2945134 Consti 1 Digests Compile

Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan and Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul Gonzalez, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution Nature: Petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to review the decision of the Sandiganbayan Facts: • Enrique Zaldivar, governor of the province of Antique • Sought to restrain the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Raul Gonzalez • From proceeding with the prosecution and hearing of criminal cases filed against him • On the ground that said cases were filed by the Tanodbayan. • The 1987 Consti provided that it is only the Ombudsman who has the authority to file cases with the Sandiganbayan. Issue: WON Tanodbayan had authority to file those cases for Sandiganbayan to prosecute and hear. Held: NO Ratio: 1.

Under the 1987 Consti, the Ombudsman (distinguished from Tanodbayan) is charged with the duty to: Section 13, par 1: Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.

2.

The Tanodbayan of the 1973 Consti became the Office of the Special prosecutor that shall continue to function and exercise it powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law, except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under the Consti. (article 11, section 7)

3.

Thus, beginning on February 2, 1987, the authority to conduct preliminary investigations and direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan was vested on the Ombudsman.

4.

The Tanodbayan is now the subordinate of the Sandiganbayan and it can investigate and prosecute cases only upon the latter’s authority or orders.

Office of the Tanodbayan: created by PB 1607 GRANTED; GONZALEZ ORDERED TO CEASE AND DESIST FROM CONDUCTING INVESTIGATIONS AND FILING CRIMNIAL CASES WITH THE SANDIGANBAYAN OR OTHERWISE EXERCISNG THE POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE OMBUDSMAN Inting vs. Tanodbayan (1980 case) Nature: Petition fro certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction and restraining order Facts: 1. Inting filed complaints for perjury at the City Fiscal of Davao’s office, against Angelina S. Salcedo (in latter’s personal data sheets, she indicated that she completed the 1year Secretarial Science course at USC in Cebu although she never enrolled in, and neither did she complete the course) Salcedo is an appurtenant of the judicial staff of the City Court of Davao 2. City Fiscal of Davao thru Special Counsel Rodrigo R. Duterte conducted preliminary investigation. 3. found prima facie case for perjury and filed 3 separate counts of perjury under article 183 of RPC 4. Salcedo interposed appeal to the ministry of Justice. 5. Ministry of Justice forwarded records to Tanodbayan, pursuant to Section 10 (f) of the PD No. 1630, which vests on the latter the power to file and prosecute offenses committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office. 6. Tanodbayan Vicente Ericta reversed decision of City Fiscal. 7. directed city fiscal to move for dismissal of the 3 criminal cases for perjury against Salcedo

Powers of Tanodbayan: PD 1603 Section 10 (a) he may investigate, on complaint by any person or on his own motion or initiative, any administrative act whether amounting to any criminal offense or not of any administrative agency including any GOCC. (f) he may file and prosecute civil and administrative cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those in GOCC, in relation to their office.

Issue: WON Tanodbayan has jurisdiction and authority to review and nullify the resolutions of the City Fiscal of Davao Held: Yes Ratio:

1. 2. 3.

Tanodbayan has authority to file and prosecute Salcedo’s case even if it does not involve graft and corrupt offices because it falls under such other offenses covered by section 10 (f) of PD 1630 Act of perjury was in relation to Salcedo’s office. Section 18 of PD 1630 gives Tanodbayan authority to conduct investigations and file case for such occurrence. Tanodbayan therefore had authority to nullify and review resolutions of the City Fiscal of Davao as the case involved the actions of a government official related to his office.

PETITION DISMISSED. Orap, Vicente vs. Sandiganbayan represented by Justices Manuel Pamaran, Fernandez, and Escareal (1985 case) Nature: Petition for certiorari and prohibition to review the decision of the Sandiganbayan Facts: • Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor Rodolfo Aquino • Charged Vicente Orap, presiding judge of the Municipal Court of Mangatarem, Pangasinan • With violation of Section 39e) of Rep Act 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act • Juan Sison, then Chief Special prosecutor of the Tanodbayan approved information and the latter was docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. SB-020, 021, 022. • Clerk of Court, Melanio Fernandez was also charged. • Orap contended that Tanodbayan had no power to conduct preliminary investigations, file infos, and prosecute criminal cases against judges and their appurtenant judicial staff. Alleged crime of Orap: took sums of money from several persons in connection with the case of People vs. Pepito Iglesias, for reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide, serious physical injuries and damage to property Issue WON Tanodbayan has authority to conduct preliminary investigation of the complaint

WON Tanodbayan had authority to corresponding information before Sandiganbayan and prosecute the same

file the

Held/Ratio NO. As Ombudsman, his investigatory powers are limited to complaints initiated against offices and personnel of administrative agencies as defined in Section 9(a) of PD 1607. YES. As prosecutor, the authority of the Tanodbayan is plenary and without exceptions. Section 17 of PD 1607 empowers special

prosecutors exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. Section 19 gave the Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor power to investigate employees and officials who act in a manner warranting criminal or disciplinary action

