3H 2016-17 - CivPro Digests Part 3

E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. i. Benito, 312 SCRA 65 ,1999| FACTS: E.B. Villarosa & Partners is a limited partnership with principal office address at 102 Juan Luna St., Davao City and with branch offices at Parañaque and Cagayan de Oro City (CDO). Villarosa and Imperial Development (ID) executed an Agreement wherein Villarosa agreed to develop certain parcels of land in CDO belonging to ID into a housing subdivision. ID, filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages against Villarosa before the RTC allegedly for failure of the latter to comply with its contractual obligation. Summons, together with the complaint, were served upon Villarosa, through its Branch Manager Wendell Sabulbero at the address at CDO but the Sheriff’s Return of Service stated that the summons was duly served "E.B. Villarosa & Partner thru its Branch Manager at their new office Villa Gonzalo, CDO, and evidenced by the signature on the face of the original copy of the summons." Villarosa prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper service of summons and for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Villarosa contends that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over its person since the summons was improperly served upon its employee in its branch office at CDO who is not one of those persons named in Sec. 11, Rule 14 upon whom service of summons may be made. ID filed a Motion to Declare Villarosa in Default alleging that Villarosa has failed to file an Answer despite its receipt allegedly on May 5, 1998 of the summons and the complaint, as shown in the Sheriff's Return. Issue: Won an agent of a corporation can receive summons in behalf of their corporation? HELD: The court agrees with the contention of Villarosa. Earlier cases have uphold service of summons upon a construction project manager; a corporation's assistant manager; ordinary clerk of a corporation; private secretary of corporate executives; retained counsel; officials who had charge or control of the operations of the corporation, like the assistant general manager; or the corporation's Chief Finance and Administrative Office. In these cases, these persons were considered as "agent" within the contemplation of the old rule.” “Notably, under the new Rules, service of summons upon an AGENT of the corporation is NO LONGER authorized.” “The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept summons for a domestic corporation or partnership is now limited and more clearly specified in Section11, Rule 14. The rule now states "general manager" instead of only "manager";"corporate secretary" instead of "secretary"; and "treasurer" instead of "cashier." The phrase “agent, or any of its directors" is conspicuously deleted in the new rule.” “A strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the court over a corporation. The officer upon whom service is made must be one who is named in the statute; otherwise the service is insufficient. . . The liberal construction rule cannot be invoked and utilized as a substitute for the plain legal requirements as to the manner in which summons should be served on a domestic corporation. .”

Galura v. Math-Agro Corp: Invalid service A LAW EACH DAY (Keeps Trouble Away) By Jose C. Sison | Updated October 1, 2009 - 12:00am In civil actions, courts acquire jurisdiction by proper service of summons upon the defendants. If summons have not been properly served, judgments or orders rendered by the courts are null and void. This is illustrated in this case of the spouses Ted and Risa. For non-payment of their obligation representing the balance of the purchase price of broiler starters and finishers amounting to P353,500, the spouses were sued by the supplier, MAC on June 21, 2000 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). MAC prayed that the couple be ordered to pay the said amount plus interest and attorney’s fees of P60,000 as well as expenses of litigation. The complaint specified their poultry farm address in the province (Barangay Kalayaan, Gerona, Tarlac) and their residence address in Quezon City (230 Apo Street Sta. Mesa Heights) as the places where they could be served with summons. On September 17, 2000, the court process server Tino went to 230 Apo St. to serve the summons. There, Ted’s father told Tino that the spouses were presently residing at Tierra Pura Subdivision, Tandang Sora, QC. Despite being informed of the spouses’ correct address, Tino still went to their poultry farm at Barangay Kalayaan in Gerona Tarlac to serve the summons, only to find out that the property has been foreclosed and that the spouses no longer resided there. On September 26, 2000, Tino went to the Tierra Pura Subdivision in QC and, without any explanation, served the summons not on the spouses but on Vicky, the sister-in-law of Ted who received it, as evidenced by her signature. Ted and Risa failed to answer, so they were declared in default and MAC was allowed to present its evidence ex-parte. On June 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision in favor of MAC and ordered the spouses to pay P353,500 plus 6% interest and P30,000 attorney’s fees. On November 10, 2004, the RTC issued a writ of execution of its June 27, 2001 decision. The spouses received a copy of this order from their parents-in-law who gave it to them on December 13, 2004. So on January 6, 2005, they filed a petition for the annulment of the June 27, 2001 judgment and the order of execution dated November 10, 2004. The spouses claimed that the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over their persons because the service of summons was invalid. They said that the resort of the process server to what purport to be a substituted service when he left the

