31822892 Military History of Rhodesia Zimbabwe

Military history of Rhodesia / Zimbabwe

2010

Military history of Zimbabwe From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia The military history of Zimbabwe chronicles a vast time period and complex events from the dawn of history until the present time. It covers invasions of native peoples of Africa (Shona and Ndebele), colonization by Europeans (Portuguese, Boer and British people), and civil wars. The San People and invasion by ironworking cultures Stone Age evidence indicates that the San people, now living mostly in the Kalahari Desert, are the descendants of this region’s original inhabitants, almost 100 000 years ago. There are also remnants of several ironworking cultures dating back to AD 300. Little is known of the early ironworkers, but it is believed that they put pressure on the San and gradually took over the land. Shona invasion Around the 10th and 11th centuries the Bantu-speaking Shona (Gokomere, Sotho-Tswana and related tribes) arrived from the north and the both the San and the early ironworkers were driven out. This group gave rise to the maShona and the waRozwi tribes, and probably also gave rise to the Lemba people through a merger with descent from the ancient Jews who arrived in this region via Sena in Yemen. By the 15th century, the Shona had established a strong empire, known as the Munhumutapa Empire (also called Monomotapa or Mwene Mutapa Empire), with its capital at the ancient city of Zimbabwe -- Great Zimbabwe. This empire ruled territory now falling within the modern states of Zimbabwe (which took its name from this city) and Mozambique, but the empire was split by the end of the 15th century with southern part becoming the Urozwi Empire. The Portuguese began their attempts to subdue the Shona states as early as 1505 but were confined to the coast until 1513. The states were also torn apart by rival factions and trade in gold was gradually replaced by a trade in slaves. The empire finally collapsed in 1629 and never recovered. Remnants of the government established another Mutapa kingdom in Mozambique sometimes called Karanga, who reigned in the region until 1902.[1] Mfecane Main article: Mfecane Mfecane (Zulu), also known as the Difaqane or Lifaqane (Sesotho), is an African expression which means something like "the crushing" or "scattering". It describes a period of widespread chaos and disturbance in southern Africa during the period between 1815 and about 1835 which resulted from the rise to power of Shaka, the Zulu king and military leader who conquered the Nguni peoples between the Tugela and Pongola rivers in the beginning of the nineteenth century, and created a militaristic kingdom in the region. The Mfecane also led to the formation and consolidation of other groups — such as the Ndebele Kingdom, the Mfengu and the Makololo — and the creation of states such as the modern Lesotho. In 1817, the Southern Shona regions were invaded by Mzilikazi, originally a lieutenant of Zulu King Shaka who was pushed from his own territories to the west by the Zulu armies. After a brief alliance with the Transvaal Ndebele, Mzilikazi became leader of the Ndebele people. Many of the Shona people were incorporated and the rest were either made satellite territories who paid taxes to the Ndebele Kingdom. He called his new nation Mthwakazi (which the British later called Matabeleland), a name derived from the original settlers the San people called aba Thwa (The Ndebele called themselves Matabele, but because of linguistic differences, were called Ndebele by the local Sotho-Tswana.) Mzilikazi's invasion of the Transvaal was one part of a vast series of inter-related wars, forced migrations and famines that indigenous people and later historians came to call the Mfecane. In the Transvaal, the Mfecane severely weakened and disrupted the towns and villages of the Sotho-Tswana chiefdoms, their political systems and economies, making them very weak, and easy to colonize by the European settlers who would shortly arrive from the south. As Ndebele moved into Transvaal, the remnants of the Bavenda retreated north to the Waterberg and Zoutpansberg, while Mzilikazi made his chief kraal north of the Magaliesberg mountains near present day Pretoria, with an important military outpost to guard trade routes to the north at Mosega, not far from the site of the modern town of Zeerust. From about 1827 until about 1836, Mzilikazi dominated the southwestern Transvaal. Before that time the region between the Vaal and Limpopo was scarcely known to Europeans, but in 1829, Mzilikazi was visited at Mosega by Robert Moffat, and between that date and 1836 a few British traders and explorers visited the country and made known its principal features. Boer confrontations In the 1830s and the 1840s, descendants of Dutch and other settlers, collectively known as Boers (farmers) or Voortrekkers (pioneers), left the British Cape Colony, in what was to be called the Great Trek. With their military technology, they overcame the local forces with relative ease, and formed several small Boer republics in areas beyond British control, without a central government. From 1835 until 1838, Boer settlers started to cross the Vaal and they had several skirmishes with the Ndebele. On October 16, 1836, a Boer laager (or fortified circle of wagons) led by Andries Hendrik Potgieter, was attacked by an Ndebele force of about 5,000, who looted all of Potgiester's livestock, but were unable to defeat the laager. One of the Sotho-Tswana chiefs, Chief Moroko of the Rolong people, who had earlier fled the Difaqane to the south to create the settlement of Thaba-Nchu, sent fresh livestock to Potgieter to draw his party's wagons back to the safety of the Rolong stronghold of Thaba Nchu, where the SothoTswana chief offered the Boers food and protection. By January 1837, an alliance of 107 Boers, sixty Rolong, and forty Coloured men, organized as a commando under the leadership of Potgieter and Gert Maritz, attacked Mzilikazi's settlement at Mosega, which suffered heavy losses, and early in 1838 Mzilikazi fled north beyond the Limpopo (to current day Zimbabwe), never to return to Tranvaal. Andries Hendrik Potgieter, after the flight of the Ndebele, issued a proclamation in which he declared the country which Mzilikazi had abandoned and forfeited to the emigrant farmers, but also denying land rights to the Sotho-Tswana who had saved him and assisted in the defeat of the Mzilikazi and the Ndebele. After the Ndebele and Sotho-Tswana claims to the territory had been suppressed by the Boer political leadership, many Boer farmers trekked across the Vaal and occupied parts of the Transvaal, often near Sotho-Tswana villages, dividing the population up as forced laborers. Into these areas, still partly populated by remnants of the Ndebele and Sotho-Tswana, there was also a considerable immigration of members of the various Sotho-Tswana chiefdoms who had fled during the Difaqane. The Boer entered into further conflicts with Mzilikazi from 1847-51, but his Ndebele warriors proved strong enough to repel the invaders. In 1852, the Boer government in Transvaal entered into a peace with Mzilikazi. However, gold was discovered near Mthwakazi in 1867 and the European powers became increasingly interested in the region. Mzilikazi died on 9 September 1868, near Bulawayo. His son, Lobengula, became the king of Mthwakazi. In exchange for wealth and arms, Lobengula granted several concessions to the British, the most prominent of which is the 1888 Rudd concession giving Cecil Rhodes exclusive mineral rights in much of the lands east of his main territory. Gold was already known to exist in nearby Mashonaland, so with the Rudd concession, Rhodes was able to obtain a royal charter to form the British South Africa Company in 1889.

Pioneer Column Main article: Pioneer Column In 1890, Rhodes sent a group of settlers, known as the Pioneer Column, into Mashonaland. The 400+ man Pioneer Column was guided by the explorer and big game hunter Frederick Selous and was officially designated the British South Africa Company Police (BSACP) accompanied by about 100 Bechuanaland Border Police (BBP). When they reached Harari Hill, they founded Fort Salisbury (now Harare). Rhodes had been distributing land to the settlers even before the royal charter, but the charter legitimized his further actions with the British government. By 1891 an Order-in-Council declared Matabeleland, Mashonaland, and Bechuanaland a British protectorate. By 1892, the number of men in the force had decreased and the BSACP was replaced by a number of volunteer forces - the Mashonaland Horse, the Mashonaland Mounted Police and the Mashonaland Constabulary, and later additions of Salisbury Horse, Victoria Rangers, and Raaf's Rangers. The BSACP was later renamed the British South Africa Police (BSAP) and this force stayed together for much of the 20th century. Rhodes had a vested interest in the continued expansion of white settlements in the region, so now with the cover of a legal mandate, he used a brutal attack by Ndebele against the Shona near Fort Victoria (now Masvingo) in 1893 as a pretense for attacking the kingdom of Lobengula. First Matabele War Main article: First Matabele War The first battle in the war occurred on 1 November 1893 when the laager was attacked on open ground a few miles from the Impembisi River. The laager consisted of 670 British soldiers, 400 of whom were mounted along with a small force of native allies fought off the Imbezu and Ingubu regiments computed by Sir John Willoughby to number 1 700 warriors in all. The laager had with it a small artillery of 5 Maxim gun, 2 seven-pounders, 1 Gardner gun, and 1 Hotchkiss. The Maxim guns took center stage and decimated the native force. Other African regiments were in the immediate vicinity, estimated at 5 000 men, however this force never took part in the fighting. Lobengula had 80 000 spearmen and 20 000 riflemen, against fewer than 700 soldiers of the British South Africa Police, but the Ndebele warriors were no match against the British Maxim guns. Leander Starr Jameson immediately sent his troops to Bulawayo to try to capture Lobengula, but the king escaped and left Bulawayo in ruins behind him. The group of white settlers was sent to find Lobengula along the Shangani river, which they did, but nearly all members of this patrol were killed in battle on the Shangani river in Matabeleland in 1893. The incident achieved a lasting, prominent place in Rhodesian colonial history as the Shangani Patrol and is roughly the British equivalent to Custer's Last Stand. But this was no victory for the Ndebele. Under somewhat mysterious circumstances, King Lobengula died in January 1894, and within a few short months the British South Africa Company controlled most of the Matabeleland and white settlers continued to arrive. The Jameson Raid Main article: Jameson Raid The Jameson Raid (December 29, 1895 - January 2, 1896) was a raid on Paul Kruger's Transvaal Republic carried out by Leander Starr Jameson and his Rhodesian and Bechuanaland policemen over the New Year weekend of 1895-96. It was intended to trigger an uprising by the primarily British expatriate workers (known as Uitlanders) in the Transvaal but failed to do so. The raid was ineffective and no uprising took place, but it did much to bring about the Second Boer War and the Second Matabele War. First Chimurenga Main article: Second Matabele War The First Chimurenga is now celebrated in Zimbabwe as the First War of Independence, but it is best known in the anglosaxon world as the Second Matabele War. This conflict refers to the 1896-1897 Ndebele-Shona revolt against colonial rule by the British South Africa Company. Mlimo, the Ndebele spiritual/religious leader, is credited with formenting much of the anger that led to this confrontation. He convinced the Ndebele and Shona that the white settlers (almost 4,000 strong by then) were responsible for the drought, locust plagues and the cattle disease rinderpest ravaging the country at the time. Mlimo's call to battle was well timed. Only a few months earlier, the British South Africa Company's Administrator General for Matabeleland, Leander Starr Jameson, had sent most of his troops and armaments to fight the Transvaal Republic in the ill-fated Jameson Raid. This left the country’s defenses in disarray. The Ndebele began their revolt in March 1896, and in June 1896 they were joined by the Shona. The British South Africa Company immediately sent troops to suppress the Ndebele and the Shona, but it took months for the British to re-capture their major colonial fortifications under siege by native warriors. Mlimo was eventually assassinated in his temple in Matobo Hills by the American scout Frederick Russell Burnham. Upon learning of the death of Mlimo, Cecil Rhodes boldly walked unarmed into the native's stronghold and persuaded the impi to lay down their arms.[2] The First Chimurenga thus ended on October 1897 and Matabeleland and Mashonaland were later renamed Rhodesia. Second Chimurenga Main article: Rhodesian Bush War The Second Chimurenga, also known as the Rhodesian Bush War or as Zimbabwe's liberation war, refers to the guerrilla war of 1966-1979 which led to the end of white-minority rule in Rhodesia and to the de-facto independence of Zimbabwe. It was a conflict between the minority white settler government of Ian Smith Rhodesian Front and the African nationalists of the Patriotic Front (Zimbabwe) alliance of ZANU (mainly Shona) and ZAPU (mainly Ndebele) movements, led by Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo respectively.[3] [4] Overview With the breakup of Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1964 the army underwent a large- scale reorganization by the British. In 1965, Southern Rhodesia took matters into its own hands in 1965 with a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). From April 1966 onwards groups of Soviet-supported guerrillas infiltrated Rhodesia from neighbouring Zambia in steadily increasing numbers, with the goal of overthrowing the white-rule government, but the Second Chumerenga is generally considered to have started in earnest on December 21, 1972 when an attack took place on a farm in the Centenary District, with further attacks on other farms in the following days. As the guerrilla activity increased in 1973 "Operation Hurricane" started and the military prepared itself for war. During 1974 a major effort by the security forces resulted in many guerrillas being killed and the number inside the country reduced to less than 100. However, a second front in the Second Chumerenga emerged in 1974 when the Portugal withdrew from its colonly of Mozambique. In 1976 Operations "Thrasher" and "Repulse" started in order to contain the ever-increasing influx of guerrillas. At the same time rivalry between the two main guerrilla factions increased and resulted in open fighting in the training camps in Tanzania, with over 600 deaths. The Soviets increased their influence and began to take a more active role in the training and control of the ZIPRA guerrillas. Perhaps too late, the Rhodesians decided to take the war to the enemy, and cross-border operations, which had started in 1976 with a raid on a major base in Mozambique in which the Rhodesians had killed over 1,200 guerrillas and captured huge amounts of weapons, were stepped up. In 1977, Operation "Dingo" was a major raid on large guerrilla camps such as Chimoio and Tembue in Moazambique which resulted in thousands of guerrilla deaths and the capture of supplies sorely needed by the Rhodesians. In 1978 the Rhodesian Air Force launched the daring "Green Leader" attack on a ZIPRA camp outside Lusaka, the Rhodesian fighters completely taking over Zambian air space for the duration of the raid. In September of the same year, the guerrillas again took the offensive by shooting down a Rhodesian airliner with a SAM-7 missile. Eighteen civilians who survived the crash were subsequently massacred at the crash site by ZIPRA guerrillas, increasing calls for massive retaliation by the Rhodesian security forces. In 1979 as the war increased even more in intensity.

Rhodesian Light Infantry The Rhodesian Light Infantry, or RLI, was at the forefront of the Second Chimurenga. It was a regular army infantry regiment in the Rhodesian army, composed only of white recruits, The battalion was organised into four company size sub-units called 'Commandos', numbered One to Four. In theory each commando had five 'Troops' (platoon size structures), though much of the time there were only four. The average fighting strength of a Commando was about 70. The rank structure was; Trooper, Lance-corporal, Corporal, Sergeant etc. All ranks were called 'troopies' by the Rhodesian media. The RLI's most characteristic deployment was the 'fire force' reaction operation. This was an operational assault or response composed of, usually, a first wave of 32 troopers carried to the scene by three helicopters and one DC-3 Dakota (called "Dak"), with a command/gun helicopter and a light attack-aircraft in support. The latter was a Cessna Skymaster, usually armed with two 30 mm rocket pods and two small napalmbombs (made in Rhodesia and called 'Fran-tan'). The RLI became extremely adept at this type of military operation and the battalion killed or captured around 3000 of the enemy (the vast majority being ZANLA - Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army) in the last three years of the war, whilst losing less than three hundred killed and wounded (not counting those casualties incurred in patrolling or external ops). In addition to the fire force, the four Commandos were often used in patrolling actions, mostly inside Rhodesia but sometimes in Zambia and Mozambique. In these operations troopies were required to carry well over 100lbs of equipment for five to tens days for one patrol and come back and repeat, for weeks, sometimes months. Also, they participated in many attacks on enemy camps in above countries. In a few of these attacks most or all of the battalion was involved. The First Battalion Rhodesian Light Infantry was originally formed within the army of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1961 in Bulawayo. The battalion's nucleus came from the short-lived Number One Training Unit, which had been raised to provide personnel for a white infantry battalion as well as for C Squadron 22 (Rhodesian) SAS and the Rhodesian Armoured Car Regiment Selous Scouts (not the Selous Scout special forces regiment of the same name). Selous Scouts During this time period the Selous Scouts, or Rhodesian SS, operated as special forces regiment of the Rhodesian Army. They were named after British explorer Frederick Courteney Selous (1851-1917), and their motto was pamwe chete, which translated from Shona means "all together", "together only" or "forward together". The charter of the Selous Scouts directed "the clandestine elimination of terrorists/terrorism both within and without the country." [5] The Selous Scouts were racial-integrated unit (approx. 70% black soldiers) which conducted a highly successful clandestine war against the guerrillas by posing as guerrillas themselves. Their unrivalled tracking abilities, survival and COIN skills made them one of the most feared of the army units by enemy. The unit was responsible for 68% of all enemy casualties within the borders of Rhodesia.[6] British South Africa Police The BSAP, a unit in existence since the 1890s, formed an important part of the white minority government's fight against black nationalist guerrillas. The force formed a riot unit; a tracker combat team (later renamed the Police Anti-Terrorist Unit or PATU); an Urban Emergency Unit and a Marine Division, and from 1973 offered places to white conscripts as part of Rhodesia's national service scheme. Until the late 1970s, black Rhodesians were prevented from holding ranks higher than Sub-Inspector in the BSAP, and only white Rhodesians could gain commissioned rank. The Patriotic Front The Patriotic Front (PF) was originally formed in 1976 as a political and military alliance between ZAPU and ZANU during the war against white minority rule. Both movements contributed their respective military forces: ZAPU's military wing was known as Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) which operated mainly from Zambia and somewhat in Angola, and ZANU's guerrillas where known as Zimbabwe National African Liberation Army (ZANLA) which formed in 1965 in Tanzania, but operated mainly from camps around Lusaka, Zambia and later from Mozambique. Objective of the Patriotic Front was to overthrow the white minority regime by means of political pressure and military force. End of Second Chimurenga In 1979 another airliner was shot down and the Rhodesians launched more raids on guerrilla bases, successfully avoiding air-defence systems and the Soviet MiG-17s based in Mozambique. A raid was made by the SAS and the Selous Scouts on the ZIPRA HQ in Lusaka, where they narrowly missed being able to kill the ZIPRA leader, Nkomo. The Rhodesian people tired of increasing war and political isolation, so the Second Chimurenga/Bush War ended when the white-ruled government of Rhodesia returned power to the British government at the 1979 Lancaster House Constitutional Conference, at the behest of both South Africa (its major backer) and the US, multi-ethnic elections were subsequently held in early 1980. Britain recognised this new government and the newly, internationally recognised, independent country was renamed as Zimbabwe. A nucleus of former RLI personnel remained to train and form the First Zimbabwe Commando Battalion of the Zimbabwe National Army, however, the RLI regiment itself was disbanded in 1980. The Selous Scouts were also disbanded in 1980, but many of its soldiers travelled south to join the Apartheid South African Defence Force, where they joined 5 Reconnaissance Commando. The BSAP, which at the time of Mugabe's victory consisted of approximately 11,000 regulars (about 60% black) and almost 35,000 reservists, of whom the overwhelming majority were white, was renamed the Zimbabwe Republic Police and followed an official policy of "Africanisation", in which senior white officers were retired and their positions filled by black officers. Third Chimurenga Following majority rule elections, the rivalry that had been fermenting between ZAPU and ZANU erupted, with guerrilla activity starting again in the Matabeleland provinces (south-western Zimbabwe). Armed resistance in Matabeleland was met with bloody government repression. At least 20,000 Matabele died in the ensuing near-genocidal massacres, perpetrated by an elite, communist-trained brigade, known in Zimbabwe as the Gukurahundi. A peace accord was negotiated and on December 30, 1987 Mugabe became head of state after changing the constitution to usher in his vision of a presidential regime. On December 19, 1989 ZAPU merged with ZANU under the name ZANU-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). The present era in Zimbabwe is called the Third Chimurenga, by the ruling ZANU-PF. The Mugabe administration claims that colonial social and economic structures remained largely intact in the years after the end of Rhodesian rule, with a small minority of white farmers owning the vast majority of the country's arable land (many partys within Zimbabwe question the extent and validity of these assertions, considering twenty years of ZANU-PF rule, the "Willing Buyer-Willing Seller" policy paid for by Britain and the diminished size of Zimbabwe's white population). By 2000 ZANU militants proclaimed violent struggle for land reform the "Third Chimurenga". The beginning of the "Third Chimurenga" is often attributed to the need to distract Zimbabwean electorate from the poorly conceived war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and deepening economic problems blamed on graft and ineptitude in the ruling party. The opposition briefly used the term to describe Zimbabwe's current struggles aimed at removing the ZANU government, resolving the Land Question, the establishment of democracy, rebuilding the rule of law and good governance, as well as the eradication of corruption in Government. The term is no longer in vogue amongst Zimbabwe's urban population and lacks the gravitas it once had so was dropped from the opposition's lexicon.

Modern Zimbabwe Main article: Military of Zimbabwe In 1999, the Government of Zimbabwe sent a sizeable military force into the Democratic Republic of Congo to support the government of President Laurent Kabila during the Second Congo War. Those forces were largely withdrawn in 2002. Footnotes 1. ^ Braudel, Fernand (1984). The Perspective of the World vol III of Civilization and Capitalism. 2. ^ Farwell, Byron (2001). The Encyclopedia of !ineteenth-Century Land Warfare: An Illustrated World View. W. W. Norton & Company. pp. 539. ISBN 0393047709. http://books.google.com/books?vid=ISBN0393047709&id=mXpP_pdANcC&pg=PA539&lpg=PA539&ots=XHkbH7K9Em&dq=Cecil+Rhodes+boldly+walked+unarmed&sig=dVixJw T8o4WckD9Dvz2C_Vfz3X8. 3. ^ King Chung, Fay (2006). Re-living the Second Chimurenga: Memories from Zimbabwes Liberation Struggle. Stockholm: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. 4. ^ David, Martin (1981). The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga War. Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing Company. 5. ^ Melson, C.D., Top Secret War: Rhodesian Special Operations, 2005, Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol. 16, No. 1, Pp. 57-82. http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=article&issn=0959-2318&volume=16&issue

Officers of the Pioneer Column - Lobengula Kumalo Burnham & Armstrong after the assassination of Mlimo

Trek Boer - Mzilikazi Kumalo - Great Zimbabwe: Tower in the Great Enclosure.

Pioneer Column From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Officers of the Pioneer Corps, c1890. The Pioneer Column was a force raised by Cecil Rhodes and his British South Africa Company in 1890 and used in his efforts to annex the territory of Mashonaland, later part of Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). Rhodes was anxious to secure Matabeleland and Mashonaland before the Germans, Portuguese or Boers did. His first step was to persuade the Matabele King Lobengula, in 1888, to sign a treaty giving him rights to mining and administration (but not settlement as such) in the area of Mashonaland which was ruled by the King by use of coercion and murderous raids involved tribute-taking and abduction of young men and women. [1] Using this Rudd Concession (so called because Rhodes's business partner, Charles Rudd, was instrumental in securing the signature) between Rhodes' British South Africa Company (allegedly on behalf of Queen Victoria though without any official knowledge or authority) and Lobengula, he then sought and obtained a charter from the British government allowing him to act, essentially although in a limited way, with the government's consent. The next step was to occupy the territory. Column Assembly Rhodes's military advisers estimated that it would take 2,500 men and about one million pounds to win the war that would, they thought, inevitably result when Lobengula realised that Rhodes meant not only to mine but also to occupy his land. Frank Johnson, a 23-year-old adventurer, however, undertook to deliver the territory in nine months with a mere 250 men for £87,500. Frederick Selous, a hunter with close knowledge of Mashonaland, agreed to join the effort as guide. Johnson published recruitment notices in Kimberley offering each volunteer 3,000 acres (12 km2) of land and 15 mining claims (aggregating about 21 acres). On the advice of Rhodes, Johnson selected for his column, from thousands of applicants, mostly the sons of rich families, so that if they were, indeed, imperilled by Lobengula their families would be more likely to enlist British government support for their rescue. Johnson’s column eventually consisted of 180 civilian colonists, 62 wagons and 200 volunteers (who ultimately formed the nucleus of what became the British South African Police). A further party of 110 men, 16 wagons, 250 cattle and 130 spare horses later attached itself to the column.[2] The troopers were equipped with Martini-Henry rifles, revolvers, seven-pound field guns and Maxim machine guns, as well as an electric searchlight (which they later used to good effect to intimidate Matabele warriors shadowing the column). Occupation The route began at Macloutsie in Bechuanaland on 28 June 1890. On July 11, it crossed the river Tuli into Matabeland. It proceeded north-east and then north over a distance of about 650 km intending to terminate at an open area explored by Selous a few years earlier that he called Mount Hampden. However, the column halted about 15 km before that at a naturally flat and marshy meadow bounded by a steep rocky hill; (today's Harare Kopje) on 12 September. The British union flag was hoisted on the following day, September 12 (later celebrated as a Rhodesian public holiday). Three towns were founded; the first in early August at the head of a gentle route that led up from the low altitude area known as the Lowveld (named Providential Pass), called Fort Victoria (renamed Masvingo in 1982); the second at Fort Charter on a plateau halfway to the terminus of the column at the originally named Fort Salisbury.[3] The Pioneer Corps was officially disbanded on 1 October 1890 and each member was granted land on which to farm. Consequences The effects of the Pioneer Column were immense. With one act the destiny of the territory was changed forever. Mashonaland and Matabeleland ceased to be the poorly developed backwaters they had slipped into since the subsidence of the Mwenemutapa state about 500 years earlier and were irreversibly propelled into alignment with the world of the capitalist Christian West. A new elite snatched control from the Iron Age monarchy which had formerly held sway and retained power through demonstration of overwhelming technological superiority along with a towering confidence in its achievements. A new moral order was also imposed that has dramatically altered the culture and beliefs of the indigenous people.[4] Campaign Medal In 1927, the government of South Rhodesia issued a new British South Africa Company Medal to commemorate the earlier 1890 Pioneer Column. This medal was identical to the prior British South Africa Company Medals issued for the First Matabele War and Second Matabele War, except that it was struck without any campaign details on the reverse.[5] References 1. ^ Path of Blood, Becker, P.,Pengiuin Books,London,(1979) 2. ^ Bridger, P., House, M., and others, 1973. Encyclopaedia Rhodesia, College Press, Salisbury, Rhodesia 3. ^ Sunshine and Storm in Rhodesia, FC Selous, Rhodesiana Reprint Library, Salisbury, 1969 4. ^ The Cambridge History of Africa: From 1870 to 1905 v. 6 (The Cambridge History of Africa) CUP, 1985 5. ^ "BSA CM" (HTML). www.angloboerwar.com. http://www.angloboerwar.com/medals/bsacm.htm. Retrieved 2009-0404. • Samkange, Stanlake, On Trial for My Country, Heinemann African Writers Series 1966, for an African perspective. • Hill, Geoff, The Battle for Zimbabwe, Zebra Press, Cape Town, 2003.

Hensman, Howard, History of Rhodesia, Wm Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh & London, 1890, for a contemporary and jingoistic British view. See also .ehanda .yakasikana Shangani Patrol

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First Matabele War From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Date Location Result Territorial changes

November 1893–January 1894 Matabeleland & Mashonaland British victory; death of King Lobengula and the destruction of the Ndebele Kingdom Rhodesia conquest

Belligerents United Kingdom British South Africa Police Ndebele (Matabele) Tswana (Bechuana) Commanders Cecil Rhodes Leander Starr Jameson Major Allan Wilson† Major King Lobengula† Mjaan, chief inDuna Patrick Forbes Khama III Casualties and losses ca. 100

Over 10,000

The First Matabele War was fought in 1893-1894 between the British South Africa Company military forces and the Ndebele (Matabele) people. Lobengula, king of the Ndebele, avoided outright war with the British settlers because he and his advisors were mindful of the destructive power of the European weapons on traditional Matabele impis (units of Zulu warriors) attacking in massed ranks. Lobengula had 80,000 spearmen and 20,000 riflemen, armed with nine pound Martini-Henrys which were modern arms at that time. However, poor training meant that these were not effective weapons. The British South Africa Company had no more than 750 BSA Police troops with an undetermined number of possible colonial volunteers and an additional 700 Tswana (Bechuana) allies. Cecil Rhodes, who was Prime Minister of the Cape Colony and Leander Starr Jameson, the Administrator of Mashonaland also avoided war to prevent loss of confidence in the future of the territory. Matters came to a head when Lobengula approved a raid to forcibly extract tribute from a Mashona chief in the district of the town of Fort Victoria, which inevitably led to a clash with the BSA Company. Events leading to war The British government agreed that the British South Africa Company (BSAC) would administer the territory stretching from the Limpopo to Lake Tanganyika under charter as a protectorate. Queen Victoria signed the charter in 1889. Cecil Rhodes used this document in 1890 to justify sending the Pioneer Column, a group of white settlers protected by well-armed British South Africa Police (BSAP) and guided by the big game hunter Frederick Selous, through Matabeleland and into Shona territory to establish Fort Salisbury (now Harare). Throughout 1891 and 1892, Lobengula ensured that his raiding parties were directed away from their main target areas of Mashonaland and so precluded possible clashes between his zealous young commanders and the white settlers.[1] However, in 1893, a chief in the Victoria district refused tribute feeling that he was now under the protection of the laws of the white settlers. In order to save face, Lobengula was impelled to send a raiding party of several thousand warriors to bring his vassal to heel. The raiding party destroyed several villages and murdered many of the inhabitants. (In this they were more restrained than usual as they generally abducted the suitably aged young men and women and killed everyone else.) However, the local BSA Company administration felt that they had to intervene to avoid losing the confidence of the local people who complained that they were not being given any support against the raid. As a result the Company officials demanded from the raiders that they leave immediately. The Ndebele refused and in the hostilities that developed the Ndebele sustained an unknown number of casualties; this led to their withdrawal. Start of the war There was a delay just over two months (August to October) while Jameson corresponded with Rhodes in Cape Town and considered how to amass enough troops to undertake an invasion of Matabeleland. The first battle in the war occurred on November 1, 1893 when the laager was attacked on open ground a few miles from the Bembesi River. The laager consisted of 670 British soldiers, 400 of whom were mounted along with a small force of native allies fought off the Imbezu and Ingubu regiments, the oldest and most battle-hardened regiments of Lobengula, estimated by Sir John Willoughby to number 1700 warriors in all. The laager had with it a small artillery of five Maxim guns, two seven-pounders, one Gardner gun, and one Hotchkiss. The Maxim guns took centre stage and decimated the native force. The Ndebele dashed right up to the muzzles of the guns, but were swept down before the modern rifles and machine guns with which the invaders were armed. Other Ndebele regiments were waiting in ambush in woodland further along the route but this force took no part in the fighting and withdrew after the defeat of their comrades. Jameson determined that the quickest way to end the war would be to march to Bulawayo, the headquarters of Lobengula and the capital of Matabeleland, and capture the king. The colonial force consisted of two columns: Victoria Column with about 400 men, under Major Allan Wilson, and the United Salisbury Column with less than 300 men under Major Patrick Forbes. An additional of 700 Bechuanas marching from the south under Khama, the most influential of the Bamangwato chiefs and a loyal friend of the British, would meet up with the two colonial columns. Destruction of Bulawayo The column of Khama's men from the south had reached the Tati, and won a victory on the Singuesi river on 2 November. Advanced scouts for the colonial forces, including Burnham and Selous, reached Bulawayo that same day, only to watch as Lobengula blew up his arsenal of ammunition rather than allow it to be captured by the British. The town, mostly made up

of wood-beam huts with mud (dagga) walls, was largely destroyed.[2] On 3 November, Bulawayo was reached by the Victoria column from Mashonaland, accompanied by Jameson and Sir John Willoughby. By this time, Lobengula and his warriors were in full flight towards the Zambezi. An attempt was made to induce Lobengula to surrender, but no replies were received to the messages. The United Salisbury Column later arrived in Bulawayo, and on 13 November, Major Patrick Forbes organized his column and started in pursuit of Lobengula. Shangani Patrol Main article: Shangani Patrol The pursuing party was delayed by difficult routes and heavy rains, and did not come up with Lobengula until the 3rd of December. Major Allan Wilson, in command of thirty-four troopers, crossed the Shangani river in advance, and bivouacked close to Lobengula's quarters. Efforts by Forbes to reinforce Wilson's patrol were too little and too late to make a difference. In the night the river rose, and the remainder of Forbes' forces were unable to cross. During the early morning the Matabele surrounded the little band. Wilson his followers all fought most gallantly, according Ndebele reports, but the opposing forces were too great. Except for three scouts, who under orders from Wilson, miraculously crossed the swollen Shangani and returned to Forbes to request reinforcements (the Americans Frederick Russell Burnham and Pearl "Pete" Ingram, and an Australian named Gooding), all 32 men of the Wilson party, known as the Shangani Patrol perished in what is viewed roughly as British/Rhodesian equivalent to Custer's Last Stand. Defeat of the Matabele Lobengula eventually died under somewhat mysterious circumstances sometime in January 1894. The Ndebele warriors gradually succumbed to the superior British firepower and, after the king’s death, Ndebele izinDuna submitted to the British South Africa Company. An order in council of the 18th of July defined the administrative power of the company over Matabeleland. Charges were made in the British House of Commons against the company of having provoked the Ndebele in order to bring on the war and thus secure their territory, but after enquiry the company was exonerated from the charge by Lord Ripon, then Colonial Secretary. It was also discovered that Lobengula had in fact sent to Jameson gold dust worth about £1000, and communicated his desire for peace, but two troopers to whom the gold and message were entrusted kept the gold and suppressed the message. Their crime was afterwards discovered and the troopers sentenced to fourteen years' penal servitude, although they were released after just a few months due to technicalities. Aftermath In every step taken by the company the guiding hand was that of Cecil Rhodes, a fact which received recognition when, by a proclamation of 3 May 1895, the company's territory received officially the name "Rhodesia". During this year there was great activity in exploiting Matabeleland, " Stands " or plots were sold at extraordinary prices in Bulawayo. Within nine months the rebuilt town of Bulawayo had a population of 1,900 colonials and in the various goldfields there were over 2,000 colonial prospectors. The construction of telegraphs proceeded with rapidity and by the end of 1895, 500 m. of new lines had been constructed, making about 1,500 in all. A new company, the African Transcontinental Company, had been founded under the auspices of Col. Frank Rhodes, brother of Cecil, with the ultimate purpose of connecting the Cape with Cairo. By the end of 1895, 133 m. of these lines had been laid. At this time too, the railway from Cape Town, Cape Colony had passed Mafeking, Transvaal and was approaching the Rhodesian frontier. This railway reached Bulawayo in 1897. Meanwhile on the east coast the line to connect Salisbury (now Harare) with the Portuguese East Africa Colony in Beira, Mozambique was under construction and this was completed in 1899. Maxim gun Main article: Maxim gun The First Matabele War was the first wartime use of a Maxim gun by Britain and it proved to have a decisive impact. In less than optimal situations, such as hilly or mountainous terrain or dense vegetation with poor lines of sight, the Maxim gun resulted in little direct impact on enemy deaths. But as a psychological weapon, the Maxim gun was truly phenomenal. It generated a sense of fear in the Ndebele and made the British South Africa Police seem invincible. In one engagement, for example, 50 British soldiers with just four Maxim guns fought off 5,000 Ndebele warriors. See also Second Matabele War References 1. ^ Knight-Bruce, George Wyndham (1892). Journals of the Mashonaland Mission 1888 to 1892. Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts. http://anglicanhistory.org/africa/knight-bruce_mashonaland1892/05.html. 2. ^ The Cambridge History of Africa: From 1870 to 1905 v. 6 (The Cambridge History of Africa) CUP, 1985 • History of Rhodesia, by Howard Hensman (1900) -- the full-text of the book can be found online for free PDF • The Story of Baden-Powell, by Harold Begbie (1900) • Scouting on Two Continents, by Major Frederick Russell Burnham, D.S.O., Autobiography. LC call number: DT775 .B8 1926. (1926) • Shangani Patrol, a feature film, docudrama by David Millin. Filmed on location by the Rhodesian Broadcasting Corporation. Stars Brian O'Shaughnessy at Major Allan Wilson and co-stars Will Hutchins as Fred Burnham. Internet Movie DataBase (1970) • A History of Rhodesia, by Robert Blake (1978) External links • "Britain Matabele War 1893". Armed Conflict Events Database. http://www.onwar.com/aced/chrono/c1800s/yr90/fanglomatab1893.htm. Retrieved 2006-07-09. • "Map of the First Matabele War". http://www.bsap.org/images/MatabeleWar.jpg. Retrieved 2006-10-29.