PETITION DISMISSED. Tanodbayan has jurisdiction to investigate and file information. Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction to prosecute defined under section 4 of PD 1606. Nixon: PRESIDENCY In the White House, the contradictions in Nixon were most obvious. He could be bold, yet also cautious; effective, yet often inept. Working closely with his national security advisor (later, secretary of state), Henry KISSINGER, he forsook the anti-Communist policies that he had supported throughout most of his career in favor of DETENTE with the USSR and rapprochement with the Communist government of China. In 1969 he began the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with the Soviet Union. In February 1972 he made a historic trip to Beijing--where he was received by Mao Zedong--thus reversing the U.S. policy of not recognizing the Communist government. In 1973, after 4 years of waging war in Vietnam-including heavy bombing raids on North Vietnam (1972) and the invasion (1970) of Cambodia-the administration managed to arrange a cease-fire that would last long enough to permit U.S. withdrawal from the Indochinese war zone. After the Arab-Israel War in 1973, the efforts of Henry Kissinger led to a cease-fire and troop disengagement in the Middle East. Domestically, under the banner of "A New Federalism," Nixon attempted to shift important elements of governmental power and responsibility back to state and local governments. He cut back and opposed federal welfare services, proposed antibusing legislation, and used wage-and-price controls to fight inflation. A combination of domestic and international developments, notably the quintupling of oil prices by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1973, led to the economic recession of 1974-75. In 1972, Nixon swept to an overwhelming victory in the presidential election against his Democratic challenger Sen. George S. MCGOVERN--but, ironically, the seeds of political collapse had already been sown. During the campaign, a group of burglars working for the Committee to Re-elect the President broke into the headquarters of the Democratic National Committee at the Watergate office-apartment complex in Washington, D.C., apparently in search of political intelligence. Attempts by the White House to stop or frustrate the ensuing investigations ultimately failed when Nixon's own White House tape recordings revealed that the president and his assistants had engaged in an obstruction of justice. In the meantime he had been forced to drop Vice-President Spiro T. AGNEW, who resigned in October 1973 after he was charged with corruption that began during his tenure as Baltimore County executive. As the revelations of wrongdoing piled up, Nixon became preoccupied with preserving his presidency. He jettisoned top assistants in the White House and fired Special Prosecutor Archibald COX. After the Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, required that he supply Cox's successor, Leon JAWORSKI, with tape recordings of conversations with his advisors, the House Judiciary Committee voted to recommend (July 27-30, 1974) approval by the full House of three articles of impeachment against the president. On Aug. 9, 1974, Nixon resigned his office and was succeeded by Vice-President Gerald R. FORD, whom he had selected to replace Agnew. A month after Nixon's resignation, Ford pardoned him for any crimes he might have committed as president. Nixon accepted the pardon but insisted that his mistakes had been personal and political, not criminal. Watergate

Watergate is the popular name for the political scandal and constitutional crisis that began with the arrest (June 17, 1972) of five burglars who broke into Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate office building in Washington, D.C. It ended with the resignation (Aug. 9, 1974) of President Richard M. NIXON. The burglars and two co-plotters--G. Gordon Liddy and E. Howard Hunt--were indicted (September 1972) on charges of burglary, conspiracy, and wiretapping. Four months later, they were convicted and sentenced to prison terms by District Court Judge John J. Sirica, who was convinced that pertinent details had not been unveiled during the trial and proffered leniency in exchange for further information. As it became increasingly evident that the Watergate burglars were tied closely to the Central Intelligence Agency and the Committee to Re-elect the President (CRP), some of Nixon's aides began talking to federal prosecutors. The defection of aides such as Jeb Stuart Magruder, assistant to CRP director John N. MITCHELL, quickly implicated others in Nixon's inner circle. The Senate established (February 1973) an investigative committee headed by Sen. Sam ERVIN, Jr., to look into the growing scandal. Amid increasing disclosures of White House involvement in the Watergate break-in and its aftermath, Nixon announced the resignations of John Ehrlichman and H. R. Haldeman, two of his closest advisors, and the dismissal of his counsel John W. Dean III. Growing suspicion of presidential involvement in the scandal resulted in an intensification of the investigation. Leaders in this inquiry included Judge Sirica, reporters for the Washington Post, the Ervin committee, and Archibald COX, who was sworn in as special prosecutor in May 1973. Dean told the Ervin committee in June that Nixon had known of the cover-up. A month later, former White House staff member Alexander Butterfield revealed that Nixon had secretly tape-recorded conversations in his offices. Both Cox and the Ervin committee began efforts to obtain selected tapes. Nixon, citing EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, refused to relinquish them and tried to have Cox fired. On Oct. 20, 1973, Attorney General Elliot L. Richardson, refusing to dismiss Cox, resigned in protest. His deputy, William Ruckelshaus, also refused and was fired. Nixon's solicitor general, Robert H. Bork, who was next in command, then fired Cox. The "Saturday night massacre," as the events of that evening became known, heightened suspicions that Nixon had much to hide. Leon Jaworski, who replaced Cox as special prosecutor on November 1, continued to press for the tapes. On Mar. 1, 1974, a federal grand jury indicted seven men, including Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Mitchell, and White House special counsel Charles Colson, for conspiracy to obstruct justice. At the same time, the House Judiciary Committee began investigating the Watergate affair and related matters. The president released (April 30) edited transcripts--containing suspicious gaps--of Watergaterelated Oval Office conversations. Not satisfied, Judge Sirica subpoenaed additional tapes. When Nixon refused, the case moved to the Supreme Court, which ruled (July 24) against him by an 8-0 vote. The Court conceded that a president could withhold national security material but insisted that Watergate was a criminal matter (see UNITED STATES V. RICHARD M. NIXON). On July 27-30, the House Judiciary Committee, whose public hearings had disclosed evidence of illegal White House activities, recommended that Nixon be impeached on three charges: obstruction of justice, abuse of presidential powers, and trying to impede the impeachment process by defying committee subpoenas. The committee rejected two other possible counts: Nixon's unauthorized, secret bombing of Cambodia in 1969 and his use of public funds to improve his private property. A beleaguered President Nixon released three tapes to the public on Aug. 5, 1974. One revealed that he had taken steps to thwart the FBI's inquiry into the Watergate burglary. The tape made it clear that Nixon had been involved actively in the cover-up from its beginnings. These disclosures destroyed the president's remaining congressional support. With House impeachment inevitable and Senate conviction probable, Richard Nixon became (Aug. 9, 1974) the first U.S. chief executive to resign.

