3g Class Digest - Judicial Ethics

CLASS DIGESTS FOR JUDICIAL ETHICS

UNDUE DELAY IN RENDERING A DECISION OR ORDER

Junio vs. Beltran A.M. No. RTJ-14-2367 January 13, 2014 Facts : Claire Ann Campos, a 17-year old student, filed an affidavit-complai nt for violation of Child Abuse Law and the Magna Carta for the Disabled before the Tuguegarao Tuguegarao City Prosecution Office against Sr. Remy Angela Junio and Dr. Josephine D. Lorica, the President and the Dean of the School of Health Services, respectively, of St. Paul University of the Philippines (SPUP). ( SPUP). The prosecutor’s office filed two informations against Junio and Lorica for violations for the said laws as per DOJ’s February 24, 2011 resolution. The cases were assigned to Judge Marivic A. Cacatian-Beltran of the RTC, Branch 3, Tuguegarao City, due to the inhibition of Judge Aquino. Junio and Lorica sought a reconsideration of the DOJ’s February 24, 2011 resolution. The RTC found probable cause to issue warrants of arrest against Junio and Lorica. Accordingly, it issued the warrants of arrest against them. Meanwhile, DOJ Secretary Leila de Lima granted Junio and Lorica’s motion for reconsideration and set aside the February 24, 2011 resolution. The City Prosecutor, Junio and Lorica filed a joint motion to withdraw informations in view of Secretary De Lima’s August 8, 2011 resolution.  Judge Cacatian-Beltran issued an order stating that "the motion relative to the resolution of the Department of Justice is deemed submitted for resolution.

The Administrative Complaint Junio and Lorica filed an affidavit-complaint against Judge Cacatian-Beltran for violation of Rules 1.02, 3.01, 3.02, and 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. They alleged that Judge Cacatian-Beltran only resolved the joint motion to withdraw informations after almost four months  from the time it was submitted for resolution. They claimed that four months was beyond the period prescribed by existing rules for the resolution of simple motions. In her comment, Judge Cacatian-Beltran explained that Junio and Lorica might have conducted a follow-up of the motions to dismiss at Branch 4 where the records of the criminal cases had been retained, and that the staff of Branch 4 failed to inform her of any follow-up by Junio and Lorica and/or by their counsel. She maintained that she "lost no time in finishing the draft" draft"4 of her January 6, 2012 order when the joint motion for resolution was brought to her attention. Judge Cacatian-Beltran maintained that the RTC was not bound by the findings of the Secretary of Justice since her court had already acquired jurisdiction over the case. She added that she made an independent assessment of the evidence before denying the motion. She further stated that she acted promptly on all other incidents in the case. In its Report and Recommendation dated August 13, 2013, the OCA recommended that: (1) the administrative complaint against Judge Cacatian-Beltran be dismissed for being judicial in nature; and (2) Judge Cacatian-Beltran be admonished to strictly comply with the reglementary periods to act on pending motions and other incidents in her court. The OCA held that errors committed by a judge in the exercise of his adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

administrative proceedings. It explained that the aberrant acts allegedly committed by Judge Cacatian-Beltran relate to the exercise of her judicial functions, and added that only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith or deliberate intent to do an injustice should be administratively sanctioned. The OCA, nonetheless, ruled that Judge Cacatian-Beltran should be admonished to be more mindful of the reglementary periods to resolve pending motions.

Issue : Whether Jude Beltran is administratively liable for the delay?

Ruling  : NO.

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT JUDGES CANNOT NOTARIZE  AFFIDAVITS  AFFIDAVITS OF COHABITATION COHABITATION OF PARTIES PARTIES WHOSE WHOSE MARRIAGE THEY WILL SOLEMNIZE.

A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842 MTJ-14 -1842 February 24, 2014 [Formerly [Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-2491-MTJ] REX M. TUPAL,  Complainant, vs. JUDGE REMEGIO V. ROJO, Branch 5, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bacolod City, Negros Occidental,  Respondent. FACTS:

Sections 9 and 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, classifies undue delay in rendering a decision or order as a less serious charge, with the following administrative sanctions: (a) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or (b) a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00. However, the records are bereft of any evidence showing that there had been undue delay (as shown by the records), any attendant bad faith, any intent to prejudice a party to the case, or some other ulterior ends. The OCA, in fact, pointedly ruled that the inaction was not attended with malice: Judge Cacatian-Beltran resolved the joint motion to withdraw informations two (2) days after she learned of its existence on January 4, 2012. To our mind, these circumstances are sufficient to mitigate the liability of Judge Cacatian-Beltran and keep us from imposing a fine or suspension from office. Accordingly, we find sufficient

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

and warranted the OCA’s recommended penalty of admonition.

Rex M. M. Tupal filed with the Office of the Court  Administrator  Administrator a complaint complaint against Judge Remegio V. Rojo for violating the Code of Judicial Conduct and for gross ignorance of the law. Judge Rojo allegedly solemnized marriages without the required marriage license. He instead notarized affidavits of cohabitation and issued them to the contracti ng parties. He notarized these affidavits on the day of the parties’ marriage. These "package marriages" are allegedly common in Bacolod City. Circular No. 1-90 allows municipal trial court judges to act as notaries public ex officio and notarize documents only if connected with their official functions and duties. Rex argues that affidavits of cohabitation are not connected with a judge’s official functions and duties as solemnizing officer. Thus, Judge Rojo cannot notarize ex officio affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage he solemnized. Also, Judge Rojo allegedly violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice since he notarized affidavits of cohabitation without affixing his judicial seal on the affidavits. He also did not require the parties to

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

present their competent pieces of evidence of identity as required by law. Judge Rojo argued that Rex was only harassing him. He di d not deny notarizing the affidavits of cohabitation and argued that such was connected with his official functions and duties as a  judge.The  judge.The Guidelines Guidelines on the Solemnization Solemnization of Marriage Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary does not prohibit judges from notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage they will solemnize.Thus, Judge Rojo did not violate Circular No. 1-90. Also, he argued that he did not violate the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. He is a judge, not a notary public. Thus, he was not required to affix a notarial seal on the affidavits he notarized. And that he need not notarize the affidavits with the parties presenting their competent pieces of evidence of identity. Since he interviewed the parties as to the contents of their affidavits, he personally knew them to be the same persons who executed the affidavit.The parties’ identities are "unquestionable." Moreover, he alleged that other judges in Bacolod City and Talisay City also notarized affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage they solemnized.He pleaded "not to make him [complainant Tupal’s] doormat, punching bag and chopping block" since other judges also notarized affidavits of cohabitation

ISSUE: Whether Judge Rojo is guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and of gross ignorance of the law?

HELD: YES. This court finds Judge Rojo guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and of gross ignorance of the law. Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90 and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.

notaries public ex officio, undertake the preparation and acknowledgment of private documents, contract s and other acts of conveyances which bear no direct relation to the performance of their functions as judges. The 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct not only enjoins judges to regulate their extra-judicial activities in order to minimize the risk of conflict with their judicial duties, but also prohibits them from engaging in the private practice of law (Canon 5 and Rule 5.07).They may also act as notaries public ex officio only if lawyers or notaries public are lacking in their courts’ territorial jurisdiction Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation, which were documents not connected with the exercise of his official functions and duties as solemnizing officer. He also notarized affidavits of cohabitation without certifying that lawyers or notaries public were lacking i n his court’s territorial jurisdiction. Thus, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90. Based on law and the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary, the person who notarizes the contracting parties’ affidavit of cohabitati on cannot be the judge who will solemnize the parties’ marriage. That other  judges have notarized notarized affidavits of cohabitation cohabitation of parties whose marriages they solemnized does not make the practice legal. Violations of laws are not excused by practice to the contrary. This court does not condone violations of law. Judges have been dismissed from the service for gross ignorance of the law. However, Judge Rojo may have been misled by other judges’ practice of notarizing affidavits of cohabitation in Bacolod City and Talisay City. Thus, this court finds suspension from office without salary and other benefits for six (6) months sufficient sanction.

MTC and MCTC judges may act as notaries public ex officio in the notarization of documents connected only with the exercise of their official functions and duties x x x. They may not, as

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

ERRORS IN JUDGEMENT; JUDGES SHALL AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN  ALL THE ACTIVITIES ACTIVITIES OF A JUDGE. ”

A.M. No. RTJ-14-2376 [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3625-RTJ], March 05, 2014 MA. LIZA M. JORDA, CITY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, TACLOBAN CITY , Complainant , v. JUDGE CRISOLOGO S. BITAS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 7, TACLOBAN CITY, RESPONDENT. [A.M. NO. RTJ-14-2377 [FORMERLY OCA I.P.I. NO. 11 -3645RTJ]] PROSECUTOR LEO C. TABAO , Complainant , v. JUDGE CRISOLOGO S. BITAS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 7, TACLOBAN CITY, Respondent.

City Prosecuto r Leo C. Tabao, Tabao, Tacloban City v. Judge Crisolog o S. Bitas, RTC, Branc h 7, Taclob Taclob an City 

The complaint stemmed from Criminal Case Nos. 2009-11-537; 2009-11-538 and 2009-11-539 4 for Qualified Trafficking and Violation of Article VI, Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610, which were filed against Danilo Miralles ( Miralles), et al . before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City where respondent Judge Bitas presides. Complainant lamented that respondent judge disregarded his duties and violated mandatory provisions of the Rules of Court when he did not issue a warrant of arrest against the accused Miralles, who was charged with two (2) non-bailable criminal offenses. As early as November 19, 2009, 2009, criminal complaints

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

against Miralles for Qualified Trafficking were already filed, yet respondent judge never issued a warrant of arrest for Miralles despite accused’s presence during the court hearings. Moreover, respondent judge granted a reduced bail of P40,000.00 for accused Miralles for each of the three (3) cases even without any petition for the fixing of bail. In fact, complainant reiterated that even after respondent judge found probable cause to hold accused Miralles for trial, he did not order the arrest of the accused. Instead, respondent judge summarily granted a reduced bail in the absence of a motion to fix bail and the prosecution was not given the opportunity to interpose its objections. objections. Complainant claimed that such acts of respondent judge were evident of his bias towards accused Miralles. Subsequently, on February 4, 2011, Sheriff Jose Cabcabin of the Office of the RTC Clerk of Court issued a certification that Miralles surrendered to him to avail of his right to bail. The cash bail bond in the amount of P120,000.00 was approved by respondent judge on the same day. In his Answer, respondent judge reasoned that it was wrong to arrest Miralles, because the court was still in the process of determining whether there is sufficient evidence to hold the accused for trial. He explained that that Miralles had always always made himself available during the hearings for the determination of probable cause; thus, the court already acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.  After the the hearing hearing for the determinatio determination n of probable probable cause, the court ruled that there is no strong evidence presented by the prosecution. On February 4, 2011, accused Danilo Danilo Miralles surrendered to Sheriff Jose Cabcabin and posted P40,000.00 bail for each of the three (3) cases, or a total of P120,000.00.

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

Respondent judge claimed that there was no more need for a petition for bail, because in the judicial determination of probable cause the court found that the evidence against accused was weak. 5

subsequent hearings of the case, complainant opted to transfer to another court, pursuant to an office order issued by City Prosecutor Ruperto Golong. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) directed respondent  judge to to comment comment on the complaint complaint against against him. 11

Ma. Liza M. Jorda, Asso ciate City Prosecuto r, Taclob Taclob an City v. Judg e Crisologo S. Bitas, RTC, Branc h 7, Tacloban Tacloban City 

This complaint, borne from the same criminal cases, has substantially the same facts involving accused Danilo Miralles referred to in A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3645-RTJ. Complainant, Prosecutor Liza M. Jorda, Associate City Prosecutor, alleged that during the hearing on the Petition for Involuntary Commitment of the minor victim Margie Baldoza, to the Department of Social Welfare and Development ( DSWD), respondent judge propounded a series of questions which appeared to mitigate Miralles’ role in the crime charged. Complainant pointed poi nted out that respondent judge’s line of questions went beyond judicial authority and discretion. Upon investigation, complainant claimed to have discovered that the family members of respondent judge are close associates of Miralles. Prompted by said events, complainant filed a motion for inhibition against respondent judge. Respondent judge denied the motion. During the hearing on December 15, 2009, complainant alleged that respondent judge publicly humiliated her and exhibited his anger and animosity towards her for filing the motion for inhibition. 7 Complainant added that when when she was supposed supposed to conduct the cross-examination, respondent judge stated off-therecord: “I don’t want you to participate anymore,”  and  and refused to allow her to do the cross-examination. Due to the continued hostility of respondent judge towards complainant during the

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

In his Answer and Comment 12, respondent judge denied the allegations in the complaint and contended that complainant was piqued when he blamed her for making baseless assumptions. He claimed that complainant was incompetent as showed by the lack of evidence against Miralles. Respondent judge further averred that, contrary to complainant’s allegation that it was her option to transfer to another court, it was he who caused her transfer. He accused complainant of lacking in knowledge of the law and that she appeared for politicians and not for the Republic of the Philippines. Regarding complainant’s accusation that he was close to the Miralleses, respondent judge explained that it was his sister who was a classmate of one Nora Nora Miralles. Respondent judge also admitted that he indeed stopped complainant from conducting a cross-examination on the witness during the hearing for involuntary commitment, because the lawyer for petitioner DSWD should be the one actively participating in the case, and not the prosecutors. He, however, added added that the the court had already ordered that minor Margie Baldoza be committed to the DSWD Home for Girls pending resolution of the criminal cases.  As to the the other other allegations allegations in in the Complaint Complaint,, respondent respondent judge commented that these were mere rehash of the complaint filed in  A.M. OCA OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3645-RTJ 11-3645-RTJ .

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

RULING 

We adopt the findings of the Investigating Justice, except as to the recommended penalty.  As a matter matter of public policy, policy, not every error error or mistake mistake of of a judge judge in the performance of his official duties renders him liable. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his official capacity do not always constitute misconduct although the same acts may be erroneous. True, a judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment, absent proof that such error was made with a conscious and deliberate intent to cause an injustice. This does not mean, however, that a judge need not observe propriety, discreetness and due care in the performance of his official functions. Here, what is appalling is not only did respondent judge deviate from the requirement of a hearing where there is an application for bail, respondent judge granted bail to Miralles without neither conducting a hearing nor a motion for application for bail. Respondent judge’s justification that he granted bail, because he found the evidence of the prosecution weak, cannot be sustained because the records show that no such hearing for that purpose transpired. What the records show is a hearing to determine the existence of probable cause, not a hearing for a petition for bail. The hearing for bail is different from the determination of the existence of probable cause. cause. Clearly, in the instant case, respondent judge’s act of fixing the accused’s bail and reducing the same motu proprio is not mere deficiency in prudence, discretion and judgment on the part of respondent judge, but a patent disregard of well-known rules. W h e n a n e r r o r i s s o g r o s s and patent, such error prod uces an inference of bad faith, m a k i n g t h e j u d g e l i ab ab l e f o r g r o s s i g n o r a n c e o f t h e l a w. 22

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

Likewise, we are convinced that respondent judge’s actuations in the court premises during the hearing of the petition for commitment to the DSWD constitute abuse of authority and manifest partiality to the accused. Respondent Bitas’ use of abusive and insulting words, tending to project complainant’s ignorance of the laws and procedure, prompted by his belief that the latter mishandled the cause of his client is obviously and clearly insensitive, distasteful, and inexcusable. Complainants, likewise, cannot be blamed for being suspicious of respondent’s bias to the accused considering that the former can be associated with the accused following his admission that his sister was a classmate of one Nora Miralles. In pending or prospective litigations before them, judges should be scrupulously careful to avoid anything that may tend to awaken the suspicion that their personal, social or sundry relations could influence their objectivity. The use of intemperate language is included in the proscription provided by Section 1, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, thus: “Judges shall avoid

impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all the activities of a judge .” It bears stressing that as a dispenser of  justice, respond respondent ent should should exercise exercise judicial judicial temperament temperament at all times, avoiding vulgar and insulting language. He must maintain maintain composure and equanimity. This is not the first time that respondent judge was found guilty of the offense charged. In the case case of Valmores-Salinas v. Judge Crisologo Bitas,26 the Court had previously imposed a fine of P10,000.00 on respondent judge for disregarding the basic procedural requirements in instituting an indirect contempt charge, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

The provisions of the Revised Penal Code in bail are so clear and unmistakable that there can be no room for doubt or even interpretation. There can, therefore, therefore, be no excuse for respondent  judge’s error of law. law. It hardly speaks well of the legal background of respondent judge, considering his length of service when he failed to observe observe procedural requirements before granting bail. To top it all, the actuations of respondent judge towards the complainants, as shown by his use of abusive and insulting words against complainants in open court, and his correspondence with the Court, are evident of his partiality to the accused. All these taken into consideration, respondent judge deserves a penalty of suspension of three (3) months and one (1) day for the two (2) cases, instead of P20,000.00 fine for each of the cases, as recommended by the Investigating Justice.

WHEREFORE , respondent JUDGE CRISOLOGO BITAS , Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City, is hereby SUSPENDED  from service for a period of THREE (3) MONTHSand ONE (1) DAY without pay, and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.

INORDINATE DELAY IN THE DISPOSITION OF THE PENDING INCIDENTS RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WRIT OF EXECUTION OF THE SUBJECT DECISION

Facts: Complainants Sps Marcelo were plaintiffs in an unlawful detainer case against Sps Magopoy. By virtue of a decision by the MeTC. Sps Magopoy were ordered to vacate and surrender the property to the complainants. Sps Marcelo were able to gain possession of the subject land but the Sps Magopoy were able to successfully re-enter the property and regained its possession. Complainant Marcelo moved to cite Magopoy in contempt for disobedience to lawful processes. However, the RTC did not cite them in contempt but rather ordered them to surrender the property to the Marcelos within 10 days from the receipt of the order.

Sps. Marcelo filed an Ex-Parte Constancia in view of the continued refusal of Sps. Magopoy to surrender the subject property. This prompted Judge Pichay to issue an Order giving Sheriff Epres 3 days within which to effect Sps. Magopoy ’s eviction from the subject property. Consequently, Sps. Magopoy filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by Sps. Marcelo. With respect to the Supplemental Motion and Reply, and in the interest of justice, the Court directs Sps. Marcelo to file their Comment and/or Opposition to said Supplemental Motion and Reply within five (5) days from receipt of this Order with copy furnished the Sps. Magopoy. The latter is given three (3) days from the Comment and/or Opposition within which to file their Reply if necessary.

Marcelo vs Pichay | March 12, 2004  AM No. MTJ-13-183 MTJ-13-1838 8 | Perlas-Bernabe Perlas-Bernabe,, J.:

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

Despite the directive of the court a quo, Sps. Marcelo failed to file their comment and/or opposition. Nonetheless, Judge Pichay, set Sps. Magopoy’ Magopoy ’s previous motion for reconsideration as well as their supplemental motion for hearing.

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

Disconcerted with Judge Pichay ’s continuous inaction, Sps. Marcelo filed an administrative complaint before the Office of the Court Administrator, charging him and Sheriff Epres with inordinate delay in the disposition of the pending incidents relating to the implementation of the writ of execution of the subject decision.

Separately, however, the OCA did not recommend that Sheriff Epres be held administratively liable, considering the dearth of evidence showing that the delay in the implementation of the subject writ of execution was attributable to him or that he acted with bad faith or any corrupt motive.

Issue : In his Comment Judge Pichay attributed the delay to the new arguments raised in Sps. Magopoy ’s supplemental motion. In particular, he considered the denial of the sales application of Sps. Marcelo over the subject property, as brought to his attention by Sps. Magopoy, as a supervening event that may materially change the situation of the parties and, thus, render the execution of the subject decision inequitable. Therefore, in the interest of  justice and and equity, equity, he scheduled scheduled the the supplemental supplemental motion for hearing in order to be better apprised of the situation of the parties. Unfortunately, the hearing dates therefor were further reset due to the requests of Sps. Marcelo, and because he went on sick leave from June 8 to 29, 2010.

OCA - r ecommended ecommended that Judge Pichay be held administratively liable for undue delay in the resolution of the pending incidents relative to the execution of the subject decision, and that a fine in the amount of ₱10,000.00 be imposed for the infraction.

-

found that Judge Pichay entertained dilatory machinations that resulted in the delay in the implementation of the writ of execution issued as early as in 2006 for the eviction of Sps. Magopoy from the subject property.

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

Whether or not Judge Pichay should be held administratively liable for undue delay in the resolution of the pending incidents.

Held:  YES. The Constitution requires our courts to conscientiously observe the time periods in deciding cases and resolving matters brought to their adjudication, which, for lower courts, is three (3) months from the date they are deemed submitted for decision or resolution. Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (1987 Constitution) states this rule, viz.: Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts. In consonance with the foregoing, Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct For the Philippine Judiciary states that: Sec. 5. Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently fairly and with reasonable promptness.

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

In furtherance of the foregoing mandate, the Court issued  Administrative  Administrative Circular Circular No. 13-87, 13-87, which which states: states: The reorganized judiciary is tasked with the tremendous responsibility of assisting parties litigants in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their cases and proceedings as directed in Rule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court. 38 Delay is a recurring complaint of every litigant. The main objective of every  judge, particularly particularly trial judges, judges, should should be to avoid avoid delays, delays, or ifif it cannot be totally avoided, to hold them to the minimum and to repudiate manifestly dilatory tactics.

