4th set

4TH SET OF CASES Legitime (In General) Raymundo v. Vda De Suarez G.R. No. 149017, November 28, 2008 [compulsory succession defined] Facts:

Spouses Marcelo and Teofista Suarez had five children namely Danilo, Eufrocina, Marcelo Jr, Evelyn and Reggineo. Spouses acquired several properties including a parcel of land in Pasig, a property in Pinagbuhatan Pasig and Lots 5,6 and 7. When Marcelo Sr. died, Teofista, together with the other respondents, and Elpidio Suarez executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate. Despite the said partition, the properties remained under the name of the spouses. Teofista continued to administer and manage said properties. In a case against Valente Raymundo and others, the court ordered Teofista and Rizal Realty Coporation to pay Raymundo P70,000.00 for damages. The subject properties were levied to satisfy the judgment. Before the expiration of the redemption period, herein respondents filed a revindicatory action against Valente fof the annulment of the auction sale. Meanwhile, RTC ordered Teofista to vacate the premises and leave Valente in peaceful possession thereof. Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. They then filed a patition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which also dismissed the said petition. In another litigation, a writ of preliminary injuction was issued by the RTC of Pasig enjoining petitioner Valente from transferring to third persons the levied properties based on its preliminary findings that the auctioned properties are co-owned by Teofista and the respondents. Valente now contends that the respondents must first be declared as heirs before they can file an action to annul the judicial sale.

group of heirs, or combination of heirs, prevailing over all kinds of succession. The portion that is so reserved is the legitime. Article 886 of the Civil Code defines legitime as “that part of the testator’s property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for certain heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory heirs.” Herein respondents are primary compulsory heirs, excluding secondary compulsory heirs, and preferred over concurring compulsory heirs in the distribution of the decedent’s estate. Compulsory Heir Lapuz v. Eufemio G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972 [when legal separation is pending] Facts:

Whether the properties in question can be subject of levy.

On August 1953, Carmen Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio on the ground that she found out that her husband abandoned her and cohabitated with a Chinese woman Go Hiok. The spouses do not have a child. In his amended answer, Eufemio alleged affirmative and special defenses. He also filed a counter-claim for the declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiol alias Ngo Hiok in accordance with Chinese law and cutoms. Before the trial can be completed, Carmen died in a vehicular accident. Eufemio then mobbed to dismiss the petition fro legal separation saying that the petition was filed beyond the one-year period provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation. Counsel of Carmen moved to substitute the deceased by her father Macario Lapuz. Eufemio opposed the motion. The lower court dismissed the case stating that the motion to dismiss and the motion for substitution had to be resolved on the question of whether the plaintiff’s cause of action has survived which was ruled in the negative. Petitioners then filed a review by certiorari before the Supreme Court. Hence this appeal.

Held:

Issue:

No, the properties in question cannot be subject of levy to satisfy the judgment against Teofista Suarez. Petitioner Valente, along with Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion, became owners of the subject properties only by virtue of an execution sale to recover Teofista’s judgment obligation. This judgment obligation is solely Teofista’s, and payment therefor cannot be made through an execution sale of properties not absolutely owned by her. These properties were evidently conjugal properties and were, in fact, even titled in the name of Marcelo, Sr. married to Teofista. Thus, upon Marcelo Sr.’s death, by virtue of compulsory succession, Marcelo Sr.’s share in the conjugal partnership was transmitted by operation of law to his compulsory heirs. Compulsory succession is a distinct kind of succession, albeit not categorized as such in Article 778 of the Civil Code. It reserves a portion of the net estate of the decedent in favor of certain heirs, or

Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal separation, abate the action and will it also apply if the action involved property rights.

Issue:

Held:

Yes, the death of the plaintiff before the final decree in an action for legal separation abate the action. An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself — actio

personalis moritur cum persona. This also applied if the action involved property rights. A review of the resulting changes in property relations between spouses shows that they are solely the effect of the decree of legal separation; hence, they can not survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree. The loss of right by the offending spouse to any share of the profits earned by the partnership or community, or his disqualification to inherit by intestacy from the innocent spouse as well as the revocation of testamentary provisions in favor of the offending spouse made by the innocent one, are all rights and disabilities that, by the very terms of the Civil Code article, are vested exclusively in the persons of the spouses; and by their nature and intent, such claims and disabilities are difficult to conceive as assignable or transmissible. Hence, a claim to said rights is not a claim that "is not thereby extinguished" after a party dies, under Section 17, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court, to warrant continuation of the action through a substitute of the deceased party.

Baritua v. CA G.R. No. 82233 March 22, 1990 [estrangement – not a legal ground for disqualification]

discharged the liability of the petitioners. Held:

Yes, the petitioners are discharged from the liability by virtue of the release executed by Alicia. Obligations are extinguished by various modes among them being by payment. There is no denying that the petitioners had paid their obligation petition arising from the accident. The only question now is whether or not Alicia, the spouse and the one who received the petitioners' payment, is entitled to it. There can be no question that Alicia and her son with the deceased are the successors in interest referred to in law as the persons authorized to receive payment. It is patently clear that the parents of the deceased succeed only when the latter dies without a legitimate descendant. On the other hand, the surviving spouse concurs with all classes of heirs. As it has been established that Bienvenido was married to Alicia and that they begot a child, the private respondents are not successors-in-interest of Bienvenido; they are not compulsory heirs. The petitioners therefore acted correctly in settling their obligation with Alicia as the widow of Bienvenido and as the natural guardian of their lone child. This is so even if Alicia had been estranged from Bienvenido. Mere estrangement is not a legal ground for the disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse.