Battle beetween British soldiers and Matabele (Richard Caton Woodville) British Artillery, ca 1900. Maxim gun, 1895 vintage

Bulawayo native, ca 1890. Depiction of Burnham & Armstrong after the assassination of Mlimo. Ndebele

warriors in hot pursuit, drawn by Frank Dadd. Dadd.

Shangani Patrol

A panel from the Shangani Memorial at World's View in Zimbabwe, c1905 1893 Photograph of two survivors of the Shangani Patrol - Burnham & Ingram. Left to right: (standing) Pete Ingram, Capt. Charles White, Art Cummings, Stocker, Moffat, Robert Bain (member of Wilson party, killed in action), Frederick Russell Burnham and Maurice Gifford.

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

. Date Location Result Belligerents British South Africa Police Commanders Major Patrick Major Allan Capt Henry Borrow Strength

December 3, 1893 - December 4, 1893 Shangani River, Rhodesia Ndebele victory Ndebele Forbes King Wilson Mjaan

Lobengula

42

est. 3,000

Casualties and losses 31 dead, 3 escaped Over 500 suspected The Shangani Patrol was a group of white Rhodesian pioneer police officers killed in battle on the Shangani River in Matabeleland in 1893. The incident achieved a lasting, prominent place in Rhodesian colonial history. Following the abandonment of Bulawayo, during the First Matabele War, a column of soldiers had been despatched by Leander Starr Jameson to attempt the capture of King Lobengula, leader of the Ndebele nation. The column camped on the south bank of the Shangani River about 40 km north-east of the village of Lupane on the evening of 3 December 1893. Late in the afternoon, a dozen men, under the command of Major Allan Wilson, were sent across the river to reconnoitre. Shortly afterwards, Wilson sent a message back to the laager to say that he had found the king, and was requesting reinforcements. The commander of the column, Major Patrick Forbes, unwilling to set off across the river in the dark, sent 20 more men under the command of Henry Borrow, intending to send the main body of troops and artillery across the river the following morning. However, on their way to the river the next day, the column was ambushed by Ndebele fighters and delayed. In an act of near desperation, Wilson had sent his two American scouts and George Gooding, an Australian, back for further reinforcements also that morning. In spite of a shower of bullets and spears, the three men set off to find Forbes. When Burnham, Pearl "Pete" Ingram, and Gooding did finally reach the Forbes encampment, the battle raging there was just as intense and there was no hope of anyone reaching Wilson in time. As Burnham loaded his rifle to beat back the Matabele warriors, he quietly said to Forbes, "I think I may say we are the sole survivors of that party."[1] In the meantime, Wilson, Borrow, and their men were surrounded by a large number of Ndebele, and the Shangani River had suddenly risen in flood, making it impossible to cross. All 34 men were killed, but the inaccessibility of the spot and the risk of attack by the Ndebele made it impossible to recover the bodies until February 1894. Wilson’s Last Stand was produced on the stage as a patriotic play and ran in London for two years. In the play, based on some embellished facts, it is said that in the killing of Wilson and his thirty-one men, Lobengula lost 80 of his royal guard and another 500 Matabele warriors. Wilson was the last to fall and the wounded men of the Shangani Patrol loaded rifles and passed them to him during the final stages of the defense. When their ammunition ran out, the remaining men of the Patrol are said to have risen and sung, God Save the Queen. Once both of Wilson’s arms were broken and he could no longer shoot, he stepped from behind a barricade of dead horses, walked toward the Matabele, and was stabbed with a spear by a young warrior. The Shangani Patrol entered Rhodesian colonial history as part of the mythology of white conquest, with Wilson and Borrow hailed as national heroes. Composition of the Patrol Initially (left column at 5pm on Dec 3, 1893): Reinforcements (left column at 1am and arrived at dawn on Dec 4, 1893): 1. Major Allan Wilson (Scottish) 1. Capt. Henry Borrow 2. Chief of Scouts Frederick Russell Burnham (American) 2. Scout Pearl "Pete" Ingram (American) 3. Scout Robert Bain (American) 3. Sgt. W.H. Birkley 4. Capt. Freddie Fitgerald 4. Sgt. H.D.W.M. Money 5. Capt. Harry Greenfield 5. Cpl. H.G. Kirloch 6. Capt. William Judd 6. Tpr. Abbot 7. Capt. Argent Krlon 7. Tpr. W. Bath 8. Capt. Napier 8. Tpr. W.H. Briton 9. Lt. Arend Hofmeyer 9. Trp. E. Brock 10. Lt. George Hughes 10. Tpr. P.W. da Vos 11. Sgt. Maj. S.C. Harding 11. Tpr. L. Dowis 12. Sgt. Maj. Judge 12. Tpr. W. Gooding (Australian) 13. Sgt. G. Bradburn 13. Tpr. Landsberg 14. Sgt. H.A. Brown 14. Tpr. E.G. MacKenze 15. Cp. F.C. Colquhoun 15. Tpr. M. Meiklejohn 16. Cpl. Ebbage 16. Tpr. Nesbin 17. Tpr. D. M.C. Dillon 17. Tpr. P.C. Nunn 18. Tpr. A. Hay-Robertson 18. Tpr. W. A. Thompson 19. Tpr. H.J. Heller 19. Tpr. H.StJ. Tuck 20. Tpr. J. Robertson 20. Tpr. F.L. Vogal 21. Tpr. E.E. Welby 21. Tpr. H.G. Watson Notes: • Trps. Judge and Ebbage sent to column for reinforcements at 9pm on Dec. 3rd; • Capt. Napier, Tpr. Robertson, and one other Trp. detached to column at 9pm on Dec. 3rd; • Tpr. Robertson returns with Capt. Borrow's reinforcements; • Tprs. Landsberg and Nesbin, part of Capt. Borrow's reinforcements, get lost on their way to Wilson; • Scout Burnham, Scout Pearl "Pete" Ingram, and Tpr. W. Gooding sent to Maj. Forbes for reinforncements the morning of Dec. 4th) Jameson letter and Lobengula's response

Just before Capt. Borrow, Burnham, and the rest of the advance-guard of the Jameson-Forbes column arrived at Bulawayo, Lobengula had fled in the direction of the Bubi river and was reportedly hiding there. Jameson sent Lobengula the following message:[cite this quote] "I send this message in order, if possible, to prevent the necessity of any further killing of your people or burning of their kraals. To stop this useless slaughter you must at once come and see me at Bulawayo, when I will guarantee that your life will be saved and the you will be kindly treated. I will allow sufficient time for this message to reach you and return to me and two days more to allow you to reach me in your wagon. Should you not then arrive I shall at once send out troops to follow you, as I am determined as soon as possible to put the country in a condition where whites and blacks can live in peace and friendliness." Jameson never received a response and the Matabele war raged on. However, later in the war it was learned that Lobengula had sent two messengers to Jameson to admit his defeat, along with a large quantity of gold-dust. The message and the gold-dust were handed over to two troopers of the rear guard, Daniels and Wilson, who then traitorously suppressed this information and kept the gold-dust for their own. Both men were tried by the Resident Magistrate and four assessors at Bulawayo, found guilty and sentenced to fourteen years' imprisonment with hard labor. But the High Commissioner's legal experts pointed out that the magistrate's powers did not entitle him to pass sentences of more than three months' imprisonment. The sentences were afterwards quashed and the men released. The treachery of these two troopers indirectly led to the deaths of thousands of Matabele warriors and of the Shangani Patrol. Memorial The remains of the Patrol members were interred at World's View in the Matopo Hills and are currently buried next to the bodies of Rhodes and Jameson. At the request of Rhodes, a memorial to the Shangani Patrol was erected at the site. Designed by John Tweed, the monument was dedicated by Bishop Gaul of Mashonaland in 1904. The memorial is an austere, oblong monument, 33 feet high and made of granite blocks hewn from the neighboring kopje, with a panel on each of the four sides depicting the members of the patrol in bas relief.[2] See also Wikisource has original text related to this article: Shangani Patrol • First Matabele War • Pioneer Column .otes 1. ^ Latimer, Elizabeth Wormeley (1895). Europe in Africa in the !ineteenth Century. Chicago: A.C. McClurg and company. p. 377. 2. ^ Norman, Andrew (2004). Robert Mugabe and the Betrayal of Zimbabwe. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Company. ISBN 0786416866. References • History of Rhodesia, by Howard Hensman (1900) -- the full-text of the book can be found online for free PDF • Scouting on Two Continents, by Major Frederick Russell Burnham, D.S.O., Autobiography. LC call number: DT775 .B8 1926. (1926) • Shangani Patrol, a feature film, docudrama by David Millin. Filmed on location by RPM Film Studios. Stars Brian O'Shaughnessy as Major Allan Wilson and co-stars Will Hutchins as Fred Burnham. Internet Movie DataBase(1970) • A Time To Die, by Robert Carey, the story of the Patrol. • 35mm copies and publicity stills of this film are preserved at the South African National Film, Video and Sound Archives, Pretoria. [1] • Pursuit of Lobengula, by W.D. Gale (1958) The story of the Shangani Patrol [2] • Shangani Patrol dvd, Shangani Patrol [3] • The Matabele War. Mr. F. C. Selous's Narrative. The Times, Tuesday, Feb 06, 1894; pg. 4; Issue 34180; col C. • An eyewitness account written by Trooper W.L. Gooding and published in The Times, Thursday, Feb 08, 1894; pg. 3; Issue 34182; col G There is also a ballad of the Shangani Patrol, by Nick Taylor (1966), and a free MP3 version sung by John Edmond - [4]. External links • Major Alan Wilson Last Stand a.k.a Shangani Patrol • "Blue & Old Gold - The History of the British South Africa Police 1889-1890" published September 2009 http://www.30degreessouth.co.za sample images at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0Sqrk8yn9r4

British South Africa Company Medal

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Eligibility

First Matabele War, Second Matabele War, and the Pioneer Column

Awarded for

Service in the Matabele Wars

Description

Circular, silver medal, 36 mm inches in diameter. The ribbon consists of four golden yellow and three navy blue stripes.

Clasps

Matabeleland 1893, Rhodesia 1896, Mashonaland 1897, Mashonaland 1890

Established

1896, 1897, 1927

The British South Africa Company Medal (1890–97). In 1896, Queen Victoria sanctioned the issue by the British South Africa Company of a medal to troops who had been engaged in the First Matabele War. In 1897, the Queen sanctioned another medal for those engaged in the two campaigns of the Second Matabele War: Rhodesia (1896) and Mashonaland (1897). The three medals are the same except for name and date above the lion on the reverse, and the three wordings above the lion denote the campaign for which the medal was issued. In 1927, the government of South Rhodesia issued a medal to commemorate the earlier 1890 Pioneer Column. This medal identical to the prior medals, except that it was struck without any campaign details on the reverse. Description • A circular, silver medal, 36 mm inches in diameter, with an ornate swivelling suspension decorated with shamrocks, thistles and roses. • The obverse shows the crowned and veiled head of Queen Victoria with the inscription Victoria Regina. • On the reverse is depicted the scene of charging lion, wounded in the chest with an assegai. In the foreground are native weapons and a shield, in the background is a bush, and below the scene is inscribed: BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA COMPA!Y. The recipient's first eligible campaign and date is usually inscribed at the top. • The ribbon consists of four golden yellow and three navy blue stripes. Clasps Four were issued: 1. Matabeleland 1893 (No clap issued to those who served exclusively in the First Matabele War) 2. Rhodesia 1896 (No clap issued to those who served exclusively in the first year of the Second Matabele War) 3. Mashonaland 1897 4. Mashonaland 1890 .otable Recipients • Robert Baden-Powell - service in: Rhodesia (1896)[1] • Frederick Russell Burnham - service in: Matabeleland (1893) ; Rhodesia (1896)[2] • Col. Frank Rhodes • Frederick Selous - service in: Mashonaland (1890) ; Matabeleland (1893) ; Rhodesia (1896)[3] References 1. ^ "Matabele Campaign". The Pine Tree Web. http://pinetreeweb.com/bp-matabele.htm. Retrieved 2006-12-02. 2. ^ Davis, Richard Harding (1906). Real Soldiers of Fortune. Charles Scribner's Sons. ISBN 1-59540-686-7. http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/3029. 3. ^ Selous, Frederick Courteney (1896). Sunshine and Storm in Rhodesia. London: R. Ward & Co. http://books.google.com/books?id=GjNfildy5fsC&pg=PA1&dq=Sunshine+and+Storm+in+Rhodesia. • The Guide to British

Second Matabele War From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia March 1896 - October 1897 Matabeleland & Mashonaland British victory

Date Location Result Belligerents United British South Africa Police Commanders Col Gen. Cecil Rhodes

R.S.S. Frederick

Kingdom Ndebele Shona

(Matabele)

Baden-Powell Mlimo† Carrington Sikombo Inyanda

Casualties and losses 400+ settlers & soldiers 50,000+ (estimated) The Second Matabele War, also known as the Matabeleland Rebellion and in Zimbabwe as the First Chimurenga, took place from 1896–97. In March 1896, the Ndebele (Matabele) people revolted against the authority of the British South Africa Company in what is now celebrated in Zimbabwe as the First War of Independence. Mlimo, the Ndebele spiritual leader, is credited with fomenting much of the anger that led to this confrontation. He convinced the Ndebele and the Shona that the white settlers (almost 4,000 strong by then) were responsible for the drought, locust plagues and the cattle disease rinderpest ravaging the country at the time. Mlimo's call to battle was well-timed. Only a few months earlier, the British South Africa Company's Administrator General for Matabeleland, Leander Starr Jameson, had sent most of his troops and armaments to fight the Transvaal Republic in the ill-fated Jameson Raid. This left the country nearly defenceless. The British would immediately send troops to suppress the Ndebele and the Shona, but it would cost the lives of many settlers, Ndebele, and Shona alike, take months before British forces would be adequate to break the sieges and defend the major settlements, and war would rage on until October of the following year. The War in Matabeleland Rebellion Mlimo planned to wait until the night of March 29, the first full moon, to take Bulawayo by surprise immediately after a ceremony called the Big Dance. He promised, through his priests, that if the Ndebele went to war against the white settlers their bullets would change to water and their cannon shells would become eggs. His plan was to kill all of the settlers in Bulawayo first, but not to destroy the town itself as it would serve again as the royal kraal for the newly reincarnated King Lobengula. Mlimo decreed that the white settlers should be attacked and driven from the country through the Mangwe Pass on the Western edge of the Matobo Hills, which was to be left open and unguarded for this reason. Once the settlers were purged from Bulawayo, the Ndebele and Shona warriors would head out into the countryside and continue the slaughter until all the settlers were either killed or fled. But several young Ndebele were overly anxious to go to war and the rebellion started prematurely. On March 20, Ndebele rebels shot and stabbed a native policeman. Over the next few days, other outlying settlers and prospectors were killed. Frederick Selous, the famous big-game hunter, had heard rumours of settlers in the countryside being killed, but he thought it was a localised problem. When news of the policeman's murder reached Selous on March 23, he knew the Ndebele had started a massive uprising. Nearly 2,000 Ndebele warriors began the rebellion in earnest on March 24. Many, although not all, of the young native police quickly deserted and joined the rebels. Armed with Martini-Henry rifles, Winchester repeaters, and Lee-Metfords, as well old and obsolete guns, assegais, knobkerries, and battle-axes, the Ndebele headed into the countryside. As news of the massive rebellion spread, and the Shona joined in the fighting, the settlers headed towards Bulawayo. Within a week, 141 white settlers were slain in Matabeleland, an additional 103 were killed in Mashonaland, and hundreds of settler homes, ranches and mines were burned. Siege of Bulawayo With few troops to support them, the settlers quickly built a laager in the centre of Bulawayo on their own. Oilsoaked fagots were arranged in strategic locations in case of attack at night. Blasting gelatin was secreted in outlying buildings that were beyond the defence perimeter, to be exploded in the event the enemy occupied them. Smashed glass bottles were spread around the front of the wagons. Barbed wire and a laager of sandbagged wagons was added to Bulawayo's defenses. Except for hunting rifles, there were few weapons to be found in Bulawayo. But fortunately for settlers, there were a few working artillery pieces and a small assortment of machine guns. Rather than wait passively the settlers immediately mounted patrols, called the Bulawayo Field Force, under legendary figures such as Selous and Frederick Russell Burnham who rode out to rescue any surviving settlers in the countryside and went on attack against the Ndebele. Selous raised a mounted troop of forty men to scout southward into the Matobo Hills. Maurice Gifford, along with 40 men, rode east along the Iniza River. Whenever settlers were found they were quickly loaded into their wagons and closely guarded on their way to Bulawayo. Within the first week of fighting, 20 men of the Bulawayo Field Force were killed and another 50 wounded. In the First Matabele War, the Ndebele had experienced the effectiveness of the settler's Maxim guns, so they never mounted a significant attack against Bulawayo even though over 10,000 Ndebele warriors could be seen near the town. Conditions inside Bulawayo, however, were quickly becoming unbearable. During the day, settlers could go to homes and buildings within the town, but at night they were forced to seek shelter in the much smaller laager. Nearly 1,000 women and children were crowded into the city and false alarms of attacks were common. But the Ndebele did make one critical error during the siege; they neglected to cut the telegraph lines connecting Bulawayo to Mafeking. This gave both the relief forces and the besieged Bulawayo Field Force far more information than they would otherwise have had. Several relief columns were organized to break the

siege, but the long trek through hostile countryside would take several months. Late in May, the first two relief columns would appear near Bulawayo on almost the same day but from opposite directions -- Cecil Rhodes and Col. Beal arriving from Salisbury and Fort Victoria in Mashonaland 300 miles to the North; and Lord Grey and Col. Plumer (of the York and Lancaster Regiment) from Kimberley and Mafeking, 600 miles to the South. The Southern relief forces were nearly ambushed on their approach to Bulawayo, but Selous discovered the whereabouts of the Matabele and the maxim guns of the relief forces drove back the attackers. Not long after relief forces began arriving in Bulawayo, Gen. Carrington arrived to take overall command along with his Chief of Staff, Col Baden-Powell. With the siege broken, an estimated 50,000 Matabele retreated into their stronghold of the Matobo Hills near Bulawayo. This region became the scene of the fiercest fighting between the white settler patrols and the Matabele. By June, the Shona kept their promise and joined the fighting on the side of the Ndebele. But lacking a clear leader similar to Mlimo, the Shonas mostly stayed behind their fortifications and conducted few raids. Assassination of Mlimo The turning point in the war came when a Zulu informant gave up information on the whereabouts of Mlimo. The scout Burnham and native commissioner Bonnar Armstrong were dispatched to find Mlimo's sacred cave, which was used as a shrine, and to capture or kill the Ndebele spiritual leader. Burnham and Armstrong traveled by night through Matobo Hills and closed in on the sacred cave. Not far from the cave was a village of about 100 huts filled with many warriors. The two scouts tethered their horses to a thicket and crawled on their bellies, screening their slow and cautious movements with branches held before them. Once inside the cave, they waited until Mlimo entered.[1] Burnham and Armstrong waited until Mlimo, entered the cave and started his dance of immunity. Burnham shot Mlimo just below the heart.[2] The two scouts then leapt over the dead Mlimo and ran down a trail towards their horses. Hundreds of warriors, encamped nearby, picked up their arms and started in pursuit. Burnham set fire to the village as a distraction. The two men hurried back to Bulawayo, with warriors in pursuit. Upon learning of the death of Mlimo, Cecil Rhodes boldly walked unarmed into the Ndebele stronghold and persuaded the impi to lay down their arms.[3] The extension of the War in Mashonaland continued for another year, however. The War in Mashonaland War broke out in June 1896 at Mazowe with an attack on Alice Mine. This was followed by the medium Nehanda Nyakasikana capturing and executing Mazowe Native Commissioner Pollard. Other religious figures who led the rebellion include Kaguvi Gumboreshumba, who was active in the Goromonzi area and Mukwati, a priest of the Mwari shrine[4] who was active throughout Mashonaland[5]. In addition to the mediums, traditional leaders played a major role in the rebellion, notably Chief Mashayamombe, who led resistance in his chieftancy in Mhondoro, south of Harare. He was amongst the first chiefs to rebel and the last to be defeated [6]. He was supplied by many of the surrounding districts, such as Chikomba (then Charter)[7]. Other chiefs who played an important role included Gwabayana, Makoni, Mapondera, Mangwende and Seke [8] With the war in Matabeleland ending, the Gen. Carrington was able to concentrate his forces on Mashonaland and the rebels retreated into granite kopjes. With no central command to oppose him, Carrington was able to bring maxim guns against each stronhold in turn, until resistance ended. Nehanda Nyakasikana and Kaguvi Gumboreshumba were captured and executed in 1898, but Mukwati was never captured and died in Mutoko.[5] Legacy The rebellion failed completely and did not result in any major changes in BSAC policy, for example the hut tax was implemented. The territories of Matabeleland and Mashonaland became Rhodesia and both the Ndebele and Shona became subjects of the Rhodes administration. However, the legacy of leaders such as Kaguvi, Mapondera and Nehanda was to inspire future generations[9]. Scouting It was during the war in Matabeleland that Baden-Powell and Burnham first met and began their life-long friendship. In mid-June 1896, during a scouting patrol in Matobo Hills, Burnham first taught Baden-Powell woodcraft, the fundamentals of scouting. As a boy growing up in the American Old West during the Indian Wars, Burnham had learned scoutcraft from Indian trackers, frontiersmen, and cowboys, so as a scout in Africa he was simply practising the art and applying it as a soldier. So impressed was Baden-Powell by Burnham's scouting spirit that he fondly told people he "sucked him dry" of all he could possibly tell. Scoutcraft was not generally practised outside of the American Old West, but it was vitally needed in places like colonial Africa, so Baden-Powell and Burnham discussed how this art might be taught to young boys. These young boy scouts envisioned by BadenPowell and Burnham during those evenings camping in the Matobo Hills was one of fighters first whose business it was to face their enemies with both courage and good cheer, and as social workers afterwards. While Baden-Powell went on to refine the concept of scouting and eventually become the founder of the international scouting movement, Burnham can also be called one of the movement's fathers. 1901 Mapondera Rebellion In 1901 Chief Kadungure Mapondera, who had in 1894 proclaimed his independence of company rule[6], led a rebellion in the Guruve and Mount Darwin areas of Mashonaland Central. He led a force of initially under 100 men, but had over 600 under his command by mid-1901. He was captured in 1903 and died in jail in 1904 after a hunger strike[10] Monuments Rhodes decreed in his will that he was to be buried in Matobo Hills, so when he died in the Cape in 1902 his body came up by train and wagon to Bulawayo. His burial was attended by Ndebele chiefs, who asked that the firing party should not discharge their rifles as this would disturb the spirits. Then, for the first and probably the only time, they gave the white man the Ndebele royal salute "Bayete". Rhodes is buried alongside Jameson and the 34 white soldiers killed in the Shangani Patrol. See also • First Matabele War • Pioneer Column • British South Africa Company Medal • Lobengula • Nehanda Nyakasikana • Kaguvi • Kadungure Mapondera References 1. ^ Burnham, Frederick Russell (1926). Scouting on Two Continents. New York: Doubleday, Page & company. OCLC 407686. 2. ^ "Killed the Matabele God: Burnham, the American scout, may end uprising". !ew York Times. June 25, 1896. ISSN 0093-1179. http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9E06E7DF123BEE33A25756C2A9609C94679ED7CF. Retrieved 2007-09-28.

3.

^ Farwell, Byron (2001). The Encyclopedia of !ineteenth-Century Land Warfare: An Illustrated World View. W. W. Norton & Company. p. 539. ISBN 0393047709. http://books.google.com/books?vid=ISBN0393047709&id=mXpP_pdANcC&pg=PA539&lpg=PA539&ots=XHkbH7K9Em&dq=Cecil+Rhodes+boldly+walked+unarmed&sig=dVixJw T8o4WckD9Dvz2C_Vfz3X8. 4. ^ Pena, L. 2000. The Revolt of the Zimbabwean Masses: Part 1: How Did it Begin? [1] 5. ^ a b M. Sibanda, H. Moyana et al. 1992. The African Heritage. History for Junior Secondary Schools. Book 1. Zimbabwe Publishing House. ISBN 9780908300006 6. ^ a b Keppel-Jones, A. 1983. Rhodes and Rhodesia: The White Conquest of Zimbabwe, 1884-1902. McGill-Queen's University Press. ISBN 9780773505346 7. ^ Beach, D.N. 1970. Afrikaner and Shona Settlement in the Enkeldoorn Area, 1890–1900. Zambezia, 1, 5-34. [2] 8. ^ Adu Boahen, A. 1990. Africa Under Colonial Domination, 1880-1935. James Currey. ISBN 9780852550977 9. ^ Maritz, J. 1989. Towards a Zimbabwean Aeneid: a pedagogical exercise. Zambezia, 16, 151-157 [3]. 10. ^ Beach, D.N. 1989. Mapondera: heroism and history in !orthern Zimbabwe, 1840-1904. Mambo Press, Gweru, ISBN 9780869224458 Further reading • History of Rhodesia, by Howard Hensman (1900) PDF • The Story of Baden-Powell, by Harold Begbie (1900) • Scouting on Two Continents, by Major Frederick Russell Burnham, D.S.O., Autobiography. LC call number: DT775 .B8 1926. (1926) • Taking Chances, by Major Frederick Russell Burnham, D.S.O., LC call number: DT29 .B8. (1944) • The Matabele campaign, 1896; being a narrative of the campaign in suppressing the native rising in Matabeleland and Mashonaland, by Col. Robert Baden-Powell, ISBN 0-8371-3566-4 External links • "Map of the Second Matabele War". http://www.bsap.org/images/MatabeleRebellion.jpg. Retrieved 2006-10-29.