summons with Vicky is unjustified as it was premature. They pointed out that in his return of service the process server did not state that attempts to serve the summons on them personally had failed and that the same could not be made within a reasonable time. He likewise failed to state facts and circumstances showing why personal service of the summons upon them at their address at Tierra Pura was impossible. Finally the couple pointed out that the process server also failed to state that Vicky was a person of sufficient age and discretion residing at Tierra Pura. Were the spouses correct? Yes. Substituted service of summons is valid only if (1) personal service of summons on the defendants within a reasonable time is impossible; (2) the person serving the summons exerted efforts to locate the defendant/s; (3) the person to whom the summons is served is of sufficient age and discretion; (4) the person to whom the summons is served resides at the defendant’s place of residence; (5) the return of service states facts and circumstances showing why personal service upon defendants at their place of residence is impossible. In the present case, there was no showing in the return of service that: (1) personal service to Ted and Risa within a reasonable time is impossible; (2) Vicky, the person on whom summons was served, was of suitable age and discretion and (3) that she resided in the residence of the Ted and Risa. Consequently, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the spouses and thus the spouses are not bound by its decision of June 27, 2001 and Order dated November 10, 2004 which are hereby set aside for being null and void. CITIZENS SURETY & INSURANCE CO v. MELENCIO-HERRERA L- 32170 (38 SCRA 369) | March 31, 1971 Facts: Citizens Surety and Insurance Co (Citizens) alleged that at the request of Santiago Dacanay, it issued 2 surety bonds to guarantee payment of P5K promissory notes in favor Gregorio Fajardo and Manufacturers Bank & Trust Co respectively. As security, the Santiago and Josefina Dacanay executed an Indemnity Agreement to jointly indemnify Citizens for losses, costs and expenses (with 12% annual interest) and a REM over a parcel of land in Baguio. The Dacanays failed to pay the promissory notes compelling Citizens to pay. The Dacanays failed to reimburse Citizens however, forcing the latter to cause the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage and file a case to recover the unsatisfied balance.

At petitioner’s request, the respondent Judge caused summons to be made by publication in the Philippines Herald. But despite such publication and deposit of copy with the Manila post office, the defendant did not appear within 60 days from the last publication. Plaintiff sought the defendants to be declared in default, but the Judge eventually dismissed the case, the suit being in personam and the defendants not having appeared. Issue: W/N summons made by publication is sufficient for the court to acquire jurisdiction Held: No. In an action strictly in personam, personal service of summons, within the forum, is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court. In other words, summons by publication cannot – consistently with the due process clause in the Bill of Rights – confer upon the court jurisdiction over said defendants. The proper recourse for the creditor is to locate properties, real or personal, of the resident defendant debtor with unknown address and cause them two be attached, in which case, the attachment converts the action into a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem and the summons by publication may be valid. Given the skill of debtors to conceal their properties however, the decision of the respondent Judge should be set aside and held pending in the archives until petitioner tracks down the whereabouts of the defendant’s person or properties.

Santos v. PNOC G.R. No. 170943, September 23, 2008 FACTS: December 23, 2002, PNOC Exploration Corporation, respondent, filed a complaint for a sum of money against petitioner Pedro Santos Jr. in the RTC of Pasig. The amount sought to be collected was the petitioner’s unpaid balance of the car loan advanced to him by respondent when he was still a member of its board of directors. Personal service of summons were made to petitioner but failed because the latter cannot be located in his last known address despite earnest efforts to do so.