Facts:

A tricycle driven by Bienvenido Nacario collided with a JB Bus driven by Edgar Bitancor and owned and operated by Jose Baritua. As a result of the accident, Bienvenido and his passenger died. An extra-judicial settlement was executed by herein petitioners and Philippine First Insurance Company, Inc. and Alicia Nacario, Bienvenido’s widow. In consideration of the amount she received, Alicia executed a “release of claim” in favor of petitioners and PFICI. She also executed an affidavit of desistance. About a year after the accident, the parents of Bienvenido filed a complaint for damages against the petitioners. They alleged that in accordance with the extra-judicial settlement that they executed, the petitioners promised to indemnify them for the death of there son, for the funeral expenses they incurred and for the damage of the tricycle, the purchase price of which was loaned by them in favor of their son. However, instead of indemnifying them, the petitioners negotiated with the long-estranged wife of their late son. The lower court dismissed the complaint saying that the payment by the petitioners to the widow and her child, who are the preferred heirs and successors-in-interest of the deceased extinguished any claims against the petitioners. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court. It said that the release executed by Alicia did not discharge the liability of the petitioners because the case was instituted by the respondents in their own capacity as “heirs, representatives, successors and assigns of Alicia and that Alicia could not have validly waived the damages prayed for since she was not the one who suffered these damages. Issue:

Whether

the

release

executed

by

Alicia

Raymundo v. Vda De Suarez, G.R. No. 149017, November 28, 2008 [primary compulsory heirs and secondary compulsory heirs] Issue:

What are the rights of a primary compulsory heir and a secondary compulsory heir? Held:

Compulsory succession is a distinct kind of succession, albeit not categorized as such in Article 778 of the Civil Code. It reserves a portion of the net estate of the decedent in favor of certain heirs, or group of heirs, or combination of heirs, prevailing over all kinds of succession. The portion that is so reserved is the legitime. Article 886 of the Civil Code defines legitime as “that part of the testator’s property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for certain heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory heirs.” Herein respondents are primary compulsory heirs, excluding secondary compulsory heirs, and preferred over concurring compulsory heirs in the distribution of the decedent’s estate. Even without delving into the Extrajudicial Settlement of Marcelo Sr.’s estate in 1957, it must be stressed that herein respondents’ rights to the succession vested from the moment of their father’s death. Herein respondents’ ownership of the subject properties is no longer inchoate; it became absolute upon Marcelo’s death, although their respective shares therein remained pro indiviso. Ineluctably, at the time the subject properties were sold on execution sale to answer for Teofista’s judgment obligation, the inclusion of herein respondents’ share therein was null

and void. In fine, Teofista’s ownership over the subject properties is not absolute. Significantly, petitioner Valente does not even attempt to dispute the conjugal nature of the subject properties. Since Teofista owns only a portion of the subject properties, only that portion could have been, and was actually, levied upon and sold on auction by the provincial sheriff of Rizal. Thus, a separate declaration of heirship by herein respondents is not necessary to annul the judicial sale of their share in the subject properties.

Reyes v. CA G.R. No. L- 39537, March 19, 1985 [natural and spurious children] Facts:

Placida Delgado, together with the other private respondents, filed a complaint before the CFI of Batangas praying that Irene Delgado (alias Irene Reyes and Irene Ramero) be ordered to execute a deed of reconveyance in favor of Placido, Domingo and Paula, all surnamed Delgado respondents over five parcels of land in Quezon and another deed of reconveyance in favor of Maximo Delgado over three parcels of land in Batangas. Herein respondents alleged that Irene was able to register the lands under her name by lying that she was the sole child of Francisco Delgado and thus entitled to inherit the parcels of land. Irene filed an answer saying that she is the illegitimate daughter of Genoveva Ramero and deceased Francisco Delgado. After her mother and Justino Reyes separated, her mother cohabitated with Francisco Delgado. Irene also filed a counter-claim averring that as the illegitimate daughter of Francisco, she has the right to represent her father to the inheritance left by her grandmother, Benigna Castillo. The CFI of Batangas dismissed the action for reconveyance and declared Irene Delgado as the lawful owner of the parcels of land. However, the counterclaim of Irene was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the lower court. It said that the self-adjudication executed by Irene is null and void. The transfer certificates of title issued in the name of Irene were cancelled and the titles covering the parcels of land were reinstated in the name of Francisco. The Court of Appeals said that although Irene was the spurious daughter of Francisco, she cannot inherit because she was not recognized wither voluntarily or by court action. Furthermore, the titles of the lots cannot be executed in favor of herein respondents because in doing so it will be in effect a recognition by the court that herein respondents are the only heirs of Francisco to the prejudice of other possible heirs or creditors of the deceased. Issue: Held:

Whether Irene Delgado could inherit the lot.