Clinton vs. Jones Nature: Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit Facts: • May 8, 1991, during an official conference at the Excelsior Hotel in Little Rock, Arkansas where Clinton was governor. • Danny Ferguson, former Arkansas State Police, persuaded her to leave her desk (registration) and to visit the Governor in a business suite at the hotel. • There, Clinton allegedly made abhorrent sexual advances that she vehemently rejected. • Subsequently, her superiors at work shanged her duties to ounish her for rejecting those advances. • Jones sought actual damamges of $75,000 and punitive damages of $100,000 • Clinton filed a motion to dismiss on grounds of presidential immunity. Issue: WON Clinton could claim presidential immunity for unofficial acts performed before he became president of the USA. Held: NO Ratio: 1. Presidential immunity can only be claimed if the President was performing an official act. 2. Allowing the trial to proceed will not prejudice the function of the President. a. His testimonies for discovery and for use at trial may be taken at the White House b. Such shall be acquired at a time that will accommodate his busy schedule c. The President may choose not to be present at the trial. 3. The President cannot claim immunity from suits for money damages because in this particular case, the suit did not arise out of his official act. 4. Immunities are grounded in the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it. 5. Delaying the trial would increase the danger of prejudice resulting from the loss of evidence, including the inability off witnesses to recall specific facts, or the possible death of a party. The Federal District Court has jurisdiction to decide this case. Like every other citizen who properly invokes that jurisdiction, respondent has a right to an orderly disposition of her claims. Accordingly, the judgment of the COA is affirmed. Contents of Jones’ complaint: 1. Clinton deprived her of rights protected by the Constitution. 2. Clinton and Ferguson engaged in a conspiracy to violate her federal rights. 3. state common-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress 4. for defamation, embracing both the comments allegedly made to the press by Ferguson and the statements of petitioner’s agents. In Re. Raul M. Gonzalez Nature: In re 1st Indorsement from Honorable Raul M. Gonzalez dated March 16, 1988 requesting Hon. Judge Marcelo Fernan to Comment on an Anonymous Letter-Complaint Facts: An anonymous letter by Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court was addressed to Hon. Raul Gonzalez. Contents of the letter: • charges of disbarment brought by Mr. Miguel Cuenco against Justice Marcelo Fernan • a request for Mr. Raul M. Gonzalez as Tanodbayan/Special Prosecutor to do something about the case February 12, 1988 The Court directed the Clerk of Court to furnish Mr. Gonzalez a copy of a resolution.

• •

Contents of the resolution: dismiss the charges made by Cuenco against Fernan require Cuenco to show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with for making such unfounded accusations

Issue: WON a member of the Supreme Court can be charged with disbarment during his incumbency Held: NO Ratio: Article 8, section7, par 1 and article 9, section2 provide: That members of the Supreme Court who are members of the Philippine bar may be removed from office only by impeachment. 1.

Such public officer cannot be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any other court with any offense which carries with it a penalty of removal from office, or any penalty service of which would amount to removal from office.

2.

To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Member’s incumbency would circumvent the constitutional mandate that Members of the Court may be removed from office

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only by impeachment and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article 11 (2) of Consti o culpable violation of the Constitution o treason o bribery o graft o corruption o high crimes o betrayal of public trust

Proper remedy for offending members of the SC who are members of the Philippine bar: 1. impeachment under sections 2 and 3 of article 11 of 1987 Consti 2. when tenure is terminated by impeachment, he may be held liable to answer wither: a. criminally or b. administratively (by disbarment proceedings) •

for any wrong or misbehavior that may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings

The Clerk of Court is hereby DIRECTED to serve a copy of this Resolution upon Hon. Raul Gonzalez and Mr. Miguel Cuenco. In re Jarque Nature: Facts: • November 18, 1995: letter by Cpt. Jose Rene N. Jarque, sworn to before Notary Public Atty. Aida Balbastro: complaint of disbarment against Ombudsman Aniano Desierto for “immorality and involvement in various illegal and immoral activities. • The letter alleged that Desierto has an illegitimate daughter with Teresita Alferez by the name of Desiree. Issue: WON the Court can make out a prima facie case for disbarment against Desierto based on such letter-complaint. Held: NO Ratio: 1. The letter made very general allegations made y other, unknown and unnamed sources.

2.

Even if the letter-complaint had succeeded in making out such a prima facie case, the Court would still have to dismiss the complaints.