Subsequently, on respondent’s motion, the trial court allowed service of summons by publication. Respondent caused the publication of the summons in Remate, a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Thereafter, respondent submitted the affidavit of publication and the affidavit of service of respondent’s employee to the effect that he sent a copy of the summons by registered mail to petitioner’s last known address. Petitioner still failed to answer within the prescribed period despite the publication of summons. Hence, respondent filed a motion for the reception of its evidence ex parte. Trial court granted said motion and proceeded with the ex parte presentation and formal offer of its evidence. Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer, alleging that the affidavit of service submitted by respondent failed to comply with Section 19, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court as it was not executed by the clerk of court. Trial court denied the said motion and held that the rules did not require such execution with the clerk of court. It also denied the motion to admit petitioner’s answer because the same was filed way beyond the reglementary period. Petitioner appeals to the CA via a petition for certiorari contending that the court committed grave abuse of discretion since it has no jurisdiction due to improper service of summons, failure to furnish him with copies of its orders and processes and upholding technicality over equity and justice. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a failure on the part of the trial court to furnish Petitioner with copies of orders and processes issued in the course of the proceedings HELD: No, Santos failed to file an answer in time, which is why he had to file an Omnibus Motion to Admit Attached Answer. The disputed order of September 11, 2003 was a finding that the Santos was in default for failure to file an answer or pleading within the period fixed. It is illogical to notify him of the order simply on account of the reality that he was no longer residing and/or found on his last known address and his whereabouts unknown thus the publication of summons. Santos could not reasonably demand that copies of orders and processes be furnished him. His residence or whereabouts is not known and he cannot be located. In the case at bar, there is obviously no way notice can be sent to him and the notice requirement cannot apply to him. The law does not require that the impossible be done. Nemo tenetur ad impossible. The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility. Laws and rules must be interpreted in a way that they are in accordance with logic, common sense, reason and practicability. Be that as

it may, a copy of the September 11, 2003 order was still mailed to him at his last known address but it was unclaimed.

RAPID CITY v. VILLA FACTS: Sometime in 2004, Rapid City Realty and Development Corporation (petitioner) filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of subdivision plans . . . mandamus and damages against several defendants including Spouses Orlando and Lourdes Villa (respondents).After one failed attempt at personal service of summons, court process server resorted to substituted service by serving summons upon respondents househelp who did not acknowledge receipt thereof and refused to divulge their names. Despite substituted service, respondents failed to file their Answer, prompting petitioner to file a "Motion to Declare Defendants[-herein respondents] in Default" which the trial court granted by Order of May 3, 2005.More than eight months thereafter respondents filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default, claiming that on January 27, 2006 they "officially received all pertinent papers such as Complaint and Annexes. And they denied the existence of two women helpers who allegedly refused to sign and acknowledge receipt of the summons. In any event, they contended that assuming that the allegation were true, the helpers had no authority to receive the documents. By Order the trial court set aside the Order of Default and gave herein respondents five days to file their Answer. Respondents just the same did not file an Answer, drawing petitioner to again file a Motion to declare them in default, which the trial court again granted..So, respondents filed an Omnibus Motion for reconsideration of the second order declaring them in default and to vacate proceedings, this time claiming that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons due to invalid service of summons. The trial court denied respondents? Omnibus Motion by Order and proceeded to receive ex-parte evidence for petitioner. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court by Resolution of August12, 2008, it comes to the Court via petition for review on certiorari, arguing in the main that respondents, in filing the first Motion to Lift the Order of Default, voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court. ISSUE: W/n the court acquires jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants [respondents]. RULING: YES

The petition is impressed with merit. It is settled that if there is no valid service of summons, the court can still acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by virtue of the latter’s voluntary appearance. Thus Section 20 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 20.Voluntary appearance. The defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance. And Respondents did not, in said motion, allege that their filing thereof was a special appearance for the purpose only to question the jurisdiction over their persons. Clearly, they had acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the court. Palma v. Galvez Facts: On July 28, 2003, petitioner Leah Palma filed with the RTC an action for damages against the Philippine Heart Center (PHC) and Drs Giron and Cruz, alleging that the defendants committed professional fault, negligence and omission for having removed her right ovary against her will, and losing the same and the tissues extracted from her during the surgery; and that although the specimens were subsequently found, petitioner was doubtful and uncertain that the same was hers as the label therein pertained that of somebody else. Defendants filed their respective Answers. Petitioner subsequently filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Complaint, praying for the inclusion of additional defendants who were all nurses at the PHC, namely, Karla Reyes, Myra Mangaser and herein private respondent Agudo. Thus, summons were subsequently issued to them. feb 17, 04RTC's process server submitted his return of summons stating that the alias summons, together with a copy of the amended complaint and its annexes, were served upon private respondent thru her husband Alfredo Agudo, who received and signed the same as private respondent was out of the country March 01, 04 private respondent’s counsel filed a Notice of Appearance and a Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer 4 stating that he was just engaged by private respondent's husband as she was out of the country and the Answer was already due. On March 15,04 Motion for Another Extension of Time to File Answer was filed March 30,04 an MTD was filed on grounds of no jurisdiction over agudo as she was temp out of the country and summons on hr shud abide by Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court: RTC ruling(may 7,04)