Rhodesian Bush War From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Rhodesian Bush War a.k.a.Zimbabwe War of Liberation Second Chimurenga Date Location Result

July 1964–1979 Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) Lancaster House Agreement, Majority rule

Belligerents Rhodesia South Africa Zimbabwe Rhodesia (1979) FROLIZI (1978–1979)

ZANLA (ZANU) ZIPRA (ZAPU) FRELIMO[1] FROLIZI (October 1971–1978) Umkhonto we Sizwe

Commanders PM Ian Smith PM Abel Muzorewa Defence Minister P. K. van der Byl Commander Peter Walls Ndabaningi Sithole (1978–1979) James Chikerema (1978–1979)

Robert Mugabe Joshua Nkomo MLA: Samora Machel Ndabaningi Sithole (1964–1978) Herbert Chitepo Josiah Tongogara Edgar Tekere Solomon Mujuru

Joe Slovo Around 30,000 fatalities [2] of which 7-8 percent (c. 2,000+) from the Rhodesian security forces [3]; the remainder, insurgents and civilians. The Rhodesian Bush War—also known as the Zimbabwe War of Liberation or the Second Chimurenga—was a civil war in the former country of Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) fought from July 1964 to 1979.[4] The Rhodesian government under Ian Smith and Zimbabwe-Rhodesian government under Abel Muzorewa fought against Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union and Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union. The war and its subsequent settlement ultimately led to the implementation of universal suffrage, the end of the white minority ruled Rhodesia and the short-lived government of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, and resulted in the creation of the Republic of Zimbabwe under the leadership of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe. Background The origins of the war in Rhodesia can be traced to the colonization of the region by white settlers in the late 19th century, and the dissent of black African nationalist leaders who opposed white minority rule.[5] Rhodesia was settled by British and South African pioneers beginning in the 1890s and while it was never accorded full dominion status, Rhodesia effectively governed itself after 1923. In his famous "Wind of Change" speech addressed to the parliament of South Africa in 1960, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan stated Britain's intention to grant independence to British territories in Africa. As a consequence many Rhodesians[who?] were concerned at the possibility that decolonization and native rule would bring chaos, as had resulted when the Congo became independent[citation needed]. Britain's unwillingness to compromise on the policy of No Independence before Majority African Rule led to Rhodesia unilaterally declaring independence (UDI) on 11 November 1965. Though Rhodesia had the support of neighbouring South Africa and Portuguese-ruled Mozambique, it never gained formal recognition from any other country.[citation needed] Although the vote in Rhodesia was open to all, regardless of race, property ownership requirements effectively denied the franchise to most of Rhodesia's blacks.[citation needed] and the 1969 constitution provided for "Non-Europeans" (principally blacks) to elect representatives for 8 of the seats in the 66 seat parliament. A further 8 of these seats were reserved for chiefs. Amidst this backdrop, black nationalists advocated armed struggle to bring about independence in Rhodesia. Resistance also stemmed from the wide disparities in wealth possession between blacks and whites. In Rhodesia, Europeans owned most of the fertile land whilst Africans were crowded on barren land,[6] following forced evictions or clearances by the colonial authorities.[7] Two rival nationalist organizations soon emerged: the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), following a split in the former in August 1963, following dissagreements over tactics as well as tribalism and personality clashes.[8]. ZANU and its military wing ZANLA were headed initially by the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, and later Robert Mugabe, consisted mainly of the Shona speaking tribes. ZAPU and its military wing ZIPRA consisted mainly of Ndebele ethnic groups under Joshua Nkomo.[5] Cold War politics played into the conflict also, with the Soviet Union supporting ZIPRA and Communist China providing support to ZANLA. Each group subsequently fought a separate war against the Rhodesian security forces, and the two groups sometimes fought against each other as well.[citation needed] In June 1979, the governments of Cuba and Mozambique offered direct military assistance to the Patriotic Front, but Mugabe and Nkomo declined.[9] Other foreign nations also contributed to the conflict, for instance North Korean military officials taught Zimbabwean militants how to use explosives and arms in a camp near Pyongyang.[10] By April 1979 12,000 ZANLA troops were training in Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Libya.[11] On the other side of the conflict South Africa clandestinely provided both material and military support to the Rhodesian government.[citation needed] Inevitably the Bush War occurred within the context of regional Cold War in Africa, and became embroiled with a number of conflicts in several neighbouring countries as well. Such conflicts included the Angolan War of Independence (1961–1975) and Angolan Civil War (1975–2002), the Mozambican War of Independence (1964–1974) and Mozambican Civil War (1977–1992), and the Shaba I (1977) and Shaba II (1978) conflicts.[citation needed]

Perceptions The conflict was seen by the nationalist groups and the British government of the time as a war of national and racial liberation. The Rhodesian government saw the conflict as a fight between one part of the country's population (the whites) on behalf of the whole population (including the black majority) against several externally financed parties made up of predominantly black radicals and communists. The Nationalists saw their country as having been occupied and dominated by a foreign power, namely, Britain, since 1890. The British government, in the person of the Governor General, directly ruled the country from 1923, when it took over from the British South Africa Company. In 1965, Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front party took over the government when it unilaterally declared independence.[12] The minority Rhodesian government believed they were defending Western values, Christianity, the rule of law and democracy by fighting Communists. They were unwilling to compromise on most political, economic and social inequalities. The Smith administration said the traditional chiefs were the legitimate voice of the black Shona and Ndebele population and that the nationalists were dangerous usurpers.[citation needed] In 1978-1979 the Smith administration attempted to blunt the power of the nationalist cause by acceding to an "Internal Settlement" which ended minority rule, changed the name of the country to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, and installed the country's first black head of government, Abel Muzorewa. However, unsatisfied with this and spurred on by Britain's refusal to recognise the new order, the nationalist forces persisted. Ultimately the war ended when the white-dominated government of Rhodesia returned power to the British government with the 1979 Lancaster House Agreement. The Rhodesian government did so at the behest of both South Africa (its major backer) and the United States. Britain recognised this new government, headed by Robert Mugabe, and the newly independent and internationally recognised country was renamed Zimbabwe. Belligerents Rhodesian Security Forces Despite the impact of economic and diplomatic sanctions, Rhodesia was able to develop and maintain a potent and professional military capability.[13] The regular army was always a relatively small force, but by 1978-79 it consisted of some 10,800 regulars supported by perhaps 15,000 reservists. While the regular army consisted of a professional core drawn from the white population (and some units, such as the Rhodesian SAS were all white), by 1978-79 the majority of its complement was actually composed of black soldiers. The army reserves, in contrast, were largely white and, toward the end of the war, were increasingly being called up to deal with the growing insurgency. The regular army was supported by the para-military British South Africa Police with a strength of about 8,000 men and supported by about 19,000 police reservists (which like their army counterparts, were also largely white) who acted as type of home guard. [14] The war saw the extensive operation of Rhodesian regulars as well as elite units such as the Selous Scouts and the Rhodesian SAS. The Rhodesian Army fought bitterly against the black nationalist guerrillas. The Rhodesian Army also comprised mostly black regiments such as the Rhodesian African Rifles. As the war went on, the frequent callup of reservists was increasingly utilized to supplement the professional soldiers and the many volunteers from overseas. By 1978 all white males up to the age of 60 were subject to periodic call-up into the army; younger men up to 35 might expect to spend alternating blocks of six weeks in the army and at home. Many of the overseas volunteers came from Britain, Ireland, South Africa, Portugal, Hong Kong, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America with the latter three being held in high regard for their recent Vietnam War experience.[citation needed] The Rhodesian Army was, considering the arms embargo, well-equipped. The standard infantry weapon was the Belgian FN FAL Rifle as produced in South Africa under license as the R1 Rifle and supplemented by the H&K G3 rifle that came from Portugese forces. However other weapons such as the British L1A1 variant of the FAL and the older British Lee-Enfield bolt action rifle were used by reservists and the British South Africa Police. Other weapons included the Bren LMG, Sten SMG, Uzi, Browning Hi-Power pistol, Colt M16 rifle (very late in the war), FN MAG general-purpose machine-gun, 81 mm mortar, and Claymore mines. After UDI Rhodesia was heavily reliant on South African and domestically-produced weapons and equipment, as well as international smuggling operations.[citation needed] The Rhodesian Air Force (RhAF) operated a variety of equipment and carried out numerous roles, with air power providing the Rhodesians with a significant advantage over their enemy.[13] When the arms embargo was introduced, the RhAF was suddenly lacking spare parts from external suppliers and was forced to find alternative means of keeping their aircraft flying. The RhAF was also relatively well equipped and used a large proportion of equipment which was obsolete, such as the World War II vintage Douglas Dakota transport aircraft and the early British jet-fighter the de Havilland Vampire. It also used more modern types of aircraft like the Hawker Hunter and Canberra bombers, the Cessna Skymaster as well as Aérospatiale Alouette III helicopters until they were supplemented by the Augusta Bell 205.[13] Very late in the war, the Rhodesian forces were able to obtain and use a very few smuggled in Bell UH-1 Iroquois helicopters.[15] At the beginning of the war much of Rhodesia's military hardware was of British and Commonwealth origin but during the course of the conflict new equipment such as armoured cars were procured from the South Africans. Several captured Soviet Bloc T-55 tanks were provided to Rhodesia by the South Africans, though only in the last year of the war.[16] The Rhodesians also produced some of their own armoured vehicles, including unlicensed copies of the Mercedes-Benz UR-416.[17] The means with which the Rhodesians procured weaponry meant that the arms embargoes had little effect on the Rhodesian war effort. During the course of the war most white citizens carried personal weapons, and it was not unusual to see white housewives carrying submachine guns. A siege mentality set in and all civilian transport had to be escorted in convoys for safety against ambushes. Farms and villages in rural areas were frequently attacked. The Rhodesian government divided the nation into eight geographical operational areas: North West Border (Operation Ranger), Eastern Border (Operation Thrasher), North East Border (Operation Hurricane), South East Border (Operation Repulse), Midlands (Operation Grapple), Kariba (Operation Splinter), Matabeleland (Operation Tangent), Salisbury and District ("SALOPS"). Rebel/Guerilla Forces The two major armed groups campaigning against Ian Smith's government were: • ZANLA (Zimbabwe National Liberation Army), the armed wing of ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union). • ZIPRA (Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army), the armed wing of ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union). The fighting was largely rural, with both movements attempting to secure peasant support and to recruit fighters while harassing the administration and the white civilians. Unlike the town-dwellers, rural whites faced danger and many were killed but in 1979 there were still 6,000 white farmers. They were vulnerable every time they left the homestead. ZA.LA Main article: ZANLA ZANLA was the armed wing of ZANU.[18] The organization also had strong links with Mozambique's independence movement, FRELIMO. ZANLA, in the end, was present on a more or less permanent basis in over half the country, as evidenced by the location of the demobilisation bases at the end of the war, which were in every province except Matabeleland North.[19] In addition, they were fighting a civil war against ZIPRA, despite the formation of a joint front by their political parties after 1978. It was ZANLA's intention to occupy the ground, supplant the administration in rural areas, and then

mount the final conventional campaign. ZANLA concentrated on the politicisation of the rural areas using force, persuasion, ties of kinship and collaboration with spirit mediums.[citation needed] ZANLA tried to paralyze the Rhodesian effort and economy by planting Soviet anti-tank land mines on the roads. From 1972 to 1980 there were 2,504 vehicle detonations of land mines (mainly Soviet TM46s), killing 632 people and injuring 4,410. The mining of roads increased as the war intensified; indeed the increase from 1978 (894 mines or 2.44 mines were detonated or recovered a day) to 1979 (2,089 mines or 5.72 mines a day) was 233.7%.[citation needed] In response, the Rhodesians co-operated with the South Africans to develop a range of mine protected vehicles. They began by replacing air in tyres with water which absorbed some of the blast and reduced the heat of the explosion. Initially, they protected the bodies with steel deflector plates, sandbags and mine conveyor belting. Later, purpose built vehicles with V shaped blast hulls dispersed the blast and deaths in such vehicles became unusual events.[citation needed][20] ZIPRA Main article: ZIPRA ZIPRA was the anti-government force based around the Ndebele ethnicity, led by Joshua Nkomo, and the ZAPU political organization. In contrast to ZANLA's Mozambique links, Nkomo's ZIPRA was more oriented towards Zambia for local bases. However, this was not always with full Zambian government support, and by 1979 ZIPRA's forces, combined with ANC and SWAPO forces in Zambia, was a major threat to Zambia's internal security. Because ZAPU's political strategy relied more heavily on negotiations than armed force, ZIPRA did not grow as quickly or elaborately as ZANLA, but by 1979 it had an estimated 20,000 combatants, almost all based in camps around Lusaka, Zambia. ZIPRA was responsible for two attacks on civilian Air Rhodesia Viscount airplanes, using a SAM-7 surface-to-air missiles. Ten out of the eighteen civilians on board who survived the first crash were subsequently and systematically massacred by the ZIPRA militants. Nkomo later spoke to the BBC of the attack in a way some considered gloating. In his memoirs, Story of My Life (1985), Nkomo expressed regret for the shooting down of both planes, claiming ZIPRA intelligence believed the plane was carrying General Walls and his aides.[19] ZIPRA took advice from its Soviet instructors in formulating its version of popular revolution and its strategy for taking over the country. On the advice of the Soviets, ZIPRA built up its conventional forces, and motorised with Soviet armored vehicles and a number of small airplanes,[21] in Zambia. ZIPRA's (i.e. ZAPU's) intention was to allow ZANLA to bring the Rhodesian forces to the point of defeat, and then to take the victory from the much lighter forces of ZANLA and the essentially defeated Rhodesians. ZIPRA kept a light presence within Rhodesia, reconnoitering, keeping contact with the peasants and sometimes skirmishing with ZANLA. ZIPRA's conventional threat actually distracted the Rhodesians from fighting ZANLA to an extent. By the late 1970s, ZIPRA had developed a strategy known as Storming the Heavens to launch a conventional invasion from Zambia, supported by a limited number of armoured vehicles and light aircraft. An operation by the Rhodesian armed forces to destroy a ZIPRA base near Livingstone in Zambia was never launched.[22] The ZAPU/ZIPRA strategy for taking over Zimbabwe proved unsuccessful. In any event, the transfer of power to black nationalists took place not by the military take-over expected by ZAPU/ZIPRA, but by a peaceful and internationally supervised election. Rhodesia reverted briefly to real British rule, and a general election took place in early 1980. This election was supervised both by the UK and international forces. Robert Mugabe (of ZANLA/ZANU) won this election, being the only major competitor for the vote of the majority ethnicity, the Shona. Once in power, Mugabe was internationally recognised as Zimbabwe's leader and was installed as head of government, as well as having the backing of the overwhelming majority ethnic group. He was therefore able to quickly and irreversibly consolidate his power in Zimbabwe, forcing ZAPU, and therefore ZIPRA which was ZAPU's army, to give up hope of taking over the country in the place of ZANU/ZANLA. Pre-war events Civil disobedience (1957–1964) In September 1956, bus fares in Salisbury were raised to the point at which workers were spending between 18% and 30% of their earnings on transportation.[citation needed] The City Youth League responded by boycotting the United Transport Company's buses and succeeded in preventing the price change. On 12 September 1957 members of the Youth League and the defunct ANC formed the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress, led by Joshua Nkomo. The Whitehead administration banned the SRANC in 1959 and arrested 307 leaders, excluding Nkomo who was out of the country, on 29 February in Operation Sunrise.[4][23][24] Nkomo, Mugabe, Herbert Chitepo, and Ndabaningi Sithole established the National Democratic Party in January 1960. Nkomo became its leader in October. An NDP delegation headed by Nkomo attended the constitutional conference in January 1961. While Nkomo initially supported the constitution, he reversed his position after other NDP leaders disagreed. The government banned the NDP in December 1961 and arrested NDP leaders, excluding Nkomo who, again, was out of the country. Nkomo formed the Zimbabwe African People's Union which the Whitehead administration banned in September 1962.[4][23][24] The United Federal Party, campaigning on majority rule, lost overwhelmingly in the 1962 general election to the more conservative Rhodesian Front. Nkomo, legally barred from forming a new political party, moved ZAPU's headquarters to Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.[23] In July 1963 Nkomo suspended Ndabaningi Sithole, Robert Mugabe, Leopold Takawira, and Washington Malianga for their opposition to his continued leadership of ZAPU.[25] On 8 August they announced the establishment of the Zimbabwe African National Union. ZANU members formed a militant wing, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army, and sent ZANLA members to the People's Republic of China for training.[23] In July 1964 ZANLA forces assassinated a Rhodesian Front official and the war began.[4] Course of the war First phase (1964–1972) In July 1964 ZANLA ambushed and killed a white civilian, Petrus Oberholtzer, in the first act of war to occur in Rhodesia since the 1890s. The murder had a lasting effect on the small, close-knit white community, even though it was an isolated incident.[26] The Smith administration subsequently moved to detain the ZANU and ZAPU political leadership in August 1964. The major political leaders imprisoned were Ndabaningi Sithole, Leopold Takawira, Edgar Tekere, Enos Nkala, Maurice Nyagumbo. The remaining military leaders of ZANLA, consisted of Dare ReChimurenga, the barrister Herbert Chitepo, and Josiah Tongogara. Operating from bases in Zambia and later from Mozambique, militants subsequently began launching attacks against Rhodesia.[27] The conflict intensified after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence from Britain on 11 November 1965.[26] Sanctions were implemented by the British government after UDI, and member states of the United Nations endorsed the British embargo. The embargo meant the Rhodesians were hampered by a lack of modern equipment but used other means to receive vital war supplies such as receiving oil, munitions, and arms via the government of apartheid-era South Africa. War material was also obtained through elaborate international smuggling schemes, domestic production, and equipment captured from infiltrating enemy combatants.[citation needed] Five months later on 28 April 1966, the Rhodesian Security Forces engaged militants in Sinoia, during the first major engagement of the war.[4] Seven ZANLA men were killed during the fighting and in retaliation the survivors murdered two civilians at their farm near Hartley three weeks later.[26] Prior to the collapse of Portuguese rule in Mozambique in 1974-75, the Rhodesians were able to defend their frontier with Zambia with relative ease and prevent many guerrilla incursions. The Rhodesians were able to set up a strong defensive line along the Zambezi River running from Lake Kariba to the Mozambique border. Here 30-

man camps were etablished at 8 kilometer intervals supported by mobile rapid reaction units. Between 1966 and 1970 these defences accounted for 175 insurgents killed for the loss of 14 defenders.[28] In the latter months of 1971, the black nationalist factions united and formed a coalition which became known as the 'Joint Guerrilla Alliance to Overthrow the Government.'[citation needed] Regardless, the conflict continued at a low level until 21 December 1972 when ZANLA attacked Altena Farm in north-east Rhodesia. In response the Rhodesians moved to hit their enemy in their foreign camps and staging areas before they could infiltrate into Rhodesia.[29] Secret cross-border operations by the Special Air Service began in the mid-1960s, with Rhodesian Security Forces already engaging in hotpursuits into Mozambique. However three weeks after the attack on Altena Farm, ZANLA murdered two civilians and abducted another who was subsequently taken into Mozambique and then Tanzania. In response SAS troops were inserted into Mozambique with the approval of the Portuguese administration, in the first officially sanctioned external operation. The Rhodesian government began authorizing an increasing number of external operations.[29] In the first phase of the conflict (up until the end of 1972), Rhodesia's political and military position appeared to be a strong one. Nationalist guerrillas had been unable to make serious military inroads against Rhodesia and Britain's efforts to isolate Rhodesia economically had not forced major compromises from the Smith Government. Indeed, late in 1971 the British and Rhodesian Governments had negotiated a compromise political settlement which would have bowed to the Smith Government's agenda of postponing majority rule into the indefinite future. Nevertheless, when it was found that such a delayed approach to majority rule was completely unacceptable to most of Rhodesia's African population, the deal fell apart. [30]It would take the collapse of Portuguese rule in Mozambique to create new military and political pressures on the Rhodesian Government to accept the principle of immediate majority rule. Second phase (1972–1979) For Rhodesian Army counter-insurgency "Fireforce" tactics see: Main article: Rhodesian Light Infantry The black nationalists continued to operate from secluded bases in neighbouring Zambia and from FRELIMO-controlled areas in the Portuguese colony of Mozambique, making periodic raids into Rhodesia. In April 1974, a left wing coup in Portugal heralded the coming end of colonial rule in Mozambique. FRELIMO formed a transitional government within months, and officially took over the country in June 1975. Such events proved beneficial to ZANLA but disastrous for the Rhodesians, adding an additional 800 miles of hostile border.[31] Indeed with the demise of the Portuguese empire Ian Smith realised Rhodesia was surrounded on three sides by hostile nations and declared a formal state of emergency. Soon Mozambique closed its border, however Rhodesian forces continued to cross the border in "hot pursuit" raids, attacking the nationalists and their training camps.[citation needed] By 1976 it was clear that an indefinite postponment of majority rule, which had been the cornerstone of the Smith Government's strategy since UDI, was no longer viable. Late in 1976, Ian Smith accepted the basic elements of the compromise proposals made by US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to introduce majority rule within two years. [32] The Smith Government then sought to negotiate an acceptable settlement with moderate black leaders, while retaining strong white influence in key areas. The Rhodesian military, in turn, had the job of eroding the rising military strength of the ZANLA and ZIPRA to the greatest extent possible in order "buy time" for an acceptable political settlement to be reached. The Rhodesian Security Forces called up part-time soldiers in preparation for a major counter-offensive on 2 May 1976.[33] In August 1976, Rhodesian Selous Scouts destroyed a camp at Nyadzonya in Mozambique containing many hundreds of trainees, which they claimed was a military target. The Rhodesians reported more than 1,000 insurgents killed when they were caught by surprise on the parade ground [34], while the nationalists claimed the site was a refugee camp. The Rhodesians also operated into Zambia after Nkomo's nationalists shot down two unarmed Vickers Viscount civilian airliners with Soviet supplied SAM-7 heat-seeking missiles. In the first incident, Air Rhodesia Flight RH825, ten passengers who survived the crash landing were shot and killed at the crash scene. Militants bombed a railroad bridge over Matetsi River on 7 October 1976 when a train carrying ore passed over.[35] As the conflict intensified, the United States and Britain attempted to negotiate a peaceful settlement. However this was rejected by the Rhodesian government insofar at it involved any potential surrender of power to the ZANLA or ZIPRA. By 1977 the war had spread throughout Rhodesia. ZANLA continued to operate from Mozambique, remained dominant among the Mashona peoples in eastern and central Rhodesia. Meanwhile ZIPRA remained active in the north and west, using bases in Zambia and Botswana, and were mainly supported by the Ndebele tribes.[31] With this escalation came increasing sophistication and organisation. No longer were the guerrillas the disorganised force they had been in the 1960s. Indeed now they were well-equipped with modern weapons, and although many were still untrained, an increasing number had received training in Communist bloc and other sympathetic countries. Weapons fielded included AK47 and SKS assault rifles, RPD and RPK light machine guns, as well as RPG-2 and RPG-7 rocket propelled grenade launchers. Just how well equipped the nationalists had become only became evident from Rhodesian raids on guerrilla base areas which even revealed mortars as well as 12.7mm and 14.5mm heavy machine guns, and even heavier calibre weapons such as 122mm multiple rocket launchers towards the end of the war.[36] On 3 April 1977, General Peter Walls announced the government would launch a campaign to win the "hearts and minds" of Rhodesia's black citizens.[37] In May Walls received reports of ZANLA forces massing in the city of Mapai in Gaza Province, Mozambique. Prime Minister Smith gave Walls permission to destroy the base. Walls told the media the Rhodesian forces were changing tactics from contain and hold to search and destroy, "adopting hot pursuit when necessary." On 30 May 1977, 500 troops passed the border and travelled 60 miles to Mapai, engaging the ZANLA forces with air cover from the Rhodesian Air Force and paratroopers in C-47 Dakotas. The Rhodesian government said the military killed 32 ZANLA fighters and lost one Rhodesian pilot. The Mozambican government disputed the number of casualties, saying it shot down three Rhodesian planes and a helicopter and took several troops prisoner, all of which Minister of Combined Operations Roger Hawkins denied.[38][39][40] The United Nations Security Council subsequently denounced the incursion of the "illegal racist minority regime in Southern Rhodesia" into Mozambique in Resolution 411, on 30 June 1977.[41] Walls announced a day later that the Rhodesian military would occupy Mapai until they had eliminated ZANLA's presence. Kurt Waldheim, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, condemned the incident on 1 June, and Rhodesian forces withdrew. The American, British, and Soviet governments also condemned the raid.[38] Militants bombed a department store in Salisbury on 11 August, killing 11 and injuring 70.[42] They killed sixteen black civilians in eastern Rhodesia on 21 August, burning their homes on a white-owned farm.[43] In November, 1977, in response to the buildup of ZANLA guerrillas in Mozambique, Rhodesian forces launched Operation Dingo, a pre-emptive combined arms surprise attack on guerrilla camps at Chimoio and Tembue in Mozambique. The attack was carried out over three days, from November 23 to 25, 1977. While these operations reportedly inflicted thousands of casualties on Robert Mugabe's ZANLA cadres, probably blunting guerrilla incursions in the months that followed, a steady intensification of the insurgency neverthless continued through 1978. In order to disrupt FRELIMO's hold on Mozambique, the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization helped to create and support its own insurgency movement within Mozambique. This guerrilla group, known as RENAMO battled with FRELIMO even as Rhodesian

forces fought the ZANLA within Mozambique. In May 1978, 50 civilians were killed in crossfire exchanged between Marxist militants and the Rhodesian military, the highest number of civilians to be killed in an engagement up to that point.[44] In July Patriotic Front members killed 39 black civilians and the Rhodesian government killed 106 militants.[45] On 4 November 1978 Walls said 2,000 Patriotic Front militants had been persuaded to defect and fight for the Rhodesian Security Forces. In reality only 50 militants defected.[37] In 1978 450 ZANLA militants crossed the Mozambique border and attacked the town of Umtali. At the time ZANU said the militants were women, an unusual characteristic, but in 1996 Joyce Mujuru said the vast majority involved were men and ZANU concocted the story to make Western organizations believe women were involved in the fighting.[46] In retaliation for these acts the Rhodesian Air Force bombed guerrilla camps 125 miles inside Mozambique, using 'fatigued' Canberra B2 aircraft and Hawker Hunters — actively, but clandestinely, supported by several of the more capable Canberra B(I)12 aircraft of the South African Air Force. A number of joint-force bomber raids on guerrilla encampments and assembly areas in Mozambique and Zambia were mounted in 1978, and extensive air reconnaissance and surveillance of guerrilla encampments and logistical build-up was carried out by the South African Air Force on behalf of the RhAF. In October, 1978 Rhodesian Air Force Canberra bombers, Hunter fighter-bombers and helicopter gunships attacked the ZIPRA guerrilla base at Westlands farm near Lusaka, Zambia while Zambian forces were warned by radio not to interfere. [47] The increased effectiveness of the bombing and follow-up 'air mobile' strikes using Dakota-dropped parachutists and helicopter 'air cav' techniques had a significant effect on the development of the conflict. As late as September 1979, despite the increased sophistication of guerrilla forces in Mozambique, a raid by Selous Scouts, with artillery and air support, on "New Chimoio" still reportedly resulted in heavy ZANLA casualties. [48] However, a successful raid on the Rhodesian strategic fuel reserves in Salisbury also underscored the importance of concluding a negotiated settlement and achieving international recognition before the war expanded further. The larger problem was that by 1979, combined ZIRPA and ZANLA strength inside Rhodesia totalled at least 12,500 guerrillas and it was evident that insurgents were entering the country at a rate greater than the Rhodesian forces could kill or capture. In addition, 22,000 ZIPRA and 16,000 ZANLA fighters remained uncommitted outside the country.[49] Joshua Nkomo's ZIPRA forces were preparing their forces in Zambia with the intent of confronting the Rhodesians through a conventional invasion. Whether such an invasion could have been successful in the short term against the well trained Rhodesian army and air force is questionable. However, what was clear was that the insurgency was growing in strength daily and the ability of the security forces to continue to control the entire country was coming under serious challenge. [50] By putting the civilian population at risk, ZIPRA and the ZANLA had been particularly effective in creating conditions that accelerated white emigration. This not only seriously undermined the morale of the white population, it was also gradually reducing the availability of trained reserves for the army and the police. For a discussion see: Main article: Rhodesia Regiment The economy was also suffering badly as a result of the war with the Rhodesian GDP in consistent decline in the late 1970s. [51] Politically, the Rhodesians were therefore pinning all their hopes on the "internal" political settlement that had been negotiated with moderate black nationalist leaders in 1978 and its ability to achieve external recognition and support. This internal settlement led to the creation of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia under a new constitution in 1979. Resolution Under the agreement of March 1978, the country was to be known as Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, and in the general election of 24 April 1979, Bishop Abel Muzorewa became the country's first black prime minister. The factions led by Nkomo and Mugabe denounced the new government as a puppet of white Rhodesians and fighting continued. The hoped for recognition of the internal settlement, and of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, by the newly elected Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher did not materialize after the latter's election in May, 1979. Likewise, despite the fact that the US Senate voted to lift sanctions against ZimbabweRhodesia, the Carter administration also refused to recognize the internal settlement. While Prime Minister Thatcher clearly sympathized with the internal settlement and thought of the ZANLA and ZIPRA leaders as "terrorists", she was prepared to support a push for further compromise if it could end the fighting. [52] Britain was also reluctant to recognize the internal settlement for fear of fracturing the unity of the Commonwealth. Thus later in 1979, the Thatcher government called a peace conference in London to which all nationalist leaders were invited. The outcome of this conference would become known as the Lancaster House Agreement. During the conference, the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian Government accepted a watering down of the 1978 internal settlement while Mugabe and Nkomo agreed to end the war in exchange for new elections in which they could participate. The economic sanctions imposed on the country were lifted in late 1979, and British rule resumed under a transitional arrangement leading to full independence. On 21 December 1979 a cease-fire was subsequently announced.[53] The elections of 1980 resulted in a victory for Robert Mugabe, who assumed the post of prime minister after ZANU-PF received 63% of the vote. Accusations of voter intimidation by Mugabe's guerrilla cadres, sections of which were accused of not having assembled in the designated guerrilla assembly points as required under the Lancaster House Agreement, may have led the Rhodesian military to give serious consideration to a coup d'etat in March 1980. This alleged coup was to have included the assassination of Mugabe and coordinated assaults on ZANLA guerrilla assembly points within the country. However, even in the context of alleged voter intimidation by ZANLA elements, widespread support for Mugabe from large sections of the black population (in particular from his own Shona tribal group which made up the overwhelming majority of the country's population) could not be seriously disputed. Moreover, the clear absence of any external support for such a coup, and the inevitable conflagration that would have engulfed the country thereafter, scuttled the plan. [54] The result was that on 18 April, 1980 the country gained independence and international recognition. Two years later the government changed the name of the country's capital from Salisbury to Harare. Aftermath Following independence, Robert Mugabe acted incrementally to consolidate his power. Fighting between ZANLA and ZIPRA units broke out in 1981 and led to what has become known as Gukurahundi (Shona: "the early rain which washes away the chaff before the spring rains")[55]) or the Matabeleland Massacres, which ran from 1982 until 1985. Mugabe used his North Korean trained Fifth Brigade to crush any resistance in Matabeleland. It has been estimated that 20,000 Matabele were murdered in these first years after the war. [56] For the history of Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe after 1980 see: Main article: Zimbabwe Main article: Robert Mugabe Beyond Zimbabwe's borders, as a result of Rhodesian aid and support for RENAMO, the Bush War also led to the outbreak of the Mozambique Civil War, which lasted from 1977 until 1992. That conflict claimed about 30 times the number of lives lost in the Rhodesian War and also led to some 5 million people being made homeless. See also • Military history of Africa • Operation Dingo • Portuguese Colonial War

• • • • • • • • • • • .otes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

35. 36. 37.