The doctrine that for an illegitimate child other than natural to inherit must be first recognized voluntarily or by court action is well settled in our

jurisprudence. There is no reason to overturn this doctrine. Though the Civil Code is silent with respect to spurious children as to their recognition, this Court, in applying the rules of recognition, applicable to natural children, to said spurious children, declared that the considerations of fairness and justice that underlie the time limit fixed in Article 285 of the Civil Code for actions seeking compulsory acknowledgment of natural children are fully applicable, if not more, to actions to investigate and declare the paternity of illegitimate children that are not natural. There are two (2) general classifications of illegitimate children or those who are conceived and born out of wedlock. They may be either natural (actually or by fiction) or spurious (the incestuous, adulterous or illicit). Natural children are defined as those born outside of wedlock of parents, who at the time of conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other (Article 269, New Civil Code). On the other hand, spurious children are those born of parents, who at the time of their conception, are disqualified to marry each other on account of certain impediment. Because of this basic distinction between these children, it is not legally possible to classify unrecognized natural children under the class of spurious children. Besides, commentators construe the phrase "illegitimate children other than natural" as excluding from the grants of rights under Article 287 of the New Civil Code those children who are natural child proper by birth and who have not secured voluntary or compulsory recognition. They fag within the scope of the definition of natural children enumerated in Article 269, New Civil Code Lastly, to follow petitioners' contention win not be in accordance with the consistent pronouncements of this Court. It is an elementary and basic principle under the old and new Civil Code, that an unrecognized natural child has no rights whatsoever against his parent or his estate. His rights spring not from the filiation itself, but from the child's acknowledgment by the natural parent. Reserva Troncal Padura v. Baldovino G.R. No. L-11960, December 1958 FACTS

Agustin Padura contracted two marriages during his lifetime. With his first wife Gervacia Landig, he had one child, Manuel Padura. With the second wife, Benita Garing, he had two children, Fortunato and Candelaria Padura. Agustin died on Apr 26, 1908, leaving a last will and testament, duly probated, wherein he bequeathed his properties among his three children and his surviving spouse, Benita Garing. Fortunato was adjudicated four parcels of land. He died unmarried on May 28, 1908, without having executed a will; and not having any issue, the parcels of land were inherited exclusively by his mother Benita. Benita was issued a Torrens Certificate of Title in her name, subject to the condition that the properties were reservable in favor of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came. On Aug 26, 1934, Candelaria died, leaving as her heirs her four legitimate children: Cristeta,

Melania, Anicia, and Pablo Baldovino (Oppositorsappellants). On Oct 6, 1940, Manuel also died, survived by his legitimate children Dionisia, Felisa, Flora, Cornelio, Francisco, Juana, and Severino Padura (Petitioners-appellees) Upon the death of Benita (the reservista) on Oct 15, 1952, the heirs took possession of the reservable properties. CFI Laguna declared the children of Manuel and Candelaria to be the rightful reservees, and as such, entitled to the reservable properties (the original reservees, Candelaria and Manuel, having predeceased the reservista) The Baldovino heirs filed a petition seeking to have the properties partitioned, such that one-half be adjudicated to them, and the other half to the appellees, allegedly on the basis that they inherited by right of representation from their respective parents, the original reservees. Padura heirs opposed, maintaining that they should all be deemed as inheriting in their own right, under which, they claim, each should have an equal share. (In essence, the Baldovino heirs, who are whole blood relatives of the reservista, were contending that they should get more than their half-blood relatives, the Padura heirs. They anchor their claim on Articles 1006 and 1008 of the Civil Code) RTC RULING Declared all the reservees, without distinction, “co-owners, pro-indiviso, in equal shares of the parcels of land.” ISSUE WON the reserved properties should, as the trial court held, be apportioned among the heirs equally. HELD NO. The nephews of the whole blood should take a share twice as large as that of the nephews of the half blood. The reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of the reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant (reservista). Article 891 of the Code provides: ART 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came. The purpose of the reserva troncal is accomplished once the property has devolved to the specified relatives of the line of origin. But from this time on, there is no further occasion for its application. In the relations between one reservatario and another of the same degree, there is no call for applying Art 891 any longer; the respective share of each in the reversionary property should be governed by the ordinary rules of interstate succession. Florentino v Florentino (as restated in the case): upon the death of the ascendant reservista, the reservable property should pass, not to all the reservatorios as a class, but only to those nearest in degree to the descendant (prepositus), excluding those reservatarios of more remote degree... And within the third degree of relationship from the descendant (prepositus), the right of representation operates in