MTD was granted It found that while the summons was served at private respondent's house and received by respondent's husband, such service did not qualify as a valid service of summons on her as she was out of the country at the time the summons was served, thus, she was not personally served a summons; and even granting that she knew that a complaint was filed against her, nevertheless, the court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person as she was not validly served with summons; that substituted service could not be resorted to since it was established that private respondent was out of the country, thus, Section 16, Rule 14 provides for the service of summons on her by publication. MR by petitioner was filed and denied. Issue: Petitioner is now before us alleging that the public respondent committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he ruled that: I. Substituted service of summons upon private respondent, a defendant residing in the Philippines but temporarily outside the country is invalid; II. Section 16, Rule 14, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure limits the mode of service of summons upon a defendant residing in the Philippines, but temporarily outside the country, exclusively to extraterritorial service of summons under section 15 of the same rule; III. In not ruling that by filing two (2) motions for extension of time to file Answer, private respondent had voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of respondent court, pursuant to Section 20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, hence, equivalent to having been served with summons; IV. The cases cited in his challenged Order of May 7, 2004 constitute stare decisis despite his own admission that the factual landscape in those decided cases are entirely different from those in this case. Held: In civil cases, the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant either by the service of summons or by the latter’s voluntary appearance and submission to the authority of the former. 16 Private respondent was a Filipino resident who was temporarily out of the Philippines at the time of the service of summons; thus, service of summons on her is governed by Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which provides: Sec. 16. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines . – When an action is commenced against a defendant who ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but who is temporarily out of it, service

may, by leave of court, be also effected out of the Philippines, as under the preceding section. (Emphasis supplied) The preceding section referred to in the above provision is Section 15, which speaks of extraterritorial service, thus: SEC. 15. Extraterritorial service. ─ When the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines by personal service as under section 6; or by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant, or in any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after notice, within which the defendant must answer. SC said: In Montefalcon v. Vasquez , we said that because Section 16 of Rule 14 uses the words "may" and "also," it is not mandatory. Other methods of service of summons allowed under the Rules may also be availed of by the serving officer on a defendant-resident who is temporarily out of the Philippines. Thus, if a resident defendant is temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of service may be resorted to: (1) substituted service set forth in section 7 ( formerly Section 8), Rule 14; (2) personal service outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also with leave of court; or (4) in any other manner the court may deem sufficient. In Montalban v. Maximo, 19 we held that substituted service of summons under the present Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court in a suit in personam against residents of the Philippines temporarily absent therefrom is the normal method of service of summons that will confer jurisdiction on the court over such defendant. In the same case, we expounded on the rationale in providing for substituted service as the normal mode of service for residents temporarily out of the Philippines. Considering that private respondent was temporarily out of the country, the summons and complaint may be validly served on her through substituted service under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court which reads:

SEC. 7. Substituted service. — If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effecte d (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. We have held that a dwelling, house or residence refers to the place where the person named in the summons is living at the time when the service is made, even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the time. It is, thus, the service of the summons intended for the defendant that must be left with the person of suitable age and discretion residing in the house of the defendant. Compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as important as the issue of due process as that of jurisdiction. Section 7 also designates the persons with whom copies of the process may be left. The rule presupposes that such a relation of confidence exists between the person with whom the copy is left and the defendant and, therefore, assumes that such person will deliver the process to defendant or in some way give him notice thereof. In this case, the Sheriff's Return stated that private respondent was out of the country; thus, the service of summons was made at her residence with her husband, Alfredo P. Agudo, acknowledging receipt thereof. Alfredo was presumably of suitable age and discretion, who was residing in that place and, therefore, was competent to receive the summons on private respondent's behalf.