Article 8, section7, par 1 and article 9, section2 provide: That members of the Supreme Court who are members of the Philippine bar may be removed from office only by impeachment. 3.

Such public officer cannot be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any other court with any offense which carries with it a penalty of removal from office, or any penalty service of which would amount to removal from office.

4.

To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Member’s incumbency would circumvent the constitutional mandate that Members of the Court may be removed from office

• •

only by impeachment and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article 11 (2) of Consti o culpable violation of the Constitution o treason o bribery o graft o corruption o high crimes o betrayal of public trust

Proper remedy for offending members of the SC who are members of the Philippine bar: 3. impeachment under sections 2 and 3 of article 11 of 1987 Consti 4. when tenure is terminated by impeachment, he may be held liable to answer wither: a. criminally or b. administratively (by disbarment proceedings) •

for any wrong or misbehavior that may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings

Ocampo, IV vs. Ombudsman Nature: Petition for review of the memorandum of the Ombudsman Facts: • November 27 1991: The Ombudsman issued a memorandum to the Office of the Special Prosecutor disapproving the recommendation of the special prosecutors (Roger Berbano, Sr. and Rodolfo Reynoso) that the criminal cases filed against Gov. Mariano Un Ocampo III and his sons Mariano Ocampo IV be dismissed and that corresponding motions to withdraw them be filed with the Sandiganbayan. What did they do? Marino Ocampo III, governor of Tarlac and president-chairman of the BOT of the Lingkod Tarlac Foundation, Inc. in connivance with his son, loaned amount of money out of the National Aid for LG funds of Tarlac to the New Territory Manufacturing Inc (then IMCOR) of which the son was incorporator and stockholder, under terms and conditions grossly disadvantageous to the government the same being interest-free, without collateral, and without a definite date of repayment. Issue: WON the Ombudsman has authority to order for the investigation to proceed despite the recommendations of the special prosecutors to dismiss the same Held: Yes. Ratio: 1. The Courts cannot interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine the specificity and adequacy of the averments of the offense charged. 2. His actions were neither whimsical nor capricious because he sincerely believed that there is sufficient evidence to indict both accused. Such rule is based not only upon

3.

respect of for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Consti to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. But take note: once a case has been filed with the Sandiganbayan, such court will have full control of the case so much that the information may not be dismissed without approval of the said court.

Additional info: Criminal prosecutions may not be restrained, either through preliminary or final injunction or a writ of prohibition, except in the following instances: 1. to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; 2. when necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; 3. when there is a pre-judicial question which is sub-judice; 4. when the acts of the office are without or in excess of authority 5. where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance, or regulation 6. when double jeopardy is clearly apparent 7. where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense 8. where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution 9. where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by lust for vengeance 10. when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied 11. preliminary injunction to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners.

Venus vs. Desierto Nature: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Prohibition Facts: Petitioner: Municipal Mayor of Aklan Respondents: Mars Regalado and Harry Abayon, members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Aklan Events: September 2, 1988: Resolution 19 was passed authorizing petitioner to negotiate and enter into a contract with the Board of Liquidators in the Acquisition of the Garcia-Diapo Enterprise September 6, 1988: petitioner proceeded to Manila and submitted to Wenceslao Buenaventura, Director and gen. Manager of the BOL and offered to buy the lot on a government-to-government basis at a price mutually acceptable to the parties September 8, 1988: • offer was rejected. ] • Petitioner returned to New Washington and submitted to treasurer his voucher for transpo expenses • Asked Atty. Antonio Tabang, provincial auditor, as regards the municipality’s participation in a public bidding. • SB doubted whether NW can participate in the bidding September 19, 1988: petitioner went to manila at his personal expense and participated in the bidding. He submitted the highest bid and thus the property was sold to him and a deed of absolute sale was executed. During his term, he allowed a portion of the lots to be used as garage for the municipality’s fire truck and for the municipality’s mushroom culture laboratory Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Kalibo, Aklan • Private respondents then filed complaint and charged petitioner with violation of • Paragraph (h) of section 3 of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) as amended. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas:

•

dismissed the complaint on the ground that there existed no case for violation of paragraph (h) of section 3 of RA 3019 as amended

Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez: • disapproved resolution • marginal note: to consider possible liability of petitioner for a violation of mentioned act since there is pervading showing of bad faith on the part of petitioner in maneuvering to acquire for himself a piece of property which he himself knew to be badly needed by the municipality Reraffled to Graft Investigation Officer I Carla Tanco of Office of Deputy Ombudsman: • found prima facie evidence to proceed against petitioner • Deputy Ombudsman of Visayas approved. Office of Special Prosecutor Officer III Orlando Ines: • found reasonable ground to charge Eriberto Venus of the violation • Deputy Special Prosecutor Robert E. kallos recommended Ines’ resolution • Special prosecutor Leonardo Tamayo concurred • Ombudsman Desierto approved. • Info was filed with Sandiganbayan • Petitioner filed a motion for recon with Victor Pascual, Special Prosecutor (found out that petitioner had not violated said act and then recommended that the case be dismissed) • Ombudsman disapproved Issue: WON the Ombudsman can reinvestigate a case already filed with the Sandiganbayan Held: Yes Ratio: 1. The Sandiganbayan allowed petitioner to file motion to reconsider the adverse resolution of Special Prosecutor Ines. 2. Thru this, Sandiganbayan thus deferred to the authority of the Ombudsman to reinvestigate the case and further assess or re-examine the facts. 3. The Sandiganbayan was willing to accept and adopt the final resolution of the Officer of the Special Prosecutor and Ombudsman on the issue of whether of not the offense charged was in fact committed by the petitioner Crim. case dismissed: lack of reasonable ground to believe that petitioner violated said act. Ynchausti & Co. vs Wright Nature: Original Action in the Supreme Court Ben F. Wright: Auditor of the Philippine Islands Ynchausti & Co: agent and operator of Venus: used in the coastwise trade of the Phil Islands Facts: • Ynchausti & Co, agent and operator of steamship Venus, used in the coastwise trade of the Philippine Islands • They acquired services in Hong Kong for the repair and reconstruction of the ship (repair and overhaul of the thrust shaft and boilers) • There were no adequate facilities in the Philippines to achieve such purpose. • Upon Venus’ return to the Philippines, • The Insular Collector of Customs asked petitioners to pay customs duty payable on such repairs and reconstruction work. • Petitioner paid said amount under protest. •

Petitioner claimed that such repairs and works should be exempted from the payment of customs duty under

•

Par 200, section 8, and par. 348, section 11 of the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909.

•

After hearing the Internal Collector of Customs sustained the protest and ordered the refund of the money through a warrant for Auditor Wright to sign in approval.

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Wright refused to sign such.

Issue: WON countersignature of the COA may be compelled if it can be shown that: 1) the warrant has been legally drawn by the officer authorized by law to do so 2) and appropriation to which the warrant may be applied exists by virtue of law 3) an unexpended balance of the amount appropriated is available. Held: YES Ratio: The duty to countersign the warrant in this case is simply ministerial and it is not up to the discretion of the Auditor to decide otherwise. It was then necessary to find out if the 3 requisites needed to compel COA to countersign warrant for refund were present in the case at bar. 1.

Requisite WON warrant has been legally drawn by the officer authorized by law to do so

Status YES. •

•

•

2. WON Venus and the repairs it undertook were exempted from customs duty

YES. Act of Congress of 1901 as amended by Act No. 2872 of the Philippine Legislature •

3. WON the law provides appropriations for the asked refund

4. WON mandamus is the proper remedy

The Collector of Customs was given the authority to investigate WON such repairs undertaken by the operators of Venus were necessary and such would exempt them from customs duty. Representatives from several Philippine firms testified that the nature of the repair and overhaul needed by Venus could not be done in the Philippines due to lack of needed facilities. Since it was found out that such repairs were needed and that the Tariff law does exempt them from customs duty, the Collector of Customs was authorized by law to issue a warrant to be countersigned by the COA so that the petitioners can be refunded for the amount paid.

provides that repairs made in foreign countries to vessels shall be subject to provisions in par 348 of the Tariff law if it could be shown that: • such repairs can only be done • in a foreign country • reasonably • economically • and within reasonable time YES. Act No. 357 as amended by Act No. 1515 provides: • that to meet refunds of customs duties or taxes • erroneously and illegally collected • by the Philippine Government, • permanent annual appropriations are provided YES.

• • •

Countersigning of COA of legally executed Is a ministerial function of Auditor The writ of mandamus is remedy to compel an perform and official duty

a warrant the Insular the proper official to

Matute vs. Hernandez Nature: Original Action in the Supreme Court Jaime Hernandez: Auditor General of the Commonwealth of the Philippines Facts: • December 24, 1936: Matute entered into a contract with the Commonwealth of the Philippines • Through its Purchasing Agent • With the consent and approval of it Secretary of Finance • To supply government with fresh meat (hindquarters and brisket, boneless) • For the entire month of January 1937. • Subsequently, the City of Manila raised the fees in the municipal slaughterhouse from 2 to 3 and ½ cents per kilo. • Petitioner asked Purchasing Agent that the price for the meat he offered to supply for government be raised by 1 and ½ cents also. •

CE Unson, technical adviser to the President and Acting Purchasing Agent

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Granted request with the approval of Undersecretary of Finance Guillermo Gomez.

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Subsequently, petitioner supplied and delivered meat to Bureau of Prisons.

•

However when the treasury warrant was sent to the Auditor general, he refused to countersign it.

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Petitioner wanted court to compel auditor general to sign and consequently cash in due amount.

Issues 1. WON Auditor General has the right and power to judge the merits and legality of any contract entered into by the Commonwealth of the Philippines through the Purchasing Agent

Held/Ratio YES. Section 2 of Article 10: • Auditor General has the duty to bring to the attention of the proper administrative officers expenditure of funds or property, which, in his opinion, are irregular, unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant. • Auditor General had to find out WON disbursement was illegal. (discretionary power, as opposed to Wright case where the countersigning was a ministerial duty)

2. WON the raise of prices in the City of Manila was illegal and void

YES. •

It was not effected in accordance with

• • •

the requirements of EO No. 16 No public bidding had been held Auditor-General, Secretary of Justice, or the Secretary of the dept was not consulted Approval of the President was not obtained