favor of nephews. Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary intestate succession; so is the rule that whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to share double that of brothers and nephews of half-blood. If in determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree and the right of representation of nephews are made to aply, the rule of double share for immedaite collaterals of the whole blood should likewise be operative. In other words, reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives (reservatarios) to whom the property should be returned; but within that group, the individual right to the property should be decided by the applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Art 891 does not specify otherwise. The reserva being an exceptional case, its application should be limited to what is strictly needed to accomplish the purpose of the law. Even during the reservista’s lifetime, the reservatarios, who are the ultimate acquirers of the property, can already assert the right to prevent the reservista from doing anything that might frustrate their reversionary right: and for this purpose they can compel the annotation of their right in the Registry of Property even while the reservista is alive. This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that corresponds to the natural heirs of the reservista. It is also clear that the reservable property is not part of the estate of the reservista, who may not dispose of them by will, so long as there are reservatarios existing. The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista, but from the descendant prepositus, of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the condition that they must survive the reservista. Gonzales v. CFI Manila G.R. No. L-34395, May 19, 1981 [purpose] Facts: Benito D. Legarda (II) predeceased his father Benito T. Legarda (I). Benito (II) was survived by his widow, Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda (I), and their seven children namely Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa, Filomena (II), Benito (III), Alejandro and Jose. When Benito T. Legarda (I) died, his real properties were divided in three equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita and the heirs of his deceased son Benito (II) who were represented by Benito F. Legarda (III). Filomena R. Legarda (II), died intestate and without issue. Her sole heir was her mother, Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda. Mrs. Legarda executed an affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially to herself the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena Legarda (II). As a result of the affidavit of adjudication, Filomena Races (I) succeeded her deceased daughter Filomena Legarda (II) as coowner of the properties held proindiviso by her other six children. In 1953, Mrs. Legarda executed two handwritten identical documents wherein she disposed of the properties which she inherited from her daughter in favor of her sixteen grandchildren, the children of her three sons, Benito (III), Alejandro and Jose. From July 1958 to February 1959, Mrs. Legarda and her six surviving children partitioned the

properties consisting of the 1/3 share in the estate of Benito T. Legarda (I) which the children inherited in representation of their father, Benito D. Legarda (II). Mrs. Legarda died in 1967 and left a holographic will. The said will was admitted to probate. In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of Mrs. Legarda filed a motion to exclude from the inventory of her mother’s estate the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena (II), on the ground that said properties are reservable properties which should be inherited by Filomena’s (II) three sisters and three brother and not by the children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose. The motion was opposed by the administrator Benito F. Legarda (III). Before the court could issue a resolution, Beatriz Gonzales filed an ordinary civil action against her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her mother’s estate for the purpose of securing a declaration that the said properties are reservable properties. The lower court dismissed the action of Beatriz Gonzales. Hence this appeal. Issue:

the exclusion of the reservees in the second degree, her three daughters and three sons. We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren the reservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the reservable properties did not form part of her estate. The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees survived the reservor. Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the nearest relatives within the third degree from the prepositus who in this case are the six children of Mrs. Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom the reservable property should be given and deprive the other reservees of their share therein. To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition of the reservable properties in favor of the reservees in the third degree and, consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second degree would be a glaring violation of article 891. That testamentary disposition cannot be allowed

What is the purpose of reverva troncal?

Edroso v. Sablan GR No. 6878, September 13, 1913 [Purpose Reserva Troncal]

Held:

The rationale of reserve troncal is to avoid "the risk that assets possessed by a family pass for centuries suddenly gratuitously to foreign hands by random links and premature deaths or impeder that for a random strange people vide a family to acquire property without that would have been therein.” In reserve troncal (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property from an ascendant or from a brother or sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another ascendant or is acquired by him by operation of law from the said descendant, and (3) the said ascendant should reserve the said property for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree from the deceased descendant (prepositus) and who belong to the line from which the said property came. So, three transmissions are involved: (I) a first transmission by lucrative title (inheritance or donation) from an ascendant or brother or sister to the deceased descendant; (2) a posterior transmission, by operation of law (intestate succession or legitime) from the deceased descendant (causante de la reserve) in favor of another ascendant, the reservor or reservista, which two transmissions precede the reservation, and (3) a third transmissions of the same property (in consequence of the reservation) from the reservor to the reservees (reservatarios) or the relatives within the third degree from the deceased descendant belonging to the line of the first ascendant, brother or sister of the deceased descendant. In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The reservation became a certainty when at the time of her death the reservees or relatives within the third degree of the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or they survived Mrs. Legarda. So, the ultimate issue in this case is whether Mrs. Legarda, as reservor, could convey the reservable properties by will or mortis causa to the reservees within the third degree (her sixteen grandchildren) to

Facts:

Victoriano Sablan and Marcelina Edroso were married and had a son, Pedro Sablan. Upon the death of his father, Pedro inherited two parcels of land in Laguna. These parcels of land were acquired by Victoriano by inheritance from his ascendants, Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, they having been adjudicated to him in the partition of hereditary property between him and his brothers. On July 1902, Pedro died unmarried and without any child. The two parcels of land passed through inheritance to his mother, Marcelina Edroso. Marcelina then applied for the registration and issuance of title of the two lots. Pablo and Basilio Sablan, the legitimate brother of Victoriano, opposed the registration of the lots. They claimed that wither the registration be denied or if granted to Marcelina, the right reserved by law to them be recorded in the registration of each parcel. The Court of Land Registration denied the registration holding that the land in question partake of the nature of property required by law to be reserved and that in such a case application could only be presented jointly in the names of Marcelina Edroso and Pablo and Basilio Sablan. Hence this appeal. Issue:

Whether the two parcels of land is in the nature of a reservable property. Held:

