(3) Non Fatal Offences

March 12, 2019 | Author: AFA | Category: Assault, Intention (Criminal Law), Victimology, Crimes, Crime & Justice
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NON-FATAL OFFENCES ASSAULT 1  The parties involve are A, as the accused and B, as the victim. Then, the issue here is whether B can be held liable for assault as defined under Section 351 of the Penal Code and punishable under Section 352 of the same code for pointed a water pistol to B. LAW PRINCIPLE Section 351 defines assault as gesture or preparation in conveying the threat of violence that causes the apprehension that constitute the offence. In determining whether A can be held liable for assault, we must see whether whether his act falls falls within within the the meaning meaning of assaul assault. t. The 2 elements elements to an assault are physical gesture and the intention to cause threat that the victim will apprehend. The physical gesture need not be an actual force and requires no contact with the body. In the case of  Sammy Pillay , the accused was charged for an offence of assault in respect of his action in  pointing a revolver at the complainant complainant in a coffee shop. shop. In this situat situation, ion, there there is an issue issue to the effect of  liability since A since A is a prankster . If Section 351 is read literally, it states that an act amounts to assault as long long as there here is gest gestur ure e or prep prepar arat atio ion n and and no bodi bodily ly cont contac act. t. Then Then,, in  Jashanmal  Jashanmal Jhamatmal, the court held that when the accused put on his hand towards the woman in a menacing manner so as to cause her to apprehend that he was was abou aboutt us use e crimi crimina nall force force,, it was was an assa assault ult.. Howe Howeve ver, r, the the cour court’ t’s s interpretation was differs in the case of  Dato Sri S Samy Vellu v S Nadarajah, the accused went on a meeting and in that meeting he tried to hit the victim.  The court stated that whether a certain act amounts to an assault  depends upon the reason reasonable able appreh apprehens ension ion which which a person person entert entertains ains about about crimina criminall force force being imminent. imminent. If there is no present present ability to use criminal force, there cannot be reasonable apprehension. APPLICATION In applying the law to the situation, there is a physical gesture directed by A to B when he pointed the water pistol. If the literal literal interpretat interpretation ion is applied, applied, A can be held liable even if there is no intention to either use criminal force or make no bodily contact. However, in this case, the court’s interpretation shall apply. A pointing a water pistol does not cause reasonable apprehension to B. CONCLUSION In conclusion, A cannot be held liable for assault under Section 351.

ASSAULT 2  The parties involve in volve are A, the accused and B, the victim. The issue here is whether A can be held liable for assault as defined under Section 351 of the Penal Code for rolling up her sleeves and uttered words of threat to B and punishable under Section 352 of the same code. LAW PRINCIPLE Section 351 defines assault as gesture or preparation in conveying the threat of violence that causes the apprehension that constitute the offence. In determining whether A can be held liable for assault, we must see whether whether his act falls within the meaning of assault. assault. The first element of assault is there must be a physical physical gesture. The physical The  physical gesture need not be an actual force and requires no contact with the body . In Sammy Pillay , the accused was charged for an offence of assault in respect of his action in pointing a revolver at the complainant in a coffee shop. there must must intent intention ion that the victim victim will will appreh apprehend. end. In this this Secondly, there situ situat atio ion, n, ther there e is an issu issue e whet whether her words words can can amou amount nt to an assa assaul ult  t . The The general rule is that words cannot amount to assault. However, words can colour gestures to indicate intention. In Read v Coker , the plaintiff was fired by the defendant. defendant. Two days later, later, the plaintiff plaintiff returned to the premises premises owned by the defendant defendant and refused refused to leave. leave. The defendant defendant gathered gathered up some some of his men and threat threatened ened him that that if he didn’t didn’t leave, leave, they would would break his neck. neck. The plaintiff left fearing the men would strike him. The court held that it was an assault. Gesture and intent locked the deal. In Illustration (c),  A takes up a stick saying to Z “I will give you a beating”. Here, though the words used by A could in no case amou mount to an assault and though mere ere gesture is unaccompanied by any other circumstances might not amount to an assault, the gesture explained by the words amounts may amount to an assault. APPLICATION In applying the law to the situation, A conducted a mere act of rolling up her sleeve sleeve accompa accompanied nied by words words of assault assault.. Thus, Thus, eventh eventhoug ough h the threat threats s uttered by A may not amounting to assault as in general rule, but her threats was accompanied by her gesture by the act of rolling up her sleeve. CONCLUSION In conclusion, A can be held liable for assault under Section 351 and punishable under 352.