 An inexcusable inexcusable failure to to decide decide a case case within the prescribed prescribed 90day period constitutes gross inefficiency, warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions such as suspension from office without pay or fine on the defaulting judge. The fines imposed vary in each case, depending chiefly on the number of cases not decided within the reglementary period and other factors, such as the presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the damage suffered by the parties as a result of the delay, the health and age of the judge, and other analogous circumstances.  As correctly correctly observed observed by the OCA OCA in this case, Judge Judge Pichay Pichay failed to resolve the subject motions, within the 3 month-period prescribed therefor. Records show that Sps. Marcelo ’s period to file their comment/opposition to the supplemental motion and/ or rejoinder to the reply lapsed on October 18, 2009, 44 at which time, the pending incidents were already deemed submitted for resolution.”

Notwithstanding that the matter had already been submitted for resolution, Judge Pichay continued with the proceedings by

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

setting the motions for hearing to the effect of unreasonably delaying the execution of the subject decision. Indeed, while it has been held that a presiding judge shall at all times remain in firm control of the proceedings, he is nevertheless mandated to adopt a policy against unwarranted delays. In this case, Judge Pichay did not sufficiently explain the reasons as to why he failed to resolve the pending incidents on time, as well as to why he still had to set the same for hearing and repeatedly grant postponements therefor, either motu proprio or by motion, despite the summary nature of ejectment proceedings and the ministerial nature of the subsequent issuance of a writ of execution. These considerations he should have been fully aware of. As case law proceedings instructs, "ejectment cases are summary proceedings

intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right of possession of property ,” and that "it becomes mandatory or ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of execution to enforce the judgment which has become executory,". To add, the fact that Judge Pichay required medical attention is no excuse for his default, considering that on such date, the subject motions were already due for resolution.Thus, without having duly applied for any extension before the Court, Judge Pichay was bound to resolve the pending incidents in the said case within the three (3) month-period prescribed by the Constitution. This, he, however, failed to do, and, as such, the imposition of administrative sanctions against him remains in order.

Pursuant to Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or order is considered as a less serious offense which is punishable by either: (a) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or (b) a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00. Considering, however,

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

that Judge Pichay was held administratively liable for the same offense, and hitherto warned that a repetition of a similar infraction would warrant a more severe penalty, the Court deems it apt to increase the fine recommended by the OCA from P10,000.00 to P12,000.00.

WHEREFORE, respondent J udge Ramsey Domingo G. Pichay is found GUILTY  of violating Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court for undue delay in resolving the pending incidents relative to Civil Case No. 2004-286 and is thus FINED in the amount of P12,000.00. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

ERRORS COMMITTED BY A JUDGE IN THE EXERCISE OF  ADJUDICATIVE  ADJUDICATIVE FUNCTIONS FUNCTIONS CANNOT CANNOT BE CORRECTE CORRECTED D THROUGH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS BUT SHOULD BE ASSAILED INSTEAD THROUGH JUDICIAL REMEDIES

A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200 RTJ-09 -2200 April 2, 2014 (formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2834-RTJ) ANTONIO M. LORENZANA, Complainant, vs. JUDGE MA. CECILIA I. AUSTRIA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Batangas City, Respondent. FACTS: The complainant alleged that in the course of SP. Proc. No. 06-7993, the respondent committed Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority, Gross Misconduct, Grave Incompetence, Irregularity in the Performance of Duty, Grave Bias

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

and Partiality, Lack of Circumspection, Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge, Failure to Observe the Reglementary Period and Violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 1. The respondent appointed Atty. Santiago T. Gabionza, Jr. as rehabilitation receiver over SCP’s objections and despite serious conflict of interest in being the duly appointed rehabilitation receiver for SCP and, at the same time, the external legal counsel of most of SCP’s creditors; he is also a partner of the law firm that he engaged as legal adviser. 2. The respondent conducted informal meetings (which she termed as "consultative meetings" in her Order2 dated May 11, 2007) in places outside her official jurisdiction (i.e., a first class golf club, a hotel and sports club facilities in Metro Manila) and where she arbitrarily dictated the terms, parameters and features of the rehabilitation plan she wanted to approve for SCP. She also announced in the meetings that she would prepare the rehabilitation plan for SCP. 3. The modified rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza is a replica of what the respondent dictated to him. Thus, the respondent exceeded the limits of her authority and effectively usurped and pre- empted the rehabilitation receiver’s exercise of functions. 4. The respondent ordered that the proceedings of the informal meetings be off-record so that there would be no record that she had favored Equitable-PCI Bank (EPCIB). 5. The respondent had secret meetings and communications with EPCIB to discuss the case without the knowledge and presence of SCP and its creditors. 6. The respondent appointed Gerardo Anonas (Anonas) as Atty. Gabionza’s financial adviser and, at the same time, as her financial adviser to guide her in the formulation and development

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

of the rehabilitation plan, for a fee of P3.5M at SCP’s expense.  Anonas  Anonas is also the cousin-in-law cousin-in-law of the managing managing partner partner of of Atty. Gabionza’s law firm. 7. The respondent encouraged EPCIB to raise complaints or accusations against SCP, leading to EPCIB’s filing of a motion to create a management committee. 8. When requested to conduct an evidentiary meeting and to issue a subpoena (so that SCP could confront EPCIB’s witnesses to prove the allegation that there was a need for the creation of a management committee), c ommittee), the respondent denied SCP’s requests and delayed the issuance of the order until the last minute. 9. At the hearing of September 14, 2007, the respondent intimidated SCP’s counsel, Atty. Ferdinand Topacio; blocked his every attempt to speak; refused to recognize his appearances in court; and made condescending and snide remarks. 10. The respondent failed to observe the reglementary period prescribed by the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation (Rules). She approved the rehabilitation plan beyond the 180 days given to her in the Rules, without asking for permission to extend the period from the Supreme Court (SC). 11. The respondent erroneously interpreted and applied Section 23, Rule 4 of the Rules (the court’s power to approve  the rehabilitation plan) to include the power to amend, modify and alter it. 12. The respondent took a personal interest and commitment to decide the matter in EPCIB’s favor and made comments and rulings in the proceedings that raised concerns regarding her impartiality.

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

13. The respondent adamantly refused to inhibit herself and showed special interest and personal involvement in the case. The complainant likewise filed a supplemental complaint3 dated  April 14, 2008 where where he he alleged alleged that the responde respondent nt committed an act of impropriety when she displayed her photographs in a social networking website called "Friendster" and posted her personal details as an RTC Judge, allegedly for the purpose of finding a compatible partner. She also posed with her upper body barely covered by a shawl, allegedly suggesting that nothing was worn underneath except probably a brassiere. In arriving at its recommendation the OCA found that the respondent was not guilty of gross ignorance of the law as the complainant failed to prove that her orders were motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. The OCA also found that the charges of bias and partiality in handling the rehabilitation proceedings were not supported by evidence. It accepted the respondent’s expla nation in the charge of failure to observe the reglementary period. Lastly, the OCA maintained that the allegations of grave abuse of authority and gross incompetence are judicial in nature, hence, they should not be the subject of disciplinary action. On the other hand, on allegations of conduct unbecoming of a judge, violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code), lack of circumspection and impropriety, the OCA shared Justice Gonzales-Sison’s Gonzales- Sison’s observations that the respondent’s act of posting seductive photos in her Friendster account contravened the standard of propriety set forth by the Code. ISSUE: WON respondent violated the Code of Judicial Conduct.

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

RULING: We agree with the recommendation of both Justice GonzalesSison and the OCA for the imposition of a fine on the respondent but modify the amount as indicated below. We sustain Justice Gonzales-Sison’s Gonzales- Sison’s finding of gross ignorance of the law in so far as the respondent ordered the creation of a management committee without conducting an evidentiary hearing. The absence of a hearing was a matter of basic due process that no magistrate should be forgetful or careless about. Even granting that the respondent indeed erred in the exercise of her judicial functions, these are, at best, legal errors correctible not by a disciplinary action, but by judicial remedies that are readily available to the complainant. "An administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is available, such as a motion for reconsideration or an appeal."23 Errors committed by him/her in the exercise of adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings but should be assailed instead through judicial remedies.24 In the present case, aside from being speculative and judicial in character, the circumstances cited by the complainant were grounded on mere opinion and surmises. The complainant, too, failed to adduce proof indicating the respondent’s pred isposition to decide the case in favor of one party. This kind of evidence would have helped its cause. The bare allegations of the complainant cannot overturn the presumption that the respondent acted regularly and impartially. We thus conclude that due to the complainant’s failure to establish with clear, solid, and convincing proof, the allegations of bias and partiality must fail. In the present case, nothing in the records suggests that the respondent was motivated by bad faith, fraud, corruption, dishonesty or egregious error in rendering her decision approving the modified rehabilitation plan. Besides his bare accusations, the

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

complainant failed to substantiate his allegations with competent proof. Bad faith cannot be presumed32 and this Court cannot conclude that bad faith intervened when none was actually proven. WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria guilty of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW for which she is FINED Twenty-One Thousand Pesos (P21,000,00). Judge Austria is likewise hereby ADMONISHED to refrain from further acts of IMPROPRIETY and to refrain from CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF  A JUDGE, JUDGE, with the the STERN WARNING that that a repetitio repetition n of the the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

UNDUE DELAY IN RENDERING DECISION; LIABILITY OF JUDGES

A.M. No. MTJ-14-1841 June 2, 2014 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-2388-MTJ) GERSHON N. DULANG,  Complainant, vs.

JUDGE MARY JOCYLEN 1 G. REGENCIA, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT (MCTC), ASTURIAS-BALAMBAN, CEBU, Respondent.

FACTS: In a Verified Complaint, Dulang alleged that he moved for the resolution of an ejectment case within the sala of respondent Judge, given that the same had been filed as early as year 2000 and had already been submitted for resolution. Notwithstanding the summary nature of the ejectment proceedings Judge Regencia rendered a Judgment dismissing the ejectment case after more than 11 years since its filing.

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

Dulang filed a Verified Supplemental before the OCA, alleging that despite the filing of a notice of appeal from Judge Regencia’s  judgment,  judgment, the latter neverth nevertheless eless issued issued an Order Order directing directing the the postmaster and postal carrier of the Cebu Central Post Office, Cebu City to certify Dulang’s receipt of a copy of the said Judgment. In this regard, Dulang accused Judge Regencia of gross ignorance of the law, gross incompetence, serious misconduct, and serious dereliction of duty, contending that by filing his appeal, the latter was already stripped of her (Judge Regencia) jurisdiction over the case and should not have issued the said order. Dulang claimed that this effectively stalled the administration of justice, much to his prejudice. Judge Regencia maintained that no trial was held in said ejectment case as the parties merely filed their respective position papers and that she could have easily resolved the said case if not for another case pending which was closely intertwined with the former. She also averred that she should not be faulted for the long delay in resolving the ejectment case as she assumed her post as MCTC judge only in November 2002 and, thereafter, began presiding over the same starting on November 2007. She also explained that this order was merely intended to determine whether or not Dulang filed his appeal within the reglementary period. The OCA recommended that Judge Regencia be held administratively liable for undue delay in rendering a decision, and thereby fined her in the amount of 20,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. It agreed with the findings of Judge Montero that there is no justifiable excuse for Judge Regencia not to render  judgment  judgment in the the ejectment ejectment case case within the 30-day 30-day reglementar reglementary y period mandated by the Rules on Summary Procedure.

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Regencia may be held administratively liable for undue delay in rendering a decision. HELD: Judges should be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of their obligation to administer  justice promptly.T promptly.This his is embodied embodied in Rule 3.05, Canon Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which states that "[a] judge shall dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods" and echoed in Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary 26which provides that "[j]udges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness." Civil Case No. 212-B being an ejectment case, it is governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure which clearly sets a period of thirty (30) days from the submission of the last affidavit or position paper within which a decision thereon must be issued . 27Despite this, Judge Regencia rendered judgment only about two (2) years and four (4) months later. While rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are indispensable to prevent needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of cases and, thus, should be regarded as mandatory , 28 the Court has nevertheless been mindful of the plight of judges and has been understanding of circumstances that may hinder them from promptly disposing of their businesses and, as such, has allowed extensions of time due to justifiable reasons . 29 However, Judge Regencia failed to proffer any acceptable reason in delaying the disposition of the ejectment case, thus, making her administratively liable for undue delay in rendering a decision.  Also as correctly correctly held held by Judge Montero Montero there there was was neither a prejudicial question nor an agreement between the litigants that would warrant substantial delays in the proceedings  – a  – a finding which is subscribed to by the OCA .30 Verily, Judge Regencia’s

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

clear and blatant attempt to mislead the Court is deplorable and should never be countenanced. 1âwphi1

Meanwhile, the new Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Sixto S. Esquivias IV, issued a new Revenue Travel Assignment Order  Order  reiterating reiterating Hefti’s order. Secretary Teves also approved Esquivias’s order. Gandarosa thus filed a petition for indirect contempt against Secretary Teves and Commissioner Esquivias. 4

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Mary Jocylen G. Regencia of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of AsturiasBalamban, Cebu, GUILTY of undue delay in rendering a decision.  Accordingly,  Accordingly, she she is ordered ordered to pay pay a fine fine of P40,000.00 P40,000.00 and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

5

Judge Flores issued the following orders : (1) Order  Order  dated 6

November 3, 2008 granting a 72-hour temporary restraining order; (2) Order  Order  dated November 7, 2008 extending the temporary restraining order; (3) Order  Orde r  dated November 21, 2008 admitting Gandarosa’s Gandarosa’s documentary exhibits; (4) Order  Order  dated November 21, 2008 granting a writ of preliminary injunction; (5) Omnibus Order  Order  dated November 25, 2008 treating the comment to the Rule 65 petition, filed through LBC, as a mere scr ap of paper; (6) Order  Orde r  dated December 15, 2008 requiring Secretary Teves and Commissioner Esquivias to file their comment to the contempt petition; petition; and (7) Omnibus and Interim Orde r  dated December 22, 2008, which, among others, (a) impleaded Deputy Commissioner Commissioner Nelson Aspe and Alb erto Olasiman, Officer-inCharge, Revenue Region No. 16, as respondents in the contempt petition, and (b) ordered Secretary Teves, Commissioner Esquivias and their subordinate officials to m aintain the status quo and retain Gandarosa as Regional Director of Revenue Region No. 16. 7

8

9

GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW

10

11

EFREN T. UY vs. Judge Flores  A.M. No. RTJ-12-2332 RTJ-12-2332,, June 25, 2014 VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Facts: In a Revenue Travel Assignment Order , Order , Commissioner of 2

Internal Revenue Lilian B. Hefti relieved Mustapha M. Gandarosa as Regional Director of Revenue Region No. 16, Bureau of Internal Revenue, Cagayan de Oro City. Hefti reassigned Gandarosa as Chief of Staff of the Special Concerns Group at the Bureau's Head Office in Quezon City. Secretary of Finance Margarito B. Teves approved Hefti's order. Gandarosa Gandarosa filed a Rule 65 petition for certiorari and/or pr ohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tubod, Lanao del Norte, presided by Judge Flores. Gandarosa prayed that Hefti’s order be declared void and that a writ of injunction be issued prohibiting the Secretary of Finance and the new Commissioner of Internal Revenue from enforcing Hefti’s order and from replacing or reassigning him. Judge Flores granted a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction in favor of Gandarosa. Gandarosa. 3

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

12

Court of Appeals (CA)  - annulled all seven orders and ordered Judge Flores to dismiss Gandarosa’s Gandarosa’s Rule65 and contempt petitions. The CA ruled that the trial court lacks jurisdiction over the Rule 65 petition. Said CA Decision attained finality and entry of judgment was made.

Complainant’s Contentions: Complainants Complainants Efren T. Uy, Nelia B. Lee, Rodolfo L. Menes and Quinciano H. Lui now allege that Judge Flores exhibited gross ignorance of the law when he assumed  jurisdiction over the Rule 65 petition as it is the Civil Service

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

Commission Commi ssion which has jurisdiction over the i ssue of Gandarosa’s reassignment. They add that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tubod, Lanao del Norte, which is within the 12th Judicial Region, also lacks jurisdiction to issue a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction effective in Metro Manila, National Capital Judicial Region, where the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue hold office, and in Cagayan de Oro City, 10th Judicial Region, where the Regional Office of Revenue Region No. 16 is based. Moreover, Judge Flores treated the comment to the Rule 65 petition as a mere scrap of paper contrary to the basic rule that if a private carrier, LBC in this case, is used by a party, the date of actual receipt by the court of such pleading is deemed to be the date of filing of that pleading. Complainants also allege that Judge Flores violated the right to due process of the Secretary of Finance and Commissioner of Internal Revenue when he treated their comment to the Rule 65 petition as a mere scrap of paper. And in impleading Aspe and Olasiman as respondents to the contempt petition, Judge Flores sentenced them even if they had no opportunity to speak a single word in their defense. Moreover, complainants assail Judge Flores ’s alleged bias when he enjoined the implementation of Hefti and Esquivias’s orders Judge Flores’s Reply: Citing an earlier complaint filed against him by the Coalition of Chambers of Commerce and Industry  Associations, Northern Mindanao, Mindanao, he he cites that upon upon recommendation recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator in i ts Report dated January 28,2009, we dismissed said complaint in a minute Resolution dated March 11, 2009 on the ground that (1) there was no sufficient evidence to show any anomaly or irregularity in the trial court’s proceedings and (2) the propriety of the temporary restraining order, writ of preliminary injunction and Omnibus and Interim Order dated December 22, 2008 was a  judicial matter matter which should be properly resolved resolved in a judicial judicial proceeding. 15

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

Judge Flores also claims that while he may have erred in taking cognizance of Gandarosa’s cases, he did so in good faith and without malice.

Office of the Court Administrator Report: Report: Judge Flores guilty of gross ignorance of the law. The Office of the Court  Administrator  Administrator adopted the ruling of the the CA in CAG.R. CAG.R. SP No. 02753-MIN 02753- MIN that Judge Flores’s seven orders were void since the trial court lacked jurisdiction j urisdiction over Gandarosa’s case which was a personnel personnel action within the jurisdiction of the Ci vil Service Commission; that Judge Flores’s orders could only be enforced within the 12th Judicial Region; that Judge Fl ores gravely erred in restraining the implementation im plementation of Hefti’s order; and that Judge Flores failed to show cold neutrality in granting the writ of preliminary injunction based on documents identified by Gandarosa’s Gandarosa’s counsel.

Issue: (1) Whether or not Judge Flores failed to act with neutrality; (2) whether or not he denied complainant’s of due process ; and (3) whether or not he displayed gross ignorance of the law .

Ruling: (1) NO. The Office of the Court Administrator did not discuss the charges of m anifest partiality, denial of due process and conduct prejudicial prejudicial to the interest of the service. This implies that Judge Flores is not guilty of these charges. In any event, we dismiss the charge of manifest partiality against Judge Flores for complainants’ complainants’ failure to prove by extrinsic evidence this serious this serious allegation. We cannot presume that Judge Flores was biased and partial simply because he enjoined the implementation of Hefti

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

and Esquivias’s orders. We have held that there should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality. Extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias. Absent extrinsic evidence, the decision itself would be insufficient to establish a case against the j udge.

deliberate or malicious. It may also be committed when a judge ignores, contradicts contradicts or f ails to apply settled law and jurisprudence because of bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. Gross ignorance of the law or incompetence cannot be excused by a claim of good faith. faith . When an error is so gross and patent, such error produces an inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for gross ignorance of the law . 17

18

(2) NO. In the application of of the principle of due process, process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not the lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard . We note that the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, even if their comment was erroneously treated treated as a mere scrap of paper, were duly represented represented by the Office of the Solicitor General during the hearing on November 21, 2008 and were not denied the opportunity to be heard. They were likewise required to file their comment to the contempt petition in the Order dated December 15, 2008. When Aspe and Olasiman were impleaded as respondents in the contempt petition, there was a motion to implead them as additional respondents and Judge Flores stated in the Omnibus and Interim Order dated December 22, 2008 that  Aspeand Olasiman were notified of the the hearing for said motion. motion. Complainants Complainants claimed that Aspe and Olasim an were already sentenced sentenced by J udge Flores in the Omnibus and Interim Order dated December 22, 2008 despite the fact that the hearing for the contempt petition was only scheduled on January 26, 2009.

In Republic v. Judge Caguioa, we said that the rules on jurisdiction are basic and judges should know them by heart.

25

(3) YES. We agree with the Office of the Court Administrator that Judge Flores committed gross ignorance of the law but we dismiss the other charges.

On the issue of Jurisdiction: When a law or a rule is basic,  judges owe it to their their office to simply apply the law.  Anything less is gross ignorance of the law. There is gross ignorance of the law when an error committed by the judge was gross or patent, 1âwph i 1

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

Here, Judge Flores assumed jurisdiction over the Rule 65 petition assailing Hefti’s order when he should have dismissed the petition for Gandarosa’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies. An employee who questions questions the validity of his transfer should appeal to the Civil Service Commission per Section 26(3), Chapter 5, Subtitle A, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987, which reads: “If the employee believes that there is no justification for the

transfer, he may appeal his case to the [Civil Service] Commission.” The law is basic and jurisprudence is clear but Judge Flores failed to apply them. Judge Flores committed a gross and patent error which makes him liable for gross ignorance of the law notwithstanding notwithstanding his cl aim of good faith. Judge Flores even mentioned in the Order dated November 21, 2008 the contention of the Office of the Solicitor General that the trial court lacks  jurisdiction over the the case. Judge Flores’s gross gross and patent patent error produces an inference of bad faith on his part, considering that the issue of jurisdiction was raised.

On the issue of Territorial Jurisdiction:  And even if we assume that the trial court has jurisdiction over Gandarosa’s Rule 65 petition, Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court requires that the petition must be filed in the Regional Trial Court exercising

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

 jurisdiction over the the territorial area area asdefined asdefined by the Supreme Supreme Court. But the trial court presided by Judge Flores is within the 12th Judicial Region while the Head Off ice and Regional Office, Revenue Region No. 16, of the Bureau of Internal Revenue are respectively located in Metro Manila, National Capital Judicial Region,and Cagayan de Oro City, 10th Judicial Region. Judge Flores issued a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction against the Secretary of Finance and Commissioner of Internal Revenue who both hold office in Metro Manila, outside the territorial area where his court can exercise its  jurisdiction. And And while Revenue Revenue Region No. 16 has a district office in Tubod, Lanao del Norte, where the trial court is situated, the CA found that no court process was served on the said district office or in Gandarosa’s residence in Tubod, Lanao del Norte. All court processes were served in the Regional Office of Revenue Region No. 16 based in Cagayan de Oro City, 10th Judicial Region. In Republic v. Judge Caguioa, we found Judge Caguioa guilty of gross ignorance of the law. Among others, we said that

the writ of preliminary preliminary injunction was issued to enjoin acts performed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City. It was directed against

comment was duly filed on the date it was received by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, we FIND respondent Judge Alan L. Flores of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tubod, Lanao del Norte, LIABLE for gross ignorance of the law, and  SUSPEND him from office without salary and other benefits for three months and one day , with WARNING that similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

GROSS MISCONDUCT OF A JUDGE AND COURT PERSONNEL

EMILIE SISON-BARIAS vs. JUDGE MARINO E. RUBIA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT [RTC], BRANCH 24, BIÑAN, LAGUNA and EILEEN A. PECAÑA, DATA ENCODER II, RTC, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, BIÑAN, LAGUNA A.M. No. RTJ-14-2388

June 10, 2014. PER CURIAM CURIAM

government government officials whose offices are located in Manila.

On the issue of filing:  Another gross and patent patent error of Judge Judge Flores is treating the comment of the Secretary of Finance and Commissioner Commissioner of Internal Internal Revenue as a mere scrap of paper because the comment was filed through LBC, not by personal filing or registered mail. But the established rule is that the date of delivery of pleadings to a private letter-forwarding agency agency is not to be considered as the date of filing thereof in court, and that in such cases, the date of actual receipt by the court, and not the date of delivery to the private carrier, is deemed deemed the date of filing of that pleading. pleading . Thus, even if the comment was filed through LBC, it cannot be considered as a mere scrap of paper. The

FACTS: Complainant Emilie Sison-Barias is involved in three cases pending before the sala of respondent Judge Marino Rubianamely, intestate proceeding where she applied for letters of administration of her husbands estate (opposed by her mother in law Romelias Barias), guardianship proceeding over Romelias Almeda-Barias, and a civil action for annulment of contracts and reconveyance of real properties filed by Romelias Almeda-Barias, represented by Evelyn Tanael, against complainant, among others.

23

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

In several instances, complainant noticed respondents’ partiality in favor of complainant’s opponents in above cases manifested in the ff(among others): - In her (complainant) meeting with respondents, Judge Bariasallegedly knew some personal information about complainant (i.e. her being employed at PAL, etc.), despite the fact that such were never disclosed in the pleadings. Judge himself told that such facts were told by opponen t’s counsel Zarate. - That in 2010, Judge Rubia granted opponent’s motion for consolidation of the 3 cases without even considering complainant’s opposition despite the clear import of the law that ordinary civil action and special proceedings cannot be consolidated.

the testimony of Rodel Cortez (respondent’s witness) as against the uncorroborated testimony of complainant. Justice Gaerlan emphasized the fact that it had taken complainant eight (8) months before she filed the administrative complaint. He stated that the deliberate concealment of the meeting was inconsistent with her resolve to prove respondent Judge Rubia’salleged partiality toward the counsel of the opposing party.

ISSUE: Whether re spondents Judge Rubia and Pecaña should be held administratively administratively liable. HELD: YES. First, the Court rejected Justice Gaerlan’s recommendation Gaerlan’s  recommendation and

- That when complainant filed a motion for Judge Rubia to inhibit due to his apparent partiality, the latter deliberately refused.

explained that Justice Gaerlan should have not heavy relied on Rodel Cortez testimony because contrary to J. Gaerlan’s findings, Gaerlan’s  findings, Cortez is not a disinterested witness based from the circumstances. Further, there were a lot of inconsistencies in Cortez’ testimony which were not addressed in J. Gaerlan’s investigation. Gaerlan’s  investigation.

- Among others.

Second, the evidence needed to be established in Administrative

Respondents denied the allegations and in corroboration with each other, alleged that the meeting was mere chance encounter, that it was not set by respondent Pecana as alleged by complainant. The OCA referred the matter to the Court of Appeals Justice Gaerlanwho investigated the matter. Justice Gaerlan recommended that no penalty be imposed against respondents. He was "convinced that the meeting at Burgos Circle was just a chance encounter" and found that complainant failed to prove her claim with substantial evidence that would justify the imposition of a penalty on respondents. Justice Gaerlan relied on

Proceedings is substantial evidence, which, according to the Court, was satisfied in this case by the evidence thus presented and offered. The Court noted that based from the testimony of complainant (which is more credible) and corroborated by the exchanges of SMS between complainant and Pecana, the inescapable conclusion is that the meeting was set and in fact chance meeting could be one in a million considering the circumstances according to the Court (Please see cross examination of Pecana and the exchanges of messages for your reference). Also, the Court said that delay in filing the administrative complaint is not a proper defense.

- That despite opponents noncompliance in a previous 4 pre-trials that were postponed, respondent never declared opponents in default.

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

Third , Respondent Pecaña’s actions Pecaña’s  actions amount to violations of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel "Court personnel, regardless of position or rank, are expected to conduct themselves in accordance with the strict standards of integrity and morality. "137 The complaint states that respondents were allegedly acting in favor of Atty. Noe Zarate, counsel for the opposing parties in the three cases pending in the sala of respondent Judge Rubia. Because of respondents’ actions, complainant and all who will be made aware of the events of this case will harbor distrust toward the judiciary and its processes. For this alone, respondents should be held administratively liable. For respondent Pecaña, the fact that she allowed herself to be placed in a position that could cause suspicion toward her work as a court personnel is disconcerting. Respondent Pecaña admitted to meeting with complainant several times, despite the former’s knowl edge of the pendency of cases in the court where she is employed and in addition to the text messages exchanged between them. She had a duty to sever all forms of communication with complainant or to inform her superiors or the proper authority of complain ant’s attempts to communicate with her. Respondent Pecaña failed to do so. Instead, she continued to communicate with complainant, even to the extent of advising complainant against filing an administrative case against her and respondent Judge Rubia. Respondent Pecaña violated Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel: CANON 1- FIDELITY TO DUTY SECTION 3. Court personnel shall not discriminate by dispensing special favors to anyone. They shall not allow kinship, rank,

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

position or favors from any party to influence their official acts or duties. SECTION 5. Court personnel shall use the resources, property and funds under their official custody in a judicious manner and solely in accordance with the prescribed statutory and regulatory guidelines or procedures.

Fourth , as for Judge Rubia: 1. He could have been held administratively liable by the fact alone that he failed to admonish Pecana notwithstanding his knowledge of her several meetings with complainant. 2. He violated Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to avoid not only impropriety but also the mere appearance of impropriety in all activities. 3. He violated: Canon 1 INDEPENDECE- Judicial Independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a fundamental guarantee of a fair trial. A judge shall therefore uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both its individual and institutional aspects. (SEE: Secs. 1, 6 and 8); Canon 2 INTEGRITY- Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of judges. (SEE: Secs. 1, 2, 3); CANON 3. IMPARTIALITY- Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made. (See: Secs. 1,2,3,4); Canon 4. PROPRIETY- Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge. (See Secs. 1-3). Both respondents are indeed guilty of gross misconduct. However, respondent Judge Rubia is also guilty of conduct unbecoming of a  judge for violating violating Canons Canons 2, 3, and 4 of the New Code Code of Judicial Judicial Conduct. Judge Rubia is DISMISSED from the service, with corresponding forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and disqualified from reinstatement or appointment in any public office, including government owned or -controlled

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

corporations. Respondent Eileen Pecaña is SUSPENDED for one (1) year for gross misconduct.

BLATANT DISREGARD OF BASIC, ELEMENTARY, AND WELLKNOWN RULES OF PROCEDURE AND LAW

ATTY. REY FERDINAND T. GARAY, Petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROLANDO S. VENADAS, SR., Respondent. A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000 DEL CASTILLO, J. FACTS:

Upon learning that Atty. Garay intended to purchase the entire property for himself, spouses Sombilon offered to buy back the property from PNB. The bank advised them to make a 10% down payment of the bank’s total claim to formalize their offer. PNB decided to approve the purchase offer of Atty. Garay since spouses Sombilon failed to make the required down payment.

G.R. No. 179914

 A judge judge owes the the public public and the the court court the duty duty to know know the law by heart and to have the basic rules of procedure at the palm of his hands. This involves two consolidated cases: (1) a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals ; and (2) an  Administrative  Administrative Complaint Complaint against Judge Rolando Rolando S. Venadas, Venadas, Sr. (Judge Venadas, Sr.) of the RTC of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, Branch 8, for Grave Abuse of Authority and Grave Misconduct. Spouses Reynaldo and Hilly G. Sombilon were the previous owners of a 601-square meter property, with two buildings constructed on it, in South Poblacion, Maramag, Bukidnon. The said property, which they mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank as security for their loan, was foreclosed and sold at public auction, where PNB emerged as the winning bidder. The one-year redemption period lapsed but spouses Sombilon failed to redeem the property.

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

The spouses Sombilon sought the help of Atty. Rey Ferdinand T. Garay who was once appointed by the court as counsel de officio for Hilly Sombilon in a criminal case and who happens to be the owner of a lot adjacent to the property. The spouses were hoping that he would agree to advance the money and, in exchange, they promised to sell him the 331-square meter portion of the property.

PNB filed an Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession before the RTC of Malaybalay City, Bukidnon presided over by Judge Venadas, Sr. which was granted. The spouses Sombilon moved for a reconsideration of the issuance of the Writ of Possession arguing that Atty. Garay, who was the former counsel of Hilly, was barred from purchasing the property pursuant to paragraph 5,32 Article 1491 of the Civil Code. Judge Venadas, Sr. issued an Order holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession. The CA found grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Venadas, Sr. in holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession.

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000

RULING:

 Atty. Garay Garay filed a Verified Verified Complaint Complaint against against Judge Judge Venadas, Venadas, Sr., charging him with Grave Abuse of Authority and Grave Misconduct. Atty. Garay claims that Judge Venadas, Sr. should be administratively sanctioned for holding in abeyance the Writ of Possession he earlier issued and for ignoring Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court as he proceeded to hear the motion despite lack of notice to PNB.

1. YES. The issuance of a writ of possession is ministerial upon the court. Once title is consolidated under the name of the purchaser, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial on the part of the court; thus, no discretion is left to the court. Questions regarding the regularity and validity of the mortgage or the foreclosure sale may not be raised as a ground to oppose or hold in abeyance the issuance of the writ of possession as these must be raised in a separate action for the annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure sale. The pendency of such action is also not a ground to stay the issuance of a writ of possession.

In his defense, Judge Venadas, Sr. contends that he did not annul the Writ of Possession but merely stayed its execution and implementation to prevent any injustice. He insists there was no violation of due process because he immediately scheduled a hearing for PNB to present its evidence. The OCA, in its Report, found Judge Venadas, Sr. administratively liable for grave abuse of authority bordering on gross ignorance of procedure. It found Judge Venadas, Sr. guilty of blatantly disregarding Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court when he acted on the defective motion filed by spouses Sombilon.

WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 179914, the Petition is hereby DENIED.

ISSUES: (1) Whether Judge Venadas, Sr. committed grave abuse of discretion in holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession; and (2) Whether he should be administratively sanctioned for holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession and for disregarding Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

In this case, the redemption period had long lapsed when PNB applied for the issuance of the Writ of Possession. In fact, the title over the subject property had already been consolidated in PNB’s name. Thus, it was ministerial upon Judge Venadas, Sr. to issue the Writ of Possession in favor of PNB, the registered owner of the subject property. The alleged invalidity of the sale is not a ground to oppose or defer the issuance of the Writ of Possession as this does not affect PNB’ s right to possess the subject property.

2. YES. The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA. Records show that spouses Sombilon failed to comply with the three-day notice rule and the required proof of service embodied in Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, thereby rendering the motion fatally defective. Despite this, Judge Venadas, Sr. still took cognizance of the motion filed by spouses Sombilon, depriving PNB and Atty. Garay of their right to due process.

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

Blatant disregard of basic, elementary, and well-known rules of procedure and law is gross ignorance of the law, which is classified as a serious charge under Rule 140, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, punishable by either dismissal from service, suspension for more than three months but not exceeding six months, or a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. In Administrative Matter No. RTJ-06-2000, Judge Rolando S. Venadas, Sr. of the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, Branch 8, is hereby found guilty of grave abuse of authority bordering on gross ignorance of the law and is ordered to pay a FINE of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS.

IMPROPRIETY OF A JUDGE RELATIVE TO A LAND DISPUTE

Lopez vs. Judge Lucmayon A.M. No. MTJ-13-1837 September 24, 2014 Brion, J : FACTS: Conrado Lopez inherited a land from his adoptive father as evidenced by “Katapusan Panugon” (Testamente). While the document mentioned Lot No. 1718, he ended up receiving a portion of Lot No. 1696 which became an object of extrajudicial settlement between him, his adoptive mother and the relatives of Judge Lucmayon. Half of the said land was cultivated by his mother until her death and thereafter, he took over the cultivation. Lopez alleged that sometime in 2004, Judge Lucmayon allegedly deceived him into signing a SPA to process the sale of Lot No. 1696 to a prospective buyer, Aboitiz Group of Company. Unknown to him, the said SPA contained at the bottom portion a so-called “Waiver of Rights” that Judge Lucmayon had deceptively inserted

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

in order to strip him of the ownership of the said lot. The document was notarized by a certain Atty. Mata without the complainant’s presence and thereafter Judge Lucmayon told him that he no longer had any right over the same. Lopez also asserted that Judge Lucmayon had cause Pedro Lucmayon (father of respondent) and his siblings to execute a “Supplemental Extrajudicial Settlement of Moises Legaspino and Victoria Lopez” to his damage and prejudice because his name and that of his adoptive mother were excluded. He claimed that as the legal heirs of his adoptive father, who in turn inherited the property from his late mother Victoria Lopez, their exclusion from the settlement was an act of dishonesty to which the respondent should be held administratively liable.

The respondent vehemently denied that he convinced Lopez to sell his shares in the property and claimed that it was Lopez who was interested in selling his shares after he got tired of cultivating the land. He also denied that he deceived Lopez into signing the Waiver of Rights because such Waiver of Rights was only done after he discovered that Lopez was not legally adopted. Since there was no legal adoption, Lopez could not be considered as a legal heir thus not entitled to any portion of the land. According to him, his participation in the sale transaction was limited to informing his parents and relatives that Lopez was not a legal heir of his adoptive father. He maintained that the filing of the administrative case was intended to harass and embarrass him.

In the evaluation report of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), it noted that the allegations in the administrative complaint are the same with that raised in the criminal complaint for Falsification of Public Documents filed against the respondent. Such case was dismissed by the City Prosecutor for lack of merit

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

and evidentiary proof. It was also recommended that the administrative case be dismissed because Lopez failed to discharge the burden of proving the respondent’s administrative liability. The Court then issued a resolution adopting OCA’s findings and recommendation. The complainant sought consideration thus the Court referred back the complainan t’s MR to OCA for evaluation. The OCA then recommended that the respondent be liable for acts of impropriety. The OCA held that while the respondent’s act of asking the complainant to sign the SPAs may not constitute dishonesty, corruption and misconduct, his act of requiring the complainant to sign the SPA and allowing  Atty. Mata Mata to notarize the Waiver Waiver of Rights Rights without without each other’s presence as well as his appointment as complainant’s attorney -infact- violate Rule 5.-6 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and amount to impropriety. ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of Judge Lucmayon constitute impropriety thus violated the Code of Judicial Conduct RULING: YES. Rule 5.06 provides, “A judge is prohibited from s e r v i n g a s e x e c u t o r , a d m i n i s t r at at o r , t r u s t e e , g u a r d i a n o r o t h e r f i d u c i a r y e x c e p t f o r t h e e s t a t e, e, t r u s t s , o r p e r s o n o f a m e m b e r o f t h e i m m e d i a t e f a m i l y , an an d t h e n o n l y i f s u c h s e r v i c e w i l l n o t interfere with the proper perform ance of judicial duties.

“Member of immediate family” shall be limited to the spouse  The a n d r elatives e   latives within the second degree of consanguinity.”  The intent of the rule is to limit a judge's involvement in the affairs and interests of private individuals to minimize the risk of conflict with his judicial duties and to allow him to devote his undivided attention to the performance of his official functions. When a member of the bench serves as administrator of the properties of private individuals, he runs the risk of losing his neutrality and impartiality, especially when the interests of his principal conflicts with those of the litigant who comes before his court.

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

In this case, since complainant clearly does not fall under respondent’s "immediate family", his appointment as the former’s attorney-in-fact is not a valid exception to the rule. By serving as attorney-in-fact, the respondent not only allowed himself to be distracted from the performance of his judicial duties; he also undertook to perform all acts necessary to protect the complainant’s interest which in effect, he acted as the complainant’s complaina nt’s fiduciary, in direct and patent violation of the prohibition against judges. The respondent should have been more circumspect in accepting the appointment as an attorney-infact of the complainant. In the present administrative complaint, the respondent’s responde nt’s acts of: (1) making the complainant sign at least two (2) documents – documents  – consisting  consisting of SPA and Waiver of Rights  – without the presence of a counsel; and (2) allowing the notarization of the documents outside the presence of the executor, amount to impropriety. While no evidence directly shows that the respondent had deceived the complainant into signing these documents, this Court cannot ignore the fact that the documents the respondent himself prepared greatly prejudiced the complainant. We also note that the Waiver of Rights benefitted the respondent and his family. As a judge who is more learned in the law than the complainant, the respondent, at the very least should have taken the appropriate steps (e.g. advise the former to engage the services of a lawyer who could lend him unbiased legal advice regarding the legal effects of the waiver) to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in his dealings. This step, the respondent failed to take. In these lights, the Court finds the respondent guilty of impropriety.

PENALTY: fine of P20,000 for violation of Rule 5.06 of the Code and P10,000 for impropriety and a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

A.M. No. SB-14-21-J

September 23, 2014

[Formerly A.M. No. 13-10-06-SB] RE: ALLEGATIONS MADE UNDER OATH AT THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE HEARING HELD ON SEPTEMBER 26, 2013 AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG, SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS: This administrative complaint was filed by the Court En Banc after investigation into certain allegations that surfaced during the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing indicated prima facie violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct by an  Associate  Associate Justice Justice of the the Sandiganbay Sandiganbayan. an. The The investigation investigation was conducted motu proprio pursuant to the Court's power of administrative supervision over members of the Judiciary. The factual antecedents are the following: In the middle of 2013, the local media ran an expose involving billions of government funds channeled through bogus foundations. Dubbed as the "pork barrel scam," as the money was sourced from the Priority Development Assistance Fund allotted to members of the House of Representatives and Senate. In the course of the investigation conducted by the Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon Committee), the names of certain government officials and other individuals were mentioned by "whistle-blowers" who are former employees of the alleged mastermind, Janet Lim-Napoles (Mrs. Napoles), wife of an ex-military officer. These personalities identified by the whistle-blowers allegedly transacted with or attended Mrs. Napoles' parties and events, among whom is incumbent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, herein respondent.

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

Benhur Luy (Luy), filed illegal detention charges against Mrs. Napoles who accused him of double-dealing. When Luy went public with his story about Mrs. Napoles' anomalous transactions and before the warrant of arrest was issued by the court, she reportedly tried to reach out to the other whistle-blowers for them not to testify against her but instead point to Luy as the one receiving and distributing the money. Marina Sula (Sula) executed a Sworn Statement before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) stating that she witnessed the ff personalities who would either visit their office or join their events and affairs : Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator Jinggoy Estrada and family, Senator Bong Revilla, Lani Mercado-Revilla, Bryan Revilla, Secretary Rene Villa, Congressman Pichay and Wife, Congressman Plaza, Congressman Ducut, DAR Director Theresita Panlilio, Catherine Mae Canlas Santos, Pauline Labayen, Jen Corpuz (Staff of Senator Sotto), Mayor Rene Maglanque, Atty. Dequina, Justice Gregory Ong , x x x. The following day, the social news network Rappler published an article entitled "Exclusive: Napoles Parties with Anti-Graft Court Justice" showing a photograph of Senator Jinggoy Estrada (Senator Estrada), one of the main public figures involved in the pork barrel scam, together with Mrs. Napoles and respondent. The reporter had interviewed respondent who quickly denied knowing Mrs. Napoles and recalled that the photograph was probably taken in one of the parties frequently hosted by Senator Estrada who is his longtime friend. Respondent also supposedly admitted that given the ongoing pork barrel controversy, the picture gains a different context; nevertheless, he insisted that he has untainted service in the judiciary, and further denied he was the one advising Mrs. Napoles on legal strategies in connection with the Kevlar helmet cases where she was acquitted by a Division of the Sandiganbayan of which respondent is the Chairman and the then  Acting Presidin Presiding g Justice. Justice.

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

In a letter dated September 26, 2013 addressed to Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, respondent meticulously explained the controversial photograph which raised questions on his integrity as a magistrate, particularly in connection with the decision rendered by the Sandiganbayan' s Fourth Division in the Kevlar helmet cases, which convicted some of the accused but acquitted Mrs. Napoles. Respondent surmised that the photograph was taken during the birthday of Senator Estrada in February, either in the year 2012 or 2013, but definitely not in 2010 or earlier. He explained that he could vaguely remember the circumstances but it would have been rude for him to prevent any guest from posing with him and Senator Estrada during the party.  As to the the Kevlar Kevlar helmet helmet cases, cases, respondent respondent said said it was impossibl impossible e for him to have been advising Mrs. Napoles, as claimed by Mr. Rufo, as even the article itself noted that Mrs. Napoles' own brother, Reynald L. Lim, ( a.k.a. Reynaldo L. Francisco), a coaccused in the case, was convicted by the Sandiganbayan. He stressed that these cases were decided on the merits by the Sandiganbayan, acting as a collegial body and he was not even the ponente of the decision. Chief Justice Sereno then requested the Court En Banc to conduct an investigation motu proprio under this Court's power of administrative supervision over members of the judiciary and members of the legal profession (referring to notaries public who were alleged to have purposely left their specimen signatures, dry seals and notarial books with Mrs. Napoles to facilitate the incorporation of non-governmental organizations [NGOs] involved in the scam).

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

This Court upon evaluation of the factual circumstances found possible transgressions of the New Code of Judicial Conduct committed by respondent. Accordingly, a Resolution was issued on January 21, 2014 stating that: WHEREFORE, the Court hereby resolves to have the instant administrative matter RE-DOCKETED as A.M. No. SB-14-21-J (Re: Allegations Made Under Oath at tlze Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing held on September 26, 2013 against  Associate  Associate Justice Justice Gregory Gregory S. Ong, Ong, Sandiganb Sandiganbayan), ayan), and  ASSIGNS  ASSIGNS the same same to retired retired Supreme Supreme Court Court Justice Justice Angelina Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez for investigation, report and recommendation within a period of sixty (60) days from notice hereof.

xxxx Respondent, in his defense, vehemently denied the imputations hurled against him. 1. He asserted that he could not be the contact or "connect" of Napoles at the Sandiganbayan for he never met or came to know her during the pendency of the Kevlar case; 2. Challenging Benhur's testimony that he fixed or "inayos" the Kevlar case, respondent claimed that it was decided based on the merits by the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division as a collegial body. The two other members of the court, Justice Jose R. Hernandez (ponente) and Justice Maria Cristina J. Cornejo, are independentminded jurists who could not be pressured or influenced by anybody, not even by their peers; 3. On Benhur's allegation that respondent received an amount of money from Napoles prior to the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case, respondent deplored the fact that Benhur was attempting to tarnish his reputation without any proof. And that it is

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

unthinkable for him to have received money from Napoles considering that her mother, brother, and sister-in-law were convicted; 4. Respondent admitted he went to Napoles' office twice, sometime in March 2012, after the decision in the Kevlar case was promulgated in 2010 and narrated what prompted him to do so, thus: 5. Concerning Benhur's testimony that Napoles paid respondent an advanced interest consisting of eleven (11) checks in the amount of P282,000.00 each and that he issued to her his BDO check of P25.5 million which she deposited in her account, he claimed that "he never issued that check as he did not intend to invest in AFPSLAI. In fact, he does not have any money deposited there. Inasmuch as he did not issue any BDO check, it follows that Napoles could not have given him those eleven (11) checks representing advanced interest. He further explained that he found from the internet that in AFPSLAI, an investor can only make an initial deposit of P30,000.00 every quarter or Pl20,000.00 per year. The limit or ceiling is P3 million with an interest of 15% or 16% per annum. 6. The whistle blower's testimony are conflicting and therefore lack credibility. While Sula testified that Napoles told her that she did not want to approach respondent (should a case involving the pork barrel scam be filed with the Sandiganbayan) because his talent fee is too high, however, both whistle blowers claimed that he is Napoles' contact in the Sandiganbayan. With respect to the Rappler Report, according to respondent, Rufo (rappler reporter) was insinuating four things: 1. That there was irregularity in the manner the Kevlar case was decided; 2. That respondent was close to Napoles even during the pendency of the Kevlar case;

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

3. That respondent was attending parties of the Napoleses; and 4. That respondent was advising Napoles about legal strategies relative to the Kevlar case. Respondent "dismissed all the above insinuations as false and without factual basis." As to the last insinuation that he advised Napoles about legal strategies to be pursued in the Kevlar case, respondent stressed that the case was decided by a collegial body and that he never interceded on her behalf. RECOMMENDATION OF INVESTIGATING JUSTICES IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, It is respectfully recommended, for consideration of the Honorable Court, that respondent Justice Gregory S. Ong be found GUILTY of gross misconduct, dishonesty, and impropriety, all in violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and be meted the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service WITH FORFEITURE of all retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave credits, and WITH PREJUDICE to reemployment to any government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. xxxx The Court's Ruling This Court adopts the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the Investigating Justice which are well-supported by the evidence on record. Based on the testimonies of Luy, Sula and Rufo, the Investigating Justice formulated the charges against the respondent, as follows: 1. Respondent acted as contact of Napoles in connection with the Kevlar case while it was pending in the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division wherein he is the Chairman;

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

2. Respondent, being Napoles' contact in the Sandiganbayan, fixed the Kevlar case resulting in her acquittal; 3. Respondent received an undetermined amount of money from Napoles prior to the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case thus, she was sure ("kampante") of her acquittal; 4. Respondent visited Napoles in her office where she handed to him eleven (ll) checks, each amounting to P282,000.00 or a total of P3,102,000.00, as advanced interest for his P25.5 million BDO check she deposited in her personal account; and 5. Respondent attended Napoles' parties and was photographed with Senator Estrada and Napoles.11 Respondent thus stands accused of gross misconduct, partiality and corruption or bribery during the pendency of the Kevlar case, and impropriety on account of his dealing and socializing with Napoles after her acquittal in the said case. Additionally, respondent failed to disclose in his September 26, 2013 letter to Chief Justice Sereno that he had actually visited Napoles at her office in 2012, as he vehemently denied having partied with or attended any social event hosted by her. Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior; while •"gross" has been defined as "out of all measure beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be excused."12 We agree with Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez that respondent's association with Napoles during the pendency and after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case resulting in her acquittal, constitutes gross misconduct notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of corruption or bribery in the rendition of the said judgment.

The testimonies of Luy and Sula established that Napoles had been in contact with respondent ("nag-uusap sila") during the pendency of the Kevlar case. As Napoles' trusted staff, they (especially Luy who is a cousin) were privy to her daily business and personal activities. Napoles constantly updated them of developments regarding the case. She revealed to them that she has a "connect" or "contact" in the Sandiganbayan who will help "fix" the case involving her, her mother, brother and some employees. Having closely observed and heard Napoles being confident that she will be acquitted even prior to the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case, they were convinced she was indeed in contact with respondent, whose identity was earlier divulged by Napoles to Luy. Luy categorically testified that Napoles told him she gave money to respondent but did not disclose the amount. There was no reason for them to doubt Napoles' statement as they even keep a ledger detailing her expenses for the "Sandiganbayan," which reached Pl 00 million. Napoles' information about her association with respondent was confirmed when she was eventually acquitted in 2010 and when they saw respondent visit her office and given the eleven checks issued by Napoles in 2012.  An accusation accusation of of bribery is easy to concoct concoct and and difficult difficult to disprove. The complainant must present a panoply of evidence in support of such an accusation. Inasmuch as what is imputed against the respondent judge connotes a grave misconduct, the quantum of proof required should be more than substantial.16 Concededly, the evidence in this case is insufficient to sustain the bribery and corruption charges against the respondent. Both Luy and Sula have not witnessed respondent actually receiving money from Napoles in exchange for her acquittal in the Kevlar case. Napoles had confided to Luy her alleged bribe to respondent. Notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of any corrupt act by the respondent, we find credible evidence of his association

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

with Napoles after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case. The totality of the circumstances of such association strongly indicates respondent's corrupt inclinations that only heightened the public's perception of anomaly in the decisionmaking process. By his act of going to respondent at her office on two occasions, respondent exposed himself to the suspicion that he was partial to Napoles. That respondent was not the ponente of the decision which was rendered by a collegial body did not forestall such suspicion of partiality, as evident from the public disgust generated by the publication of a photograph of respondent together with Napoles and Senator Jinggoy Estrada. Indeed, the context of the declarations under oath by Luy and Sula before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, taking place at the height of the "Pork Barrel" controversy, made all the difference as respondent himself acknowledged. Thus, even in the present administrative proceeding, their declarations are taken in the light of the public revelations of what they know of that government corruption controversy, and how it has tainted the image of the Judiciary. It is a settled rule that the findings of investigating magistrates are generally given great weight by the Court by reason of their unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of the witnesses as they testified.The rule which concedes due respect, and even finality, to the assessment of credibility of witnesses by trial judges in civil and criminal cases applies a fortiori to administrative cases.18 In particular, we concur with Justice SandovalGutierrez's assessment on the credibility of Luy and Sula, and disagree with respondent's claim that these witnesses are simply telling lies about his association with Napoles.  As it turned turned out, out, Napoles' Napoles' husband husband was was dropped dropped from from the two two informations while her mother, brother and sister-in-law were convicted in the lesser charge of falsification of public documents.  Apparently,  Apparently, after after her acquittal, acquittal, Napoles Napoles helped helped those those convicted convicted

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

secure a probation. But as stated in our earlier resolution, the Court will no longer delve into the merits of the Kevlar case as the investigation will focus on respondent's administrative liability. Respondent's act of voluntarily meeting with Napoles at her office on two occasions was grossly improper and violated Section 1, Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, which took effect on June 1, 2004. SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.  A judge judge must not not only be impartial impartial but must also appear to be impartial and that fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this appearance.20 Public confidence in the Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and the appearance thereof. Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.21 In Caneda v. Alaan,22 we held that: Judges are required not only to be impartial but also to appear to be so, for appearance is an essential manifestation of reality. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to avoid not just impropriety in their conduct but even the mere appearance of impropriety. They must conduct themselves in such a manner that they give no ground for reproach. [Respondent's] acts have been less than circumspect. He should have kept himself free from any appearance of impropriety and endeavored to distance himself from any act liable to create an impression of indecorum. xxxx

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

Indeed, respondent must always bear in mind that: "A judicial office traces a line around his official as well as personal conduct, a price one has to pay for o ccupying an exalted position in the judiciary, beyond which he may not freely venture. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins a judge to avoid not just impropriety in the performance of judicial duties but in all his activities whether in his public or private life. He must conduct himself in a manner that gives no ground for reproach." (Emphasis supplied.) '30. Social relations It is not necessary to the proper performance of judicial duty that  judges should should live live in retirement retirement or seclusion seclusion;; it is desirable desirable that, that, so far as the reasonable attention to the completion of their work will permit, they continue to mingle in social intercourse, and that they should not discontinue their interests in or appearance at meetings of members at the bar. A judge should, however, in pending or prospective litigation before him be scrupulously careful to avoid such action as may reasonably tend to waken the suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships constitute an element in determining his judicial course.'" The factual setting in Abundo v. Mania, Jr. is not similar to the present case because Napoles was not a colleague or lawyerfriend but an accused in a former case before the Sandiganbayan's Fourth Division chaired by respondent and which acquitted her from malversation charge. What respondent perhaps want to underscore is the caveat for judges, in pending or prospective litigation before them, to avoid such action as may raise suspicion on their partiality in resolving or deciding the case. Thus, he emphasized in his Memorandum that he "never knew Napoles on a personal level while she was still on trial as an accused in Kevlar helmet case." Respondent even quoted Sula's testimony expressing her opinion that she finds nothing wrong

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

with respondent going to Napoles' office because at that time, the Kevlar case had already been terminated. We do not share the view that the rule on propriety was intended to cover only pending and prospective litigations. Judges must, at all times, be beyond reproach and should avoid even the mere suggestion of partiality and impropriety.24 Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that "[p ]ropriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge." Section 2 further provides: SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.  As we held held in Sibayan-Joa Sibayan-Joaquin quin v. Javellana25 Javellana25 ... Judges, indeed, should be extra prudent in associating with litigants and counsel appearing before them so as to avoid even a mere perception of possible bias or partiality. It is not expected, of course, that judges should live in retirement or seclusion from any social intercourse. Indeed, it may be desirable, for instance, that they continue, time and work commitments permitting, to relate to members of the bar in worthwhile endeavors and in such fields of interest, in general, as are in keeping with the noble aims and objectives of the legal profession. In pending or prospective litigations before them, however, judges should be scrupulously careful to avoid anything that may tend to awaken the suspicion that their personal, social or sundry relations could influence their objectivity, for not only must judges possess proficiency in law but that also they must act and behave in such manner that would assure, with great comfort, litigants and their counsel of the  judges' competence, competence, integrity integrity and independ independence. ence.

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

In this light, it does not matter that the case is no longer pending when improper acts were committed by the judge. Because magistrates are under constant public scrutiny, the termination of a case will not deter public criticisms for acts which may cast suspicion on its disposition or resolution. As what transpired in this case, respondent's association with Napoles has unfortunately dragged the Judiciary into the "Pork Barrel" controversy which initially involved only legislative and executive officials. Worse, Napoles' much-flaunted "contact" in the judiciary is no less than a Justice of the Sandiganbayan, our special court tasked with hearing graft cases. We cannot, by any stretch of indulgence and compassion, consider respondent's transgression as a simple misconduct. During his testimony, respondent acknowledged his violation of  judicial ethics and and its serious serious repercussio repercussions, ns, as shown by his answers to the questions from the Investigation Justice, viz: Justice Gutierrez

Dishonesty is a "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray."28 Dishonesty, being a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and with perpetual disqualification from reemployment in government service. Indeed, dishonesty is a malevolent act that has no place in the Judiciary.29 Under Section 11(A), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, a respondent found guilty of a serious charge may be penalized as follows: SEC. 11. Sanctions. - A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:

. Regrettably, the conduct of respondent gave cause for the public in general to doubt the honesty and fairness of his participation in the Kevlar case and the integrity of our courts of justice. Before this Court, even prior to the commencement of administrative investigation, respondent was less than candid. In his letter to the Chief Justice where he vehemently denied having attended parties or social events hosted by Napoles, he failed to mention that he had in fact visited Napoles at her office. Far from being a plain omission, we find that respondent deliberately did not disclose his social calls to Napoles. It was only when Luy and Sula testified before the Senate and named him as the "contact" of Napoles in the Sandiganbayan, that respondent mentioned of only one instance he visited Napoles ("This is the single occasion that Sula was talking about in her supplemental affidavit x x x."27).

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

The Court finds that respondent, in not being truthful on crucial matters even before the administrative complaint was filed against him motu proprio, is guilty of Dishonesty, a violation of Canon 3 (Integrity) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government owned or -controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; 2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or 3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. Considering that respondent is not a first time offender and the charges of gross misconduct and dishonesty are both grave offenses showing his unfitness to remain as a magistrate of the

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

special graft court, we deem it proper to impose the supreme penalty of dismissal. WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Sandiganbayan  Associate  Associate Justice Justice Gregory Gregory S. Ong Ong GUILTY GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT, DISHONESTY and IMPROPRIETY, all in violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, for which he is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the government including government-owned or -controlled corporations. This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

TOPIC: GRAVE ABUSE OF AUTHORITY, GRAVE MISCONDUCT, GROSS INSUBORDINATION, AND ACTS INIMICAL TO JUDICIAL SERVICE.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. EXECUTIVE JUDGE OWEN B. AMOR, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, DAET, CAMARINES CAMARINES NORTE A.M. No. RTJ-08-2140. October 7, 2014. PERLASBERNABE, J.: FACTS: In the Memorandum which he submitted pursuant to the verbal instruction of then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo, Judge Contreras reported on on the alleged acts of respondent, as follows: First, on October 1, 1999, respondent impounded the tricycle of a certain Gervin Ojeda at the Hall of Justice of Daet, Camarines Norte, when the latter bumped the former’s vehicle and was

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

unable to pay the amount demanded for the incurred damages. As such impounding was entered in the Guard’s Logbook, Judge Contreras was able to secure a certification regarding the same from Security Guard Virginia Morico (SG Morico). However, SG Morico inadvertently dated the certification October 11, 1999, instead of November 11, 1999. When Judge Contreras called the attention of SG Morico of the wrong date, the latter took the certification and went straight to respondent’s chambers. After leaving the chambers, SG Morico became "belligerent and discourteous" and refused to return the certification to Judge Contreras. Thus, Judge Contreras sought the assistance of Judge Sancho Dames and 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Leo Intia in order to retrieve the aforesaid certification from SG Morico, but to no avail. Thereafter, Judge Contreras learned that respondent had berated the guards of the Hall of Justice, including SG Morico, for issuing the certification, and that SG Morico and Head Guard Quintin Fernandez tried to conceal the alleged acts of grave abuse of authority by respondent. Second, during the latter part of October 1999, Acting Presiding Judge Rosita Lalwani (Judge Lalwani) of the MTC of Mercedes, Camarines Norte called respondent to seek reconsideration of her detail to another station. Respondent then berated Judge Lalwani and accused her of being lazy and abusive like the other judges of Camarines Sur who were also detailed at Camarines Norte. Further, respondent instructed Judge Lalwani to go slow with the trial of a BP 22 case as the accused therein was his friend. Third, on October 27, 1999 and under the pretext of a judicial visit, respondent visited Judge Contreras at the latter’s chambers and personally intervened for one Atty. Freddie Venida (Atty. Venida), who was previously arrested and charged with indirect contempt for his failure to appear in three (3) criminal cases for which he stood as an accused. Respondent then told Judge Contreras that he does not mind Atty. Verida’s abusive prac tice as he gives him

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

gold which was abundant in Paracale, Camarines Norte. Respondent further sneered at Judge Contreras for "not exploiting the situation" and intimated to the latter that Atty. Venida would give him gold. Judge Contreras rejected responde nt’s indecent overtures, resulting in the latter publicly announcing in open court that he is an abusive judge for persecuting Atty. Venida. Fourth, lawyers, prosecutors, and litigants complained about the habitual absenteeism of respondent, especially during Mondays and Fridays, resulting in delays in the disposition of cases in violation of existing laws and circulars on speedy trial. Lastly, upon assumption as Executive Judge, respondent ordered Clerk of Court Atty. Perfecto Loria (Atty. Loria) to submit all petitions for extra-judicial foreclosures to him for scrutiny, especially those requiring publication upon filing, resulting in the delay in the proceedings. Respondent also ordered Atty. Loria to ask for "grease money" from the newspaper publishers under the pain of being blacklisted. Atty. Loria, however, never obeyed respondent regarding this matter. Respondent never filed his comment despite repeated order of the Court. Instead, pending the case, he ran for the 2002 barangay elections, resulting to his automatic resignation. OCA recommended that respondent’s retirement benefits be ordered forfeited; and respondent be disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned and controlled corporations. In fact, had respondent not resigned, his actuations warranted dismissal.

ISSUE:  Whether respondent should be held administratively liable for Grave Abuse of Authority, Grave Misconduct, Gross Insubordination, and Acts Inimical to Judicial Service.

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

HELD: YES. Grave abuse of authority is defined as a misdemeanor committed by a public officer, who, under color of his office, wrongfully inflicts upon a person any bodily harm, imprisonment, or other injury; it is an act characterized with cruelty, severity, or excessive use of authority. Misconduct, on the other hand, is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. To warrant dismissal from service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment and must also have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of the public officer’s official  duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the office. In order to differentiate grave misconduct from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in the former. Needless to say, these acts are inimical to judicial service, and thus, constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service as they violate the norm of public accountability and diminish – diminish  – or  or tend to diminish  – the people’s faith in the Judiciary. In the instant case, the OCA correctly found respondent guilty of the charges against him. As aptly pointed out, respondent’s failure to file a comment despite all the opportunities afforded him constituted a waiver of his right to defend himself. In the natural order of things, a man would resist an unfounded claim or imputation against him. It is generally contrary to human nature to remain silent and say nothing in the face of false accusations. As such, respondent’s silence may thus be construed as an implied admission and acknowledgement of the veracity of the allegations against him. Hence, the Court upholds the OCA’s findings that

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

respondent: (a) abused his authority in impounding the tricycle and exerted undue influence on the security guards of the Hall of Justice in his attempt to obstruct the investigation of Judge Contreras; (b) was discourteous in dealing with a fellow judge when the latter was merely asking for reconsideration of her detail to another station; (c) used his office and position to intervene in behalf of Atty. Venida and tolerated the latter’s abusive practice as a lawyer in exchange for gold; (d) was habitually absent; and (e) gave orders to Atty. Loria to submit all petitions for extra-judicial foreclosures to him which resulted in delays in the proceedings and asked the latter to demand "grease money" from newspaper publishers in order not to be blacklisted. Further, the OCA properly found respondent guilty of Gross Misconduct and Insubordination for refusing to comply with the numerous directives of the Court to file a comment on the administrative complaint against him. WHEREFORE, respondent Executive Judge Owen B. Amor of the Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines Norte, is found GUILTY of Grave Abuse of Authority, Grave Misconduct, Acts Inimical to Judicial Service, and Insubordination and would have been DISMISSED from service, had he not been deemed automatically resigned effective June 7, 2002. Accordingly, his civil service eligibility is CANCELLED, his retirement and other benefits, except accrued leave credits which he had already claimed, are hereby FORFEITED. Further, he is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from re-employment in any government agency or instrumentality, including any government-owned and controlled corporation or government financial institution.

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

TOPIC: IMMORALITY AND IMPROPER USE BY A JUDGE OF THE HALL OF JUSTICE

DOROTHY FE MAH-AREVALO vs.

JUDGE CELSO L. MANTUA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PALOMPON, LEYTE, BRANCH 17 FACTS: Complainant alleged in her complaint that respondent: (a) used the Hall of Justice, particularly his chamber, as his residence; (b) openly brought his mistress in court as observed by all of his staff, especially by a former Utility Worker of the Metropolitan Trial Court of the same station, Dyndee Nuñez (Nuñez); (c) used the court process server, Benjamin Pepito (Pepito), as his personal driver; (d) delegated his work load tohis legal researcher, Atty. Elmer Mape (Atty. Mape), because he could no longer attend to the same due to his many vices; (e) committed gross ignorance of the law when, in one criminal case that he handled, he proceeded to trial and allowed the private complainant to testify in open court even if the accused was not assisted by counsel, and furthermore, extorted money from the accused in the amount of P200,000.00; (f) asked for gasoline, personal allowance, and other benefits from the local government; and (g) failed to decide cases within the prescribed 90-day period because he was waiting for litigants to offer him monetary consideration. In response to the OCA’s 1st Indorsemen t4 dated February 13, 2009 directing him to comment on the complaint, respondent submitted an undated comment denying all accusations against him. In particular, respondent maintained that he: (a) could not be residing at the Hall of Justice as he was already renting a vacant house near the same during his tenure as judge of the RTC; (b) had no mistress, explaining that the woman that often goes inside his office was his caterer who brought him food; (c) merely

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

requested to hitchhike with Pepito from Palompon to Ormoc City and viceversa on Mondays and Fridays since the latter synchronized his process serving to litigants and lawyers of Ormoc City on such days; (d) personally prepared his decisions as  Atty. Mape Mape only assisted him with legal research; research; (e) indeed indeed allowed trial to proceed without the accused being assisted by counsel in that criminal case pointed out by the complainant, but only because the accused violated the three (3)-day rule of filing postponements and failed to inform the adverse party of such intention, and that he never extorted money from the accused; and (f) never asked for gasoline allowance, but nevertheless affirmed that he, like all other local officials, received allowances from the local government. Further, respondent averred that as of January 9, 2009, he had already been separated from service due to compulsory retirement. The Investigating Justice of the OCA found respondent guilty of violating the prohibition on not using the hall of justice as residence and guilty of immorality. He was then fined 40,000.

ISSUE:  Whether respondent should be held administratively liable for Immorality and violation of SC Administrative Circular No. 3-92 inrelation to A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC.

HELD: YES. SC Administrative Circular No. 3-92 explicitly states that the Halls of Justice may only be used for functions related to the administration of justice and for no other purpose. Similar thereto, Section 3, PartI of A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC also provides for similar restrictions regarding the use of the Halls of Justice, to wit: Sec. 3. USE OF [Halls of Justice] HOJ.

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

Sec. 3.1. The HOJ shall be for the exclusive use of Judges, Prosecutors, Public Attorneys, Probation and ParoleOfficers and, in the proper cases, the Registries of Deeds, including their support personnel. Sec. 3.2. The HOJ shall be used only for court and office purposes and shall not be used for residential, i.e., dwelling or sleeping, or commercial purposes. Sec. 3.3. Cooking, except for boiling water for coffee or similar beverage, shall not be allowed in the HOJ .20(Emphasis and underscoring supplied) In this case, complainant’s evidence had sufficiently established that respondent used his chambers in the Hall of Justice as his residential and dwelling place. As correctly pointed out by both the Investigating Justice and the OCA, respondent’s defense that he rented a house did not negate the possibility that he used the Hall of Justice as his residence, since it is possible that a person could be renting one place while actually and physically residing in another. Further, the Investigating Justice and the OCA correctly found respondent guilty of Immorality. 1âwphi1 Immorality has been defined "to include not on ly sexual matters but also ‘conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare. WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Celso L. Mantua of the Regional Trial Court of Palompon, Leyte, Branch 17 is found GUILTY of Immorality and violation of Administrative Circular No. 3-92 in relation to A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC. Accordingly, he is hereby

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

meted the penalty of a FINE in the amount of P40,000.00, which amount shall be deducted from the retirement benefits due him.

THE CONDUCT OF A JUDGE MUST BE FREE OF A WHIFF OF IMPROPRIETY NOT ONLY WITH RESPECT TO HIS PERFORMANCE OF HIS JUDICIAL DUTIES, BUT ALSO TO HIS BEHAVIOR OUTSIDE HIS SALA AND AS A PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL

A.M. No. RTJ-13-2366

February 4, 2015

JILL M. TORMIS vs. JUDGE MEINRADO P. PAREDES Facts: Jill charged Judge Paredes with grave misconduct. Jill was a student of Judge Paredes in Political Law Review. She averred that in his class discussions, Judge Paredes named her mother, Judge Rosabella Tormis (Judge Tormis),then Presiding Judge of Branch 4, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),Cebu City, as one of the judges involved in the marriage scams in Cebu City. Judge Paredes also mentioned in his class that Judge Tormis was abusive of her position as a judge, corrupt, and ignorant of the law. Jill added that Judge Paredes included Judge Tormis in his discussions not only once but several times. In one session, Judge Paredes was even said to have included in his discussion Francis Mondragon Tormis (Francis),son of Judge Tormis, stating that he was a "court-noted addict. She was absent from class at that time, but one of her classmates who was present, Rhoda L. Litang (Rhoda), informed her about the inclusion of her brother. To avoid humiliation in school, Jill decided to drop the class under Judge Paredes and transfer to another law school in Tacloban City.

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

Jill also disclosed thatin the case entitled "Trinidad O. Lachica v. Judge Tormis" (Lachica v. Tormis), her mother was suspended from the service for six (6) months for allegedly receiving payment of a cash bail bond for the temporary release of an accused for the warrant she had issued in a case then pending before her sala. Judge Paredes was the one who reviewed the findings conducted therein and he recommended that the penalty be reduced to severe reprimand. Thus, she prayed that Judge Paredes be administratively sanctioned for his actuations. In his Comment, Paredes denied the accusations of Jill. He stated that Judge Tormis had several administrative cases, some of which he had investigated; that as a result of the investigations, he recommended sanctions against Judge Tormis; that Judge Tormis used Jill, her daughter, to get back at him; that he discussed in his class the case of Lachica v. Tormis, but never Judge Tormis’ involvement in the marriage scams nor her sanctions as a result of the investigation conducted by the Court; that he never personally attacked Judge Tormis’ dignity and credibility. that there was nothing wrong in discussing the administrative cases involving Judge Tormis because these cases were known to the legal community and some were even published in the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and other legal publications; and that when he was the executive judge tasked to investigate Judge Tormis, he told her to mend her ways, butshe resented his advice. Judge Paredes further stated that when Jill was still his student, she did not complain about or dispute his discussions in class regarding the administrative liabilities of her mother Reply of the Complainant In her Verified-Reply, Verified-Reply ,8 dated November 23, 2011, Jill countered that her mother had nothing to do with the filing of the present

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

complaint; that she was forced to leave her family in Cebu City to continue her law studies elsewhere because she could no longer bear the discriminating and judgmental eyes of her classmates brought about by Judge Paredes’ frequent discussions in class of her mother’s administrative cases Jill claimed that the intention to humiliate her family was evident when Judge Paredes branded her brother, Francis, as a "drug addict." Rejoinder of Judge Paredes In his Rejoinder, dated December 2, 2011, Judge Paredes asserted that it was not premature to discuss the marriage scams in class because the scandal was already disclosed by Atty. Rullyn Garcia and was also written in many legal publications, and that the drug addiction of Francis was known in the Palace of Justice of Cebu City. In its Report, 1 dated September 12, 2012, the Office of the Court  Administrator  Administrator (OCA) (OCA) stated stated that the the conflicting conflicting allegation allegations s by the the parties presented factual issues that could not be resolved based on the evidence on record then. Considering the gravity and the sensitive natureof the charges, a full-blown investigation should be conducted by the CA. On January 14, 2013, pursuant tothe recommendation of the OCA, the Court referred the administrative complaint to the Executive Justice of the CA, Cebu Station, for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of the records. records .11 On March 26, 2013, the case was raffled to, and the records were received by, Justice Diy. In her Report and Recommendation, Justice Diy found Judge Paredes guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge. She opined that

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

his use of intemperate language during class discussions was inappropriate. His statements in class, tending to project Judge Tormis as corrupt and ignorant of the laws and procedure, were obviously and clearly insensitive and inexcusable. Justice Diy disregarded the defense of Judge Paredes that his discussions of the administrative case of Judge Tormis in class was an exercise of his right to freedom of expression. She cited the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary which urged members of the the Judiciary to be models of of propriety at all times. She quoted with emphasis Section 6 which stated that "Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary. "16 Based on these findings, Justice Diy came up with the following recommendations, thus: The undersigned Investigating Justice finds that indeed Judge Paredes is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge. Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section 10, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, penalized under Section 11 (c) thereof by any of the following: (1) a Fine of not less thanP1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4) Admonition with warning.

Issue: W/N Judge Paredes is guilty of conduct of unbecoming a judge Held: Yes. The Court adopts the findings and recommendations of Justice Diy except as to the penalty.

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence. As distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. To constitute misconduct, the act or acts must have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of his official duties. Considering that the acts complained of, the remarks against Judge Tormis and Francis, were made by Judge Paredes in his class discussions, they cannot be considered as "misconduct." They are simply not related to the discharge of his official functions as a judge. Thus, Judge Paredes cannot be held liable for misconduct, much less for grave misconduct. Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section 10, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court and penalized under Section 11(C) thereof by any of the following: (1) A fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4) Admonition with warning. Considering that this is the first offense of Judge Paredes, the appropriate penalty under the circumstances is admonition. WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Meinrado P. Paredes, Presiding Judge of Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, administratively liable for conduct unbecoming of a judge and  ADMONISHES  ADMONISHES him him therefor. therefor.

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

Discussion of a subjudicematter, however, is another thing. On subjudice matters, Section 4, Canon 3 ofthe New Code of Judicial Conduct provides: CANON 3 IMPARTIALITY SEC. 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before or could come before them, make any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall judges make any comment in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or issue. (Emphasis supplied) The subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. The rationale for the rule was spelled is that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies. Notably, when Judge Paredes discussed the marriage scams involving Judge Tormis in 2010, the investigation relative to the said case had not yet been concluded. In fact, the decision on the case was promulgated by the Court only on April 2, 2013. In 2010, he still could not make comments on the administrative case to prevent any undue influence in its resolution. Commenting on the marriage scams, where Judge Tormis was one of the judges involved, was in contravention of the subjudicerule. Justice Diy was, therefore, correct in finding that Judge Paredes violated Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

The Court shares the view of Justice Diy that although the reasons of Judge Paredes for discussing the marriage scams in his classes seemed noble, his objectives were carried out insensitively and in bad taste.

not descend to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant by uttering harsh words, snide remarks and sarcastic comments. He is required to always be temperate, patient and courteous, both in conduct and in language .26

Judge Paredes in using intemperate language and unnecessary comments tending to project Judge Tormisas a corrupt and ignorant judge in his class discussions, was correctly found guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge by Justice Dy.

In this case, records show that Judge Paredes failed to observe the propriety required by the Code and to use temperate and courteous language befitting a magistrate. Indeed, Judge Paredes demonstrated conduct unbecoming of a judge.

Indeed, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to exemplify propriety at all times. Canon 4 instructs: CANON 4 PROPRIETY SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities. xxx SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.  A judge judge should should always conduct conduct himself himself in a manner manner that that would would preserve the dignity, independence and respect for himself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole. He must exhibit the hallmark  judicial temperam temperament ent of of utmost sobriety sobriety and self-restrain self-restraint. t. Heshould choose his words and exercise more caution and control inexpressing himself. In other words, a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas. Furthermore, a magistrate should

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

When Judge Paredes failed to restrain himself and included Francis, whose condition and personal circumstances, as properly observed by Justice Diy, had no relevance to the topic that was then being discussed in class, it strongly indicated his intention to taint their reputations. The inclusion of Judge Tormis and Francis in his class discussions was never denied by Judge Paredes who merely  justified his action action by invoking invoking his right to freedom freedom of expression expression.. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression. Such right, however, is not without limitation. Section 6, Canon 4 of the Code also imposes a correlative restriction on judges: in the exercise of their freedom of expression, they should always conduct themselves in a manner that preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary. In the exercise of his right to freedomof expression, Judge Paredes should uphold the good image of the Judiciary ofwhich he is a part. He should have avoided unnecessary and uncalled for remarks in his discussions and should have been more circumspect inhis language. Beinga  judge, he is expecte expected d to act with greater greater circumspe circumspection ction and and to speak with self-restraint. Verily, Judge Paredes fell short of this standard.

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure thatnot only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer. SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of the judiciary. 1âwphi1Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done. (Emphases supplied)  Any impropriety impropriety on on the part part of Judge Judge Paredes Paredes,, whether whether committed committed in or out of the court, should not be tolerated for he is not a judge only occasionally. It should be emphasized that the Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality, a public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. The personal behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be above suspicion.

UNDUE DELAY IN DECIDING CASES

BERSAMIN,

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

March 17, 2015 J.:

with Joseph Denamarca, filed a protest in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources of the National Capital Region (DENR-NCR) against the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 14391 and TCT No. 14188 in favor of Susan Enriquez and Alma Rodriguez covering two lots inside the Signal Village, Taguig.2 The DENR-NCR dismissed the protest,3 but the dismissal was subsequently reversed by the DENR.4 Aggrieved, Enriquez and Rodriguez appealed to the Office of the President (OP), which denied their appeal.5 With their motion for reconsideration having been similarly denied,6 Enriquez and Rodriguez appealed to the CA by petition for review,7 and it is such appeal from which this administrative complaint arose. It appears that on June 26, 2012, the Special Sixteenth (16th) Division of the CA issued its resolution submitting C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 for decision.8 However, the complainants lament that from the issuance of the resolution until the filing of their complaint on February 8, 2014, the respondents, who comprised the Special 16th Division of the CA, had not rendered the decision, which the complainants insist was in patent violation of the mandatory period within which the respondents should decide under Section 15(1 ),  Article VIII VIII of the the 1987 Constitution. Constitution.

Issue: Whether the respondents are liable for undue delay in deciding CA-GR SP No. 108807

RE: COMPLAINT DATED JANUARY 28, 2014 OF WENEFREDO PARRENO, ET AL., AGAINST HON. CELIA C. LIBREALEAGOGO, HON. ELIHU A. YBANEZ AND HON. AMY C. LAZARO-JAVIER, ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, RELATIVE TO CA G.R. SP NO.108807 OCA IPI NO. 14-220-CA-J

Facts: Complainants Wenefredo Parreno and Ronnie Cuevas,

Held: No. The Constitution mandates a lower collegiate court like the CA to resolve a case within 12 months from the submission of the last required pleading or as set by the court itself.

Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution provides: Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and,

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all lower courts.

(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself. xx xx  Although  Although C.A.-G.R. C.A.-G.R. SP No. No. 108807 108807 was submitte submitted d for decision decision by the Special 16th Division on June 26, 2012 after the parties did not file their memoranda,18 it was the 13th Division of the CA (composed of Justice Ybafiez as the ponente, Justice Japar B. Dimaampao as the Chairman, and Justice Melchor Quirino C. Sadang) that promulgated the decision on February 28, 2014, or nearly 20 months later. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule VI of the 2009 IRCA, the adjudication of cases was the responsibility of the assigned Justice and the Members of the Division to which he or she then belonged. Determining who should be administratively accountable must consider the specific role each of the respondents played leading to the resolution of C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807. Under the applicable rule of the 2009 IRCA, the liability for undue delay in resolving C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 might devolve only on the Members of the 13th Division who actually promulgated the decision. Justice Librea-Leagogo and Justice Lazaro-Javier were not accountable for the delay in rendering the judgment. Justice Librea-Leagogo had a limited participation in respect of C.A.- G.R. SP No. 108807 because the reorganization of the CA ensuing after the promulgation of the resolution by the Special 16th Division on June 26, 2012 caused her transfer to the 15 th Division through CA Office Order No. 220-12-ABR,19 terminating her responsibility in C.A.- G.R. SP No. 108807. Justice Lazaro-Javier

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

should also be exculpated because her participation was limited to her acting as a special Member of the 16th Division in lieu of Justice Paredes. Justice Ybanez, as the ponente for C.A. G.R. SP No. 108807, carried the case with him when he was transferred to the 13th Division. But whether or not he was administratively liable for the delay of eight months should depend on the relevant circumstances. The delay in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 could not be said to have been incurred by Justice Ybafiez with malice or deliberate attempt to impede the dispensation of justice. He assigned C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 to a member of his legal staff, but the latter had fallen seriously ill in the meantime, forcing him to hire a contractuallawyer for the purpose. The latter subsequently joined another agency of the Government on a permanent basis. Thus, Justice Ybafiez could promulgate the decision only on February 28, 2014. His explanation for the delay, being entirely plausible, is accepted. WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES for lack of merit the administrative complaint against Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, Justice Elihu A. Ybafiez and Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier.

IMPROPER CONDUCT OF JUDGES – JUDGES  – FAILURE  FAILURE TO PAY LOANS

A.M. No. RTJ-14-2402 RTJ-14 -2402

April 15, 2015

JOSEFINA M. ONGCUANGCO TRADING CORPORATION, represented by JOSEFINA M. ONGCUANGCO VS JUDGE RENATO D. PINLAC, Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, San Carlos City, Pangasinan

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

REYES, J .: 

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

Facts: In its complaint dated June 14, 2012, JMOTC (Josefina M. Ongcuangco Trading Corp) averred that, sometime in 2002, Ongcuangco, its president and majority shareholder, filed with the MTCC of Cabanatuan City several cases against Yolanda Lazaro (Lazaro) for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The said cases were raffled to Branch 1 of the MTCC wherein Judge Pinlac was then the Presiding Judge. JMOTC claimed that: 1. During the course of the trial of the the said cases, Judge Pinlac allegedly learned that Ongcuangco is engaged in the business of selling, marketing and distribution of animal feeds. 2. Judge Pinlac approached Ongcuangco, Ongcuangco, informing her that he has a hog farm in Pangasinan, and requested her to supply on credit his farm’s animal feeds needs. 3. Sometime in 2008, Judge Judge Pinlac purchased on credit animal feeds from JMOTC, issuing 8 post-dated checks in the aggregate amount of 2,203,400.00. 4. Upon Judge Pinlac’s request, JMOTC did not deposit the said checks due to lack of funds. Judge Pinlac told JMOTC not to worry because he secured a loan from a bank, the proceeds of which will be utilized by him in paying of his debt. However, JMOTC learned that the loan has not been approved. 5. On June 18, 2010, Judge Pinlac executed an acknowledgement for his unpaid obligations in the aggregate amount of 2,153,400.00 to be paid in installment basis starting from June 21, 2010 to October 31, 2011. However, Judge Pinlac failed to fulfill his undertakings.

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

6. JMOTC, through counsel, sent Judge Pinlac demand letters but the same went unheeded Hence, this administrative case for violation of Rule 140 Section 8, paragraph 6 for willful failure to pay just debt and paragraph (7) for borrowing money or property from lawyers and litigants in a case pending before the court and Section 8, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct (please see the ruling for the specific provision). JMOTC averred that Judge Pinlac should be discharged from the service for taking advantage of his position, by availing of credit purchases from a litigant who has cases pending before his sala, and his deliberate failure to pay his debts for almost four years despite repeated demands. In his Comment: 1. Judge Pinlac belied JMOTC’s claim that there was a pending case filed by JMOTC before the MTCC of Cabanatuan City, Branch 1, from 2002 to 2010 while he was the Presiding Judge therein. 2.

He explained that the complainant in the present administrative complaint is JMOTC  – a  – a judicial entity that has a separate and distinct personality from its officers and stockholders. As such, it cannot be presumed that Ongcuangco, the complainant in the case before Branch 1 of the MTCC of Cabanatuan City is the same as JMOTC.

3. He claimed that he did not personally transact the purchase on credit of animal feeds from JMOTC or from Ongcuangco because it was Belinda Austria (manager of Judge Pinlac’s hog Pinlac’s  hog farm) who transacted with Legend Feeds 4. He claimed that he he did not know then that that Legend Feeds is a product that is being distributed by JMOTC. He only

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

came to know that he transacted with JMOTC when invoice receipts were delivered and the request was made for the issuance of post-dated checks payable to JMOTC. 5. He further denied denied having used his office to advance his private interest and said that when he was appointed to the RTC, the case filed by Ongcuangco against Lazaro was then still being tried before the MTCC of Cabanatuan City. 6. Judge Pinlac also alleged that his failure to pay pay his debt was not willful because he made several payments in the total amount of 500,000 as partial payment of his obligation. His failure was due to the losses suffered by his hog farm, which eventually ceased operations when the hogs suffered from a disease caused by the substandard quality of the animal feeds he purchased from JMOTC. The CA Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta as Investigating Justice found no evidence to support JMOTC’s allegation that Judge Pinlac took advantage of his office but there was willful failure on his part to pay just debt. The partial payment made by respondent and his offer to pay in kind, which were done only after the filing of the administrative case, may only serve to mitigate his liability. Justice Peralta recommended that respondent be suspended from office for 3 months without salary and other benefits. With respect to the civil liability of respondent pertaining to his unpaid obligation, the undersigned respectfully defers to the determination thereof in the separate civil case filed by petitioner against respondent.

Issues: 1. Whether Judge Pinlac should be held administratively liable for taking advantage of his obtain to obtain a loan from JMOTC

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

2. Whether Judge Pinlac is guilty for borrowing money from a litigant in a case pending before his sala 3. Whether Judge Pinlac is guilty of willful failure to pay just debt Ruling of the Court: 1. NO. The claim that Judge Pinlac used the prestige of his office to obtain the loan from JMOTC is unsubstantiated. Sections 8 and 13, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary provides that: Sec. 8. Judges shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance their private interests, or those of a member of their family or of anyone else, nor shall they convey or permit others to convey the impression that anyone is in a special position improperly to influence them in the performance of judicial duties. Sec. 13. Judges and members of their families shall neither ask for nor accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by him or her in connection with the performance of official duties. Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, in order for a Judge to be held liable under Sections 8 and 13, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, there must be evidence first that would establish that private interests were advanced using the prestige of judicial office or that the acceptance, inter alia, of loans or favors was made in exchange for anything to be done or omitted to be done by the Judge in connection with the performance of official duties. The Court finds that JMOTC failed to adduce substantial evidence that would establish that Judge Pinlac used the prestige of his

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

office in negotiating the purchase on credit of animal feeds from JMOTC or that the loan accommodation was extended to Judge Pinlac in exchange for anything to be done or omitted to be done by him in connection with his judicial functions. Verily, other than self-serving testimonies of its witnesses, JMOTC failed to present any other evidence that would prove its claim. There is a dearth of evidence to support complainant’s affirmative allegation that respondent took advantage of his position as MTCC Judge when the initial negotiations of the purchase for the animal feeds took place. Respondent claims that during the negotiations for purchase of the feeds sometime in 2007, he was not aware that Josefina M. Ongcuangco was one of the incorporators of JMO Trading Corporation. Notably, in the criminal cases, the private prosecutor proposed for admission and the defense admitted that "Josefina M. Ongcuangco (also referred to as Josephine Ongcuangco)" is the owner of JO Agricultural Supply with office at Sanciangco Street, Cabanatuan City. JMO Trading Corporation was not mentioned at all as one of the corporations owned by Josefina M. Ongcuangco. There is also no clear indication in the pertinent records of the criminal cases that complainant was unduly favored by the respondent when the latter started to purchase animal feeds in 2007. At the time, the prosecution had already rested its case. Neither is there any showing in the records that respondent acted with manifest partiality or bias against complainant from 2008 onwards, when respondent failed to pay his obligation. At the time, the defense was presenting evidence and the prosecution was given opportunity to cross examine the defense witnesses. 2. NO . Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, borrowing money or property from lawyers and litigants in a case pending before the court is considered a serious charge for which a Judge may be administratively sanctioned.

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

The proscription against borrowing money or property from lawyers and litigants in a case pending before the court is imposed on Judges to avoid the impression that the Judge would rule in favor of a litigant because the former is indebted to the latter. In order for the said proscription to operate, it should first be established that the Judge knows that the person or entity from whom he or she is borrowing money or property is actually a lawyer or litigant in a case pending before his or her sala. It is true that Ongcuangco, in her personal capacity, instituted several criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against Lazaro in 2001 and that the same was raffled to Branch 1 wherein Judge Pinlac was the Presiding Judge. However, in 2007, Judge Pinlac transacted with JMOTC – JMOTC  – a  a corporation that has a personality separate and distinct from its officers and stockholders  – for  – for the purchase on credit of animal feeds. Further, during the initial negotiations for the purchase of animal feeds, the representatives of JMOTC introduced themselves to  Austria, the manag manager er of Judge Pinlac’s hog farm, as representatives of Legend Feeds. It was only during the initial delivery that Judge Pinlac, through the invoice receipt, was apprised that Legend Feeds was actually JMOTC. In view of the foregoing, it would be unjust to administratively penalize Judge Pinlac for obtaining a loan from JMOTC notwithstanding that the latter is not a litigant in any pending case in his sala. Moreover, JMOTC failed to adduce substantial evidence that would establish that Judge Pinlac knew that Ongcuangco, who is a litigant in several criminal cases then pending before his sala, is the majority shareholder of either Legend Feeds or JMOTC. 3. NO. Jud ge P  inlac’s failure to pay his debt t o J M O T C c a n n o t inlac’s be characterized as willful.  The mere failure of a Judge to pay a loan he obtained on the due date despite written demands cannot

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

be instantly characterized as willful. The term "willful" means voluntary and intentional .29 Thus, a Judge’s failure to pay a just debt, as would constitute a serious charge under Section 8(6) of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, must not only be voluntary, but also intentional, i.e., that the Judge no longer has any intention to satisfy his obligation. The complainant must present substantial evidence that would show that the respondent no longer intends to fulfill his obligation. There must be circumstances that would support the conclusion that the respondent no longer has any intention to pay his debt. Contrary to the Investigating Justice’s finding, the circumstances of this case show that Judge Pinlac had every intention to pay his debt to JMOTC. Judge Pinlac’s inability to pa y his debt to JMOTC was due to the losses suffered by his hog farm, which eventually ceased operations. Nevertheless, Judge Pinlac made partial payments to JMOTC as follows: (1) 50,000.00 on March 31, 2009, which was received by Galang; (2) 50,000.00 on August 13, 2009, which was received by Royo; and (3) 400,000.00 given by way of a manager’s check dated October 4, 2012.

J u d g e P i n l ac ac i s , h o w e v e r , g u i l t y o f i m p r o p r i e t y f o r f a i l u r e t o pay his debt to JMOTC.

Propriety and appearance of impropriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge. Thus, Judges are enjoined to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities. Judge Pinlac does not deny having obtained a loan from JMOTC on his purchases of animal feeds and that the same has yet to be fully satisfied. Thus, there being no evidence that would establish that Judge Pinl ac’s failure to pay his debt was intentional, he could only be held liable for impropriety. Impropriety constitutes a light charge, which, under Section 11(C) of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, carries with it the sanction of: (1) a fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00 and/or; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4) Admonition with warning. The Court deems it proper to impose the same penalty on Judge Pinlac considering the amount of his unpaid obligation to JM OTC. WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Renato D. Pinlac found GUILTY of IMPROPRIETY and is FINED in the amount of P10,000.00 and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

Judge Pinlac even offered two residential parcels of land to JMOTC as payment for his obligation, which, however, was refused by Ongcuangco. As such, Judge Pinlac may have been unable to pay his debt to JMOTC, but such inability cannot be characterized as willful. The foregoing circumstances indubitably show that Judge Pinlac had no intention to abscond from his obligation to JMOTC.

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

THE ACT OF MISAPPROPRIATING COURT -FUNDS CONSTITUTES DISHONESTY AND GRAVE MISCONDUCT, PUNISHABLE BY DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE EVEN ON THE FIRST OFFENSE

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATION vs.

JUDGE ALEXANDER BALUT FACTS: Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) conducted a  judicial audit and and physical physical inventory inventory of cases at the Municipal Municipal Trial Trial Courts (MTCs) of Bayombong and Solano, Nueva Vizcaya. Judge  Alexander  Alexander S. Balut Balut was the acting acting presiding presiding judge judge in both courts. courts.  Aside from the judicial judicial audit, audit, a financial financial audit was was also also conducted conducted in the MTCs of Bayombong and Solano as well as the MCTC of  Aritao-Sta.  Aritao-Sta. Fe. In the MTC, Bayombong, where Judith En. Salimpade was Clerk of Court II, the audit team found an unremitted amount of P18,702.oo representing the court's collection from August 3, 2003 to August 18, 2003. In sum, the shortages in the various funds incurred by Salimpade as of August 31, 2003 totalled P2,057,378.59.

Salimpade, when asked about the shortages, explained explained that Judge Balut, since 1995 had been getting money from the JDF collections.  She had given in to the requests of Judge Balut out of fear of him. She also admitted that she lent her coemployees money which she took from her collections. Parenthetically, in September 2003, Judge Balut turned over P240,000.00 to Salimpade and the latter issued a certification stating that the former had completely settled his monetary accountability to the MTC, Bayombong. Judge Balut

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

delivered to the Fiscal Monitoring Division, Court Management Office (CMO) OCA the certification and deposit slip evidencing the turnover of the P240,000.00. In the MTC, Solano, the spot cash count on the court's collection disclosed that Eduardo Esconde, Clerk of Court, had an unremitted/undeposited cash on hand amounting to P59,545.oo. Esconde explained to the audit team that Judge Balut borrowed various amounts from the collections. He stated that Judge Balut started borrowing funds when the former was still the Clerk of Court of MCTC, Aritao-Sta. Fe. He transferred to MTC, Solano, to get out of the shadow of Judge Balut. But, much to his dismay, Judge Balut was designated Acting Presiding Judge of MTC, Solano and continued the practice of borrowing money from the collections of the court. In the MCTC, Aritao-Sta. Fe, the audit team found that Lydia Ramos, Clerk of Court, succeeded Eduardo S. Esconde on July 16, 2000, without proper turnover of accountabilities. The team also found that the amount ofP540.00, part of the JDF collections from August 1, 2003 to August 21, 2003, remained undeposited at the time of audit.  As of August August 31, 2003, 2003, however, however, the the amount amount of P846,710 P846,710.00 .00 was unaccounted for by Mr. Esconde and Mrs. Ramos. Both denied that the shortages incurred were of their own doing and they instead pointed to Judge Balut as the offender. Ramos related to the audit team the constant requests/orders of Judge Balut to hand over to him money from the Fiduciary Fund collections. In these instances, she requested Judge Balut to affix his signature at the back portion of the withdrawal slips as the cash recipient. However, not all of the transactions were evidenced by an acknowledgement receipt.

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

 Aside from these, these, withdrawals withdrawals from the Fiduciary Fiduciary Fund account account totalling P90,500.oo were also given to Judge Balut. On the face of the slips of this class of withdrawals were notations such as "Judge," "for Judge," "taken by Judge xxx" and "given to Judge" written by Ramos. On May 9, 2002, Judge Balut issued a Certification stating that his accountability with the Fiduciary Fund collection of MCTC AritaoSta. Fe as of April 2002 amounted to .P207,774.42. However, before the final report on the court's shortages was completed, various amounts totalling P802,299.82 were deposited by Judge Balut, Esconde and Ramos in the court's LBP Account No. 32510544-51, as restitution/payment of part of the shortage of P846, 710.00.  As of August, August, 2004, Ramos Ramos had had fully settled settled the the balance balance of her her accountability. On the other hand, Esconde still had a balance of accountability in MCTC, Aritao-Sta. Fe of P58,100.oo which, as of the time this case was submitted by the OCA for the Court's consideration, has remained unsettled. (Emphases supplied) In its Resolution, the Court ordered Judge Balut to pay a fine for his failure to decide 33 cases and 101 motions without properly requesting for an extension. The Court, however, did not rule on the administrative liability of Judge Balut with respect to the result of the financial audit for the reason that he was not given a chance to present his side on the matter. OCA sought reconsideration. CA recommended the dismissal of the charges against Judge Balut for failure of the OCA to clearly substantiate and prove the participation of Judge Balut in the financial transactions of the courts. On his admission that he borrowed money from the judiciary fund, the CA opined that Judge Balut could no longer be penalized as he was previously fined by the Court in its October 9, 2007 Resolution.

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

ISSUE: W/N charges against Judge Balut must be dismissed HELD: NO. The Court finds itself unable to agree with the recommendation of the CA. In administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The standard of substantial evidence is justified when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence is not overwhelming or even preponderant. Once again, the Court stresses that judges must adhere to the highest tenets of judicial conduct. Because of the sensitivity of his position, a judge is required to exhibit, at all times, the highest degree of honesty and integrity and to observe exacting standards of morality, decency and competence. He should adhere to the highest standards of public accountability lest his action erode the public faith in the Judiciary. Judge Balut fell short of this standard for borrowing money from the collections of the court. He knowingly and deliberately made the clerks of court violate the circulars on the proper administration of court funds. He miserably failed to become a role model of his staff and other court personnel in the observance of the standards of morality and decency, both in his official and personal conduct.

The act of misappropriating court -funds constitutes dishonesty and grave misconduct, punishable by dismissal from the service even on the first offense.  For said reason, the respondent deserves a penalty no lighter than dismissal. This Court has never tolerated and will never condone any conduct which violates the norms of public accountability, and diminish, or even tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the justice system.

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

The fact that Judge Balut fully paid his cash liabilities will not shield him from the consequences of his wrongdoings. His unwarranted interference in the Court collections deserves administrative sanction and not even the full payment of his accountabilities will exempt him from liability. "It matters not that these personal borrowings were paid as what counts is the fact that these funds were used outside of official business." Similarly, his nearly 22 years in the service would not serve to mitigate his liability. His offense was not a single or isolated act but it constituted a series of acts committed in a span of several years. In other words, he was a repeated offender, perpetrating his misdeeds with impunity not once, not twice, but several times in three (3) different stations. Time and time again, this Court has emphasized that "the judge is the visible representation of the law, and more importantly, of  justice. ItIt is from him that the people people draw their will and awareness awareness to obey the law. For the judge to return that regard, he must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for others to follow." WHEREFORE, finding Judge Alexander Balut GUILTY of gross misconduct, the Court hereby imposes upon him the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations, except the money value of accrued earned leave credits. Judge Balut is hereby ORDERED to cease and desist immediately from rendering any order or decision, or from continuing any proceedings, in any case whatsoever, effective upon receipt of a copy of this resolution.

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE MCLE REQUIREMENT SHALL NOT BE A GROUND FOR CITING A COUNSEL IN CONTEMPT

ATTY. LUCITA E. MARCELO , Complainant , v. JUDGE PELAGIA J. DALMACIO-JOAQUIN, PRESIDING JUDGE, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, BRANCH 1, SAN JOSE DEL MONTE, BULACAN, Respondent . A.M. No. MTJ-14-1839, July 22, 2015 Facts: Complainant, as counsel for accused in three criminal cases raffled off to respondent judge's sala, failed to appear during the hearing. She reasoned that she was indisposed, and conveyed her condition through a phone call to Randy Sarmiento, Clerk of the Office of City Prosecutor of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan to inform the assigned prosecutor and the trial court. She also instructed her client, Manolito Capingol, through his sister, to inform the trial court of her predicament. Respondent judge issued an Order directing complainant to show cause "why she should not be cited in contempt of court for not appearing in court despite notice and causing delay in the proceedings." Complainant filed a "Compliance and Manifestation" explaining the reason for her absence during the hearing, attaching thereto a medical certificate.chanrobleslaw During the scheduled hearing, complainant verbally objected to the show cause order for lack of basis, to which respondent judge allegedly countered that "the issue was not [her] absence but the failure to indicate in [her] 'Compliance and Manifestation' the details regarding [her] third [Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)] compliance." Complainant stated that she had the honest belief that as a retired prosecutor she was exempt from the MCLE requirement in accordance with Department of Justice (DOJ) Circular No. 50. In an Order of even date, respondent judge directed complainant to submit her exemption certificate within 10

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

days, which was extended to 15 days upon complainant's motion. Since she failed to obtain immediately a copy of the exemption certificate, complainant wrote a letter addressed to the Clerk of Court of the MTCC, protesting about respondent judge's "sudden shift of focus from [her] absence on the hearing to [her] MCLE Certification"; stating her belief that she was exempted from completing the MCLE; and explaining why she could not submit any Certificate of Exemption within the period given by respondent  judge, that is due to the MCLE MCLE Board Board meeting meeting held only once once a month delaying the release of the Certificate of Exemption. The Clerk of Court returned the letter to complainant reasoning that it concerned a court matter.hanrobleslaw Respondent judge issued an Order (1) expunging the Compliance and Manifestation, (2) citing complainant in contempt for failing to comply with the show cause order dated 21 January 2011, and (3) imposing a fine of P2,000. Complainant, through counsel, filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied.chanrobleslaw Respondent judge issued an Order  directing complainant to show cause why she should not be ordered arrested for her failure to pay the fine imposed on her. Thereafter, complainant filed with the trial court a Compliance maintaining that she "[had] not the slightest intention to defy lawful court orders." Complainant reiterated the reason for her absence during the 21 January 2011 hearing and her honest belief that she was exempted from the MCLE requirement as a retired city prosecutor pursuant to DOJ Circular No. 50. Complainant claimed that "her absence in court and/or her failure to timely submit the Certificate of MCLE Exemption does not fall within the ambit of the enumerated acts in Section 3, Rule 71 which constitutes indirect contempt."hanrobleslaw

Respondent judge issued an Order for the arrest of complainant for non-payment of the fine. Complainant paid the P2,000 fine, thereby lifting the warrant of arrest.  An administrativ administrative e complaint complaint was filed by Atty. Lucita E. Marcelo against Judge Pelagia J. Dalmacio-Joaquin, Presiding Judge of MTCC-San Jose del Monte for grave abuse of authority, grave misconduct, and violation of Section 4(a), (b), and (c) of Republic  Act No. 6713 (RA 6713) In her Complaint, complainant alleged that respondent judge issued the contempt orders "out of her whims and caprices and without any legal basis therefor."Complainant further alleged that respondent judge "deprived her of the opportunity to defend herself against her unjust orders by refusing to consider all the explanation, compliance, and/or correspondence she filed as expunged pleadings under the cloak of non-compliance with the MCLE requirements." Complainant alleged that her nonappearance in just one hearing due to a justifiable reason or her failure to indicate the details of her third MCLE Compliance does not fall under any of the particular acts which constitute indirect contempt under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. In her Comment, respondent judge explained that she cites in contempt only those lawyers or litigants who fail to submit satisfactory explanations to show cause orders and only after giving them sufficient time to submit explanations or compliances. She admitted citing complainant in contempt since complainant submitted an explanation or compliance which the trial court did not consider filed or was ordered expunged from the records for not being compliant with the MCLE requirement. Respondent judge claimed that it was complainant who had the

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

propensity to do improper acts as a legal practitioner such as sending a letter to the Clerk of Court asking her to reschedule a hearing, when what should have been done was to submit a timely motion for cancellation or postponement of hearing. In another instance, complainant, instead of submitting a compliance to the trial court's show cause order by way of pleading, sent a letter-explanation which was not considered at all, since the show cause order called for a formal pleading that conforms with the prescribed rules. Respondent judge further pointed out that complainant filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan challenging the show cause and contempt orders and the P2,000 fine imposed by respondent judge for being issued with grave abuse of authority. Respondent judge stressed that the petition for certiorari was dismissed for being moot since complainant already paid the fine. Respondent judge alleged that complainant was impelled by revenge in filing the administrative case because it was respondent judge who initiated a financial audit in the MTCC-San Jose del Monte, which resulted in the dismissal of complainant's son, then acting clerk of court, who was found guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, and gross neglect of duty.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of grave abuse of authority.

HELD: YES. The records show that respondent judge directed complainant to show cause why she should not be cited in contempt for not appearing during the hearing. In her Compliance and Manifestation, complainant explained that she was unable to attend the scheduled hearing because she was unwell, which condition was relayed to her client and the office of the prosecutor for the information of the trial court. Complainant attached a

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

medical certificate to support her explanation. However, complainant's Compliance and Manifestation lacked the number and date of issue of her MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Exemption. For this reason alone, respondent judge admits expunging the Compliance and Manifestation and eventually citing complainant in contempt for failure to file a satisfactory explanation for her non-appearance. Respondent judge did not review or consider complainant's explanation for her absence during the hearing. In the interest of substantial justice, respondent judge should have relaxed the application of Bar Matter No. 1922; accepted complainant's Compliance and Manifestation; and should not have expunged the same from the records. Besides, complainant was not without reason for not indicating the MCLE information, that is, her honest belief of her exemption from such requirement. At any rate, complainant applied for a Certificate of Exemption and completed the units for her third MCLE Compliance period. Yet, her application for exemption remained pending when the contempt order was issued. As noted by the OCA, the delay in the issuance of the Certificate of Exemption should not be taken against her. Reviewing the records, we find that complainant exhibited respect and obedience to the trial court's orders. There is clearly no disobedience, much less defiance, on the part of complainant against respondent judge's authority. In other words, there is no contempt of court to speak of, which has been defined as "a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during litigation." chanrobleslaw

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

While respondent judge has inherent contempt powers, the same should be exercised judiciously, sparingly, and with utmost restraint. Respondent judge miserably failed to exercise restraint. She cited complainant in contempt on the sole ground that complainant failed to file a satisfactory explanation for her nonappearance before the court. Yet, the records clearly show that complainant filed a satisfactory explanation, albeit lacking the required MCLE information. Indeed, respondent judge demonstrated grave abuse of authority, which has been defined as "a misdemeanor committed by a public officer, who under color of his office, wrongfully inflicts upon any person any bodily harm, imprisonment or other injury; it is an act  cruelty, severity, or excessive use of authority ." ." To repeat, of  cruelty, respondent judge strictly, albeit unreasonably, applied the provisions of Bar Matter No. 1922 in expunging the Compliance and Manifestation. Respondent judge equated the expunged explanation to non-filing of a satisfactory explanation when in fact complainant filed a sufficient explanation for her non-appearance. We find unsubstantiated respondent judge's accusation of ill-will or revenge as motive for the filing of this administrative complaint. Respondent judge did not adduce any evidence to prove such allegation. On complainant's sending of letters addressed to the Clerk of the trial court concerning court matters, we remind complainant to file the appropriate pleadings or motions directly with the trial court.

WHEREFORE,  we find respondent Judge Pelagia J. DalmacioJoaquin, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, GUILTY of grave abuse of authority and accordingly REPRIMAND  her, with a STERN

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

WARNING  that a repetition of the same, or any similar infraction in the future, shall be dealt with more severely.

TO BE HELD LIABLE FOR GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW, THE JUDGE MUST BE SHOWN TO HAVE COMMITTED AN ERROR THAT WAS GROSS OR PATENT, DELIBERATE OR MALICIOUS

ARIEL "AGA" MUHLACH v. EXECUTIVE JUDGE (EJ) MA. ANGELA ACOMPAÑADO-ARROYO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN JOSE CITY, CAMARINES SUR A.M. No. RTJ-15-2439 (Formerly: OCA I.P.I. No. 12-3989-RTJ), August 26, 2015 PEREZ, J.:

FACTS: Francisco Perico Dizon, et. al. filed a petition before the MCTC of San Jose-Presentacion, Camarines Sur praying for the exclusion of Ariel and Charlene Mae G. Muhlach (Spouses Muhlach) from the list of voters of Precinct No. 10A, Brgy. San Juan, San Jose, Camarines Sur. The case was docketed as Spec. Pro. No. 80.

Hon. Angel A. Tadeo, MCTC, San Jose-Presentacion, Camarines Sur voluntarily recused himself from hearing the case on the ground that petitioner Edgar Malate is a cousin of his late motherin-law and Francisco Perico-Dazon is the son-in-law of the his former clerk of court, Florecito V. Patrocinio.

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

EJ Arroyo scheduled the raffle of the case and was eventually raffled to Judge Ricky C. Begino (Judge Begino). The Office of the Clerk of Court received a copy of the Order of Inhibition of Judge Begino, which states that: “ An  An (sic) oral motion motion of the the counsel counsel of the respondents, undersigned judge hereby inhibit (sic) himself from further trying and ruling of this case to avoid any doubt as to the impartiality of this court. ”

EJ Arroyo issued the assailed order which rendered ineffective the order of inhibition of Judge Begino. It further directed Judge Begino to continue to hear and decide the case. Judge Begino proceeded with the hearing of the case and resolved and ruled that the Court is not convinced of the merit being shown by [Spouses Muhlach] for the Undersigned Judge (Judge for brevity) to inhibit from hearing and deciding this case.

Judge Begino granted the petition for exclusion. Aggrieved, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint against EJ  Arroyo. He accused accused EJ Arroyo of of having having issued issued the assailed assailed order, which rendered ineffective the order of inhibition of Judge Begino, with abuse of authority and with gross ignorance of law and procedure. Complainant contended that EJ Arroyo had no authority to reverse Judge Begino's order inhibiting himself as such power is vested solely in the Supreme Court.

EJ Arroyo explained that she noticed in Judge Begino's order of inhibition that on its face, it was improper or defective. She averred that she was not ignorant of Administrative Circular No. 1 dated 28 January 1998 which provided that “the duty of the executive judge is to appoint another trial judge under his/her

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

supervision to handle the inhibited case or to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court. ” EJ Arroyo further explained that the subject case is a petition for exclusion of the names of Spouses Muhlach from the list of voters which should be decided within ten days from its filing.

She alleged that after Judge Begino decided the case in favor of the petitioners and ordered the exclusion of Spouses Muhlach from the voters list, Spouses Muhlach appealed the decision to the RTC. It was raffled to Branch 40 presided over by Judge Noel Paulite (Judge Paulite) who eventually rendered a decision affirming the decision of Judge Begino.

Spouses Muhlach thereafter filed a Motion for the Inhibition of Judge Paulite.

EJ Arroyo submits that should Judge Paulite grant the motion for inhibition, a dilemma would arise because the case would be assigned to Branch 58 where she is the presiding judge, there being only two branches in RTC San Jose. She claimed that such scenario would lead her to inhibit from the case because of the administrative complaint filed against her. Consequently, the case will be referred to the nearest RTC and raffled among the judges in that jurisdiction. She opined that other delaying tactics may be employed, and soon, it would already be elections day without the case having decided. Finally, she averred that she had been a  judge for 11 years years and and this is the first time that that an administrative administrative case has been filed against her.

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

ISSUE: Whether or not EJ Arroyo can be held liable for ignorance of the law and abuse of discretion.

hearing, would be meaningless if the ultimate decision would come from a partial and biased judge. Certainly, a presiding judge must maintain and preserve the trust and faith of the partieslitigants.

HELD: NO. The rule on inhibition and disqualification of judges is set forth in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

 A judge judge may, in the exercise exercise of of his sound sound discretion, discretion, disqualify disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

The aforesaid rule enumerates the specific grounds upon which a  judge may may be disqualified disqualified from participating participating in a trial. ItIt must be be borne in mind that the inhibition of judges is rooted in the Constitution, specifically Article III, the Bill of Rights, which requires that a hearing is conducted before an impartial and disinterested tribunal because unquestionably, every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial  judge. All the other elements elements of due process, like like notice notice and and

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

We agree with EJ Arroyo that the inhibition of Judge Begino is lacking in some elements. Judge Begino simply ruled that he is inhibiting from the case to avoid any doubts as to the impartiality of the court. Although voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge, such should still comply with the provisions of the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules, that is, it should be based on  just or valid valid reasons. reasons. In the subject subject order, order, the reason reason for for the inhibition of the judge was not stated. Neither could it be determined from the motion of the Spouses Muhlach's counsel since the motion was done orally, in violation of Section 213 of the same rule.

When EJ Arroyo declared that Judge Begino's order of inhibition was ineffective, she was in a way, returning the case back to the presiding judge for the latter to either cure the deficiency or take cognizance of the case if he finds no basis for the motion. As EJ  Arroyo explaine explained, d, she was aware aware that she she had no authority authority to revoke or disapprove the order of inhibition, as such is vested only in the Supreme Court. It was for that reason that she used the word "ineffective." Tersely put, EJ Arroyo did not reverse the Order of Inhibition of Judge Begino. She correctly asked that the Order be completed to comply with the Rule on Inhibition of Judges.

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

When Judge Begino continued with the proceedings, it was a manifestation and admission on his part that he can hear and decide the case with the cold neutrality expected from an impartial magistrate. His. subsequent ruling on the Urgent Omnibus Motion filed by counsel for the Spouses Muhlach affirmed EJ Arroyo's position that the earlier order issued on the basis of the oral motion was defective. The assailed order of EJ Arroyo was issued in the proper exercise of her administrative functions.

Moreover, to be held liable for gross ignorance of the law, the  judge must must be shown shown to to have committed committed an error error that was gross or patent, deliberate or malicious. Here, it was clearly established that the only intention of EJ Arroyo was to ensure that the case is decided expeditiously and within the period provided under the law. There was no showing that she was moved by ill-will or malicious intention to violate existing Court issuances. In fact, bad faith may be attributed to the complainant for filing successive motions for inhibition.

While it was pronounced in relation to the performance by judges of their judicial functions, we find that in the matter of their administrative duties, it can likewise be said that as a matter of public policy, a judge cannot be subjected to liability for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his  judgment.  judgment.

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the instant administrative complaint filed by Ariel "Aga" Muhlach against Executive Judge Ma. Angela Acompafiado-Arroyo, Regional Trial Court, San Jose City, Camarines Sur for ignorance of the law and abuse of discretion is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

RESPONSIBILITIES AND LIMITATIONS IN ACTING ON THE MOTIONS FOR IMMEDIATE EXECUTION OF THE JUDGMENTS.

A.M. No. RTJ-08-2102 (Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2762RTJ), October 14, 2015 SUGNI REALTY HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN/PRESIDENT, CYNTHIA CRUZ KHEMANI , Complainant , v. JUDGE BERNADETTE S. PAREDES-ENCINAREAL, [THEN IN HER CAPACITY AS ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 10, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, IN DIPOLOG CITY], PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 12, OROQUIETA CITY , Respondent . DECISION BERSAMIN,

J .:

Antecedents: On September 25, 2001, the complainant instituted the action for unlawful detainer against Spouses Rally and Noemi Falame in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2, of Dipolog City. The MTCC rendered its decision in favor of the complainant, which promptly filed a Motion for Execution Pending  Appeal. However, the MTCC did not resolve the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal,  and instead elevated the records to the RTC in Dipolog City in view of the Falames' filing of

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

their Notice of Appeal . In the RTC, the appeal was assigned to Branch 10, where respondent Judge was the Acting Presiding Judge. 6 On August 19, 2005, the complainant filed an  Urgent Motion to Dismiss Appeal, averring as grounds for dismissal the Falames' failure to post the supersedeas bond, and to deposit the monthly rental of P350,000.00. 7 According to the complainant, however, respondent Judge did not resolve its  Urgent Motion to Dismiss  Appeal but instead issued the order dated September 26, 2005, quoted as follows: To stay execution of judgment pending appeal, the defendantsappellants may post supersedeas bond within 20 days from the receipt of the copy of this order, in the aggregate amount of THREE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P350,000.00) PESOS per month beginning October 2, 2000 up to this date. The amount fixed is pursuant to the decision rendered by the court a quo in paragraph 2 of the dispositive portion (sic). Further pending appeal, the same monthly amount shall be deposited periodically as it falls due every month with the RTC Clerk of Court of Dipolog City. 8 The complainant, undaunted, filed an  Urgent Motion To Resolve and Grant Immediately ,9 whereby it reminded respondent Judge to resolve the previous motions. Ignoring the reminder, respondent Judge issued the order whereby she denied the complainant's Urgent Motion to Dismiss Appeal . The complainant insists that the order was null and void because respondent Judge had by then been relieved as the Acting Presiding Judge of the issuing court. 11

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

In her comment, 12 respondent Judge explained that she did not resolve the complainant's Motion for Execution Pending Appeal because the motion was addressed to and filed in the MTCC; that belying the allegation of delay, she stressed that there is no such thing. Regarding the order denying the motion to dismiss, Respondent Judge argued that she had the authority under item 2 of A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC to still issue the order. Respondent Judge posited that the charges of corruption, bias, and partiality against her were frivolous, despicable and allegations without proof. On November 28, 2007, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended the case to be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter, and to refer the case to any of the Justices of the Court of Appeals (CA) in the Cagayan de Oro City Station for investigation, report and recommendation. 24

Report of the Investigating Justice On July 24, 2008, this Court received from Justice Lloren the entire records of the case, 35 including his undated report, 36 whereby he recommended as follows:

WHEREFORE , in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that: 1) respondent be found guilty of violation of Supreme Court circular A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC for the issuance of the September 26, 2005 Order and be imposed a fine of P 21,000.00; 2) the charge of gross ignorance of the law for the issuance of the November 8, 2005 Order (denial of urgent motion to dismiss) be dismissed for lack of merit; and

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

3) the charge of corruption, bias, and partiality be likewise dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. 37

Ruling of the Court We AFFIRM the findings of Justice Lloren on the matter of the order of September 26, 2005, but differ from his conclusion about the order of November 8, 2005. We further AFFIRM the recommendations to dismiss the charge of unreasonable delay for being unfounded; and the charge of corruption, bias and prejudice for lack of evidence.chanrobleslaw

I In issuing the order of September 26, 2005, respondent respondent Judge disregarded the pertinent rule on the filing of the s u p e r s e d e a s  bond   bond and monthly deposits Respondent Judge was charged with gross ignorance of the law or procedure, bias and prejudice on the basis that her order of September 26, 2005 had effectively extended the Falames' period for the posting of the supersedeas bond and for depositing the monthly rental specified in the decision of the MTCC. In the complainant's view, she had no authority to do so under the law and jurisprudence. Justice Lloren found the charge warranted. He concluded in his report that the issuance of the order of September 26, 2005 did not accord with the law and  jurisprudence.  jurisprudence. We concur with Justice Lloren's finding against respondent Judge.

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court  provides:  provides: Section 19. I mmediate execution of judgment; how to stay same. - If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution

shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the  judgment appealed appealed from, from, and unless, during during the the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court . In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with the other papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed, x x x (bold emphasis supplied) Respondent Judge could not sincerely insist that the order of September 26, 2005 was regular. The actions she could or could not take as an appellate judge in an ejectment case were fully outlined in Section 19, supra. A rule as plain and explicit as Section 19 is not liable to be misread or misapplied, but should only be implemented without hesitation or equivocation. Her issuance of the order of September 26, 2005 thus constituted, gross ignorance of the law or procedure, for she was not a trial  judge bereft of of pertinent pertinent experience experience on dealing dealing with issues on immediate execution in ejectment cases. Gross ignorance of the law or procedure is a serious

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

charge. 39 Such offense may be penalized with dismissal from the service, or suspension from office without pay for more than three months but not exceeding six months, or a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. 40 As penalty, therefore, respondent Judge is fined in the amount of P21,000.00, and, in addition, she is warned against a similar offense, or else she will be more sternly dealt with. This case presents the opportune occasion to remind judges of the first level courts to always adhere to the mandate of Section 19, supra, by issuing writs of execution upon motion of the plaintiffs in actions for ejectment whenever the defendants have failed to stay execution. They should not leave to the appellate courts the action on the motions for execution because that action would be too late in the context of Section 19. The trial and appellate judges should constantly be mindful of the summary nature of the ejectments actions, and of the purpose underlying the mandate for immediate execution, which is to prevent the plaintiffs from being further deprived of their rightful possession. 41Otherwise, they stand liable for gross ignorance of the law or procedure.

II Respondent Judge was not guilty of unreasonable delay in resolving the M o t i o n f o r E x e c u t i o n P e n d i n g A p p e a l   The failure of respondent Judge to resolve in a timely manner the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal  the  the complainant had filed on June 21, 2005 constituted delay. However, Justice Lloren did not want her to be held to account for the delay because July 18, 2005, the day on which the motion would be heard, had coincided with Law Day, an event that the Court had required the entire Judiciary to observe. She thus felt constrained to cancel not only the hearing of the complainant's motions but also the

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

hearings in other cases set on said date. If the delay could not be attributed to respondent Judge on the basis of her plausible explanation, she was not guilty of unreasonable delay. 42

III In issuing the order of November November 8, 2005, respondent Judge acted without authority; but she could not be held accountable without proof of her malice, bad faith, fraud, dishonesty and corrupt motives  Although  Although respondent respondent Judge supposedly supposedly relied relied on item item 2 of of A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC to justify her issuance of the order of November 8, 2005 despite her being no longer the Acting Presiding Judge of the issuing court, Justice Lloren recommended that she be fined in the amount of P 21,000.00 for violating the guidelines for relieved detailed judges set under items 5 and 6 of A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC. We would readily join the recommendation of Justice Lloren. The basic postulate is for all judges to follow the guidelines set by the Court to ensure the just, speedy and inexpensive administration of  justice. The The non-observa non-observance nce of the guidelines guidelines inevitably inevitably results in unfairness and inefficiency. Respondent Judge had been definitely aware of her relief as the detailed Presiding Judge of the issuing court since October 6, 2005, the date she received via fax the copy of Administrative Order 159-2005 dated October 3, 2005 revoking her designation as the Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 10 of the RTC. Her correct course of action would have been to desist from taking any further action in the case, including denying the complainant's Motion to Dismiss Appeal  through  through the order of November 8, 2005, until the specific guidelines set under items 5 and 6 of A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC were first complied with. But she ignored these guidelines, particularly that which required that -

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

xxx the judge conducting the inventory shall cause the

issuance to the parties of a notice of transfer/detail/assignment transfer/detail/assignment of the judge to which the case had been assigned, with a directive for the plaintiff/s to manifest, within five (5) days from receipt of such notice, whether or not he/she desires that the transferred judge should should decide the case. The desire of the plaintiff, plaintiff, who may opt to have the case decided by the new judge, shall be respected. Nonetheless, respondent Judge's issuance of the order of November 8, 2005 should not be considered as censurable conduct in the absence of the substantial showing of her having done so with malice, or in bad faith, or with fraud or dishonesty, or with a corrupt motive. Considering that her good faith was presumed, the complainant carried the burden to establish her having acted with malice, or bad faith, or with fraud, or with dishonesty, or with a corrupt motive. Yet, the complainant did not discharge its burden. Moreover, her denial of the complainant's Motion to Dismiss Appeal through the order of November 8, 2005 could have also been characterized as an error of judgment on her part. That characterization was far from improbable because, after all, she was not an infallible functionary of the Judiciary. Accordingly, she should not be disciplined.

IV Charges of corruption, bias and partiality were not substantiated Justice Lloren's report acknowledged that the complainant did not substantiate the charge of corruption against respondent Judge after its lone witness did not appear at the scheduled hearings. The complainant did not also substantiate its charge of bias and partiality against her. Hence, Justice Lloren recommended the

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

dismissal of such charges. The recommendation is well-taken. Mere allegation of corruption, bias and partiality is insufficient to establish the accusation. Dismissal of the accusation should follow.

WHEREFORE , the Court: ( a) FINDS and DECLARES  respondent Judge Bernadette Paredes-Encinareal guilty of gross ignorance of the law or procedure for issuing the order dated September 26, 2005, and, accordingly, FINES her in the amount of P21,000.00 with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely; (b) DISMISSES the charge of unreasonable delay in resolving the complainant's Motion for  filed on June 14, 2005 for its lack of Execution Pending Appeal  filed merit; and (c) ABSOLVES  respondent Judge Bernadette Paredes-Encinareal of the charges of corruption, bias, and partiality for lack evidence.

SO ORDERED.

UNDUE DELAY IN RESOLVING CASES AMOUNTS TO NEGLIGENCE AND DERELICTION OF DUTY

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR , Petitioner , v. RETIRED JUDGE FILEMON A. TANDINCO, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES (MTCC), CALBAYOG CITY, SAMAR AND RONALDO C. DIONEDA, CLERK OF COURT OF THE MTCC, CALBAYOG CITY, SAMAR, Respondent 

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

A.M. No. MTJ-10-1760, November 16, 2015 BRION, J.

7. Judge Lampasa Lampasa failed to decide ten (10) criminal criminal cases

FACTS: This administrative matter arose from the judicial audit conducted by an audit team from the Office of the Court  Administrator  Administrator at the Municipal Municipal Trial Court in Cities ( MTCC ), ), Calbayog City, Samar, then presided by Judge Felimon S. Tandinco, Jr. The judicial audit was done prior to Judge Tandinco's retirement. Judge Tandinco was assisted in his court by Judge Alma-Uy-Lampasa ( Judge Lampasa). Thereafter, Judge Lampasa's appointment was revoked.

 Accordng  Accordng to the the records records actually actually presented presented and and examined examined by the the audit team - the MTCC, Calbayog City, Samar, had a total caseload of 940 cases, consisting of 607 criminal and 333 civil cases. Of these 940 cases audited, the audit team found that:

1. Judge Tandinco failed to resolve motions and incidents in thirty (30) criminal cases. 2. Judge Tandinco failed to resolve motions and incidents in sixty- seven (67) civil cases , 3. Judge Tandinco Tandinco failed to decide forty-six forty-six (46) criminal criminal cases submitted for decision. 4. Judge Tandinco Tandinco failed to decide twenty twenty (20) civil cases submitted for decision 5. Judge Lampasa failed to resolve motions and incidents in ninety-six (96) criminal cases

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

6. Judge Lampasa failed to resolve motions and incidents in thirty-two (32) civil cases

8. Judge Lampasa failed to decide eight (8) civil cases

Moreover, based on the Monthly Report of cases in the same court submitted to the Statistical Report Division of the Court Management Office for December 2009, the audit team discovered that:

1. Judge Tandinco Tandinco failed failed to decide decide twenty-four twenty-four (24) criminal cases submitted for decision , 2. Judge Tandinco failed to decide twelve (12) civil cases

submitted for decision

The audit team observed that many of the case folders were not presented to them while the other case records were not accurate due to the absence of the latest court orders. Records also showed that neither Judge Tandinco nor Judge Lampasa requested an extension of time within which to decide the cases submitted before them. Finally, the audit team reported that: several case records were not chronologically arranged and lacked certain documents ( i.e., certificates of arraignment, formal offer of evidence, writs of execution); the case rollos/records of the cases that were jointly tried lacked a mother record containing all documents; summons were issued in criminal cases falling under the Rule on Summary Procedure; there were no records indicating that the accused had

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

been arraigned in Criminal Cases Nos. 9548, 13719 and 13720; the court's docket books needed updating; and the employees should be reminded to wear their identification cards.

The Court docketed the judicial audit as an administrative case against Judge Tandinco for gross incompetence, inefficiency, negligence, and dereliction of duty. The Court also directed Judge Lampasa and Ronaldo C. Dioneda ( Dioneda), the Clerk of Court of the MTCC, Calbayog City, Samar, to submit their written explanation.

ISSUE:  Whether or not Judge Tandinco, Judge Lampasa, and the clerk of court shall be administratively liable

system.

This is embodied in Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which states that a j u d g e s h a l l d i s p o s e

of t h e c o u r t ' s b u s i n e s s p r o m p t l y a n d d e c i d e c a s es es w i t h i n t h e required periods  ; and in Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code

of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary (which  ju d g es sh al l p er fo r m al l ju di c ia l d u ti es , in c lu d in g provides that ju the delivery of reserved dec isions , efficiently, efficiently, fairly, fairly, and with ) .10 r e a s o n a b l e p r o m p t n e s s ).10

No less than the Constitution requires that cases at the trial court level be resolved within three (3) months from the date they are submitted for decision, that is, upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.11 This three-month or ninety-day period is mandatory12 and failure to comply can subject the  judge to disciplin disciplinary ary action.

HELD:

With respect to Judge Tandinco

YES. Judge Tandinco is liable. This Court has consistently impressed upon the members of the Bench the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously, on the time-honored principle that justice delayed is justice denied.  As frontline frontline officials officials of the Judiciary, Judiciary, trial trial court judges should should at all times act with dedication, efficiency, and a high sense of duty and responsibility as the delay in the disposition of cases is a major culprit in the erosion of public faith and confidence in the judicial

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

In the present case, Judge Tandinco did not deny the veracity of the audit team's findings that he failed to decide several criminal and civil cases submitted for decision, as well as the pending motions and incidents submitted for resolution. The audit team's report showed that the Court, through Administrative Order No. 152-2007 dated October 8, 2007, directed Judge Tandinco to decide within six (6) months from notice all cases submitted for decision. The Court further required him to submit to the OCA monthly progress reports with attached copies of the decisions. Judge Tandinco failed to do so.

 As the presiding judge of of the MTCC, MTCC, Calbayog, Calbayog, City City Samar, Samar, Judge Tandinco had the duty to keep track of the development of the

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

cases pending before his sala and to take note of the cases that were ripe for decision or resolution. More importantly, Judge Tandinco had the sworn duty to decide the cases and to resolve the matters without undue delay. If he had known that he could not decide the cases within the reglementary period, he should have requested additional time to decide the cases. Judge Tandinco never did.

The Court, in several instances, has allowed extensions of time to decide cases beyond the 90-day period. All that a judge needs to do is to request from the Court an extension of time to decide the cases, and to justify any request for additional time. However, in the present case, the record does not show any attempt by Judge Tandinco to request a reasonable extension of time to dispose of the submitted cases and matters before him. Thus, his failure to decide several cases and to resolve the motions and incidents within the reglementary period, without strong and justifiable reason, constitutes gross incompetence, inefficiency, negligence, and dereliction of duty, warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions.

With respect to Judge Lampasa

YES. Judge Lampasa is liable. The court find that her explanation - the revocation of her designation was way beyond the reglementary period to decide the cases - does not sufficiently  justify the the delay in the disposition disposition of the the court's business. business. Based Based on the OCA report, in almost two years of her designation as  Assisting  Assisting Judge of the MTCC, Calbayog Calbayog City, Samar, Samar, Judge Judge Lampasa still failed to resolve the motions and incidents in ninety-

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

five (95) criminal cases and thirty-two (32) civil cases. She also invokes her additional court assignments in two other courts and a heavy caseload for the delay and failure to decide cases already submitted for decision. We find her explanation unsatisfactory. A heavy caseload or the assignment of additional functions does not exonerate her.15 If Judge Lampasa could not decide the cases within the reglementary period, all she needed to do was to ask for extension of time to decide them. This, she also failed to do.

Under Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution, judges of the lower courts are mandated to resolve or decide matters and cases within the reglementary period of ninety (90) days. This mandate applies not only to the presiding judges assigned to each court, but also to judges who are tasked to assist other judges in the resolution of cases. Considering that Judge Lampasa failed to resolve the motions and incidents in ninety-five (95) criminal cases and thirty-two (32) civil cases, and had belatedly resolved three (3) other civil cases, we agree with the OCA that Judge Lampasa should likewise be held administratively liable.

With respect to the clerk of Court

YES. Atty. Dioneda is liable. He submitted his compliance with an attached chart of actions taken on the pending cases and motions assigned to Judge Lampasa. However, he failed to offer any valid

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

reason for failing to present the case records to the audit team. He likewise failed to attach the copy of any order, resolution, or decision on the said cases. We also note the audit team's report that several case records were not chronologically arranged and lacked certain documents (i.e., certificates of arraignment, formal offer of evidence, writs of execution); the court's docket books need updating, and the rollos and records of the cases that were jointly tried lacked a mother record containing all documents. These circumstances clearly indicate poor management of the court docket and poor record keeping. Dioneda, whose responsibilities include ensuring that the case records are safely kept and organized and are readily available upon the request of the proper parties, was himself remiss in the performance of his functions. His failure to immediately present all the case records prevented the audit team from examining and auditing the cases with accuracy. Branch clerk of courts must realize that their administrative functions are vital to the prompt and proper administration of justice. They play a big role in the complement of the court and thus cannot be permitted to slacken in their jobs under one pretext or another. For Dioneda's failure to comply with the Court's Resolutions dated  April 26, 2010; February February 7, 2011; 2011; and and March 23, 2011, 2011, respectively, we find him guilty of simple neglect of duty.

Samar, GUILTY of GROSS INCOMPETENCE, INEFFICIENCY, NEGLIGENCE, and DERELICTION OF DUTY.  Accordingly,  Accordingly, the the Court imposes on him a FINE in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) to be deducted from his retirement benefits. The Court finds Judge Alnia Uy-Lampasa, then Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, baramZumarraga, GUILTY of UNDUE DELAY IN RENDERING A DECISION OR ORDER . Accordingly, the Court imposes upon her a FINE in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), payable within thirty (30) days from notice. The Court finds Ronaldo C. Dioneda, Clerk of Court of the MTCC, Calbayog City, Samar, GUILTY of SIMPLE SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY. Accordingly, the Court imposes on him a FINE in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely. GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW AND PROCEDURE; BIAS  AND PARTIALI PARTIALITY TY

Gaspar Bandoy v. Judge Jose Jacinto AM No. RTJ-15-2399 Nov. 19, 2014 Mendoza, J Facts: Complainant Bandoy alleged, that he was one of the

WHEREFORE , premises considered, the Court finds retired Judge Filemon A. Tandinco, Jr., then Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Calbayog City,

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

accused in a case of Serious Illegal Detention filed by one Romulo De Jesus, which was raffled to Branch 44 of the RTC, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, where respondent Judge Jacinto, Jr. was the  Assisting  Assisting Presiding Presiding Judge. Judge. Bandoy Bandoy claimed claimed that that the case case was was initiated by De Jesus, Jr. to get back at him for being instrumental

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

in the filing of an earlier criminal complaint against him for Ballot Switching, the same case.

Bandoy also averred that he was an election watcher of former Mayor Joel Panaligan during the 2007 local elections, while De Jesus, Jr., a teacher of their municipality’s public elementary school, was one of the chairpersons of the Board of Election Inspectors; that they were both assigned in Precinct 3-A of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro; that De Jesus, Jr. was rumored to be closely associated with the rival mayoralty candidate, Voltaire Anthony C. Villarosa, that in the said local elections, De Jesus, Jr. was caught in the act of ballot switching, and as a result of which, he was criminally charged and a warrant of arrest was issued against him.

 According  According to Bandoy, Bandoy, on on August August 20, 2007, De De Jesus, Jesus, Jr. personally appeared before Provincial Prosecutor to file a criminal case for Serious Illegal Detention against him and several others, apparently while there was a standing warrant of arrest against him.

Bandoy further claims that Judge Jacinto, Jr. committed grave abuse of his authority by displaying manifest bias and partiality in favor of De Jesus, Jr.  when he granted several postponements of De Jesus, Jr. ’s arraignment, which was reset for seven times until De Jesus, Jr. entered a plea of not guilty supposedly insid e Judge Jacinto, Jr.’s chambers.

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

He claimed that Judge Jacinto, Jr. ordered the police and the CIDG to re-arrest him and his co-accused even though there was no warrant of arrest against them.

In his Comment, Judge Jacinto, Jr. denied being an ally of the Villarosa clan. He also denied having a hand in the order to arrest Bandoy and his co-accused.

Bandoy, in his Reply, brought to the attention of the Court that Judge Jacinto, Jr., in order to thwart the enemies of his supposed master, Mayor Villarosa, issued warrants of arrest against ten individuals. He also divulged that the audit team

from the Court was personally assisted by Judge Jacinto, Jr. and given accommodations in "Aroma Center," one of the properties of Mayor Villarosa.

In his Rejoinder, Judge Jacinto, Jr. clarified that he indeed issued warrants of arrest against ten individuals in connection with a serious illegal detention case against them, but only after a finding of probable cause by the public prosecutor handling it. He reiterated that he merely affirmed the finding of probable cause, which justified the issuance of the warrants of arrest as the charge was a non-bailable offense. He likewise denied seeking any favor from Mayor Villarosa to accommodate the audit team in their property, the Aroma Family Hotel. He explained that the audit team paid him a "courtesy call" where he assured the team of his cooperation.

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) did not give credence to Bandoy’s allegation that Judge Jacinto, Jr. issued a n order for his arrest without a warrant and to the insinuation that the Court’s audit team was conveniently housed in Aroma Family Hotel of the Villarosas for failure to present proof.33 The OCA

observed, however, that Judge Jacinto, Jacinto, Jr. never refuted the allegations of leniency  over the several resettings of the arraignment of De Jesus, Jr. and that the arraignment was held in his chambers, and as such found Judge jacinto GUILTY OF BIAS

AND PARTIALITY AND GROSS IGNORANCE OF LAW AND PROCEDURE.

Issue: W/N respondent is guilty gross ignorance of law and procedure as well as of bias and partiality?

Held: Yes. Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code ofJudicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence. Indeed, competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office. Given the exacting standards required of magistrates in the application of the law and procedure, the Court finds Judge Jacinto, Jr. administratively guilty of gross ignorance of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Court, specifically Section 1(a) thereof requiring arraignment of an accused to be made in open court, to wit: Section 1. Arraignment and plea, how made.  – (a)  – (a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or information was filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be made in open court  xxx

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

Thus, anything less than is required by Section 1(a) of Rule 116 constitutes gross ignorance of the law. There is gross

ignorance of the law when the error committed by the judge was "gross or patent, deliberate or malicious." It may also be committed when a judge ignores, contradicts or fails to apply settled law and jurisprudence because of bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.  Gross ignorance of the law or incompetence cannot be excused by a claim of good faith. Canon 2, Rule 2.01 and Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct likewise emphasize that  judges, as officers of the court, have the

duty to see to it that justice is dispensed with evenly and fairly . Not only must they be honest and impartial, but they must also appear to be honest and impartial in the dispensation of  justice. Judges Judges should should make make sure that their their acts are circumspect circumspect and do not arouse suspicion in the minds of the public. When they fail to do so, such acts may cast doubt upon their integrity and ultimately the judiciary in general. Here, the Court cannot fathom why the arraignment of De Jesus, Jr. was postponed from 2007 to 2011 without appropriate action coming from the court. Judge Jacinto, Jr. should have availed of known legal remedies to compel De Jesus, Jr. to personally appear for his arraignment, but he did not. The appearance of leniency seemingly exhibited in favor of De Jesus, Jr. gives an impression of bias and partiality that should be addressed and corrected. WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Jose S. Jacinto, Jr. GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and Procedure and of Bias and Partiality . Accordingly, he is FINED in the amount of Forty Thousand (P40,000.00) Pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

JUDGES: GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW; GROSS MISCONDUCT.

A.M. NO. RTJ-16-2443 (FORMERLY OCA IPINO. 10-3521RTJ), January 11, 2016 ARMANDO M. BALANAY , Complainant , v. JUDGE JULIANA ADALEM WHITE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 5, EASTERN SAMAR, Respondent . DEL CASTILL C ASTILLO, O, J .: FACTS: On September 20, 2010, complainant filed before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) a verified AffidavitComplaint 1 charging respondent with gross ignorance of the law for allowing Isidoro N. Adamas, Jr. (Adamas) six furloughs despite being charged with murder in Criminal Case No. 1007, a non-bailable offense. Worse, respondent granted  Adama's motions motions without without requiring requiring the the prosecution prosecution to comment or giving it opportunity to be heard thereon. Complainant likewise charged respondent with serious misconduct in precipitately dismissing Criminal Case No. 10-07 by declaring that the prosecution had no witnesses to present when the records showed otherwise. According to the complainant, the prosecution witnesses were not able to attend the hearing on July 22, 2010 because they were not duly notified. In fact, he and his son were willing to testify provided they are placed under the witness protection program. Complainant further claimed that respondent falsified the July 22, 2010 transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) in Criminal Case No. 10-07. He averred that during the hearing held on said date, the prosecution made a reservation to present additional witnesses. Respondent, however, instructed her court

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

stenographer, Prescila V. Mosende (Mosende), to delete from said TSN such reservation and insert therein other statements which were not made during the said hearing. In support of his allegations, complainant submitted a piece of paper 2 containing respondent's handwritten notes that were incorporated in the July 22, 2010 TSN. Complainant sought the dismissal of respondent from the service with forfeiture of her retirement benefits. In her Comment, 3  respondent admitted that she instructed Mosende to correct the July 22, 2010 TSN to make it more coherent and accurate. She claimed that the changes were based on her own notes which Mosende adopted after verifying them from the taped recordings of the proceedings. Respondent maintained that the prosecution never made any reservation to present additional witnesses. Respondent explained that she granted Adamas six furloughs based on the affidavits of desistance subscribed before Prosecutor Raquel G. Kho (Prosecutor Kho) which were already attached to the records of Criminal Case No. 10-07. She also insisted that Adamas is not a flight risk because he voluntarily surrendered himself to the police. Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and that complainant be cited for contempt. On June 15, 2011, this Court referred this administrative matter to the Court of Appeals, Cebu Station for raffle among the Justices therein and for the Justice to whom this case would be assigned to conduct an investigation and submit a report and recommendation.

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

Justice Maria Elisa Sempio Diy as the investigating officer found Judge White guilty of gross ignorance of law but not of serious misconduct for want of malicious intent. The OCA however found Judge White guilty on all accounts specially so that there has already been a previous administrative case against Judge White.

ISSUE: WON Judge White is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and serious misconduct

HELD:  A fortiori, respondent respondent is administrativel administratively y liable for gross ignorance of the law for granting ex parte motions to allow  Adama’s temporary liberty without setting the same for hearing.  Adama’ If hearing is indispensable in motions for bail, more so in this case where the motions for the temporary liberty of Adamas were filed without offering any bail or without any prayer that he be released on recognizance. Besides, the reasons relied upon in said motions – motions  – to  to allow Adamas to attend the Sangguniang Bayan sessions  –  – had  had already been rebuked by this Court. In People v. Hon. Maceda, reiterated in Trillanes IV v. Judge Pimentel Sr., this Court held that “all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence cannot practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. ” That the prosecution has already filed affidavits of desistance and that, to the opinion of res pondent, the accused is not a flight risk, do not justify non-compliance with procedural rules. It is basic that bail cannot be allowed without prior hearing. It is also basic that litigious motions that do not contain a notice of hearing are nothing but a useless piece of paper which the court should not act upon. These rules are so elementary that not to know them constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We also agree with the OCA that there is substantial proof to hold respondent liable for gross misconduct even if the altered

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

TSN was not formally offered in evi dence. Respondent admitted in her Comment dated November 24, 2010 and Memorandum dated May 1, 2013 that she instructed Mosende to make some changes in the July 22, 2010 TSN.  A TSN “is supposed to be a beautiful and exact recording of all matters that transpired during a court proceeding. ” Respondent’’s act of directing her subordinate to alter the TSN Respondent by incorporating therein statement pertaining to substantial matters that were not actually made during the hearing constitutes gross misconduct which warrants administrative sanction. For gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct, the respondent judge was suspended from office for one (1) year without salary and other benefits, with a stern warning that the Court will not hesitate to impose the supreme penalty of dismissal from the service, with all its accessory penalties, in case she commits the same or other similar acts. JUDGE WHOSE CRIMINAL CONVICTION ON APPEAL MAY BE SUSPENDED AND DISBARRED

Office of the Court Administrator vs Judge Ruiz AM RTJ 13-2361 || Feb 2 2016

Facts: In April 29, 2013, Judge Ruiz was found guilty by the Sandiganbayan of graft and malversation of public funds which he committed while still a city mayor. His MR and MNT being denied, he brought his case to the SC for review, then went on leave of absence and applied for optional retirement, which is supposedly

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

to take effect on December 2013. (The SC however did not acted on his request because of his standing criminal convictions.) Meanwhile, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended to the SC that its report about Judge Ruiz’ conviction in the Sandiganbayan be converted to a regular administrative complaint against him for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Invoking the SC’s inherent power of supervision over ju dges, the OCA also recommended his preventive suspension. In his comment dated Jan 2014, Judge Ruiz posited that the administrative complaint against him is premature because when it was filed, his Sandiganbayan convictions were not yet final. He also argued that there was no more need to suspend him from office because he should be considered already “retired from government service” when he received the SC resolution dated Nov 20, 2013 suspending him without pay and other monetary benefits.

Issue 1 : W/N the Court still has jurisdiction over Judge Ruiz after after his separation from the service Yes. That a judge has retired or has otherwise been separated from the service does not necessarily divest the Court of its  jurisdiction;  jurisdiction; the jurisdiction jurisdiction existing at the time time of the the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent had ceased in office during the pendency of his case. Nor does separation from office render a pending administrative charge moot and academic. The Court retains jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent public official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof.  A contrary contrary rule would would be fraught with injustice injustice and and pregnant pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications. If innocent, respondent

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

public official merits vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation. (Gallos v Cordero, 1995)

Issue 2: W/N the SC can  preventively suspend  a  a judge while the administrative complaint is still pending Yes. The Court possesses the power to preventively suspend an administratively charged judge until a final decision is reached, particularly when a serious charge is involved and a strong likelihood of guilt exists. This power is inherent in the Court’s power of administrative supervision over all courts and their personnel as a measure to allow unhampered formal investigation. It is likewise a preventive measure to shield the public from any further damage that the continued exercise by the  judge of the functions of his office office may cause. Here, the SC placed the respondent under preventive suspension because he is alleged to have committed transgressions  – violations of RA 3019 and conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude – turpitude  – which  which are classified as serious under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.

Issue 3 : W/N the acts committed by judges or justices  prior  to  to their appointment to the judiciary may be a basis for disciplinary measures by the SC Yes. It is immaterial that the respondent was not yet a member of the Judiciary when he allegedly committed the acts imputed to him; judges may be disciplined for acts committed prior to their appointment to the judiciary.

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ

The Rules of Court itself recognizes this situation, as it provides for the immediate forwarding to the Supreme Court for disposition and adjudication of charges against justices and judges before the IBP, including those filed prior to their appointment to the judiciary . It need not be shown that the respondent continued to do the act or acts complained of; it is sufficient that the evidence on record supports the charge/s against the respondent through proof that the respondent committed the imputed act/s violative of Code of Judicial Conduct and the applicable provisions of the Rules of Court.

Ruiz is administratively liable Issue 4: W/N Judge Ruiz Yes. Viewed against the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses, which are supported by the documents on record, his denial cannot stand. He even failed to substantiate his claim that the charges against him had been politically motivated. Thus, b y s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e ,  it is fully established that Judge Ruiz is guilty of the charges. Considering the nature and extent of the charges, he is now dismissed from service and disbarred.

3G 2015-2016 SAN BEDA COLLEGE MENDIOLA

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY J.F. DE CHAVEZ