Yes, the parcels of land are reservable properties. A very definite conclusions of law is that the hereditary title is one without a valuable consideration (gratuitous tile), and it is so characterized in Article 968 of the Civil Code, for he who acquires by inheritance gives nothing in return for what he

receives; and a very definite conclusion of law also is that the uncles are within the third degree of blood relationship. Article 811. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the latter acquired without a valuable consideration from another descendant, or form a brother or sister, is under obligation to reserve what he has acquired by operation of law for the relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the line where the property proceeded. Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him the two parcels of land which he had acquired without a valuable consideration – that is, by inheritance from another ascendant, his father Victoriano. Having acquire them by operation of law, she is obligated to relatives within the third degree and belong to the line of Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez (parents of Victoriano), where the lands proceeded. The trial court’s ruling that they partake of the nature property required by law to be reserved is therefore in accordance with the law. The conclusion is that the person required by Article 811 to reserve the right has, beyond any doubt at all, the rights to use and usufruct. He has, moreover, the legal title and dominion, although under a condition subsequent. Clearly he has under an express provision of the law the right to dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of is to alienate, although under a condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the one who possesses or should possess it and have title to it, although a limited and revocable one. In a word, the legal title and dominion, even though under a condition, reside in him while he lives. After the right required by law to be reserved has been assured, he can do anything that a genuine owner can do. On the other hadn’t, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor of the right is reserved cannot dispose of the property, first because it is no way, either actually or constructively or formally, in their possession; and moreover, because they have no title of ownership or of the fee simple which they can transmit to another, on the hypothesis that only when the person who must reserve the right should die before them will they acquire it. Gonzales v. CFI Manila G.R. No. L-34395, May 1981 [persons involved] Issue: troncal? Held:

Who are the persons involved in reserva

The persons involved in reserve troncal are (1) the ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title, (2) the descendant or prepositus (prepositus) who received the property, (3) the reservor (reservista) the other ascendant who obtained the property from the (prepositus) by operation of law and (4) the reserves (reservatario) who is within the third degree from the prepositus and who belongs to the (line o tronco) from which the property came and for whom the property should be reserved by the reservor.

The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters. Fourth degree relatives are not included. The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant, or the one at the end of the line from which the property came and upon whom the property last revolved by descent. He is called the prepositus. The reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant (prepositus) said property merely reverting to the line of origin from which it had temporarily and accidentally stayed during the reservista's lifetime. The authorities are all agreed that there being reservatarios that survive the reservists, the latter must be deemed to have enjoyed no more than a than interest in the reservable property. Florentino v. Florentino 40 Phill 480 (4th civil degree –excluded; cannot inherit the reserved property) Facts:

Apolonio Isabelo Floretino II married Antonia Faz de Leon. They had nine children namely Jose, Juan, Maria, Encarnacion, Isabel, Espirita, Gabriel, Pedro and Magdalena. When Antonia died, Apolonio married Severina Faz de Leon. They had two children namely Mercedes and Apolonio III. When Apolonio II died, he was survived by his second wife Severina and his ten children. His youngest son, Apolonio III was born a month after he died. Apolonio’s children, Juan, Maria and Isabel died single without any ascendants or descendants. Jose, one of Apolonio’s children had three sons named Ramon, Miguel and Victorino and a daughter named Rosario. Espirita married Eugenio Singson and was blessed with five children namely Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad and Dolores. Pedro had two children named Jose and Asuncion. Before Apolonio II died, he executed a will before the notary public instituting as his universal heirs his ten children, his to be born son Apolinio III, and Severina. He also said that his property should be divided among all of his children in both marriages. Apolonio III predeceased his mother Severina. Severina then succeeded to all his property. When Severina died, he left a will instituting as her universal heir his only living daughter Mercedes. Mercedes then took possession of all the property including the property which Severina inherited from her son Apolonio III. The subject property is said to be a reservable property held by Severina in favor of her son Apolonio III. Encarnacion Florentino, daughter of Apolinio II from the first marriage, together with the herein petitioners, asked Mercedes to deliver their corresponding part of the reservable property. However despite several demands, Mercedes refuse to deliver the property or pay its value to Encarnacion. Thus, Encarnacion together with the other petitioners filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. They prayed that the subject property be declared as a reservable property and Mercedes and her husband be ordered to deliver to them their share of the property in question. Mercedes contended that she inherited the property inherited by Severina from her son Apolonio

III. This being the case, the property did not pass into the hands of strangers. She also contended that Article 811 of the Civil Code is not applicable in this case because when she, by operation of law, entered into and succeeded to the possession of the property, said property had, while in the possession of her mother, lost the character of reservable property – there being a legitimate daughter of Severina with the right to succeed her in all her rights, property and actions. Mercedes alleged that there is no property reserved for Encarnacion and others since there is a forced heiress entitled to the property left by the death of Severina. The CFI of Ilocos Sur dismissed the complaint and ordered herein petitioners to pay the costs. The judgment was affirmed on appeal. Issue: Who has the right to inherit the property? Held:

Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property acquired by the latter gratuitously from some other ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such of the property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property came. Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative, called reservatario, over the property which the reservista (person holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not among the relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code in article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of designated persons who are the relatives, within the third degree, of the person from whom the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as such. There are then seven “reservatarios” who are entitled to the reservable property left at the death of Apolonio III; the posthumos son of the aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo II, to wit, his three children of his first marriage – Encarnacion, Gabriel, Magdalena; his three children, Jose, Espirita and Pedro who are represented by their own twelve children respectively; and Mercedes Florentino, his daughter by a second marriage. All of the plaintiffs are the relatives of the deceased posthumos son, Apolonio Florentino III, within the third degree (four of whom being his halfbrothers and the remaining twelve being his nephews as they are the children of his three half-brothers). As the first four are his relatives within the third degree in their own right and the other twelve are such by representation, all of them are indisputably entitled as reservatarios to the property which came from the common ancestor, Apolonio Isabelo, to Apolonio Florentino III by inheritance during his life-time, and in turn by inheritance to his legitimate mother, Severina Faz de Leon, widow of the aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II.

