.c4 'ii' h S 1 3 . xg7 or 1 2 . . .•gS 1 3 'ii' x gS fxgS 14 .i.xg7) 1 2 .i.c4 'ii'd 7 1 3 0-0-0 a6 1 4 .g4 tLlaS? 1 S tLlb6+! Black resigned .
'ii'e 7
.
If S . . .f6 Wh ite was i ntending 6 'ii' h S+!? (provoking a weakening of the a 1 -h8 diagonal) 6 . . . g6 7 'ii' h 4. 6 tLlf3
.i.g4
In the event of 6 .. .f6 ! ? it is dangerous to win a pawn : 7 fxeS?! fxeS 8 �xc6+ (8 tLlxeS? .i.xeS 9 .i.xc6+ �d8! is completely bad ) 8 . . . bxc6 9 tLlxeS . h4+ (9 . . . .i.xeS? 1 0 'ii' h S+) 1 0 g3 'ii' h 3 ( 1 0 •e4 is worse in view of 11 O-O ! ) 1 1 'ili'e2 tLlf6 with a dangerous attack for Black. But after the correct 7 0-0 the enemy centre remains vulnerable. . . .
7 h3 I also had occasion to play this position with Black. My opponents invariably chose 7 fxeS .i.xeS 8 iLxeS iLxf3 9 'ili'xf3 'ili'xeS 1 0 tLlc3 tLlf6 1 1 0-0 0-0 . Objectively the chances here are roughly eq ual, but this does not mean that a draw is inevitable. The player who acts more pu rposefully is the one who will be successfu l . Semeniuk-Dvoretsky (Sverdlovsk 1 987): 12 'ilih3 tLle7 !? 1 3 .i.d3?! ( 1 3 ':f4! is better)
What do you think, how original is this position? I was staggered to d iscover that many decades earl ier it was analysed by the well-known theoretician Vsevolod Rauzer in his notes to his game (with Black) agai nst Vyacheslav Ragozin, played in the 1 936 young masters tournament in Len ingrad . He pointed out that after 9 0-0 exf4 1 0 exf4 0-0 1 1 .i.xc6 bxc6 1 2 tLlc3 .:tfe8 Black has the better chances . However, by playing 1 0 �xf6! (instead of 1 0 exf4? ! ) 1 0 . . .'ii'xf6 1 1 tLlc3 , Wh ite gains the advantage, so Black does better to choose 9 . . . 0-0.
1 46
\t>
Attacks with opposite-sided Castl ing
Rauzer recommended 9 g3 with approxi mate equal ity. I think that 9 lDc3!? also deserves consideration. 9 f5?! An over-comm itting conti nuatio n . I sensed how risky it was, but I wanted to engage my opponent i n a complicated and u nusual fight. I n the end my idea was justified . 9 . . .
e4
1 0 "f2
h5
is den ied this possibil ity. As a result the bishop on b2 becomes fearfully strong. "xe6 15 i.. x e6 1 6 lDe2
lDh5
Wh ite wants to castle on the q ueenside, and therefore the most u npleasant move for him was 1 0 . . . lD h S ! , forcing kingside castl i n g . It is true that after 11 0-0 it is not possible to clamp the kingside by 1 1 . . . lDg3 because of the reply 1 2 f6! , but 1 1 . . . .. gS or 1 1 . . . 0-0 , for example, is not bad . 1 1 lDe3 I also thought about 1 1 g3 h4 1 2 gxh4, but I decided that it was too provocative. 11 12 13 14
. . . 0-0-0 "f1 �b1
h4 i.. g 3?! 0-0
What would you now have played as Black? To answer this question, it is useful to consider the point of my last move . I was not averse to the exchange of several pieces: 1 4 i.. xc6 bxc6 1 S lDe2 i.. e S 1 6 i.. x eS "xeS 1 7 'iWf4 . After 1 7 . . .'ifxf4 1 8 lDxf4 Wh ite has the better endgame. U nfor tu nately, this idea did not work because of the mate on a 1 , but now Black has to reckon with it. I recommend the attacking but also prophy lactic reply 1 4 . . . a S ! , wh ich disru pts Wh ite's pla n . If 1 S i.. x c6?! bxc6 1 6 lDe2 i.. e S 1 7 i.. x eS WxeS 1 8 Wf4 there follows 1 8 . . . We7 ! 1 9 a 4 ( 1 9 "xh4 a 4 ) 1 9 . . . lifb8 , a n d things become u npleasant for the wh ite king . 14 . . 'ii'e 5? .
A serious positional mistake . Black should always have been able to meet lDe2 with the exchange of bishops on eS, but now he
17 f6 ! Weaker was 1 7 lDxg3 lDxg3 1 8 "f4 f6 ! (but not 1 8 . . . lDxh 1 ? 1 9 i-xg7 or 1 9 f6 with deadly mati ng th reats). 17 . . .
g6
I did not even consider the acceptance of the pawn sacrifice. After 1 7 . . . lDxf6 White would have had a pleasant choice between 1 8 lDxg3 hxg3 1 9 "f4 (or 1 9 "fS), 1 8 lDd4 (with the idea of 1 9 lDfS ) and, fi nally, the primitive 1 8 i.. xf6 'ifxf6 1 9 'ii'xf6 gxf6 20 lDxg3 hxg3 2 1 l::t hf1 . If this move had been made, then I would have had to choose, but there was no point in spending time before hand . 1 8 lDxg3
hxg3
Of course, not 1 8 . . . lDxg3 1 9 'iff4 lDfS 20 "gS followed by 2 1 1:[df1 or 2 1 g4 hxg3 22 h4. 19 "e2 1 The advantage is with Wh ite, but it is not so easy to breach the opponent's defences. On the kingside he has erected someth ing resembling a fortress. If l:. hf1 with the idea of l:.fS ! , Black repl ies . . . "e6 , and the rook
CD
Attacks with opposite-sided Castling
has no invasion square on the f-file. The queen can be played via g4 to g5, threaten ing to invade at h6, but the threat will be parried by . . . 'iiti> h 7 . Wh ite would have had to open a 'second front' , by underm i n i ng the opponent's centre at a n appropriate mo ment with d2-d3. 19 . . . liJxf6? Alexander Khramtsov made things much easier for me. G reed in such situations is completely inappropriate. 20 1:[df1
liJh5
Not 2 1 "g4 f5 22 'ifg5 1:[f7. Now the threat is 22 1:[xh5 gxh5 23 'ifxh5 f6 24 'ifg6+ 'iiti> h 8 25 l:[f1 . If 2 1 . . . liJg7, then both 22 1:[g5 and 22 ltf6 'ifd7 23 1:[hf1 are strong . f6
22 'ifg4
'iiti>f7
gxh5
24 'ifxh5+
'iiti> e 7
24 . . . 'iiti> g 7 25 1:[f1 was completely bad . 24 . . . 'iiti> e 6 was more tenacious, after which I was intending 25 'ifg4+ (25 1:[f1 I?) 25 . . .f5 25 'ifg6+ 'iiti> d 7 26 'ifg7+ 'iiti> e 6 27 h4! , and Black has no way of opposing the advance of the rook's pawn - the entire board is raked by the bishop. 25 i.. a3+
'iiti> d 7
Here too 25 . . . 'iiti> e 6 was more tenacious. 26 'ifh7+
21 1:[f51
21 . . .
23 . . .
1 47
27 'ife7+
'iiti> e 6 'iiti>f5
28 'ifg7 1 More accu rate t h a n 28 1:[f1 + 'iiti> g 6 29 1:[f4 f5. 28 . . . 29 1:[f1 +
1:[fe8
Black resigned.
23 1:[xh5 An obvious exchange sacrifice, from which it is hard to refrai n . But 23 1:[hf1 would possibly have decided matters more simply.
I n conclusion I invite you to practise finding the best conti nuations in some positions with opposite-sided castl ing.
Exercises
1 . Wh ite to move
2. Black to move
1 48
�
Attacks with opposite-sided Castl ing
3. Wh ite to move
4. Black to move
5. Wh ite to move
6. Black to move
7. Wh ite to move
8. Black to move
'ZJ
Attacks with opposite-sided Castling
1 49
Sol uti ons 1 . Fori ntos-Zedek ( I mperia 1 99 1 ) . It is important for Wh ite t o open t h e h-file for his attack, but if 1 7 h4? there follows 1 7 . . . g41 . The target should first be fixed. 1 7 g41
�xg4
18 h41 Black has no defence. If 1 8 . . . �xf3, then 1 9 hxg5+ �xh 1 20 'ii' h 2+ (of course, 20 ':xh 1 + also mates). No better is 1 8 . . . g6 1 9 �xg6 ( 1 9 hxg5+ �g7 20 lDf6 is also good ) 1 9 . . . �xf3 ( 1 9 . . . fxg6 20 'ifxg6; 1 9 . . . �g7 20 �xf7! l::txf7 2 1 lDxg5) 20 hxg5+ �g8 2 1 l::t h 8+ (2 1 'ifh2) 21 . . . �g7 22 l::t h7+ �g8 23 �xf7+ l::t xf7 24 'ii'g 6+. I n the game Black resigned after first playing 1 8 . . . f5 1 9 hxg5+ �g8 20 g6 �xe3+ 21 lDxe3 l::tf6 . 2. Khol mov-Naumkin (Moscow Champi onsh ip 1 983). 12 . . .
h61
Black intends . . . g7-g5, not only beg i n n ing an attack on the king , but also preparing to hit the central e5-pawn by . . . lDg6, . . . �g7, and the n , if necessary, . . . g5-g4 or . . . h6h5. It is impossible to prevent this pla n . 1 3 h4
g51
14 hxg5
lDg6
Black has gai ned a great advantage. 15 �g3 �e71 1 6 �d3 :dg8 1 7 c4 dxc4 1 8 �xc4 hxg5 1 9 'ii' b 3 lDf4 20 l::t fd 1 l::t g 61 2 1 �xf4 gxf4 2 2 a 4 l::t hg8 23 �f1 � b 8 ! 2 4 a 5 � c 6 25 a6 l::t x g2 26 �xe6 �h4 27 l::t d 2 �xf3 28 �xg8 l::t g 1 +! Wh ite resigned . 3. A. Petrosian-Bel iavsky (Riga 1 973). I n the Samisch Variation of the King's I ndian Defence, as wel l as certain other open ing
set-ups, a strange pictu re is sometimes observed . After castl ing long, Wh ite then mounts on offensive on the q ueenside, by advancing the pawns in front of his king, while Black attacks on the kingside. (A classic example of such strategy is the game Kotov-Szabo, played in the 1 953 Candidates Tournament in Switzerland). The actions of the two sides, which at first sight seem paradoxical, are easy to explain. Each conducts an offensive on the wing where he is stronger: where he controls more space (which is deter mined by the central pawn structure) and has more pieces.
I n the position offered to you Wh ite has a clear plan: to advance his pawns to a4 and b5 and then captu re the d3-pawn. But first he must take away the c4-square from the enemy bishop. This problem can be solved only by the king , which boldly advances. 23 �b31 The advance of the wh ite pawns can not be prevented . Alexander Bel iavsky's desperate attempts to complicate the play proved unsuccessfu l . 2 3 . . . l::t c 8 2 4 a 4 c 6 25 dxc6 l::t x c6 2 6 b 5 d 5 27 lDxd5 �f8 28 'ii'x d3 'ii'd 6 2 9 �b21 ':b8 30 lIhc1 , and Wh ite won . 4. Lyublinsky-Simagin (Moscow 1 939). 12 . . .
�h81
An exchange sacrifice typical of such struc tures, which was employed many times by Vlad imir Simag i n . Black needs the bishop far more than his passive rook. It is useful both for the defence of his own king, and for the attack on the opponent's king . 1 3 �xf8 'ifxf8 1 4 a3? Without extreme necessity you should
1 50
�
Attacks with opposite-sided Castl ing
not advance pawns where you are weaker.
1 4 liJa4 or 1 4 h5 was better. 1 4 ... Ub8 The rook coord inates excellently with the bishop - the two pieces exert terrible pressure on the b2-point. Wh ite's position is already d ifficult. 1 5 .1i.d3 c5! 16 exd5?! liJxd5 1 7 liJa4 .1i.d7! 18 'iWa5 .1i.xa4 19 'iVxa4 'ii' h 6+ 20 f4 liJxf4 21 :td2 .1i.xb2+ 22 'it'd1 .1i.c3 23 Uf2 .l:!.b1 mate 5. Ochoa-Vera ( Havana 1 98 1 ). 17 b5! By sacrificing a pawn , and then also a piece, Wh ite destroys the opponent's defences on the q ueenside and obtains a decisive attack on the king . 17 . . .
hxg3
1 8 hxg3
cxb5
1 9 liJxb5!
axb5
20 a6 20 . . . bxa6 2 1 l:!.xa6 .1i.xg3!? 22 l:!.a8+ liJb8 23 'iWg4+ f5 24 'iVxg3 'ii'x g3 25 fxg3 , and , despite the exchange of queens, Wh ite's attack continues. 20 . . . liJe5 21 axb7+ (2 1 'iVd5 ! ? is also not bad ) 21 . . . 'it'd7 22 Ua6! (weaker is 22 f4? liJd3 ) 22 . . . liJd3 23 'iVg4+ f5 24 'iVd4 liJxe1 25 .1i.f4 and wins. 20 ... liJc5 2 1 axb7+ (2 1 a7!? 'it'd7 22 .1i.xc5 'iVxc5 23 .1i.xb7) 21 ... 'it'd7 22 'iVg4+ ! f5? 22 . . . liJe6 was far more tenacious. 23 'ii' b4 liJe4 24 'ii'x b5+ 'it'e6 25 :a6 (25 .1i.d4 ! ? ) 25 ... 'iWxc3 26 l:!.c1 ! 'iWe5 27 'ilt'xe5+ 'it'xe5 28 .1i.f4+ 'it'd5 29 l:!.d1 + (another way to the goal was 29 .l:!.xd6+ l:txd6 30 .1i.xd6 followed by nc8) 29 . . . 'it'c5 30 .1i.e3+ 'it'b4 31 .l:!.b6+ Black resigned .
6. Pchiolkin-Tolonen (Russian Corre spondence Championship 1 980/83). One of the most difficult problems in chess is how to correctly combine attack and defence, avoiding both excessive caution, leading to passivity, and ultra aggression, bordering on recklessness.
23 . . .
g6!
By defending against g5-g6, Black retains an excellent position. The opponent has to reckon very seriously with the th reats of 24 . . . d5 and 24 . . . liJb5. The impatient attempt to carry out one of these th reats immed iately allows Wh ite to mount a dangerous attack on the king, which outweighs Black's activity on the queenside. 23 . . . liJb5? 24 g6! liJc3+ (24 . . . liJa3+ 25 'it>a1 liJxc4 26 'iWh4, threatening to g ive mate or captu re with the q ueen on c4) 25 'it'c1 d5 26 'iVh4 fxg6 27 hxg6 h6 (Black has a difficult position after 27 . . . hxg6 28 Uxd5 liJxd5 29 .l:!.d 1 or 27 . . . 'iVa3+ 28 'it'd2 hxg6 29 'it'e1 ) 28 .1i.xh6 gxh6 (28 . . . 'iVa3+ 29 'it'd2 gxh6 30 g7 .1i.c5 3 1 'iWxh6) 29 .:txd5! (less good is 29 g7 .1i.c5, threatening a check on e3) 29 . . . liJxd5 30 g7 %:tb6 (31 'iYxh6 was threatened) 31 gxf8'iW+ 'it'xf8 32 'iVg3 with decisive th reats. 23 . . . d5? 24 g6 ! ! I n the game White d id not risk the piece sacrifice and he chose 24 .1i.d3? There followed 24 . . . g6 25 l:tg3 liJb5 26 l:!.h3 'iVa3? ! (26 . . . liJc3+ 27 'it'd2 d4 would have won ) 27 .1i.xb5 axb5 28 c3 bxc3 29 llxd5 l:td8 30 .l:!.xd8 .l:[xd8 3 1 .1i.c1 'iVa6? (31 . . . 'ii'a 5!, i ntend ing 32 ... .1i.a3, was correct - it is important that the c3-pawn is defended) 32 f4! %:tc8 33 'ilt'c2 exf4 34 l:!.xc3 with roughly equal play. 24 ... dxc4 If 24 . . . fxg6 25 hxg6 hxg6, then Wh ite should not play 26 .l:!.xd5?! liJxd5 27 .l:!.d 1 in view of 27 . . . .l:!.b5! 28 .1i. b6 (28 .:txd5 .l:!.xd5 29 .1i.b6
ttJ
Attacks with opposite-sided Castl ing
1 51
'ifb5! ) 28 . . ...xb6 29 'ifxb6 l:1xb6 30 .1t.xd5+ �h7 31 .1t.xa8 with a probable draw. 26 'iVh4! l:td8 (there is noth ing better) 27 .1t.d3 is much stronger, with an irresistible attack.
his extra pawn . Let us see how the game concluded .
25 'ii' h 4 fxg6 26 fxg6 h6
Black's lot is not eased by 35 . . . d2 36 .1t.xd2 .1t.xf2+ (36 . . . tDd3 37 l:tc6) 37 � h 1 ! .1t.d4 (37 . . . %:txd2 38 Was + ! ) 38 .1t.f4 .