Guevara vs. Gimenez Pedro Gimenez: Auditor General of the Philippines Ismael Mathay: Auditor of the Central Bank Guillermo Guevara: petitioner Nature: Original Action in the Supreme Court. Mandamus. Facts: • Governor of Central bank, Miguel Cuaderno asked petitioner • To cooperate with the legal counsel of CB • In defending CB and its Monetary Board in Civil Case 41226 • Filed against them by one R. Marino Corpus. • Accordingly, petitioner entered his appearance as counsel for the respondents. • Resolution No. 1283 of the Monetary Board recognized the designation and provided that the Governor arrange with Guevara the amount of fee which the latter will charge the CB for handling the said cases. Issue: WON CB’s governor’s designation of Guevara was a violation of Section 1664 of the Revised Administrative Code, which vests on the Solicitor General the power to employ special counsel Held: NO Ratio: 1. Petitioner was retained not by the government of the Philippines but by the CB, which has a personality distinct and separate from that of the govt 2. He did not appear in the case as representative of the Solicitor General Issue: WON Auditor General may now be compelled to pass in audit and approve the payment of the amounts claimed by the petitioner Held: YES Ratio: The Auditor General has the duty to approve and pass in audit the voucher for said disbursements, if issued by the proper officer of said agency of the Government. Since under the law, the Governor of the CB with its Monetary may employ special legal counsel and approve payments for his services, the Auditor General has the duty to disburse said amounts. Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS Facts: In view of the government’s efforts at privatization, GSIS sold its Manila Hotel shares (51%) at a bidding where only two parties participated: (1) Renong Berhad , a Malaysian firm and (2) Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino firm. Manila Prince offered a bid P2.40 lower than Renong Berhad’s (bidding was on a price per share basis). Pending confirmation of Renong Berhad as the winner, Manila Prince wrote GSIS to enjoin it from awarding the sale to Renong, saying they are now willing to match the Malaysian firm’s bid. Manila Prince then wrote a cheque as bid security, which the GSIS refused to accept.

Issues / Held / Ratio: 1. WON the Constitutional provision on preferring qualified Filipinos in the granting of concessions, privileges, and rights involving the national patrimony and economy is selfexecuting Yes. Otherwise, the Consti would always require legislation before any of its provisions could be considered binding. The Consti, which is supposed to be the supreme law of the land, cannot be held subordinate and cannot be paralyzed by a need for legislative acts. 2. WON “national patrimony” involved only public lands and natural resources No. “National patrimony” also includes cultural heritage, of which the Manila Hotel has been a symbol. 3. WON 51% of the controlling shares does not involve patrimony No. Whoever controls the shares, controls the land and the hotel. 4. WON action is addressed against the State, not the GSIS No. Although the GSIS possesses a distinct and separate personality, its acts are considered “State action” (1) when they involve the performance of a public function, (2) when the government is responsible for the action, and (3) when government authorized action. GSIS activity has requisites (2) and (3), therefore they are actions of the State covered by the Constitution. Note: Court upheld nationalism and non-material values over foreign investment ** GSIS ordered to cease from selling to Renong Berhad; to accept matching bid of Manila Prince Peralta v. Mathay Facts: Petitioner is a trustee of the GSIS. The Auditor General said his Christmas bonus, cost of living allowance and incentive bonus should be deducted from his retirement gratuity in view of the Constitutional provision that no employee of the government may receive additional or double compensation. Issue: WON petitioner’s Christmas bonus, cost of living allowance and incentive bonus are covered by the Constitutuional prohibiton Held: Yes. Ratio: The law is clear. The GSIS act only grants per diems to trustees on a daily basis. Such per diems are then considered as reimbursements or the amount they spend to fulfill their duties. Allowances given to Peralta in this case, however are not considered reimbursements and may not be granted. Between the GSIS act and the Constitution, the latter is supreme. ** Order of Auditor General affirmed. Tanada v. Cuenco – sorry, lost my digest Republic v. Imperial Facts: In 1941, Lopez Vito was first appointed to the Comelec.

In 1945, the first set of Comelec commissioners were appointed. These were: 1. Lopez Vito, chairman, who shall serve for nine years until 1954 2. Francisco Enage, member, who shall serve for six years until 1951 3. Vicente Vera, member, who shall serve for three years until 1948 In 1947, Lopez Vito died. He was succeeded by Member Vera as Comelec chairman. In 1949, Respondent Perez was appointed to fill in Vera’s position, which was vacated by his promotion to Chairmanship upon Vito’s death. Member Enage retired. In 1951, Vera died. He was succeeded by respondent Imperial as Comelec Chairman. By this time, only two of the three Comelec seats at that time were occupied. Issue: WON Imperial and Perez are legally continuing office as Chairman and Member of Comelec respectively Held: Yes Ratio: The Court counted the respondent’s terms of office from 1941, when CA 567 was implemented, completing the organization of the Comelec. The rules laid down are: 1. All initial appointments should start at the same date and; 2. Vacancies because of death, disability or resignation shall be filled only for the unexpired term of the successor. The Court ruled that to do otherwise would be to violate the rotational cycle devised by the framers of the Constitution to ensure the continuity of the policies of the Comelec. Also, with vacancies occurring only once every three years, a four-year administration may not appoint more than one member of the Comelec at a time, safeguarding against undue influence by the executive on the independent body.