The property inherited by Severina from her son Apolonio Florentino III, is reservable property. Encarnacion, et al. being relatives of the deceased Apolonio III within the third degree, are entitled to sixsevenths of said reservable property. Mercedes is entitled to the remaining seventh part thereof.

Nieva v. Alcala G.R. No. L-13386 October 27, 1920 [reserva troncal applies only to legitimate family] Facts: Francisco Deocampo married Juliana Nieva. They had a child named Alfeo Deocampo. Juliana is the alleged natural mother of Segunda Maria Nieva. In 1889, Juliana died intestate and Alfeo inherited two parcels of land. In 1890, Alfeo Deocampo also died intestate and without issue. The two parcels of land which Alfeo inherited from his mother passed to his father Francisco by intestate succession. Francisco later married Manuela Alcala. They had a child named Jose Deocampo. Francisco died in 1914. Manuela and Jose Deocampo took possession of the parcels of land in question. A year after, Segunda Maria Nieva, claiming to be an acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva, filed an action to recover the parcels of land before the Court of First Instance of Tayabas. The CFI held that, even granting, that Segunda was an acknowledged daughter if Juliana, she was not entitled to the property because an illegitimate relative has no right to the reserva troncal under the provisions of Article 811 of the Civil Code. Issue: Whether Segunda Maria Nieva has a right over the parcels of land. Held: No, Segunda does not have a right over the parcels of land in question. Reserva troncal applies only to legitimate family. According to Manresa, “persons in whose favor the reservation is established” is one of the most delicate points in the interpretation of Article 811. According to the said article, the reservation is established in favor of parents who are within the third degree and belong to the line from which the properties came. Reserva troncal treats of blood, relationship. It could not be otherwise, because relationship by affinity is established between each spouse and the family of the other, by marriage, and to admit it, would be to favor the transmission of the properties of the family of one spouse to that of the other, which is just what this article intends to prevent. Reserva troncal also treats of legitimate relationship. The person obliged to reserve it a legitimate ascendant who inherits from a descendant property which proceeds from the same legitimate family, and this being true, there can be no question, because the line from which the properties proceed must be the line of that family and only in favor of that line is the reservation established. Furthermore, we have already said, the object is to protect the patrimony of the legitimate family, following the precedents of the foral law. And it could not be

otherwise. Article 943 denies to legitimate parents the right to succeed the natural child and viceversa, from which it must be deduced that natural parents neither have the right to inhering from legitimate ones; the law in the article cited established a barrier between the two families; properties of the legitimate family shall never pass by operation of law to the natural family. Sumaya v. IAC G.R. Nos. 68843-44, September 2, 1991 [upon the death of the reservista] Facts: Jose Balantakbo Sr. married Consuelo Joaquin. They were blessed with seven children namely Amadeo, Sancho, Donato, Luis, Erasto, Jose, Jr. and Raul. Raul Balantakbo inherited from two different ascendants two sets of properties. He inherited 1/3 interest over a parcel of land in Liliw Laguna from his father, Jose Sr. He also inherited a 1/7 interest over ten parcels of land from his maternal grandmother, Luisa Bautista. Raul died intestate, single, without any issue. He was survived by his mother Consuelo. Consuelo adjudicated unto herself the subject properties. She then sold the property which Raul inherited from his father to Mariquita Sumaya. Sumaya then sold the property to Villa Honorio Development Corporation, Inc. Villa Honorio Development Corporation transferred and assigned its rights over the property in favor of Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. Consuelo sold the other property to Villa Honorio Development Corporation, Inc. The latter then transferred and assigned all its rights to the properties to Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. Both certificate of titles covering the subject properties do not contain any annotation of its reservable character. When Consuelo died, Amadeo and his brothers together with Luisa, Jose and Dolores, children of their deceased brother Jose Jr., filed a complaint before the CFI of Laguna to recover the properties claiming that such were subject to a reserva troncal in their favor. The CFI of Laguna ordered Laguna AgroIndustrial Coconut Cooperative to convey the properties to Amadeo et al. The Court of Appeals affirmed said decision. Issue:

Whether the property in question should be returned to herein respondents. Held:

Yes, the property should be returned to the respondents as it is subject to reserva troncal. Moreover, herein petitioners cannot be considered as innocent purchasers for value. Upon the death of the propositus, Raul Balantakbo, the reservista, Consuelo caused the registration of an affidavit of self-adjudication of the estate of Raul, wherein it was clearly stated that the properties were inherited by Raul from his father Jose, Sr., and from his maternal grandmother, Luisa Bautista. The said affidavit was, in its form, declaration and substance, a recording with the Registry of Deeds of the reservable character of the

properties. In Spanish language, the affidavit clearly stated that the affiant, Consuelo, was a loneascendant and heir to Raul Balantakbo, her son, who died leaving properties previously inherited from other ascendants and which properties were inventoried in the said affidavit. However, the Supreme Court did not agree with the disposition of the appellate court that there is no need to register the reservable character of the property, if only for the protection of the reservees, against innocent third persons. In one of the cases decided by the Supreme Court, it ruled that the reservable character of a property may be lost to innocent purchasers for value. Additionally, it was ruled therein that the obligation imposed on a widowed spouse to annotate the reservable character of a property subject of reserva viudal is applicable to reserva troncal. But herein petitioners cannot be considered as innocent purchasers for value. This is evidenced by the affidavit executed by Consuelo and by other proofs showing that petitioners knew of the reservable character of the properties.