26 . . . hxg6 27 "xc4+ �h8 28 ':'g3 is no better. 27 .1t.xh61 gxh6 28 g7, and Black has no defence. 7. Simagi n-Petrosian (Moscow 1 956). 17 h41 An example of skilful prophylaxis with opposite-sided castling! 'This move seems risky, but in this way White parries Black's attack on the kingside ' (Simag i n ) . It is important to deny the opponent the possibil ity of . . . h5-h4 or . . . g7-g5. For the sake of th is, one can even violate the principle, mentioned in the notes to another game by Si mag in ( Exercise 4). Wh ite , who has two strong bishops, has the better chances. The th reat is c3-c4-c5 . I ncidentally, the immedi ate 1 7 c4 g5! 1 8 c5 .1t.e 7 1 9 .1t.xf4 gxf4 ( 1 9 . . ...xf4 ! ? ) 20 tDe2 is sufficient only for equal ity. 1 7 . . . tD4d5 1 8 tDe4 tDxe4 1 9 .1t.xe4 tDf6 20 .1t.c2 tDg4 21 g3 .l:.he8 22 a51 e5 23 .1t.g5! f6 24 .1t.d2 (th reatening 25 .1t.g6) 24 . . . exd4 25 cxd4 ltxe1 + 26 ':'xe1 c5! 27 a6! cxd4 28 .1t.a5?1 A tempting move, but not the best. 28 .1t.e4! bxa6 29 "d3 tDe5 (29 . . . 'ifb6 30 .1t.g2! with a decisive attack) 30 "xa6 'ifb6 3 1 'ii'a4 was stronger. 28 . . . b6 29 .1t.d2 tDe5 30 'it'g2 d3 31 .1t.a4 The position of the next exercise has been reached. 8. Simagin-Petrosian (Moscow 1 956). It only remains for Wh ite to play 32 1:tc1 , and th ings will be bad for the opponent, despite
31 . . . .1t.c5? 32 %:tc1 "f7 33 b4 .1t.d4 34 .1t. b3 'iVe7 35 .1t.f4 b5
3 6 "c6 (36 .1t.e6! was even stronger, preparing the invasion of the q ueen at c6) 36 . . . 'ii'd 7 37 "e4 .1t. b6 38 %:td1 :e8 39 J:[xd3 "c8 40 .1t.f7 %:te7 41 .1t.xh5 "c4 42 'ii' h 7! �c7 43 l:td2 "xb4 44 'ifg8 1:td7 45 l:tc2+ It was possible to win the queen by 45 �xe5+ fxe5 46 l::t x d7+ �xd7 47 .1t.e8+ �d8 48 �xb5+ �e7 49 "xg7+ �e6 50 .1t. c4+! Wxc4 5 1 "g8+ . 4 5 . . ..1t. c 5 4 6 "a8 � d 6 4 7 .:td2+ .1t.d4 48 .1t.e3 �e6 49 "e8+ �f5 50 g4+ �e4 51 "a8+ l:td5 52 %:txd4+ Black resigned. By playing 3 1 . . . l:tc8, Black would have prevented the enemy rook from occupying the c-file (32 l:tc1 ? 'ifxc1 + 33 .1t.xc1 ':xc1 + 34 �h2 tDg4+ 35 �h3 l:th 1 + ! 36 'ii'x h 1 tDxf2+), but after 32 .1t.b5!? his position would have remained d ifficult in view of the insecure position of his king and the lack of counterplay. Only if you sense just how strateg ically dangerous Black's position is can you decide on the compl ications beg i n ning with 31 . . . b5, which was suggested after the game by Tigran Petrosian. After all, in this case you have to reckon with the seemingly powerful .1t.a5. However, in winning the exchange, Wh ite l ifts the blockade on the d3-pawn . 31 . . .
b5! 1
32 .1t.a5 The following variation is i nteresting : 32 .1t.xb5 "b6 33 .1t.a5 'ii'x b5 34 .1t.xd8 d2! (not 34 . . . tDc6? 35 %:te8; 34 . . . 'ifxa6 35 'iVe4 leads to an unclear position) 35 l:td 1 'ii' b 3 36
1 52
\t>
Attacks with opposite-sided Castling
1:[xd2! (this sacrifice is forced: 36 'iVf1 'iVd5 is bad for Wh ite, and he has a hopeless endgame after 36 'iVb7+ 'iVxb7 37 axb7 �b4 with the threats of 38 . . . lZ'lc6 and 38 . . . lZ'lc4) 38 . . . lZ'lf3+ 39 'iVxf3 'iVxf3 40 1:[xd6 'iVf5! (the only defence, but a sufficient one, against the threat of 4 1 �a5), and White faces a fight for a draw. 32 . . .
'iVc61
33 �xd8 Wh ite loses after 33 'iVxc6? lZ'lxc6 34 �xd8
bxa4 ! 35 1:[e8 lZ'lxd8 36 1:[xd8+ xf7 20 :f1 + 'iii> g 8 2 1 tt)f5 1:[f8 ( o r 2 1 . . . tt) e 6 22 tt) h 6 + 'iii> g 7 2 3 tt)f5+ 'iii> g 8 with a d raw, as in Luther-P. N iel sen , Malmo 2002) 22 tt)e7+ 'iii> g 7 23 �xg6 tt)e6 24 tt)f5+ l:txf5 25 'ii'xf5 tt)hf4 26 �h5 l:.f8 27 'iVg4+ 'iii> h 8 28 g3 l::t c8 ! 29 ':'f2 'ii'c5 30 l:tfd2 :g8 (30 . . . tt)xh5 31 'ii'x e6 tt)g7 is of equal merit - Berelovich-Dvoiris, Hoogeveen 200 1 ) 31 'ii'f5 tt)xh5 32 'ii'x e6 tt)g7 with roughly equal chances (Hakki-DeFirmian, Hamar 1 983). I n two games from the 1 0th World Corre spondence Championship, Karl-Heinz Mae der chose another, more risky method of defence. 18 . . .
O-O?!
1 9 exd7
l:.ad8
20 g4
tt)g7
Black has noth ing better: after 20 .. .'.f4+ 2 1 'ii'xf4 tt)xf4 2 2 ':e7, 2 0 . . . tt)f4 2 1 �f5 (followed by :e7) or 20 . . .f6 2 1 'ikh4 tt)g7 22 l::t e 7 'ii'f4+ (22 . . . ':xd7 23 tt)e6) 23 l:1d2 'iVxd4 24 �xg6 'iWxd2+ 25 'iii> x d2 hxg6 26 g5 he is in trouble.
ttJ
1 67
A tempti ng move . After defending his d7pawn , White then wants to double heavy pieces on the h-file. The immed iate attempt to implement this attacking set-up is ineffec tive: 2 1 'ii' h 6 ::txd7 (but not 2 1 . . . 'iWxd7? 22 :e3 'ii'x g4 23 �e2 ! and 24 l::t h 3) 22 :e3 tt)e6, and if 23 ':h3?! there is 23 . . . 'iWf4+, while 23 �f5? is refuted by 23 . . . tt)xd4 24 l:txd4 ::te7 25 l:.h3 f6 (Sanakoev). A draw results from 23 �xg6 hxg6 24 �xe6 fxe6 25 'ii'x g6+ 'iii> h 8, while the position arising after 23 l:txe6 fxe6 24 tt)xe6 'ii'd 6 25 tt)xf8 'iWxf8 26 'ike3 is merely slig htly more pleasant for White. However, there was another, stronger offen sive plan, involving the advance of the h pawn . It was employed in the game Estrin Maeder, played in the same World Corre spondence Championship. 21 h4! Ibd7 Wh ite's attacki ng possibilities are illustrated by the followi ng variation : 2 1 . . . 'ii' b 6 22 h5! 'ii'x d4?! 23 �xg6 'iWb6 24 �xf7+! .:txf7 25 l::t e 8+ l::t f8 26 l:txf8+ 'iii> xf8 27 ':f1 + 'iii> g 8 28 'iWe7 (th reatening 29 h6) 28 . . . h6 29 g5 tt)f5 (29 . . . hxg5 30 h6) 30 'ii'e 8+ 'it>g7 31 'ike5+ 'iii> g 8 32 'iWxf5 'iWe3+ 33 'iii> b 1 'ii'x g5 34 'fie6+ 'it>h8 35 'fie8+ 'fig8 36 'iWe7 , and there is no satisfactory way of parrying the threat of 37 l::t e 1 followed by 38 'ii'f6+ or 38 'ii'xd8. 22 h5 'iWd6 (22 . . . 'iWb6 ! ? ) 23 'ii' h 6 iLe8 24 l:t h 1 tt)e8 25 :df1 ':e7 (25 . . . tt)f6 26 tt)f5! gxf5 27 �xf5) 26 g5 'iWe7 27 tt)e6! lIxe6 (if 27 . . . 'iWd6 Yakov Estri n gives 28 hxg6 fxg6 29 l::t xf8+ 'iWxf8 30 'iWxf8+ 'it>xf8 31 tt)xb4 �b7 32 �xa6 , when the endgame is hopeless for Black) 28 hxg6 f6 29 gxf6 l::tfxf6 (29 . . . tt)xf6 30 ':hg 1 ! 1:[e8 3 1 g7) 30 l::t fg 1 ! �e6 31 gxh7+ 'it>h8 32 'ii'g 5! tt)g7 33 'iWxg7+ 'iWxg7 34 ':xg7 , and White won .
21 �f5 1 ?
The following analysis (if, of course, it is correct) shows that after the move in the game White no longer has an advantage . B u t t o foresee t h i s is q uite impossible even in a game by correspondence, to say
1 68
�
Virtuoso Defence
noth ing of over-the-board play. 21 . . .
i.c6
Maeder aims to eliminate the dangerous d7pawn as soon as possible. The wh ite bishop is immune: Black loses qu ickly after both 21 . . . gxf5? 22 ti)xf5, and 2 1 . . .f6? 22 'ikh6 gxf5 23 Ite7 Itf7 24 Itde 1 Itdf8 (24 . . . l:txd7 25 1:[e8+) 25 1:xf7 �xf7 (25 . . . 1:xf7 26 1:e8+ l:.f8 27 l:.xf8+ �xf8 28 ti)e6+) 26 ti)xf5 ti)xf5 27 gxf5 . 22 11d3 ! ? Which rook should b e brought t o h3? Wh ite's choice looks illogica l , since after 22 . . . i.xd7 23 'iVh6 (or 23 l:th3) the move 23 .. .l::tfe 8 will be made with gain of tempo: Wh ite will have to lose time moving his rook from e 1 . Of course, Sanakoev took this into account, but nevertheless, after delving deeply into the concrete variations, he preferred the move in the game. Later he concluded that his decision was incorrect and that 22 1:[e3 should have been played . I carried out a joint analysis with Vadim Zviagintsev, after which we d isagreed with the conclusion of the author - in fact the two moves are roughly equivalent. Let us examine the position arising after 22 1:[e3 i.xd7.
23 . . . gxf5 24 gxf5 f6 25 ':'g 1 (but not 25 1:e7 :tf7 26 ti)e6, as recommended in the first edition of Sanakoev's book, because of the counter-stroke 26 . . . ti)xf5 ! pointed out by John N u n n ) 25 . . . :tf7 (25 . . . i.c8? 26 l:th3) 26 ti)e6 ! i.xe6 27 fxe6 ':e7 28 :th3 with a powerful attack; 23 . . .i.xf5 24 l:th3 ti)h5 25 l:.xh5 gxh5 26 gxf5 'ii'x h2 27 ti)f3, and Black has to give up queen for rook; 23 . . . l:.fe8 24 l:th3 gxf5 25 'ii'x h7+ �f8 26 'ilfh8+ �e7 27 'ikxg7 'ilff4+ (after 27 . . .fxg4, as considered by Sanakoev, the simplest is 28 'iVg5+) 28 � b 1 fxg4 29 lIh6, and the black king is in trouble. The best defence is 23 . . . ti)e6 ! (with the idea of 24 .l:th3? 'ilff4+). The wh ite player thought that 24 ti)xe6 (24 i.xe6?! fxe6 25 ':xe6! lIde8 26 l:txg6+ is sufficient only for a draw) 24 . . . i.xe6 25 i.xg6 fxg6 26 l:txe6 'iVf4+ 27 'iVxf4 1:xf4 would lead to an equal endgame (i ncidentally, after 26 . . . 1:[f2 ! 27 1:[d2 .l:.f1 + 28 1:d 1 .uxd 1 + 29 �xd 1 Black's position is even to be preferred , since the enemy king can no longer feel secure). Later Sanakoev real ised that the simple 25 .l:.h3 would guarantee h i m a very strong attack, for example: 25 . . . 1:fe8 26 'iVxh7+ �f8 27 'ii' h 6+ �e7 28 'iVg5+ etc. However, this entire variation is of no importance, since it is based on the errone ous assumption that after 24 . . . fxe6 (instead of 24 . . . i.xe6?) 25 i.xg6 White wins. Noth ing of the sort! - the obvious 25 . . . i.c8 26 l:th3 l:td7 parries the opponent's attack.
23 'ii' h 6 suggests itself. Sanakoev gives the following variations:
Thus the exchange on e6 does not give Wh ite any advantage. Sanakoev wanted to play 24 l:[f1 , having in mind the winn ing variations 24 . . . ti)xd4 25 l:[h3 l:[fe8 26 i.xg6 or 24 . . . l:tfe8 25 ti)xe6 (25 l:th3!?) 25 . . . i.xe6 26 l:th3. Alas, there is a refutation: 24 . . . 'iVc4 ! , a n d t h e rook on f1 is hang i n g . B u t with the wh ite rook on d3 the q ueen move could be met by b2-b3 - this is why Sanakoev played 22 l:[d3.
Virtuoso Defence
ttJ
1 69
The attempt to transpose moves by playing 23 l:.h3 (instead of 23 'ilh6) is interesting. If now 23 . . . tDe6?, then 24 tDxe6 , and if 24 .. .fxe6 not even 25 i.xg6 'ilVf4+ 26 'ilVxf4 ':xf4, but 25 ':'xh7 ! . The sad consequences for Black of the variation 24 . . . i.xe6 25 'ilVh6 are already known to us. Wh ite retains the advantage in the event of 23 . . . h5?! 24 i.xd7 'ilVxd7 25 l:.h4. However, with the rook on h3 Black can accept the piece sacrifice : 23 . . . f6! 24 'ilVh6 gxf5 (or 23 . . . gxf5 24 'ii' h 6 f6 ! ) . The point is that if 25 gxf5 there is the simple reply 25 . . . i.xf5, while after 25 'ii'x h7+ �f7 the black queen acq u i res the important f4square : 26 gxf5 (26 . . . .l:th8 was threatened) 26 . . . 'ilf4+ 27 �b1 i.xf5 . Even after the comparatively best 25 1:f1 'iVe5 ! ? or 25 . . . 'ii' c4 !? the compensation for the sacri ficed piece is clearly insufficient. 22 . . .
i.xd7
23 'iVh6
]:tfeS
Black develops his rook with gain of tempo, although here too 23 . . . tDe6 !? came into consideration . 24 l:th3? 'iff4+ is hopeless for White, as is 24 11f1 ? ! 'ii'e 5! (24 . . . 'ii'c4 !? is also possible, since 25 b3 Wc5 26 l:[h3 will be met by 26 . . . tDg5!). The regaining of the pawn by repeated captu res on e6 gives Black the initiative. The critical variation is 24 tDxe6 fxe6 (24 . . . i.xe6? 25 l::t h3) 25 l:[h3! i.c8 26 i.xg6. A similar position arose after 22 l:te3, but there the wh ite rook stood at d 1 . It is better placed at e 1 , as is mainly seen in the variation 26 . . . .l:td7? 27 :xe6 .l:tg7 28 i.xh7+ .l:txh7 29 .l:tg6+. Black is forced to reply 26 . . . 'iff4+ 27 'iVxf4 l:[xf4 28 i.xh7+ �g7 here there is some advantage (although it is probably only slig ht) on the side of Wh ite . 24 �f1 !
What should Black do now? 25 l:th3 is th reatened , and the captu re on f5 allows the opponent to develop a mati ng attack (24 . . . gxf5? 25 gxf5 f6 25 .l:tg 1 ). If 24 . . . 'ilVe5 Sanakoev had prepared a complicated combi natio n : 25 :h3! 'ifxd4 26 i.xg6 i.. e 6! 27 i.. x h7+ �f8 28 :d3 'ife5 (28 . . :i!fc4!? comes into consideration; how ever, this resou rce can be excl uded by transposing moves: 27 l:td3! , when 27 . . . 'ii' c4? 2 8 'iVxh7+ �f8 2 9 i.xf7 i.xf7 30 'ifh8+ �e7 31 'ii'x g7 is bad for Black) 29 l:te3 'ifd4 30 i.f5 :d6 3 1 l:td 1 'ifc5 32 �ee 1 followed by 33 'iVh8+ , and Wh ite regains the piece, achieving a decisive advantage (32 l:[de 1 is even more energetic). The defence can be improved by 30 . . . �e7! (instead of 30 . . . :d6?) with chances for both sides. Wh ite can try 30 i.. g 6 (instead of 30 i.. f5). If 30 . . . l:[d7 it is simplest to defend the g-pawn by 31 h 3 ! , when it is unclear what Black should do. However, it is not apparent how 30 . . . 'ifxg4! can be refuted . For example, 3 1 i.xf7 'ifg2 ! 3 2 :ef3 i.. xf7 3 3 'ifh8+ �e7 34 :xf7+ �d6 35 'ii' x g7 'ifxg7 36 :xg7 :e2 leads to a double rook endgame, which is most probably drawn . 31 .l:tg3 'ifd4 or 3 1 .l:tef3 .l:t d 7 is also unconvi ncing (but not 31 . . . �e7? 32 nxf7+ i.xf7 33 l:txf7+ �d6 34 i.f5+ :e6 35 'ifxe6+ tDxe6 36 i.xg4 with a big advantage).
1 70
�
Virtuoso Defence
Even so, in these variations Black's position looks shaky, and it is dangerous to go in for such play - one would l i ke to fi nd someth ing rather more safe. I suggest playing 24 .. .'iWc4 ! ' Sanakoev writes that after this 'I could simply reply 25 b3 and continue the attack in comfort. Alas, after 25 . . .1Ii'c5 to attack 'in comfort' does not prove possible, since 26 l:1h3?? no longer works in view of 26 . . .'ii' x d4 27 11i'xh7+ 'itff8 (th reatening an extremely u npleasant check at a 1 ). In the variation 26 iLxd7 llxd7 27 .l:.h3 1Ii'xd4 28 1Ii'xh 7 + 'itff8 29 11i'h8+ 'itfe 7 30 .l:.e 1 + 'itfd6 31 ':'xe8 1Ii'g 1 + ! 32 'itfb2 It'lxe8 33 'ikxe8 'ikd4+ Black is guaranteed a draw. And after 26 iLxg6 he can reply either 26 . . . hxg6 27 l:.h3 f6 28 1Ii'h7+ 'itff7 29 l:th6 'ii'x d4 30 'ili'xg6+ 'itfg8 with a draw, or 26 .. .fxg6 27 .l:.h3 lt'lh5 28 l:txh5 %1e7! with an u nclear position . '
Maeder preferred a completely different method of defence. 24 . . .
b3?! An u nexpected reply! Any captu re on b3 would seem to have its d rawbacks. If 25 It'lxb3?, then 25 . . . iLb5 26 l:tc3 'ili'xc3 27 bxc3 iLxf1 (Sanakoev considers this posi tion to be 'completely unclear', but in fact here Black has a big advantage). If 25 axb3 there follows 25 . . . 'ika5 (th reatening not only 26 .. .',.'a 1 + , but also 26 . . . :1e 1 + ) 26 'itfb1 iLb5, and it is now Wh ite who has to gain a d raw by 27 iLxg6! fxg6 28 l:t h 3 ! . However, i t is not altogether clear what Black had in mind in reply to 25 :xb3 ! Wa5 26 l:t d 1 ! (26 c3 is much weaker, since the rook is cut off from the kingside). I do not see any satisfactory defence against the threatened l:th3, for example: 26 . . . gxf5 27 gxf5 f6 28 l:th3, 26 . . . Wxa2 27 l:th3, or 26 . . . lt'le6 27 It'lxe6 iLxe6 28 l:th3 Wxa2 29 iLxg6 ! . I n Sanakoev's games collection and i n previous editions o f my book, Black's last move was awarded two exclamation marks.