Rhodesian African Rifles Rhodesian Armoured Car Regiment Rhodesia Regiment Rhodesian SAS Grey's Scouts Rhodesian Light Infantry British South Africa Police Second Matabele War, officially known within Zimbabwe as the First Chimurenga Security Force Auxiliaries South African Border War Mozambique Civil War ^ Page 65 Robert Mugabe and the Betrayal of Zimbabwe, 2004. ^ Government compromise in 1971 Rhodesian talks - BBC News 2 January 2002 ^ http://www.war-memorial.net/mem_det.asp?ID=152 ^ a b c d e Peter N. Stearns and William Leonard Langer. The Encyclopedia of World History: Ancient, Medieval, and Modern, Chronologically Arranged, 2001. Page 1069. ^ a b Rogers 1998, p. 37. ^ Ranger, Terence (1985). Peasant consciousness and guerilla war in Zimbabwe: a comparative study. James Currey. pp. 377. ISBN 97808525500104. ^ Moore, D.S. (2005). Suffering for Territory: Race, Place, and Power in Zimbabwe. Duke University Press. pp. 424. ISBN 9780822335702. ^ Sibanda, Eliakim (2005). The Zimbabwe African People's Union 1961-87: A Political History of Insurgency in Southern Rhodesia. Africa World Press. pp. 321. ISBN 1592212751. ^ Preston, Matthew. Ending Civil War: Rhodesia and Lebanon in Perspective, 2004. Page 55. ^ [http://rhodesian.server101.com/communist_support_for_terrori sts.htm Red Africa: Communist support and assistance to nationalist political groups in Rhodesia] Embassy of Rhodesia in Iceland ^ Preston, Matthew. Ending Civil War: Rhodesia and Lebanon in Perspective, 2004. Page 66. ^ http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1965Rhodesia-UDI.html ^ a b c Rogers 1998, p. 41. ^ Major Charles Lohman and Major Robert MacPherson, "Rhodesia: Tactical Victory, Strategic Defeat" WAR SINCE 1945 SEMINAR AND SYMPOSIUM, US Marine Corps Command and Staff College, June 1983 - See Chapter 3 http://www.scribd.com/doc/2546386/Rhodesia-Tactical-Victory-Srategic-Defeat ^ Brent, W. A., "Rhodesian Air Force A Brief History 1947-1980", Freeworld Publications, 1988, p. 14. ^ Reference in: R. Allport, "Operation Quartz Rhodesia 1980" http://www.memoriesofrhodesia.com/media/documents/Op-Quartz.pdf ^ Stiff, Peter, "Selous Scouts Top Secret War", Galago Publishing (Pty) Ltd., 1983, P. 425. ^ Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War. Volume One by N. Bhebe, T. Ranger, IV. Zimbabwe: War and Youth, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Dec., 1996), pp. 686-688. JSTOR. ^ a b Martin, D. and Johnson, P. 1981. The struggle for Zimbabwe. Boston, Faberand Faber ^ These developments subsequently led to the South African Hippo, Casspir, Mamba and Nyala wheeled light troop carriers. ^ Dabengwa, Dumiso (1995). "ZIPRA in the Zimbabwe War of National Liberation". in Ngwabi Bhebe and Terrence Ranger (eds). Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War. One. London: James Currey. ^ Brickhill, Jeremy (1995). "Daring to storm the heavens: The military strategy of ZAPU, 1976-1979". in Ngwabi Bhebe and Terrence Ranger (eds). Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War. One. London: James Currey. pp. 48-72. ^ a b c d Lake, Anthony. The "Tar Baby" Option: American Policy Toward Southern Rhodesia, 1976. Page 32. ^ a b Muzondidya, James. Walking on a Tightrope: Towards a Social History of the Coloured Community of Zimbabwe, 2005. Page 167-170. ^ Robert Cary and Diana Mitchell. African !ationalist Leaders in Rhodesia Who's who, 1977. Page 101. ^ a b c Rogers 1998, p. 39. ^ St. John, Lauren. Rainbow's End: A Memoir of Childhood, War, and an African Farm, 2007. Page 1. ^ Ranger, Robin, "Defense", Britannica Book of the Year 1971, p. 259. ^ a b Rogers 1998, pp. 39-40. ^ Ryan, Johnny, "Principled Failure: British Policy Toward Rhodesia, 1971-72" The History Review 2004 http://johnnyryan.wordpress.com/2004/02/20/principled-failure-british-policy-toward-rhodesia-1971-72/ ^ a b Rogers 1998, p. 40. ^ BBC News, September 24, 1976 http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/september/24/newsid_2537000/2537969.stm ^ Rhodesia, planning offensive, to call up part-time soldiers The New York Times ^ Major Charles Lohman and Major Robert MacPherson, "Rhodesia: Tactical Victory, Strategic Defeat" WAR SINCE 1945 SEMINAR AND SYMPOSIUM, US Marine Corps Command and Staff College, June 1983 - See Chapter 4 re. "Operation Eland" http://www.scribd.com/doc/2546386/Rhodesia-Tactical-Victory-Srategic-Defeat ^ Rhodesia says rebels bomb bridge, sending train crashing into river, 8 October 1976. The New York Times. ^ Rogers 1998, pp. 40-41. ^ a b Rhodesia Psychological Operations 1965-1980 Psychological Operations

38. ^ a b Kalley, Jacqueline Audrey. Southern African Political History: A chronological of key political events from independence to mid-1997, 1999. Page 224. 39. ^ Smith Takes a Dangerous New Gamble TIME magazine and CNN 40. ^ Getting ready for war TIME magazine and CNN 41. ^ Resolution 411 (1977) United Nations 42. ^ Muzondidya, James. Walking on a Tightrope: Towards a Social History of the Coloured Community of Zimbabwe, 2005. Page 246. 43. ^ 16 Rhodesian blacks reported killed by guerrillas 22 August 1977. Reuters via The New York Times 44. ^ 50 black civilians killed in crossfire In Rhodesian War; Varying Curfew Restrictions, 17 May 1978. The New York Times. 45. ^ Rhodesia Reports 39 Blacks Slain, Says Military Killed 106 Guerrillas; 106 Guerrillas Reported Slain Guerrillas Kill 39 Black Civilians, Rhodesia Reports, 23 July 1978. The New York Times. 46. ^ Lyons, Tanya. Guns and Guerilla Girls: Women in the Zimbabwean !ational Liberation Struggle, 2003. Page 167. 47. ^ A radio recording of the Rhodesian warning and Air Force pilot chatter during the attack is found at (WARNING: Strong and disturbing language): http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-p1NRLFso6Q&feature=related 48. ^ The increased guerrilla capabilities were evident during that raid in that the insurgents, now armed with Soviet surfaceto-air missiles, were able to shoot down a Rhodesian helicopter killing all 12 occupants on board. Ian F. W. Beckett "The Rhodesian Army: Counter-Insurgency, 1972-1979 Part II" http://selousscouts.tripod.com/rhodesian%20army%20coin%2072_79%20part2.htm 49. ^ Ian F. W. Beckett "The Rhodesian Army: Counter-Insurgency, 1972-1979 Part II" http://selousscouts.tripod.com/rhodesian%20army%20coin%2072_79%20part2.htm 50. ^ Major Charles Lohman and Major Robert MacPherson, "Rhodesia: Tactical Victory, Strategic Defeat" WAR SINCE 1945 SEMINAR AND SYMPOSIUM, US Marine Corps Command and Staff College, June 1983 - See Chapter 4 http://www.scribd.com/doc/2546386/Rhodesia-Tactical-Victory-Srategic-Defeat 51. ^ Ian F. W. Beckett "The Rhodesian Army: Counter-Insurgency, 1972-1979 Part II" http://selousscouts.tripod.com/rhodesian%20army%20coin%2072_79%20part2.htm 52. ^ Margaret Thatcher blocked talks with 'Terrorist' Mugabe, December 30, 2009 http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-12-30margaret-thatcher-blocked-talks-with-terrorist-mugabe 53. ^ Rogers 1998, p. 65. 54. ^ See discussion of the planned "Operation Quartz" in: R. Allport, "Operation Quartz - Rhodesia 1980" http://www.memoriesofrhodesia.com/media/documents/Op-Quartz.pdf 55. ^ Nyarota, Geoffrey. Against the Grain. p. 134. 56. ^ "Matabeleland: Its Struggle for National Legitimacy, and the Relevance of this in the 2008 Election". Heinrich Böll Stiftung. http://www.boell.de/weltweit/afrika/afrika-2482.html. References • Rogers, Anthony (1998). Someone Else's War: Mercenaries from 1960 to the Present. Hammersmith: Harper Collins. pp. 255. ISBN 9780004720777. External links • Rhodesian Bush War historical research / discussion forum • FireForce Operations: Helicopter Warfare in Rhodesia: 1962–80 • The Selous Scouts Home Page a site with a lot of information on the war in general and in the Selous Scouts in particular • Rhodesian and South African Military History: An extensive collection of histories and analysis of Rhodesian and South African military operations, to the early 1980s • Rhodesian Special Forces roll of honour, awards and images. • The bush war Leopard: Leopard, Rhodesian Bush War landmine resisting vehicle. • The Black Devils: the Rhodesian Armoured Car Regiment • Nyadzonya Raid: Selous Scouts raid on the Nyadzonya Camp in Mozambique.

Leopard APC, mine-protected vehicle, designed and built in Rhodesia during the late 1970s and based on a Volkswagen engine. This example is displayed in the Imperial War Museum North, Manchester, UK

Rhodesian soldiers on patrol with FN FAL rifles during the 1970s. - White civilians; A woman and two children murdered by guerrillas during the Bush War.

The Zimbabwean Liberation Medal, awarded to fighters of the war. The Rhodesian General Service Medal awarded to Rhodesian armed forces and featuring Cecil Rhodes. Recruiting poster for the Rhodesian Army.

Rhodesian Army From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Rhodesian Army was part of the Security Forces of Rhodesia. Bush War During the Bush War, the army included: • Army Headquarters Army HQ • Four Brigade HQs (numbered 1 to 4), two District HQs (Salisbury and Midlands), and HQ Special Forces • The Rhodesian Light Infantry (unofficially the "Rhodesian Foreign Legion", this regiment especially included foreign volunteers) • C Squadron 22 (Rhodesian) SAS (in 1978 became 1 (Rhodesian) Special Air Service Regiment) • Selous Scouts • The Rhodesian Armoured Car Regiment (The Black Devils) • Grey's Scouts • The Rhodesian African Rifles (six independent companies) • The Rhodesia Regiment (eight battalions, numbered 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10) • 1 Psychological Operations Unit • The Rhodesian Defence Regiment (two battalions) • The Rhodesian Intelligence Corps • The Rhodesian Artillery (one depot, one field regiment) • Six Engineer Squadrons (numbered 2, 3, 4, 6, 7) 1 Engr Sqn (link www.sasappers.net) • 5 Engineer Support Squadron • Three Brigade Signals Squadrons (numbered 1 to 3), 41 Troop 4 (Bde.) Signals Squadron, and three Signal Squadrons numbered 8, 10-12 • Two Services Area HQs (Matabeleland and Mashonaland) • Two Ordnance and Supplies Depots (Bulawayo, Salisbury) • Two Base Workshops (Bulawayo, Salisbury) • 1 Air Supply Platoon • Three Maintenance Companies (numbered 1 to 3) • Three Medical Companies (1, 2, 5) and the Army Health Unit • Tsanga Lodge • Five Provost Platoons (numbered 1 to 5) and the Army Detention Barracks • Six Pay Companies (numbered 1 to 5, 7) • Rhodesian Army Education Corps • Rhodesian Corps of Chaplains • Army Records, and Army Data Processing Unit • Rail Transport Organisation Platoon • 1 Military Postal Platoon • Training establishments: School of Infantry, 19 Corps Training Depot, School of Military Engineering, School of Signals, Services Training School, Services Trade Training Centre, Medical Training School, School of Military Police, Pay Corps Training School, School of Military Administration. In addition the Department of Internal Affairs was a separate government department which during the Bush War armed its personnel and became a para-military force, losing about 300 men during the war. See also • Rhodesian Light Infantry • Selous Scouts • Rhodesian Air Force External link • Rhodesian Militaria: Army - Detailed photos & descriptions of genuine Army & Brigade patches.

Rhodesian Army Association

Rhodesia, Milton High School - Royal Rhodesia Regiment – Royal Rhodesian Air Force - 3/17th Rhodesian Field Battery -

Southern Rhodesia Reconnaissance Unit - Southern Rhodesia Armoured Car Regiment Rhodesia Armoured Corps

Selous Scouts (Rhodesia) Southern Rhodesia Corps of Military Police

Rhodesian Defence Unit

Southern Rhodesia Transport Corps

Rhodesia & Nyasaland Army Services Corps - Rhodesia Army Services Corps

4th Rhodesian Anti-Tank Battery

Southern Rhodesia Staff Corps - Rhodesia & Nyasaland Staff Corps - Rhodesia Staff Corps

Rhodesian Light Infantry

Rhodesia Railways Shunter

Rhodesia Internal Affairs Department - Rhodesia Army W.O.2 – Rhodesia Guard Force

Southern Rhodesia Native Department - Rhodesia and Nyasaland Native Department

Rhodesian and .yasaland Engineers - Rhodesian Corps of Engineers – Corps of Signals

Rhodesia Intelligence Corps – Southern Rhodesia Medical Corps - Rhodesia Army Education Corps – Rh. Army Pay Corps

Rhodesian Army

Lance Corporal Staff Sergeant 2nd Lieutenant Major Major General

Corporal Warrant Officer II Lieutenant Lieutenant Colonel Colonel Lieutenant General www.uniforminsignia.net

Sergeant Warrant Officer I Captain Brigadier General

Rhodesian African Rifles

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia 1916–December 31, 1981 Rhodesia Republic of Rhodesia Regular Army, Rhodesian Bush War Infantry Green & Black "Private N'duna" the goat World War II Suez Crisis Malayan Emergency Nyasaland Northern Rhodesia Engagements Congo Border Rhodesian Bush War Her Majesty the Queen Ceremonial chief The Rhodesian African Rifles, or RAR, was the oldest regiment in the Rhodesian Army, dating from the formation of the 1st Rhodesian Native Regiment in 1916 during the First World War. This was followed by the creation of the Matabeleland Native Regiment, and the 2nd Rhodesian Native Regiment, formed in 1917. In 1918, the Rhodesia Native Regiment was formed by combining the 1st and 2nd Regiments. Second World War The regiment was raised again in 1940 during the Second World War and staffed with black non-commissioned officers (NCOs) from the British South Africa Police Askari Unit. This was considered as the direct successor of the Rhodesia Native Regiment, which was confirmed in 1962, and the RAR inherited all of that Regiment's battle honours. Until the late 1970s, the RAR had exclusively black recruits and NCOs and exclusively white officers. In 1979, black officers first began to serve in the unit.[1] The RAR was responsible for over 400 guerrilla casualties from 1966-1973, during the Rhodesian Bush War. During the Second World War, the RAR established its first training depot at Borrowdale Camp, Salisbury in 1941.[2] The RAR shipped out to Burma in 1944, to serve with the King's African Rifles in 22 (East African) Independent Brigade. The unit saw action in April 1945, and earned the battle honors 'Taungup', 'Arakan Beaches', and 'Burma'. The regiment went back to Rhodesia in 1946, where its depot was closed, and the unit effectively disbanded. 1945-1980 A skeleton unit was however retained. By 1949, A, B, and C companies were operational as demo companies. In 1951, B Company became support company. The regiment saw service in Suez in 1952, and in 1953 it was presented with the Queen's Colour and Regimental Color by the Queen Mother. In 1954 a new depot was opened for the regiment at Llewellin Barracks in Bulawayo. The Depot was situated near the HQ 1st Bn R.A.R, which had always been at Heany/Methuen Barracks near Llewellyn Barracks. In Malaya from 1956 to 1958, during the Emergency, the regiment served as part of the Army of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. While in Malaya, the unit was known as the RhAR to distinguish it from the Royal Australian Regiment. After the Malaya Emergency, the RAR was deployed to Nyasaland (now Malawi) in 1959. Later deployments included Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), the Congo Border, and within Rhodesia in 1966. Its first contact in the Rhodesian Bush War came in the Zambezi Valley in September 1966. A second battalion was raised in 1973; in 1976 this battalion was based at the former boarding school of St. Stephen's College, Balla Balla which had closed in 1975. This new barracks in Balla Balla was named Shaw Barracks, after the late Maj-Genl J. Shaw. A JOC HQ was formed at Fort Victoria (now Masvingo) followed by 3 RAR (HQ at Umtali, now Mutare) in 1977 - formed from three of the Independent RAR companies. Para-training was introduced in 1978 and the RAR were actively involved in "fireforce" missions, where they gained a reputation of jumping from minimum heights. The unit was not deployed outside Rhodesia during the war, but it established a considerable tally on internal operations. The 4th Bn (Holding Unit) RAR was formed when the Selous Scouts disbanded on 17 April 1980. It existed in name only and continued until 30 September 1980 before becoming 1st Zimbabwe Parachute Battalion as it is today in 2007. After independence, on April 18, 1980, the Rhodesian African Rifles Battalions were integrated into the 1st, 3rd and 4th Brigades of the Zimbabwe National Army but were not immediately integrated with ZIPRA or ZANLA cadres; in fact, in 1981 RAR and recalled elements of other Rhodesian units were used to suppress fighting in integrated battalions of the Zimbabwe National Army. • Note: Balla Balla was renamed Mbalabala in 1980 when Rhodesia became Zimbabwe. The village is in Matabeleland, about 41 miles (66 km) south-east of Bulawayo. Weapons As in most Rhodesian Army units, the standard weapon was the FN-FAL in caliber 7.62, or the identical South African R1. The MAG-58 light machine gun was carried as a section weapon, with heavier support provided by 81mm mortars. The West German G3 rifle was used in increasing numbers toward the end of the war. Regulation issued weapons were often supplemented by local products, captured weapons, and a variety of personal sidearms.[3] References Active Country Allegiance Branch Type Colors Mascot

1. 2. 3.

• • •

^ Abbott 2001, p.14. ^ Rhodesian African Rifles ^ Abbott 2001, p.15. Abbott, Peter, Modern African Wars (I): Rhodesia 1965-80, Osprey Publishing London, 2001 Rasmussen, R. K., & Rubert, S. C., 1990. A Historical Dictionary of Zimbabwe, Scarecrow Press, Inc., Metuchen, NJ, United States of America. Warrant Officer M.R. Moran (MTO) 1st Zimbabwe Parachute Battalion 1982. More Rhodesian Senior Schools Part two 1950-1982 contributed editorial, edited by I.P. Maclaren. Published by Books of Zimbabwe, Bulawayo.

See also Selous Scouts Rhodesian Light Infantry Rhodesian SAS Grey's Scouts Rhodesian Air Force Rhodesian Armoured Car Regiment British South Africa Police External links • Rhodesian African Rifles Regimental Song "Sweet Banana" • "Sweet Banana mp3"

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Rhodesia Regiment

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia The Rhodesia Regiment was one of the oldest and largest regiments in the Rhodesian Army. It served on the side of Great Britain in the Boer War and the First and Second World Wars and served the Republic of Rhodesia in the anti-terrorist counter-insurgency war of the 1970s. It was an infantry regiment, which by the 1970s, consisted of a number of territorial army battalions (1RR, 2RR, 4RR, 5RR, 6RR, 8RR, 9RR, 10RR) and 6 national service independent companies (1 Indep Coy RR, 2 Indep Coy RR, 3 Indep Coy RR, 4 Indep Coy RR, 5 Indep Coy RR and 6 Indep Coy, RR) as well as a training depot, DRR, which received and trained most of the Rhodesian Army national servicemen from the 1950s onwards. 3RR was a Northern Rhodesian battalion, but the origin and form of 7RR, if it existed, is not currently known. In the world wars the regiment served in South West Africa and Tanganyika. On the regimental badge, consisting of a dark grey to black Maltese Cross, battle honours are recorded in the four cross-members, as follows: Great War 1914-18, South West Africa 1915, Beho Beho 1917 and the Second World War 1939-45. A lion and tusk is featured above the centre of the cross, with a crown in the middle of the cross, but when the regiment was a royal regiment (19471970?), the royal crown was displayed at the top of the cross and the lion and tusk in the centre. The drill uniform, like that of most of the peace-time army, consisted of a heavily starched, short-sleeved light green drill shirt and similarly starched KD pants (long khaki pants), woollen hose tops and putties, black stick boots, a black webbing belt or regimental stable belt and a rifle green beret with the regimental badge underlain by a scarlet diamond shaped flash. In war time, from 1970 onwards, the everyday uniform was camoflage denim with a webbing belt and beret. The colours of the regiment were red, black and rifle green - on the stable belt, green above, black below and a thin red stripe in the middle. The regiment had drill halls in the larger towns of Rhodesia, where the citizen soldiers would report when mustered. During the COIN war however, the battalions of the regiment identified with a brigade HQ, as for instance 2RR and 9RR with 1 Brigade in Bulawayo, 1RR and 10RR with 2 Brigade in Salisbury and 4RR with 3 Brigade in Umtali. They formed the core of the brigade, to which various specialised infantry and support units were attached at the Brigade Main HQs established in operational areas. 4RR for instance was quartered at Grand Reef aerodrome WSW of Umtali and was responsible for the Hurricane Sector stretching from Inyanga to Chipinga. At Grand Reef, 4RR Main occupied the centre of the camp, while its companies were established in temporary operational bases, usually deserted farms or schools along the sector, as for instance in the Honde and Burma Valleys to name two such camps. 4RR had a tracking unit camped on the ground at the 4RR Main HQ next to the wet canteen and the runway, many of the members of the 'Sparrows' being founder members of the Selous Scouts tracking school. Whenever there was a contact or a sighting anywhere in the sector, these regimental trackers were dropped on the spoor by an Alouette helicopter and did the dangerous work of follow-up. When or if they had run the enemy to ground, then the Fire Force was called in to surround and eliminate them, most often with superior numbers, fire-power and air support. The Sparrows on the other hand, usually three or four, armed with FNs and an MAG, covered in green 'jungle juice', would frequently run down and then face an enemy force which greatly outnumbered and out-gunned them. These incidents would make interesting reading if they could be recorded. The Independent Companies were where conscripts ended up if they did not volunteer for more glamorous infantry or specialist units, consequently they tended to be the more conservative, long-suffering, persistent, and ultimately the toughest recruits. An intake of some 300 men reporting to Depot RR would be whittled down to about 30 of these individuals, the remainder of the intake 'skiving off' to support or specialist units elsewhere in the army over the course of the first four and a half months. 1 and 4 Indeps were stationed at Victoria Falls or Wankie, 2 Indep at Kariba, 3 Indep at Inyanga and 5 and 6 Indeps at Umtali. After national service they were posted to a territorial battalion in or close to the town or city they hailed from. The RR battalions and their national service counterparts, the Independent Companies, rarely received much attention in the media but covered most of the ground that was ever covered on aggressive foot patrols by the Rhodesian Forces. They ambushed and were ambushed. When there was trouble, as often as not, it was an Bedford lorry full of RR soldiers who were first on the scene of a massacre, a contact, or an attack. It was the ordinary citizens who recognised their contribution: as it was, the regiment was peopled by the citizens and the citizens knew it from the inside and the outside. The Regiment was honoured by being given the Freedom of Towns and Cities throughout the country. A book could be filled with the exploits and undertakings of the Rhodesia Regiment, which was the familiar regiment of the army and the country. The trouble would be to find a surviving member or members with sufficient inside knowledge and enough vanity or pride to write such a book. Even less is known of the exploits of the regiment in its long history. The Regiment was virtually destroyed in the last year and a half of the COIN war by being merged with or stocked by ill-trained RAR soldiers, many of whom were African conscripts from 'civvie street' without much of a will to fight. At the same time the experienced members, many of them family men, were emigrating to South Africa as the end drew near, so that by December 1979 the Regiment was barely recognisable for what it had been. Morale was shattered and the Regiment, as happened to many others, disappeared when the British peacefully took over the executive powers of the country, Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, in that month. With the creation of Zimbabwe, the Rhodesia Regiment ceased by definition. External links [1]

Rhodesian Light Infantry

Cap badge of the Rhodesian Light Infantry. The Queen's crown indicates that it is pre-1970 pattern From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia February 1, 1961–October 31, 1980 Active Rhodesia Country Republic of Rhodesia Allegiance Regular Army, Rhodesian Bush War Branch Infantry Type various Role Cranborne Barracks, Salisbury Garrison/HQ The Saints .ickname The Incredibles Green & White Colors "When the Saints Go Marching In" March Cheetah Mascot February 1, 1961 Anniversaries The 1st Battalion, The Rhodesian Light Infantry (1RLI or RLI) was a regular airborne commando regiment (paratroops and heliborne troops) in the Rhodesian army. The RLI was originally formed as a light infantry regiment in 1961, reformed as a commando Battalion in 1965, became a parachute Battalion in 1977 and was disbanded at the end of the Rhodesian War in 1980. Nicknamed 'The Saints' or 'The Incredibles', the Rhodesian Light Infantry was regarded as one of the world's foremost proponents of counter-insurgency warfare, through both internal Fire Force operations in Rhodesia and external preemptive strikes against guerrillas based in Mozambique and Zambia. Origin Composed only of white recruits, the Rhodesian Light Infantry was formed within the army of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in Bulawayo on 1 February 1961. The Battalion's nucleus was formed from the short-lived Number One Training Unit, which had been raised to provide personnel for a white infantry Battalion as well as for C Squadron 22 (Rhodesian) SAS and the Selous Scouts (a Federation Armoured Car Corps). The latter is not to be confused with the Selous Scouts, a special forces regiment of the same name, whose Commanding Officer, Colonel Ron Reid-Daly, had been the RSM and later a Captain in the RLI. The first RLI intake included 100 recruits from South Africa, and was trained by instructors seconded from the British Army; shortly afterwards the regiment moved to its purpose built, and at the time state-of-the art HQ at Cranborne Barracks near the capital, Salisbury. As well as Rhodesian-born (or raised) soldiers, the Rhodesian Light Infantry (and 3 Commando in particular) attracted foreign volunteers from the United Kingdom, Ireland, South Africa, the United States, Mozambique (settlers of Portuguese descent), Australia, New Zealand, Canada, France, West Germany, Scandinavia and other places. This does not mean however, that this was a mercenary unit, as it was a regular unit of the Rhodesian Army and the nonRhodesians (who all spoke English) had the same pay and conditions of service as the Rhodesian regulars. The significant majority (probably more than 80%) of serving members were Rhodesian. From 1977 onwards around half of the Battalion was composed of selected Rhodesian conscripts, who served less time (in theory) than a regular. In practice, there was such a high turnover that the conscript could serve longer than many a regular. The quality of these conscripts was overall at least as high as the regulars, of which many were former conscripts. The Battalion was organised into four company size sub-units called Commandos. These were named One Commando, Two Commando, Three Commando and Support Commando. In theory each Commando had five Troops (platoon size structures), though most of the time there were only four. The average fighting strength of a Commando was about 70 men. The rank order was as follows: Trooper (around two-thirds), Lance Corporal, Full Corporal, Sergeant, Colour Sergeant, Commando Sergeant Major or CSM (Warrant Officer Class Two), Second Lieutenant, First Lieutenant, Captain and Major (the Officer Commanding or OC). Sometimes the Commando's OC was a Captain. The ranks of CSM and above would be referred to as "Sir" by the subordinate ranks. Officers would refer to the CSM as "Sergeant Major". All ranks tended to be called "troopies" by the Rhodesian media. Operations The RLI was at the forefront of the Rhodesian Bush War or Second Chimurenga, the armed struggle by nationalist guerrillas against the white minority government of Rhodesia from the late 1960s until majority rule in 1980, when the country became known as Zimbabwe. This conflict is an excellent example of classic counter-insurgency or guerrilla warfare (although of course it was unique, as all wars are).

Fire Force The RLI's most characteristic deployment was the Fire Force reaction operation. This was an operational assault or response composed of, usually, a first wave of 32 soldiers carried to the scene by three helicopters and one DC-3 Dakota (called "Dak"), with a command/gun helicopter and a light attack aircraft in support. The latter was a Cessna Skymaster, armed with two machine-guns and normally two 30 mm rocket pods and two small napalm bombs (made in Rhodesia and called Frantan). The RLI became extremely adept at this type of military operation. A Commando would be based at an airfield with usually four helicopters, one DC-3 Dakota and the Cessna (known as the "Lynx"). The helicopters were Alouette Mk IIIs (in 1979 a few Bell UH-1s were used) of which one was equipped with a 20mm cannon and seating arrangement for the commander of the operation who was usually the officer in charge of the Commando. This machine/entity was called the K-car with a crew of three (pilot, gunner, and commander). The other three helicopters were known as "G-cars" and carried four soldiers (a stick leader, two riflemen and a gunner) along with the pilot and his technician (called a "tech"). This carrying capacity of the G-car dictated the combat organisation of the Commando, which was called a "stop". Stop-1 was assigned to the first G-car, stop-2 to the second, stop-3 to the third. Stop-4 to stop-8 were for the Dakota. Each stop had four soldiers. One was the commander, with a radio, a FN FAL, 100 rounds (7.62 × 51 mm NATO), several types of grenade. One was the machine gunner, with a FN MAG machine-gun and carrying 400 rounds. The other two were riflemen with a FN and 100 rounds, grenades, rifle grenades and medical equipment. During 1979 one of these two was issued a radio. The Dak carried five stops. Two on the port side, three on the starboard. Apart from the parachutes the equipment was identical to the heli-stops. The gunner had to jump with his machine-gun strapped to his side and carrying 400 rounds. These eight stops (32 men) were deemed the "First Wave". The Fire Force (of which there were only three main ones most of the time) had responsibility for huge swathes of the country (many thousands of square miles each). Any sightings of the enemy within the Fire Force zone was reported and a siren sounded in the base. The First Wave troops rushed to their helicopters (after of course donning their webbing and packs. The Paratroopers went first to the tent where their equipment and parachutes were held and the dispatchers and off-duty comrades would help them kit out. Normally the Second Wave (or Landtail) rushed to the trucks, although if "jousting" or the "scene" was nearby they would wait at the airfield to be picked up by the G-cars after the First Wave had been dropped off. Soldiers alternated as Heliborne, Paratroopers, Landtail and Off-duty throughout the Bush Trip. The Landtail was often an important factor in refueling of helicopters and recovering of deceased persons (enemy and civilian) and parachutes. Sometimes there was a small third wave if numbers permitted. Quite often only the First Wave was involved in the action. In general, most soldiers preferred to be in the Heliborne First Wave. The most important factors (apart from the reaction of the enemy and the terrain) in a Fire Force operation were firstly the reliability of the sighting of the enemy and secondly the skill of the Fire Force commander. In the former case the majority of successful contacts were due to the skills of the Selous Scouts (many of which were former enemy). They had the capacity to insert observation posts (OPs) into the bush without being noticed by the inhabitants. In the latter case the difficulty of commanding the scene was extreme and good Fire Force commanders were highly prized by the troops. How soon the enemy heard the approaching helicopters and his reaction to it was of course decisive. Wind direction and speed, the presence of a tree covered ridge line or a multitude of other factors would make the difference of life or death. Where he was caught in unfavourable terrain for him (like a village surrounded by open ground) he had no chance and normally none escaped (unless it was near nightfall). Although the number of operational parachute jumps was remarkable, the majority of troops were carried into action by helicopter. Tactics of Fire Force Operations The following paragraphs are for the standard Fire Force assault of one K-car, three G-cars, a Dakota and the Lynx. Often there was no Dakota involved, or more G-cars. When in 1979 Cheetas (the Bell Hueys) were introduced, a Commando might go into action with two or three of these, each carrying two (sometimes three) stops. There were many times when no Lynx was used. The K-car was always the first to arrive at the scene. The K-car Commander, using the radio callsign OneNine, Two-Nine, Three-Nine, or Four-Nine, depending on the Commando, had to first attempt to confirm the precise area where the enemy had been spotted by the OP (Observation Post). Usually the terrain was extremely broken and covered in vegetation, which made this task particularly difficult. The K-car Commander then had to make a plan - where to position the first stops, where to make the main sweep, and in what direction. The first stops to arrive were always transported in by the G-cars, which followed the K-car in column (sometimes a long way behind, for they were a little slower than the K-car). Sometimes the stops were dropped immediately, but on many occasions the G-cars would circle the scene several times (to the delight of the troops) before #-nine made his final decisions. Very often the K-car occupants would see the enemy (or any perceived enemy), and then the Helicopter Gunner/Technician would attack them with his 20 mm cannon, using bursts of two to four shells (but no more than five). The accuracy of this firing was extraordinary, due to the machine flying in tight anticlockwise circles just a few hundred feet above the ground. The 20 mm cannon poked out of the port side, thus there was no "lead in", and the exploding high velocity shells would impact right next to and often on their intended targets - very few persons caught by this fire were ever found alive by the troops. Usually the G-car stops were positioned in areas where the enemy would most likely run through (often a riverbed or dry "donga"), where there was more vegetation, therefore attempting to surround or cut off enemy movement. If there was a hill or ridge that gave outstanding observation, then more than one stop might be placed there. Sometimes G-car stop groups would form the main sweep line immediately they were deployed instead of the Paras, depending on the circumstances at hand. Whilst the K-car was looking for, or engaging the enemy, #-nine also had to decide on where to drop the Para-stops (and direct any strikes by the Lynx). The Drop Zone (DZ) position was of course dictated by the enemy's own position, and the terrain, but often there would be no clear DZ nearby, in which case the Para-stops would be dropped a mile or so away to be picked up and repositioned by the G-cars. Usually the Parastops were dropped as close as possible, which resulted on numerous occasions with the Paras being fired at whilst floating down for a few seconds (drop heights normally varied from about 400 feet (120 m) to 600 feet). This firing was always ineffective, as no troops were ever hit. There was also a great variation on the dropping patterns of these stops, as sometimes they were all dropped at once, sometimes individually, or any combination thereof. Whilst all this was taking place, one of #-nine's main concerns was where the main sweep would occur. In a perfect scenario, the Para-stops would form the main sweep, and the G-car stops would carry out blocking actions. In reality, there was vast variation, so that there was little difference in being Para, or in the First Wave Helicopter assault. First Wave strikes in the G-cars however were generally the best stops to be in for those wishing action. The Sweep Each stop made a sweep every time it moved to a new location. This meant (usually) all four soldiers moving in a sweepline formation, spaced apart according to the terrain. In flat open land this may mean as much as twenty five metres or so. In heavy vegetation this dropped to several metres. Even then it was common to lose sight of comrades, pushing alone through the denseness. It was more effective to be spaced as far apart as possible. Whether in the main sweep (which might be composed of any number of stops available) or in a stop's sweep, the tactics were the same and very simple, to sweep ahead observing your line of sight ahead through the bush and undergrowth. The speed of this