Civ Pro Rule 14, Sec 7 Chu vs. Mach Asia G.R. No. 184333 April 1, 2013 Facts: Respondent Mach Asia Trading Corporation is a corporation engaged in importing dump trucks and heavy equipments. On December 8, 1998, petitioner Sixto N. Chu purchased on installment one (1) Hitachi Excavator worth P900,000.00 from the respondent. Petitioner initially paid P180,000.00 with the balance of P720,000.00 to be paid in 12 monthly installments through Prime Bank postdated checks. On March 29, 1999, petitioner again purchased two (2) heavy equipments from the respondent on installment basis in the sum of P1,000,000.00, namely: one (1) motorgrader and one (1) payloader. Petitioner made a down payment of P200,000.00 with the balance of P800,000.00 payable in 12 monthly installments through Land Bank postdated checks. However, upon presentment of the checks for encashment, they were dishonored by the bank either by reason of "closed account," "drawn against insufficient funds," or "payment stopped." On November 29, 1999, the RTC issued an Order6 allowing the issuance of a writ of replevin on the subject heavy equipments. On December 9, 1999, Sheriff Doroteo P. Cortes proceeded at petitioner's given address for the purpose of serving the summons, together with the complaint, writ of replevin and bond. However, the Sheriff failed to serve the summons personally upon the petitioner, since the latter was not there. The Sheriff then resorted to substituted service by having the summons and the complaint received by a certain Rolando Bonayon, a security guard of the petitioner.7chanroblesvirtualawlibrary Issue: Whether or not there was a valid substituted service Rulings: No. As a rule, summons should be personally served on the defendant. It is only when summons cannot be served personally within a reasonable period of time that substituted service may be resorted to.15Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. It is to be noted that in case of substituted service, there should be a report indicating that the person who received the summons in the defendant's behalf was one with whom the defendant had a relation of confidence, ensuring that the latter would actually receive the summons. Also, impossibility of prompt personal service must be shown by stating that efforts have been made to find the defendant personally and that such efforts have failed. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It is a method extraordinary in character, hence, may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. The statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any substituted service other than that authorized by statute is considered ineffective. In the case at bar, it was not shown that the security guard who received the summons in behalf of the petitioner was authorized and possessed a relation of confidence that petitioner would definitely receive the summons. This is not the kind of service contemplated by law. Thus, service on the security guard could not be considered as substantial compliance with the requirements of substituted service. Evidently, plaintiff-appellee cannot be penalized, through no fault of its own, for an irregular or defective return on service of summons. In the interest of fairness, the process server's neglect or inadvertence in the service of summons should not, thus, unduly prejudice plaintiffappellee's right to speedy justice. The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due process. As a rule, if defendants have not been validly summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction over their person, and a judgment rendered against them is null and void.20 Since the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner, the judgment rendered by the court could not be considered binding upon him for being null and void.

Seeking An Affirmative Relief Is Inconsistent With The Position That No Voluntary Appearance Had Been Made, And To Ask For Such relief, Without The Proper Objection, Necessitates Submission To The Court’s Jurisdiction… by The Lawyer's Post • June 27, 2015 • Comments Off

The Facts:

In a case for breach of contract with damages filed by Diamond Dragon Realty and Management, Inc., (Diamond) against Reicon Realty Builders Corporation (Reicon) and several other defendants, Reicon filed a Motion to Dismiss thru a special appearance, alleging as grounds improper service of summons since the summons in the case was served not on the president and any of the other persons designated in the rules, as well as lack of legal capacity  to sue , Reicon alleging that Diamond’s juridical personality had been revoked by the Securities and Exchange Commission.  In its comment to the motion to dismiss, Diamond alleged that improper service of summons is not a ground for a motion to dismiss; likewise, its corporate name is “Diamond Dragon Realty & Management, Inc.”, while the corporation whose certificate of incorporation was revoked was known asDiamond Dragon Realty & Mgt. Inc.”  At any rate, the personality of the corporation may only be assailed in a quo warranto position.