ASSAULT 3  The parties involve are A the accused and B the victim. The issue here is whether A can be held liable for assault as defined under Section 351 of the Penal Code for pointing a sharpened bamboo stick to B and punishable under Section 352 of the same code. LAW PRINCIPLE Section 351 defines assault as gesture or preparation in conveying the threat of violence that causes the apprehension that constitute the offence. In determining whether A can be held liable for assault, we must see whether whether his act falls within the meaning of assault. assault. The first element of assault is there must be a physical physical gesture. The physical The  physical gesture need not be an actual force and requires no contact with the body . In Sammy Pillay , the accused was charged for an offence of assault in respect of his action in pointing a revolver at the complainant in a coffee shop.

Secondly , there must intention that the victim will apprehend. In this situ situat atio ion, n, ther there e is an issu issue e whet whether her words words can can amou amount nt to an assa assaul ult  t . The The general rule is that words cannot amount to assault. However, words can colour gestures to indicate intention. In the case of  Tuberville v Savage, the accused had a sword in his hand and uttered “if it is not assize time, I would take such language from you”. you”. The court held that the words negative the intention and therefore no assault. Thus, words can also negative an intention. APPLICATION In applying the law, eventhough A made physical gestures by pointing a shar sh arpen pened ed bambo bamboo o stic stick k to B. Bu But, t, he had had utte uttere red d word words s that that nega negativ tive e his his intention to cause apprehension which prevent him from doing the threat which he said that he will execute the threat if B is not his brother. CONCLUSION In conclusion, A cannot be held liable for assault under Section 351.

CRIMINAL INTIMIDATION  The parties involve are A, the accused and B, the victim. The issue is whether A can be held liable for criminal intimidation as defined under Section 503 of the Penal Code and punishable under section 506 of the same code for causing threat to B. LAW PRINCIPLE Section 503 defines criminal intimidation as a threat which intent to cause alarm to that person as the means of avoiding the execution of threat. In determining whether A can be held liable for criminal intimidation, we must see whether his act falls within the meaning of the offence. There are two (2) elements that must be satisfied.

Firstly, there must be a threat to cause an injury to persons, reputation or property. Section 44 defines injury as any harm illegally caused to any person, body, body, mind, mind, reputa reputatio tion, n, or proper property  ty . In the case of  Sinna Sinnasa samy my v PP, the accused threatens to kill the victim with a parang, the court held that there is suffi su ffici cient ent evid evident ent to su supp ppor ortt a crimi crimina nall inti intimi mida dati tion on beca becaus use e the the para parang ng is sufficient to constitute a threat. However it is not essential to have a weapon as mere would suffice.  The second element is that there was an intention to cause alarm. The  person have to be alarmed by the threat and the accused must have the intention to cause alarm which is to cause a person to do any act which he is not  legally bound to do or to omit any act which that person is legally bound to do so . In the case of  Lee Yoke Choong v PP , the important requirement to constitute criminal intimidation is the intention of the maker and the nature of threat, in which it would be enough to conclude that the maker of the threats had the intention to cause alarm.  Then, in the case of  PP v Aziz Bin Wee , the accused had picked up a dangerous weapon and shouted ‘try if you want to get it’ as the staff of Ministry of Health was trying to remove the accused good as he has no license to operate a food stall. The court decided that, anyone who had faced with the accused while holding the knife near to him must have been gravely alarmed. Thus, the accused was guilty of criminal intimidation. APPLICATION

CONCLUSION In conclusion, A may be held liable for criminal intimidation under section 504 of the Penal Code and punishable under section 506 of the same code for causing threat to B.