movement varied. Where it was thought (usually deemed by #-nine) the enemy lurked, the sweep would slow very much. When the troops sensed enemy ahead the sweep became even more slow, edging forward inch by inch, rifles held at chest level, pointed ahead with the safety catch off. MAG gunners would bear the gun at the hip, held by a sling from their shoulders. Usually encounters with the enemy were resolved with great speed (a typical Fire Force action could take hours, whilst a fire fight might take just a few seconds). In the great majority of cases, the enemy were killed outright by swift shooting (sometimes hand grenades were used). Prisoners were taken on occasion. Although the Commandos were requested to take prisoners wherever possible, in a close-quarter fire fight and in thick bush, it was sometimes difficult to determine an enemy's intentions. Prisoners were usually extremely valuable as they might reveal important intelligence to Special Branch or Selous Scouts. Captured guerrillas were frequently turned to work for the Rhodesian Security Forces, sometimes as Auxiliary Forces (Pfumo Re Vanhu) from 1979. The Stop Position The other main experience was for an individual stop to sweep to a position thought most likely to intercept a fleeing enemy, and stay there for up to several hours (perhaps being moved around and maybe later on joining the main sweep). More often than not nothing happened but on many occasions one or more of the enemy came down the (usual) stream bed, or nearby. If there was a clear view then it was easy, once again just a few seconds shooting. Sometimes the process was repeated in the same spot, with fire being opened a bit earlier. Sometimes the enemy were seen behind in which case the stop immediately pursued. There were many occasions where the action was not so tidy due to terrain/vegetation, or even the sunlight blinding them. The Importance of Air Power Fire Force without air power is inconceivable. As the enemy did not have air power and was unable to shoot down significant numbers of aircraft (remarkably few helicopters, and no Dakotas were shot down in this conflict, though at least one Dakota was damaged by enemy fire in flight), Fire Force operations were invincible as long as the infantry performed correctly. The movement of the circling helicopters was enough to drown out the sound of the dropped attackers (there was no shouting or talking in the sweeps) so that often they surprised the hiding defenders - in effect ambushing them. The terrain varied wildly, from villages surrounded by open fields on flat plains, to dense vegetation amongst huge boulders on mountain slopes. Usually there was plenty of cover. Where the enemy ran and a stop had been placed by the Fire Force commander in the right place the hunt was usually easy. The difficult thing was to walk up to the enemy hiding in a house or cave or behind a boulder and kill or capture him. Many a troopie clawing through obstacles found himself very suddenly right by another armed man he was supposed to kill or capture. Though the event was shocking (and often results in one or more persons being killed), it is far more efficient than firing or dropping ordnance from air and overall reduces civilian casualties. The dedication of the Rhodesian Air Force to army operations was total. Even when patrolling, the RLI (or any other unit of the Rhodesian Army) could expect prompt G-car response in any crisis. Other Operations In addition to the Fire Force, the four Commandos were very often used in patrolling actions, mostly inside Rhodesia but often in Zambia and Mozambique. In these operations troops were required to carry well over 100 lb (45 kg) of equipment for five to ten (or so) days on one patrol and then return for resupply and then go out on patrol again, in some cases immediately. This could last for weeks and sometimes months. Also, there were many attacks on enemy camps in Zambia and Mozambique. Most of these involved two or more Commandos. The Rhodesian SAS (which was almost exclusively used for external operations) were often present, as were the Selous Scouts. Patrolling In these operations the stop of four was not used (unless of course there were only four men in the patrol, even then their callsign was not called a 'stop'). Patrols took place in Zambia and Mozambique though most patrolling took place in Rhodesia. Patrolling bush trips were not popular with the troops due to the extreme arduous nature of it, and the lack of action compared to Fire Force (though there were long occasions when most Fire Forces saw little or no action). A Commando could be more exhausted from a patrolling bush trip than the most intense Fire Force period even if more action in the latter. However, the nature of patrolling work greatly expanded the minds of the troops. Patrols varied from moving about during the day and setting up ambushes at night, to OP work, where a suitable position was occupied to observe the locality. Extreme precautions were made to be clandestine on these OPs, though it was often felt that the locals knew of the presence. Regardless of type of patrol, a night march would normally be made to the area. Conditions could make this task most difficult, especially when it was so dark that the troopies were completely blind. Water was a concern, though it was always found. Discipline on these patrols was extreme. The civilians were not regarded as hostiles by the troops. There were numerous occasions when they helped each other and process of great empathy took place. If a patrol learned of enemy presence it immediately attacked. Pursuit might occur, where the troops ran as fast as they could through the bush carrying their bergens, sometimes for miles and into the night. There were times when patrols were ambushed (not formal ambushes). Patrols in Mozambique could be the most hazardous due to the violent reaction of FRELIMO (also known as FPML). Externals The RLI carried out assaults on bases in Zambia (ZIPRA camps) and Mozambique (ZANLA camps). There were many of these (including one in Botswana). The outcome varied wildly from total "lemons" to the most successful days in the Battalion's history. The larger raids were a gathering of the Fire Forces and were similar in execution, save for the greater scale and planning and logistics. Just before the assault Canberra and Hunter jets would bomb the target. Just like Fire Force, surprise was most important. For example, three Commandos of the battalion participated in an attack on ZIPRA camps in Zambia in October 1978 and killed no person, whereas there was an attack in November 1977 on a ZANLA camp in Mozambique (see Operation Dingo) by elements of the RLI (operating together with the Rhodesian SAS) in which some three thousand guerrillas were reported killed. There were several raids by individual Commandos where the presence of FRELIMO units led to greater resistance. The stop of four was used in these raids (though they were organised into larger entities). The plans for these raids varied from sudden and fairly simple operations (subject to change on the fly) to highly intricate. The political situation interfered on occasions and this was much resented. The troops always thought that these operations were most important. Technical notes Equipment and armaments Riflemen carried as their primary weapon a 7.62x51 (also called the 7.62 NATO) battle rifle, normally the FN FAL, it's British variant the L1A1 SLR, the South African variant the R1, or the HK G3. The FAL series of rifles was preferred to the G3. The primary infantry support weapon was the 7.62x51 belt fed general purpose machine gun the FN MAG. Also carried was a mixed load of hand grenades including high-explosive (HE), white-phosphorus (WP), and colored smoke. To prevent accidental ignition of a grenade, the safety levers which upon release activated the fuse of the grenade, were taped down. Also carried were HE and WP rifle grenades, with anti-tank grenades or rockets sometimes carried as well. Sometimes "bunker bombs" were carried. Machine gunners and some rifleman carried a revolver or pistol. The 7.62x51 fired by the FAL and the MAG had a significant range advantage compared to the 7.62x39 round fired by the AK 47, SKS, RPD, and RPK rifles and light machine guns

normally carried by the ZALNA and ZIPRA forces. The 7.62x51 is generally considered effective out to 800 meters, and the 7.62x39 is normally considered effective out to only 400 meters. This difference in effective range when combined with the high standards of training and experience in the RLI could prove to be a decisive factor in engagements, allowing RLI forces to fire upon the enemy effectively with minimal danger of effective return fire. Issued webbing was not used much which led to a bewildering array of webbing/packs. All troops carried a water bottle or canteen, canned rations, and a light sleeping-bag or blanket. Often the stops stayed the night at a Fire Force scene and perhaps patrolled the next day, other times incidents led into the night and through the following day. On direct action missions, additional ammunition for their personal weapon as well as for squad weapons such as mortars and machine guns was often carried. On patrols a bergen was carried, with rations, water, batteries for the squad radio, etc. Riflemen were required to carry a panga, which could be used to chop down brush to create a landing zone so that the G-cars could pick them up. Strangely, some riflemen tried not to carry this piece of equipment, while some gunners and stop commanders (also known as stick leaders and whose rank varied from Trooper to Captain) did carry them. Stop commanders carried mini-flares. These devices were about the size and shape of a large pencil, and fired thimble-sized flares of various colors. These were often used to signal positions, though never at night, and were popular with the troops. The parachutes (harnesses) were Saviac Mk1s, of U.S. manufacture. They were extremely reliable with a reserve parachute on the chest. They used an overhead static line attachment in the Dak. From 1977 onwards the RLI was forbidden to wear shorts on operations, due to the dangerous visibility of the soldiers' white legs. This rule was strictly adhered to, but a rule which required troops to wear ankle-boots when in para-stops was often broken. The number of parachute injuries on ops was insignificant, despite (or perhaps, because of) around half of landings falling into trees (small trees were good but large trees could be hazardous). Sometimes they fell onto boulders or buildings or fences or boggy ground. Fields varied from concrete but hard to soil so dry and diffuse that it swallowed them up. Extremely fast "ground rush" was frequently experienced, due to taking place on the sides or top of great hills. Confusedly the stops in the Dak were dropped in "sticks", supposedly noted in an entry in the parachute log book held by troops which was filled in by themselves, as other data pertinent to the jump. This resulted in the log books filled often with false data. The port side of the Dak was much more preferable than the starboard. There were many times when the exiting from G-cars was dangerous, due (for example) to them unable to descend close enough because of trees and troops had to clamber out and hold on to the steps and drop from too great a height, with mass leaves and twigs whirling about the inside of the machine and great stress of pilot and tech. The Alouettes were much more capable of dropping off stops in rough terrain than the Bells, though they had less carrying capacity and range and speed. The Alouettes were extremely reliable (they had a tendency to sway a little as the troops jumped). Both these vehicles were armed with twin-Browning M1919 machine-guns chamber in .303 British, which were never indiscriminately fired by the tech. The K-car Gunners had to be careful, for there was always a shortage of 20mm rounds and there were many times when troops were only yards away from the target. K-cars with four Browning .303 machine-guns (instead of the 20mm cannon) were not popular with the troops, as they were less effective. The numbers of the enemy killed by the K-car in a scene varied from zero to all (and are included in the estimate for those killed). On some Fire Force operations Hunter jets were used, and more rarely, Vampires. Up to the second quarter of 1979, troops were required to collect and remove all deceased persons from the scene. This rule was very strictly adhered to, even if it reduced in the short term the effectiveness of the Fire Force (due to the immense effort of it). The plight of the civilians was most profoundly realized by the troops. Communication Radios were reasonably light and reliable. Most importantly they were easy to use. Headsets weren't used normally just a telehand tied to a shoulder strap. An extremely efficient form of radio speech known as Voice Procedure was used. Troopers were expected to have a high degree of self-initiative and reliance. For example, if a stop-commander desired, the two riflemen would be detached to perform a mini-sweep (or stop position) of their own (and perhaps even an individual go off on his own). The introduction of the second radio in 1979 merely confirmed this practice. The most important hand-signals were: Thumb up: friend, Thumb down: enemy, Palm down on head: come to me. Deployments Commandos (based at Cranborne Barracks) were sent on bush trips, usually from four to six weeks duration, where they would motor off to either the Fire Force bases (Grand Reef, Mtoko and Mount Darwin the most important, covering the NorthEastern zone of the country), or any other place from which to carry out patrolling actions or externals. Most bush trips were Fire Force, though there could be mixture (also, elements could be detached to operate alone or attached to another Commando). After such period they would motor back for around twelve days "R & R", when apart from a time of sorting out they were set totally free. This routine meant that the troops could operate for years on end at any desired tempo of operations, though a degree of "burn-out" in individuals could not be avoided, especially in 1979. Medical Each Commando had attached one trained medic, from the Rhodesian Army Medical Corps. These held the rank of Full Corporal and had a much higher standard of medical training than the norm. They were able to prescribe painkillers (like Propon) and also stitch. These persons were parachute-trained and usually were in stops just like any Trooper, though not officially required to be so. A great deal of training was devoted to first-aid so that all were required to know the basics (including drips). Troop medics were trained to a lesser standard than Commando medics, which interfered with their main duty of being an infantryman. Enemy Armaments No more than half of ZANLA combatants were armed with AK-47s, mostly supplied from Soviet satellite states (none from Russia). Around half of them had SKS rifles, all from the People's Republic of China (which also sent some AK-47s). These SKS's were semi-automatic and fired the same round as the AK-47 with a magazine of ten (normal AK-magazines, which are detachable, held 30). Thus the AK-47s were inevitably held by the more determined members of a section. Few RLI casualties were caused by SKSs. Hand grenades were mostly of Communist Chinese manufacture. These were stick grenades, with a wood handle at the bottom of which was a screw cap whereupon unscrewing out fell (if holding right) a porcelain-bead with a thread attached. Pull this and in an unknown time (for these were badly stored and old weapons) it might explode. Despite this there were numerous troops wounded by this weapon. RPG-2's and RPG-7's were prevalent, sometimes one or two to a section of ten men, though hardly ever used against Fire Force (there was usually only one present and the difficulties of targeting the helicopters was extreme). However the RLI's greatest single loss in one day was due to a South African Air Force Puma shot down by a RPG-7 wielded by a FRELIMO member, in a raid into Mozambique. Heavy infantry weapons like medium mortars and heavy machine guns were rare, though encountered more frequently in external ops late in the war, so much that these had a definite effect on Rhodesian policy. There was only one serious attack on a Fire Force base, which occurred in December 1977, at Grand Reef (near the Mozambique border). A force of ZANLA (about 60 strong) bombarded and shot for ten minutes, then retired (one killed by the Commando mortar), with the only effect (beside the very few casualties) that they energised the Commando that was deployed there.

Training Culture The Commandos were trained at Cranborne Barracks at an institution known as "Training Troop", although there were long periods when there were more men being trained there than were serving in a single Commando. Some non-Rhodesians that met a certain military criteria were able to evade this training entirely. A sixteen week course was standard (plus a two week parachute course at New Sarum in Salisbury or with the South African Parabats in Bloemfontein, South Africa). Most of the Training Troop instructors were trained at the Rhodesian School of Infantry and were a mix of Commando veterans and Rhodesian conscripts. An extremely high standard of training was achieved, without bullying by the staff yet of great pressure. There was a great deal of humour and very often good-natured parody. The ethos of the staff was such that independent thought was not suppressed, it was enhanced (as in the Commandos). Bullying of the recruits by instructors or other recruits was rare, although not non-existent. Recruits helped each other (some more than others) and without this help many would not have made it to the Commandos (many did not make it). At any time, a recruit could withdraw from this training (and most likely leave the Battalion). Training was composed of the standard Infantry counter-insurgency (COIN) and conventional warfare as well as Commando training (watermanship, rockclimbing, abseiling, unarmed combat, bushcraft, survival, tracking, demolitions and helicopter drills). Officers were trained at the School of Infantry in Gwelo. The freshly passed out 2nd Lieutenants (normally pronounced American style by Rhodesians as "lootenants" or "loots") had to first prove themselves in action before being given the responsibility of becoming a stick leader. When they first joined a Commando, they were normally taken under the wings of an experienced NCO and performed the role of a rifleman in a stop. Thus were they taught the arts of war as practiced by the RLI (often not quite what one learned in training). Casualties The Rhodesian Light Infantry Regimental Association maintains a Roll of Honour which lists 85 men killed in action from March 1968 to December 1979. A further 15 are listed as died on operations from September 1961 to December 1979. Another 34 are listed as deceased from other causes, from 1961 to December 1979. Of the 85 killed in action, 66 occurred in the last four years of the war, thirty-one in 1979 alone. These figures mirror fairly accurately the ratio of combat the battalion was in. The number of wounded is not known. It is known that in one of the Commandos there were more than 50 wounded in action in a two-year period where it had 21 killed in action. There were of course many other casualties, from accidents and illness/disease, or bad landings on jumps. These figures are very low for a battalion that was involved in so much combat, though it must be remembered that the Commandos were both smaller than the companies of the average strength infantry battalion of modern warfare and fighting with modern weapons and tactics against a lightly-armed and relatively untrained foe. Conclusion The Rhodesian Light Infantry was an outstanding example of infantry capable of performing any task ordered, no matter the means of transport (whether crossing the Zambezi river in little boats, walking long miles with huge weights, or riding high in Gcars and Daks), no matter what type of operation. Though the enemy was always at a disadvantage in having no radios or air support, the stops always continued in seeking them out even when all the helicopters had to go away for fuel. The troops walked close to the enemy; they believed that this was the most efficient way of dealing with him. Following majority rule, the regiment was disbanded on 31 October 1980. A nucleus of former RLI personnel remained to train and form the First Zimbabwe Commando Battalion of the Zimbabwe National Army. The regimental statue, "The Trooper", was spirited out of Zimbabwe to South Africa, and is now held at the British Empire and Commonwealth Museum in Bristol, United Kingdom. On 28 September 2008, it was be re-dedicated on the grounds of Hatfield House, country seat of the Marquess of Salisbury[1]. References 1. ^ "TROOPIE REDEDICATION". Rhodesian Light Infantry Regimental Association. http://therli.com/Troper_report.asp. • Bond, Geoffrey. The Incredibles: The Story of the 1st Battalion, the Rhodesian Light Infantry. Salisbury: Sarum Imprint (distributed by Kingstons), 1977. ISBN 0-7974-0233-0. • Cocks, C. J. Fire Force: One Man's War in the Rhodesian Light Infantry. South Africa: St. Albans: Covos; Verulam, 2000. ISBN 0-620-21573-9 • http://domainhelp.search.com/reference/Rhodesia • 3 Croukamp, Dennis E. W. Only My Friends Call Me 'Crouks' . Cape Town: Pseudo Publishing, 2006. Pp. 123–124. • Gledhill, Dick. One Commando: Rhodesian Light Infantry. South Africa: Covos Books; 2nd Rev Ed edition (November 2001). ISBN 1919874356/ISBN 978-1919874357. Fiction, but based on life of author. • http://www.therli.com • http://www.theoutnumbered.com See also • Rhodesian Light Infantry Regimental Association • Rhodesian African Rifles • Selous Scouts • Rhodesian SAS • Grey's Scouts • Rhodesian Air Force • Rhodesian Armoured Car Regiment • British South Africa Police

Rhodesian Special Air Service RHODESIAN SPECIAL AIR SERVICE (S.A.S.) "C" SQUADRON (MALAYAN SCOUTS)

Flaming sword[1] symbol of the SAS From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia 1950–December 31, 1980 Active Rhodesia Country Southern Rhodesia, Republic of Rhodesia Allegiance Regular Army, Rhodesian Bush War Branch Special Forces Type Who Dares Wins Motto Light Blue Colors Malayan Emergency Northern Rhodesia Aden Rhodesian Bush War Engagements The Rhodesian Special Air Service or Rhodesian SAS refers to: • C Squadron, Special Air Service Regiment (Second World War until 1960) • "C" Squadron (Rhodesian) Special Air Service (1962-1978) • 1 (Rhodesian) Special Air Service Regiment (1978-1980) C Squadron, Special Air Service Regiment was formed during the Second World War by volunteers from Rhodesia. It was disbanded in 1955 and became the nucleus of "C" Squadron (Rhodesian) Special Air Service, operational from 1962. In June 1978 "C" Squadron (Rhodesian) Special Air Service became 1 (Rhodesian) Special Air Service Regiment until Rhodesia became Zimbabwe in 1980. During the Malayan campaign (1951-1953), a group of men from Southern Rhodesia volunteered to go to Malaya and were initially known as "The Far East Volunteer Group" later to become the Malayan Scouts. While in Malaya, they became "C" Squadron (Malayan Scouts) of the already formed "A", "B" Squadron of the British SAS. Later on, "D" Squadron (made up mostly of South Africans[citation needed]) were formed and an HQ to complete that regiment. When "C" Squadron concluded their tour of duty they came back to Southern Rhodesia and the unit was disbanded. Re-formation in Rhodesia The formation of the Rhodesian SAS goes back to November 1959 when it was decided in the Federal Assembly to form a Parachute Evaluation Detachment to examine the practicalities of military parachuting and parachute training in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, with a view to the possible formation of an airborne unit. This was announced by the then Federal Minister of Defence Mr Caldicott, but it was Sir Roy Welensky who was the reported driving force behind the reforming of what was to become the SAS. In 1960 a detachment of RAF arrived under Squadron Leader E. Minter to conduct the training of the parachute Evaluation Detachment (PED). By March 1960, the PED was complete and those on the course were presented their wings by the said Minister of Defence. The "experiment" was a complete success and in July decided to form a regular European Special Air Services Squadron. In late 1960, No 1 Training Unit was formed, and once assembled and trained they would form the nucleus of what was to become : 1 Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI) and "C" Squadron SAS. In early 1961 six volunteers from the Air Force were sent to RAF Abingdon in England for parachute instructor training and a further group of volunteer officers and NCO's to complete a selection course with the SAS in Britain. On their return they called for volunteers from No. 1 Training Unit and in August 1961 the first of many selection courses was run in the Matopos just outside Bulawayo. No 1 basic training course completed their training in November and were presented their wings by Sir Malcolm Barrow, CBE, MP and then Deputy Prime Minister. In late 1961 the SAS were moved to Ndola in Northern Rhodesia along with the Selous Scouts Armoured Car Regiment. By July the following year, No 9 basic course received their wings from the Federal Prime Minister himself, Sir Roy Welensky, KCMG, MP. In August 1962, the Unit had sufficient men to become operational and became known as "C" Squadron (Rhodesian) Special Air Service. With the break up of the Federation at the end of 1963, the Squadron was virtually destroyed by many taking the "Golden Handshake" and some remaining in Northern Rhodesia which included all the officers and the OC at that time. Only 38 NCO's and men remained to serve in Southern Rhodesia. The Unit was relocated to Cranborne Barracks in Salisbury. The initial years after the break-up found the unit having difficulty in attracting recruits. This was largely due to the high standards required of an SAS soldier and also due to the "ill feeling" between the SAS and the RLI (from where most of the recruits should have been selected). The numbers of men in the SAS went up to approximately 250 when in June 1978 "C" Squadron (Rhodesian) Special Air Service became 1 (Rhodesian) Special Air Service Regiment[2]. The unit moved to their new barracks called Kabrit in 1979 and continued to serve with outstanding success and distinction[citation needed] until it was disbanded with the transition to black majority rule on 31 December 1980 as Rhodesia became Zimbabwe. References

1.

2. See also

^ The Originals by Gordon Stevens ISBN 978-0-09-190182-0, Page 57, "(Bob Bennet)....designed by Bob Tait....he called it a Flaming Sword, but it became a winged dagger over the years", "(Johnny Cooper)....Bob Tait MM & Bar....designed it......and it's not a winged dagger. They're flames. The sword of Excalibur. When "The Winged Dagger" came out we laughed our heads off." ^ Abbott, Peter, "Modern African Wars (I): Rhodesia 1965-80", Osprey Publishing London, 2001, p.18.

Selous Scouts Rhodesian African Rifles Rhodesian Light Infantry Grey's Scouts Rhodesian Air Force Rhodesian Armoured Car Regiment British South Africa Police Peter McAleese External links • Rhodesian and South African Military History: An extensive collection of histories and analysis of Rhodesian and South African military operations, to the early 1980s • Rhodesian Special Forces - Roll of honour, awards and images. • Rhodesian Militaria: SAS Insignia & Parachute Wings - Detailed photos & descriptions of genuine SAS insignia & parachute Wings

• • • • • • • •

Selous Scouts

The cap badge of the Selous Scouts was a stylised osprey. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia 1973–1980 Active Rhodesia Country Republic of Rhodesia Allegiance Regular Army, Rhodesian Bush War Branch Special Forces Type Inkomo Barracks (Andre Rabie Barracks) Garrison/HQ Pamwe Chete (meaning-Altogether) Motto Green Colors Rhodesian Bush War Engagements Lt. Col. Ron Reid Daly .otable commanders The Selous Scouts was a special forces regiment of the Rhodesian Army which operated from 1973 until the introduction of majority rule in 1980. They were named after British explorer Frederick Courteney Selous (1851-1917), and their motto was pamwe chete, which translated from Shona means "all together", "together only" or "forward together". The charter of the Selous Scouts directed "the clandestine elimination of terrorists/terrorism both within and without the country."[1] Context The period in which the Selous Scouts operated was known as the Rhodesian Bush War or Second Chimurenga. This was a civil war fought between black nationalist guerrillas (ZANLA/ZANU and ZIPRA/ZAPU) and the white minority government of Ian Smith. Unlike the Rhodesian Light Infantry and the Rhodesian Special Air Service (SAS), the Selous Scouts were a mixed race force and had many black Rhodesians in its ranks including the first African commissioned officers in the Rhodesian Army. Selection and training The Selous Scouts acted as a combat reconnaissance force, its mission was to infiltrate Rhodesia's tribal population and guerilla networks, pinpoint rebel groups and relay vital information back to the conventional forces earmarked to carry out the actual attacks. Scouts were trained to operate in small under-cover teams capable of working independently in the bush for weeks on end and of passing themselves off as rebels. The Selous Scouts were a strictly volunteer force, and only highly motivated men of the very highest calibre could fulfil the task they had to undertake. A mere 15 percent of the many who signed up to join the regiment emerged from the tough training programme with the right to wear the brown beret of the Selous Scouts. As Lt. Col. Ron Reid Daly stated[2]: "...a special force soldier has to be a certain very special type of man. In his profile it is necessary to look for intelligence, fortitude and guts potential, loyalty, dedication, a deep sense of professionalism, maturity - the ideal age being 24 to 32 years -, responsibility and self discipline..." Selection was rigorous, and even tougher than the Rhodesian Special Air Service course. As soon as volunteers arrived at Wafa Wafa, the Selous Scouts' training camp, on the shores of the Lake Kariba they were given a taste of the hardships they would have to endure. On reaching the base (which was a 25 kilometres run away from the dropoff point) they saw no cosy barracks, no welcoming mess tent, but only a few straw huts and the blackened embers of a dying fire. There was no food issued. The goal was to starve, exhaust and antagonise the recruits. This usually proved successful as 40 or 50 men out of the original 60 regularly dropped out in the first two days. The selection course lasted seventeen days. From the first light to 7 am they were put through a strength-sapping fitness programme. Afterwards they sharpened their basic combat skills and they had to pass a particularly nasty assault course several times, designed to overcome their fear of heights. As soon as the night fell, they went on to the night training. In the first five days, no food was issued at all. After this only rotten animals were available. At the end, there were an endurance march of 100 kilometres, laden with 30 kilograms of rocks in their packs. The rocks were painted red, so they could not be discharged and replaced at the end. The final stage of these was a speed march, and had to be completed in a mere two-and-a-half hours. Those who survived these days were given a week off, and taken to a special camp for the dark phase of their training. There they learned to act and talk like the enemy. The base was built and set out as a real rebel camp, and the instructors were on hand to turn the recruits into fully-fledged members of the enemy groups. In this phase recruits were taught to break with habits such as shaving, rising at regular times, smoking and drinking and to adopt a guerilla lifestyle. The recruits, after finishing their training had little time to congratulate themselves, because only a week after their successful completion of the course, they were in the bush on patrol with the Selous Scouts[3]. Composition The regiment was proposed by members of the British South Africa Police Special Branch, and many of its earliest recruits were policemen. The Selous Scouts differed from C Squadron 22 (Rhodesian) SAS, in that it was formed specifically to take part in tracking and infiltration operations in which soldiers would

pretend to be guerrillas -- so-called pseudo-operators. These tactics were used very successfully in the Mau Mau Uprising. In addition, it often recruited from enemy forces; captured guerrillas were offered a choice between prison, a trial and possible execution or joining the Selous Scouts.[4] This concept was initially highly controversial in the Rhodesian government; the idea of "turning" what they regarded as captured terrorists instead of punishing them was unpalatable to some.[5] However, the idea's supporters, who won out, portrayed these operations as an aspect of counter-insurgency similar to the law enforcement use of informants and 'sting' methods to penetrate and disrupt criminal and subversive organizations. In order to keep knowledge of their existence as restricted as possible, the "turned" guerrillas were paid from Special Branch funds which were not accountable to government auditors,[6] and volunteers for the unit were not told of its actual function until they actually joined it;[7] in some cases, where captured guerrillas had already entered the judicial system, the Selous Scouts would fake their escapes without informing the Criminal Investigation Department.[8] In order to prevent the regular army or police from firing at the regiment while it was operating, the authorities would declare "frozen areas", where Army and Police units were ordered to temporarily cease all operations in, and withdraw from, certain areas, without being told the reason for this.[9] Many commanders felt that the initiation of "frozen areas" ceded control to the enemy and reduced the initiative of the security forces. In addition to the obvious tactic of luring "fellow" guerrillas into ambushes, the pseudo-operators also took measures to weaken any popular support for the guerrillas that might have existed; in one case, for example, a group of pseudo-operators pretending to be guerrillas accused eight of the most enthusiastic guerrilla supporters in the Madziwa region of being police informers and beat them up before leaving.[10] The unit's detractors cited events like this as the difference between the phrases anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism. The Selous Scouts used covert forms of chemical warfare. Clothing was impregnated with parathion and left for enemy guerillas to find. Cigarettes and canned food were used in a similar fashion after being contaminated with thallium.[11] The camouflage used by reserve members of this unit as pseudoforces were captured "Warsaw Pact" clothing originating from various countries and specified for certain operations. There is no doubt that the regiment achieved many of its objectives; its members were acclaimed trackers, and the unit was responsible for 68% of all guerrilla deaths within the borders of Rhodesia.[12] However, its C.O., Ron Reid-Daly, was irascible and enjoyed a poor relationship with many of the Rhodesian Army commanders; [13] in addition, from 1978 there were persistent rumours that soldiers in the regiment had been implicated in ivory poaching in the Gonarezhou National Park and that an ivory processing "factory" existed at Andre Rabie Barracks near Inkomo Garrison.[13] The friction between the Army command and Reid-Daly peaked on 29 january 1979, when a bugging device was found in Reid-Daly's office. Needless to say this compromised ongoing Selous Scout operations, and therefore it became necessary to call them off[14]. The Selous Scouts numbered only about 500 men at peak strength, yet according to a Combined Operations statement, they inflicted 68 percent of the nationalist guerilla fatalities between 1973 and 1980[15]. Dissolution Following the dissolution of the regiment in 1980, many of its soldiers travelled south to join the South African Defence Force, where they joined 5 Reconnaissance Commando. Those that remained formed 4th Bn(HU)R.A.R. which was placed on "immediate standby " for most of its short service. The battalion covered the areas to the north of Andre Rabie Barracks, as far as Miami/Mangula in the east and as far as Kariba in the north. The unit existed from 23 April to 30 September 1980 when it changed its name for the final time and became as it is today, 1st Zimbabwe Parachute Battalion/Group. Previous Uses The name Selous Scouts was also given to the short-lived Rhodesian Armoured Car Regiment, a regiment in the Army of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland between about 1960 and 1962 that drove Staghound armoured cars and scout cars. See also • C Squadron 22 (Rhodesian) SAS • Rhodesian Light Infantry • Rhodesian African Rifles • Grey's Scouts • Rhodesian Air Force • Rhodesian Armoured Car Regiment • British South Africa Police • 32 Battalion (South Africa) • Koevoet • False flag • UR-416 External links • The Selous Scouts Website • Rhodesian and South African Military History • Selous Scouts.com • Rhodesian Special Forces - Roll of honour, awards and images. • Selous Scouts • Rhodesian Militaria: Selous Scouts - Detailed photos & descriptions of genuine Selous Scouts insignia & parachute Wings. • Tracker Combat Unit (TCU) Footnotes 1. ^ Melson, C.D., Top Secret War: Rhodesian Special Operations, 2005, Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol. 16, No. 1, Pp. http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=article&issn=095957-82. 2318&volume=16&issue=1&spage=57 2. ^ Stiff, Peter: Scouting for Danger, Soldier of Fortune Magazine, April, 1981 3. ^ Stiff, Peter: Scouting for Danger, Soldier of Fortune Magazine, April, 1981 4. ^ Reid-Daly, R. F., Pamwe Chete - the legend of the Selous Scouts, 2001, Covos Day Books, Weltevreden Park, South Africa. ISBN 1-919874-33-X, pp. 189-190) 5. ^ Lt. Col. Ron Reid Daly as told to Peter Stiff, Selous Scouts: Top Secret War, Alberton (South Africa):Galago 1982, p. 26

6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

^ Lt. Col. Ron Reid Daly as told to Peter Stiff, Selous Scouts: Top Secret War, Alberton (South Africa):Galago 1982, p. 31 ^ Lt. Col. Ron Reid Daly as told to Peter Stiff, Selous Scouts: Top Secret War, Alberton (South Africa):Galago 1982, p. 116 ^ Lt. Col. Ron Reid Daly as told to Peter Stiff, Selous Scouts: Top Secret War, Alberton (South Africa):Galago 1982, p. 60 ^ Lt. Col. Ron Reid Daly as told to Peter Stiff, Selous Scouts: Top Secret War, Alberton (South Africa):Galago 1982, p. 41 ^ Lt. Col. Ron Reid Daly as told to Peter Stiff, Selous Scouts: Top Secret War, Alberton (South Africa):Galago 1982, p. 33 ^ Moorcraft, Paul and McLaughlin, Peter. The Rhodesian War: A Military History. Yorkshire: Pen & Sword, 2008, p. 106 ^ Radford, M. P., Service Before Self, 1994 ^ a b Godwin, P. & Hancock, I.,Rhodesians !ever Die - the impact of war and political change on white Rhodesia, 1995, Baobab Books, Harare, Zimbabwe. ISBN 0-908311-82-6, pp. 241-242 ^ Stiff, Peter: Scouting for Danger, Soldier of Fortune Magazine, April, 1981 ^ McNab, Chris, "Modern Military Uniforms", Chartwell Books, Inc., 2000, p. 158.