It was only when the present ed ition was being prepared for publ ication that I d iscov ered both the refutation of Maeder's idea , and the defensive improvement 24 . . . 1Ii'c4 ! . 25 l:th3? A bold, but objectively i ncorrect decision ! Sanakoev tries to break through immedi ately on the h-file, but at a high price : the black pawn is now on the threshold of q ueen ing. However, subseq uently it may still be possible to stop it, by playing 1:1a3 or It'lb3 . 25 . . .
bxa2
26 Wxh7+
'itff8
27 'ii' h 8+ In the event of 27 1:1a3 Black would have gained an advantage with the spectacular 27 . . . l:te1 +! 28 l:txe 1 Wf4+ 29 'itfd 1 Wxd4+ 30 'itfc1 lIc8! (th reatening 3 1 . . . 1:1xc2 + ! ) 31 'ii' h 6+ 'itfg8 32 1Ii'e3 Wc4 or 3 1 ':xa2 iLxf5 32 'itf b 1 ':'xc2 33 'itfa 1 ':'e2 . 27 . . .
'itf e 7
28 Wh4+
Sanakoev had aimed for this position . If 28 . . . 'itfd6 he was intend ing to reply simply 29 :a3, stopping the pawn and reta i n i ng a strong attack. The king move to f8 did not concern h i m , if only because if Wh ite wishes he can satisfy
�
Virtuoso Defence
h imself with a repetition of moves (28 . . .'�i'f8 29 'ii' h 8+ �e7 30 'iWh4+ ). He can also consider 29 iVf6!? a 1 iV+ 30 �d2 . However, here with correct play the game should conclude with the same result:
A) 30 . . . 'iif4+? is incorrect: 3 1 l:lxf4 iVe 1 + 32 �d3 'ii'd 1 + 33 �c3 l:lc8+ 34 �b3, and after moving along the 3rd rank the king hides from the checks at a2 (Sanakoev). Noth ing is changed by 32 . . . ..tf5+ (in the hope of 33 gxf5? lbh5 or 33 .i:txf5?! iVd 1 + 34 �c3 iVe 1 + 35 �b3 1I b8+ 36 �a2 iVa5+ 37 .ll a 3 iVc7) 33 lbxf5! 'iid 1 + 34 �c3 etc. B) I n Sanakoev's opinion , 30 . . . iVaa5+ loses to 31 c3 lbh5 32 l:[xh5 gxh5 33 iVh6+ rJ;; e 7 34 l:le1 + ..te6 35 ..txe6 �xh2+ 36 l::t e 2 iVxe2+ 37 �xe2 l:[d6 38 lbf5+ �d8 39 lbxd6 .i:txe6+ 40 'ii' x e6 fxe6 41 lbb 7 + with a won ending for Wh ite . I n fact, the evaluation of the endgame after 41 . . . �c7 42 lbxa5 hxg4 43 �f2 is sti ll not altogether obvious, but this is immaterial, since instead of 39 lbxd6 Wh ite wins far more simply by 39 'iWf6+! ri;c7 40 'i¥xf7+ ri;b8 4 1 lbxd6. On the other hand , Black is by no means bound to place his rook on d6, where it is immed iately lost - 37 . . . l::t b 8! is stronger, when Wh ite , apparently, has no advantage. Besides, Black can play d ifferently on the 35th move . True, 35 . . J:td6? does not work in view of 36 ..tc8+! (with the idea of giving mate in the variation 36 . . . 'iii d 8 37 .i:txe8+ �xe8 38 �h8+ �e7 39 lbf5 mate) 36 . . . l:le6 37 ..txe6 �d8 38 'iWg5+ 11e7 39 .i:te5. However, the simple 35 . . .fxe6! ? forces Wh ite to be satis fied with perpetual check: 36 'iWxe6+ (36 llxe6+? �d7) 36 . . . �f8 37 .i:tf1 + 'iii' g 7 38 lbf5+ �h7 39 'ii' h 6+ �g8 40 iVg6+ 'iii h 8 . C ) 30 . . . 'ii'c a5+ 3 1 c 3 iVxb2+ (perpetual check results from 3 1 . . . ri;g8 ! ? 32 ..txg6! �xb2+ 33 ..tc2 ..te6 34 lbxe6 'ii'x c2+ ! ) 32 ..tc2 iVbxc3+ 33 l::t x c3 .i:te7 (here Sanakoev terminated his analysis, thinking that in this way White's attack was refuted) 34 'it'h4! 1:1e3 ! ! (Black loses after 34 . . . 'iii g 8? 35 'ii'x e7
1 71
or 34 . . . lbh5? 35 gxh5 J:.c8 36 .i:tf3) 35 ..td3 l:lxd3+ 36 �xd3 �g8 with approximate equal ity. Alas, Black has available a much sounder defence, secu ri ng him the advantage. f6! 28 . . . 29 1:.e3+ Now, in Sanakoev's opinion, Black loses after both 29 . . . 'iii f7? 30 ..txg6+ and 29 . . . �f8 30 ..txg6! ' However, the second variation must be conti nued : 30 . . . a 1 'ii + 31 'iii' d 2 'iica5+ 32 c3 'iix b2+ 33 lbc2 1Wxc2+! 34 ..txc2 f5 ! 35 ..txf5 ..txf5 36 'it'h8+ 'iii' f7 37 ':xf5+ lbxf5 38 iVh5+ 'iii' g 7 39 'iWg5+ ri;f7 40 'ii'xf5+ rJ;; g 7 41 Vi'g5+ ri;f7 42 'iWh5+ (there is no mate after 42 l:lf3+ �e6) 42 . . . rJ;; g 7 43 l:lxe8 'iWa2+ 44 �e3 l:lxe8 45 Vi'xe8 'ii'x h2, and the result is a drawn q ueen endgame. However, Black is no longer satisfied with a d raw. 29 . . .
lbe6 ! !
2 9 . . . ..te6 was weaker - in the variation which occu rred in the game 30 lbb3 'ii'c4 3 1 iLd3 'ii'x b3+ 3 2 'ii'xf6+ the knight o n g 7 would b e vul nerable. 30 lb b3 No combinations are apparent, and there fore Wh ite has to retreat. 30 . . .
'iVc4!?
A good move, but by no means Black's only option. 30 . . . .i:th8 31 'ii'e 1 gxf5 32 gxf5 l:lxh2 was very strong, for example, 33 l:lxe6+ �f7 ! 34 .i:te7+ rJ;;f8 35 .i:te2 l:tb8!?, or 33 .i:tc3 'i¥a5 34 'ii' a 1 d4. 31 iLd3
'ii'x b3
32 'ii'xf6+ 33 'ii' e 5+
'iii d 6 �c6
34 cxb3
a1 'ii' +
35 'iii c2
'ii'a 5
36 ..txg6
.i:tf8
37 .i:tf7 (see diagram)
1 72
�
Virtuoso Defence
'iVc3+ '>t>b7) 39 . . . l:txe6 40 'iVc3+ in view of 40 . . . '>t>b7 4 1 'iVb4+ : b6 42 'it'xf8 (42 ':xf8 'ii' c 7+ 43 'ili'c3 l:tc6) 42 . . . 'ii'xf8 43 l:txf8 l:txg6. I th ink that Black would have retai ned a significant advantage by conti nuing 37 . . . 'it'b4!? Maeder found another, also very strong conti nuatio n . 37 . . . ttJc7 ! !
At this point Wh ite was still feeling optimis tic. His pieces are active, and the oppo nent's material advantage is not too g reat. However, analysis shows that, in al most all of the continuations available to Black a d raw is the l i m it of White's dreams, an d in some cases it is difficult to ach ieve. An i nteresting drawing variation was sug gested by Zviag intsev: 37 . . . '>t>b6 38 'iVd6+ i.. c6 39 'ili'xe6 l:tde8! 40 'iVd6! (40 l1xf8? l:txe6 41 .l:!.xe6 'ikc5+; 40 l:te7? .i:tf2+ 4 1 � b 1 l:!.f1 + 4 2 �c2 'iVc5+) 4 0 . . . l:txf7 4 1 l:!.xe8 .l::f.f2+ 42 '>t>b 1 .i:tf1 + 43 'it'c2 l:!.f2 + . After 37 . . . .l:!.xf7 38 i.. xf7 ttJ c 5 ( 3 8 . . . ttJc7? is bad : 39 'ikf6+ '>t>b 7 40 'iVxd8 'ikc5+ 4 1 l:tc3) 39 .ixd5+ '>t>b6 Sanakoev was planning 40 'iVd6+ '>t>a7 41 b4 (4 1 l:te7 is better) 41 . . . 'iVa4+ 42 .ib3 ttJxb3 43 'iVc7+ '>t>a8 44 'iWxd8+. However, instead of the losing 42 .. .'�Jxb3?? Black achieves the opposite result with the simple 42 . . . 'iVxb4 (th reaten ing 43 . . . .if5+) 43 'iWc7+ ttJb7. Wh ite has to play differently: 40 'ii'f6+ '>t>a7 41 b4 'ika4+ (4 1 . . . i.. a 4+? 42 b3) 42 '>t>c3 'iWd 1 ! 43 bxc5 'ii' c 1 + 44 '>t>d4 'iVxb2+ 45 11c3 'iWd2+ 46 �d3 'ili'b2+ with perpetual check. In the event of 37 . . . l:tde8 Wh ite must aim for a draw by 38 l:tc3+ ttJc5 39 'iWd4 .l:!.e2+ 40 'it' b 1 . Sanakoev's recommendation is sig nificantly weaker: 38 'iWf6 'it'd8!? (38 . . . 'iWb4!?) 39 l:!.xe6+? (Wh ite is also worse after 39
The rook on f8 is indirectly defended : 38 'ili'f6+ '>t>b7 39 11xf8 'iVc5+. Wh ite must finally forget about any ambitious plans and beg in fig hting for a draw, although it is now unclear how to attain it. 38 'iVe7
l:t g 8 !
Perpetual check results from 3 8 . . . :tfe8 39 l:tf6+ '>t>b7 40 i.. x e8 .uxe8 4 1 'iVxd7 .uxe3 42 'ili'c6+ '>t>b8 (42 . . . 'it'a7?? 43 b4 ! ) 43 �f8+ cj;; a 7 44 Itf7 (44 b4? 'iVb6) 44 . . . .l:!.e2+ 45 '>t> b 1 'iVe 1 + (45 . . . .l:!.e1 + ) 46 cj;; a 2 'iVa5+. The outcome is the same after 38 . . . d4 39 .l:!.e5 .l:!.xf7 (of course, not 39 . . . ttJd5? 40 .:txd 5 ! ) 40 i.. e4+ ! ? (40 i.. xf7 d3+ 4 1 '>t> b 1 ttJb5) 40 . . . ttJd5 4 1 'ili'xf7 d3+!? 42 cj;; b 1 (42 'iit x d3 .ixg4) 42 . . . 'ike 1 + 43 'it'a2 'iVa5+ . A roughly equal position is reached after 38 .. J:txf7 39 .ixf7 (39 l:tc3+?? 'ikxc3+) 39 . . . ttJb5 40 iVf6+, when Black has to give up his d5pawn. However, it would appear that 38 . . . .:th8!? was not inferior to the move in the game: if 39 b4 there follows not 39 . . . l:txh2+? 40 '>t>b3 'iVa 1 ! 41 l:!.c3+ '>t>b7 42 l:txc7+ �xc7 43 'iVc5+ with a d raw, but 39 . . .'�a4+! 40 'it'b1 'iVd 1 + 4 1 �a2 cj;; b 7. 39 b4
'iVa4+
In the event of 39 . . .'iWb5? 40 i.. f5 the sharp skirmish would have ended in a draw: 40 . . . i.. xf5+ 41 gxf5 'if'c4+ (or 41 .. :�a4+ 42 l1b3! .l:!.g2+ 43 '>t> b 1 l:tg 1 + 44 '>t>c2 ) 42 .l:!.c3 �g2+ 43 '>t>d 1 ':g 1 + 44 '>t>d2 l:tg2+ with perpetual check (not 45 '>t> e 1 ? l:.e8). 40 �d2 41 i.. f5
'>t>b7
tLJ
Virtuoso Defence
A bad sign for White : he is forced to exchange pieces. But after 4 1 11f6? (with the threat of 42 :a3) 41 . . . �xg4! it is now his king that comes under attack. It is more d ifficult to evaluate 41 l:tc3 :ge8 !? 42 'ifc5 (but not 42 'ifd6? :e2+! 43 �xe2 �xg4+ 44 �f2 :xd6 45 :cxc7+ �b8! 46 .l:.b7+ �c8 47 :a7 'ifc6) 42 .. :iVc6 . In the event of 43 'iff2 a draw results from 43 . . . 'ifxg6? 44 l:.xc7+ �xc7 45 'ifa7+, but Black can choose between 43 . . . 'iVd6!? and 43 . . . 'ifb6 ! ? 44 'ifxb6+ �xb6 45 :xd7 :xd7 46 .l:.xc7 �xc7 47 �xe8 :h7 48 �h5 �d6 with a big advantage i n both cases. 43 h4!? is more promising for Wh ite. I n tu rn , Black's play can b e improved : 4 1 . . . 'iVb5! (instead of 41 . . . :ge8 ) 42 'ife5 (42 'iVd6 'iVb6) 42 . . . 'ifb6 43 .l:r.f6 lDe6, and the advantage remains on his side. 41 . . .
:ge8
42 'iVd6
1 73
With the rooks on (43 . . . �xc6?! 44 h4) the position would become unclear - Wh ite's passed pawns are rather dangerous. I n order to neutralise them, i t is i mporta nt above all to exchange the strong wh ite bishop, which explains the captu re on c6 with the king . It is true that the opponent gains the opportun ity to regain part of the material deficit, but the position is sign ifi cantly simpl ified , and all the same Black's position remains sufficient for a win . 44 l:tc3+ 45 ':f6+ 46 l:bc7 47 ':xd7
�d6 �e51 �xf6
I n the event of 47 �xd7 :h8 Black soon creates a decisive attack by the un ited efforts of his two rooks and king . 47 . . . 48 .i.xd7 49 h3
':xd7 l1h8 �e51
The king must stay i n the centre, while the rook itself deals with the kingside pawns. If 49 . . . �g5? there could have followed 50 b5 axb5 51 �d3 l:[xh3+ 52 �d4 :b3 (52 . . . b4 53 .i.a4 J:[h 1 54 �xd5 ':c1 55 �b5 with the idea of 56 �c4 ) 53 �xd5 ':xb2 (53 . . . :d3+ 54 �c6 b4 55 �e6) 54 �c5 b4 55 �a4 and 56 �c4 with a draw. 50 g5 51 h4
42 . . .
'iVc61
Not 42 . . . .:xe3? 43 :xd7! or 42 . . . 'ifd 1 +? 43 �xd 1 �a4+ 44 b3 :xd6 45 :h3! �b5 46 :hh7 :c6 47 �d7. 43 'iVxc6+ 43 'ifxd7? :xd7 44 �xd7 did not work in view of 44 ... 'ifh6! 45 �xe8 d4 . 43 . . .
�xc6!
:g8 ':h8
1 74
�
Virtuoso Defence
52 96 I n one way or another Wh ite must exchange the q ueenside pawns. The immediate 52 b5 is refuted by 52 . . . d6! 53 bxa6 (what else?) 53 . . . xd7 54 a7 1:[a8! - the rook eliminates the a-pawn , wh ile the king stops the passed pawns on the kingside. I ncidental ly, another, less successfu l alloca tion of the roles of the black pieces 54 . . . c7?! 55 h5 b7 56 h6 xa7 57 e3 b6 is also good enough to wi n : 5 8 f4 d4; 58 b4 c6 59 f4 d6 60 f5 e 7 (but not 60 . . . d4? 61 g6); 58 d4 c6 59 b4 (in the event of 59 e5 Black wins by both 59 . . . d7 60 b4 e7 6 1 xd5 l:tg8, and 5 9 . . .1le8+ 6 0 f6 d4) 59 . . . 'it>d6 60 b5 'it>e6 6 1 b6 l::t d 8 ! ! 62 h7 f7 63 h8'it' l:[xh8 64 'it>xd5 e7 65 c6 .l::r.c8 + ! ' 52 . . .
':xh4
53 b5
axb5
54 .txb5
d41
The most accu rate - the king supports the advance of the d-pawn . The conseq uences of 54 .. .1lb4 55 .td3 (55 .te8) 55 . . . .:xb2+ 56 e3 .l:lg2 57 f3 are less clear. 55 c2 In the variation 55 .te8 l:th2+ 56 c1 (56 'it>e1 e3 57 f1 f3 ! ) 56 .. .1lg2 (56 . . . 'it>e3? 57 g7! .l:tg2 58 .tf7 ; 56 . . . d3!?) 57 .tf7 e4 58 b4 d4 59 b5 d3 60 b6 d4 (or 60 . . . e3) Black wins, as is usually the case in the endgame, by one tempo. 55 . . .
':94
56 .te8
'it>e3
57 b4
d4
Of course, not 57 . . . .:xb4?? 58 .tf7 . 58 97
l:tx97
59 b3
':95
A good move , although not essentia l . The immed iate 59 . . . d3 was possible, for exam ple, 60 .th5 .1:.g5 61 .td 1 1:[g 1 62 .th5 %:t h 1 (62 . . . d2 also wins) 6 3 .tg4 f4 .
6 0 c4
d3
61 .ta4
d2
62 .t b3
:91
63 b5
J:!c1 +!
Of course, not 63 . . . d 1 'ii' ? ? 64 .txd 1 l:lxd 1 65 b6 with a draw. 64 'it>d5
l:[b1
Wh ite resigned . Let us sum u p . I n playing for a win both players willingly took g reat risks. From the opening Wh ite did not gain any advantage, but Black's d u bious castl ing on the 1 8th move put him in an extremely dangerous position . He committed another error by being tempted by the spectacular 24 . . . b3?! instead of reta i n i n g the bala nce with 24 . . . 'ifc4! . Sanakoev also went wrong twice: on the 2 1 st move he did not choose the strongest plan of attack, and on the 25th he played too straight-forwardly for mate, miss ing a q u iet way of refuting his opponent's idea . Later Black defended accu rately and at no point d id he let his advantage slip. On the whole, the qual ity of the play (taking into account the irrational natu re of the very sharp situation which arose in the game) can be assessed as very high. 'I have played about 300 games by corre spondence, the majority of which I have won, but few of these victories brought me such creative satisfaction as this unsuc cessful attack. The excitement of the crea tive process took such a hold on me, that at some point the actual result became not so important - creativity came to the fore . . . 'Heaven knows, in this game I did every thing in my powers. My opponent played better - all praise to the winner! But I conducted the attack without heed for the circumstances, and in the end a person is responsible for his actions, but not for their result . . . Of course, it was crazy to allow the black pawn to reach a2, but "he who has never done anything reckless is less wise
ctJ
Virtuoso Defence
than he thinks" (La Rochefoucauld). Is creative pleasure really worth less than pitiful half points or even a whole point? And has not Caissa repaid me one hundredfold for that glorious recklessness, which I permitted myself not only in this game, but also others, which did not end so sadly?' (Sanakoev) When I was analysing this game I couldn't help remembering a colourful a rticle by Bent Larsen, devoted to the same theme (it was published in the 1 982 No.5 issue of the Danish magazine Skakbladet and trans lated into Russian by Valery Murakhveri ) . Here for t h e readers is an extract from the article.