Resolving the motion to dismiss, the RTC denied it.  Improper service of summons is not a ground for a motion to dismiss the case.  On the other hand, only thru a quo warranto may the personality of the corporation (Diamond) be resolved.  Its motion for reconsideration denied, Reicon filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to assail the denial of its motion to dismiss.

In a Resolution, the CA required Reicon to show cause as to why its petition forcertiorari should not be dismissed for its failure to acquire jurisdiction over the person of Diamond, as private respondent, as required under Section 4, Rule 46 of the Rules.  It appears that the CA’s earlier Resolution dated January 5, 2011 addressed to Diamond, with address at “Suite 305, AIC Burgundy Empire Tower, ADB Ave., cor[.] Garnet Road, Ortigas Center 1605 Pasig City” was returned to it, with the notation “RTS­Moved Out.” In response, Reicon alleged that Diamond always used the address of record of the latter in the action below, “Suite 305, AIC Burgundy Empire Tower, ADB Avenue corner Garnet Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City”. It had not submitted any pleading attesting to its change of address.  Thus service of the petition at the latter address should be deemed effective.  In the alternative, it prayed that summons be served on Diamond’s counsel, Atty. Marqueda at his office address.

By way of special appearance, Diamond thru its counsel  alleged that the petition for certiorari must be dismissed outright for its failure to serve a copy thereof on its counsel of record (i.e., Atty. Marqueda). It cited the rule that when a party is represented by counsel, notice of proceedings must be served upon said counsel to constitute valid service.

The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by Reicon on the following grounds: a) non­compliance with the requirements of proof of service of the petition on Diamond pursuant to Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules, and (b) non­compliance with the rule on service upon a party through counsel under Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules. Its motion for reconsideration denied, Reicon leevated the dismissal of the petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.

The Issue:

Whether or not the CA properly dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by Reicon for failure to acquire jurisdiction over Diamond.

The Ruling:

The petition is meritorious.

I. Sections 3 and 4, Rule 46 of the Rules, which covers cases originally filed 1  before the CA, provide as follows:

SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non­compliance with requirements. – The petition shall contain the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a concise statement of the matters involved, the factual background of the case, and the grounds relied upon for the relief prayed for.

In actions filed under Rule 65, the petition shall further indicate the material dates showing when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was received.

It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of service thereof on the respondent with the original copy intended for the court indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material portions of the record as are referred to therein, and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto. x x x.

x x x x

The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.

SEC. 4. Jurisdiction over the person of respondent, how acquired. – The court shall acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent by the service on himof its order or resolution indicating its initial action on the petition or by his voluntary submission to such jurisdiction. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

A punctilious review of the records, particularly of the certiorari petition filed by Reicon before the CA, shows that it contains the registry numbers corresponding to the registry receipts 2  as well as the affidavit of service and/or filing 3  of the person who filed and served the petition via registered mail on behalf of Reicon. These imply that a copy of Reicon’s certiorari petition had been served to the RTC as well as to Diamond through its address at “Suite 305 AIC Burgundy Empire Tower, ADB Avenue corner Garnet Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City,”4 in compliance with Section 13,5  Rule 13 of the Rules on proof of service as well as with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 46 above­quoted.6  On this score, the Court notes that Diamond declared the aforesaid address as its business address 7  in its complaint before the RTC, and that there is dearth of evidence to show that it had since changed its address or had moved out. Hence, Reicon cannot be faulted for adopting the said address in serving a copy of itscertiorari petition to Diamond in light of the requirement under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 46 of the Rules as above­cited, which merely entails service of the petition upon the respondent itself, not upon his counsel.

The underlying rationale behind this rule is that a certiorari proceeding is, by nature, an original and independent action, and, therefore not considered as part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained of.8  Hence, at the preliminary point of serving the certiorari petition, as in other initiatory pleadings, it cannot be said that an appearance for respondent has been made by his counsel. Consequently, the requirement under Section 2, 9  Rule 13 of the Rules, which provides that if any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel, should not apply.

Thus, the CA erred when it dismissed Reicon’s certiorari petition outright for non­compliance with Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules as well as the rule on service upon a party through counsel under Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules. The service of said pleading upon the person of the respondent, and not upon his counsel, is what the rule properly requires, as in this case.

II.