Rhodesian Armoured Corps

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Active Allegiance

February 1941 - 1956, 1972 - 1980 Republic of Rhodesia

Type

Line Cavalry

Size

One battalion (circa 400-500)

.ickname

"The Black Devils"

Motto

Asesabi Lutho (We Fear Nothing)[1]

Colors

Maroon & Yellow

Rhodesian Bush War Engagements The Rhodesian Armoured Corps was the last incarnation of various armoured military units in Rhodesia. Its initial incarnation was raised in 1941 for service in World War II. This was disbanded in 1956 before being re-established in 1973 to fight in Rhodesia's insurgency. The various names of the regiment are as follows: • Southern Rhodesian Armoured Car Regiment - 1941 • Southern Rhodesian Reconnaissance Car Regiment - 1941-1947 • Southern Rhodesian Armoured Car Regiment - 1948-1956 • Disbanded - 1956-1973 • Rhodesian Armoured Car Regiment (RhACR) - 1973-1979 • Rhodesian Armoured Corps (RhAC) - 1980 The regiment consisted of five armoured squadrons, each of four troops, with a supporting Signals Troop, Army Service Corps detachment, Training Troop and an HQ element. In 1979 a supporting Infantry Troop was added. A, B and C Squadrons were territorial units, while D and E Squadrons were staffed by regulars and national servicemen. The armoured troops used the South African manufactured Eland 90 armoured car, the British made Ferret armoured scout car and a variety of Rhodesian armoured personnel carriers constructed on the short wheelbase '25' and long wheelbase '45' Mercedes truck chassis, or the Nissan truck chassis. The unit acquired 8 Soviet block T-55 tanks in October 1979, that were seized by South Africa from a Libyan freighter in Durban[2]. The regiment's primary roles were in static defence of key border crossing points, in high density operations in no-go areas heavily infiltrated by guerillas, in external operations against enemy bases and mainly in the provision of an armoured force in the event of a classical war invasion of the country. This latter scenario only materialised in 1980 after the end of the Bush War, whereas the regiment carried out most of its operations in a counter-insurgency role prior to 1980. The regiment had the reputation of high standards, with all members being infantry trained prior to application. Applicants were then trained to an armoured specialisation at the regiment's own training centre. Performance during the peak of the Rhodesian Bush War The unit's CO from inception to 1977 was Major Rooken Smith, and from 1978 was American Major Darrell Winkler. He was a field grade officer in the U.S. Army, who, after resignation went to South Africa first, and then towards Rhodesia. He was commissioned in the Rhodesian Army on 12 August 1977. The Rhodesian Armoured Corps then consisted of four squadrons, three of them were manned by territorials and only one squadron with a regular staff supplemented by National Servicemen. An Armoured Depot was established at Blakiston-Houston Barracks which conducted all armour training and housed the Headquarters, Stores, Signals and Workshop detachments adjacent to King George VI Barracks (Army HQ) on the outskirts of Salisbury. Their vehicles consisted of the Rolls-Royce powered Ferret Scout Car, housing a 7.62mm Browning machine-gun in a small hatch-topped turret and a GMpowered Eland Armoured Car, based on the French Panhard, equipped with a 90mm cannon and a co-axial 7.62mm Browning machine-gun in a fully enclosed revolving turret. Later on the regiment received their T-55 main battle tanks, armed with a 100mm main cannon and 12.7mm co-axial machine-gun. They were fighting a counterinsurgency war for the most part but also continually trained for classical warfare in order to deal with enemies in the front line states who were equipped with T-34, T-55 and T-62 tanks, supported by Soviet, Red Chinese and Eastern European advisers. Heavy weapons deployed against the RhACR during border battles included 122mm rocket launchers, 75mm recoilless rifles and 82mm mortars. The TM46 anti-tank mine, often boosted, accounted for most of the regiment's casualities in the internal insurgency conflict[3]. The regiment took part in a number of static but intense battles, notably at Mount Selinda against Mocambiquan Frelimo Forces (where a Bronze Cross was awarded to 2nd Lieutenant Rae) in 1977 and at Chirundu in October 1978, where heavy-machine gun, artillery and mortar duels took place between D Squadron and elements of the Zambian Army over a period of three days and nights near the Otto Beit Bridge. Elements of the RDR were also

involved at close quarters at the bridge, while 10RR provided 81mm mortar and 106mm recoilless rifle fire support. In July 1977 D Squadron engaged a large group of ZANLA guerillas north of Vila Salazar, while they were attempting to cross the border into Rhodesia, and it was reported that 37 enemy were killed in that engagement with some accounted for at point-blank range. In these battles the Eland and its devastating 90mm round were decisive in the outcome. Nobody was hurt on the Rhodesian side in any of these engagements. Casualties in the regiment were among the lowest in the army, owing to the fact that the guerilla enemy avoided contact as far as possible. Rhodesian T-55 Tanks Before 1979 the Rhodesian Army had not possessed any tanks. In October of that year they received eight T-55 tanks from South Africa. These tanks were confiscated from a Libyan cargo ship that was destined for Maputo (Mozambique) but had entered Durban due to the ship captain having mistaken Durban for Maputo. The tanks were to be sent to Mozambique where they were going to be delivered to anti-Rhodesian insurgents operating out of Mozambique. The ship entered the port at Durban where the cargo, including ten Polish-built T-55LD tanks (built in 1975), was seized. Two of the tanks were kept by the South Africans for evaluation. Since South Africa was an unofficial ally of Rhodesia, the remaining eight tanks were transported to Rhodesia. The South African Defense Force (SADF) sent advisers for the purpose of training Rhodesian crews. The rumour was spread that the tanks had been captured in Mozambique, in order to obscure South Africa’s part in the deal. The tanks, now part of the Rhodesian Armoured Car Regiment - in a newly-formed "E" Squadron - were driven around on tank transporters for several months in order to give the impression that the Rhodesians possessed a large number of heavy tanks. On arrival the T-55s had sported the original Libyan camouflage scheme. Major Winkler ordered them repainted in American camo, which was eminently unsuitable, and finally the South African instructors had them painted in anti-infra-red South African camo, which proved perfect for Rhodesian conditions. The tank crews came from 'D' Sqn RhACR, regular force soldiers who had signed on for a minimum of 3 years. Trained crews were vital if the tanks were to be used to maximum effect and it was necessary to ensure that the crews would remain in the Army for some time. A few of the men had tank experience already, but initially there was a lot of experimenting and reliance on the manuals, until Army HQ arranged for proper training by members of the SADF School of Armour. Command of 'E' Sqn was given to Captain Kaufeldt, an experienced tanker from West Germany. More recruits from the RLI and Selous Scouts arrived to fill the gaps and acquitted themselves well in their new task. The Soviet-manufactured radios were removed from the tanks and replaced with the South African radios and headsets used on the Eland 90 AFVs. These used a throat-activated microphone system and were far superior to the Soviet models. In Soviet tanks the radios were operated by the loader, in addition to his task on the main gun. The Rhodesians, reasoning that the loader already had enough to keep him occupied, moved the radios to the tank commander's position. The tank crews were issued with brand-new Soviet AKMS assault rifles which they were eager to test in battle conditions. They were destined to remain unused[4]. Trivia The regiment was allegedly given the nickname "The Black Devils" by the insurgents and reflected the black tank-suits and leather jackets worn by some of the more highly spirited D Squadron members. These were introduced by Darryl Winkler in and effort to engender an esprit de corps within his crack squadron - and echoed the all black look of the British Royal Tank Regiment (although the appearance of Frank Sinatra in the 1965 film Von Ryan's Express readily springs to mind). In the operational area the majority of the soldiers of the regiment wore camoflage tank-suits and the ubiquitous 'cuntcap' with the folding neck flap, which offered protection from the sun. In base the standard camo uniform was worn with a black beret, fitted with the sable badge illustrated on this page. 'T' Troop wore the Corps of Signals badge while the mechanics and armourers wore the Army Service Corps badge. All badges were underpinned by the maroon and yellow regimental colours on an enamelled plaque, as illustrated on this page. The stable belt was red with the unfortunate inclusion of two yellow stripes, for which members were sometimes mocked. The olive-green webbing belt was worn in preference by many members. Further reading • Brown, Robert K. The Black Devils. (Soldier of Fortune, January 1979) See also • Grey's Scouts • Rhodesian Light Infantry • Rhodesian SAS • Rhodesian African Rifles • Selous Scouts • Rhodesian Air Force • British South Africa Police References 1. ^ http://www.zimbabwejournalists.com/story.php?art_id=2096&cat=6 2. ^ http://www.rhodesia.nl/briefhi1.htm 3. ^ Robert K. Brown: The "Black Devils, SOFMAG, 1979 4. ^ http://www.memoriesofrhodesia.com/media/documents/Op-Quartz.pdf External links • Rhodesian Armoured Corps

Grey's Scouts

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia July 1975–November 1980 Active Rhodesia Country Republic of Rhodesia Allegiance Regular Army, Rhodesian Bush War Branch Mounted Infantry Type Red & Grey Colors Rhodesian Bush War Engagements Grey's Scouts were a Rhodesian mounted infantry unit raised in July 1975 and named for George Grey, a prominent soldier in the Second Matabele War. Based in Salisbury (now Harare), they were known for their participation in the Rhodesian Bush War.[1] The unit was disbanded in November 1980 (following the conclusion of the Bush War in 1979) and then became a regiment of the Special Forces of Zimbabwe. Use in the Rhodesian Bush War The creation of the unit was probably inspired by the Dragoons of Angola, a Portuguese Army mounted unit, raised in 1966, during the Portuguese Colonial War, to combat the guerrillas in Eastern Angola. Like the Dragoons of Angola, Grey's Scouts were used for tracking, reconnaissance, pursuit, and, most prominently, patrol in the Rhodesian Bush War.[2] With measured variations in horse speed for training purposes, they would cover an area of over 65 km (40 miles) on the average day. Their routes often took them through active minefields, which they were to inspect.[3] In addition to this, the small stature and manoeuvrability of the crossbreeds they rode on was of repeated benefit to the Rhodesian forces in the construction of border defences; the Scouts could transport materials and supplies over terrains impassable to vehicles. The horses themselves were mostly given in charity by sympathisers of the Rhodesian effort from South Africa and elsewhere.[1] Constitution and training Initially, the unit consisted of around 200 men, but this would eventually grow to over 1,000. It conscripted soldiers from other infantry regiments of the Rhodesian Army, who were then instructed in equestrianism. Craftsmen such as farriers, horsebreeders, smithers and manufacturers were employed internally.[1] Grey's Scouts were trained as mounted infantry rather than cavalry, and were prepared for engagements on foot rather than on horseback. A tactic of rushing and fronting with their horses was implemented to significant success by Grey's Scouts and they were noted for their skill in launching shock attacks. The number of casualties Grey's Scouts suffered during the Rhodesian Bush War is unknown, but is believed to be relatively small.[4] .otes 1. ^ a b c Abbott, p.20 2. ^ Stringer, p.98 3. ^ Beckett, p.175 4. ^ Stringer, p.99 References • Abbott, Peter; Mike Chappell, Manuel Ribeiro Rodrigues, Ron Volstad (1986). Modern African Wars. Osprey Publishing. ISBN 0850457289. • Frederick William Beckett, Ian; John Pimlott (1985). Armed Forces & Modern Counter-insurgency. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 0709932367. • Douglas Stringer, Kevin; John Adams Wickham (2006). Military Organizations for Homeland Defense and Smaller-scale. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN 0275993086. See also • Rhodesian Armoured Car Regiment • Rhodesian Light Infantry • Rhodesian SAS • Rhodesian African Rifles • Selous Scouts • Rhodesian Air Force • British South Africa Police

Royal Rhodesian Air Force

Rhodesian Lion and Tusk as depicted on aircraft roundels and flag From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia The Royal Rhodesian Air Force was the air arm of the British colonial state of Rhodesia. It existed between 1935 and 1980 under various names, and is now the Air Force of Zimbabwe. History Formed in 1935 under the name Southern Rhodesia Staff Corps Air Unit as a territorial unit, the first regular servicemen with the unit went to Britain for ground crew training in 1936. Its first pilots were awarded their flying wings on 13 May 1938. The reservists were called up early August 1939 and were posted to Canada by 28 August. On 19 September 1939, two weeks after the United Kingdom declared war against Germany, the Air Unit officially became the Southern Rhodesia Air Force (SRAF), and Air Unit flights become Number 1 Squadron SRAF. In 1939, the Southern Rhodesia government amalgamated the SRAF with the civilian airline Rhodesia And Nyasaland Airways (RANA). The ex-RANA aircraft formed the Communication Squadron, which operated internal services within Southern Rhodesai, plus services to South Africa and Mozambique. By January 1940, with Britain at war with Germany, Royal Air Force (RAF) Air Vice-Marshal Sir Arthur 'Bomber' Harris was desperate for trained aircrew and turned for help to Southern Rhodesia (where Harris had enlisted in 1914). Harris was frustrated by delays launching Commonwealth Air Training Plan stations in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister Godfrey Huggins (1933-53) recognised an opportunity not just to aid Britain and the Allies, but also to boost the domestic economy. The Rhodesian Air Training Group (RATG) installed aviation infrastructure, trained 10,000 Commonwealth and Allied airmen 1940-45 (seven percent of the total) and provided the stimulus for manufacturing that had been lacking in the 1920s and 1930s. Southern Rhodesia's textile, metallurgy, chemical and food processing industries expanded rapidly.[1] The SRAF was absorbed into the RAF proper in April 1940 and redesignated No. 237 (Rhodesia) Squadron RAF. This squadron, initially equipped with Hawker Hardys, participated in the East African Campaign against the Italians. On 1 June 1941, the Southern Rhodesian Women's Auxiliary Air Services came into being. British No. 44 Squadron RAF and No. 266 Squadron RAF were also assigned the name "(Rhodesia)" because of the large number of Rhodesian airmen and crew in these units. Rhodesians fought in many of the theatres of World War II, the most notable of those in the contemporary era being Ian Smith who, after being shot down over Italy behind enemy lines, was able to avoid capture and return to Allied lines. Rhodesian airmen suffered 20 percent fatalities, becoming emblematic of a ‘nation in arms’ ideal that peppered settler nationalism and erupted fully in the 1960s. The RAF remained until 1954, indirectly assisting Rhodesian aviation, and many airmen returned with young families as settlers. The SRAF was re-established in 1947 and two years later, Huggins appointed a 32 year-old South African-born Rhodesian Spitfire pilot, Ted Jacklin, as air officer commanding tasked to build an air force in the expectation that British African territories would begin moving towards independence, and air power would be vital for land-locked Southern Rhodesia. The threadbare SRAF bought, borrowed or salvaged a collection of vintage aircraft, including six Tiger Moths, six Harvard trainers, an Anson freighter and a handful of De Havilland Rapide transport aircraft, before purchasing a squadron of 22 Mk22 war surplus Spitfires from the RAF which were then flown to Southern Rhodesia.[2] Huggins was anxious to maintain the strong wartime links established with the RAF, not only for access to training and new technology, but also because of his growing concern over the expansionist ideas of the newly-established apartheid Afrikaner nationalist regime in South Africa. The booming Rhodesian economy allowed more money to be allocated for new aircraft, training and aerodrome facilities, and growing cooperation with the RAF in the 1950s saw the SRAF operating in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Kenya, Cyprus, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Oman and South Yemen. Huggins maintained his enthusiasm for air power when he became the first prime minister (1953-56) of the semi-independent Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland also known as the Central African Federation (CAF) comprising Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The CAF was viewed as an experiment, a democratic multiracial alternative to apartheid South Africa and it was widely expected that the new federal state would become independent within a decade The SRAF became a 'federal' body and received its first jets, 16 de Havilland Vampire FB9 aircraft. On 15 October 1954 the federal air arm was officially designated as the Royal Rhodesian Air Force (RRAF). In a well-received move aimed to distinguish the RRAF from the South African Air Force, khaki uniforms and army ranks were

abandoned in favour of those utilised by other Commonwealth air forces such as the RAF, RCAF, RAAF and RNZAF. Despite efforts to broker a consensus, black and white Rhodesians complained that the pace of reform was too slow or too fast and by 1961, it became clear that the Federation was doomed. Following the dissolution of the CAF in 1963, the British government granted independence to Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi) but refused Southern Rhodesia independence until more progress was made towards multiracial democracy. White settler opinion hardened and Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front government issued a Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965. Chief of the Air Staff Air Vice Marshal 'Raf' Bentley was representing Rhodesia in Washington, D.C, and resigned immediately. Bentley's reluctant successor, former Royal Australian Air Force pilot Harold Hawkins had come to Rhodesia with the RATG in 1944 and joined the SRAF in 1947. Hawkins accepted command of the RRAF in the increasingly forlorn hope that the rebellion could be resolved peacefully through negotiation.[3] Although Southern Rhodesia acquired the lion's share of the Federation's aircraft, the imposition of international economic sanctions in 1965 saw the country abandoned by many aircraft equipment suppliers and maintenance contractors. RRAF aircraft maintenance crews had stockpiled essential items, but the Air Staff knew that metal fatigue, spare parts shortages and the need for new electronic equipment would begin to erode the RRAF's capabilities. In 1968, Air Vice Marshal Hawkins failed to convince Prime Minister Ian Smith that the 'HMS Fearless' settlement offered by British Prime Minister Harold Wilson was the best result that Rhodesia could expect. Hawkins resigned his command but accepted the post of Rhodesia's diplomatic representative in Pretoria. When the Rhodesian 'Bush War' intensified after 1972, the age of the aircraft, the shortage of spares and a deteriorating air safety record would become a growing concern for the Air Staff. The abrupt switch of allies saw Rhodesia increasingly dependent upon South African support and growing disillusion with the rebellion. In contrast to most of the police and the Army, Rhodesian airmen possessed skills in demand by other air forces and civilian airlines and the Air Staff struggled to retain, recruit and train technicians. In the late 1950s, 16 Canberra B2 and T4 bombers were purchased, as well as Provost T52 trainers, C-47 Dakota and Canadair DC-4M Argonaut transports. In 1962, Hunter fighter aircraft were obtained, and the Vampire FB9 and T55s were reallocated to advanced training and ground attack roles. The first Alouette III helicopters also arrived around this time, equipping Number 7 Squadron. Insignia

Southern Rhodesian Air Force Roundel (1939Rhodesian Regiment, 1954) Royal Air Force Roundel Federation of Rhodesia &Royal Rhodesian Air Rhodesian Air Force (1935-1939) Nyasaland Air Force RoundelForce Roundel (1963Roundel (1970-1980) 1970) (1954-1963) The SRAF used standard RAF type A roundel, with green/yellow/green bars on each side of the fuselage roundel and type A fin flashes. The RRAF used standard RAF type A roundels with three small assegais in black and white superimposed on the red center and type A fin flashes.. These assegais represented the three territories of the Federation, namely Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The Rhodesian Air Force changed to a type D roundel with a single assegai and a type D in flash. When Rhodesia became a republic in 1970 the roundels became a green ring with a lion and tusk on the white center. Aircraft

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Aermacchi AL60-B2L - "Trojan" Aerospatiale SA316/319 Alouette III B Agusta Bell 205A - "Cheetah" Britten-Norman BN-A Islander Canadair C.4 Argonaut English Electric Canberra B.2 and T4 De Havilland DH.82A Tiger Moth De Havilland Vampire FB9 and T11 Douglas Dakota

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Hawker Hunter FGA 9 Hunting Pembroke C1 Hunting Percival Provost T52 North American Harvard Reims Cessna FTB337G - "Lynx" SIAI Marchetti SF 260 - "Genet" Supermarine Spitfire Mk.22 Douglas DC-7CF Beech 95 C-55 Baron

[4]

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Cessna 421A Hawker Hart DH.89 Dragon Rapide Hawker Audax Mk.1 DH.85 Leopard Moth Auster J-1 Autocrat Avro Anson Auster J-5 Aiglet

Aerospatiale Alouette II - Six helicopters on loan from the South African Air Force, in service from 1974 to 1980. Cessna 185 Skywagon - Two civil aircraft impressed into service, about 17 aircraft on loan from the South African Air Force, in service during the 1970s. Major air bases .ew Sarum Air Force Base In the early days of Rhodesian aviation, the various air units often lodged in buildings and facilities that they inherited. By the 1940s, it became apparent that a more permanent home for aviation was needed near the capital city, Salisbury. The decision was made to build a completely new airfield at Kentucky Farm to provide a base of operations for civilian airlines and military aircraft. Work started on the military section of the airfield in 1951. In March 1952, the New Air Headquarters and Technical Headquarters were completed at what was called New Sarum Air Force Base. The name derived from Salisbury's sister city in England, Wiltshire, which for centuries had used the name "Sarum". The RAF station near the English Salisbury was called "Old Sarum". It was therefore appropriate in view of both similarities in name and close association with the Royal Air Force that the new airfield be called "New Sarum." New Sarum is still regarded as the principal Air Force establishment and provides facilities for four squadrons of aircraft of widely differing roles as well as housing training schools for technicians, security personnel, dog handlers, and the Air Force Regiment. The schools and flying squadrons are supported by a full range of services and amenities including workshops, transport fleets, living quarters, equipment depots, and sporting & entertainment facilities. The station shares with Harare International Airport, one of the longest civil airport runways in the world, 15510 feet or 2.42 miles, but is otherwise a totally self-

contained community. The military site, complete with housing complex, is to the south of the crossing runways, whereas the international airport is to the north. [5]. Thornhill Air Force Base In 1939 a committee was set up to locate and survey three sites in the Gwelo area that were suitable for the establishment of an airfield for the Commonwealth Training Group responsible for training aircrews for the defence of the Empire during World War II. The most suitable site comprised a portion of Thornhill farm and an adjacent farm, Glengarry. This land was commandeered for the duration of the War and finally purchased in 1947. The first buildings were constructed in 1941 and official use and the beginning of training began in March 1942. Some of the original buildings of this time are still in use at Thornhill today. The town of Gwelo and the air station grew during World War II. A total of 1810 pilots were trained during this time. Many of these men returned after the war to settle in Rhodesia. Some of them formed the nucleus of the military training schemes which led to the formation of the Southern Rhodesian Air Force. Thornhill is the home to the fighter squadrons, the training squadrons, and the Pilot Training School, where all Officer Cadets spend up to six months on initial training before beginning flying training with the squadrons. Like New Sarum, Thornhill shares its runway and Air Traffic Control facilities with civil aircraft operators. The military air traffic controllers based at Thornhill are responsible for all air traffic control in the Midlands area[6]. Rank structure [7]

Air Marshal – Air Vice-Marshal – Air Commodore – Group Captain – Wing Commander – Squadron Leader – Flight Lieutenant

Air Lt (Flying Officer) – Air Sub-Lt (Pilot Officer) - Warrant Officer I Class – WO II Class – Master Technician – Master Sergeant

Flight Sergeant – Sergeant – Corporal – Senior Aircrraftsman – Leading Aircreafsman Rhodesian Air Force (1970-1980) During the "Emergency" the air force consisted of no more than 2,300 personnel and of those only 150 were pilots. These pilots were qualified to fly all the aircraft within the air force so were often involved in combat missions. In addition, they were rotated through the various units so as to give rest to the airmen who would otherwise be constantly on active service. In March 1970, when Rhodesia declared itself a republic, the prefix "Royal" was dropped and the Service's name became the Rhodesian Air Force (RhAF). A new roundel was adopted in the new Rhodesian colours of green and white containing a lion (in gold) and tusk in the centre of the white. The new air force ensign was taken into use on 5 April 1970. The new flag contained the Rhodesian flag in the canton with the roundel in the fly on a light blue field. This marking was displayed in the usual six positions, together with a green/white/green fin flash with a narrow white stripe as in RAF type C. During the 1970s bush war, Rhodesia managed to obtain Rheims-Cessna 337 (known in Rhodesia as the Lynx), and SIAI Machetti SF260 (known in Rhodesia as the Genet or Warrior - two versions, trainer and ground-attack) piston engined aircraft, Bell 204 Iroquois (from Israel), and additional Aérospatiale Alouette III helicopters via covert means, but proved unsuccessful in obtaining jet aircraft (except for some Vampires FB9 and T11 aircraft from South Africa). An order for CT/4 trainers was embargoed by the New Zealand government Drawing upon counter-insurgency experience gained in the Second World War, the Malayan Emergency and the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya, and adapting more recent Israeli, South African and Portuguese tactics, Rhodesian combined operations (police Special Branch, army, air force) developed ‘pseudo-guerrillas’, such as the Mozambican National Resistance, (RENAMO) that wreaked havoc across the border, where Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) guerrilla camps were razed by ‘Fireforce’ cross-border raids. Fireforce comprised units of Selous Scouts, an undercover tracker battalion of 1,500 troops on double pay, 80 percent black, (many recruited by Special Branch from captured guerrillas facing trial and execution) probing ahead of a parachute infantry battalion and up to 200 Special Air Service commandos. These forces were supported, in turn, by armoured transport columns, mobile field artillery, equestrian pursuit dragoons, (Grey's Scouts) air force helicopter gunships and bomber squadrons, one newly-equipped with 20 French-made Cessna Lynx low-altitude

surveillance aircraft modified for precision ground attacks. Fireforce gathered intelligence, disrupted guerrilla forces, seized equipment and is identified frequently as a precursor of new forms of counterinsurgency warfare. The United Nations condemned the Fireforce raids, especially the use of napalm, but evidence confirming or disproving the utilisation of Rhodesian biological weapons remains inconclusive.[8] Order of battle • No. 1 Squadron - Thornhill (12 x Hawker Hunter FGA.9) • No. 2 Squadron - Thornhill (8 x Vampire FB.9; 8 x Vampire T.55; plus 13 x Vampire FB.52 on loan from South Africa) • No. 3 Squadron - New Sarum (13 x Douglas C-47; 1 x Cessna 402; 6 x BN-2A Islander; 1 x DC-7C; 1 x Baron) • No. 4 Squadron - Thornhill (11 x AL-60F5 Trojan; 21 x Reims-Cessna FTB.337G; 14 x SF.260W) • No. 5 Squadron - New Sarum (8 x EE Canberra B.2; 2 x EE Canberra T.4) • No. 6 Squadron - Thornhill (13 x Percival Provost T.52; 17 x SF.260C) • No. 7 Squadron - New Sarum (6 x Alouette II; 34 x Alouette III) • No. 8 Squadron - New Sarum (11 x AB.205) Air Force of Zimbabwe (1980-) In June 1979, the short-lived Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government of Bishop Muzorewa was installed and the air force flag was the only military flag to be changed to coincide with the change in the national flag. The roundel remained the same. In the last year of the Rhodesian War and the first few years of Zimbabwe's independence, no national insignia of any sort were carried on Air Force aircraft. This was legal as long as the aircraft did not fly outside of the country's borders. Following the independence of Zimbabwe in April 1980, the air force was renamed the Air Force of Zimbabwe, but continued to use the emblem of a Bateleur eagle in flight, as used by the Rhodesians. The new air force flag retains the light blue field and has the Zimbabwe flag in the canton with the air force emblem in gold in the fly. In 1982, a new post-independence marking was introduced, featuring a yellow Zimbabwe Bird sitting on the walls of Great Zimbabwe. This marking was displayed on the fin of the aircraft or on the fuselage of helicopters. No wing markings were displayed. In 1994, a new roundel was introduced, featuring the national colours in concentric rings. Initially, the roundel was used in association with the 'Zimbabwe Bird' tail marking used previously, but this was soon replaced by the national flag. The main marking is normally displayed above and below each wing and on each side of the fuselage. However, this seems to be changed, and today the Zimbabwe Bird is also used as a fin flash. Commanders The following officers were commanders of the Rhodesian Air Force: • 1949 - 30 June 1961 Air Vice-Marshal "Ted" Jacklin • 1961 - 1965 Air Vice-Marshal Bentley • 1965 - 1968 Air Vice-Marshal Harold Hawkins • 1968 - 15 April 1973 Air Marshal Archie Wilson • 13 April 1973 - 1977 Air Marshal Mick McLaren • 12 April 1977 - 1981 Air Marshal Frank Mussell References 1. ^ On Rhodesian industrialisation, see Phimister, (1988). 2. ^ Moss (n.d.); Petter-Bowyer (2003) p. 16 3. ^ The extent to which Hawkins was involved in the abortive Army plot to arrest Ian Smith, senior members of the Rhodesian Front regime and their principal supporter in the security forces, Police Commissioner Frank Barfoot, has yet to be clarified. See Flower (1987) p. 56; Wood (2005) p. 471 4. ^ Brent, W. A., "Rhodesian Air Force - A Brief History 1947-1980", Freeworld Publications, 1988, p. 13-23. 5. ^ Brent, W. A., "Rhodesian Air Force - A Brief History 1947-1980", Freeworld Publications, 1988, p. 25. 6. ^ Brent, W. A., "Rhodesian Air Force - A Brief History 1947-1980", Freeworld Publications, 1988, p. 26. 7. ^ Brent, W. A., "Rhodesian Air Force - A Brief History 1947-1980", Freeworld Publications, 1988, p. 35. 8. ^ See, for example, Cilliers (1984); Carver (1993); Wood (1996); Martinez (2000); Parker (2006). • RRAF/AFZ markings • www.rhodesianforces.org • Allport, R, Flags and Symbols of Rhodesia, 1890-1980 (SAVA Journal 5/96) Bibliography • Allport, R. (n.d.) Brief History of the Rhodesian Army. Rhodesia and South Africa Military History • Australian Gold Coast Branch of the Aircrew Association, (n.d.) Service Profile: Archie Wilson (Point Cook: RAAF Museum). • CAA (Central African Airways) (1961) The Story of CAA 1946-61 (Salisbury: CAA). • Carver, R. (1993) ‘Zimbabwe: Drawing a Line through the Past’, Journal of African Law, (31) 1 pp. 69–81. • Cilliers, J. K. (1984) Pseudo Operations and the Selous Scouts, (London: Routledge). • Clark. C (2003) The Empire Air Training Scheme, (Canberra: Australian War Memorial History Conference). • Clayton, A. (1999) ‘”Deceptive Might”: Imperial Defence and Security 1900-1968’ in J. M. Brown and W. R. Louis (eds) (1999) The Oxford History of the British Empire vol. IV: The Twentieth Century, (Oxford: Oxford University Press).pp. 280–305. • Flower, K. (1987) Serving Secretly. An Intelligence Chief On Record: Rhodesia into Zimbabwe 1964 to 1981, (London: John Hammond). • Gann, L. H. (n.d.) The Development of Southern Rhodesia’s Military System, 1890-1953, Rhodesia and South Africa Military History. • Huggins, Sir Godfrey. (1953) ‘Foreword for Air Rally Programme’, Rhodes Centenary Air Rally, June 13-14.