According to the SC, the following occupied the seats during these times: 1941 Chairman Member Member

Vito Term ends 1950 Enage Term ends 1947 vacant Term ends 1944

1945 Vito Term ends 1950 Enage Term ends 1947 Vera Term ends 1953

1947 Vera Term ends 1950 Perez Term ends 1956 Rovira Term ends 1953

1950 Imperial Term ends 1959 Perez Term ends 1956 vacant Term ends 1962

** In 1947, the first vacancy occurred when Chairman Vito died. The second vacancy occurred when Enage retired.

Ordinarily, resignation or death creates a vacancy in the office. But the Court said that Constitutional Commissions like the Comelec are exceptions to the rule, saying that anyone who succeeds as a member has to deal with a shortened tenure.

Assuming the Comelec adopted the ROC suppletorily, it does not have the power to adopt rules on the disqualification of its members because the Constitution provides that its members may only be removed through impeachment.

** Imperial’s term ends in 1959, Perez in 1956. Quo warranto dismissed.

The older De Vera should be able to inhibit himself solely on the basis of ethics.

Note:

(2) WON a person who has not served for the full term of nine years in the Comelec may be reappointed

Republic v. Imperial held that any person, once appointed, may not be reappointed to the Commission regardless of tenure. Compare this with an earlier case, Nacionalista Party v. De Vera, which held that reappointment is valid so long as the person to be reappointed has not yet served the full term of nine years.

Nacionalista Party v. De Vera Facts: The petitioners, members of the Nacionalista Party, sought to disqualify Comelec chairman Vicente de Vera from taking part in the Comelec deliberations concerning the Nov. 1949 elections on two grounds:

Yes. The phrase “may not be reappointed” is a continuation of the phrase “who shall serve office for a term of nine years”. This does not warrant the interpretation that members may not be reappointed when they have not served the full term. In such cases, they may be reappointed provided that (1) the appointment does not preclude the appointment of a new member and (2) a term does not exceed nine years in all. ** Petition dismissed Note: De Vera inhibited himself from the deliberations.

Brillantes v. Yorac

1. De Vera’s son, Teodoro de Vera, was a Liberal Party senatorial candidate during said elections. Following Rules of Court, the older de Vera should be disqualified. 2. De Vera’s appointment as Chairman is void ab initio, because he had already served as member of Comelec prior to his term as Chairman. Under the Constitution, he was not entitled to any reappointment.

Facts:

Issues / Held / Ratio:

Ratio:

(1) WON the Rules of Court applies to the Comelec

1. The Comelec, although it exercises primarily executive functions, is an independent constitutional body and is not under the control of the President. The discretion in filling out a vacancy in its chairmanship shall belong to the commission itself.

No. The Rules of Court, promulgated by the Supreme Court, applies only to judicial bodies under its general power of supervision. The Comelec is an independent, administrative body over which the Supreme Court has jurisdiction only to the extent that it may review the Comelec’s decisions, ordinances or rulings on certiorari.

Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of Yorac’s appointment as Acting Chairman of the Comelec by then President Aquino. Issue: WON constitutional

Yorac’s

appointment

is

Held: No

2. The lack of laws, similar to those rules that guide the Supreme Court in filling out vacancies, shall not diminish the commission’s discretion. Otherwise appointments revocable at will, would violate

the security of tenure and independence of its members. ** Appointment held to be unconstitutional; without prejudice to members of the Comelec re-electing Yorac or somebody else until a new Chairman is appointed by the President. Besa vs. PNB Nature: Original Petition in the Supreme Court. Certiorari, prohibition, and quo warranto Facts: • • • •

Tomas Besa was appointed Chief Legal Counsel with the rank of Vice President of PNB. By virtue of a resolution by PNB president Roberto Benedicto, he became Consultant on Legal Matters. Conrado Medina took over his position. PNB justified by saying that: o The position of Chief Legal Counsel carries a special confidential relationship of lawyer and client and thus they have the prerogative to designate or change its lawyer o The transfer was made by the Board in the exercise of its powers, upon recommendation of the PNB president

Resolution No. 1053: by BOD: shifted Besa to Office of President as Consultant on Legal Matters, without change in salary and other privileges Issue: WON Besa’s transfer was illegal Held: NO Ratio: 1.

2. 3.

4.

The position of Chief Legal Counsel was a highly confidential position and such position’s term depends upon the will of the appointing power. Removal without just cause as a defense applies only to officers and employees enjoying a fixed term. According to Chief Justice, a primarily confidential officer cannot be removed. His term merely expires according to nature of job. Reyes says tenure of confidential officers ends upon loss of confidence. Court also ruled that the position of Chief Legal Counsel is primarily confidential and secondarily technical.

Petition Dismissed. Dario vs. Mison Mison: Commissioner of Customs

Dario: Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs Nature: • March 25, 1986, Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 3 • “DECLARING A NATIONAL POLICY TO IMPLEMENT THE REFORMS MANDATED BY THE PEOPLE, PROTECTING THEIR BASIC RIGHTS, ADOPTING A PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION, AND PROVIDING FOR AN ORDERLY TRNASITION TO A GOVERNMENT UNDER NEW CONSTITUTION” • EO 127, Reorganization Program, was also issued. • Several acts and rules were issued to comply with the proclamation. • January 6, 1988, Mison issued a memorandum for employees where the latter shall be: o Informed of their reappointment, or o Offered another position in the same department or agency o Informed of their termination • As a result, Dario was one of the many whose services were terminated subject to normal clearances and possible receipt of retirement benefits under existing laws, rules, and regulations. • Hereafter, the Civil Service Commission reinstated hundreds of employees who were separated by Mison. • Mison charged the CSC with grave abuse of discretion, a case that could be subject to judicial review without prejudice to the powers of CSC to have the final say to cases involving its employees and officers. • Dario invoked security of tenure. 1.