1 75
the g6-pawn (usually this is done by a pawn). Possibly Mestel overlooked something here, since he lost this position in four moves. And since he thought for a whole hour over his 26th move in an unsuccessful search for a defence, it is at the given moment, on the 24th move, that the persistent reader should seek the last hope for Black. We will return again to the diagram position, but first let us see what happened in the game. 24 . . .
.:te8??
25 'ilg511
l:. e5
What else ? The threat was i.. xg6+ and h4- h5. 26 CiJe71
Rivas Pastor - Mestel Marbella 1 982
26 . . . When I annotated this game for the newspa per 'Ekstrabladet', I was under the influence of analyses by Rivas and under pressure from the editor Dinesen . . . And I believed that Black was doomed: 24 . . . gxh5? 25 "ilg5; 24 . . . i.. e 6? 25 'Wig5 i.. xd5 26 i.. xg6+ fxg5 27 h5, and White wins (according to Rivas, there can follow 27 . . . "ilxf6 28 hxg6+ �g8 29 "iixd5+ �g7 30 : h 7+ �xg6 31 "ikh5 mate this in indeed pretty). I should mention one instructive feature: the queen on g5 blocks
"il g8
The main variation is 26. . . :1xg5 27 hxg5 "ikxe 7 28 fxe 7 iLe6 29 iLd1 �g7 30 i.. a 4. Or 29 iLe2 and 30 iLb5. Why I also mention this second possibility, we will see later. The d1-a4 diagonal could have been blocked! Apart from this variation we will also analyse 26. . . "ilf8 27 iLxg6+ �h8 (27. . . fxg6 28 h5) 28 iL f5 i.. xf5 29 exf5 �h7 30 CiJg8!!. Perhaps it was this that Mestel overlooked. However, it is not difficult to see 30 CiJg8, if you think about how White can prevent the defence 30. . :ikh6.
1 76
\t? 27 i.. d1
Virtuoso Defence
�h8
Or 27 . . .'!:J.xe 7 28 h5. 28 "ikh6+
Black resigned. Very pretty. But let's return to the 24th move, when Mestel still clearly had sufficient time for thought, and see what moves and what ideas are contained in this position, apart from 24 . . . gxh5, 24 . . . .i.e6 and 24 . . . 1:1e8. For example, 24. . . "ike8 is possible: the queen defends the g6-pawn, and also eyes the squares e5 (like the rook after 24 . . . fJ.e8) and e4. Say, 25 �e7 c4 26 "ikg5 11b5. But here we already know the solution: 27 .i.xg6+! fxg6 28 h5. Thus the defence 24 . . . "ike8 does not save Black, but it was right to examine it: unusual moves sometimes lead to correct ideas. I remember it being said about Reshevsky that he deliberately got into time-trouble, after first studying all (!) the tactical subtle ties of the position, and then played very confidently with his flag about to fall. This is clearly an invention, since you cannot cover all the tactical subtleties, as new ones also arise. It is better to think about something else: from the 1 7th move onwards, on every move there was the possibility of . . . b4-b3. There you have it! Here Black is not threatened with mate in two, and after 24 . . . b3 the capture . . . b3xa2 is a serious threat. And if 25 a3, then let's return to the idea of . . . "ike8: 25. . . "ike8 26 �e7 'ila4!. Unexpectedly Black obtains play. His queen can go to c4, d4 or e4, for example: 27 �xg6? "ikc4+! or 27 .i.f3 "ikc4+ 28 �b 1 "ikc2+. White has a pawn for the exchange and some positional pluses, so that the chances are roughly equal.
The idea of . . . b4-b3, which was constantly on the cards, in combination with the manoeuvre . . :ii e 8, which has now become possible, is discovered in a desperate search of the position, when you see that all the natural replies are unsatisfactory. In a difficult moment you play 24 . . . b3!!, without even examining 25 �b 1 or 25 axb3. After 25 � b 1 (the king is on a light square!) there is, of course, no point in taking the a2pawn. 25. . . "ike8 is good, but 25. . . .i. b 7 is also acceptable, in order to capture on e4 with check (25 �b 1 ? .i. b 7!? 26 "ikg5 .i.xd5 27 .i.xg6+ ? fxg6 28 h5 .i.xe4+ 29 �a 1 "iixf6). After 25 axb3 Black does after all have the open a-file. There is also the defensive idea . . . 1:1b8xb3-h3, but unfortunately it does not work. The simple 25. . . 11a8 forces the reply 26 �c2, and the king is again on a light square. 26. . . .i. b 7 is possible, or even 26. . . c4, but why give White another pawn for the exchange ? One could spend a long time in analysis. But in a practical game the most likely course of events was 24... b3!/ 25 a3 "ik e8 t, and the optimist playing White, if he has time, will have a long think. Gradually his ears will turn red, his breathing will come difficult, and he will begin slightly shaking his knees - and the entire board. Cool-headed defence saves many points. I have seen Mestel escape from worse scrapes. I am sure that after 24 . . . b3 he would even have won the game. Attacking optimists are very bad at readjusting. The problem for commentators is that when a game ends in a pretty rout for one of the sides, it can be difficult to give an objective commentary.
CZJ
1 77
Mark Dvoretsky
What l i es be h i nd a M istake ' To err is human'. It is obvious that no I player is able to play faultlessly. E rrors are sometimes caused by the d ifficulty of the problem being solved , or by chance circumstances. But very ofte n , mistakes conform to a pattern - they are the result of certain playing or personal ity defects . This applies not only to ordinary players, but also to lead ing grandmasters , and even world champions.
Bareev - Kasparov Linares 1 992
For all of us, the most d ifficult th ing is performing successfully in unfamiliar situa tions, in which we have insufficient experi ence. To some extent this deficiency can be cou nterbalanced by pu rposefu l training, but, unfortunately, there are very few who resort to this. It is wel l known that Garry Kasparov's main strength is the breadth and depth of his open ing preparatio n : for many years he hi mself, the members of his reg ularly u p dated tea m , and in recent times also powerfu l computers, have been tirelessly perfecting his opening arsenal . As a result he comparatively rarely finds h imself in d ifficult positions and in this field he has very limited experience. It is no surprise, there fore , that defence is one of his vulnerable poi nts. When he is forced to defend , Kasparov always does this as actively as possible, immediately aiming to undertake someth ing, to change sharply the character of the play. This trait of his was poi nted out, in particular, by grandmaster Evgeny Bareev in a lecture which he read in 1 992 at a session of the Dvoretsky-Yusu pov school for talented young players.
Black has a choice between the exchange of queens and the sharp knight sacrifice on e4 ( 1 7 .. .'ii c7? is anti-positional in view of 1 8 ttJa3 followed by l::t c 1 and ttJf2). I n Bareev's opinion, 1 7 . . . 'i!Vxd2+ was correct. Too risky now is 1 8 Wxd2? ttJfxe4+ or 1 8 ii.xd2 (with the idea of developing the knight on a3) 1 8 . . . ii.xg4! ( 1 8 . . . ttJfxe4 is less good : 1 9 fxe4 ttJxe4 20 ttJc3) 1 9 fxg4 ttJcxe4 (intending 20 . . . ttJxd5), and if 20 ii.f3 (20 ttJc3!? comes into consideration), then 20 . . . ttJxd2 and 21 . . . . e4 . There would most probably have followed 1 8 ttJxd2 b5 1 9 ttJf2 l::tfc8 with a roughly equal ending. 'Each of us has his own style, his own way of playing ' Bareev remarked in his lectu re. 'In Black's place I would have agreed to the exchange of queens. But Kasparov does not like positions in which he has no counterplay. He did not want to go into a
1 78
�
What lies behind a M i stake
quiet and (as it seemed to him) slightly inferior endgame, and so he decided on a rather dubious piece sacrifice. ' 17 . . .
tDfxe4?1
18 fxe4
tDxe4
1 9 'iWxaS
l:[xaS
Anand - Kasparov 9th game of the match
20 tDc31 'A simple and very strong move. If 20. . . tDxc3 21 bxc3 11xd5, then 22 tDf2 with a subse quent blockade on the light squares. Black has three pawns for the knight, but without counterplay this is insufficient - he needs some dynamic factor, such as two con nected passed pawns. ' (Bareev) There followed : 20 ... tDg3 21 ':'g1 tDxe2 22 'it>xe2 e4 23 l:tac1 1 fS 24 gxfS 11xfS?1 (24 . . . �e8) 2S tDf2 �e8 26 ':h1 � bS+ 27 tDxbS l:[xbS 28 ':c8+ 'it>h7. And now, instead of the game continuation 29 ':d1 ? ':xb2+ 30 ':d2 a31 with an unclear position , Wh ite could have gai ned a decisive advan tage with the simple 29 l:tb1 ! l:tfxd5 30 b4! axb3 3 1 axb3. In many cases it is active defence which promises the best chances of success, but this is by no means always the case. Any one-sided approach is bad . Sometimes you should calmly parry the opponent's threats, patiently and accu rately solving the prob lems which arise. A lack of flexibil ity in his choice of playing methods makes a player vul nerable. It is i nteresting that in his match against Vishwanathan Anand (New York 1 995) Kasparov several ti mes chose the tactics of active defence in situations where they were completely inappropriate (true, in the second half of the event Anand was demor alised and he was unable to pun ish his opponent for th is).
27 l:IdS! It is obviously extremely dangerous to accept the positional exchange sacrifice offered by the I ndian grand master - the grouping which Wh ite creates in the centre and on the q ueens ide is just too powerful. Black should have played 28 . . . h 5 ! ? , i ntend ing to meet 28 �c7, attacking the e5-pawn , with 28 . . . 'iWe7! . Black's position would have remained u npleasant, but by no means lost. 27 . . .
tDxdS?
28 exdS
'iWg6
Kasparov nevertheless took the rook. Why? I see the explanation as being that he hi mself was hoping to obtain some activity. The queen aims at the rook, and also at the c2- and d3-squares; he has the active move . . . e5--e4 , attacking the bishop . . . Alas, this is all an illusion - the strategic pluses of White's position are far more important. 29 cS
e4
30 �e2
:eS
31 'iWd7 1
':gS?
In the opinion of Alexander Chern i n , 31 . . . e3 was more tenacious, for example: 32 l:tf1 ':'g5 33 �d3 e2! 34 �xe2 ':xg2 35 �d3 :g 1 + ! 36 %1xg 1 'iWxd3, and the position
ltJ
What lies behind a M i stake
remains instead position another,
sharp. 32 %l g 1 is stronger, but then of 32 . . . %lg5 (which leads to a from the game) Black can make more useful move - 32 . . . 'ii'c2 .
32 %lg1
e3
33 d6
%lg3
34 'ii'x b7
'ii'e 6
35 �h21 Black resigned , since after 35 . . . 'ii'e 5 36 'ii'x aB he is unable to make favourable use of the d iscovered check. Anand - Kasparov 1 1 th game of the match
1 79
nervous tension , agg ravated by the emo tions provoked by the loss of the previous, 1 0th game. And on the other hand - a lack of the habit of deeply and carefully checking variations. Anand possesses a wonderful i ntuition , and many of his decisions (some times very d ifficult ones) are taken quickly, but rapid ity of th i n king often goes badly with accu racy and precision in calculation . 3 0 . . . :1xb4+ 31 �a3. Wh ite was expecting to emerge with the exchange for a pawn after, say, 3 1 . . . .l:.bc4, but he overlooked a fearfu lly strong counter-stroke: 31 . . Jlxc2 ! . He had to resign immediately in view of 32 %lxc2 l:Ib3+ 33 �a2 :e3+, when Black is two pawns up. Here Kasparov was simply lucky - after all, the move he made was in fact bad ! The captu re on e7 leads by force to a double rook ending with an extra pawn and excel lent winning chances for White . 28 li'lxe7!
:te8
29 li'ld5
�xd5
30 b4! The moves can also be interposed : 29 b4 axb4 30 axb4 l::t c4 31 li'ld 5 . 30 . . .
axb4
31 axb4
%lc4
32 l:txd5 The e7-pawn is under attack. After the normal 27 . . .�fB Black would have retained an acceptable, although slightly inferior position . I n stead of this Kasparov played 'actively' . 27 . . .
�e6?
In the game his idea proved justified , si nce his opponent was tempted by a faulty combination on the theme of double attack: 28 b4? axb4 29 axb4 %lc4 30 li'l b6?? I should mention that Anand thought about this combination for only a few minutes. and the fatal knight move was altogether made almost instantly. Why? On the one hand, what obviously told was the enormous
This position has been reached by force. Of course, it is too early to call a halt - a certain calcu lating tech nique (although not too complicated ) is requ i red , in order to take the variation to its logical end. It is surprising that neither Anand (during the game) nor Kasparov (in his analysis in Informator) coped with this problem . 32 . . .
%lxb4+
If 32 . . . .l:.ecB? (suggested by Kasparov), then 33 c3! (weaker is 33 %le2 l::t x b4+ 34 �c1 ':c6 35 .l:.ed2 l:ta6) 33 . . . l::t xc3 34 :e2 followed by 35 %lxb5. 33 �c3 Of cou rse, not 33 �c1 ? f5 with equality.
1 80
�
What lies behind a Mistake
33 . . .
1:[c4+
34 �b3
l:tec8
34 .. .f5!? is more tenacious , but after 35 l:txb5 1:[d4 36 �c3 Black's position remains difficult. 35 11e2 Black loses one of his pawns, and his chances of saving the game are problem atic. I should mention that if Anand had accu rately calculated this variation, he would al most certainly have gone in for it. Here Wh ite's advantage is g reater than in the position with an exchange advantage, which he was hoping to obtain by playing 28 b4? (it is most probably drawn ).
1:[xg5 the g2-pawn is lost, and after 34 g3 gxh4 35 gxh4 1:[f5 - the f3-pawn . But Anand finds an excellent rook manoeuvre, which refutes the opponent's idea . 34 1:[a8 1 gxh4 34 . . . �d7! 35 g3 (of cou rse, not 35 g4?? gxh4 36 1:[h8 h3) 35 . . .1:[f5 36 1:[h8 .l:[xf3 37 hxg5 l:txg3 38 1:[xh5 �c6 was stronger however, here too Black would stil l have been a pawn down . 35 1:1e8+!
�d7
35 . . . �f5 36 1:[e4 �g5 37 a4!? was even worse for Black. 36 1:[e4
c3
Anand - Kasparov 1 7th game of the match
Here Wh ite had to make a d ifficult choice. Anand preferred simply to remain a pawn up. 37 ':xh4? 1 cxb2+ 38 �xb2 Of course, Black should have safeg uarded his pawn : 32 . . . a6. It is important that if 33 �d2 (with the positional threat of �c3-d4) he has 33 . . . c3+ ! 34 bxc3 :tc5, after which the game should end i n a draw. But aga i n , instead o f a normal cou rse Kasparov chooses an 'active' one. 32 . . . 1:[c5? 33 %1xa7
g5
It appears that Black is alright: after 34 hxg5
1Ig 5
39 a4 But in the resulting position Wh ite's pawns are broken and the opponent reta ins real chances of saving the game (remember the d rawing tendencies of rook endings). I n the end Kasparov managed to gain a d raw. H ad Anand been a l ittle more self-confident (he was appreciably oppressed by the burden of failure in the preced ing games), he would most probably have chosen 37 b4!
What lies behind a M i stake
lIg5 3 8 lIxh4 lIxg2 3 9 'iti>b1 . Here , for the moment, Wh ite is not a pawn up, but he has a serious positional plus - two connected passed pawns on the q ueenside. If the wh ite king ma nages to get to b3 (as i n the variation 39 . . ..:f2 40 ':xh5!? ':'xf3 41 'iti>a2), the position will certainly become won . Black's only counter-chance (although I doubt whether it is sufficient) is to push his d-
ttJ
181
pawn to d4 when the king is on b 1 . The moral to be d rawn from these examples (the list of them could have been extended ) is obvious. For a player of any standard it is important to make a thorough analysis of his own games, and disclose the latent, deep causes of the mistakes he has made, as this always serves as the first step towards their elimination .
1 82
PART VI Mark Dvoretsky
Analysis of a Game
Wgame, played by Sasha Chernosvitov.
e are going t o look a t an interesting
He annotated it in great deta i l : he gave numerous variations, and described what he was thinking about d u ring the game, what he was afraid of and what he over looked . His analysis is not error-free. Of course, in such cases mistakes are inevita ble - after all, when you are examining complicated variations, it is easy at some point to become entang led . But beh ind the mistakes made, defin ite deficiencies in thinking, in the approach to the game, can sometimes be see n . The reason I have chosen this particu lar game for analysis was because some of the omissions, both in the moves and in the comments , seemed to me to be instructive . Den isov - C hernosvitov Moscow J u n ior Championsh i p 1 99 1 Queen 's Gambit Accepted 1 d4
dS
2 c4
dxc4
3 e3
lDf6
4 �xc4
e6
S lDf3
cS
6 0-0 7 a4 8 'ife2
a6 lDc6 'ifc7
9 lDc3
�d6
1 0 dxcS
1 0 b3, 1 0 d5 and 1 0 l:r. d 1 have also been played . In his commentary on the game Sasha described in detail his views on the theory of the g iven variation . But since his opening conceptions are to a certa i n extent a personal matter, there is no need to discuss them here. We are more interested in the problems which arose later. 10 . . .
�xcS
1 1 h3?! 1 1 e4 is more critical, althoug h then 1 1 . . . lDg4 (th reatening 1 2 . . . lDd4) or the immed iate 1 1 . . . lDd4 has to be reckoned with . Wh ite wants to adva nce his e-pawn in comfort, but in the open ing every tempo counts , and with such slow play he can no longer expect an advantage. 11 . . .
0-0
1 2 e4
lDd41
1 3 lDxd4
�xd4
The opening stage has concluded in Black's favour. He controls the central squares, the bishop on c4 is running up against the e6pawn, the wh ite e-pawn has been halted and in some variations it can even come under attack. It only remains for Black to develop his light-square bishop, and his position will be preferable. 14 �d2?! Chernosvitov recommends 14 �d3, in order to prepare the development of the bishop at e3.
tZJ
Analysis of a Game
14 . . .
b6
1 5 llac1
�b7
The threat of 1 7 ttJd5 (or 1 7 ttJb5) is very obvious. But what will Wh ite do after the queen moves off the c-file? Perhaps ex change the dark-square bishops by 1 7 �e3, but most probably prepare f2-f4 by movi ng the king to h 1 . Is it not possible to make it d ifficult for the opponent to carry out his plans? 'ii' g 3!