On a related note, the Court further observes that jurisdiction over the person of Diamond had already been acquired by the CA through its voluntary appearance by virtue of the Manifestation dated May 5, 2011, filed by its counsel, Atty. Marqueda, who, as the records would show, had consistently represented Diamond before the proceedings in the court a quo and even before this Court. To restate, Section 4, Rule 46 of the Rules provides:

SEC. 4. Jurisdiction over person of respondent, how acquired. — The court shall acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent by the service on him of its order or resolution indicating its initial action on the petition or by his voluntary submission to such jurisdiction. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Hence, while the CA’s resolution indicating its initial action on the petition, i.e.,the Resolution dated January 5, 2011 requiring Diamond to comment, was returned with the notation “RTS­Moved Out,” the alternative mode of Diamond’s voluntary appearance was enough for the CA to acquire jurisdiction over

its person. Diamond cannot escape this conclusion by invoking the convenient excuse of limiting its manifestation as a mere “special appearance,” considering that it affirmatively sought therein the dismissal of the certiorari petition. Seeking an affirmative relief is inconsistent with the position that no voluntary appearance had been made, and to ask for such relief, without the proper objection, necessitates submission to the Court’s jurisdiction. Here, Diamond’s special appearance cannot be treated as a specific objection to the CA’s jurisdiction over its person for the reason that the argument it pressed on was about the alleged error in the service of Reicon’s certiorari petition, and not the CA’s service of its resolution indicating its initial action on the said pleading. Properly speaking, this argument does not have anything to do with the CA’s acquisition of jurisdiction over Diamond for it is the service of the appellate court’s resolution indicating its initial action, and not of the certiorari petition itself, which is material to this analysis.

Note that the conclusion would be different if Diamond had actually objected to the CA’s service of its resolution indicating its initial action; if such were the case, then its special appearance could then be treated as a proper conditional appearance challenging the CA’s jurisdiction over its person. To parallel, in ordinary civil cases, a conditional appearance to object to a trial court’s jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be made when said party specifically objects to the service of summons, which is an issuance directed by the court, not the complainant. If the defendant, however, enters a special appearance but grounds the same on the service of the complainant’s initiatory pleading to him, then that would not be considered as an objection to the court’s jurisdiction over his person. It must be underscored that the service of the initiatory pleading has nothing to do with how courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in an ordinary civil action. Rather, it is the propriety of the trial court’s service of summons – same as the CA’s service of its resolution indicating its initial action on the certiorari petition – which remains material to the matter of  the court’s acquisition jurisdiction over the defendant’s/respondents’ person. In Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy,10 it was ruled that “[a]s a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare that the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the court’s jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the court’s jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority.

Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:

(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance;

(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and

(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the

(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution.”11 

Considering that the tenor of Diamond’s objection in its special appearance had actually no legal bearing on the CA’s jurisdiction over its person (that is, since it objected to the propriety of Reicon’s service of its petition, and not the CA’s service of its order indicating its initial action), it cannot be said that the proper objection to the appellate court’s jurisdiction, as above­discussed, had been made by Diamond. Thus, by asking for an affirmative relief, i.e., the dismissal of Reicon’s certiorari petition, bereft of the proper jurisdictional objection, the Court therefore concludes that Diamond had submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the appellate court.

In fine, the proper course of action would be for the CA to reinstate Reicon’scertiorari petition, docketed as CA­G.R. SP No. 116845, given that it had already acquired jurisdiction over Diamond’s person. In order to ensure that Diamond’s due process rights are protected, Reicon should, however, be directed to submit proof that the service of its petition had actually been completed in accordance with Rule 1312 of the Rules. 13  Diamond, in the meantime, should be ordered to furnish the CA the details of its current address and confirm whether or not Atty. Marqueda would be representing it as its counsel of record in the main (and not only through special appearance); if Diamond will be represented by a different counsel, it must so notify the appellate court. Henceforth, all pleadings and papers should be addressed to such counsel and would equally bind Diamond as client. Throughout the proceedings, the CA is exhorted to bear in mind the judicial policy to resolve the present controversy with utmost dispatch in order to avoid further delay.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated May 21, 2012 and November 21, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the CA is DIRECTED to REINSTATE the petition for certiorari, docketed as CA­G.R. SP No. 116845 under the parameters discussed in this Decision.