Carillo v. De Paz G.R. No. L-22601, October 28, 1966 [prescriptive period] Facts:

Spouses Severino Salak and Petra Garcia owned Lot No. 221 located in Tarlac. They mortgaged the said property for the sum of P 1,200.00 to spouses Pedro Magat and Filomena Silva. Said mortgage was registered. Later on, spouses Magat assigned their mortgaged rights to Honaria Salak for P 1,632.00 with the consent of the surviving debtor, Severino. In 1943, Severino transferred ½ of his interest in the property to Honaria Salak for P 162.00. This transaction and assignment of the mortgage credit were not registered in the office of the Register of Deeds nor annotated in the title. An intestate proceedung was instituted for the settlement of the estate of Severino Salak and Petra Garcia. The said proceeding included Lot No. 221. Said lot was adjudicated to Ernesto Bautista, Aurea Sahagun, Rita Sahagun and Francisca Salak. Francisca Salak then acquired the shares of the other heirs by virtue of which TCT No. 970 covering Lot No. 221 was issued in her name. Meanwhile, Honaria Salak died single living as sole heir Agustina de Guzman. A lease was executed by Francisca in favor of Gabino de Leon and Asuncion Reyes covering Lot No. 221. A mortgage was also executed thereon by the lessees in favor of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation. Agustina de Guzman then filed an action against Francisca in the CFI of Tarlac seeking the reconveyance to Agustina of ½ portion of Lot No. 221. The lower court dismissed the complaint saying that the court has no jurisdiction to entertain any collateral attack in the present action against the proceedings taken in the probate proceedings covering Lot No. 221. Issue: Whether the action had already prescribed.

Held: No, the action had not yet prescribed. The lower court erred in dismissing the complaint. While the Court admits that the sale made by Severino Salak of his ½ undivided interest in the property to Honoria Salak, predecessor in interest of the plaintiff, has not been registered in the office of the Register of Deeds, nor annotated on the Torrens Title covering it, such technical deficiency does not render the transaction ineffective, nor does it convert it into a mere monetary obligation. But it simply renders the transaction not binding against a third person because, being a registered land, the operative act to bind the land is the act of registration. Said transaction however is valid and binding between the parties and can serve as basis to compel the register of deeds to make the necessary registration. Such being the case, it is error to say that plaintiff should have filed her claim in the intestate proceedings of the late Severino Salak if she wanted to protect her interest in the land for, the transaction being binding between the parties, the same can be invoked against them or their privies. This means that plaintiff can still press her claim against the heirs of the deceased Severino Salak who were made parties-defendants in this case. These heirs cannot escape the legal consequence of this transaction because they have inherited the property subject to the liability affecting their common ancestor. The fact that Francisca Salak bought the shares of her co-heirs in said property is of no moment because in so far as the portion of the land acquired by Honoria Salak is concerned, Francisca Salak can recoup what she has parted with from her co-heirs when the time for read judgment comes. This matter can be threshed out when the case is decided on the merits. For the present suffice it to state that the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint for the reasons set forth in its order subject of the present appeal. Computation of Legitime Pagkatipunan v. IAC G.R. No. 70722, July 3, 1991 [manner of computation] Facts:

Jose Velasquez, Sr. was married to Victorina Real. They had five children. When Victorina died, no dissolution of conjugal property was made. Jose Sr. enjoyed full possession, use, usufruct and administration of the whole conjugal property. Jose Sr. then married his second wife, Canuta Pagkatipunan with whom he had 13 children. Jose Sr. died intestate and was survived by his second wife Canuta Pagkatipunan and their 13 children and his two children Jose Jr. and Lourdes from his first marriage. His other three children were Amelia, Guillermo and Lutgarda. Amelia died without ant issue. Guillermo was survived by his five children and Lutgarda was survived by her six children. Herein private respondents filed a complaint against the petitioners for accion reinvindicatoria, annulment of deeds of sale, partition and damages. `The trial court appointed two sets of commissions — one for the purpose of making an inventory of the estate of Jose Velasquez, Sr., and the other, to determine which of the parcels of land listed in such