CRIMINAL FORCE  The parties involve are A, the accused and B, the victim. The issue is whether A can be held liable for criminal force as defined under Section 350 of  the Penal Code and punishable under section 352 of the same code for spittle on B. LAW PRINCIPLE Section 350 defines criminal force as if an accused caused motion, change of motion or cessation of motion to any substance as to bring it into contact to body body as to create create feeling feeling,, by his own bodily bodily power, disposin disposing g su subst bstanc ance e or  inducing animals to move. move. Force is further defined in section 349 as a person is said to use force on another if he causes motion, change of motion or cessation of motion. motion . In determining whether A can be held liable for criminal force, we must see whether his act falls within the meaning of the offence. The first element which which is the the actus actus reus reus of this this offenc offence e is that the force must be intent intentiona ionally lly inflicted, as it is not sufficiently to constitute an offence if force was accidently or recklessly inflicted or that the offender knew his action was likely to cause force. In Ng Eng Huat v PP, there was no direct force but the movement was affected when the appellant intentionally reversed his car to collide with the other car.  The court held that the appellant’s act was an intentional and deliberate act and he had used criminal force.  The second element is that the force must be used on a person. person. The person must be the ultimate object of the force. No offence of criminal force is committed when the lock of a house is broken or where a ladder is removed leaving the victim stranded on the roof of a house. Its shows that the purpose of  doing such acts is to directly affect the person. In the case of  Raja Izzuddin Shah v PP , the accused was convicted with the offence under section 353 when he had slapped the complainant who was a police officer, dragged him by shirt and pushed him against the wall.  Then, the third element of this offence is the force must be without the victim’s consent. Where the victim consents to the use of force, there is no offence. APPLICATION

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, conclusion, A may be held liable for criminal criminal force under section 350 of  the Penal Code and punishable under section 352 of the same code for causing threat to B.

CRIMINAL FORCE TO OUTRAGE MODESTY   The parties involve are A, the accused and B, the victim. The issue is whether A can be held liable for criminal force to outrage modesty as defined under Section 354 of the Penal Code and punishable under the same section for using force to outrage the modesty of B. LAW PRINCIPLE Section 354 of the Penal Code provides that whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any person, intending to outrage or knowing it to be likely that  he will thereby outrage the modesty of that person. Force is further defined in section 349 as a person is said to use force on another if he causes motion, change of motion or cessation of motion. motion . In determining whether A can be held liable for criminal force, we must see whether his act falls within the meaning of the offence. The first element which which is the the actus actus reus reus of this this offenc offence e is that the force must be intent intentiona ionally lly inflicted, as it is not sufficiently to constitute an offence if force was accidently or recklessly inflicted or that the offender knew his action was likely to cause force. In Rajeevan v PP, the accused was convicted of this offence for slipping his left hand through the gap between the bus’s bus’s window and the victim’s victim’s seat. He then pressed the victim’s blouse twice at the left breast region.  The second element is that the force must be used on a person. person. The person must be the ultimate object of the force. In the case of  Tan Beng Chye v PP, the accused had taken the victim to some bushes, removed his short and inner pants. He then made the victim take off her coat and trousers leaving her in knickers, knickers, which she refused refused to take off. The accused accused then arrested, arrested, charged charged and convicted for attempted rape. The appeal court held there was no sufficient eviden evidence ce in the act to consti constitut tute e rape rape but his attempt attempt to remove remove her knickers knickers was evidence of use of force to outrage her modesty.  Then, the third element of this offence is the force must be without the victim’s consent. Where the victim consents to the use of force, there is no offence. APPLICATION

CONCLUSION In conclusion, A may be held liable for criminal force to outrage modesty under section section 354 of the Penal Code and punishable under the same section for causing threat to B.