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Hyam, R (1987) ‘The Geopolitical Origins of the Central African Federation: Britain, Rhodesia and South Africa, 19481953’, The Historical Journal, (30) 1 pp. 145–72. Hyam, R. and Henshaw, P. (2003) The Lion and the Springbok: Britain and South Africa Since the Boer War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Keatley, P. (1963) The Politics of Partnership: The Federation of Rhodesia and !yasaland, (Harmondsworth: Penguin). Killingray, D. (1984) ‘“A Swift Agent of Government”: Air Power in British Colonial Africa, 1916-1939’, The Journal of African History (25) 4 pp. 429–44. McAdam, J. (1969) ‘Birth of an Airline: Establishment of Rhodesia and Nyasaland Airways’, Rhodesiana, (21). McCormack, R. L. (1976) ‘Airlines and Empires: Great Britain and the “Scramble for Africa”, 1919-39’, Canadian Journal of African Studies, (10) 1 pp. 87–105. McCormack, R. L. (1979) ‘Man With A Mission: Oswald Pirow and South African Airways, 1933-1939’, The Journal of African History, (20) 4 pp. 543–57. Martinez, I. (2000) ‘The History and Use of Bacteriological and Chemical Agents During Zimbabwe’s Liberation War 1965-80 by Rhodesian Forces’. Third World Quarterly, (23) 6, pp. 1159–79. Melson, C. (2005) ‘Top Secret War: Rhodesian Special Operations’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, (16) 1 pp. 57–82. Meredith, C. (1973) ‘The Rhodesian Air Training Group 1940-1945’, Rhodesiana (28) 1973. Minter, W. and Schmidt, E. (1988) ‘When Sanctions Worked: The Case of Rhodesia Reexamined’, African Affairs (87) 347 pp. 207–37. Mlambo, N. (2002) ‘The Zimbabwe Defence Industry, 1980-1995’, Defence Digest Working Paper 2 (Rondebosch: South African Centre for Defence Information). Morris, Capt. G. C. (1991) ‘The Other Side of the Coin: Low-Technology Aircraft and Little Wars’, Airpower Journal Spring. Moss, J. P. (n.d.) Spit Epic: March, 1951 (unpublished manuscript). Murray, D. J. (1970) The Governmental System in Southern Rhodesia (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Parker, J. (2006) Assignment Selous Scouts: Inside Story of a Rhodesian Special Branch Officer, (Alberton: Galago). Percox, D. (2004) Britain, Kenya and the Cold War: Imperial Defence, Colonial Security and Decolonisation., (London: I. B. Tauris). Petter-Bowyer, P. J. H. (2003) Winds of Destruction: The Autobiography of a Rhodesian Combat Pilot, (Victoria, British Columbia: Trafford Publishing). Phimister, I. R. (1988) An Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe 1890-1948: Capital Accumulation and Class Struggle (London: Longman). Royal Australian Air Force, (1945) ‘Personal Record of Service: Flt. Lt. Harold Hawkins, RAAF’, ref. no. 504128, (Canberra: Australian National Archives). RCAF.com (Royal Canadian Air Force History) (n.d.) The British Commonwealth Air Training Plan. Salt, B. (2001) A Pride of Eagles: The Definitive History of the Rhodesian Air Force 1920-1980, (Weltevreden Park: Covos Day Books). Samasuwo, N. (2003) ‘Food Production and War supplies: Rhodesia’s Beef Industry During the Second World War’, Journal of Southern African Studies, (29) 2 pp. 487–502. Vickery, K. P. (1989) ‘The Second World War Revival of Forced Labor in the Rhodesias’, International Journal of African Historical Studies, (22) 3 pp. 423–37. Wood, J. R. T. (1995) Rhodesian Insurgency Rhodesia and South Africa Military History. Wood, J. R. T. (1996) Fireforce: Helicopter Warfare in Rhodesia 1962-1980, at Rhodesia and South Africa Military History. Wood, J. R. T. (2005 So Far and !o Further: Rhodesia’s Bid for Independence During the Retreat From Empire 19591965. (Victoria, British Columbia: Trafford Publishing).

See also Rhodesian Armoured Car Regiment Rhodesian Light Infantry Rhodesian SAS Rhodesian African Rifles Selous Scouts Grey's Scouts British South Africa Police External links • Air Force of Zimbabwe • Rhodesian Air Force Pictorial • Rhodesian Air Force and Rhodesian civil aircraft photographs and info • The Rhodesian Air Force • Rhodesian and South African Military History: An extensive collection of histories and analysis of Rhodesian and South African military operations, to the early 1980s • Rhodesian Air Force Sods photos and videos • Photos of the Rhodesian Bush War

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Federation of Rhodesia and .yasaland Air Force Flag (.ote: The three asagais on the Roundel) Royal Rhodesian Air Force Flag ( Post Federation/Pre UDI: .ote: Only one asagai on the roundel )

Rhodesian Air Force Flag Post UDI

Royal Rhodesian Air Force - Rhodesia Air Training Group – 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th Squadrons

British South Africa Police

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

1899–December 31, 1980 Republic of Rhodesia Police, Rhodesian Bush War Police Pro rege, pro patria, pro lege, or Latin for "For King, For Country, For Law" Kum-A-Kye First Matabele War Second Matabele War Second Boer War World War I - anganyika Engagements World War II Rhodesian Bush War The British South Africa Police (BSAP) was the police force of the British South Africa Company (BSAC) of Cecil Rhodes which became the national police force of Southern Rhodesia and its successor after 1965, Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). Until 1899, the force also policed parts of BSAC territories north of the Zambezi River and now in Zambia. The organisation was formed by the BSAC in 1889 as a paramilitary, mounted infantry force in order to provide protection for the Pioneer Column of settlers which moved into Mashonaland in 1890. The unit played a central role in both the First Matabele War (1893) and the Second Matabele War (1896/97). Until 1897 the force was called the British South Africa Company's Police. The BSAP operated originally in conjunction with the Southern Rhodesia Constabulary (SRC), the town police force for Salisbury (now Harare) and Bulawayo, but amalgamated with the SRC in 1909. As a paramilitary unit, the BSAP fought in the Second Boer War and in Tanganyika during World War I, while some members were seconded to the Rhodesia Native Regiment. From 1923, Southern Rhodesia was a self-governing colony of the British Empire, but the BSAP retained its title and its position as the senior regiment of the Southern Rhodesian armed forces. One of the first casualties of the BSAP in World War II was Keppel Bagot Levett, born in 1919, who died in active service with the BSAP in March 1941.[1] A Criminal Investigation Department was founded in 1923; a Women's Section in 1941, and a Dog Unit in 1945. From 1957, the Police Reserve also had an airborne wing. Prior to the use of motor vehicles, extended rural patrols were carried out on horseback, and right up until the Force was renamed all white male officers were taught to ride as part of their basic traíning. Selected officers were retained in Morris Depot after "passing out" and tasked with training remount horses for future use by recuits and on ceremonial duties. Mounted Escorts were provided for occasions such as the state opening of Parliament. The BSAP's name remained unchanged by the Unilateral Declaration of Independence, although following the declaration of a republic by Ian Smith's government in 1970, the crown was removed from the BSAP's badge. Officer's cap badge of the BSAP, circa 1965, showing the "wounded lion" device During the period of the Second Chimurenga (a.k.a. Rhodesian Bush War) in the late 1960s and 1970s, the BSAP formed an important part of the white minority government's fight against black nationalist guerrillas. The force formed a riot unit; a tracker combat team (later renamed the Police Anti-Terrorist Unit or PATU); a police field force type Support Unit (who were distinquished by wearing black boots), an Urban Emergency Unit, a Police Reserve Air Wing or PRAW, and a Marine Division, and from 1973 offered places to white conscripts as part of Rhodesia's national service scheme. At independence, the force had a strength of approximately 11,000 regulars (about 60% black) and almost 35,000 reservists, of whom the overwhelming majority were white. A former BSAP officer, Daniel Carney wrote a book titled Whispering Death about the BSAP in anti-terrorist operations which was later made into the film Albino . The Support Unit (known as the "Black Boots") was staffed by about 30-40 white and 300 black regular and national servicemen [2]. Their additional training consisted of a four-weeks long Counter-Insurgency (COIN) training, small-arms and driving courses amongst others. Their primary task was to patrol the long distances in the Tribal Trust Lands, to maintain and reinstate order in the kraals (native villages´)[3]. In the late seventies a Civilian African Tracking Unit (C.A.T.U.) was added, to relieve the professional trackers in the pursuing of the enemy infiltrators into Rhodesia. Their tracking methods were based on the traditional skills and techniques of the Rhodesian Shangaan tribe. Their formations were called as 'sticks', and consisted of a couple of white Rhodesian Warrant Officers, and six to eight black Rhodesian trackers[4]. Until the late 1970s, black Rhodesians were prevented from holding ranks higher than SubInspector in the BSAP, and only white Rhodesians could gain commissioned rank. After independence, the force followed an official policy of "Africanisation", in which senior white officers were retired and their positions filled by black officers. The British South Active Allegiance Branch Type Motto March

Africa Police was renamed the Zimbabwe Republic Police in July 1980 following the installation of Robert Mugabe as Prime Minister of Zimbabwe. See also • C Squadron 22 (Rhodesian) SAS • Rhodesian Light Infantry • Rhodesian African Rifles • Grey's Scouts • Rhodesian Air Force • Rhodesian Armoured Car Regiment • Selous Scouts • "Blue & Old Gold - The History of the British South Africa Police 1889-1890" published October 2009 References 1. ^ An Armorial of Zimbabwe and Rhodesia, Council of the Heraldry and Genealogy Society of Zimbabwe, 2001 2. ^ History of the BSAP Gibbs/Phillips 2000 3. ^ Brown, Robert K.: American mercenaries in Africa - How to be a Soldier of Fortune in Rhodesia, SOFMAG, 1976. 4. ^ Jack Lott: "Run the bastards down!" C.A.T.U. tracks terrorists - Rhodesia's civilian tracking unit. - SOFMAG July, 1979 • Scouting on Two Continents, by Major Frederick Russell Burnham, D.S.O. LC call number: DT775 .B8 1926. (1926) • Radford, M., 1994. Service Before Self, privately published. • Gibbs, P., & Phillips, H., 2000. The History of the British South Africa Police, Something of Value Publications, Victoria, Australia. • Kent Rasmussen, R., & Rubert, S. C., 1990. Historical Dictionary of Zimbabwe, Scarecrow Press, Metuchen, N.J., USA. • Brown, Robert K.: American mercenaries in Africa - How to be a Soldier of Fortune in Rhodesia, Soldier of Fortune Magazine, First ever issue 1976. • Lott, Jack: "Run the bastards down!" C.A.T.U. tracks terrorists - Rhodesia's civilian tracking unit. - Soldier of Fortune Magazine July, 1979 External links • The Regimental Association of the British South Africa Police • [1]Blue & Old Gold - The History of the British South Africa Police 1889-1890

Rhodesia BSAP

Military of Zimbabwe

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Current form

1980

Service branches

Zimbabwe National Army, Air Force of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Republic Police

Headquarters

Harare

Conscription

18-24 years of age

Available service

for

military

2,778,404 males, age 18-49 (2005 est.), 2,681,531 females, age 18-49 (2005 est.)

Fit for military service

1,304,424 males, age 18-49 (2005 est.) 1,115,096 females, age 18-49 (2005 est.)

Active personnel

29,000 military, 21,800 paramilitary (ranked 83rd)

Budget

US$60 million (2006)

Percent of GDP

3.8% (2006)

History

Military history of Zimbabwe

The Armed Forces of Zimbabwe are composed of an army (ZNA) and an air force (AFZ). The most senior commander of Zimbabwe's army is currently General Constantine Chiwenga. As a landlocked country, Zimbabwe has no navy. The ZNA currently has an active duty strength of 30,000. The air force has about 5,000 men assigned. In July 1994 the combined Zimbabwe Defence Forces Headquarters was created. The branches are the Zimbabwe National Army, Air Force of Zimbabwe, and the Zimbabwe Republic Police (which includes the Police Support Unit and the Paramilitary Police). The main service rifle is the AKM assault rifle. It has been alleged by opposition leaders that the military has gained control of political life in Zimbabwe following the 2008 elections that saw the MDC become the majority party in the Parliament. At the time of independence, the then Prime Minister Robert Mugabe declared that integrating Zimbabwe's three armed forces would be one of Zimbabwe's top priorities. The existing Rhodesian Army was combined with the two guerilla armies; the 20,000-strong ZANLA forces of ZANU-PF and the 15,000-strong ZIPRA forces of PF-ZAPU. The Rhodesian Air Force was eventually reorganised as the Air Force of Zimbabwe. In 1999, the Government of Zimbabwe sent a sizeable military force into the Democratic Republic of Congo to support the government of President Laurent Kabila during the Second Congo War. Those forces were largely withdrawn in 2002. References • Central Intelligence Agency The World Factbook - Zimbabwe • The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) (2007). The Military Balance 2007. Abingdon: Routledge Journals. ISBN 9781857434378. Page 299. External links • Zimbabwe Ministry of Defence • Zimbabwe Defence Forces Unofficial Website Further reading • Abiodun Alao, 'The Metamorphosis of the “Unorthodox”: The Integration and Development of the Zimbabwe National Army'

The Zimbabwe military is one of the best in Africa with excellent training, vast operational experience and doctrines drawing from both the East and Western blocks. As an organization the ZDF has experience from the country’s civil war in the 60s and 70s that led to independence, through the Mozambican civil war in the 80s, “cooperating” with Angola during the South African inversion also in the 80s and UNITA banditry to the two DRC wars in the 90s and beyond. In all these conflicts the ZDF has been or been part of the victorious side. While other allies like Angola and Namibia contributed significant men and equipment, the overall command of the forces was entrusted to the ZDF. The ZDF exploits during the second DRC war does not get much attention because the Zimbabwean involvement and achievements upset global powers. On the other hand, the ZDF professionalism in the many UN sponsored peace keeping operations has been noted. The request by the South African government to have Air Force of Zimbabwe instructors help in modernizing the SAAF is a very positive testimonial for the Zimbabweans. ZDF – Organization The Zimbabwe Defense Forces (ZDF) are under the command of the President, who is the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Defense Forces. He is assisted by the Minister of defense who is responsible for the administrative and logistical support of the defense force, and the Command of the Defense Forces, who maintains operational control through the Defense Forces Headquarters in Harare. Subordinate to the Defense Force Headquarters are the Commander, Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA), and Commander, Air Force of Zimbabwe (AFZ). Commander, Land Forces is assisted at Army Headquarters by a chief of staff to whom the Army Staff is subordinate. The Staff consists of the chiefs of staff for operations, administration, procurement, and logistics. The 32-35,000 strong army is divided into five brigades, four of which are based on geographical areas; the fifth is an elite unit based in Harare. The Presidential Guard is sometimes refered to as a group and sometimes as a brigade. Other operational forces include an armored regiment, an artillery regiment, and 15 infantry battalions. The Presidential Guard Group consists of two battalions. Guards (two battalions) Mechanized (2 battalions) Commando Regiment Parachute Regiment Armored Vehicle Mounted (one battalion) Two artillery regiments are available: one is equipped with Chinese field artillery, and one with AA guns and shoulder-launched SAMs. Each infantry brigade has: Three infantry battalions with 31 APCs each Reconnaissance Company (12 EE-9) Signals Company Mortar Battery (6 81/82mm or 120mm) AA gun battery Engineer company Supply and transport Workshop Medical units

ORGANISATION OF THE AIR FORCE OF ZIMBABWE Air Marshal Perrance Shiri who took over from the late Rtd Air Chief Marshal Josiah Tungamirai in 1992 commands the Air Force of Zimbabwe. The Air Force Commander reports to the Commander Defence Forces. Below him are two Chiefs of Staff who head the divisional responsibilities of Operations and Supporting Services assisted by Director Generals responsible for Operations, Supporting Services and Inspectorate. The AFZ has more than 5,000. Functional departments of Operations, Training, Engineering, Administration, Regiment, Inspectorate, Medical Services and three operational bases namely, Manyame Air Base, Thornhill Air Base and Field Air Force Base support the Command element. There are also several Forward Air Fields (FAF) like Grand Reef, Buffalo Range, Hwange and Kotwa around the country http://www.zimbabwedefence.com/AFZ0.html

Zimbabwean generals have 'taken Robert Mugabe's power' Zimbabwe's generals have mounted a "military coup by stealth", reducing President Robert Mugabe to a "figurehead", a senior western diplomat said. By David Blair, Diplomatic Editor Published: 8:45PM BST 05 Jun 2008

Augustine Chihuri [from right] addresses a press conference, as Constantine Chiwenga, Perence Shiri and Paul Zimondi look on Photo: AP The tight circle of "securocrats", who sit on the Joint Operations Command (JOC) committee, are now believed to be in day-to-day charge of Zimbabwe's government. They ensured Mr Mugabe did not step down after his defeat in the presidential election's first round in March and are now masterminding a campaign of terror to suppress the opposition Movement for Democratic Change and guarantee victory for Mr Mugabe in the June 27 run-off. Related Articles • UK and US diplomats attacked in Zimbabwe • Zimbabwe: restrictions on foreigners • Morgan Tsvangirai released from police custody in Zimbabwe • Zimbabwe crisis: White farming couple beaten and kicked off land • Zimbabwe: Robert Mugabe suspends aid operations • Robert Mugabe allows aid agencies to resume work in Zimbabwe The government indefinitely suspended all work by aid groups and non-governmental organisations, accusing them of breaching their terms of registration. Mr Mugabe is a useful figurehead who still commands the deference of other African leaders, notably President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa. But the western diplomat said Mr Mugabe's power had ebbed away and Zimbabwe was now run by a "junta". "This is a military coup by stealth," he said. "There are no tanks on people's lawns, but the Joint Operations Command runs this country." The most powerful figures on the JOC are Gen Constantine Chiwenga, the overall military chief; Augustine Chihuri, the national police commissioner, and Gen Paradzai Zimondi, the commander of the prison service. Air Marshal Perence Shiri, the commander of the air force, who masterminded a brutal military campaign against Zimbabwe's minority Ndebele people in the 1980s, is also part of the circle, although believed to be less influential. All four fought in Mr Mugabe's guerrilla army during the war against white rule in the 1970s. Each has publicly proclaimed their support for the ruling Zanu-PF party. They have also benefited from Mr Mugabe's seizure of white-owned land, with farms and business concessions falling into their hands, allowing them to amass considerable wealth. The diplomat said after the first round of the election on March 29, Mr Mugabe, 84, "almost went" when it became clear that Morgan Tsvangirai, the opposition leader, had won significantly more votes. But a pivotal meeting of the JOC on March 30 convinced him to stay. "The generals didn't let him go," said the diplomat. From that moment, Mr Mugabe was "beholden to his senior generals to hold office". Another source inside Zimbabwe confirmed: "He [Mugabe] was prepared to concede but the generals, whose positions would become uncertain with his departure, prevented that from happening," he said. Other observers backed the diplomat's view that Zimbabwean politics had fundamentally changed. Tiseke Kasambala, a Zimbabwe specialist at Human Rights Watch, said there was an "increasing militarisation of the state". "The evidence points to an increasing role by the army in state affairs," she said. "The army is no longer just in barracks, waiting to protect the country. The army is out there, taking a role in the day-to-day government of the country." Mr Mugabe does not fear his generals will actually overthrow him – they still need him as the regime's titular leader – or he would not have travelled to Rome for the United Nations food summit this week. However, observers believe Mr Mugabe's age and his new dependence on the generals means he is no longer the sole arbiter of Zimbabwe's fate.

Zimbabwe .ational Army

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia The Zimbabwe .ational Army or ZNA was created in 1980 from elements of the Rhodesian Army, integrated to a greater or lesser extent with combatants from the ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrilla movements (the armed wings of, respectively, ZANU and ZAPU. Following majority rule in early 1980 and the cantonment of the ZANLA and ZIPRA under Operation Agila, British Army trainers (the British Military Advisory and Training Team, BMATT) oversaw the integration of guerrilla fighters into one unified army.[1] A battalion structure was overlaid on the existing Rhodesian Army. For the first year a system was followed where the top-performing candidate became battalion commander. If he or she was from ZANLA, then his or her second-in-command was the top-performing ZIPRA candidate, and vice versa. This ensured a balance between the two movements in the command structure. From early 1981 this system was abandoned in favour of political appointments, and ZANLA/ZANU fighters consequently quickly formed the majority of battalion commanders in the ZNA. The ZNA was originally formed into four brigades, 1 Brigade, Matabeleland, 2 Brigade, Mashonaland, 3 Brigade, Manicaland, and 4 Brigade, Masavingo.[2] These brigade comprised a total of 29 battalions. The brigade support units were composed almost entirely of specialists of the former Rhodesian Army, while unintegrated battalions of the Rhodesian African Rifles were assigned to the 1st, 3rd and 4th Brigades. The notorious Fifth Brigade (Zimbabwe) was formed in 1981 and went for retraining in 1984 after allegations of brutality and murder during the Brigade's occupation of Matabeleland. Contrary to popular belief, the Zimbabwe National Army still has a 5th Brigade. [2][3] The ZNA is under the command of Lieutenant General Philip Velario Sibanda, who took over from General Constantine Chiwenga following his elevation to the post of Commander Zimbabwe Defence Forces in December 2003. The ZNA currently has an active duty strength of 30,000. Past Operations Raids On Gorongosa Some Renamo elements had crossed from Mozambique into Zimbabwe several times, had robbed some shops along the border and had burned down a timber factory. After several meetings with Mozambican officials it was agreed that the ZDF could pursue into Mozambique any Renamo elements that might have committed atrocities in Zimbabwe. This was the basis on which the ZDF started planning follow up operations which took them deep into Mozambique and all the way to Gorongossa. Operation Lemon The first of these Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) follow up operations was launched from Katiyo and Aberdeen and it was code named Operation Lemon. The operation lasted from the 5-9 December 1984. It comprised elements of 3 Brigade, the Parachute Group, Special Air Service (SAS), and was supported by the Air Force of Zimbabwe (AFZ). Bad weather conditions and the difficult mountainous terrain reduced the use of aircraft, and all the trooping had to be done by helicopters. The movement of troops on the ground was also difficult. Four contacts were made and two Renamo bases were destroyed. However, most Renamo elements in the bases managed to escape and only eight were captured. The ZDF considered this operation as a major failure and the code word Lemon was corrupted to mean any failure in all subsequent operations. It was further established that there were no other permanent bases in the area, only some advance posts and temporary bases used by Renamo as launching pads for food raids into Zimbabwe. It was also revealed for the first time that the main Renamo bases were at Messinse, Chito, Nyazonia, Buetoni, Gorongossa, Central Base and Cassa Banana. Operation Grape Fruit The report for Operation Lemon was taken seriously by the commanders of the ZDF, and in July 1985 preparations for major offensive operations were started. Rehearsals for a FireForce operation were carried out at Inkomo Barracks near Harare. Three infantry brigades were mobilised together with the Parachute Group, One Commando Battalion and the AFZ. Men and equipment were moved to Chimoio in Mozambique, with a Forward Replenishment Point (FRP) being established at Grand Reef near Mutare. Intelligence sources had indicated that Renamo's main regional base in Manica province was at Muxamba and that Cassa Banana was the national stronghold of Renamo. Both bases had to be attacked and Muxamba was targeted first, being only 70 kilometres south of Chimoio. The most important consideration however, was the hope that activities around Muxamba might divert Renamo's attention from monitoring too closely the movement of the heavily armed three Zimbabwean infantry battalions marching from Chimoio towards the Gorongosa Mountains. Muxamba was believed to hold at least 400 Renamo elements commanded by Major General Mabachi. The attack on Muxamba was launched on the 20th of August 1985 by elements of 3 Brigade, supported by the Parachute Group and the AFZ. The operation went on for four days with minor problems for the ZDF. One helicopter was riddled with small arms fire but managed to get back to Chimoio. Raid on Cassa Banana

Intelligence sources had indicated that Cassa Banana, Renamo's national headquarters had a strength of 400 elements. However, the organisation maintained a string of other smaller bases along the Gorongossa Mountains, which were considered as part of the main base. This raised the total estimated strength in the area to 1 000 elements. During the night of the 27th of August 1985, three Zimbabwe infantry battalions were established in their Form Up Points (FUP) with the help of the SAS and Commando elements. At Chimoio a FireForce was being given final briefing, and five AFZ planes were given orders for a first light take off for Gorongossa on the morning of the 28th of August. Although the Renamo elements captured at Katiyo had given a grid reference for Cassa Banana, further intelligence had cast some doubt as to which of the several Renamo bases scattered on all sides of the Gorongossa Mountains was the actual headquarters of Renamo. It was because of this uncertainty that the FireForce was divided into three sections each with one helicopter gunship, two transport helicopters and two transport aircraft with paratroopers. Each FireForce section was detailed to attack specific suspected Renamo positions around the Gorongossa Mountains. It was during this three pronged attack that one helicopter flew overhead Cassa Banana airstrip and the pilot noticed a green pickup truck disappearing into some bushes. It was then that the pilot recognised the place as that given at the briefing as Cassa Banana. The jets from Thornhill, which were already orbiting overhead a predetermined Initial Point (IP), were then talked on to the target, and the raid on Cassa Banana began. The aircraft attacked the target, knocking out several Anti - Aircraft gun positions. Two helicopter gunships continued to hit suspected strategic positions and managed to flash out several pockets of resistance. A third helicopter was directing the dropping of the first wave of paratroopers. When the paratroopers had entered the base, the infantry battalions, which were close by, were ordered to move in and occupy strategic positions. The FireForce then moved on to deal with the several pockets of resistance from the smaller Renamo bases all along the Gorongosa Mountains. It took the whole day to silence all of these pockets of resistance. Operation Lifeline-Tete Corridor This corridor is a tarred 263-kilometre road running from Nyamapanda on the Zimbabwean border through the Mozambican city of Tete to Zobue on the Malawi border. After UDI in 1965, this route carried Rhodesian goods to and from Malawi, which had not applied United Nations sanctions against the Smith regime. After the independence of Mozambique in 1974, the bulk of Malawi's trade with South Africa went through Rhodesia by road via Tete. It was only in 1984 that trade via this route declined because of Renamo attacks. It was in the wake of these developments that in June 1984 the governments of Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe formed a joint security committee 13 . The aim of the committee was to monitor operations on a day - to - day basis and to attempt to remove all security threats along the Tete Corridor. Zimbabwe's First Mechanised Battalion was ordered to move into Mozambique and they established their headquarters in Tete thereby securing the strategic bridge crossing the Zambezi River. In 1985, President Samora Machel of Mozambique formally requested the governments of Tanzania and Zimbabwe to contribute troops for "the restoration of law and order" in Mozambique. Following this request, Tanzanian troops were deployed into Mozambique in the provinces north of the Zambezi River while Zimbabwe undertook to help restore law and order in the provinces south of the Zambezi River. The decision to send Zimbabwean troops to help restore law and order in Mozambique was partly influenced by Zimbabwe's close relationship with the Mozambican government which dates back to Frelimo's assistance during Zimbabwe's war of liberation. There was also the underlying fact that Frelimo and ZANU shared a common Marxist ideology of scientific socialism. The South Africa-backed Renamo professed to be an anti - communist movement, just like Jonas Savimbi's Unita movement, which was fighting against the Marxist MPLA government of Angola. There was thus an ideological alliance of the Maputo - Harare - Luanda axis, with support for these governments from the Soviet Union. The fact that the United States of America was providing covert and overt support to opposition movements such as Unita in Angola and Renamo in Mozambique reflected the extension of the Cold War to Southern Africa. It was Zimbabwe's involvement in this complicated situation that deteriorated into what some critics have called "Zimbabwe's Vietnam" There is no official Zimbabwean record of the number of casualties on the first raid on Cassa Banana. However, considering the amount of effort, the numbers of troops involved on both sides, and the time it took to capture the base, there must have been a lot of deaths and injuries on both sides. [4] Organisation The bulk of the formations are motorized, but several are more specialized. Commanders 1 Brigade - Brigadier General Chris Mupande 2 Brigade - Brigadier-General Douglas Nyikayaramba 3 Brigade - Brigadier General Davidson Manyika 4 Brigade - Brigadier General Francis Mutisi 5 Brigade - Brigadier General Luke Z Ncube Tank Brigade Mechanized Brigade - Brigadier General Daniel Sigauke Armoured Regiment Artillery Brigade - Colonel Morgan Urayai Munawa Parachute Regiment - Lieutenant Colonel Chosen Mpatiwa Commando Regiment - Lieutenant Colonel Hwami Vengesai Special Air Service - Lieutenant Colonel Panga Kufa Presidential Guards - Brigadier Armstrong Gunda(died) Mounted Infantry Regiment - Lieutenant Colonel Bothwell Brian Chigaba Corps of Engineers - Colonel Jardinious Garira Corps of Intelligence - Colonel M. Mzilikazi Formations • Five Infantry brigades with three battalions each. • The Presidential Guard: Three battalions at Dzivarasekwa barracks led by Brigadier Armstrong Gunda. [5] Also known as the Presidential Guard Group or the Presidential Guard Brigade • A number of infantry battalions (possibly between ten and twenty battalions) • The Tank Regiment • The Mechanized Regiment (IFVs) • Two Field Artillery Regiments (one equipped with Chinese field artillery, one with AA guns & shoulder-launched SAMs)

1 Air Defence Artillery Regiment based at Redcliffe Two Combat Engineer Regiments at Pomona Barracks ZDF Construction Regiment The Commando Regiment (part of the Special Forces of Zimbabwe) The Parachute Regiment (also known as the Parachute Group or Parachute Battalion) (part of the Special Forces of Zimbabwe) • The Special Air Service (part of the Special Forces of Zimbabwe) • The Boat Squadron (part of the Special Forces of Zimbabwe) • The Zimbabwe Mounted Infantry (a horse-mounted unit indirectly derived from Grey's Scouts) (part of the Special Forces of Zimbabwe) • Armored Reconnaissance Squadron Infantry Brigade Organisation Each infantry brigade has: • Three infantry battalions with 31 APCs each • Reconnaissance Company (12 EE-9) • Signals Company • Mortar Battery (6 81/82mm or 120mm) • AA gun battery • Engineer company • Supply and transport • Workshop • Medical units Equipment Armour • Norinco Type 59 MBT - 35 • Norinco Type 69 MBT - 10 • Type 63 light tank - 20 received 1983/1984 from China • T-54 - 20 tanks received from USSR in September 1984.[6] • T-54/55 ARV • T-55 tanks - 12 from North Korea, 1981[7] • EE-9 Cascavel Armoured Car - 90 • EE-11 Urutu - 7 • Panhard AML Armoured Car - 30 • Eland Mk7 - 20 • EQ2050 Armoured Car (Chinese version of the American M998 (HMMWV) - 100 • Type 63 APC- 30 [8] • YW 531 Armoured Personnel Carrier - 30 (8 from China and 22 Korean VTT-323 version) • Unknown type Armoured Personnel Carrier - 22 donated by China in January 2005 [9] • UR-416 Armoured Personnel Carrier - 36 • Crocodile Armoured Personnel Carrier - 40 • BRDM-1 Armoured Personnel Carrier, from North Korea in 1984 - 20 • BRDM-2 Armoured Personnel Carrier, from USSR - 1980 • BTR-152 Armoured Personnel Carrier, from North Korea - 1983 • BTR-50 Armoured personnel carrier, from Syria - 1984 - 40 • ACMAT TPK 4.20 VSC Armoured Personnel Carrier 260. Delivered over 5 years from 1995 [10]. • Steyr-Daimler-Puch 4x4 Armoured Personnel Carrier (exact type not known)- at least 66 • Mine Protected Combat Vehicle - MPCV 4x4 Armoured personnel carrier, locally-produced - 115 [3] Field Artillery • 2S1 122mm Self-propelled howitzer - 12 • D-30/2A18M Towed Artillery (122mm) - 4 • Type 60 howitzer - Towed Artillery (122 mm) - 18 • PRC Type-54 - Towed Artillery (122 mm) - 12 • OTO Melara Mod 56 105mm Pack Howitzer - 18 • L118 Light Gun 105 mm towed howitzer - 12 • PRC Type 63 Multiple Rocket Launcher - 18 • RM-70 Multiple Rocket Launcher - 60 • BM-21 Grad - 25 • 81 mm / 82 mm Mortar - over 600. Includes L16 81mm Mortar and Chinese W91 81mm Long Range mortars. 98 W91 tubes were on the An Yue Jiang. These weapons did get to Zimbabwe. [11] • 2B11 120 mm Mortar - 140 (60 2B11s received from Hungary in 2000[4]) Air Defense Artillery