An excellent manoeuvre! 16 . . . 'ii'e 5 1 7 �h1 ttJh5 1 8 'ii'g 4 was much weaker. 1 7 �h1
�xg7 21 g3 with equality. 18 . . .
l:.fd8
The wh ite pieces on the d-file are beg i n n i ng to hang . If 1 9 � c2 (with the idea of �h2 and g2-g 3 , or 'ii'f3-g3) Chernosvitov suggests replying 1 9 . . . g5! 20 'ii'f3 �e5 2 1 ':'e2 l:.d4 . If 1 9 ttJd 1 (preparing 20 � c3), then 1 9 . . . b5 20 axb5 axb5 21 �c3 e5 22 'ii'f3 �xc3 23 bxc3 (23 ttJxc3 b4) 23 . . . ':'a2, and Black has an appreciable advantage.
1 6 �d3
16 . . .
1 83
Sasha considers the comparatively best defence to be 1 9 'ii'f3! ? �xf2 20 ':'xf2 ':xd3 21 'ii'x d3 'ii'xf2 22 'ii'e 3!? 'ii'x e3 23 �xe3 ttJxe4 (23 . . . ttJd7 24 : d 1 ) 24 ttJxe4 �xe4 25 �xb6 with chances of equalising (for exam ple, 25 .. .f5 26 ':'c1 �f7 27 �d4). However, if the concluding position of this variation does not satisfy Black, he can retain the advantage with the qu iet move 1 9 . . . �e5 ! ? , seeing as 20 ttJd 1 w i l l b e met b y a little combinatio n : 20 . . . J:txd3! 2 1 'ii'x d3 ttJxe4 with the threats 22 . . Jld8 and 22 . . . ttJg3+. 1 9 � h2? It is a well-known tru ism that everyth ing should be done at the right time. 'A move made one move later is often a mistake. ' Now the capture with the bishop o n f2 , which we saw in the last variation, gains greatly in strength .
'ii' h 4
The queen is excellently placed at h4. From here it presses on the e4-pawn and simulta neously eyes the king. In some cases the knight will jump to g4, while if 1 8 f4 , then 1 8 . . . ttJh5 1 9 �e1 ttJg3+ 20 �xg3 'ii'x g3 with the better chances for Black. 1 8 l:tce1 ? ! Now Wh ite's position becomes d ifficu lt. He should have decided on a second succes sive king move: 1 8 �h2 ! . The tactical basis of it is the elegant variation 1 8 . . . �xc3 1 9 �xc3 (weaker is 1 9 g 3 �e5 20 f4 ttJg4+! 2 1 �g2 'ii'e 7) 1 9 . . . ttJxe4 (after 1 9 . . . �xe4 20 �xa6 White is only slig htly worse) 20 �xg7!
19 . . .
�xf2 1
1 84
�
Analysis of a Game
20 1lxf2
l:txd3
21 'iWxd3
lDg4+ !
22 �g1
'ifxf2+
23 �h1 Chernosvitov played the first half of the game very strongly, completely outplayed his opponent, and gained an advantage qu ite sufficient for a wi n . But from this moment it was as though a substitute had taken his place. What should Black play now? 23 . . . 'iWh4 suggests itself, but then the cou nterattack 24 'iWd7 is unpleasant. Therefore in the fi rst instance the safer conti nuation 23 . . . lDe5! should be considered . The reply 24 'iWe3 is forced . Let us conti nue the variation : 2 4 . . . 'iWxe3 2 5 i.xe3 lDc4 2 6 i. c 1 (26 i.f2 lDxb2 27 i.xb6 ':'c8 is also cheerless, for example: 28 i.d4 I[c4 29 lIb1 ':xd4 30 J:txb2 l:td7) 26 . . . lId8 27 b3 lDe5 28 i.e3 (28 i.f4 lDd3) 28 . . . lId3 29 i.xb6 J:txc3 30 i.d4 l1xb3 31 i.xe5 f6 followed by . . . e6-e5, and Black converts his extra pawn without particular d ifficulty. Why d id n 't Sasha play this? Through inertia he wanted to conti nue the attack, fearing that i n the endgame Wh ite would save hi mself thanks to the opposite-colour bish ops. But more importa ntly, he underesti mated the opponent's threat, assuming that the q ueen move to d7 was not possible due to the loss of the e4-pawn . But in fact after 23 . . :tIi'h4 24 'iWd7 lDf2+ 25 �h2 i.xe4 after exchanging on e4 Wh ite can then simultane ously attack two pieces with 'iWc6 or 'iWb7. One can lau nch into such adventures only on the basis of very accurate calculation. Here I would almost certainly have called a halt and rejected the entire variation (if I had not done this a move earl ier, on seeing the move 24 'iWd7). I n the conversion of an advantage you should try to strictly control all the oppo nent's active possibil ities, not allowing any
u n necessary sharpening of the play. It can happen that your advantage hangs by a thread , and to maintain it you have to exert yourself and deeply calculate complicated variations. But here the situation is clearly d ifferent: Black is a sound pawn to the good and he has a safe way of retaining all the advantages of his position . 23 . . .
'iWh4?
24 'iid 7! What should Black do now?
24 . . Jlb8? 25 :f1 is completely bad for Black, and therefore he must choose be tween 24 . . Jld8 and 24 . . . lDf2+ . On the previous move Sash a committed a typical psychological mistake: realising that he had gained a decisive advantage, he relaxed and played carelessly. Now he sensed that things were by no means as simple as they appeared earlier. And here came a second psychological mistake (re member, incidentally, Tarrasch's famous maxim: ' M istakes never occur singly' . ) As often happens, the sudden d ifficulties spoiled his mood and prevented h i m from calmly analysing the variations, which , however, are now very complicated . Black also failed to solve this problem later, i n analysis at home. Chernosvitov rejected 24 . . .lId8 25 'iWxb7
ttJ
Analysis of a Game
':xd2 because of 26 1:.e2. But here it is too early to stop the calculation: Black can play 26 ... h51 (or 26 . . . h6!), opening an escape square for the king . Black's rook is immune and his th reats look rather dangerous. I ncidentally, in similar situations the pawn is usually advanced not one square , but two , since it may come in useful i n the attack. I n the g iven instance the two moves are roughly equ ivalent. The opponent's reply is obvious: 27 'ii'x b6 (27 'ii'x a6? l:1c2! is bad ). The next problem is this: how can Black exploit the advantages of his position?
1 85
the position would not be changed (if 32 'itt g 3 , then 32 . . . 'iVe 1 + followed by 33 . . . a5 is possible, if there is noth ing better). And in the event of 28 'itt h 2 there is an excellent knight sacrifice : 28 ... lbxh31 29 gxh3 l:[d31 with an irresistible attack. For example, 30 'iVb8+ 'itt h 7 3 1 'itt g 1 ':xh3 32 .l:th2 'iVg5+ ! , or 30 'itt g 2 ':xh3 31 'ii'd 6 'itt h 7 ! , intending 32 . . .f6 and 33 . . . e5 (31 . . . 'ii'g 4+ 32 'ittf2 'iVg5! with the same th reat of . . . e6-e5 is equally good ). Attempts to avoid mate lead to a lost endgame for Wh ite : 29 ':xd2 lbf4+ 30 'itt g 1 'iVe 1 + 3 1 'itt h 2 'ii'x d2 , o r 2 9 'ii' b 8+ 'itt h7 30 'iVg3 'iVxg3+ 31 'itt x g3 ':d3+ ! 32 'itt h 2 lbg5. I n stead of 26 ':e2 we must consider 26 .l:tf1 ! .
The simplest solution - 27 . . . .l:.xe2 28 lbxe2 'iVe 1 + 29 lbg 1 lbf2+ 30 'itt h 2 lbxe4 - does not seem convincing to me. After 3 1 lbf3 (31 'ifb8+ ! 'itt h 7 32 lbf3 is even more accurate) the coordination of the black pieces is disrupted somewhat, and Wh ite is threaten ing the rapid advance of his pawn on the queenside. For example, 31 lbf3 'ii'g 3+ 32 'itt g 1 'iVd6 33 'iVxd6 lbxd6 34 b4 followed by lbd4 . Let us try 27 ... lbf2+ ! . If 28 'itt g 1 ? , then 28 . . . lbxh3+! 29 gxh3 :xe2 30 lbxe2 'iVe 1 + 3 1 'itt g 2 'ii'xe2+, and the queen endgame is easily won . I n this variation the pawn is better placed at h5 than at h6. However, even with the pawn on h6 the evaluation of
After 26 . . . f6 there i s the strong reply 27 'iVe? ! . And if 26 ... h5!?, then White conti n ues 27 'ii'x f7+ 'itt h 7 28 'ii'xe6 lbe3 29 lbd5! lbxf1 30 'ii'f5+ 'itt h 6 31 'ii'e 6+ g6 32 'iVg8 1 , and the game inevitably ends in perpetual check. How can Black's play be improved? Grand master Dolmatov found a rather unexpected idea : after 24 . . .l:ld8 25 'ii'x b7 he suggested avoiding the capture of the bishop in favour of 25 ... h6!. (see diagram)
1 86
�
Analysis of a Game
achieve noth ing after 24 ... liJf2+ 25 �h2 iLxe4 , nevertheless he quickly rejected 24 . . . .l:.d8. Apparently what showed itself here was the psycholog ical effect of the mistake made earl ier, about which I have already spoke n .
26 l:le2 l:lxd2 transposes into the variation 25 .. J:txd2 26 l:le2 h6, in which , accord ing to our analysis, Black's attack achieves its aim (true, we put the pawn on h5, but this is of no sign ificance). And in the event of 26 l:lf1 Black is no longer obliged to captu re on d2 26 . . . liJf2+! 27 l:lxf2 'ii'xf2 is much stronger, when the wh ite bishop cannot escape. The best defence is 26 liJd51 exd5 27 :f1 (if 27 exd5, then 27 . . . liJf2+ and 28 . . . liJxh3! ) , b u t here too Black retains a b i g advantage, by continuing 27 . . . liJf2+ 28 �h2 (28 �g 1 liJxh3+ 29 gxh3 'ii'g 3+ 30 � h 1 'ii'x h3+ 3 1 �g 1 'ii'g 4+! 3 2 � h 1 'ii' h 5+ and 3 3 . . . dxe4 i s hopeless for White) 2 8. . . dxe4 (weaker i s 2 8 . . . liJxe4 2 9 'ii' x f7+ � h 7 3 0 iLf4) 2 9 iLe1 'ii'f4+ 30 �g1 e3 31 'ii'x a6 :d1 32 'ii'e2 'iix a4 (32 . . . 'ifd4 33 iLxf2 exf2+ 34 'ifxf2 l:lxf1 + 35 �xf1 'ii'd 1 + 36 'ii'e 1 'ili'xa4 is also good , with an extra pawn in a queen endgame) 33 'ii'x e3 liJd3 . There are good g rounds for once again remembering Tarrasch , who maintained that you should resort to a combi nation in order to repair a mistake committed earlier. I would remark, however, that at the board it is not so d ifficult to decide to go in for tactical complications, if the method of elimination is employed - after first satisfying yourself that all other tries are unpromising. Strangely enoug h , although Sash a saw that he would
24 . . .
liJf2+
25 �h2
iLxe4?
As grandmaster Evgeny Bareev poi nted out, it was not yet too late to switch to attack by 25 . . . :d8! 26 'ili'xb7 lIxd2. Wh ite loses after 27 l:r.f1 ? 'ii'f4+ 28 �g 1 liJxh3+ or 27 'ifb8+? l:r.d8 28 _g3 liJg4+ ! ' And in the event of 27 :e2 Black gains an advantage by 27 . . . h6 (or 27 . . . h5) 28 'iVxa6 liJg4+ 29 �g 1 (29 � h 1 ? :tc2 ! ) 29 . . . liJe3 ! , for exam ple: 30 llxd2 'ili'e 1 + 3 1 � h2 liJf1 + etc. The outcome of the complications arising after 27 . . . g5!? is less clear: 28 'ili'xb6! (28 'iVxa6? ! l:txe2 29 'ii'xe2 g4 ! ) 28 . . . liJxh3!? 29 gxh3 l:td3 30 �g 1 ! lIxh3 31 'iVb8+ �g7 32 �g2. I ncidentally, with this move order, as in the variation by Dolmatov analysed earl ier, Black would have deprived his opponent of the best defence l:tf1 ! . 26 liJxe4? Wh ite misses his chance. He should have played 26 :txe4 ! liJxe4 27 'ii'c6 'ifg3+ (after 27 . . . l:td8 28 liJxe4 the bishop on d2 is defended - this is why he should take with the rook, not the knight) 28 � g 1 .l:.d8 29 liJxe4. After 29 .. :"e5 there fol lows 30 'ii'x b6 'ili'd4+?! 31 iLe3, while if 29 . . . 'ii' b 8 (as Chernosvitov wanted to play), then 30 iLe3! b5 31 a5 h6 32 'ili'b6 (32 'ii'x a6? 'ii'e 5) 32 .. J:ld 1 + 33 �f2 'if e5 34 liJd2 with excellent drawing chances. In endings a rook is often stronger than a bishop and knig ht, if it is able to break through at the right time into the opponent's position to attack the enemy q ueenside pawns and create there an outside passed pawn. But here the endgame is stil l a long way off, and besides, it is not only Wh ite's
Analysis of a Game
q ueenside pawns that are under fire , but also Black's. 26 . . .
tDxe4
27 'it'c6
'ii'g 3+
28 �g1
'ii'f2+
29 � h2
'ii'g 3+
It is usefu l , by repeati ng moves, to save time on the clock.
1 87
40 . . . 1:.d2+? ! ) 41 1:.g2 1:.d 1 or 4 1 'ii'x d6 'it'xc2+ 42 � g 1 'ii' b 1 + and 43 . . . 'ii'x b5. In the game Black decided to go i nto an endgame. An incorrect assessment of the position! Even if the endgame is won , it is clear that with the q ueens on it would be much simpler to convert the advantage. 33 . . .
'ii'd 3? 'ii'd 6+ ':'xd6
30 �g1
'it'f2+
34 1:.e3
31 �h2
l:.d8
35 'it'xd6
32 l:txe4
'ii'x d2
33 'it'xb6
ltJ
An interesting rook ending has arise n . In the analysis of it, numerous questions occurred to me; the answers to them were either lacking i n the commentary, or did not seem convi ncing.
Black is a sound pawn to the good . Which is more correct: to exchange or retai n the queens? Of cou rse, it is better to keep the queens on. After all, the wh ite king is exposed and it can easily come under attack. Chernosvitov illustrates this assessment with the follow ing sample variations: 33 . . . h6 34 b4 (34 'iVxa6 'it'xb2) 34 . . . 1:.d6 35 'it'b8+ �h7 36 b5 axb5 37 axb5 f5! 38 ltc4 e5 (if 38 . . . 'ii'd 5 the only defence is 39 1:.c3! 'ii'e 5+ 40 ':'g3) 39 l:.c2 'iVf4+ 40 g3 1:.d2+ 41 1:.xd2 'ii'x d2+ 42 �g 1 'iVe3+ 43 �g2 e4 44 'ii'f4? 'ii'e 2+ 45 �g 1 'ii'x b5. It is unclear whether Black can win after 44 b6, but this is not so important: he can ach ieve his goal with 40 . . . 'ii'e4! (instead of
36 .l:[b3 White prepares a4-a5 and 1:.b6. A tempti ng idea , but the more standard plan beginn ing with 36 b4 should also have been consid ered (the rook will stand beh ind the passed pawn). After 36 . . . �f8 37 b5 axb5 38 axb5 �e7 39 1:.b3 it is bad to play 39 . . . �d7? 40 b6 �c8 in view of 41 l:lc3+ �b8 42 1:.c7 . 39 . . . l:tb6 is correct, when Black most prob ably wins, although it is not so simple. If his king goes to c5, there follows 1:.c3+ ; this means that he will have to waste a tempo on . . . 1:. b6-b 7 . During this time White will create cou nterplay on the kingside. How? Wel l , for
1 88
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Analysis of a Game
example, by 40 �g3 l:tb 7 41 �f4 �d6 42 g4 f6 43 g5 �c5 44 l:te3, or 42 . . . �c5 43 ':c3+ �xb5 44 �e5 , intending l:tc8-g8. 36 . . .
g6?
A very strange move , on which Sash a makes no comment. It is clear that Black will have to advance his kingside pawns, so why not advance the pawn two squares, why waste a tempo? It is qu ite possible that a race will develop, in which every tempo will count. Even if the delay does not affect the assessment here, the next time it wil l . O f course, 3 6 . . . g 5 ! ? was stronger than the move in the game. 36 .. .f5!? also looks tempti ng, intending to bring the king out to f6 followed by . . . h7-h5-h4 , and . . . e6-e5-e4 . For example: 37 a5 (37 l::t b 7 a5!?) 37 . . . �f7 38 l:t b6 �e7! (gaining another tempo) 39 :b7+ �f6 40 l:tb6 l::t d 2 41 b4 l:1d4 . 37 :b8+ Here Chernosvitov makes the following comment: 'It would appear that White could have immediately gained a draw by 37 a5 :d5 38 :b8+ �g7 39 b4 �f6 40 l:tb6 l:td4 4 1 ':'xa6 l:txb4 42 l:ta 7' .
rook is excellently placed to the rear of the passed a-pawn . I don't see what can be done to oppose the advance of the pawn armada on the kingside. For example: 42 . . . h5 43 a6 l:ta4 44 �g3 h4+ 45 �f3 e5 46 ':'a8 (46 �e3 l:ta2) 46 . . . �f5 47 a7 l:ta3+ 48 �f2 g5 and 49 . . . �f4 . Note the good position of the f7-pawn on its i n itial square - after 49 ':'f8 ':'xa7 it will be defended by the rook. 48 .. .f6? would be a typical mistake - now after . . . �f5-f4 the reply l:ta8-f8 gains in strength . 37 . . .
�g7
38 a5
l:td2
Black's other plan is to bring his king to the centre of the board . But in this case he will have to g ive u p one or two pawns on the kingside. Here is Chernosvitov's analysis: 38 . . . �f6 39 l:lb6 �e5 40 l:tb7 f5 4 1 l:txh7 'ud5 (4 1 . . .�d4 42 l:tb7 e5 43 l:tb6 �c5 44 l:txd6 �xd6 45 g4! fxg4 46 hxg4 �c5 47 �g2 , and the pawn endgame is d rawn ) 42 b4 l:.b5 43 ':'a7 ':'xb4 44 l:txa6 l:ta4 45 l:ta8 �f4 46 a6 e5 47 a7 e4 (47 . . . g5 48 g3+ �e4 49 11g8 or 48 . . . �f3 49 l:tf8) 48 l:tg8 l:txa7 49 l:txg6 e3 50 ':'e6 with a draw. This variation is interesting, but by no means forced . At the very end instead of 49 . . . e3? there is the far stronger 49 . . . �e3 ! ' I am not sure that White can save himself here - the e-pawn really is too strong . On the other hand , it is not altogether clear why he i n itially wasted time advancing his a-pawn, and only then went for the g6-pawn . In reply to 45 . . . �f4 either 46 :a6 e5 47 l:txg6 or 46 l:te8 e5 47 g3+ suggests itself.