HURT  The parties involve in volve are A, the accused and B, the victim. The issue here is whether A can be held liable for hurt as defined under Section 321 of the Penal code for punching B and punishable under Section 323 of the same code. LAW PRINCIPLE Sect Section ion 32 321 1 defin defines es volu volunt ntar arily ily caus causing ing hurt hurt as an act act done done with with the the intention of causing hurt to another person or with knowledge that he is likely cause hurt the person and the hurt caused is said to be voluntarily. furtherr defines defines hurt as  person who causes bodily pain, Section 319 furthe disease or infirmity to another person. person . Then, infirmity was defined in the case of  Anis Beg as inability of an organ to perform its normal function which may be either temporary or permanent. In determining whether B can be held liable for causing hurt, we must see whether his act falls within the meaning of the offence. The actus reus of this offence is causing bodily pain, diseases or infirmity to any person. Then, the mens rea is the intention or knowledge to cause hurt.  The first element needs to be proved is i s the act must m ust be done voluntarily. voluntary act as when one causes it by means he intended Section 39 defines voluntary to do it or at that time, knew k new and believe to likely to cause it . Then, in the case of   Jashanmal  Jashanmal Jhamatmal Jhamatmal v Brahmanand Brahmanand , it was said that there was nothing in the provision to suggest that hurt should be caused by direct physical contact  between the accused and the victim. Secondly, the act must be accompanied with knowledge and intention to cause and thereby caused hurt. In PP v Mahfar bin Sairan , it was held that where where an acti action on lack lacked ed inten intenti tion on or know knowle ledg dge, e, it also also lacks lacks the the esse essent ntia iall element of voluntary. Then, in Manzoor Ahmad v State of Allahabad , the accused, after an argument with a 15 year old boy, fed him with copper sulphate which led to his collapse and subsequent admission to hospital for a stomach wash. The court held that hurt can be either temporary or permanent. So long caused infirmity, it is sufficient. APPLICATION

CONCLUSION In the conclusion, A can be held liable for causing hurt towards B under Section 321 of the Penal Code and punishable under section 323 of the same code.

GRIEVOUS HURT  The parties involve in volve are A, the accused and B, the victim. The issue here is whether A can be held liable for hurt as defined under Section 322 of the Penal code for punching B and punishable under Section 325 of the same code. LAW PRINCIPLE Section 322 defines voluntarily causing grievous hurt as an act done with the intention of causing grievous hurt to another another person or with knowledge that he is likely to cause grievous hurt the person and the grievous hurt caused is said to be voluntarily. In determining determining whether B can be held liable for causing grievous grievous hurt, we must see whether his act falls within the meaning of the offence. In the case of  PP v Sng Siew Ngoh, it was provided that for an offence of voluntarily causing grievous hurt, it is necessary to show: 1. The hurt hurt was was cause caused d volunt voluntaril arily; y; 2. The accused accused intended intended or or knew he was was likely to to cause grievou grievous s hurt; hurt; and 3. The hurt hurt caus caused ed was was grievo grievous us hurt. hurt. For For the the first eleme element nt,, the the offen offende derr must must volun volunta taril rily y commi committ the the act act. Secondly, the accused must intended or knew he was likely to cause to cause grievous hurt. In the case of  PP v Mahfar bin Sairan , it was held that where an action action lacked lacked intent intention ion or knowled knowledge, ge, it also also lacks lacks the essent essential ial element element of  voluntary.  Then, lastly hurt becomes grievous hurt when hurt takes one of the forms stated in section 320 of the Penal Code. [State any of the forms applicable according to the question]. APPLICATION

CONCLUSION In the conclusion, A can be held liable for causing grievous hurt towards B under Section 322 of the Penal Code and punishable under section 325 of the same code.

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