inventory submitted by the first set of commissioners belong to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage or to the conjugal partnership of the second marriage. It was found out that after the death of Jose Sr., Canuta Pagkatipunan acquired full possession of two parcels of land in Bagumbayan, Laguna among other properties. The said parcels of land were sold by Canuta to Spouses Moises Santos and Magdalena. The spouses later resold the same property to Canuta Pagkatipunan. During the pendency of this suit, the subject property was subdivided and assigned by Canta in favor of her 13 children. The 13 children caused the issuance of separate free patent titles in their favor covering the subdivided lots. Another property, which is the West Avenue property is a residential lot purchased on installments by spouses Jose Sr. and Canuta. When Jose Sr. died Canuta shouldered the payment of the remaining installment until the property was paid in full. A deed of absolute sale conveying the house was issued in favor of Canuta. The lower court ruled in favor of herein respondents. It declared the sale of the lots in Laguna in favor of Moises and Magdalena null and void. The deeds of assignments executed by Canuta in favor of her children were also declared null and void. The house and lot in West Avenue was also ordered to be divided among Canuta and her children and Jose Sr.’s heirs from his first marriage. The ruling was appealed before the Intermediate Appellate Court. The IAC affirmed the decision of the trial court with the modification that the entire house and lot in West Avenue be divided into two – ½ value to Canuta and the 13 children to the extent of their respective proportional contributions and the other half value to the second conjugal partnership of Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Canuta Pagkatipunan to be partitioned one-fourth to the wife and the other one-fourth appertaining to the deceased Jose Sr. to be divided equally among his heirs. Issue: How should legitime be computed? Held:

It is a basic rule that before any conclusion about the legal share due to the heirs may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken first. In the assailed decision, the respondent court affirmed the trial court's ruling, that Jose Velasquez, Sr. had already disposed of and exhausted his corresponding share in the conjugal partnership owned by him and Victorina Real, so that his heirs have nothing more to inherit from him, and that accordingly, whatever remaining portion of the conjugal property must necessarily appertain only to the private respondents as heirs of the deceased Victorina Real. The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code provide: Art. 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the testator shall be considered, deducting all debts and charges, which shall not include those imposed in the will. To the net value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all donations by the testator that are subject to collation, at the time he made them. Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the

lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition. It is undeniable that numerous donations inter vivos were made by Jose Velasquez, Sr. in favor of some of his compulsory heirs. It appears that there was no determination whatsoever of the gross value of the conjugal properties of Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Victorina Real. Obviously it is impossible to determine the conjugal share of Jose Velasquez, Sr. from the said property relationship. Likewise, no collation of the donations he executed during his lifetime was undertaken by the trial court. Thus, it would be extremely difficult to ascertain whether or not such donations trenched on the heirs' legitime so that the same may be considered subject to reduction for being inofficious. Article 909 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 909. Donations given to children shall be charged to their legitime. Donations made to strangers shall be charged to that part of the estate of which the testator could have disposed by his last will. Insofar as they may be inofficious or may exceed the disposable portion, they shall be reduced according to the rules established by this Code. Heirs of Marcelino Doronio v. Heirs of Fortunato Doronio, G.R. No. 169454, December 27, 2007 [manner of computation] Facts:

Spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante were the registered owners of a parcel of land in Pangasinan. They had several children, two of which were Marcelino Doronio and Fortunato Doronio. In 1919, a private deed of donation propter nuptias was executed by Simeon and Cornelia in favor of Marcelino and his wife Veronica Pico. One of the properties subject of said deed of donation is a residential lot in Cabalitian. The lot was described in the deed of donation as bound in the east by Fortunato Doronio. However, it appears that the property described was previously covered by OCT No. 352. According to the OCT the adjacent lot in the east was owned by Zacarias and Alejandro Najorda but according to the deed of donation, the property was owned by Fortunato Doronio. The heirs of Marcelino and the heirs of Fortunato have been occupying the subject land for several decades. Herein petitioners, the heirs of Marcelino, contend that they are the owners of the entire property in view of the private deed of donation propter nuptias in favor of Marcelino and Veronica. On the other hand, herein respondents, the heirs of Fortunato claim that only half of the property was actually incorporated in the said deed of donation because it said that Fortunato, instead of Zacarias and Alejandro, is the owner of the adjacent property at the eastern side. The heirs of Marcelino then filed before the RTC of Pangasinan a petition “for the Registration of a Private Deed of Donation”. No respondents were named in the said petition. During the hearing, no one interposed an objection. The petition was granted. The

OCT was cancelled and a TCT covering the entire property was issued in the name of Marcelino and Veronica. The heirs of Fortunato then filed a petition for the reconsideration of the ruling issued by the RTC ordering the registration of the subject deed of donation. The petition was dismissed. The heirs of Fortunato then filed an action for reconveyance and damages with prayer for preliminary injunction against the heirs of Marcelino. RTC ruled in favor of petitioner heirs of Marcelino Doronio. It concluded that the parties admitted the identity of the land which they all occupy; that a title once registered under the torrens system cannot be defeated by adverse, open and notorious possession or by prescription and that the deed of donation in consideration of the marriage of the parents of petitioners is valid. The case was brought before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court. It ruled that the intention to donate half of the disputed property to appellees’ predecessors can be gleaned from the disparity of technical descriptions appearing in the title. It likewise ruled that the donation of the entire property in favor of petitioners’ predecessors is invalid on the ground that it impairs the legitime of respondents’ predecessor, Fortunato Doronio. Issue: Whether the legitime of Fortunato Doronio was impaired. Held: No, the legitime of Fortunato was not impaired. Before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken first. The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitime of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only then can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes.