34535240 Notes in Political Law Review

PRE-BAR REVIEW NOTES IN POLITICAL LAW (Prepared by Judge ESTELA ALMA A. SINGCO)

ARTICLE I NATIONAL TERRITORY -

Archipelago as defined by Article 46 of UNCLOS: A group of islands, including parts of the islands, interconnecting waters and other natural features which are closely interrelated that such islands, waters, and other natural resources form an intensive geographical, economic, political entity or to have historically regarded as an archipelago.

Archipelagic State- means a State constituted wholly by one or more archipelagos and may include other islands. -

Archipelagic Baselines- basis: UNCLOS: how to treat Kalayaan Group of Islands (KIG) and Scarborough shaol: whether to include or to exclude them from the baselines; and/or consider as part of the regime of islands. -

Kalayaan Islands- part of Region IV-B, Province of Palawan but under the custody of DND. Found some 380 miles west of the southern end of Palawan. -

Scarborough shaol also known as scarborough reef, panatag shoal and Huangyan Dao. Found in the South China Sea, part of the province of Zambales. A shaol is a traingle shaped chain of reefs and islands (but mostly rocks. 55 kilometers around with an area of 150 square kilometer. Its 123 miles west of Subic Bay. Basis: terra nullius; 200 EEZ -

Spratly Archipelago- international reference to the entire archipelago wherein the Kalayaan chain of islands is located. The Philippines essentially claims only the western section of Spratlys, which is nearest to Palawan. RA 9552- redrew the country’s baseline to comply with the UNCLOS requirements for archipelagic state, in the process excluding the disputed Kalayaan Island Group and the Scarborough from the main archipelago and classifying them instead as “regimes of islands”. They excluded from the baselines. The national territory constitutes a -

roughly triangular delineation which excludes large areas of waters within 600 miles by 1,200 miles rectangular enclosing the Philippine archipelago as defined in the Treaty of Paris. Determines the country’s extended continental shelf which is believed to contain substantial amounts of oil, natural gas, minerals and polymetals. Regime of islands – consists of islands or naturally formed areas of land surrounded by water that remain above water during high tide. -

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Constitutional issues: Internal waters vs. Archipelagic waters EEZ; claims over Sabbah and Spratly islands Delineation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris vs. RA 9552 - Right of innocent passage- archipelagic sea lane passage and right of overflight

200-Economic Zone (includes Territorial Seas and Contiguous Zone) – READ: UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. -

Contiguous Zone (12 nm from the end of territorials seas) Teritorial seas/maritime domain (12 nm from baseline) Internal waters vs. Archipelagic waters

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Reagan vs. CIR, 30 SCRA 968- An exception to the full and complete power of a nation within its territories is by virtue of the consent of the nation itself. The embassy premises of a foreign power are within the territorial domain of the host State. The ground occupied as embassy premises is not the territory of the foreign State to which the premises belong. -

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Kalayaan Island Group a) historic right b) P.D. No. 1596, dated June 11, 1978 c) effective occupation d) principle of contiguity because of proximity e) part of the continental shelf c) RA 3046 & RA 5446 c) RA 9552 Freedom islands to which Spratly islands belong- basis: terra

nullius

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ARTICLE II DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES -

Republicanism - Separation of Powers - Principles of Blending of Powers and Checks & Balances - under the principle of separation of powers, courts cannot interfere with the exercise by the legislature of its authority to conduct investigations in aid of legislation (Senate Blue Ribbon vs Majaducon, GR # 136760, July 29, 2003; Executive privilege -Neri vs. Senate Committee, GR. No. 180643, Mach 25, 2008) -

Judicial Review: Requisites (Francisco, et al. vs. HR, et al., November 10, 2003; ABAKADA Guro Party List, et al. vs. Executive Secretary Ermita, September 1, 2005; David et al. vs. Ermita, et al., April 20, 2006).

Local governments: With Rep. Act No. 7160, the union of legislative and executive powers in the office of the local chief executive under the BP Blg. 337 has been disbanded, so that either department now comprises different and non-intermingling official personalities with the end in view of ensuring a better delivery of public service and provide a system of check and balance between the two. The avowed intent of Rep. Act. No. 7160, therefore, is to vest on the Sangguniang Panlalawigan independence in the exercise of its legislative functions vis-a-vis the discharge by the Governor of the executive functions. (Atienza vs. Villarosa, May 10, 2005). •

Non-Delegation of legislative power ( Abakada Guro Party List vs. Executive Secretary, September 1, 2005; Epira case-Gerochi vs. DOE, GR. No. 159796, July 17, 2007). Permissible delegation: 1. tariff powers of the President (Sec. 28 (2) Art. VI) 2. emergency power of the President (Sec. 23 (2) of Art. VI 3. people (Sec. 32 of Art. VI; Sec. 10 of Art. X, Sec. 2 of Art. XVII; RA 6735) 4. local governments (Art X) 5. administrative bodies (power of subordinate legislation) 1.

Tests of valid delegation: completeness test * Gerochi vs. DOE, July 17, 2007 3

2. sufficient standard *Santiago vs. COMELEC, 3/19/97; Abakada Guro Party List vs. Exec. Sec. Incorporation Clause -By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws. [Tanada vs. Angara, May 2, 1997] -

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Incorporated: 1. Treaties duly ratified (Pimentel vs. Ermita, 462 SCRA 622, July 6, 2005) 2. norms of general or customary laws 3. treaties which have become part of customary Law (Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons; Kuroda vs. Jalandoni

Mijares, et al. vs. Javier, et al., April 12, 2005- There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that requires the Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or allow a procedure for the enforcement thereof. However, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules accepted as binding result from the combination two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. -

Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines, vs. Duque, et al., GR No. 1703034, October 9, 2007Customary international law is deemed incorporated into our domestic system. A mere constitutionsl declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law. Lim vs. Exec. Sec., April 11, 2002 – generally accepted principles of International Law, the provisions of a treaty are always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law, or that it is subject to the police power of the State. -

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law -

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in observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 55). In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect – a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution [Sec. of Justice vs. Lantion] - Civilian Supremacy (IBP vs. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81(2000)The calling of the marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian enforcement. Notwithstanding the conduct of joint visibility patrols by the members of PNP and the Philippine marines, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader and it is the local police forces who are in charge at all times. - Gudani vs. Senga, August 15, 2006- The vitality of the tenet that the President is the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces is most crucial to the democratic way of life, to civilian supremacy over the military, and to the general stability of our representative system of government. The Constitution reposes final authority, control and supervision of the AFP to the President, a civilian who is not a member of the armed forces, and whose duties as commander-in-chief represent only a part of the organic duties imposed upon the office, the other functions being clearly civil in nature. Civilian supremacy over the military also countermands the notion that the military may bypass civilian authorities, such as civil courts, on matters such as conducting warrantless searches and seizure. The ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations 5

as in executive privilege. The President could, as a general rule, require military officers to seek presidential approval before appearing before Congress is based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief. - Gonzales, et al vs. Gen. Abaya, G.R. No. 164007, August 10, 2006- Courts-martial are instrumentalities of the Executive to enable the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to effectively command, control, and discipline the armed forces (see Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, 75 Phil. 875 [1946], citing Winthrop’s Military Law and Precedents, 2nd edition, p. 49). In short, courts-martial form part of the disciplinary system that ensures the President’s control, and thus civilian supremacy, over the military. At the apex of this disciplinary system is the President who exercises review powers over decisions of courts-martial (citing Article 50 of the Articles of War; quoted provisions omitted - Maintenance of Peace & Order and the protection of the people against violence are constitutionsl duties of the State and to bear arms is to be construed in connection and in harmony with these constitutional duties (Chavez s. Romulo, G. R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004). Separation of the Church and State- Estrada vs. Escritor, June 22, 2006- It is indubitable that benevolent neutralityaccommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution. Benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend “compelling state interest”. -

Islamic Da’Wah Council of the Philippines vs. Office of the Executive Secretary, July 9, 2003. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In a society with a democratic framework like ours, the State must minimize its interference with the affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to exercise reasonable freedom of personal and religious activity. -

Balanced & Healthful Ecology- The right to a balanced and healthful ecology is a fundamental legal right that carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. This right implies, among other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country’s resources, which duty is reposed in the DENR. ( Prov. of Rizal vs. Exec. Sec., December 13, 2005) -

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Local Autonomy ( Basco vs. Pagcor)- the power of local government to impose taxes and fees is always subject to limitations which Congress may provide by law. The principle of local autonomy under the 1987 constitution simply means decentralization. It does not make local governments sovereign within the state of an “imperium in imperio” (unlike in a Federal System). The matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with gambling is a State concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the State to retain it or delegate it to local governments. -

- Limbonas vs. Mangelin, 170 SCRA 786- Under the constitution, provinces, cities, municipalities and barangay enjoy local autonomy subject to the supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government). Autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras, on the other hand, are subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating them and accepted principles on the effects and limits of autonomy. Lina vs. Pano, August 30, 2001- Ours is still a unitary form of government, not a federal state. Being so, any form of autonomy granted to local governments will necessarily be limited and confined within the extent allowed by the central government. -

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National Liga ng mga Barangay vs. Paredes, 439 SCRA 130- President’s power of general supervision, as exercised by the DILG, extends to Liga ng mga Barangay.

Dadole vs. COA, December 3, 2002- The President’s power of general supervision can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local government unit if he or she finds that the latter acted contrary to law. The President or his alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the constitution. -

Equal access of opportunities for public service – Pamatong vs. COMELEC, April 13, 2004- the provision does not bestow a right to seek the presidency; it does not contain a judicial enforceable constitutional right and merely specifies a guideline for legislative action. It is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accomodate as many as possible into public office. -

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*NOTE: (Details refer to Article X)

ARTICLE IV CITIZENSHIP Valles vs. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 543- Having a Filipino father at the time of birth makes one a Filipino. Having an Australian passport and an alien certificate of registration does not constitute an effective renunciation of citizenship and does not militate against the claim of Filipino citizenship. -

Co vs. HRET, 199 SCRA 692- An attack on a person’s citizenship may be done through a direct action for its nullity. -

Re: Vicente Ching, 316 SCRA 1- There are two conditions in order that the election of Philippine citizenship is effective: 1. the mother of the person making the election must be citizen of the Philippines; and 2. said election must be made upon reaching the age of majority. Bengson vs. HRET, May 7, 2001- Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: 1) desertion of the AFP; 2) served in the armed forces of the allied forces in WWII; 3) service in the AF of the US at any other time; 4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; 5) political and economic necessity. -

- R.A. No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on 23 October 1995, is an act providing for the repatriation (a) of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and (b) of natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. To claim the benefit of RA 8171, the children must be of minor age at the time of the petititon for repatriation was filed by the parent [Angat vs. RP, September 14, 1999; Tabasa vs. CA, GR. No. 125793, August 29, 2006- no showing that Tabasa’s parents lost their Philippine citizenship “on account of political or economic necessity”]. - Repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the RP and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. - Altarejos vs. COMELEC, 441 SCRA 655- In addition to the taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the

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registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in the proper civil registry and the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting the repatriation of a citizen. - Repatriation retroacts to the date of the filing of one’s application for repatriation. Supra. - Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. If he was originally a natural born citizen before he lost his citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as natural born Filipino. - NATURAL BORN- Read Sections 2 and 4 of RA 9225, amending CA 63, otherwise known as Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act (August 29, 2003)- including citizens repatriated and unmarried children, whether legitimate or illegitimate or adopted, below 18 years of age of those repatriated. - DUAL CITIZENSHIP- Read: Mercado vs. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630- The phrase “dual citizenship” in RA 7160 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance (especially for naturalized citizens). In filing a certificate of candidacy, the person with dual citizenship effectively renounces his foreign citizenship. The oath of allegiance contained in the certificate of candidacy constitutes sufficient renunciation of his foreign citizenship. - Corodora v. COMELEC, GR No. 176947, February 19, 2009The Supreme Court recently ruled that a natural-born Filipino, who also possesses American citizenship having been born of an American father and a Filipino mother, is exempt from the twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship under the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act (RA 9225) before running for public office. The Supreme Court En Banc held that that it has applied the twin requirements to cases “which involve naturalborn Filipinos who later became naturalized citizens of another country and thereafter ran for elective office in the Philippines. In the present case, [private respondent Gustavo S.] Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino, did not subsequently become a naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the twin requirements in RA No. 9225 do not apply to him.” - LOPEZ VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008 – Valles and Mercado Doctrines do not apply is one reacquires his citizenship under RA 9225 and runs for public office. To comply with the provisions of Section 5 (2) of RA 9225, it is necessary that

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the candidate for public office must state in clear and unequivocal terms that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship. - Jacot vs. COMELEC, G. R. No. 179848, November 27, 2008 – Mercado case was decided under Section 40 of LGC re dual allegiance, and that time RA 9225 was not yet enacted. - Manuel B. Japzon vs. COMELEC, GR No. 180088, January 19, 2009- It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in which a natural-born Filipino may reacquire or retain his Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a foreign citizenship, and provides for his rights and liabilities under such circumstances. A close scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it does not at all touch on the matter of residence of the natural-born Filipino taking advantage of its provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. This is only logical and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may establish residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also a citizen. Residency in the Philippines only becomes relevant when the natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship decides to run for public office. Under Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office, he must: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. - Roseller de Guzman vs. COMELEC, GR No. 180048, June 19, 2009- R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship for: 1) natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; and 2) natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of the law, become citizens of a foreign country. The law provides that they are deemed to have re-acquired or retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance. However, it must be emphasized that R.A. No. 9225 imposes an additional requirement on those who wish to seek elective public office, as follows: Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine Citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: 1

- x x x x (2)Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. The filing of a certificate of candidacy does not ipso facto amount to a renunciation of his foreign citizenship under R.A. No. 9225. The rulings in the cases of Frivaldo and Mercado are not applicable because R.A. No. 9225 provides for more requirements. - BM No. 1678, Petition for Leave to Resume the Practice of Law, Benjamin M. Dacanay, December 17, 2007- Dual citizens may practice law in the Philippines by leave of the Supreme Court and upon compliance with the requirements, which will restore their good standing as members of the Philippine Bar. - Effective nationality principle (Nottebohm case)- The Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the international law principle of effective nationality which is clearly not applicable to the case at bar. This principle is expressed in Article 5 of the Hague Convention of 1930 on the Conflict of Nationality Laws as follows: Art. 5. Within a third State a person having more than one nationality shall be treated as if he had only one. Without prejudice to the application of its law in matters of personal status and of any convention in force, a third State shall, of the nationalities which any such person possesses, recognize exclusively in its territory either the nationality of the country in which he is habitually and principally resident or the nationality of the country with which in the circumstances he appears to be in fact most closely connected. Nottebohm was a German by birth but a resident of Guatemala for 34 years when he applied for and acquired naturalization in Liechtenstein one month before the outbreak of World War II. Many members of his family and his business interests were in Germany. In 1943, Guatemala, which had declared war on Germany, arrested Nottebohm and confiscated all his properties on the ground that he was a German national. Liechtenstein thereupon filed suit on his behalf, as its citizen, against Guatemala. The International Court of Justice held Nottebohm to be still a national of Germany, with which he was more closely connected than with Liechtenstein. *Read: Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, GR No. 87193, June 23, 1989

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AASJS, Calilung vs. Datumanong, GR No. 160869, May 11, 2007- It is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes away Philippine citizenship from naturalborn Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225. xxx To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department, including the Supreme Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.

- Tecson vs. COMELEC, 424 SCRA 148; Velez vs. Poe and Fornier vs. COMELEC, March 3, 2004- Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, a “citizen of the Philippines” was one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The term “inhabitant” was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899. Whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of 1

residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the “en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate. - As Section 3, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution does not distinguish between legitimate child and illegitimate child of a Filipino father, we should not make a distinction. The civil status of legitimacy or illegitimacy, by itself, is not determinative of the Philippine citizenship. - Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner Immigration, 41 SCRA 292- When citizenship is raised as an issue in judicial or administrative proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is generally not considered as res judicata in any subsequent proceeding challenging the same. - Burca vs. Republic, 51 SCRA 248- EXCEPTIONS (to res judicata principle) 1.) a person’s citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where the person is a party; 2.) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof; and 3.) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by the Supreme Court. - Administrative Naturalization (R.A. No. 9139) – grants Philippine citizenship by administrative proceedings to aliens born and residing in the Philippines. They have the choice to apply for judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the prescribed qualifications and disqualifications. Kilosbayan vs. Ermita, GR No. 177721, July 3, 2007 . The alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his father. -

JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179120, April 1, 2009- Clearly, under the law and jurisprudence, it is the - State, through its representatives designated by statute, that may question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization proceedings. It is not a matter that maybe raised by private persons in an election case involving the naturalized citizen’s descendant. -

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ARTICLE V (SUFFRAGE) - READ: RA 9225 and RA 9189 (Absentee Voting) - AKBAYAN-Youth vs. COMELEC, March 26, 2001- where it is both impractical and illegal to conduct a two-day special registration for new voters, the COMELEC cannot be compelled to do so. - The right of suffrage is not absolute. The exercise of the right is subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other repositories of law. - The right of citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon certain procedural requirements he must undergo, among others the process of registration under RA 8189 (Voter’s Registration Act of 1996). - Makalintal vs. COMELEC, July 10, 2003- The interpretation of residence is synonymous to domicile. An absentee remains attached to his residence in the Philippines, as residence is considered synonymous with domicile. Domicile means an individual’s permanent home or a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent. - Absentee voting – under Section 2 of RA 9189 – is an exception to the six-month/one-year residency requirement. - Lewis vs. COMELEC, August 4, 2006- There is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that “duals” are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189 (election for president, v-pres., senators). It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote.

ARTICLE VI (LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT) 1

Pimentel III vs. COMELEC, G. R. No. 178413, March 13, 2008- in elections for President, V-President, Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the general rule still is that preproclamation cases on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or certificates of canvass are prohibited. As with other general rules, there are recognized exceptions to he prohibition namely: (1) correction of manifest errors; (2) questions affecting the composition of proceeding of the board of canvassers; and (3) determination of the authenticity and the due execution of certificates of canvass as provided in Section 30 of RA 7166, as amended by RA No. 9369. -

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Non delegation of legislative power

Gerochi vs. DOE, GR. No. 159796, July 17, 2007 - Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. The Court finds that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in its entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and that it contains sufficient standards. xxx In the past, accepted as sufficient standards the following: "interest of law and order;" "adequate and efficient instruction;" "public interest;" "justice and equity;" "public convenience and welfare;" "simplicity, economy and efficiency;" "standardization and regulation of medical education;" and "fair and equitable employment practices." Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among others, “to ensure the total electrification of the country and the quality, reliability, security and affordability of the supply of electric power” and “watershed rehabilitation and management” meet the requirements for valid delegation, as they provide the limitations on the ERC’s power to formulate the IRR. These are sufficient standards. -

Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice- Being a mere constituent unit of the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Corrections could not promulgate a manual that would not bear the imprimatur of the administrative superior, the Secretary of Justice as the rule making authority under RA No. 8177. -

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V. POEA, 166 SCRA 533Power of Subordinate Legislation – with this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by “filling” the details which Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is 1

effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by DOLE on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law. ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, September 1, 2005No undue delegation of legislative power. It is simply a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increase rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive. -

Congress did not delegate the power to tax to the President.- The intent and will to increase the VAT rate to 12% came from Congress and the task of the President is simply to execute the legislative policy. -

SEMA VS. COMELEC, G. R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008Congress cannot validly delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create legislative districts. The power to increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives and to reapportion legislative districts is vested exclusively in Congress. -

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PARTY-LIST SYSTEM- BA-RA 7941 vs. COMELEC, GR No. 1777271, May 4, 2007- No national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies. xxx The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: “[T]he names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list” is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. To us, the prohibition imposed on the Comelec under said Section 7 is limited in scope and duration, meaning, that it extends only to the certified list which the same provision requires to be posted in the polling places on election day. To stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the absolute is to read into the law something that is not intended. As it were, there is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than the “Certified List” the names of the party-list nominees. The Comelec obviously misread the limited non-disclosure aspect of the provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure before the May 2007 elections. The interpretation thus given by the Comelec virtually tacks an unconstitutional dimension on the last sentence 1

of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7941. xxx Comelec has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups. -

Veterans Federation Party vs. COMELEC, 342 SCRA 244, October 6, 2000; Partido Ng Manggagawa vs. COMELEC, March 15, 2006 – Section VI 5(2) of Article of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of Representatives. The Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution and RA 7941 mandate at least 4 inviolable parameters: (1) the 20% allocation: the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed 20% of the total membership of the House of Representatives; (2) the 2% threshold: only those parties garnering a minimum of 2% of the total votes cast for the party list system are qualified to a have a seat in the House; (3) the three seat limit: each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats, i.e., one qualifying and two additional; and (4) proportional representation: the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed “in proportion to their total number of votes”.

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CIBAC vs. COMELEC, GR No. 172103, April 13, 2007 Applying the Veterans formula in petitioner’s case, we reach the conclusion that CIBAC is not entitled to an additional seat. PartyList Canvass Report No. 2018 contained in the petition shows that the first party, Bayan Muna, garnered the highest number of votes, that is, a total of 1,203,305 votes. Petitioner CIBAC, on the other hand, received a total of 495,190 votes. It was proclaimed that the first party, Bayan Muna, was entitled to a maximum of three (3) seats19 based on June 2, 2004 Resolution No. NBC 04-004 of the COMELEC. A computation using the Veterans formula would therefore lead us to the following result:

No. of additional No. of votes of seats concerned party x allocated to No. of votes of the first the first party party

=

Additional Seats for concerned party

Applying this formula, the result is as follows: 495,190 1,203,305 0.41152493

x x

2

=

2

=

0.82304986

1

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BANAT vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009- 2% threshold in relation to the distribution of additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is declared unconstitutional. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.

- In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed: -

(1) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections. (2)The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each. (3) Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated. (4) Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

-

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.

-

In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional seats in Table 3 below to the twopercenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the twopercenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a party’s share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats

1

are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled. Thus: Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats

Rank

Party

Votes ( B) Addition Applyin Garnere Guarante plus al g the d over ed Seat ( C), in three Seats Total whole seat Votes intege cap Votes for rs Garnere Party d List, in % (First (Second Round) Round)

1

BUHAY

1,169,234

2

BAYAN MUNA

979,039

( A) 7.33% 6.14%

3

CIBAC

755,686

4

GABRIELA

5

( B)

( C)

( E)

( D)

1

2.79

3

N.A.

1

2.33

3

N.A.

4.74%

1

1.80

2

N.A.

621,171

3.89%

1

1.48

2

N.A.

APEC

619,657

3.88%

1

1.48

2

N.A.

6

A Teacher

490,379

3.07%

1

1.17

2

N.A.

7

AKBAYAN

466,112

2.92%

1

1.11

2

N.A.

8

ALAGAD

423,149

2.65%

1

1.01

2

N.A.

1[31]

COOPNATCCO

409,883

2.57%

1

1

2

N.A.

10

BUTIL

409,160

2.57%

1

1

2

N.A.

11

BATAS

385,810

2.42%

1

1

2

N.A.

12

ARC

374,288

2.35%

1

1

2

N.A.

13

ANAKPAWI S

370,261

2.32%

1

1

2

N.A.

14

ABONO

339,990

2.13%

1

1

2

N.A.

15

AMIN

338,185

2.12%

1

1

2

N.A.

16

AGAP

328,724

2.06%

1

1

2

N.A.

17

AN WARAY

321,503

2.02%

1

1

2

N.A.

18

YACAP

310,889

1.95%

0

1

1

N.A.

19

FPJPM

300,923

1.89%

0

1

1

N.A.

20

UNI-MAD

245,382

1.54%

0

1

1

N.A.

21

ABS

235,086

1.47%

0

1

1

N.A.

22

KAKUSA

228,999

1.44%

0

1

1

N.A.

23

KABATAAN

228,637

1.43%

0

1

1

N.A.

24

ABA-AKO

218,818

1.37%

0

1

1

N.A.

25

ALIF

217,822

1.37%

0

1

1

N.A.

26

SENIOR CITIZENS

213,058

1.34%

0

1

1

N.A.

27

AT

197,872

1.24%

0

1

1

N.A.

28

VFP

196,266

1.23%

0

1

1

N.A.

29

ANAD

188,521

1.18%

0

1

1

N.A.

9

1

1

30

BANAT

177,028

1.11%

0

1

1

N.A.

31

ANG KASANGG A

170,531

1.07%

0

1

1

N.A.

32

BANTAY

169,801

1.06%

0

1

1

N.A.

33

ABAKADA

166,747

1.05%

0

1

1

N.A.

34

1-UTAK

164,980

1.03%

0

1

1

N.A.

35

TUCP

162,647

1.02%

0

1

1

N.A.

36

COCOFED

155,920

0.98%

0

1

1

N.A.

Total

17

55

- Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are 55 party-list representatives from the 36 winning party-list organizations. All 55 available party-list seats are filled. The additional seats allocated to the parties with sufficient number of votes for one whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of three seats for each party, are shown in column (D). -

Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections: The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all political parties to participate in the party-list elections.

-

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. In defining a “party” that participates in party-list elections as either “a political party or a sectoral party,” R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.

-

Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state that major political parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or political purposes. There should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector

2

or sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for the urban poor. -

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress: “The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, x x x.” The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections. Seats for party-list representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 above.

-

However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

LEGISLATIVE PERKS – (PP vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689) – The history of the provision granting Senators and Congressmen immunity from arrest and detention shows that the privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. -

Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, June 27, 2008- presumption of innocence does not necessarily carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and politicsl rights. -

Parliamentary immunity guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. However, it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming of a member thereof (Osmeña vs. Pendatun). -

2

Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009- Richard Gordon did not relinquish his Senatorial post despite his election to and acceptance of the post Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors. PNRC is a “private organization merely performing public functions”, and that the “PNRC Chairman is not a government official or employee.” Not being a government office, the PNRC Chairmanship may be held by any individual, including a Senator or Member of the House of Congress. NRC is “autonomous, neutral and independent” of the Philippine Government. It is a voluntary organization that “does not have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine Congress”. The PNRC is not a part of any of the government branches. PNRC Chairmanship is not a government office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in the 1987 Constitution.” Senator Gordon can validly serve as the Chairman of the PNRC without giving up his senatorial position. -

QUORUM – PP vs. Jalosjos- The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than 6 years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. -

Avelino vs. Cruz- When the constitution declares that a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum, it does not mean all the members. The base in computing majority is normally the total membership of the body, within the coercive power of the House. Santiago vs. Guingona (298 SCRA 756)- The term majority simply means the greater number or more than half. Who shall sit as officers is the sole prerogative of the Senate. (Note: splitting of term between Senate President Drilon and another Senator). When the Constitution provides that the Senate President shall be elected by the majority it does not delineate who comprises the majority or the minority. The defeated senator (s) in the election for the Senate presidency are not necessarily the minority. RULES OF PROCEEDINGS- Arroyo vs. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268- Courts cannot inquire into the allegations that in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules in the absence of showing that there was violation of a constitutional provision or private rights. Parliamentary rules are mere procedures which may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. -

DISCIPLINING MEMBERS- Osmeña vs Pendatun, The House of Representatives is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior. The courts will not assume jurisdiction in any case which will -

2

amount to an interference by the judicial department with the legislature. People vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689- His election as congressman did not thereby amount to a condonation of his offense; neither does it entitle him, pending appeal of his case, to be free from confinement and to be allowed to attend sessions of congress, for the people elected him with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action and movement. -

It was never the intention of the framers of the constitution to shield a member of congress from the consequences of his wrongdoings. A member of Congress could only invoke the immunity from arrests for relatively minor offenses, punishable at most by correctional penalties. Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan- suspension imposed by Congress to a colleague is distinct from suspension spoken in Section 13 of RA 3019 which is not a penalty but a preliminary preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed for misbehavior as a member of Congress. ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS- Vera vs. Avelino- The members of the Senate validly suspended the oath-taking of the 3 senators elect. This does not fall within the powers of the electoral tribunal. The latter has jurisdiction only over electoral contests in which contestant seeks not only to oust the intruder, but also have himself inducted into office. -

LIMKAICHONG vs. COMELEC; Biraogo vs. Nograles; Paras vs. Nograles & Villando vs. COMELEC, April 1, 2009- once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as member of the House of Rep -

rePsentatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over the election contests relating to his election, returns and qualifications, ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. The proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation. -

Accordingly, after the proclamation of the winning candidates in the congressional elections, the remedy of those who may assail one’s eligibility or ineligibility, qualification or disqualification is to file before the HRET a petition for an election protest, or a petition for quo warranto, within the period provided by the HRET Rules. -

-

2002-

Codilla vs. De Venecia, GR No. 150605, December 10, Since petitioner (Codilla) seasonably filed a Motion for 2

Reconsideration of the Order of the Second Division suspending the proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the 2nd Division. The said Order was yet unenforceable as it has not attained finality, the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration suspends the execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the assumption in office of the respondent (Locsin) as the duly elected representative of the 4th District of Leyte. At the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC 2nd Division was seasonably challenged by the petitioner (Codilla) in his motion for reconsideration. The issue was still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter. -

Barbers vs. COMELEC, June 22, 2005- The phrase “election, returns and qualifications” should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee’s title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that “election” referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes; “returns” to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns; and “qualifications” to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy. -

Chavez vs. COMELEC- While the COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies involving local elective officials (Sec. 242, Omnibus Election Code), nevertheless, pre-proclamation cases are not allowed in elections for President, V-President, Senator and Members of the House of Representatives. -

What is allowed is the correction of “manifest errors” in the certificate of canvass or election returns”. To be manifest, the errors must appear on the face of the certificates of canvass or election returns sought to be corrected and/or objections thereto must have been made before the board of canvassers and specifically noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings. Where the petition calls for the correction of manifest errors in the certificates of canvass, COMELEC has jurisdiction. If it calls for the re-opening and appreciation of ballots, the Electoral Tribunal has jurisdiction.

2

This Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to review decisions and resolutions of HRET operates only upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Tribunal tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion or personal hostility (Angara vs. Electoral Commission; Pena vs. HRET). -

Bondoc vs. Pineda- Members of the HRET as sole judge of congressional election contests are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution. -

Robles vs. HRET- Jurisdiction of HRET once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties bu| continues until the case is terminated. -

Abubakar vs. HRET, March 7, 2007- The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to review decisions and resolutions of HRET operates only upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Tribunal tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion or personal hostility. The grave abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. It is absent in this case. -

DAZA V. SINGSON, 180 SCRA 496- The House of Representatives is authorized to change its representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its membership. The changes must be PERMANENT and do not include temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another. -

The provision on Section 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in character and does not leave any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard. A political party must have at least two senators to be able to have a representative in the Commission on Appointments, so that any number less than 2 will not entitle such party a membership in the CA. (Guingona v. Gonzales, 214 SCRA 789). -

Pimentel, Jr. vs. House of Representatives, 11/19/02- Even assuming that party-list representatives comprise a sufficient number and have agreed to designate common nominees to the HRET and the CA, their primary recourse clearly rests with the House of Representatives and not with this Court. Under Sections 17 and 18, -

2

Article VI of the Constitution, party-list representatives must first show to the House that they possess the required numerical strength to be entitled to seats in the HRET and the CA. Only if the House fails to comply with the directive of the Constitution on proportional representation of political parties in the HRET and the CA can the party-list representatives seek recourse to this Court under its power of judicial review. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, prior recourse to the House is necessary before petitioners may bring the instant case to the court. Consequently, petitioners’ direct recourse to this Court is premature. The discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation. Pimentel III vs. COMELEC, Zubiri, March 13, 2008 - It is the SET which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of Pimentel involving, as it does, a contest relating to the election of Zubiri, now a member of the Senate. -

APPROPRIATION- Gonzales vs. Narvasa, 337 SCRA 733, - The President’s creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform through an executive Order involves no exercise by Congress of its taxing power or spending power. -

The appropriation for the PCCR was authorized by the President, not by Congress. In a strict sense, appropriation has been defined as “nothing more than the legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution that the money may be paid out of the treasury, while appropriation made by law refers to the “act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a particular use a certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues from the State to its creditors. -

IMPORTANT: LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY- Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon (203 SRCA 76)- An investigation that seeks the determination whether a law has been violated is not in aid of legislation but in aid of prosecution, and therefore, violative of separation of powers. To allow the Committee to investigate the matter would create the possibility of conflicting judgments; and that the inquiry into the same justiceable controversy would be an encroachment on the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had set in much earlier (investigation was not in aid of legislation). -

Standard Chartered Bank vs. Senate Committee on Banks, GR No. 167173, December 27, 2007- the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative inquiry, otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry -

2

by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE- is the implied constitutional power of the President to withhold information requested by other branches of the government. The Constitution does not expressly grant this power to the President but courts have long recognized implied Presidential powers if “necessary and proper” in carrying out powers and functions expressly granted to the Executive under the Constitution. xxx In this jurisdiction, several decisions have recognized executive privilege starting with the 1995 case of Almonte v. Vasquez, and the most recent being the 2002 case of Chavez v. Public Estates Authority and the 2006 case of Senate v. Ermita. -

As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and as Chief Executive, the President is ultimately responsible for military and national security matters affecting the nation. In the discharge of this responsibility, the President may find it necessary to withhold sensitive military and national security secrets from the Legislature or the public. As the official in control of the nation’s foreign service by virtue of the President’s control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the President is the chief implementer of the foreign policy relations of the State. The President’s role as chief implementer of the State’s foreign policy is reinforced by the President’s constitutional power to negotiate and enter into treaties and international agreements. In the discharge of this responsibility, the President may find it necessary to refuse disclosure of sensitive diplomatic secrets to the Legislature or the public. Traditionally, states have conducted diplomacy with considerable secrecy. There is every expectation that a state will not imprudently reveal secrets that its allies have shared with it. There is also the need to protect the confidentiality of the internal deliberations of the President with his Cabinet and advisers. To encourage candid discussions and thorough exchange of views, the President’s communications with his Cabinet and advisers need to be shielded from the glare of publicity. Otherwise, the Cabinet and other presidential advisers may be reluctant to discuss freely with the President policy issues and executive matters knowing that their discussions will be publicly disclosed, thus depriving the President of candid advice. Executive privilege, however, is not absolute. The interest of protecting military, national security and diplomatic secrets, as well as Presidential 2

communications, must be weighed against other constitutionally recognized interests. There is the declared state policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest, the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, the accountability of public officers, the power of legislative inquiry, and the judicial power to secure testimonial and documentary evidence in deciding cases. The balancing of interests – between executive privilege on one hand and the other competing constitutionally recognized interests on the other hand - is a function of the courts. The courts will have to decide the issue based on the factual circumstances of each case. This is how conflicts on executive privilege between the Executive and the Legislature, and between the Executive and the Judiciary, have been decided by the courts. Akbayan vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008 -Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential – since there should be “ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved” – the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that “historic confidentiality” would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations. xxx Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting no exception. It bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information as privileged does not mean that it will be considered privileged in all instances. Only after a consideration of the context in which the claim is made may it be determined if there is a public interest that calls for the disclosure of the desired information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally privileged status. Neri vs. Senate Committee, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008- The communications elicited by the three (3) questions [a) Whether the President followed up the (NBN) project? b) Were you dictated to prioritize the ZTE? c) Whether the President said to go ahead and approve the project after being told about the alleged bribe?] are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the -

2

communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. Conduct of legislative inquiries must be in accordance with publish rules. In the matter of the petition for issuance of writ of habeas corpus of Camilo Sabio- GR No. 174340, October 17, 2006- The Congress’ power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends “to government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish.” PCGG belongs to this class. xxx So long as the constitutional rights of witnesses, like Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners, will be respected by respondent Senate Committees, it is their duty to cooperate with them in their efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action. The unremitting obligation of every citizen is to respond to subpoenae, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its Committees, and to testify fully with respect to matters within the realm of proper investigation -

Miguel vs. Gordon, GR No. 174340, October 17, 2006- a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress in the absence of constitutional basis. -

Senate vs. Ermita (E.O. 464), April 20, 2006- Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. -

Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is executive privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefore and why it must be respected. -

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When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power — the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. -

The absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its appearance of department heads in the question hour contemplated in Section 22 of Article VI, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function. -

The power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives; (b) to determine whether agencies are properly administered; (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty; (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority; and (e) to assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of public interest. -

The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight powers may be divided into three categories, namely: scrutiny; investigation and supervision. -

ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE – Abakada Guro Party List, et al. vs. Ermita, ed al., October 18, 2005 – the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the Housa and the Senate Presi`ent and the certification od the Secretaraes of both houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment. -

A bidl originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Selate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole, a distinct bill may be produced. The power of the Senate to propose alendments, it cal propose its own version even with respect to bills which are required by the Constitution to originate in the House. -

BICAMERAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE- The Supreme Court recognizes the long standing legislative practice of giving said conference ample latitude for compromising differences between the Senate and the House. It can propose amendment in the -

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nature of a substitute, so long as the amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before the committee. After all, its report was not final but needed the approval of both houses of Congress to become valid as an act of the legislative department. Lung Center vs. Quezon City, G.R. No. 144104, June 29, 2004 – Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and RA 7160 in order to be entitled to the exemption, the petitioner is burdened to prove, by clear and unequivocal proof, that (a) it is a charitable institution; and (b) its real properties are actually, directly, and exclusively used for charitable purposes. “Exclusive” is defined as possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of others; debarred from participation or enjoyment, and exclusively is defined, in a manner to exclude; as enjoying a privilege exclusively. The words “dominant use” or “principal use” cannot be substituted for the words “used exclusively” without doing violence to the Constitution and the law. Solely is synonymous with exclusively. -

Suplico, et al. vs. Romulo Neri, et al, GR No. 178830, July 14, 2008- Any government expenditure without the corresponding appropriation from Congress is unconstitutional. There can be no dispute that the proceeds of foreign loans, whether concluded or not, cannot be obligated in a procurement contract without a prior appropriation from Congress. When the executive branch secures a loan to fund a procurement of goods or services, the loan proceeds enter the National Treasury as part of the general funds of the government. Congress must appropriate by law the loan proceeds to fund the procurement of goods or services, otherwise the loan proceeds cannot be spent by the executive branch. When the loan falls due, Congress must make another appropriation law authorizing the repayment of the loan out of the general funds in the National Treasury. This appropriation for the repayment of the loan is what is covered by the automatic appropriation. -

ARTICLE VII (PRESIDENT) PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY- The immunity enjoyed by a sitting president evolved through case law. -

Soliven vs. Makasiar- The privilege pertains to the President by virtue of the office. There is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President’s prerogative. Estrada vs. Desierto- There is no basis in the contention that the immunity of the President extends to the end of the term

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to which he was elected notwithstanding his resignation. It is clear that the immunity of the President from suit is concurrent only with his tenure (representing the period during which the incumbent actually holds office) and not his term (the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as a matter of right). Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan, 435 SCRA 371- Executive immunity applied only during the incumbency of a President. David, et al. vs. Ermita, et al., April 20, 2006 – It is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. SUPREME COURT AS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL- Lopez vs. Roxas, 17 SCRA 755- When the law grants the Supreme Court the power to resolve an election contest between or among presidential candidates, no new or separate court is created. The law merely conferred upon the Supreme Court the functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. -

- The power of Congress to declare who, among the candidates for President and/or Vice-President has obtained the largest number of votes, is entirely different in nature from and not inconsistent with the jurisdiction vested in the Presidential Electoral Tribunal by RA 1793. Congress merely acts as national board of canvassers, charged with the ministerial and executive duty to make said declaration, on the basis of the election returns duly certified by provincial and city boards of canvassers. Upon the other hand, the Presidential Electoral tribunal has the judicial power to determine whether or not said duly certified election returns have been irregularly made or tampered with or reflect the true results of the elections in the areas covered by each and, if not, to recount the ballots cast, and incidentally thereto, pass upon the validity of each ballot or determine whether the same shall be counted, and, in the affirmative, in whose favor, which Congress has no power to do. In assuming the Office of Senator protestant Santiago has effectively abandoned or withdrawn her protest to the election protestee Ramos as President. (Santiago v. Ramos, 253 SCRA 559). -

Citing Defensor Santiago v. Ramos, the PET stressed that Legarda effectively abandoned or withdrawn her protest when she ran in the Senate, which term coincides with the term of the Vice-

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Presidency 2004-2010. (Min. Res., PET Case No. 003, Legarda v. De Castro, February 12, 2008) - The fundamental rule applicable in a presidential election protest is Rule 14 of the PET Rules. It provides, Rule 14. Election Protest.–Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner.

Pursuant to this rule, only two persons, the 2nd and 3rd placers, may contest the election. By this express enumeration, the rule makers have in effect determined the real parties in interest concerning an ongoing election contest. It envisioned a scenario where, if the declared winner had not been truly voted upon by the electorate, the candidate who received that 2nd or the 3rd highest number of votes would be the legitimate beneficiary in a successful election contest. -

The Supreme Court ruled that it does not have any rule on substitution nor intervention but it does allow for the analogous and suppletory application of the Rules of Court, decisions of the Supreme Court, and the decisions of the electoral tribunals. Rule 3, Section 16 is the rule on substitution in the Rules of Court. This rule allows substitution by a legal representative. It can be gleaned from the citation of this rule that movant/intervenor seeks to appear before the Presidential Tribunal as the legal representative/substitute of the late protestant prescribed by said Section 16. However, in the Supreme Court’s application of this rule to an election contest, it has every time ruled that a public office is personal to the public officer and not a property transmissible to the heirs upon death. Thus, the Supreme Court consistently rejected substitution by the widow or the heirs in election contests where the protestant dies during the pendency of the protest. -

This is not to say that death of the protestant necessarily abates the pending action. In Vda. de De Mesa (1966) the Supreme Court held that while the right to a public office is personal and exclusive to the public officer, an election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either would oust the court of all authority to continue the protest -

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proceedings. Hence, the Supreme Court has allowed substitution and intervention but only by a real party in interest. A real party in interest is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, and the party who is entitled to the avails of the suit. Herein movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ, herself denies any claim to the august office of President. Thus, given the circumstances of this case, we can conclude that protestant’s widow is not a real party in interest to this election protest (Ronald Allan Poe vs. GMA, PET case No. 002, March 29, 2005). Tecson vs. COMELEC, 424 SCRA 277- The actions contemplated in Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution are post election remedies, namely, regular election contests and quo warranto. The word “contest” means that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court only be invoked after the election and proclamation of the President or Vice-President – there can be no “contest” before a winner is proclaimed. -

VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENTEstrada vs. Desierto, March 2, 2001- Also Read: TEMPORARY DISABILITY OF PRESIDENT- The question whether the claimed temporary inability of Estrada is a political question beyond the Supreme Court’s power of review. The decision that President Arroyo is the dejure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court. -

POLITICAL QUALIFIED AGENCY (ALTER-EGO DOCTRINE) – Constantino vs. Cuisia, G.R. No. 106064, October 13, 2005- Nevertheless, there are powers vested in the President by the Constitution which may not be delegated to or exercised by an agent or alter ego of the President. Justice Laurel, in his ponencia in Villena, makes this clear: Withal, at first blush, the argument of ratification may seem plausible under the circumstances, it should be observed that there are certain acts which, by their very nature, cannot be validated by subsequent approval or ratification by the President. There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, in his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law (PAR. 3, SEC. 11, Art. VII) and the exercise by him of the benign prerogative of mercy (par. 6, sec. 11, idem]. These distinctions hold true to this day. There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension 3

of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import. We cannot conclude that the power of the President to contract or guarantee foreign debts falls within the same exceptional class. Indubitably, the decision to contract or guarantee foreign debts is of vital public interest, but only akin to any contractual obligation undertaken by the sovereign, which arises not from any extraordinary incident, but from the established functions of governance. APPOINTING POWER OF THE PRESIDENTSarmiento vs. Mison; Bautista vs. Salonga; Bermudez vs. Torres; Calderon vs. Carale- Congress cannot expand the constitution by increasing those officers who need prior confirmation by the CA. -

Election Ban (Midnight Appointments) GR No. 191002, De Castro v. JBC; GR No. 191032, Soriano v. JBC; GR No. 191057, PHILCONSA v. JBC; AM No. 10-2-5-SC, In Re Applicability of Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution to Appointments to the Judiciary; GR No. 191149, Peralta v. JBC; GR No. 191342, Tolentino, Jr. v. JBC; GR No. 191420, Philippine Bar Association, Inc. v. JBC; March 17, 2010, April 20, 2010)- the prohibition under Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution against presidential appointments immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the term of the outgoing President does not apply to vacancies in the High Tribunal. “Although Valenzuela came to hold that the prohibition covered even judicial appointments, it cannot be disputed that the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Thereby, the confirmation made to the JBC by then Senior Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado of this Court, a former member of the Constitutional Commission, about the prohibition not being intended to apply to the appointments to the Judiciary, which confirmation Valenzuela even expressly mentioned, should prevail.“ Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. -

Binamira vs. Garucho; Matibag vs. Benipayo, April 2, 2002- An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by -

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the President once an appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the CA does not alter its permanent character. It is effective until disapproved by the CA or until the next adjournment of Congress. It is extended only during a recess of Congress. If disapproved by CA, appointee can no longer be extended a new appointment. If by-passed, the President is free to renew the ad-interim appointment. Pimentel, Jr. v. Office of the Executive Secretary, 462 SCRA 622, July 6, 2005- The law allows the President to make such acting appointment. The President may even appoint in acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the President deems that person competent. -

Acting appointment- It is temporary in nature. It is a stopgap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office. It may be extended any time there is vacancy, given while Congress is in session. -

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Rufino vs. Endriga, G. R. No. 139554, July 21¬ 2006- Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three groups of officers. The first group refers to the heads of the Executive departments," ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution. The second group refers to those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. The third group refers to all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law. Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress may by law vest in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. xxx The President appoints the first group of officers with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The President appoints the second and third groups of officers without the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The President appoints the third group of officers if the law is silent on who is the appointing power, or if the law authorizing the head of a department, agency, commission, or board to appoint is declared unconstitutional.

CABINET SECRETARIES, UNDERSECRETARIES AND THEIR ASSISTANT SECRETARIES are prohibited from holding multiple positions and receiving compensation therefromBITONIO VS. COA, 425 SCRA 437, March 12, 2004. -

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CONTROL OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS- Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora, July 10, 2001- The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature. The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are concerned, the President’s power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular office, or certain laws may grant him broad authority to carry out reorganization measures. The chief executive, under our laws, has the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. -

Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines, Inc. (MEWAP) vs. Romulo, GR No. 160093, July 31, 2007 – The President has the authority to carry out a reorganization of the Department of Health under the Constitution and statutory laws. This authority is an adjunct of his power of control under Article VII, Sections 1 and 17 of the 1987 Constitution. The President’s power to reorganize the executive branch is also an exercise of his residual powers under Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. No. 292 which grants the President broad organization powers to implement reorganization measures. Be that as it may, the President must exercise good faith in carrying out the reorganization of any branch or agency of the executive department. Reorganization is effected in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. -

Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials. The validity of these two decrees [is]"unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearly provides that “all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with thés Constitution sha|n remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked. -

Domingo vs. Zamora, GR No. 142283, February 6, 2003 – The President’s power (EO 292) to reorganize offices outside of the Office of the President Proper is limited merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to Departments or Agencies and vice-versa. The DECS is indisputably a Department of the Executive Branch. Even if the DECS is not part of the Office of the President, Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 clearly authorizes the President to transfer any function or agency of the DECS to the Office of the President. Under its charter, the Philippine Sports Commission (PSC), is attached to the Office of the President. Therefore, the President has the authority to transfer the “functions, -

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programs and activities of DECS related to sports development” to the PSC, making EO 81 a valid presidential issuance. -

Rufino vs. Endriga, GR No. 113956, July 21, 2006- The presidential power of control over the Executive branch of government extends to all executive employees from the Department Secretary to the lowliest clerk. This constitutional power of the President is self-executing and does not require any implementing law. Congress cannot limit or curtail the President’s power of control over the Executive branch. xxx In mandating that the President “shall have control of all executive x x x offices,” Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not exempt any executive office — one performing executive functions outside of the independent constitutional bodies — from the President’s power of control. xxx The President’s power of control applies to the acts or decisions of all officers in the Executive branch. This is true whether such officers are appointed by the President or by heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The power of control means the power to revise or reverse the acts or decisions of a subordinate officer involving the exercise of discretion.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE AFP– (Lacson vs. Perez, May 10, 2001)- The declaration by the President of ‘state of rebellion” during or in the aftermath of the May 1, 2001 seige of Malacanang is not violative of the separation of powers doctrine. The President, as Commander in chief of Armed Forces of the Philippines, may call upon such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. -

Sanlakas vs. Executive Committee, 421 SCRA 656, February 3, 2004- The President’s authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at the same time draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers pursuant to her calling out power. -

Gudani vs. Senga, Augsut 15, 2006- It is on the President that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate that the President’s ability to control the individual members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Supreme Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. if the President or the Chief of Staff refuses to allow a -

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member of the AFP to appear before Congress, the legislative body seeking such testimony may seek judicial relief to compel the attendance. Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora – The President has full discretion to call the military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. There is no equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s action to call out the armed forces. -

David, et al. vs. Executive Secretary Ermita, May 3, 2006PP 1017 constitutes the call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, PP 1017’s extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to direct AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the president; and (3) to impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. In the absence of legislation, the President cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business affected with public interest. -

The President can validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in the absence of congressional enactment. But the exercise of emergency powers requires a delegation from Congress. EMERGENCY POWER GRANT TO PRESIDENTRequisites: 1) there must be a war or other emergency; 2) the delegation must be for a limited period only; 3) the delegation must be subject to such restrictions as Congress may prescribe and 4) the emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress. -

David, et al. vs. Ermita- It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision refers not only to war but also to other national emergency. If the intention of the Framers of our Constitution was to withhold from the President the authority to declare a state of national emergency pursuant to Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the existence of a state of war), then the Framers could have provided so. Clearly, they did not intend that Congress should first authorize the President before he can declare a state of national emergency. The logical conclusion then is that President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in the absence of a Congressional enactment. But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest, is different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress. -

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PARDONING POWER- Drilon vs. CA, 202 SCRA 370The pardoning power of the President is final and unappealable. -

TREATY MAKING POWER- Bayan vs. Zamora, 342 SCRA 449-It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. (Also read USAFFE Veterans Ass. v. Treasurer 105 Phil. 1030) In the field of negotiation, the Senate cannot intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to invade it. -

Akbayan vs. Aquino - The doctrine in PMPF v. Manglapus that the treaty-making power is exclusive to the President, being the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, was echoed in BAYAN v. Executive Secretary where the Court held: By constitutional fiat and by the intrinsic nature of his office, the President, as head of State, is the sole organ and authority in the external affairs of the country. In many ways, the President is the chief architect of the nation's foreign policy; his "dominance in the field of foreign relations is (then) conceded." Wielding vast powers and influence, his conduct in the external affairs of the nation, as Jefferson describes, is “executive altogether.” As regards the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the Constitution vests the same in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least two thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. In this light, the negotiation of the VFA and the subsequent ratification of the agreement are exclusive acts which pertain solely to the President, in the lawful exercise of his vast executive and diplomatic powers granted him no less than by the fundamental law itself. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to invade it. x x x (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The same doctrine was reiterated even more recently in Pimentel v. Executive Secretary where the Court ruled: In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the country's sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country's mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states. Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the 4

members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It has long been recognized that the power to enter into treaties is vested directly and exclusively in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty. In this light, the authority of the President to enter into trade agreements with foreign nations provided under P.D. 1464 may be interpreted as an acknowledgment of a power already inherent in its office. It may not be used as basis to hold the President or its representatives accountable to Congress for the conduct of treaty negotiations. This is not to say, of course, that the President’s power to enter into treaties is unlimited but for the requirement of Senate concurrence, since the President must still ensure that all treaties will substantively conform to all the relevant provisions of the Constitution. It follows from the above discussion that Congress, while possessing vast legislative powers, may not interfere in the field of treaty negotiations. While Article VII, Section 21 provides for Senate concurrence, such pertains only to the validity of the treaty under consideration, not to the conduct of negotiations attendant to its conclusion. Moreover, it is not even Congress as a whole that has been given the authority to concur as a means of checking the treaty-making power of the President, but only the Senate. Pimentel, Jr. vs. Executive Secretary, July 6, 2005-Under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties. The Court, therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the government to transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the Senate. -

POWER TO CLASSIFY PUBLIC LANDS and TO SELL THE SAME- The power to classify lands as alienable belongs to the -

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President. Only lands, which have been classified as alienable, may be sold. There must be a law authorizing its sale or alienation by the President or by another officer before conveyance can be executed on behalf of the government (Section 48, Book I of the 1987 Administrative Code). Laurel vs. Garcia, 187 SCRA 797- The President may not convey valuable real property of the government on her sole will. Conveyance must be authorized by a law enacted by Congress. POWER OF SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL GOVERNMENTS- to ensure that local affairs are administered according to law. xxx Insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against local officials administratively. -

ARTICLE VIII (JUDICIAL) JUDICIAL REVIEW- Joya vs. PCGG; Kilosbayan vs. Guingona; Oposa vs. Factoran (petitioners-children); Kilosbayan vs. Morato; IBP vs. Zamora (IBP not proper party); Gonzales vs. Narvasa (private citizen not proper party). -

Garcia v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 157584, April 2, 2009- The immediate implementation of full deregulation of the local downstream oil industry is a policy determination by Congress which this Court cannot overturn without offending the Constitution and the principle of separation of powers. That the law failed in its objectives because its adoption spawned the evils petitioner Garcia alludes to does not warrant its nullification. In the words of Mr. Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing in the 1999 Garcia case, ‘[a] calculus of fear and pessimism xxx does not justify the remedy petitioner seeks: that we overturn a law enacted by Congress and approved by the Chief Executive. -

Gudani vs. Senga, August 15, 2006- Courts are empowered, under the constitutional principle of judicial review, to arbitrate disputes between the legislative and executive branches of government on the proper constitutional parameters of power. -

PROPER PARTY- In this jurisdiction, the Supreme Court adopts the “DIRECT INJURY” test. In People vs. Vera, it held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. -

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However, being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus standi may be waived by the Supreme Court in the exercise of its discretion. Even when the petitioners have failed to show direct injury, they have been allowed to sue under the “principle of transcendental importance”. DAVID, ET AL VS. ARROYO; CHAVEZ VS. PEA, 384 SCRA 152; BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN VS. ZAMORA, 342 SCRA 449; LIM VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 380 SCRA 739. -

Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met: 1. the cases involved constitutional issues; 2. for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; 3. for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question; 4. for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and 5. for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators. -

AIWA vs. Romulo, GR No. 157509, January 18, 2005- For a citizen to have standing, he must establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. -

TELEBAP VS.C OMELEC- proper party 1. registered voter – must show that the action concerns his right of suffrage 2. taxpayer – he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation. 3. corporate entity- the party suing has substantial relation to the third party; the third party cannot assert his constitutional right; the right of the third party will be diluted unless the party in court is allowed to espouse the third party’s constitutional claim. -

As the case involves constitutional questions, the Supreme Court is not concerned with whether the petitioners are real parties in interest, but whether they have legal standing. LA BUGAL-B’LAAN TRIBAL ASS., INC., VS RAMOS, 421 SCRA 148. -

EVEN WHEN THE ISSUES ARE MOOT AND ACADEMIC, the Court still entertains to adjudicate the substantive matter if there is a grave violation of the constitution; to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and public and capable of -

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repetition, yet evading review PROVINCE OF BATANGAS VS. ROMULO, 429 SCRA 736, May 27, 2004. The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is grave violation of the constitution, second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved, third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and the public, and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. DAVID, ET AL. VS. ARROYO, ET AL.; SANLAKAS VS. EXEC. SEC., 421 SCRA 656; ACOP VS. GUINGONA, JR., 383 SCRA 577; ALBA-A VS. COMELEC, 435 SCRA 98. -

POLITICAL QUESTIONS- are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure. QUESTIONS REGARDING ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUANCES will not preclude the SUPREME COURT from exercising its power of judicial review to determine whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of issuing authority under its EXPANDED JURISDICTIONBRILLANTES VS. COMELEC, 432 SCRA 269, June 15 2004. -

KILOSBAYAN VS. ERMITA, GR No. 177721, July 3, 2007 - Petitioners have standing to file the suit simply as people’s organizations and taxpayers since the matter involves an issue of utmost and far-reaching Constitutional importance, namely, the qualification – nay, the citizenship – of a person to be appointed a member of this Court. xxxx This case is a matter of primordial importance involving compliance with a Constitutional mandate. As the body tasked with the determination of the merits of conflicting claims under the Constitution, the Supreme Court is the proper forum for resolving the issue, even as the JBC has the initial competence to do so. xxx It is clear, therefore, that from the records of this Court, respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his father. -

FISCAL AUTONOMY- Bengzon vs. Drilon- The Chief Justice must be given a free hand on how to augment appropriations where augmentation is needed. -

PP VS. DY, 395 SCRA 256- Under Article VIII, Section 4(1) of the Constitution, the Supreme Court may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven members. -

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IBP vs. Zamora, deployment of marines – is justiciable- the problem being one of legality or validity, not its wisdom. -

FARIÑAS VS. EXEC. SEC., 417 SCRA 503- Policy matters are not the concern of the Supreme Court- government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. -

CHANGE OF VENUE-Larranaga vs. CA, 287 SCRA 581, A motion to change the venue of (and authority to conduct) preliminary investigation cannot be taken cognizance by the courts for lack of jurisdiction. The holding of a preliminary investigation is a function of the Executive department and not of the judiciary. -

PP vs. Sola, 103 SCRA 393 (1981)- In case of doubt, it should be resolved in favor of change of venue. -

PP VS. TUBONGBANUA, GR No. 171271- August 31, 2006- In view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 or the Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty on June 24, 2006, the penalty that should be meted is reclusion perpetua, thus: -

SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law and all other laws, executive orders and decrees insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly. -

SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:

(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or (b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.

PROMULGATE RULES concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all court, the admission to the practice of law, the IBP, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. NOTE: Limitations: simplified and inexpensive procedure; uniform; not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. -

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WRIT OF AMPARO – The right to enforce and protect a person’s rights guaranteed and recognized by the bill of rights. It is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and security has been violated or is threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ covers extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. Upon filing of the petition or at anytime before final judgment, the court, justice or judge may grant any of the following reliefs: (a) Temporary Protection Order. “ The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio, may order that the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family be protected in a government agency or by an accredited person or private institution capable of keeping and securing their safety. If the petitioner is an organization, association or institution referred to in Section 3(c) of the Rule, the protection may be extended to the officers involved. The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private institutions that shall extend temporary protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family, in accordance with guidelines which it shall issue. The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply with the rules and conditions that may be imposed by the court, justice or judge. (b) Inspection Order. ” The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after due hearing, may order any person in possession or control of a designated land or other property, to permit entry for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any relevant object or operation thereon. The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be inspected. It shall be supported by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge of the enforced disappearance or whereabouts of the aggrieved party. If the motion is opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the information, the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition. The movant must show that the inspection order is necessary to establish the right of the aggrieved party alleged to be threatened or violated. The inspection order shall specify the person or persons authorized to make the inspection and the date, time, place and manner of making the inspection and may prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all parties. The order shall expire five (5) days after 4

the date of its issuance, unless extended for justifiable reasons. (c) Production Order. “ The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after due hearing, may order any person in possession, custody or control of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, or objects in digitized or electronic form, which constitute or contain evidence relevant to the petition or the return, to produce and permit their inspection, copying or photographing by or on behalf of the movant. The motion may be opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the information, in which case the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition. The court, justice or judge shall prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all the parties. (d) Witness Protection Order. “ The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio, may refer the witnesses to the Department of Justice for admission to the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Program, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6981. The court, justice or judge may also refer the witnesses to other government agencies, or to accredited persons or private institutions capable of keeping and securing their safety. WRIT OF HABEAS DATA- It is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. Masangkay vs. del Rosario, G.R. No. 182484, June 17, 2008- To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and harassment, we see no point in separately and directly intervening -

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through a writ of amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or security – the personal concern that the writ is intended to protect - is immediately in danger or threatened, or that the danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a separately filed criminal case. Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following material allegations of ultimate facts in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data: - (a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent; (b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party; (c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information; (d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information, if known; (e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information or files kept by the respondent. -

Aruelo vs. Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 475- The COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court. Republic vs. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 16429, December 19, 2005- Congress has the plenary legislative power. The silence of the Constitution on the subject can only be interpreted as meaning there is no intention to diminish that plenary power. RA 8974 which requires full payment before the State may exercise proprietary rights, contrary to Rule 67 which requires only a deposit was recognized by the Supreme Court. PEOPLE VS. MATEO, July 7, 2004 – While the fundamental law requires mandatory review by the Supreme

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Court of cases where the penalty is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere however, has it proscribed an intermediate review. The Supreme Court deems it wise and compelling to provide in these cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court. Procedural matters, first and foremost, fall more squarely within the rule making prerogative of the Supreme Court than the law making power of Congress. The rule allowing an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals, a subordinate appellate court, before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court for automatic review, is such a procedural matter. MINUTE RESOLUTION- Komatsu vs. CA, 289 SCRA 604- does not violate Section 14. Resolutions are not decisions within the constitutional requirement; they merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained and the petition to review decision of the CA is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, hence, there is no need to fully explain the Court’s denial since, for one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the CA decision. -

German Machineries Corporation vs. Endaya, 444 SCRA 329- The mandate under Section 14, Article VIII of the constitution is applicable only in cases “submitted for decision”, i.e, given due course and after the filing of the briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not where a resolution is issued denying due course to a petition and stating the legal basis thereof. -

Joaquin-Agregado v. Yama, March 20, 2009, GR No. 181107- The Supreme Court stressed that it has the discretion to decide whether a “minute resolution” should be used in lieu of a full-blown decision in any particular case. Further, the Supreme Court explained that the grant of due course to a petition for review is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion. When it fails to find any reversible error committed by the CA, there is no need to fully explain the Court’s denial as it means that the Supreme Court agrees with or adopts the findings and conclusions of the CA. “There is no point in reproducing or restating in the resolution of denial the conclusions of the appellate court affirmed”.The constitutional requirement of sec. 14, Art. VIII of a clear presentation of facts and laws applies to decisions, where the petition is given due course, but not where the petition is denied due course, with the resolution stating the legal basis for the dismissal. -

Oil & National Gas Com. vs. CA, 293 SCRA 26- Section 14 does not preclude the validity of “Memorandum Decision” which -

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adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals. It is intended to avoid cumbersome reproduction of the decision (or portions thereof) of the lower court.

ARTICLE IX (CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS)

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION GSIS VS. CSC, 202 SCRA 799- The grant to the Civil Service Commission of adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and adjudge cases, necessarily includes the power to enforce or order execution of its decisions, resolutions, or orders. The authority to decide cases would be inutile unless accompanied by the authority to see that what has been decided is carried out. -

CSC vs. Sojor, GR No. 168766, May 22, 2008- The Constitution grants to the CSC administration over the entire civil service. As defined, the civil service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, including every government-owned or controlled corporation. It is further classified into career and non-career service positions. Career service positions are those where: (1) entrance is based on merit and fitness or highly technical qualifications; (2) there is opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and (3) there is security of tenure. A state university president with a fixed term of office appointed by the governing board of trustees of the university, is a non-career civil service officer. He was appointed by the chairman and members of the governing board of CVPC. By clear provision of law, respondent is a non-career civil servant who is under the jurisdiction of the CSC. -

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CSC v. Alfonso, GR No. 179452, June 11, 2009,- Even though the CSC has appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary cases decided by government departments, agencies, and instrumentalities, a complaint may be filed directly with the CSC, and the CSC has the authority to hear and decide the case, although it may in its discretion opt to deputize a department or an agency to conduct the investigation, as provided for in the Civil Service Law of 1975. The Supreme Court also ruled that since the complaints were filed directly with the CSC and the CSC had opted to assume jurisdiction over the complaint, the CSC’s exercise of jurisdiction

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shall be to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction. CSC vs. DBM, GR No. 158791, July 22, 2005- The no “report, no release” policy may not be validly enforced against offices vested with fiscal autonomy. Being automatic connotes something mechanical, spontaneous and perfunctory. It means that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed. -

Naseco vs. NLRC, 68 SCRA 122- Employees of GOCCs, as a general rule, are governed by the Civil Service Law. But a distinction of the manner the GOCC was created must be made. If the GOCC was established through an original charter (or special law), then it falls under the civil service, e.g., GSIS and SSS. However, corporations which are subsidiaries of these chartered agencies, e.g., Manila Hotel, is excluded from the coverage of the civil service. -

Leveriza vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 282An agency of government refers to any of the various units of the government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality or governmentowned or controlled corporation or a local government or a distinct unit therein. Instrumentality refers to any agency of the national government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, institutes and government-owned or controlled corporations, -

MWSS vs. Hernandez, 143 SCRA 602- If one is employed in a GOCC, whether regular or not, the civil service law applies. It is not true either that with respect to money claims, the Labor Code applies. Regardless of the nature of employment or claim, an employee in a GOCC with original charter is covered by the Civil Service Law. -

Dimayuga vs. Benedicto II, 373 SCRA 652 (2002) – the appointment to the positions in the Career Executive Service may be considered permanent in which the appointee enjoys security of tenure. -

Achacoso vs. Macaraig, 195 SCRA 235- permanent appointment can be issued only to a “person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed.” The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required -

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qualifications. Such right will have to “depend on the nature of appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it. Fernandez vs. Dela Paz, 160 SCRA 751- Unconsented transfer of the officer, resulting in demotion in rank or salary is a violation of the security of tenure clause in the Constitution. -

Rosales, Jr. vs. Mijares, 442 SCRA 532- A transfer that aims by indirect method to terminate services or to force resignation constitutes removal. -

Estrada vs. Escritor, June 22, 2006 – In the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing such state interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite. -

Mateo vs. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 284- The party aggrieved by a decision, ruling, order, or action of an agency of the government involving termination of services may appeal to the CSC within 15 days. Thereafter, he could go on certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if he still feels aggrieved by the ruling of the CSC. -

PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL- Montecillo vs. CSC, June 28, 2001- The CSC is expressly empowered by the Administrative Code of 1987 to declare positions in the Civil Service primarily confidential. (Read: Salazar vs. Mathay, 73 SCRA 285, on two instances when a position may be considered primarily confidential: (1) President declares the position to be primarily confidential upon recommendation of of the CSC; (2) when by the nature of the functions, there exists close intimacy between the appointee and appointing authority which ensures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgiving or betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state. -

HILARIO VS. CSC, 243 SCRA 206, City Legal Officer is primarily confidential. PAGCOR VS. RILLORAZA, June 25, 2001, The position of Casino Operations Manager is not primarily confidential RESIGNATION- Estrada vs. Desierto, March 2, 2001, There must intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be -

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express. It can implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. To constitute a complete and operative resignation from public office, there must be: (1) an intention to relinquish a part of the term; (2) an act of relinquishment; and (3) an acceptance by the proper authority. The last one is required by reason of Article 238 of the Revised Penal Code. (Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres, Catanduanes vs. CA, 284 SCRA 276, 1997). Santos vs. CA, 345 SCRA 553, (2000) – rule on double compensation not applicable to pension. A retiree receiving pension or gratuity after retirement can continue to receive such pension or gratuity if he accepts another government position to which another compensation is attached. -

PILC vs. Elma, G.R. No. 138965, March 5, 2007 – PCCG Chair Magdangal Elma is prohibited under the Constitution from simultaneously serving as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel. The position of PCCG Chair and CPLC are incompatible offices since the CPLC reviews actions of the PCGG Chair. It pointed out that the general rule to hold more than one office is “allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position”/ -

Del Castillo vs. Civil Service Commission, August 21, 1997- When an employee is illegally dismissed, and his reinstatement is later ordered by the Court, for all legal intents and purposes he is considered as not having left his office, and notwithstanding the silence of the decision, he is entitled to payment of back salaries. -

DOTC vs. Cruz, GR No. 178256, July 23, 2008 –The Supreme Court follows as a precedent, the DOTC did not effect Cruz's termination with bad faith and, consequently, no backwages can be awarded in his favor. -

David vs. Gania GR No. 156030, August 14, 2003- A civil service officer or employee, who has been found illegally dismissed or suspended, is entitled to be reinstated and to back wages and other monetary benefits from the time of his illegal dismissal or suspension up to his reinstatement, and if at the time the decision of exoneration is promulgated, he is already of retirement age, he shall be entitled not only to back wages but also to full retirement benefits. -

CSC vs. Dacoycoy, April 29, 1999 – The CSC as an aggrieved party, may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. Appeal now lies from a decision exonerating a civil service employee of administrative charges. -

CSC vs. Albao, October 13, 2005- The present case partakes of an act by petitioner CSC to protect the integrity of the civil service -

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system, and does not fall under the provision on disciplinary actions under Sec. 47. It falls under the provisions of Sec. 12, par. 11, on administrative cases instituted by it directly. This is an integral part of its duty, authority and power to administer the civil service system and protect its integrity, as provided in Article IX-B, Sec. 3 of the Constitution, by removing from its list of eligibles those who falsified their qualifications. This is to be distinguished from ordinary proceedings intended to discipline a bona fide member of the system, for acts or omissions that constitute violations of the law or the rules of the service. SSS Employees Ass. vs. CA, 175 SCRA 686- While the Constitution and the Labor Code are silent as to whether government employees may strike, they are prohibited from striking by express provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6, series of 1997 of the CSC and as implied in E.O. 180. -

COMELEC REAPPOINTMENT OF COMMISSIONERS- Matibag vs. Benipayo, April 2, 2002- The phrase “without reappointment” applies only to one who has been appointed by the President and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, whether or not such person completes his term of office which could be seven, five or three years. There must be a confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the previous appointment before the prohibition on reappointment can apply. ISSUANCE of writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.- Relampagos vs. Cumba, 243 SCRA 690. -

Bedol vs. COMELEC, GR No. 179830, December 3, 2009- The COMELEC possesses the power to conduct -

investigations as an adjunct to its constitutional duty to enforce and administer all election laws, by virtue of the explicit provisions of paragraph 6, Section 2, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which reads: Article IX-C, Section 2. xxx (6) xxx; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices. The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon it by the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, may be -

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classified into administrative, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial. The quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC embraces the power to resolve controversies arising from the enforcement of election laws, and to be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies; and of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications. Its quasi-legislative power refers to the issuance of rules and regulations to implement the election laws and to exercise such legislative functions as may expressly be delegated to it by Congress. Its administrative function refers to the enforcement and administration of election laws. In the exercise of such power, the Constitution (Section 6, Article IX-A) and the Omnibus Election Code (Section 52 [c]) authorize the COMELEC to issue rules and regulations to implement the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code.7 The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The Court, in Dole Philippines Inc. v. Esteva, described quasi-judicial power in the following manner, viz: Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand is the power of the administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. Since rights of specific persons are affected, it is elementary that in the proper exercise of quasi-judicial power due process must be observed in the conduct of the proceedings. Task Force Maguindanao’s fact-finding investigation – to probe into the veracity of the alleged fraud that marred the elections in said province; and consequently, to determine whether the certificates of canvass were genuine or spurious, and whether an election offense had possibly been committed – could by no means be classified as a purely ministerial or administrative function. The COMELEC, through the Task Force Maguindanao, was exercising its quasi-judicial power in pursuit of the truth behind the 5

allegations of massive fraud during the elections in Maguindanao. To achieve its objective, the Task Force conducted hearings and required the attendance of the parties concerned and their counsels to give them the opportunity to argue and support their respective positions. The effectiveness of the quasi–judicial power vested by law on a government institution hinges on its authority to compel attendance of the parties and/or their witnesses at the hearings or proceedings. In the same vein, to withhold from the COMELEC the power to punish individuals who refuse to appear during a fact-finding investigation, despite a previous notice and order to attend, would render nugatory the COMELEC’s investigative power, which is an essential incident to its constitutional mandate to secure the conduct of honest and credible elections. In this case, the purpose of the investigation was however derailed when petitioner obstinately refused to appear during said hearings and to answer questions regarding the various election documents which, he claimed, were stolen while they were in his possession and custody. Undoubtedly, the COMELEC could punish petitioner for such contumacious refusal to attend the Task Force hearings. Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC was acting as a board of canvassers at that time it required petitioner to appear before it, the Court had the occasion to rule that the powers of the board of canvassers are not purely ministerial. The board exercises quasi-judicial functions, such as the function and duty to determine whether the papers transmitted to them are genuine election returns signed by the proper officers.10 When the results of the elections in the province of Maguindanao were being canvassed, counsels for various candidates posited numerous questions on the certificates of canvass brought before the COMELEC. The COMELEC asked petitioner to appear before it in order to shed light on the issue of whether the election documents coming from Maguindanao were spurious or not. When petitioner unjustifiably refused to appear, COMELEC undeniably acted within the bounds of its jurisdiction when it issued the assailed resolutions. -

LDP vs. COMELEC, GR No. 151265, February 24, 2004 The COMELEC correctly stated that “the ascertainment of the identity of [a] political party and its legitimate officers” is a matter that is well within its authority. The source of this authority is no other than the fundamental law itself, which vests upon the COMELEC the power and function to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. In the exercise of such power and in the discharge of such function, the Commission is endowed with ample “wherewithal” and “considerable latitude in adopting means and -

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methods that will ensure the accomplishment of the great objectives for which it was created to promote free, orderly and honest elections. LP vs. ATIENZA, ET AL., GR No. 174992- April 17, 2007 – COMELEC has jurisdiction to decide questions of leadership within a party and to ascertain its legitimate officers and leaders. xxx The COMELEC is endowed with ample “wherewithal” and “considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will ensure the accomplishment of the great objectives for which it was created to promote free and orderly honest elections. -

Balajonda vs. COMELEC, GR No. 166032, February 28, 2005- Despite the silence of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure as to the procedure of the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal, there is no reason to dispute the COMELEC’s authority to do so, considering that the suppletory application of the Rules of Court is expressly authorized by Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides that absent any applicable provisions therein the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court shall be applicable by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect. -

Codilla vs. De Venecia, et al., December 10, 2002- Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC en banc to review, on motion for reconsideration, decisions or resolutions decided by a division. Since the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the Second Division suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the Second Division. The said Order of the Second Division was yet unenforceable as it has not attained finality; the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration suspends its execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the assumption in office of the respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. -

Sarmiento vs. COMELEC, 212 SCRA 307- The COMELEC en banc does not have the authority to hear and decide cases at the first instance. Under the COMELEC Rules, preproclamation cases are classified as Special Cases and in compliance with the provision of the Constitution, the two divisions of the COMELEC are vested with the authority to hear and decide these special cases. -

Santiago vs. COMELEC, March 19, 1997 - COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC’s power -

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under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the “completeness” and the “sufficient standard” tests. The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; (2) to issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total number of registered voters in each legislative district; (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in the establishment of signature stations; and (4) to verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters’ affidavits, and voters’ identification cards used in the immediately preceding election. -

Cayetano vs. COMELEC, January 23, 2006- The conduct of plebiscite and determination of its result have always been the business of the COMELEC and not the regular courts. Such a case involves the appreciation of ballots which is best left to the COMELEC. As an independent constitutional body exclusively charged with the power of enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall, the COMELEC has the indisputable expertise in the field of election and related laws.” Its acts, therefore, enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. -

Alunan III vs. Mirasol, GR No. 108399, July 31, 1997 – Contests involving elections of SK officials do not fall within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. -

Loong vs. COMELEC, 305 SCRA 832- The COMELEC may validly order a manual count notwithstanding the required automated counting of ballots in R. A. 8436, the law authorizing the commission to use an automated election system, if that is the only way to count votes. It ought to be self-evident that the Constitution did not envision a COMELEC that cannot count the result of an election. -

Limkaichong vs. COMELEC- Resolution No. 8062 is a valid exercise of the COMELEC’s constitutionally mandated power to promulgate its own rules of procedure relative to the conduct of the elections. In adopting such policy-guidelines for the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections, the COMELEC had in mind the objective of upholding the sovereign will of the people and in the -

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interest of justice and fair play. Accordingly, those candidates whose disqualification cases are still pending at the time of the elections, should they obtain the highest number of votes from the electorate, shall be proclaimed but that their proclamation shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved cases. COMMISSION ON AUDIT COA’S AUDITING POWER- Blue Bar Coconut Phils. vs. Tantuico- Corporations covered by the COA’s auditing powers are not limited to GOCCs. Where a private corporation or entity handles public funds, it falls under COA jurisdiction. Under Sec. 2(1), item, (d), nongovernmental entities receiving subsidies or equity directly or indirectly from or through the government are required to submit to post audit. -

DBP vs. COA, January 16, 2002 -The mere fact that private auditors may audit government agencies does not divest the COA of its power to examine and audit the same government agencies. The COA is neither by-passed nor ignored since even with a private audit the COA will still conduct its usual examination and audit, and its findings and conclusions will still bind government agencies and their officials. A concurrent private audit poses no danger whatsoever of public funds or assets escaping the usual scrutiny of a COA audit. Manifestly, the express language of the Constitution, and the clear intent of its framers, point to only one indubitable conclusion - the COA does not have the exclusive power to examine and audit government agencies. The framers of the Constitution were fully aware of the need to allow independent private audit of certain government agencies in addition to the COA audit, as when there is a private investment in a governmentcontrolled corporation, or when a government corporation is privatized or publicly listed, or as in the case at bar when the government borrows money from abroad. -

BSP vs. COA, January 22, 2006 - Retirement benefits accruing to a public officer may not, without his consent, be withheld and applied to his indebtedness to the government. -

MISON vs. COA, 187 SCRA 445, The chairman of COA, acting by himself, has no authority to render or promulgate a decision for the commission. The power to decide on issues relating to audit and accounting is lodged in the COA acting as a collegial body which has the jurisdiction to decide any case brought before it. -

PHIL. OPERATIONS, INC. vs Auditor General, 94 Phil 868, COA’s power over the settlement of accounts is different from

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power over unliquidated claims, the latter of which is within the ambit of judicial power. NHA vs. COA, 226 SCRA 55, COA can validly disallow the approval of excess or unnecessary expenditures. -

ARTICLE X (LOCAL GOVERNMENTS) TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS- Socrates vs. COMELEC, November 12, 2002, What the Constitution prohibits is an immediate re-election for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. The Constituton, however, does not prohibit a subsequent re-election for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate reelection after the third term. -

Adormeo vs. COMELEC, February 4, 2002- The winner in the recall election cannot be charged or credited with the full term of three years for purposes of counting the consecutiveness of an elective official’s terms in office. Thus, in a situation where a candidate loses in an election to gain a third consecutive term but later wins in the recall election, the recall term cannot be stitched with his previous two consecutive terms. The period of time prior to the recall term, when another elective official holds office, constitutes an interruption in the continuity of service. -

Lonzanida vs COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602- Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three-term limit. Conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term. -

Borja vs. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157- For the three termlimit rule to apply, the local official concerned must serve three consecutive terms as a result of election. The term served must be one for which he was elected. Thus, if he assumes a position by virtue of succession, the official cannot be considered to have fully served the term. -

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Ong vs. Alegre, et al., June 23, 2006- assumption of office constitutes, for Francis Ong, “service for the full term”, and should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions, barring local elective officials from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same position. His continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule, notwithstanding the subsequent nullification of his proclamation. There was actually no interruption or break in the continuity of Francis Ong’s service respecting the 1998-2001 term. -

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORTY- Its function is limited to the delivery of basic services. RA 7924 does not grant the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. The MMDA is a development authority. It is not a political unit of government. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. It is the local government units, acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power. (MMDA vs. BelAir Village Association, 328 SCRA 836). -

Therefore, insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is understood by the lower court and by the petitioner to grant the MMDA the power to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers’ licenses without need of any other legislative enactment, such is an unauthorized exercise of police power. The MMDA was intended to coordinate services with metro-wide impact that transcend local political boundaries or would entail huge expenditures if provided by the individual LGUs, especially with regard to transport and traffic management, and we are aware of the valiant efforts of the petitioner to untangle the increasingly traffic-snarled roads of Metro Manila. But these laudable intentions are limited by the MMDA’s enabling law, which we can but interpret, and petitioner must be reminded that its efforts in this respect must be authorized by a valid law, or ordinance, or regulation arising from a legitimate source (MMDA vs. Danilo Garin, April 15, 2005). -

MMDA vs. MenCorp Transport System, G.R. No. 170657, August 15, 2007- In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Project (Greater Manila Transport System) as envisioned by E.O 179; hence, it could not have been validly designated by the President to undertake the Project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of respondents’ terminals. Even the MMDA’s claimed authority under the police power must necessarily fail in consonance with the above-quoted ruling in MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, -

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Inc. and this Court’s subsequent ruling in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin that the MMDA is not vested with police power. INTERNAL REVENUE ALLOTMENT- IRAs- are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit Alvarez vs. Guingona, 252 SCRA 695). LGUS’ SHARE IN THE IRA SHALL BE AUTOMATICALLY RELEASED WITHOUT ANY CONDITION OF APPROVAL FROM ANY GOVERNMENTAL BODY-Section 6, Art. X of the 1987constitution provides that LGUs shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them. When passed, it would be readily see that such provision mandates that (1) the LGUs shall have a “just share” in the national taxes; and (2) “just share” shall be determined by law; (3) that “just share” shall be automatically released to the LGUs. PROVINCE OF BATANGAS VS. ROMULO, 429 SCRA 736, May 27, 2004. -

The legislative is barred from withholding the release of the IRA. (ACORD vs. Zamora, June 8, 2005) AO No. 372 of President Ramos, Section 4 which provides that “pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation, the amount equivalent to 10% of the internal revenue allotment to local government units shall be withheld” is declared in contravention of Section 286 of the LG Code and Section 6 of Art X of the constitution (Pimentel vs. Aguirre, July 19, 2000). -

LOCAL TAXATION Constitution itself promotes the principles of local autonomy as embodied in the Local Government Code. The State is mandated to ensure the autonomy of local governments, and local governments are empowered to levy taxes, fees and charges that accrue exclusively to them, subject to congressional guidelines and limitations. The principle of local autonomy is no mere passing dalliance but a constitutionally enshrined precept that deserves respect and appropriate enforcement by this Court. The GSIS’s taxexempt status, in sum, was withdrawn in 1992 by the Local Government Code but restored by the Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997, the operative provision of which is Section 39. The subject real property taxes for the years 1992 to 1994 were assessed against GSIS while the Local Government Code provisions prevailed and, thus, may be collected by the City of Davao. (City of Davao vs. RTC, Br. 12, August 18, 2005). -

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G.R. No. 165827, National Power Corporation vs. Province of Isabela, represented by Hon. Benjamin G. Dy, Provincial Governor, June 16, 2006)- the NAPOCOR is not exempt from paying franchise tax. Though its charter exempted it from the tax, the enactment of the Local Government Code (LGC) has withdraw such exemption, the Court said, citing its previous ruling in National Power Corporation vs. City of Cabanatuan. -

MCCIA vs. Marcos, September 11, 1996- The power to tax is primarily vested in the Congress; however, in our jurisdiction, it may be exercised by local legislative bodies, no longer merely by virtue of a valid delegation as before, but pursuant to direct authority conferred by Section 5, Article X of the Constitution. An “agency” of the Government refers to “any of the various units of the Government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or governmentowned or controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein;” while an “instrumentality” refers to “any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned and controlled corporations.” It had already become, even if it be conceded to be an “agency” or “instrumentality” of the Government, a taxable person for such purpose in view of the withdrawal in the last paragraph of Section 234 of exemptions from the payment of real property taxes, which, as earlier adverted to, applies to MCIAA. -

PPA vs. Iloilo City, November 11, 2004- The bare fact that the port and its facilities and appurtenances are accessible to the general public does not exempt it from the payment of real property taxes. It must be stressed that the said port facilities and appurtenances are the petitioner’s corporate patrimonial properties, not for public use, and that the operation of the port and its facilities and the administration of its buildings are in the nature of ordinary business. -

MIAA vs. CA, et al., July 20, 2006- MIAA’s Airport Lands and Buildings are exempt from real estate tax imposed by local governments. MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but an instrumentality of the National Government and thus exempt from local taxation. Second, the real properties of MIAA are owned by the Republic of the Philippines and thus exempt from real estate tax. TheAirport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and therefore owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines. The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by the public for international and domestic travel and transportation. The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are devoted to public use and thus are -

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properties of public dominion. As properties of public dominion, the Airport Lands and Buildings are outside the commerce of man. Real Property Owned by the Republic is Not Taxable. When local governments invoke the power to tax on national government instrumentalities, such power is construed strictly against local governments. The rule is that a tax is never presumed and there must be clear language in the law imposing the tax. Any doubt whether a person, article or activity is taxable is resolved against taxation. This rule applies with greater force when local governments seek to tax national government instrumentalities. -

Another rule is that a tax exemption is strictly construed against the taxpayer claiming the exemption. However, when Congress grants an exemption to a national government instrumentality from local taxation, such exemption is construed liberally in favor of the national government instrumentality. -

PRESIDENT’S SUPERVISION- National Liga vs. Paredes, September 27, 2004- Like the local government units, the Liga ng mga Barangay is not subject to control by the Chief Executive or his alter ego. -

The President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local government unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the President’s supervisory powers over local government units. Hence, the President or any of his or her alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the Constitution. Any directive therefore by the President or any of his or her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity because it violates the principle of local autonomy and separation of powers of the executive and legislative departments in governing municipal corporations. (Dadole vs. COA, December 3, 2002). -

Leynes vs. COA, 418 SCRA 180- By upholding the power of LGUs to grant allowances to judges and leaving to their discretion the amount of allowances they may want to grant, depending on the availability of local funds, the genuine and meaningful local autonomy is ensured. -

Batangas CATV Inc. vs. CA, 439 SCRA 326- In the absence of constitutional or legislative authorization, municipalities have no power to grant franchises. -

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ARTICLE XI (ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS) IMPEACHMENT- Estrada vs. Desierto, April 3, 2001Section 3(7) of Article XI provides for the limit and the consequence of an impeachment judgment. Convic uted, tried and punished for criminal offenses committed. -

READ: Francisco, et al. vs. House of Representatives, November 10, 2003definition of “TO INITIATE IMPEACHMENT”- proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice. -

A vote of 1/3 of all the members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee or override its contrary resolution, De Castro vs. Committee on Justice, Batasan Pambansa, September 3, 1995. -

Resignation by an impeachable official does not place him beyond the reach of impeachment proceedings; he can still be impeached. -

The 1987 Constitution, the deliberations thereon, and the opinions of constitutional law experts all indicate that the Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer. (Office of the Ombudsman vs. Court of Appeals and former Deputy Ombudsman Arturo C. Mojica, March 4, 2005). -

Marquez vs. Desierto, June 27, 2001- there must be a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction before inspection of bank accounts by Ombudsman may be allowed. -

OMB’S POWER TO PROSECUTE, Uy vs. Sandiganbayan, March 20, 2001- The power to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. -

Ombudsman vs. Valera, September 30, 2005- The Court has consistently held that the Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman. xxx However, with respect to the grant of the power to preventively suspend, Section 24 of R.A. No 6770 makes no mention of the Special -

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Prosecutor. The obvious import of this exclusion is to withhold from the Special Prosecutor the power to preventively suspend. Honasan II vs. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of DOJ, April 13, 2004- The power of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is not exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government such as the provincial, city and state prosecutors. DOJ Panel is not precluded from conducting any investigation of cases against public officers involving violations of penal laws but if the cases fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, then respondent Ombudsman may, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction take over at any stage. -

Ledesma vs. CA, July 29, 2005 - Ombudsman has the authority to determine the administrative liability of a public official or employee at fault, and direct and compel the head of the office or agency concerned to implement the penalty imposed. In other words, it merely concerns the procedural aspect of the Ombudsman’s functions and not its jurisdiction. -

Office of the Ombudsman vs. CA, et al.,GR No. 160675, June 16, 2006- the Court similarly upholds the Office of the Ombudsman’s power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at fault, in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority. The exercise of such power is well founded in the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770. xxx The legislative history of Republic Act No. 6770 thus bears out the conclusion that the Office of the Ombudsman was intended to possess full administrative disciplinary authority, including the power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at fault. The lawmakers envisioned the Office of the Ombudsman to be “an activist watchman,” not merely a passive one. -

Masing, et al. vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 165584, January 22, 2008 – Supreme Court reiterated this ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja, where we emphasized that “the Ombudsman’s order to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee is not merely advisory or recommendatory but is actually mandatory.” Implementation of the order imposing the penalty is, however, to be coursed through the proper officer. -

Section 23(1) of the same law provides that administrative investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be in accordance with its rules of procedure and consistent with due process. It is erroneous, therefore, for respondents to contend that R.A. No. -

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4670 confers an exclusive disciplinary authority on the DECS over public school teachers and prescribes an exclusive procedure in administrative investigations involving them. R.A. No. 4670 was approved on June 18, 1966. On the other hand, the 1987 Constitution was ratified by the people in a plebiscite in 1987 while R.A. No. 6770 was enacted on November 17, 1989. It is basic that the 1987 Constitution should not be restricted in its meaning by a law of earlier enactment. The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 were quite explicit in conferring authority on the Ombudsman to act on complaints against all public officials and employees, with the exception of officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over members of Congress and the Judiciary. QUIMPO vs. TANODBAYAN- It is not material that a GOCC is originally created by charter or not. What is decisive is that it has been acquired by the government to perform functions related to government programs and policies. JURISDICTION OVER GOCCMacalino vs. Sandiganbayan, 376 SCRA 452- Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution and Section 15 of RA 6770 granted the Ombudsman the power to direct any officer or employee of government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters to perform any act or duty required by law or to stop any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties. -

PRESCRIPTION- Presidential Ad-hoc Fact-finding Committee on Behest Loans vs. Desierto , 317 SCRA 272- Section 15 of Article XI applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth and not to criminal cases. -

ARTICLE XII (NATIONAL ECONOMY & PATRIMONY) 0 ANCESTRAL DOMAIN- Alcantara vs. DENR, GR No. 161881, July 31, 2008- It must be emphasized that FLGLA No. 542 is a mere license or privilege granted by the State to petitioner for the use or exploitation of natural resources and public lands over which the State has sovereign ownership under the Regalian Doctrine. Like timber or mining licenses, a forest land grazing lease agreement is a mere permit which, by executive action, can be revoked, rescinded, cancelled, amended or modified, whenever public welfare or public interest so requires. The determination of what is in the public interest is necessarily vested in the State as owner of the country's natural resources. Thus, a privilege or license is not in the nature of a contract that enjoys protection under the due process and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution. In cases in which the license or privilege is in -

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conflict with the people's welfare, the license or privilege must yield to the supremacy of the latter, as well as to the police power of the State. Such a privilege or license is not even a property or property right, nor does it create a vested right; as such, no irrevocable rights are created in its issuance. xxx The Supreme Court recognized the inherent right of ICCs/IPs to recover their ancestral land from outsiders and usurpers. Seen by many as a victory attained by the private respondents only after a long and costly effort, the Court, as a guardian and instrument of social justice, abhors a further delay in the resolution of this controversy and brings it to its fitting conclusion by denying the petition. -

CRUZ VS. SEC. OF DENR, 347 SCRA 128- RA 8371 categorically declares ancestral lands and domains held by native title as never to have been public land. Domains and lands under native title are, therefore, indisputably presumed to have never been public lands and are private. The right of ownership granted to indigenous peoples over their ancestral domains does not cover the natural resources. The right granted to IP to negotiate the terms and conditions over the natural resources covers only their exploration to ensure ecological and environmental protection. -

Carino vs. Insular Government, 212 US 449 – recognized the existence of a native title to land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial as an exception to the theory of jus regalia. -

Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority, July 9, 2002Foreshore and submerged areas form part of the public domain and are inalienable. Lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas are also form part of the public domain and are also inalienable, unless converted into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. -

The prevailing rule is that reclaimed disposable lands of the public domain may only be leased and not sold to private parties. These lands remained sui generis, as the only alienable or disposable lands of the public domain which the government could not sell to private parties except if the legislature passes a law authorizing such sale. Reclaimed lands retain their inherent potential as areas for public use or public service. xxx The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore areas is rooted in the Regalian Doctrine, which declares that all lands and waters of the public domain belong to the State -

But notwithstanding the conversion of reclaimed lands to alienable lands of the public domain, they may not be sold to private corporations which can only lease the same. The State may only sell alienable public land to Filipino citizens. -

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Chavez vs. PEA & Amari, May 6, 2003- Decision does not bar private corporations from participating in reclamation projects and being paid for their services in reclaiming lands. What the Decision prohibits, following the explicit constitutional mandate, is for private corporations to acquire reclaimed lands of the public domain. There is no prohibition on the directors, officers and stockholders of private corporations, if they are Filipino citizens, from acquiring at public auction reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain. They can acquire not more than 12 hectares per individual, and the land thus acquired becomes private land. -

Freedom Islands are inalienable lands of the public domain. Government owned lands, as long they are patrimonial property, can be sold to private parties, whether Filipino citizens or qualified private corporations. Thus, the so-called Friar Lands acquired by the government under Act No. 1120 are patrimonial property which even private corporations can acquire by purchase. Likewise, reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain if sold or transferred to a public or municipal corporation for a monetary consideration become patrimonial property in the hands of the public or municipal corporation. Once converted to patrimonial property, the land may be sold by the public or municipal corporation to private parties, whether Filipino citizens or qualified private corporations. -

Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the Philipipnes, GR No. 179987, April 29, 2009)- public domain lands become patrimonial property or private property of the government only upon a declaration that these are alienable or disposable lands, together with an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth. Only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public domain begin to run. -

in connection with Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act recognizes that “those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous and exclusive possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945” have acquired ownership of, and registrable title, to such lands based on the length and quality of their possession. The Court clarified that the Public Land Act merely requires possession since June 12, 1945 and does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession. The possessor is thus entitled to secure judicial confirmation of title as soon as the land it covers is declared alienable and disposable. This is, however, subject to the December 31, 2020 deadline imposed by the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. 9176. 6

DENR vs. Yap, GR No. 167707, Sacay vs. DENR, GR No. 17775, October 8, 2008- Boracay Island is owned by the State except for the lot areas with existing titles. The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply a title to the land they are presently occupying. The present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. -

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, the Supreme Court said that Boracay was unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proc. 1064 (which classified Boracay as 400 hecs of reserved forest land and 628.96 hecs. of agricultural land). Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705. Forest lands do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes. Borromeo v. Descallar, GR No. 159310, February 24, 2009- While the acquisition and the purchase of real properties in the country by a foreigner is void ab initio for being contrary to the Constitution, the subsequent acquisition of the said properties from the foreigner by a Filipino citizen has cured the flaw in the original transaction and the title of the transferee is valid. -

Chavez vs. NHA, et al., August 15, 2007- To lands reclaimed by PEA or through a contract with a private person or entity, such reclaimed lands still remain alienable lands of public domain which can be transferred only to Filipino citizens but not to a private corporation. This is because PEA under PD 1084 and EO 525 is tasked to hold and dispose of alienable lands of public domain and it is only when it is transferred to Filipino citizens that it becomes patrimonial property. On the other hand, the NHA is a government agency not tasked to dispose of public lands under its charter—The Revised Administrative Code of 1987. The NHA is an “end-user agency” authorized by law to administer and dispose of reclaimed lands. The moment titles over reclaimed lands based on the special patents are transferred to the NHA by the Register of Deeds, they are automatically converted to patrimonial properties of the State which can be sold to Filipino citizens and private corporations, 60% of which are owned by Filipinos. The reason is obvious: if the reclaimed land is not converted to patrimonial land once transferred to NHA, then it would be useless to transfer it to the NHA since it cannot legally transfer or alienate lands of public domain. More importantly, it cannot attain its avowed purposes and goals since it can only transfer patrimonial lands to qualified beneficiaries and prospective buyers to raise funds for the SMDRP. From the foregoing considerations, we find that the 79-hectare reclaimed land has been declared alienable and -

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disposable land of the public domain; and in the hands of NHA, it has been reclassified as patrimonial property. Republic vs. Tri-plus Corp., September 26, 2006- Section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, provides that the classification and reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest land is the prerogative of the Executive Department. Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain. -

JG Summit Holdings Inc. vs. CA, January 31, 2005- the prohibition in the Constitution applies only to ownership of land. It does not extend to immovable or real property as defined under Article 415 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, we would have a strange situation where the ownership of immovable property such as trees, plants and growing fruit attached to the land would be limited to Filipinos and Filipino corporations only. -

Ramos-Bulalio vs. Ramos, January 23, 2006- Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State and those lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. A homestead patent, such as the subject of the instant case, is one of the modes to acquire title to public lands suitable for agricultural purposes. -

La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Ass., Inc. vs. Ramos, December 1, 2004 – Foreign corporations are confined to technical and financial assistance. The State itself may explore, develop or utilize the country’s natural resources by entering into the necessary agreements with individuals or entities in the pursuit of visible operations. Service contracts with foreign corporations as contractors who invest in and operate and manage extractive enterprises, subject to the full control and supervision of the State. Control by the state must be on the macro level, through the establishment of policies, guidelines, regulations, industry standards and similar measures that would enable the government to control the conduct of the affairs in various enterprises and restrain activities deemed not desirable or beneficial. -

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GR No. 157882, Didipio Earth-Savers’ Multi-Purpose Association, Incorporated, et al. v. DENR Sec. Gozun, et al., March 30, 2006- the Constitution expressly allows service contracts in the large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and mineral oils via “agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance” as provided by law. The Court said that these agreements with foreign corporations are not limited to mere financial or technical assistance. The 1987 Constitution allows the continued use of service contracts with foreign corporations as contractors who would invest in and operate and manage extractive enterprises, subject to the full control and supervision of the State. -

GR Nos. 152613 & 152628, Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp., et al.; GR No. 152619-20, Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative v. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp., et al.; and GR No. 152870-71, The Mines Adjudication Board and its Members, et al. v. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp., et al., June 23, 2006- Mining operations in the Diwalwal Mineral Reservation Area lies within the full control of the executive branch of the state. xxx Mining operations in the Diwalwal Mineral Reservation are now, therefore, within the full control of the State through the executive branch. Pursuant to sec. 5 of RA 7942, the State can either directly undertake the exploration, development, and utilization of the area or it can enter into agreement with qualified entities. -

Republic vs. Rosemoor Mining & Development Corp., 426 SCRA 517 – Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 constitution does not apply retroactively to a “license, concession or lease” granted by the government under the 1973 constitution or before the effectivity of the 1987 constitution. -

Zarate vs. Director of Lands, 434 SCRA 322- It is the rule of law that possession, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership. -

PUBLIC UTILITIES- Republic vs. EXTELCOM, 373 SCRA 316 – The operation of public utility shall not be exclusive. -

FRANCHISE - PLDT vs. Bacolod City, July 15, 2005 - In sum, it does not appear that, in approving §23 of R.A. No. 7925, Congress intended it to operate as a blanket tax exemption to all telecommunications entities. Applying the rule of strict construction of laws granting tax exemptions and the rule that doubts should be resolved in favor of municipal corporations in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal taxing powers, we hold that §23 of R.A. No. 7925 cannot be considered as having amended petitioner's -

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franchise so as to entitle it to exemption from the imposition of local franchise taxes. Divinagracia v. CBS, GR No. 162272, April &, 2009-The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) is not authorized to cancel the certificates of public convenience (CPCs) and other licenses it had issued to the holders of duly issued legislative franchises on the ground that the latter had violated the terms of their franchise. As legislative franchises are extended through statutes, they should receive recognition as the ultimate expression of State policy. -

City Government of San Pablo vs. Reyes, 305 SCRA 353Under the Constitution, no franchise shall be granted under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment or repeal when the public interest so requires. Franchises are also subject to alteration by the power to tax, which cannot be contracted away. -

Pilipino Telephone Corp. vs. NTC, 410 SCRA 82 – The constitution is emphatic that the operation of public utility shall not be exclusive. -

Eastern Assurance & Surety Corp. vs. LTFRB, October 7, 2003 - The constitution does not totally prohibit monopolies. It mandates the State to regulate them when public interest so requires. -

ARTICLE XIII (SOCIAL JUSTICE & HUMAN RIGHTS) SOCIAL JUSTICE- while the pursuit of social justice can have revolutionary effect, it cannot justify breaking the law. (Astudillo v. Board of Directors, PHHC, 73 SCRA 15). -

HUMAN RIGHTS- read EPZA VS, HR, 208 SCRA; Simon vs. Com. on Human Rights, 229 SCRA 1170- limited to violations of civil and political rights only either by government official or private individual. -

Human Security Act- granting adjudicatory and prosecutorial powers to the CHR re violations of human rights.- refer to Section 5- perform such other functions and duties as may be provided by law. -

CHREA vs. CHR, November 25, 2004- The CHR, although admittedly a constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not included in the genus of offices accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat. -

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People vs. Leachon, 1998- The constitutional requirement that the eviction and demolition be in accordance with law and conducted in a just and humane manner does not mean validity or legality of the demolition or eviction is hinged on the existence of resettlement area designated or earmarked by the government. -

ARTICLE XIV (ESTACS) Review Center Association of the Philippines v. Ermita, GR No. 180046, April 2, 2009- A “review center is not an institution of higher learning as contemplated by RA 7722…[i]t does not offer a degree-granting program that would put it under the jurisdiction of the CHED.” Moreover, “[a] review course is only intended to ‘refresh and enhance the knowledge or competencies and skills of reviewees,’” and it does not require enrollment, attendance, a grade or submission of a thesis in order to complete the review center course requirements or take the licensure examination. -

ACADEMIC FREEDOM- from standpoint of the educational institution and the members of the academe. The Supreme Court sustained the primacy of academic freedom over Civil service rules on AWOL, stressing when UP opted to retain private petitioner and even promoted him despite his absence, the University was exercising its freedom to choose who may teach or who may continue to teach its faculty (UP, et al. vs. CSC, April 3, 2001). -

Morales vs. UP Board of Regents, December 13, 2004- As enunciated by this Court in the case of University of San Carlos v. Court of Appeals, the discretion of schools of learning to formulate rules and guidelines in the granting of honors for purposes of graduation forms part of academic freedom. And such discretion may not be disturbed much less controlled by the courts, unless there is grave abuse of discretion in its exercise. Therefore, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion, the courts may not disturb the University’s decision not to confer honors to petitioner. -

Lacuesta vs. Ateneo, December 9, 2005- Consistent with academic freedom and constitutional autonomy, an institution of higher learning has the prerogative to provide standards for its teachers and determine whether these standards have been met. At the end of the probation period, the decision to re-hire an employee on probation, belongs to the university as the employer alone. -

UP vs. CSC, April 3, 2001- the University has the academic freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, -

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what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.” Clearly, this freedom encompasses the autonomy to choose who should teach and, concomitant therewith, who should be retained in its rolls of professors and other academic personnel. This Court declared in Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong: “As corporate entities, educational institutions of higher learning are inherently endowed with the right to establish their policies, academic and otherwise, unhampered by external controls or pressure.” De LaSalle University vs. CA, December 19, 2007- Section 5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public interest calls for some restraint. According to present jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses the independence of an academic institution to determine for itself (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4) who may be admitted to study. -

It cannot be gainsaid that “the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a necessary, if not indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise finds basis in the freedom “what to teach.” Indeed, while it is categorically stated under the Education Act of 1982 that students have a right “to freely choose their field of study, subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation,” such right is subject to the established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution. Petitioner DLSU, therefore, can very well exercise its academic freedom, which includes its free choice of students for admission to its school. -

ARTICLE XVI (GENERAL PROVISIONS) IMMUNITY OF THE STATE FROM SUIT (Read general principles; Phil Agila Satellite, Inc. vs. Lichauco, May 3, 2006)- The hornbook rule is that a suit for acts done in the performance of official functions against an officer of the government by a private citizen which would result in a charge against or financial liability to the government must be regarded as a suit against the State itself, although it has not been formally impleaded. However, government immunity from suit will not shield the public official being sued if the government no longer has an interest to protect in the outcome of a -

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suit; or if the liability of the officer is personal because it arises from a tortious act in the performance of his/her duties. GTZ v. CA, GR No. 152318, April 16, 2009- German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), which implements a joint health insurance project of the German and Philippine governments, is not entitled to immunity from suit in the Philippines as GTZ, being the equivalent of a government-owned-and-controlled corporation, has the power and capacity to sue and be sued under the Corporation Code. GTZ is akin to a governmental owned or controlled corporation without original charter which, by virtue of the Corporation Code, has expressly consented to be sued, -

PCCG vs. Sandiganbayan, March 6, 2006- When the government itself is the suitor, as in Civil Case No. 0034. Where, as here, the State itself is no less the plaintiff in the main case, immunity from suit cannot be effectively invoked. For, as jurisprudence teaches, when the State, through its duly authorized officers, takes the initiative in a suit against a private party, it thereby descends to the level of a private individual and thus opens itself to whatever counterclaims or defenses the latter may have against it. Petitioner Republic’s act of filing its complaint in Civil Case No. 0034 constitutes a waiver of its immunity from suit. Being itself the plaintiff in that case, petitioner Republic cannot set up its immunity against private respondent Benedicto’s prayers in the same case. -

NATIONAL POLICE FORCE- Under the DILG (Carpio vs. Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290). Alunan vs. Asuncion, January 28, 2000, the new PNP absorbed the members of the former NAPOLCOM, PC and INP, all three of which accordingly abolished. -

Note: Professionalism of the AFP- cannot engage, directly or indirectly, in any partisan political activity, except to vote. They cannot be appointed to a civilian position in the government, including GOCCs or their subsidiaries. -

IBP vs. Zamora- Since none of the marines were incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to a civilian position to speak of. -

OPERATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES- 60% Filipino ownership. -

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MASS MEDIA- 100% Filipino ownership

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ADVERSTISING INDUSTRY – 70%

EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION- 60 % EXCEPT: Schools established by religious groups and mission boards. -

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ARTICLE XVII (AMENDMENTS) The Province of North Cotabato v. Republic, GR Nos. 183591, 183572, 183893, and 183951, October 14, 2008- The Court noted that inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is itself a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions from the President dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, it virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that process. -

IMBONG VS. COMELEC, 35 SCRA 28- Congress when acting as a Constituent Assembly has full and plenary powers to propose amendments or to call a convention. The grant to Congress as a Constituent Assembly of such plenary authority includes, by virtue of the doctrine of necessary implication, all powers necessary to the effective exercise of principal power granted, such as the power to fix qualifications, apportionment, etc.. -

SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106- RA 6735 is insufficient in providing for mechanism to govern initiatives for constitutional amendments. While the Constitution recognizes the right of citizens to propose amendments, the people cannot exercise such until Congress provides for its implementation. -

LAMBINO VS., ET AL. VS. COMELEC, October 25, 2006 -Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of the proposed constitutional amendment” should be “ready and shown” to the people “before” they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that “before they sign there is already a draft shown to them.” The framers also “envisioned” that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must “prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature.” The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No -

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agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition. DOCTRINE OF PROPER SUBMISSION- GONZALES VS. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774- The power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments is not included in the general grant of legislative power to Congress. It is part of the inherent powers of the people as the repository of sovereignty in a republican state. Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such power. Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that Senators and Members of the House of Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as component elements of a Constituent Assembly. -

When Congress, acting as Constituent Assembly, makes proposals for amendments, it does not have the final say on whether or not its acts are within constitutional limits- an issue which is clearly subject to judicial review. -

There is nothing to indicate that a special election is all times necessary in the ratification of amendments. A plebiscite may be validly held together with general elections. -

TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702- There can be no piece meal ratification. -

Presidential proclamation is not required for effectivity of amendment/revisions. UNLESS, the proposed amendments/revisions so provide. -

ARTICLE XVIII (TRANSITORY PROVISIONS) LIM VS. EXEC SEC., April11, 2002- Section 25 of the Transitory Provisions show a marked antipathy towards foreign military presence in the country, or of foreign influence in general. Hence, foreign troops are allowed entry into the Philippines only be way of direct exception. -

Under the Constitution, the US forces are prohibited from engaging in an offensive war on Philippine territory. The Supreme Court, however, cannot accept the bare allegations that the Arroyo administration is engaged in double speak in trying to pass off as a mere training exercise an offensive effort by foreign troops on native soil. -

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Bayan vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000, 342 SCRA 449-the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested and certified by the duly authorized representative of the United States government. The fact that the VFA was not submitted for advice and consent of the United States Senate does not detract from its status as a binding international agreement or treaty recognized by the said State. For this is a matter of internal United States law. Notice can be taken of the internationally known practice by the United States of submitting to its Senate for advice and consent agreements that are policymaking in nature, whereas those that carry out or further implement these policymaking agreements are merely submitted to Congress, under the provisions of the so-called Case–Zablocki Act, within sixty days from ratification. The second reason has to do with the relation between the VFA and the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951. This earlier agreement was signed and duly ratified with the concurrence of both the Philippine Senate and the United States Senate.

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AKBAYAN CITIZENS ACTION PARTY (AKBAYAN), et al., Petitioners - versus - THOMAS G. AQUINO, et al., No. 170516, July 16, 2008- While Article VII, Section 21 provides for Senate concurrence, such pertains only to the validity of the treaty under consideration, not to the conduct of negotiations attendant to its conclusion. Moreover, it is not even Congress as a whole that has been given the authority to concur as a means of checking the treaty-making power of the President, but only the Senate.

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Nicolas vs. Romulo, et al., G.R. No. 175888; Salonga vs. Smith, et al. G.R. No. 176051; and Makabayan vs. Arroyo, et al., G.R. No. 176222- February 11, 2009 - The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States, entered into on February 10, 1998, is UPHELD as constitutional, but the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006 are DECLARED not in accordance with the VFA, and respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs is hereby ordered to forthwith negotiate with the United States representatives for the appropriate agreement on detention facilities under Philippine authorities as provided in Art. V, Sec. 10 of the VFA, pending which the status quo shall be maintained until further orders by this Court.

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