Roug hly such a position can arise in many variations and its assessment is important for the correct understanding of the entire endgame. But is it really d rawn? The black
39 �g3
�f6
40 b4
':'b2
41 l:tb6
�e5?
It is more natural to advance the kingside pawns: 4 1 . . . h5 or first 4 1 . . .g5. I ncidentally, after . . . h7-h5 the king move to e5 gains in strength - since when the wh ite rook steps onto the 7th rank, Black simply replies
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Analysis of a Game
1 89
. . . f7-f5 and the h-pawn will no longer be under attack. 42 1:[b7 Chernosvitov comments: ' Neither White nor Black saw the "two-mover" 42 ':'xa6 1:[xb4 43 1:Ia7 with a draw' . Wel l , we have already talked about such a position - in fact after 43 . . .�f6 Black should most probably wi n . 43 . . .f5 4 4 ':'xh7 ':'a4 4 5 ':'a7 g5 followed by . . .1::t a3+ is also tempti ng. When analysing endings it is very important to make a correct assessment of key positions, wh ich are reached from different variations. Sash a made a mistake in his assessment of one such position , and as a result his perception of the entire endgame was distorted . I should mention that Wh ite does not have time to take his king across to the q ueenside. Here are some sample variations: 42 �f3 f5 43 �e3 g5 44 �d3 f4 45 �c3 l:txg2 46 ':'xa6 f3 47 1:[a8 (47 �d3 .:tb2 or 47 . . . h5) 47 . . . h5 48 a6 :a2 49 �b3 :'xa6! 50 :txa6 f2 51 :a 1 g4 52 hxg4 hxg4 53 b5 �d5! 54 :1c1 g3 55 b6 g2 56 b 7 f1 'it' 57 b8'ii' 'it'xc1 , or 48 b5 :1g 1 49 :f8 �e4 50 b6 (noth ing is changed by 50 �c2 l:ta1 or 50 �b2 l:.d 1 5 1 b6 %:td5) 50 .. J:tb1 51 �c2 l:.b5 52 �d2 (52 a6 ':'xb6 53 a 7 .1:.a6 54 a8'i1i' + l::tx a 8 55 %:txa8 f2 56 ':f8 �e3) 52 . . . g4 53 hxg4 hxg4 54 a6 %lb2+! 55 �d1 (55 �e1 �e3) 55 . . . g3 56 a7 1:[a2. 42 . . .
f5
43 l::t x h7 The delay i n playing . . . h7-h5 has told. The outcome of the game is now in q uestion . 43 . . .
�e4
44 l:th4+? A decisive loss of time. And meanwhile it is possible that there was no longer a win after any of the 'normal' conti nuations: 44 1:Ia7 f4+ 45 �h4 l::t x g2 46 l::tx a6, 44 .l:r.g7 f4+ (or 44 . . . l:txb4 45 ltxg6 �e5 46 h4) 45 �h2 f3 46 :txg6 e5 47 %:tf3 (47 �g 1 ), or 44 h4 f4+ 45 �h3 e5 46 ':a7 �e3 47 l::tx a6 e4 48 %lxg6. 44 . . .
�e3
45 1:1c4
e5
46 l:tc3+ Wh ite also loses after 46 l::t c6 f4+ 47 �h2 e4 (th reatening 48 .. .f3) 48 �g 1 l::t b 1 + 49 �h2 l::t x b4 followed by . . . �f2 and . . . e4--e3. 46 . . .
�e2
47 ':'c6
1:[xb4
48 :1xg6 48 %1e6 f4+ 49 �g4 f3+ 50 �g3 f2 51 l::t x e5+ �f1 , and the f2-pawn inevitably promotes to a quee n . 48 . . .
f4+
49 � h2
e4
50 :1xa6
e3
51 l:tb6
11a4
52 a6
�f2
Wh ite resig ned .
1 90
�
Analysis of a Game
When analysing complicated endings, we sometimes stumble upon positions which , possibly, do not arise by force, but which are i nteresting i n their own right. One such position is examined by Chernosvitov.
follows 4 . . . l::t h 3+! 5 gxh3 g3+) 4 . . . l::t x a7 (4 . . . g3! 5 as" f3! mates more qu ickly) 5 l::txe4 l::t a 1 + 6 'iti>h2 g3+ 7 'iti>h3 f3 S :f4 l::t h 1 + 9 'iti>g4 'iti>xg2 1 0 l::t xf3 l::t x h4+ . It is time to sum u p . Chernosvitov played the second half of the game uncertainly, and also his commentary, although detailed, was not too successfu l . Here two serious deficiencies of his are clearly see n :
I n his opin ion this is a position of mutual zugzwang. Wel l , it is not hard to see that if it is White to move he loses (1 g3 f3 , 1 h4 g4, or 1 l::t g S ':xa7 2 ':xg5 'iti>f2 3 l::t f5 f3 4 gxf3 e3). But I can not agree with the conclusion that with Black to move it is a draw. The wh ite king is really very awkwardly placed . Black plays 1 . . . :ta2 2 'iti>g 1 l:Xa6! 3 'iti> h 1 (3 'iti>h2 ::t a 1 ) 3 . . . g4! 4 hxg4 'iti>f2 5 g5 'iti>g3 with unavoidable mate. There is also other, more spectacu lar solution : 1 . . . 'iti>f2 2 .:teS g4! 3 h4 (3 hxg4 lba7) 3 . . . l:ta3! (another way is 3 .. .f3! 4 as. l:th 1 + ! ! ) 4 'iti> h 1 (if 4 as. or 4 l:txe4 there
1 ) Weak conversion o f an advantage. Remember: in a winning position Black i ncorrectly allowed his opponent to sharpen the play. Then he did not even try to figure out the resulting complications. Finally, after incorrectly resolving an exchanging prob lem, he went into an endgame instead of playing for mate . Later any methodical player would surely have advanced his g pawn two squares, instead of one, and he would also have chosen an appropriate moment to advance his h-pawn , whereas Sasha left it at h 7, where it was lost. As a result, the opponent gained real chances of saving the game. 2) Uncertain orientation in rook endings. Chernosvitov overlooked some typical ideas and plans, and his general assessments and specific recommendations often proved incorrect. Sasha can be advised to make a serious study of rook endings, and even better - of the theory and tech nique of the endgame as a whole.
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1 91
Artur Yusu pov
C reative Ach i evements of P u p i ls from the School A t the end of the book it has become an /""\e stablished tradition to g ive examples of play by pupils from the school (their ages are g iven in brackets). The jun iors played and annotated a whole series of interesting games, some of wh ich , with slight correc tions in the analysis, will now be offered to the judgement of the readers. The author faced a d ifficult problem, since nearly every young player has good examples of attack ing play. Th is is not surprising : attack, risk and imagination are natu rally associated with youth . However, the games chosen speak for themselves. Boguslavsky ( 1 4) - Lepi n Moscow 1 989 Modern Benoni 1 d4
t'i)f6
2 c4
e6
3 t'i)c3
c5
4 d5
exd5
5 cxd5
d6
6 e4
g6
7 f4
.tg7
8 e5 This is typical of Maxim's style: already in the open ing Wh ite chooses the sharpest conti nuatio n . 8. . .
dxe5
The alternative is the immed iate 8 . . . t'i)fd7. 9 fxe5
t'i)fd7
1 0 e6
t'i)f6?
But this is already a serious mistake. Accord ing to theory, better is 1 0 .. .fxe6 1 1 dxe6 'ike7 1 2 t'i)d5 'ikxe6+ 1 3 'ili'e2 'it'xe2+ 1 4 .txe2 0-0 1 5 t'i)c7 t'i)c6 1 6 t'i)xa8 t'i) b4 1 7 t'i)f3 t'i)c2+ 1 8 �d 1 t'i)xa 1 1 9 .tc4+ �h8, as in the games Shereshevsky-Semenyu k, Vilnius 1 974 , and Lputian-Magerramov, Beltsy 1 979. 11 .t b5+
�f8
1 1 . . . �e 7 is also dangerous in view of 1 2 .tf4 fxe6 1 3 d6+ �f7 1 4 t'i)f3 . 1 2 t'i)f3
fxe6
1 2 . . . a6 looks somewhat more accu rate, although after 1 3 .te2 fxe6 1 4 0-0 exd5 1 5 t'i)g5 �g8 ( 1 5 . . . .tf5?? 1 6 ':xf5 is completely bad ; Black also loses after 1 5 . . . d4 1 6 'iVb3 'ikd7 1 7 .tg4) 1 6 .tc4 b5 1 7 .txd5+ t'i)xd5 1 8 t'i)f7 White has a very promising position . 1 3 0-0 14 t'i)g5
exd5 �g8
1 4 . . . h6 came into consideration, but in this case after 1 5 'ikxd5 'ili'xd5 16 t'i)xd5 hxg5 1 7 .txg5 Wh ite regains the piece and reta ins the in itiative in the endgame. Now, however, the king's rook is shut in the corner, and Wh ite is able to carry out his attack al most u n h i ndered . 1 5 t'i)xd5 Also not bad was 1 5 .tc4 ! ? b5 1 6 .txd5+ t'i)xd5 1 7 t'i)f7 with the idea of answering 1 7 . . . 'ikd7 with 1 8 t'i)h6+ .txh6 1 9 .txh6, with decisive threats. 15 . . .
t'i)xd5
Usually when defending the king you should
1 92
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Creative Achievements of Pupils from the School
aim for the exchange of queens. In the given instance this would not have brought any particu lar relief: 1 5 . . . 'ii'x d5 1 S 'ii'x d5+ lZ'lxd5 1 7 ..tc4 ..td4+ 1 8 'ii? h 1 'ii? g 7 1 9 ..txd5 fU8 20 ':xf8 (20 lZ'lf7!? is also not bad ) 20 . . . 'ii? xf8 2 1 lZ'leS+ ..txeS 2 2 ..txb7, winning material. 16 lZ'lf7
A fantastic position , where Wh ite has only one piece for the quee n , but one of the opponent's rooks is out of play and his king is in a mating net. The fol lowing variations are based on Boguslavsky's analysis.
A) 20 . . . 'ii'f7 loses immediately to 21 ..tc4; B) 20 ... lZ'ld7 2 1 :ae1 'ii' d 5 (or 2 1 . . . 'ii'x e 1 22 ..tc4+) 22 1:.e7 'ii'd 4+ 23 'ii? h 1 lZ'lfS (23 ... lZ'lbS 24 ..te8) 24 ':xfS with unavoidable mate; C) 20 . . . lZ'lcs 2 1 :ae 1 C 1 ) 2 1 . . . 'iVxa2? 22 1:.fS! (not 22 ..txcS? bxcS 23 :e7 'iix b2 24 :ef7 because of 24 . . :iWa 1 ! ) 2 2 . . . 'ii'f7 23 :ef1 lZ'le5 2 4 llxf7 lZ'lxf7 25 ..tc4 and wins; C2) 21 . . . 'iIi'd5 22 b3 lZ'la5 (if 22 . . . lZ'le5, then 23 l:txe5) 23 ':'e7 'ii'd 4+ 24 'ii? h 1 , and Black can not parry the threat of 25 ..te8;
16 . . .
..td4+?
In a d ifficult position Black goes wrong and is elegantly mated . A subtle queen sacrifice, which Boguslavsky had prepared , remained off-screen . After the best move 1 S .. :ii'e 7 1 7 lZ'lhS+ ..txhS Maxim was intending to play 1 8 'ii'xd 5+ ..teS ( 1 8 . . . 'ii? g 7 1 9 .l:.f7+ 'ili'xf7 20 ..txhS+ and 1 8 .. :ii'e S 1 9 ..txhS are both bad for Black) 1 9 'ii'x eS+ ! ! 'ii'x eS 20 ..txhS.
C3) U nfortu nately, Maxim does not consider the best defence: 21 . . . 'iVf7 ! . Here noth ing decisive is apparent. For example, 22 :txf7 'ii? xf7 23 ..tc4+ 'ii? fS 24 .l:.f1 + 'ii? e 5 25 �g7+ 'ii? d S with eq uality, or 22 b3 lZ'la5 (but not 22 . . . 'iVxf1 +? 23 ':xf1 lZ'le5 24 1:.e 1 as 25 ..tf1 lZ'lf7 2S ..tc4, and all the black pieces are tied up) 23 ..te2 .:te8. Objectively, Wh ite would have done better to reject playing for bri l l iancy in favour of 1 8 �xhS! (instead of 1 8 'ii'x d5+ ? ! ) 1 8 . . . ..teS 1 9 ..tc4 lZ'lc7 20 'ii'f3 (20 ':f8+ 'it'xf8 2 1 ..txeS+ lZ'lxeS 22 ..txf8 is also possible) 20 . . . lZ'ld7 2 1 ':ae 1 , a n d Black h a s no defence. 17 'ii'x d4!
cxd4
1 8 lZ'lh6+ Black resigned. Tepl itsky ( 1 4) - Paruti n Tashkent 1 989 GrOnfeld Defence 1 lZ'lf3 d5 2 c4
c6
3 e3
lZ'lf6
4 lZ'lc3
g6
5 d4
..tg7
4:J
Creative Ach ievements of Pupils from the School
6 �e2
0-0
7 0-0
li:)bd7
1 93
A transposition of moves has led to the Sch lechter Variation of the Gru nfeld De fence . Black's last move is considered inaccurate, since now Wh ite can exchange on d5, not fea ring the development of the black knight at c6 - the optimal square in this variation. I n this way Wh ite gained a clear advantage in the game Botvinnik-Blau (Olympiad , Tel Aviv 1 964) after 8 cxd5 cxd5 9 'it'b3 e6 1 0 a4 b6 1 1 .i.d2. However, White's move in the game is also not bad . 8 b3
e6
I n a game with Boris Kantsler, Van Teplitsky found the antidote to another scheme of development for Black: after 8 . . . b6 there followed 9 a4 a5 1 0 cxd5 li:)xd5 1 1 li:)xd5 cxd5 1 2 �a3 l:le8 1 3 l:[c1 �a6 1 4 �b5! with the better game. 9 'it'e2
l:te8
1 0 � b2
as
1 1 l:.ad1
li:)hS
12 �a3! U p to here Wh ite has simply deployed his pieces sensibly. But now he reacts to the opponent's plans and takes prophylactic measures agai nst . . . f7-f5 , on wh ich there follows 1 3 �d6, controlling the dark squares. 12 . . .
b6
Black changes pla n , but his knight proves badly placed on the edge of the board (remember the famous axiom of Dr. Tar rasch ! ) . White obtains good play by simple means: he prepares an offensive in the centre. 1 3 l:tfe1
.i.b7
1 4 e4
l:te8
1 S 'it'd2
dxe4
1 6 eSI An imaginative decision . Such moves are very easy to overlook. Now the win of a piece by 1 7 g4 is threatened . The 'auto matic' 1 6 bxc4 would have left Black more opportun ities for counterplay after 1 6 . . . e5 1 7 d5 �f8 ! ? (but not 1 7 . . . li:)c5? 1 8 �xc5 bxc5 1 9 d6 l:tb8 20 li:)a4 with a decisive advantage for White). 16 . . .
fS
If 1 6 . . . cxb3 there is the unpleasant reply 1 7 li:)e4 ! ( 1 7 g4 is weaker because of 1 7 . . . c5! 1 8 gxh5 �xf3 1 9 �xf3 cxd4 with fine cou nterplay, fully compensating for the sacrificed piece). Wh ite responds in the same way to 1 6 . . . b5!? ( 1 7 li:)e4 ! b4 1 8 li:)d6). 17 exf6 ! ? I nteresting play, although t h e qu iet 1 7 bxc4 would also have ensured Wh ite the better chances. 17 . . .
li:)hxf6
1 8 �xe4 This move leads to g reat compl ications. Wh ite exchanges two bishops for a rook and pawn . The consequences of such an ex change are usually d ifficult to assess cor rectly. I n many cases, especially in the middlegame, the two pieces prove stronger, since they can create more th reats to the
1 94
�
Creative Achievements of Pupils from the School
opponent. In the g iven position Tepl itsky correctly reckoned that the activity of his heavy pieces, after seizing control of the only open file, together with Black's weak ened castled position, would prove more sign ificant factors than the potential power of the h itherto dormant black bishops. 18 . . .
b5
1 9 .i.xe6+
lhe6
20 l:txe6
b4
21 'ii'e 2 ! ?
bxa3
If 2 1 . . . bxc3, then 22 l:Ie7 c2 23 l:tc1 with an attack (but not 23 'ii'xc2 .i.f8). 22 11e1
.i.f8
22 . . . ttJf8 23 lIe7 lIc7 was bad in view of 24 'ii'c4+ ..ti>h8 25 'iff7 . 23 ttJg5
.i.b4
Black overlooks a spectacular stroke by his opponent. However, 23 . . .lIc7 could also have been answered by 24 lId6 ! ! .i.xd6 (24 . . . 'ifb8 25 'ife6+ ..ti>h8 26 ttJce4 ! ) 25 'ii'e 6+ ..ti>g7 26 'ifxd6 ..ti>g8 27 'ife6+ ..ti>g7 28 'iff7+ ..ti>h6 29 ttJe6 'ife8 30 'ilVg7+ with a decisive attack.
'ilVxd6 (but not 26 'ilVf7+? ..ti>h6 27 ttJe6 because of 27 . . . 'ilVg8) Black proves helpless against the un ited onslaught of the white pieces : there is no satisfactory defence against the th reats of 27 ttJe6+ or 27 ':'e7+. If 24 . . . 'ilVc7 Wh ite has the decisive 25 'iVe6+ ..ti>h8 26 ttJce4! .i.xe 1 27 ttJxf6 . Finally, in the variation 24 . . . .i.xc3 25 'ilVe6+ ..ti>g7 26 'iVf7+ ..ti>h6 27 ':xd7! 'ilVxd7 (27 . . . ttJxd7 28 ttJe6) 28 'ilVxf6 .i.xe 1 29 ttJf7+ 'ilVxf7 30 'ilVxf7 Black has two bishops and a rook for the q ueen , but one of the bishops is inevitably lost. The attempt by Black to gain counterplay on the e-file proves unsuccessful . ..ti>h8 25 'ilVe6+ 26 ':'xd7
]::t e 8
27 ':xh7+ This d ispels the opponent's last illusions. Now Wh ite gains a decisive material advan tage, which Teplitsky confidently converts into a win . [27 'iVxf6+! 'ilVxf6 2 8 l:txe8+ .i. f8 29 ttJxh 7 would have been more quickly decisive Dvoretsky.] 27 . . .
ttJxh7
28 'ilVxe8
ttJxg5
29 'ilVxg6
ttJf7
30 :e3
'ilVg7
31 'ilVe6
.i.d6
32 :th3+
..ti>g8
33 ttJe4
'ilVxd4
34 ttJf6+
..ti>f8
35 'ilVe8+
..ti>g7
36 l:.h7+
..ti>xf6
37 'ilVxf7+ Black resigned 24 11d6 ! !