• • • • •

ZPU-1/-2/-4; ZU-23; M1939 Air Defence Guns - 215 Type 59 100mm AA Guns Type 59 57mm AA Guns ZSU-23-4 Shilka SA-7/SA-18 Igla Surface-to-air missile - 30 Seacat/Tigercat missiles [12] HQ-2 Surface-to-air missile - Reported. Quantity unknown. ATGM missiles have been cited in military exercise reports [13]. LAW 80 and MILAN noted in Zimbabwe Commando Regiment exercises[14] Light Infantry Weapons • L85A1 Assault rifle • AK family of rifles is standard issue infantry weapon • FN FAL sometimes issued the special forces • FN MAG Machine gun • PK machine gun • Dragunov Sniper Rifle • Sako TRG[15] Barracks • Imbizo (Bulawayo) - HQ 1 Brigade, School of Infantry • Hwange - 1.2 Infantry Battalion • Induna (Bulawayo) - 1.1 Infantry Battalion, School of Infantry • Plumtree (Plumtree) - 1.3 Infantry Battalion • Old Cranborne (Harare) - HQ 2 Brigade • Mudzi Barracks – 2.2 Infanrty Battalion • Magunje (Karoi)- 2.3 Infantry Battalion [16] • Chikanga (Mutare) - HQ 3 Brigade • Dangamvura (Mutare) – 3.1 Infantry Battalion • Tsanzaguru (Rusape) - 3.2 Infantry Battalion • Masvingo (Masvingo) - HQ 4 Brigade • Gutu (Gutu) – 4.2 Infantry Battalion • Battlefields (Kadoma) – HQ 5 Brigade • Ingezi (Harare) - 2 Mechanized Battalion, 5.3 Infantry Battalion • Dadaya (Zvishavane) - 5.1 Infantry Battalion • Dzivarasekwa (Harare) - HQ Presidential Guard • State House (Harare) - 1 Presidential Guard Battalion • KG VI (Harare) - Defence Forces HQ, Zimbabwe Staff College • Inkomo (Harare) - Armoured Brigade, Parachute Group • Kabrit (Harare) - Military Intelligence • Redcliff – Air Defence Regiment, Close Air Defence Mechanised Brigade • Chakari – Air Defence Regiment • Pomona (Harare) - School of Combat Engineering • Cranborne (Harare) - HQ Commando Regiment • Darwendale (Darwendale) • Elfrida - Zimbabwe Defence Industries • Connemara (Gweru) - Prison housed here • Guinea Fowl (Gweru) - HQ Mounted Infantry • Kutanga Range - Training School (artillery, armour and airforce bombing range) • Zimbabwe Military Academy (Gweru) • Border Battle School (Nyanga) - Combined Arms Battle school • Lazy Nine (Shurugwi) - Combined Armes Battle School • Nyami-nyami (Kariba) - Boat Squadron • Wafawafa (Kariba) - training grounds .otes 1. ^ Good sources for this first period are Norma J. Kriger, Guerrilla Veterans in Post-war Zimbabwe: Symbolic and Violent Politics, 1980-1987, Cambridge, 2003, and Susan Rice, The Commonwealth Intervention in Zimbabwe 1980, D.Phil thesis, New College Oxford, 1990 2. ^ Kriger, 2003, p.113 3. ^ Peter Gerard Locke & Peter David Farquharson Cooke, Fighting Vehicles and Weapons of Rhodesia 1965-80, P&P Publishing, Wellington 1995 ISSN 0-473-02413-6 4. ^ [1] References

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Rasmussen, R. K., & Rubert, S. C., 1990. A Historical Dictionary of Zimbabwe, Scarecrow Press, Inc., Metuchen, NJ, United States of America. • http://www.iss.org.za/AF/profiles/Zimbabwe/SecInfo.html • Demonstrates ATGM • http://www.zimbabwejournalists.com/story.php?art_id=3364&cat=4 External links • !ational Defence: The Experience of the Zimbabwe Defence Force, by Michael Nyambuya; Major General, Zimbabwe Defence Force, 1996. • Steyr-Daimler-Puch • Zimbabwe Defence Forces Unofficial Website

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http://www.mod.gov.zw/ http://www.mod.gov.zw/

The Zimbabwe National Army is an integral arm of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces' fighting machinery. Its formation was a feat by any definition and a major exercise in diplomacy as it involved the merger of three armies, two of which had been at loggerheads with the other. The liberation forces, comprising the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) had been pitted against the Rhodesian Army, but following a ceasefire which came into effect in 1979, the opposing forces put aside their differences, embraced the policy of reconciliation enunciated by His Excellency the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, Cde Robert Gabriel Mugabe, in a victory broadcast on March 4, 1980 and were integrated into a single, compact entity. As set out in the Zimbabwe Defence Forces policy, the role of the army includes limited conventional war, military assistance to the civil power and civil ministries and external operations. Military aid to the civil power entails counter-insurgency operations that may be carried out by the army or jointly with other security forces to quell civil disorder. Military assistance to the civil ministries is any help that the ZNA can give to maintain essential services during civil disorder or national emergencies like floods, bus accidents, droughts and strikes. The ZNA is under the command of Lieutenant General Philip Velario Sibanda, who took over from General Constantine Chiwenga following his elevation to the post of Commander Zimbabwe Defence Forces i n December 2003. His elevation followed the retirement of General Vitalis Zvinavashe, who became the first commander of the Defence Forces in 1993.

Special Forces of Zimbabwe From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Special Forces of Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia) describes the units of the Zimbabwe National Army that operate as special forces. These forces have been deployed in several African conflicts, including the Mozambique Civil War and the Second Congo War. According to Jane's Special Forces Recognition Guide Special Forces in the Zimbabwe National Army consists of: • One Commando Regiment (formerly One Commando Battalion) and base at Cranborne Barracks, Harare. The commando regiment is led by [1] • One Parachute Regiment (sometimes referred to as Parachute Group) at Inkomo Barracks just North of Harare. The regiment is led by Lieutenant Colonel Charles Mazaiwana. [2] • Combat Diving Unit. • Special Air Service - based at Kabrit Barracks, adjacent to Harare Airport, under the command of Colonel Panga Kufa.[1] • 1 x independent Armored Reconnaissance Squadron • Anti Terrorism Unit which is part of the Zimbabwe Republic Police. • Zimbabwe Mounted Infantry or Grey's Scouts, a horse-mounted reconnaissance unit. The main unit used to be based at Guinea Fowl. The battalion conducts border patrols and anti-poaching operations. The regiment is commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Bothwell Brian Chigaba [3] • Boat Squadron with five sub-units: [2] o A Troop, with an strength of 40 men and equipped with a few interceptor craft.[4] o B Troop maintained assault boats able to ferry troops ashore o C Troop, with a large transporter, the Ubique—a 72 tonne landing craft capable of carrying 30 tonnes of men and equipment including armoured cars. Ubique was also armed with 12.7 and 7.62 mm machine guns for selfprotection and covering fire purposes. o D Troop—this support group was trained for protecting beach-heads and making assault landings for nonspecialised units, employing mortar and support weapons. o E Troop was deployed for the purposes of guarding the harbours on Lake Kariba and around the rest of the squadron, as required. There is also a diving school, equipped with a decompression chamber, operated in conjunction with the commandos. The Police operates patrol boats that include 2 x Rodman 46HJ, 3 x Rodman 38, 5 x Roadman 26, 8 x Type B 79 and an unknown number of Rodman 790s. Operations Mozambique 5-9 December 1984 the Parachute Group and Special Air Service (SAS) spearheaded Operation Lemon. 20th of August 1985 in Operation Grape Fruit the Parachute Group and One Command Battalion supported 3 Brigade in taking over the MNR Muxamba base. 28th of August 1985 SAS and Commando Regiment units lead raid on Casa Banana. 24 January 1986 in Operation Octopus, Paras and Commandos were dropped near Marromeu to secure the town and the sugar refinery. 27 January 1986 several Para drops were made in support of the operation.[3] Congo Zimbabwean commandos defended Kinshasa at the last minute when it was on the brink of falling to rebels to invading Ugandan and Rwandan army units. Due to the river networks in the DRC, the Boat Squadron saw extensive use during the course of Zimbabwe’s involvement. The Parachute Regiment suffered a heavy blow when 15 soldiers and together with their CASA 212 were captured after landing on an airstrip already controlled by the invading forces. It is believed the DRC government army unit they were supposed to join had defected to the rebels. For more on past operations please see the Zimbabwe National Army page. External links • ZNA Special Forces, Training & Weapons • ZNA Amphibious Squadron is mentioned in Parliament • Zimbabwe Mounted Infantry Battalion • Brief history of ZNA's Mounted Infantry & Parachute Battalion References 1. ^ allAfrica.com: Zimbabwe: Army Investigates Reports of Coup Plot (Page 1 of 1) 2. ^ http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Books/Evol_Revol%20Oct%2005/Chap13.pdf 3. ^ Defence Digest - Working Paper 3

Lance Corporal Staff Sergeant

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Air Force of Zimbabwe

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia 1980 Active 5,000 personnel (1999) Size Air Marshal Perence Shiri Commander Air Chief Marshal Josiah Tungamirai .otable commanders Hunter FGA.9, Mi-35P Attack F-7II/N, F-7MG, MiG-23 Fighter O-2 Reconnaissance SF-260, K-8, Hawk Mk 60 Trainer Ilyushin Il-76, An-12, C-212, Islander, AB412SP Transport The Air Force of Zimbabwe (AFZ) is the air force of Zimbabwe. It was known as the Rhodesian Air Force until 1980. At one point the air force was well respected, having been credited with helping defend Kinshasa in 1998, but most planes of Western origin have been grounded in recent years for lack of spare parts due to the EU arms embargo. The air force has reduced its reliance on Western arms and has acquired Chinese K-8 trainers to replace the BAe Hawks. Testimony to the quality training of the AFZ in the past was the fact the South African Air Force had turned to Zimbabwean instructors to meet its needs in both flying and maintenance engineering.[1] The air force has Hawker Hunters, BAE Hawks, and Chinese Chengdu F-7 interceptors, as well as a variety of helicopters. Total personnel was estimated at about 5,000 in 1999, and there are three main airbases, Gweru-Thornhill, Manyame Air Base near Harare and Fylde Air Base near Chegutu. There are also several Forward Air Fields (FAF) like Grand Reef, Buffalo Range, Hwange and Kotwa around the country.[2] They also have an underground armoury and other facilities in the mountain ranges around Darwendale. In July 2003 the AFZ demonstrated recently-acquired MiG-23 jets and Mi-35 helicopter gunships. Current organisational structure The Air Force comprises the Engineering Wing (responsible for aircraft maintenance, aeronautical inspection services, Mechanical, Electrical and Ground equipment services); the Administration Wing (which supports the running of the air force and includes the accounts section, the orderly room, stores, canteens, the recruiting of personnel, and the purchasing of aircraft and equipment); the Flying Wing (includes the Flying School for new pilots, the Parachute Training School, and aircrew personnel), and the Regimental Wing (includes 201, 203 and the now defunct 203 Squadrons which are responsible for guarding air force personnel and installation). The Engineering Wing is also responsible for the School of Technical Training which is a tetairy education institution responsible for training aircraft maintanance engineering technicians, It is the only federation aviation school in Africa. The Flying Wing comprises eight Squadrons deployed at three main bases, with two more smaller bases also owned by the military but without resident Squadrons.[3] Aircraft Current • Nanchang K-8 Karakorum - 11. These are the upgraded K-8E with glass cockpit • Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-23 Flogger - multi-role fighter (2 seen in 2003 fly past) and currently believed to be stored at Thornhill because they are "excess to requirements". • Chengdu F-7 II/N Airguard - only 6 or 7 were operational when the DRC war started. It is believed an additional 12 were acquired early 1999.[4] a third batch of the Chengdu F-7 MG variant was acquired in November 2004.[5] • Guizhou FT-7BZ - conversion trainer (2) • SIAI SF260M/TP/W - basic trainer (49 delivered) • Ilyushin Il-76 Candid - (1) • Boeing 720-025 - VIP transport (1, status unknown) • BAe 146 - VIP transport (1) • Gulfstream III - VIP transport. Photographed in South Africa, 8 October 2008. [1] • Yakovlev Yak-40 Codling - VIP transport (3)

Antonov An-12 Cub - transport aircraft (1) CASA C212-200 Aviocar - medium transport aircraft (14 delivered) Harbin Y-12 - Light Transport C-47TP-AR Air Reconnaissance Aircraft - 3 C-47 Skytrains (Dakota) were converted to C-47TP-AR for EW/ELINT operations.Before the upgades, one aircraft (R7134) used as Airborne Command Post, while another (R3702) was equipped with extensive electronic surveillance equipment. Both were withdrawn from service in late 1992[6] • Britten-Norman BN-2A Islander - light utility aircraft (6) • Cessna FTB.337G and O-2A - light utility aircraft (23 delivered, 3 were lost in operations in the DRC) • Mil Mi-35P Hind - assault helicopter (IISS The Military Balance lists 2 Mi-35s and 4 Mi-35) • Eurocopter AS532 Cougar - medium utility helicopters (2 used as presidential helicopters) • Agusta-Bell 412SP - light utility helicopter, some were armed with rockets for the DRC conflict. (12 delivered) • Aerospatiale SE-316B Alouette III - light utility helicopter (4 participated during the air show in 2005) Future Zimbabwe has been interested in Mig-29s in the past. A USD300+ order for a squadron was placed with Russia in the late 80s but was cancelled in 1992 [2] when the region stabilised as South Africa withdrew from Angola and Namibia. Negotiations to buy Mig-29SMTs were held again in 2004 [3] but an order for Chngedu FC-1 fighter was placed instead [4]. See The Military Balance, 2005 to 2009 issues. • Chengdu JF-17 Thunder - multirole fighter aircraft jointly developed by the Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group(CAC) and Pakistan Aeronautical Complex(PAC) for the export market. 12 ordered in 2004. [5] Armaments • Mk.82 bombs • Matra 155 - 68mm rockets • Hunting BL.755 cluster bombs • CB-470 cluster bombs • PL-9[7] • AIM-9B Sidewinder • PL-7 • PL-5[8] Integrated air defence system Zimbabwe's integrated air defence system has at least two CEIEC 408-C radars providing long-range air surveillance coverage from the ground, serving as prime sensor. They are able to detect targets at up to 600 km. There are also some JY-14 radars. JY-14 Radar is a 320 km (192 mi) range 3-D radar that is resistant to clutter and jamming [6]. They are complemented by some gap-filler radars including the JY-9 Radar. SELENIA ATCR-22 type radars are also used and one is in Gweru. In 1990 Defence and Foreign Affairs Weekly (February 19-25), reported that Zimbabwe was purchasing a complete air defence system from China, including radar arrays and complete command, control, and communications network. In 1992-93 the Ministry of Public Construction had entries for an "Air Defence Project," consisting of Command Centres in Harare and Gweru, a Command Maintenance Centre, and radars in Harare, Gweru, Chegutu, Chivhu, Hwange and four other sites, plus twelve communications positions.[9] The radar network was upgraded in 2006.[10] It is likely the news of "Chinese radar, anti-air missiles for Mugabe's palace"[7] stemmed from here. Zimbabwe is reported to have received some HQ-2 surface-to-air missiles. Some sources also list Seacat/Tigercat missiles.[11] Rank structure The AFZ's rank structure is similar to the RAF's rank structure from where, via the Rhodesian Air Force, its ranks were derived. Officers In descending order of importance the AFZ officer ranks are: Air Chief Marshal (not currently used) Air Marshal Air Vice Marshal Air Commodore Group Captain Wing Commander Squadron Leader Flight Lieutenant Air Lieutenant Air Sub Lieutenant Officer Status Cadet Officer Airmen In descending order of importance the AFZ airman ranks are: Warrant Officer Class I Master Technician Warrant Officer Class II Master Sergeant Flight Sergeant Sergeant Corporal Senior Aircraftman Leading Aircraftman Aircraftsman DRC Campaign In 1998 the AFZ was staffed with well-trained, experienced, disciplined, and courageous personnel.[12] Consequently, the AFZ entered this war as the best-equipped and trained of all involved flying services. The No.2 AFZ Squadron was flying 12 BAe Hawk T.Mk.60/60As, which are used as strike-fighters – equipped with AIM-9B Sidewinder AAMs, Mk.82-series bombs, and Hunting BL.755 cluster-bomber units (CBUs), as well as launchers for unguided rockets. Only six or seven F-7s were fully mission-capable. At the time the war in Congo was to break out Zimbabwe was in the middle of negotiations with China for an additional batch of 12 F-7s. For transport, the AFZ had the No.3 Squadron, flying 12 CASA C.212-200 and six Britten-Norman BN-2A Islander light transports which had already seen heavy service, and were to see even more of this in Congo. Transport and liaison were also duties of the No.7 Squadron, equipped with Aérospatiale SA.316B Alouette IIIs (including ex-Portuguese Air Force- and Romanian IARbuilt examples), as well as of the No.8 Squadron, equipped with Agusta-Bell 412SPs which were later armed with rockets launchers for this war. However, the later unit was soon to play a significant role in the war in Congo, as it was only recently equipped with the most recent addition to the AFZ: six Mi-35 helicopters (including two Mi-35Ps). The first AFZ Mi-35-crews were trained at Thornhill AB, in Gweru, by Russian instructors. CO of this unit was Sqn.Ldr. Mukotekwa. In mid-August 1998 the AFZ deployed between five and six F-7s, most of C.212s, and something like a dozen of helicopters – including Alouettes, Bell 412s and Mi-35s – to Congo. All were flown by Zimbabwean pilots. Later on, after receiving an urgent shipment of spares, the AFZ apparently deployed some of Hawks as well, which, at the start of the war, had been reported as not in flyable condition. It was therefore so that the AFZ contingent in Congo in August and September 1998 consisted of flights from No.3, No.5, No.7 and No.8 Squadrons, while a flight from No.2 Squadron was to follow later. The first noted AFZ operation was when, on 26 August 1998, they destroyed a 5 km armored column of rebels as they were approaching Kinshasa.[13] After defeating the invaders in Kinshasa, the Zimbabweans in belief that Kabila's government was already safe – suggested that there was no need to continue the war, and peace should be negotiated.

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The result was that the rebels reinforced their efforts: the Rwandans and Ugandans were also rushing better-equipped units into the battle as well. Indeed, the garrisons in eastern Congo that remained loyal to Kabila were falling one after the other. They simultaneously attacked also the Ndigili airport, in Kibanseke Province, held by Zimbabwean troops, as well as Kitona. In both cases the AFZ responded with fierce air strikes, offering rebels the opportunity to claim that up to 100 civilians were killed by their bombs. In a series of fierce battles fought between 4 and 13 September 1998, during which finally also the Angolan mechanised forces were able to deploy their full firepower. The Chadian contingent was meanwhile deployed in NE Congo, where it participated in recapture of Lubutu. The AFZ and FAC were active in this area for several days, flying a number of strikes during which also clusterbomb units (CBUs) were used. According to government reports 45 rebels were killed and 19 captured in this battle On 13 September, when the Angolans attacked towards Kamina, while the Zimbabweans found themselves under fierce attacks by thousands of rebels in the Manono area. It was in this area that the AFZ suffered its first documented loss of this war: on 4 September the SF.260MC flown by Sqn.Ldr. Sharunga crashed in bad weather, killing the pilot. Nine days later also an Alouette III helicopter carrying several high officers – including Col. Kufa and Sqn.Ldr. Vundla – was shot down by rebels in eastern central Congo. Kufa and Vundla were killed, while Flt.Sgt. Sande was captured by RCD. In late October 1998, the Zimbabweans launched an offensive – to a degree possible due to deployment of additional foreign troops in Congo, including some 2.000 Namibians – in SE Congo. This began with a series of air strikes, partially flown by BAe Hawk T.Mk.60s of the No.2 Squadron, newly deployed in Congo, and by F7s of the No.5 Squadron. These first targeted airfields in Gbadolite, Dongo and Gmena, and then rebel and Rwandan communications and depots in Kisangani area, on 21 November. On the following day the No.2 Squadron prepared a special mission, launching a strike package of six aircraft, armed with Mk.82 bombs and Matra 155 rocket launchers for unguided rockets calibre 68mm: reaching out far over central Congo they appeared over the Lake Tanganyika and attacked ferries used to transport Burundi troops and supplies into the war in Congo. According to Zimbabwean reports their strike came as a complete surprise: with no other means of air defence but machine-guns and light infantry weapons, six ferries were sunk and 600 Burundi and Rwandan troops killed. In a similar attack, on 7 December 1998, Zimbabwean planes or helicopters sank two rebel boats on Lake Tanganyika some 40 km north of Moba.[14] There were only very few reports about the fighting in the next few days, probably because the Congolese, Zimbabwean and Angolan governments found themselves under heavy pressure from Western powers because of this offensive. The few reports released from sources close to the rebels indicated Zimbabwean and Congolese attacks on Nuyuzu, Kasinge and towards Manono, supported even by T-62 tanks and heavy artillery. According to Zimbabwean reports the Hawks and F-7s continued their operations by additional attacks against Kalemi, on 24 November, and a new round of strikes against different airfields in eastern Congo, two days later, during which the pilots of No.5 Squadron claimed destruction of an unidentified An-12 transport on the ground.[12] Commanders • 1981 - 1983 Air Marshal Norman Walsh[15] • July 1983 - January 1986 Air Marshal Azim Daudpota (Loan service from Pakistan Air Force)[16] • 1986 - 1992 Air Marshal Josiah Tungamirai[17] • 1992 - present Air Marshal Perence Shiri[18] References 1. ^ "SAAF says skills drain prompted Zim deal". South African Air Force. 9 December 2005. http://www.saairforce.co.za/news05.htm. Retrieved 2007-07-27. 2. ^ http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html 3. ^ "Air Force of Zimbabwe". Aeroflight. 9 March 2003. http://www.aeroflight.co.uk/waf/aa-africa/zim/zim-af-home.htm. Retrieved 2007-07-27. 4. ^ http://www.futura-dtp.dk/Flysiden/Fly/Kina/J-7ZI.htm 5. ^ http://www.forecastinternational.com/archive/mea/0114.htm 6. ^ http://www.aeroflight.co.uk/waf/aa-africa/zim/dakota.htm 7. ^ http://www.forecastinternational.com/archive/mea/0288.htm 8. ^ http://www.sinodefence.com/airforce/weapon/pl5.asp 9. ^ http://www.zimbabwedefence.com/c4isr.html 10. ^ http://www.thezimbabwean.co.uk/6 may 2005/cyber-war.html 11. ^ http://www.forecastinternational.com/archive/mea/meindex1.doc 12. ^ a b http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/printer_190.shtml 13. ^ http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/world/africa/158672.stm 14. ^ http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/irin_1211998.html 15. ^ http://www.rhodesianforces.org/RhodesianAirForce.htm 16. ^ http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_185.shtml 17. ^ http://newsfromrussia.com/world/2005/08/26/61789.html 18. ^ http://www.mod.gov.zw/airforce/airforce.htm • Roy Nesbit and Dudley Cowdery with Andrew Thomas, Britain's Rebel Air Force: The War from The Air In Rhodesia 1965-1980 (Grub Street, 1998) ISBN 1-902304-05-5 includes an AFZ chapter External links • Air Force of Zimbabwe Official Site • Description of AFZ • Aircraft details • News report about AFZ groundings • News report mentioning new aircraft • AFZ Hawk Mk 60 displayed with Sidewiders • AFZ Hawks UFO Interception • Zimbabwe's integrated air defence system (DOC file) • HQ-2

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Contraction of Darwendale Tunnels AFZ Hangers in Mountain Ranges Air Force of Zimbabwe (AFZ) Zimbabwe Defence Forces Unofficial Website

K-8 Karakorum Trainer at Ysterplaat Airshow, Cape Town

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www.uniforminsignia.net

Zimbabwe Republic Police

Cap badge of the Zimbabwe Republic Police From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The cap badge of the Zimbabwe Republic Police. Surrounding the emblem is the Latin motto, Pro lege, pro patria, pro populo, or "For the law, the nation, and the people" The Zimbabwe Republic Police (or ZRP) is the national police force of Zimbabwe, known until July 1980 as the British South Africa Police. Structure The force consists of at least 21,800 officers and is headquartered in Harare [1]. The force is organised by province, and comprises uniformed national police, the Criminal Investigation Department, and traffic police. It also includes specialist support units including the (paramilitary) Police Support Unit and riot police, a Police Internal Security and Intelligence unit (the equivalent of the Rhodesian Special Branch); and ceremonial and canine units. Overall command of the force is exercised by the commissioner Augustine Chihuri. Formation and Africanisation The predecessor of the Zimbabwe Republic Police was the British South Africa Police of Rhodesia and the interim state of Zimbabwe Rhodesia. Following the achievement of independence for Zimbabwe in 1980 the force had a strength of about 11,000 officers (of whom about 60% were white) and a further 35,000 police reservists (nearly all of whom white). After independence, the force followed an official policy of "Africanisation", in which senior white officers—predominantly former British residents of the colony of Rhodesia—were retired and their positions filled by Zimbabwean black officers. In 1982 Wiridzayi Nguruve, who had joined the force as a Constable in 1960, became the first black Commissioner of the force. Criticism Since 2000, the ZRP has faced criticism from Zimbabwean and international NGOs such as Amnesty International for alleged political bias and what is claimed to be its part in what many describe as a systematic violation of rights to freedom of expression, association and assembly [2]. The Commissioner of the ZRP, Augustine Chihuri, is open about his political loyalty to the ZANU-PF party (Zimbabwe's ruling party, led by President Robert Mugabe), saying in 2001 "Many people say I am Zanu PF. Today, I would like to make it public that I support Zanu PF because it is the ruling party. If any other party comes to power, I will resign and let those who support it take over" [3]. The ZRP are alleged to take bribes routinely[citation needed]. According to Transparency International the police and justice system of Zimbabwe are extensively corrupted[citation needed]. .otes ^ 1. The Military Balance 2003/2004, International Institute for Strategic Studies ^ 2. Amnesty International, AFR 46/003/2005 ^ 3. Daily !ews, Harare, 2 June 2001 References • Zimbabwe Intelligence Profile, 2003 • AFR 46/003/2005 - Amnesty International 2005 report on Zimbabwe election intimidation • Kent Rasmussen, R., & Rubert, S. C., 1990. Historical Dictionary of Zimbabwe, Scarecrow Press, Metuchen, N.J., USA. Sources 1. World Police Encyclopedia, ed. by Dilip K. Das & Michael Palmiotto. by Taylor & Francis. 2004, 2. World Encyclopedia of Police Forces and Correctional Systems, 2nd. edition, Gale., 2006 3. Sullivan, Larry E. et al. Encyclopedia of Law Enforcement. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2005. External links • About the Zimbabwe Republic Police and its History

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ZIMBABWE POLICE MALE CAP BADGE - ZIMBABWE POLICE LADIES CAP BADGE

ZIMBABWE SENIOR POLICE SGT. ARM BADGE - ZIMBABWE POLICE LADIES COLLAR BADGE

www.uniforminsignia.net

Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) ABOUT THE ZRP / HISTORY OF CO.VE.TIO.AL POLICI.G Who started conventional policing, and why was it started? What does conventional policing mean? A convention is usually a group of members of a certain profession for example a group of doctors or teachers. Systematic policing was considered necessary to curb rising crime rate in the world. Britain used to be policed by night watchmen and volunteers. According to a book written by Clive Emsley, entitled, "The English Police! A Political and Social History ", conventional policing started in 1829. Sir Robert Peel who was the Secretary of Home Affairs initiated the move and formed the metropolitan police. Traditionally we say, professional policing was started in Britain (London City). In 1945 New York followed suit and formed a police to run along professional lines. In Zimbabwe the British South Africa Police was born outside our borders in 1889. That police was basically formed to protect the members and interests of the Pioneer Column who were coming to this country.The Force incorporated a contigent of blacks on its inception Although both were attested into the police organisation as constables, blacks had the discriminative tern 'native' prefixed to their ranks, and could not be promoted beyond the rank of Sergeant Major. During this era, the seniority of blacks did not effect their white workmates who were junior to them, as they could still be used by the latter. Blacks were issued with an inferior quality uniform, different from Cde Augustine Chihuri the whites and with no shoes, which were considered a preserve for whites. They were expected to The Commissioner Of Police do their duties barefooted The advent of the British South Africa Company Police introduced indirectly to Zimbabwe the idea of one organised unit, policing different people with diverse cultures but living in the same country. The Victoria Charter had empowered the formation of that police force. The police force went through a number of political eras and that subsequently initiated modifications and remodifications to suit the demands dictated by existing governments. During the period of the federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Southern Rhodesia and Unilateral Declaration of Independence the police went through a number of changes due to socio-economic demands. The police was never disbanded but political changes usually compromised the standards of professional policing. In 1980, Zimbabwe attained independence and the police force changed its name to the Zimbabwe Republic Police. Section 93 (1) of the Zimbabwe Constitution mandated the restructuring of the police force on professional lines as to provide the best service possible to earn the total satisfaction, confidence and support of the public. Although the new look police force was formed with an amalgamation of the former British South Africa Police, The Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA), Zimbabwe Peoples' Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) cadres and new civilian recruits, it has strived to maintain the professionalism, consistence and vibrancy required of a standard modern police force. The primary role of the black contigent, then known as the Black watchers, was to do all the manual dirty work considered unsuitable for the white superior race such as foot patrols, escorting sick horses on foot to the vet in then Salisbury, the capital city sometimes walking more than 300 kilometres. Under the supervision of the white officers, the Black watchers were also tasked to perform other barbaric acts like beating up and burning the houses of fellow blacks accused of having disobeyed the white man's rule. The black members, who were considered inferior to their white counterparts had their recruit training at Tomlinson in Salisbury, which was known as the NativePolice Training Depot (NPTD), while the whites were trained at a nearby and better- equipped training centre at Morris Depot. As part of their curriculum, latter were taught to consider blacks not as colleagues, but as part of the equipment at their disposal in their day- to- day duties.

A police detail ready for inspection putting on a hat shako,drill shoes puttees, leather belt, a khaki short and a khaki shirt.The Uniform was phased out in early 1970s The first black Police Commissioner W. NGURUVE officiating a passout parade A native police detail in police uniform ready for a general patrol. They had no shoes and they were only introduced during the second world war (1939- 1945) http://www.moha.gov.zw/index.php?link=zrp_history

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