Boguslavsky (1 5) - Morozevich
Vacati ng t h e e6-sq uare for t h e decisive i nvasion of the wh ite queen. 24 . . .
'iVf8
I n the event of 24 . . . .i.xd6 25 'iVe6+ ..ti>g7 26
Moscow J u n ior Championship 1 990 King 's Indian Defence ttJf6 1 d4 2 c4
g6
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Creative Achievements of Pupils from the School
3 lLlc3
�g7
4 e4
0-0
S lLlf3
d6
6 �e2
eS
7 0-0
'ife8
A rare continuation , the main virtue of which is that the play now departs from familiar paths. 8 dxeS
dxeS
9 �e3 After 9 lLld5 Boguslavsky g ives the variation 9 . . . lLla6 1 0 lLlxf6+ �xf6 1 1 �e3 'fie7 1 2 lLld2 lLlc5 1 3 b4 lLle6 1 4 c5 l:td8 1 5 'iVc2 �g5 with an equal game. The latest brai nwave in this open ing line is 9 b4! ? , employed b y Ivanchuk against Judit Polar i n Novgorod in 1 996. After 9 . . . c 6 1 0 b5 'iVe7 1 1 a4 :d8 1 2 �a3 'iVe8 1 3 'fib3 �g4 1 4 a5 a6 1 6 bxa6 lLlxa6 1 6 'ifxb7 Wh ite clearly stood better. 9. . .
lLlfd7?!
Theory, not without reason , g ives prefer ence to 9 . . . b6 . After 1 0 lLld5 lLla6 Wh ite has tried various continuations, but nowhere has he gained an advantage: 1 1 'ifc2 lLlg4 1 2 �d2 c6 1 3 lLle3 lLlxe3 1 4 �xe3 lLl b4 with unclear play (Gostisa Kupreich ik, Belgrade 1 988); 1 1 �g5 lLlxe4! ? 12 �e7 c6 1 3 �xf8 'iVxf8 with good compensation for the sacrificed exchange (Vucicevic-Kupreich ik, Belgrade 1 988); 1 1 lLld2 !? lLld7 12 'ifa4 �b7, and the position is unclear (Dreev-Gelfand, Arn hem 1 989). I n stead of 1 0 lLld5 the restrai ned 1 0 h3 is more promising . 1 0 'ifd2 The immediate 1 0 b4 !? followed by c4-c5 and lLld2-c4 was also not bad . 10 . . .
c6
1 1 b4
fS?!
1 95
Prematu re activity. It is extremely danger ous to open up the game with your development incomplete . 1 2 exfS
gxfS
1 3 � h6
�xh6
1 4 'iVxh6
'iVg6
1 4 . . . l:tf6 came into consideration. 1 S 'ife3
as
16 a3
l:te8
17 cS
'iVg7?
And this who is another piece luxury!
is already a serious mistake. Black, behind in development, makes move with an already developed of course, this is a impermissible
I nteresti ng variations would have arisen after 1 7 .. .f4 . If 1 8 'iVe4 , then 1 8 . . . lLlf6 1 9 'iVxg6+ hxg6 20 �c4+ �g7 2 1 lLlg5 �f5 (preparing . . . lLla6) 22 lLlf7 �d3! 23 �xd3 �xf7 with a tenable position. However, as Dvoretsky pointed out, Wh ite can play more energetically: 1 8 'iVd2 !? e4 1 9 �c4+ �g7 20 lLlxe4 ! , for example: 20 . . . 'iVxe4 21 l:tae 1 'iVg6 22 'iVxf4 lLlf6 23 ':xe8 'ifxe8 24 l:t e 1 , or 20 . . . l:txe4 2 1 �d3 axb4 22 �xe4 'ifxe4 23 l:tae 1 - i n both cases with a powerfu l attack. Probably Black should fi rst have weakened the opponent's onslaught by exchanging one pair of rooks: 1 7 . . . axb4!? 1 8 axb4 l:txa 1 . �h8 1 8 �c4+ 1 9 lLlgS
l:te7
Now 1 9 .. .f4? is too late in view of 20 lLlf7+. 20 lLle6
'iVf6
I n the event of 20 . . . 'iVf7 Boguslavsky was intending to play 21 lLlc7 'iVxc4 22 lLlxa8 axb4 23 axb4 'fixb4 24 lLlb6 (24 lLla4 is also possible) with the possible continuation 24 . . . lLlxb6 25 cxb6 f4 26 'iVd2 'iVxb6 27 ':a8 l:td7 (27 . . . 'iVc7 28 l:txb8) 28 'iVc2 Wc7 29 l:tc1 b5 (29 . . . lLla6 30 lLlb5 'iVd8 3 1 lLla7 ':c7 32 l:td 1 'iVe8 33 'iVd2 also fails to save
1 96
Creative Achievements of Pupils from the School
Black) 30 ltJxb5 'ii' b 7 31 l:txb8 'ii'x b8 32 'ii'xc6, and Black's position collapses. 21 ltJc7
1:Ia7
22 bS! Switching to decisive action. 22 . . .
a4
Black is unable to d isentangle his clump of pieces on the q ueenside. His pawn-grab bing operation is explained by the well known argument: ' if I'm going to suffer, then at least I ' l l have something to show for it' . By energetic play Boguslavsky qu ickly con cludes the game. 27 . . .
'ifxcs
28 l:1ac1
'ifxa3
If 28 . . . 'ii'f8 , then simply 29 �e6 ltJb6 30 �xc8 ltJxc8 31 1:Ixe5 and wins. 'iff8 29 �e6 30 'ifc3 30 l:.xe5 was also possible. 30 . . .
b6
30 . . .'ifc5 would not have saved Black in view of 3 1 'ifa 1 'iifa 32 1:Ixe5. 3 1 1:IxeS
'iif6
32 ':'gSI 23 ltJcdSI? Of course, Wh ite has an undisputed advan tage. Very often it is not easy to decide whether the moment for concrete measures has arrived . In the g iven instance Wh ite had a good opportun ity to further strengthen his position by 23 1:Iad 1 . However, the ex changing combination undertaken by Bo guslavsky, wh ich thematically resembles the previous game, is also good : Wh ite sharpens the situation at a moment when the opponent's pieces are least well pre pared for coord inated action. 23 . . .
cxdS
24 ltJxdS
f4
This intermediate move does noth ing to change the evaluation of the position : the black pawns i n the centre remain under fire by the heavy pieces. 2S 'ii' d 2
'ii'g S
26 ltJxe7
'ii'x e7
27 :fe1
A simple, but attractive stroke . Since the captu re of the q ueen leads immed iately to mate , Black can only try to postpone this inevitable finish by a couple of moves. 32 . . .
h6
33 :g8+
�h7
34 'ii'd 3+ Black resigned. ZViagintsev (1 3) - Nachev Voskresensk 1 990 Slav Defence 1 d4
dS
2 c4
c6
3 ltJf3
ltJf6
4 ltJc3
dxc4
S a4
�g4
A rather risky variation , which has been upheld in a number of games by Predrag N i kolic. True, to cast doubts on it Wh ite has to play very energetically. 6 ltJeS 7 h3!
�hS
ltJ
C reative Achievements of Pupils from the School
The most u npleasant conti nuation for Black. At a favourable opportun ity Wh ite wants to occupy the centre with his pawns, and for this he unpins his e-pawn. 7 .
.
.
tD a6
What can happen if Black does not fight for the in itiative is illustrated by a game of Vadim Zviag intsev against l Iya Frog (Mos cow 1 989), in wh ich after 7 . . . tDbd7 8 g4 �g6 9 tDxc4 e6 1 0 �g2 �b4 1 1 0-0 0-0 1 2 a5! tDd5 1 3 'it'b3 b5 1 4 axb6 tD7xb6 1 5 e4 tDxc3 1 6 bxc3 �e7 1 7 f4 ! Wh ite success fully carried out his plan of seizing the centre. 8 g4 9 �g2 1 0 0-0
�g6 tD b4
If 1 0 e4 there would have followed 1 0 . . :iVxd4. 10 . . .
�c2 ! ?
Weaker is 1 0 . . .tD d 7 ? ! 1 1 tDxc4 with advan tage to Wh ite (Gelfand-Khuzman , USSR 1 987). 11 'iVd2
� b3
1 2 tDe4! 1 2 'ii'f4 ! ? h6 1 3 �e3 leads to unclear complications ( Levitt-Flear, British Champi onship 1 989). If 1 2 a5, with the unequ ivocal idea of advancing the pawn fu rther, modern theory recommends 1 2 . . . e6, not paying any attention to the opponent's threat. After 1 3 a6 'iVc7 1 4 axb7 'iVxb7 (Campos Moreno Rogers, Olympiad , Manila 1 992) Wh ite still has to demonstrate that he has sufficient compensation for the sacrificed pawn . 12 . . .
tDc2
1 2 . . . tDxe4? 1 3 'iVxb4 tDd6 is bad in view of the spectacu lar rejoinder poi nted out by Gelfand and Kapengut: 1 4 'iVxb7! ! , and Wh ite wins. 13 tDc5 If 1 3 tDxc6 , then Kapengut). 13 . . .
1 3 . . . 'iVb6!
(Gelfa n d ,
'iVxd4
1 97
The game Yusupov-G retarsson , G roningen 1 997, went 1 3 . . . tDd5 14 :b1 e6 1 5 tDxc4! �xc4?! 1 6 'iVxc2 �xc5 1 7 dxc5 �a6 1 8 b4 with advantage to Wh ite - however, 1 5 . . . �xc5 1 6 dxc5 0-0 demands further testing. 14 tDxb7
tDd5
Not 1 4 . . . 'iVxd2? because of 1 5 �xc6+! 'it'd7 1 6 tDxd7 tDxd7 1 7 :d 1 f5 1 8 :xd7 tDxa 1 1 9 :d8+ �f7 20 l::t x a8 (Khenki n-Sapis, Lenin g rad 1 989). 1 5 'iVg5! This home preparation by Zviagi ntsev sets Black un pleasant problems. 1 5 tDxc6 'iVxd2 1 6 �xd2 is less dangerous in view of 1 6 . . . tDxa 1 1 7 �xd5 e6 (Ftacn ik) or 1 6 . . . e6 (Gelfand, Kapengut) with roughly equal play. Now both 1 6 tDxc6 and 1 6 'ii'f5 are th reatened . 15 . . .
e6! ?
After t h e critical 1 5 . . .f6!? Zviag i ntsev was intending to conti nue 1 6 'ii' h 5+ g6 1 7 tDxg6 hxg6 1 8 'iVxh8, and if 1 8 . . . g5, then White retains the in itiative by playing 1 9 e4! . And in the event of 1 5 ... 'ii' b 6 , according to his analysis, strong is 16 'iVf5 'iVxb7 1 7 'iVxf7+ �d8 1 8 ':d 1 c3 ( 1 8 . . . tDxa 1 ? 1 9 �xd5 �xd 1 20 �xc6 'iVxc6 2 1 tDxc6+ riit c7 22 �f4+ �xc6 23 'iVe6+ with mate in th ree moves; 1 8 . . . tD b4 1 9 �f4) 1 9 tDxc6+ 'ii' xc6 20 �xd5 �xd5 21 ':xd5+ �c8 22 :d3 ! .
1 98
�
Creative Achievements of Pupils from the School
1 6 .lte3 ! ! A very unpleasant move for Black. I t transpires that i t is unfavourable to captu re the bishop. 1 6 . . . lLldxe3?? loses immedi ately to 1 7 .ltxc6+, wh ile after 1 6 . . . lLlcxe3 the f-file is opened and Wh ite obtains a very dangerous attack: 1 7 fxe3 f6 1 8 .l:txf6 gxf6 1 9 'iiV h 5+ (C. Horvath ), or 1 7 . . . 'iVxb2 1 8 l:tab 1 'ilfc3 1 9 l:[xf7 , and if 1 9 . . . .ltc2 there follows 20 'iVxg7! .ltxg7 2 1 lLld6+ 'iii> d 8 22 lLlxc6 mate. 16 . . . 1 7 .ltc5!
'iiVx b2
Wh ite intensifies the pressure. Now 1 7 . . . lLlxa 1 ? loses to 1 8 .ltxd5 cxd5 1 9 lLld6+ . If 1 7 . . . h6!? Wh ite had prepared 1 8 'ilff4! ! f6 1 9 'iiVe4 'ii'x e5 2 0 'ii'g 6+ 'iii> d 7 2 1 'ilff7+ 'iii> c8 22 lLla5 l:[b8 23 .i.xf8 with a very strong attack. However, as Dvoretsky poi nted out, instead of 21 . . . 'iii> c8?! Black can play 21 . . . .lte7 ! , not fearing 22 .ltxe7 lLlxe7 23 l:tad 1 + lLld4 . Possibly then Wh ite would have had to force a draw by 22 �xd5 exd5 23 !iL.xe7 'iVxe7 24 lLlc5+ 'iii> d 6 25 lLlb7+. 17 . . .
.ltxc5
2 0 lLlxe6 ! 'iVa3! 2 1 .ltxd5 cxd5 2 2 lLlc7+ 'iii> e 7 (or 22 . . . 'iii> d 8 23 'iVf6+ 'iii> c8 24 'iVc6) 23 'iVg5+ f6 24 'iVg7+ Black would have lost i mmed iately. 20 l:tab1 !
'iVd4
20 . . . 'iVa3 was bad in view of 2 1 lLlxb3 cxb3 22 lLlxc6 , but 20 . . . 'iVc3!? came into consid eration. Zviag i ntsev was planning to reply 21 lLle4 , but then Black is able to simpl ify the game by 2 1 . . . .l:tg8! 22 'iVxg8 (forced) 22 . . . :xg8 23 lLlxc3 lLlxc3 with an unclear endgame. The prophylactic 21 'iii> h 1 ! ? is stronger, or the more direct 21 e4 !? lLlc7 (after 21 . . . lLlf4 the reply 22 'iVg5! is ex tremely u npleasant) 22 lLlcd7! l:[fe8 23 'iVxf7 (poi nted out by Dvoretsky). 2 1 lLlcd7?! When the opponent is defending tena ciously, it ca n be very d ifficult to conduct an attack faultlessly. I n stead of the move in the game, 21 lLlxb3! cxb3 22 l:txb3 was simpler, when the difference in the placing of the kings should be bound to tell . The operation plan ned by Wh ite allows the opponent u nexpected saving chances .
1 8 'iVxg7! This i ntermediate move, threatening mate , is t h e point o f Wh ite's idea . 18 . . .
lIf8
Comparatively best. The queen sacrifice 1 8 . . . 'ilfxe5 1 9 'ilfxe5 .ltd4 would not have brought any relief, since the th reats created by the wh ite queen together with the knight would have been too dangerous. For exam ple, after 20 'iVd6 !iL.xa 1 21 'iVxc6+ 'iii> f8 22 lLld6 'iii> g 7 23 .ltxd5 exd5 24 lLlf5+ th ings end i n mate. I nterposing 1 8 . . . .ltxf2+? would merely open a n additional line for the attack: 1 9 l:[xf2 'iVxa 1 + 20 .ltf1 ! (weaker is 20 'iii> h 2 .l:tf8 2 1 .l:txf7 'iVxe5+) 2 0 . . . .l:tf8 2 1 .l:txf7. 1 9 lLlxc5
0-0-0 1
I n such a position it is easy to overlook someth ing. Thus i n the event of 1 9 . . . lLlxa 1 ?
21 . . .
lLlc3?
Black th i n ks that he is forced to go in for an exchange of blows. With his king exposed , this leads to a rapid finish. Of course, 21 .. J:bd7? was bad : 22 'iVxf8+ lId8 23
lD
Creative Achievements of Pupils from the School
'ii'x d8+! �xd8 24 ttJxc6+ �d7 25 ttJxd4 ttJxd4 26 e3. The only possibil ity of a defence was 2 1 . . J:tfe8! ! 22 e3!? (22 .ltxd5 exd 5 ! ) 22 . . . 'ii' c3 (22 . . . ttJcxe3!? 23 fxe3 ttJxe3 24 'ii'xf7 l:1e7 ! is possibly stronger) 23 ttJc5 ! ? l:te7 ! , and if 24 ttJe4, then 24 .. .f5 1 . True, even in this case Wh ite h a s good chances of success. He continues 25 'iifx e7 'ii'x e5 26 'iifc 5!? (26 'iifg 5 also comes into consideration) 26 . . . fxe4 27 'iifx c6+ ttJc7 28 .ltxe4 with the better game. For example, 28 .. J::t d 5 29 .ltxd5 'iifx d5 30 'ii'x d5 ttJxd5 31 l:txb3 cxb3 32 lIb1 ttJc3 33 l:txb3 ttJxa4 34 l::t b 5. 22 ttJxf8 1
ttJxb1
23 .ltxc6
'ii' b 6
23 . . . 'iiff4? is bad in view of 24 ttJxe6. 24 'iifxfl
c3
After the comparatively best 24 . . . ttJd4 there is the adequate reply 25 .ltd7+ �b8 26 l:txb 1 . The move in the game loses even more material. 25 .ltd7+
0-0
6 .lte3
ttJc6
7 ttJge2
a6
8 a3 The main continuation is the natu ral 8 'iif d 2, but the move i n the game, preparing play on the queenside, is also not without venom. However, l Iya Makariev is well prepared for such a tu rn of events and he acts in accordance with the recommendations of theory. 8. . . .ltd7 9 b4
'iWb8 ! ?
Black u n h u rriedly prepares . . . b7-b5, since in the given variation it is simpler for Wh ite to respond to the opponent's actions than to carry out his own pla n . Thus after the immed iate 9 . . . b5 there would have followed 1 0 cxb5 axb5 1 1 d5 ttJe5 1 2 ttJd4, wh ile if 9 . . . e5, then 1 0 d5 ttJe7 1 1 g4 ttJe8 1 2 ttJc1 f5 1 3 ttJb3 (Korch noi-Stein, 3 1 st USSR Cham pionship, Leningrad 1 963). 10 'iif d 2
Black resig ned . Of cou rse, when we talk about an attack, we have a mental pictu re of brill iant combina tions and subtle sacrifices. However, in many cases one can manage without brill iance. Thus in the following game, victory was gai ned without any outward effects, but by apparently very simple means. But such simpl icity is deceptive : very often it can be more d ifficult to fi nd a q u iet move , strengthening the position , than to land a tactical blow. N i kiti n - Makariev (1 5) CIS J u n ior Championsh ip, J u rmala 1 992 King 's Indian Defence 1 d4
5 f3
1 99
ttJf6
2 c4
g6
3 ttJc3
.ltg7
4 e4
d6
If now 1 0 ttJc1 , then 1 0 . . . b5 would be very timely, since in the event of 1 1 cxb5 axb5 the b5-pawn is indirectly defended ( 1 2 i.xb5 ttJxb4). If 1 0 d5 ttJe5 1 1 ttJd4 , then 1 1 . . . c6 1 2 dxc6 ( 1 2 f4 ttJg4 ; 1 2 i.e2 cxd5 1 3 cxd5 nc8) 1 2 . . . bxc6 1 3 i.e2 a5 with cou nterplay. 10 . . .
b5
Now in the event of the pawn exchange on b5 Black will be th reatening to captu re on b4 . Also possible was Boleslavsky's recom mendation 1 0 . . . :e8!? (this move is usefu l if Wh ite should move his knight from e2, since then . . . e7-e5 gains i n strength ) 1 1 g3 b5 1 2 c5 a5 1 3 l:[ b 1 e6 1 4 �f2 'ii' b 7 with equal chances. 11 g4 A bold decision - Wh ite mounts an offensive over an excessively wide front. On the other hand , contin uations such as 1 1 d5? ttJe5 1 2 cxb5 ttJc4 , 1 1 cxb5 axb5 1 2 d 5 ttJxb4 o r 1 1 ttJc1 e5 are not too impressive. A possible
200
�
C reative Achievements of Pupils from the School
alternative is 1 1 c5!? a5 1 2 � b 1 axb4 1 3 axb4, maintaining his position i n the centre. It would have been much harder for Black to create counterplay ( 1 3 . . . dxc5 1 4 bxc5), and for the moment the a-file, which has been conceded to h i m , does not play any role. 11 . . . 1 2 h4
bxc4
If 1 2 1:[ b 1 Black was planning 1 2 . . . e5 1 3 d5 ltJa7 ( 1 3 ... ltJe7 with the idea of . . . ltJe8 and . . . f7-f5 is also possible) 14 a4 c6 with counterplay. 1 2 g5!? deserved serious consideration. If 12 . . . ltJe8 there would have followed 1 3 h4! e5 14 d5 ( 1 4 h5!?) 14 . . . ltJe7 1 5 h5 with u npleasant threats . Black would probably have had to decide on 1 2 . . . ltJh5! 1 3 ltJg3! e5 14 ltJxh5 gxh5 ( 1 4 . . . exd4?! 1 5 ltJxg7 dxe3 1 6 'ili'b2 ) 1 5 ltJd5 ( 1 5 dxe5!?) 1 5 . . . exd4 ( 1 5 . . . ltJxd4? 1 6 .ltxd4 exd4 1 7 ltJf6+), and if 1 6 ltJf6+, then either 1 6 . . . .ltxf6 1 7 gxf6 dxe3 1 8 'ili'g2+ .ltg4, or 1 6 . . . 'it h8 1 7 .ltxd4 ( 1 7 ltJxd7? dxe3) 1 7 . . . ltJxd4 1 8 'ii'x d4 .lte6 with possibil ities of counterplay on the queenside by . . . c7-c5 or . . . a6-a5. 12 . . .
h5
Wh ite's offensive on the kingside must be halted . The unexpected 1 2 . . . a5 1 3 b5 ltJb4?! is too pretty to be true. Wh ite can choose between the restrained 14 axb4 axb4 1 5 1:[xa8 bxc3 ( 1 5 . . . 'ili'xa8?! 1 6 ltJa2) 16 ltJxc3 'ili'xa8 1 7 .ltxc4 with the better game, and the more refined 1 4 ltJc1 ! ? with the threat of ': b 1 . 1 3 g5 1 4 1:[b1 ?!
ltJh7
This move would appear to hand the in itiative to the opponent. 1 4 f4 ! with the threat of 1 5 d5 was more consistent. If 14 . . . a5, then according to Makariev's analy sis Wh ite should continue 1 5 b5 ltJa7 1 6 1:[b 1 ( 1 6 a4 c6! ) 1 6 . . . 'ili'e8 1 7 a4 ltJc8 1 8 ltJg3 ltJb6 1 9 f5. It probably makes sense for Black to sacrifice a pawn by 1 4 . . . e5!? 1 5 dxe5 .ltg4 1 6 exd6 .ltf3 with double-edged play.
14 . . .
'ili'd8 !
This modest retu rn of the queen prepares counterplay in the centre. 1 5 f4 If 1 5 d5 Black would have conti nued 1 5 . . . ltJe5 1 6 ltJd4 e6! 1 7 f4 ( 1 7 dxe6 c5 ! ) 1 7 . . . exd5 1 8 ltJxd5 ( 1 8 fxe5 dxe5) 1 8 . . . ltJg4 with nu merous threats. 15 . . .
e5
Beginning a counterattack in the centre. 16 fxe5? 1 6 d5? was also incorrect in view of 1 6 . . . exf4 . But now Black's position i n the centre is reinforced even more. It was time to think about development and to prepare castl ing by 1 6 .i.g2. 16 . . .
dxe5
1 7 d5
ltJa7
18 a4 In parrying the obvious threat of . . . ltJa7-b5, Wh ite allows a more unpleasant plan for the opponent. However, it is not easy to suggest anything sensible. Thus 1 8 .ltxa7 1:[xa7 (with the threat of . . . f7-f6) is hopeless, as is 1 8 .ltc5 1:[e8, or 1 8 d6 cxd6 1 9 'ili'xd6 ltJb5. Meanwhile, the pawn captu red on c4 is increasingly beg i n n ing to resemble a sound extra pawn . . . 18 . . .
ltJc8!
The knight goes to d6, where it not only
ctJ
Creative Achievements of P u p i l s from the School
defends the c4-pawn , but also presses on the white centre. Black's advantage in creases. 1 9 ltJg3 20 i.e2
ltJd6
201
I should like to conclude this account of examples of the pupils' play with one more, later game by Vadim Zviagi ntsev, which was judged to be the best game in Informator No.62 and was included in a collection, published in England , of the 1 00 best games ever played . Cifuentes - Zviagi ntsev (1 8) Wijk aan Zee 1 995 Slav Defence 1 d4
d5
2 c4
e6
3 ltJf3
ltJf6
4 ltJc3
c6
5 e3
ltJbd7
6 "c2
b6! 1
7 i.e2 Black would like to play . . . f7-f6 , after which Wh ite's position on the kingside must crumble. However, the immed iate 20 . . .f6? allows 21 i.xh5! or 21 ltJxh5! with com pletely u n necessary complications. A subtle prophylactic move prepares a decisive offensive with gain of tempo. 20 . . . "e8 1 21 'iVa2 Parrying the opponent's most obvious (2 1 . . . i.xa4) and least dangerous threat. 21 . . . f6 22 :g 1 11 23 hxg5 24 'iVd2
fxg5 'iVe7 ':f41
The decisive stroke! After Black's 'qu iet' 20th move his attack has ru n like clockwork. 25 i.xh5 26 ltJxh5 27 ':xg4 28 ltJg3
gxh5 :g4 i.xg4 ]::t f8
29 g6 30 i.c5
ltJf6 ltJh5
Wh ite resigned .
7 i.d3! i.b7 8 0-0 is more energetic, and if 8 . . . dxc4?!, then 9 i.xc4 c5 1 0 'iVe2 . 7...
i. b7
8 0-0
i.e7
9 ':d1 I n Zviagi ntsev's opin ion , 9 b3 was more accu rate. 9. . .
0-0
1 0 e4
dxe4
1 1 ltJxe4
'iVc7 1
It is useful to prevent i.f4 . 1 2 ltJc31 1 I n this way Wh ite can not hope for an advantage. If he wanted to obtain a comfort able game, he should not have avoided exchanges. Both 1 2 ltJxf6+ ltJxf6 and 1 2 i.g5 c5 wou ld have led to approximate equal ity. 12 . . .
c5
1 3 d511 A risky conception. 1 3 ltJb5 'ifb8 14 g3 cxd4 1 5 ltJbxd4 :e8 would also not have promised White anything. Possibly he should have completed his development with 1 3 i.g5.
202
W
C reative Achievements of Pupils from the School
13 . . .
exd5
1 4 cxd5
a6
1 5 lLlh4 All the same White does not achieve his aim - the exchange of the blockading piece . The immediate 1 5 a4 was better. The simple 1 5 .i.g5 or even the ultra-active 1 5 'iii'f5 !? also came into consideration . 15 . . .
g6
The immed iate 1 5 . . . .i.d6 would have led to roughly the same situation , but Black did not wa nt to allow his opponent any active possibil ities after 1 6 lLlf5 .i.xh2+ 1 7 'it' h 1 .i. d 6 1 8 lLle4, although the pawn sacrifice looks questionable. 1 6 .i.h6
J::[ fe8
1 7 �d2?! Now Wh ite should defin itely have restricted Black's play on the queenside by 1 7 a4! . 17 . . .
.i.d6
With this thematic move Black parries the opponent's simple th reats of 1 8 d6 and 1 8 lLlf5 . 1 8 g3
In the event of 23 .i.f4 Black was intending to avoid the exchange of bishops by 23 . . . .i.f8 ! , with somewhat the better chances. 23 . . .
J::[ a d8
Zviagi ntsev includes his last reserves in the battle. 23 . . . lLlxf2? 24 'it'xf2 'iii' h 3 25 .i.f4 .i.xf4 was prematu re in view of 26 lLlxf4 (but not 26 gxf4 because of 26 .. .l:he3! 27 'it'xe3 lLlg4+). Also noth ing was given by 23 . . . iVh3 24 .i.f4 l:tad8 25 lLlc4 . 24 .i.g2? Wh ite takes control of the h3-sq uare and creates the possible th reat of f2-f3 . This very natu ral operation nevertheless has a tactical flaw. Little was also promised by 24 .i.f4 .i.f8 , since if 25 lLlc4 there is the simple reply 25 . . . .i.xd5. Fol lowi ng the example of his opponent, Wh ite should have brought his rook into play, si nce for the moment the sacrifice on f2 does not work: 24 l:tac1 lLlxf2? 25 'it>xf2 �h3 26 .i.f4 'iVxh2+ 27 lLlg2 .i.xf4 28 lLlxf4.
b5
1 9 .i.f3 If 1 9 lLlf5, then 1 9 . . . b4 is un pleasant. 19 . . .
b4
1 9 . . . lLle5 also came into consideration . 2 0 lLle2 Hoping to create counterplay after a2-a3 or lLlf5 . 20 . . .
lLle4
Here also it was not too late for 20 . . . lLle5. The move in the game allows Wh ite to bring his king's knight into play and consolidate his position. 2 1 'ifc2
lLldf6
22 lLlg2! The knight heads for e3 and, given the opportun ity, to c4 . 22 . . . 23 lLle3
�d7
24 . . .
lLlxf2!
This sacrifice is merely the prelude to a genuine combinative firework display. The wh ite king is l u red into the centre , under the fi re of the opponent's pieces. 25 'it'xf2 26 .i.xe3?!
l:txe3 !
ctJ
C reative Achievements of Pupils from the School
203
If Cifuentes had anticipated the fate await ing h i m , he would undoubtedly have pre ferred 26 c.ti>xe3 liJg4+ 27 c.ti>d2 liJxh6 28 c.ti>c1 'iVe7, although in this case too the chances are with Black, who has a pawn for the exchange with good attacking chances. 26 . . .
liJg4+
27 c.ti>f3
liJxh2+
28 c.ti>f2
liJg4+
29 c.ti>f3 Wh ite was probably hoping that his oppo nent would repeat moves: after a l l , Black is a rook down ! But Zviagi ntsev continues to find new attacking resources. 29 . . .
'iVe6!
30 .i.f4
31 . . .
'iVe3+ 1 1
The most elegant solution , lead ing by force to mate . However, the prosaic 3 1 . . . Sl.xf4 would also have won :
Although this move loses, it should not really be criticised . Other continuations would most probably have led to the same result:
3 2 gxf4 'iVe3+ 3 3 c.ti>xg4 Sl.c8+ 34 f5 (34 c.ti>h4 'iVf2+ 35 liJg3 :e3) 34 . . . Sl.xf5+ 35 c.ti>h4 .f2+ 36 liJg3 :e3 ;
30 'iVe4 'iVxe4+ 3 1 c.ti>xe4 :e8+;
32 liJxf4 liJh2+ 33 c.ti>f2 'iVe3 mate.
30 Sl.c1 c4 ! 3 1 'iVe4 (or 3 1 liJf4 liJh2+ 32 c.ti>f2 Sl.c5+ with mate) 3 1 . . . 'iVxe4+ 32 c.ti>xe4 liJf2+ 33 c.ti>d4 liJxd 1 with a material and positional advantage;
I n my view, this dual solution does l ittle to spoil the aesthetic impression made by Zviagintsev's wonderful attack.
30 .i.g5 .i.e7 31 liJf4 'iVe3+ 32 c.ti>xg4 .i.c8+ 33 liJe6 'iVxg5+ 34 c.ti>f3 fxe6 with a decisive attack.
Black gives mate even more quickly after 32 c.ti>xg4 Sl.c8+ 33 c.ti>g5 (33 c.ti>h4 Sl.e7+) 33 . . . :e5+ .
30 . . .
�e8 !
Evidently the most energetic continuation of the attack. Clearly weaker was 30 . . . .i.xd5+ 3 1 l:txd5 'iVxd5+ 32 'ii'e4 , but both 30 . . . .i.xf4 3 1 'iVe4 ! ? 'iVxe4+ 32 c.ti>xe4 .i.g5 and 30 .. .f5!? were perfectly possible. 31 'iVc4 There is no other defence against 3 1 . . . .i.xd5+.
32 Sl.xe3
32 . . .
:xe3+
33 c.ti>xg4
.i.c8+
34 c.ti>g5 Or 34 c.ti>h4 Sl.e7 mate . 34 . . .
h6+!
The final touch . 34 . . . c.ti>g7 would have prolonged the game in view of 35 lt h 1 (or 35 'iVxc5) . 35 c.ti>xh6
.:te5
Against mate on the next move (36 . . . .i.f8 or 36 . . . l:th5) there is no defence . White resigned .
204
� I ndex of P layers and Analysts
Adams 1 29
Fori ntos 1 49
Ahues 80
Franzoni 6 1
Alexander 9, 31 Anand 1 23, 1 78 , 1 79, 1 80
Georgadze 1 38 Grigoriev 8 1
Bagirov 42, 44
Gulko 1 26
Bareev 1 77
Gurgen idze 53
Belavenets 53 Beliavsky 53, 1 04, 1 49
Hort 27
Belov 1 53, 1 55, 1 56, 1 58 , 1 60
H O bner 1 2 1
Berg 27 Blumenfeld 35, 36, 83 Bobrov 28 Boguslavsky 1 9 1 , 1 94 Bondarenko 1 5 , 25 Bronstein 1 4 1 Butnoryus 1 2 Capablanca 48 Chekhov 20 Chern i n 53 Chernosvitov 1 82 Cifuentes 201 Ciocaltea 1 6 Denisov 1 82
loh lesen 53 Ivanchuk 1 1 8 Ivkov 9 1 Janowski 82 Jansa 28 Kamshonkov 1 55 Karpov 46, 55 Kasparian 23 Kasparov 46, 55, 1 77, 1 78 , 1 79, 1 80 Kholmov 1 49 Kh ramtsov 1 45 Kmoch 78, 79 Kotkov 1 7
Dolmatov 59, 6 1 , 63, 66, 68, 73
Kotov 1 0
Dvoretsky 1 2 , 1 7 , 20, 44 , 47, 99, 1 38 , 1 4 1 , 1 43, 1 45
Kuznetsov 1 5
Krasen kow 33
Engel 1 00 , 1 1 2
Lag unov 33
Euwe 9, 82
Larsen 53, 66
Evans 1 34
Lasker, Em. 82 Lempert 1 56
Fahrni 84
Lepin 1 9 1
Fischer 1 34
Lerner 1 6 , 59, 73
Flesch 63
Liberzon 1 6
I ndex of Players and Analysts
ttJ
Liburkin 25
Sanakoev 1 00 , 1 0 1 , 1 05, 1 07 , 1 1 2 , 1 65
Lukin 1 6
Sax 97
Lungdal 1 07
Sergeev 36, 8 1
Lyublinsky 1 49
Shamkovich 1 33
Maeder 1 65
Simagin 1 33, 1 49, 1 5 1
Shevechek 1 05
Makariev 1 99 Makarychev 53 Marshall 3 1 Maryasin 1 43 Mestel 1 75
Smyslov 53 Sokolov, A. 28 Suetin 42 Tal 47, 85, 89
Miles 53
Tepl itsky 1 92
M ityaev 1 60 Morozevich 1 94
Timoshchenko 29 Tolonen 1 50 Tsariov 94
Nachev 1 96 Najdorf 1 0 Naumkin 1 49 N i kitin 1 99 N imzowitsch 48, 78, 82
Vaganian 29 Van der Sterren 68 Vasyu kov 85 Vaulin 1 53 Vera 1 50
Ochoa 1 50 Orlov 83
Vulfson 94
Paruti n 1 92
Wotawa 1 4
Pch iolkin 1 50 Xie J u n 1 1 6
Peev 99 Petrosia n , A. 1 49 Petrosian,
T.
9 1 , 97, 1 5 1
Yach mennik 1 58
Pinter 53
Yates 79, 80
Platonov 28
Yusupov 1 1 5, 1 1 6 , 1 1 8 , 1 2 1 , 1 23, 1 26 , 1 29
Razuvaev 1 04 Rebel 8 1 1 5
Zaitsev, A. 1 0 1
Ribli 89
Zedek 1 49
Rivas Pastor 1 75
Zhivtsov 35
Rotlewi 84
Zviagintsev 1 96 , 201
205
206
� I ndex of Ope n i ngs
Alekh ine Defence 44 Caro-Kan n Defence 63, 66 French Defence 1 38 , 1 4 1 Grunfeld Defence 1 33, 1 92 King's I ndian Attack 85 King's I ndian Defence 1 94 , 1 99 Modern Benoni 1 9 1 N imzo-Indian Defence 9 1 , 1 26 P h ilidor Defence 59 Pi rc-Ufimtsev Defence 97, 1 29, 1 43 Queen's Gambit Accepted 1 1 8 , 1 82 Queen's I ndian Defence 55 Queen's Pawn Open ing 1 1 5, 1 23 Reti Opening 20, 68, 89 Ruy Lopez 1 1 6 Sicilian Defence 6 1 , 73, 94 , 1 65 S i magi n-Larsen Open ing 1 45 Slav Defence 1 2 1 , 1 96, 201