2.

•

Issues: Is it constitutional to separate career civil service employees not for cause but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation 3 dated March 25m 1986? Yes. Under Section 16 of Article 18: Transitory Provisions of the Constitution. It also applies to separations as results of reorganization after the ratification of the Consti. Was there a valid reorganization in the Bureau of Customs occurring at that time which would validate Dario’s and several others’ separation from office? NO. NO change in the staffing pattern prescribed by Section 34 of EO 127 was made even after Mison took office.

•

• •

3.

Mison separated 394 Customs personnel but replaced them with 522. This was proof that such separations were not made to improve the bureaucracy and make them more efficient. It was also a defiance of President’s directive to halt further lay-offs as a consequence of reorganization. Mison did not follow procedures laid down by EO 127 regarding lay-offs. Could Mison remove Cesar Dario from office? No. Dario was a presidential appointee and thus Mison had no authority to terminate Dario. Reinstated to positions.

Civil Service Commission vs. Salas Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the COA. • • • • •

Facts: PAGCOR Chairman appointed Salas as Internal Security Staff member and Assigned him to the casino at the Manila Pavilion Hotel. December 3, 1991: the BOD of PAGCOR terminated his employment allegedly for loss of confidence. The Intelligence Division of PAGCOR reported that Salas was engaged in proxy betting. Salas claimed that he was not a confidential employee of PAGCOR and thus should not be dismissed on the ground of loss of confidence.

Issue: WON Salas was a confidential employee Held: NO 1.

•

•

Ratio: PD No 1869, which created PAGCOR, also included in section 16 that all employees of the casinos and related services shall be classified as confidential appointees. However, under the Consti and the Admin Code, classification of confidential employees depends on the nature of their work.(Section 2(2) of Article 9-B). Court will have the final say as to whether position is confidential or not. Court found that Salas did not enjoy ‘close intimacy’ with PAGCOR, which would otherwise place him under the category of a confidential employee. He does not enjoy primarily close intimacy that characterizes a confidential

•

employee. He does not even directly report to the Office of the Chairman but to the Area Supervisor who in turn implements the directives of the Branch Chief Security Officer. His compensation level belongs to Pay Class 2 relative to the highest, Pay Class 12.

COA decision affirmed. Salas not reinstated.

Labo ‘tong digest na ‘to. Don’t depend on this. SSS vs. CA Nature: Petition for review of the decision of the COA Facts: June 9, 1987: officers and members allegedly staged an illegal strike • and barricaded the entrances to the SSS Building • preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and • SSS members from transacting business with the SSS. REASON FOR STRIKE: SSS failed to act on union’s demands which included among many other things, the implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA CBD on check-off of union dues. • The Public Sector Labor Management, upon report of the strike, ordered strikers to return to work. •

•

Strikers refused.

Issue: WON the employees of SSS have the right to strike. Held: NO • •

•

Ratio: EO No. 180 implemented the Consti guarantee of the right of govt employees to organize. However, section 14 thereof also provided that the Civil Service Law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the govt service shall be observed, subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress. Such mentioned legislation was Memorandum Circular 6 by CSC which provided that ‘prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees…enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all

govt officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service. Issue: WON RTC has jurisdiction over the case and to issue a writ of injunction enjoining the continuance of the strike. Held: YES. Ratio: It is the Public Sector Labor Management that has jurisdiction over unresolved labor disputes involving government employees. (thru EO No. 180) However, it has not been granted by law the authority to issue writs of injunction in labor disputes within its jurisidiction. Blaquera vs. Alcala Nature: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition •

• • •

Facts: Petitioners were paid incentive benefits for the year 1992, pursuant to EO 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987 and the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292. ADEPT members were granted incentive bonus for 1992 pursuant to RA 6971 or the Productivity Incentives Act of 1990. Corporate Auditor disallowed the act as it was a violation of Admin Order 29. ADEPT questioned this action.

AO 29: Ramos, authorized the grant of productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum amount of 1000 * return/refund of the excess within a period of 6 months to commence 15 days after issuance of order AO 268: enjoins the grant of productivity incentive benefits without prior approval of the president * Productivity incentive benefits in a maximum amount equivalent to 30 percent of his 1 month basic salary but not less than 2000. •

Constitutionality and Validity of Administrative Order No. 29 and 268 Other petitioners granted incentives. No need for refund coz there was no bad faith. ADEPT not given incentives, as they are not covered by RA 5971 COMELEC

Loong vs. COMELEC 305 SCRA 832 NATURE: Special Civil Action in the SC. Certiorari Facts: •

•

May 12, 1998: Atty. Tolentino, Jr. was informed by some election inspectors and watchers of discrepancies between votes cast and the election returns for the mayoralty candidates in the Municipality of Pata.

•

Upon submission of problem to the technical experts of COMELEC, it was discovered that the ballots were not properly printed and such was the cause of the wrong readings. Nothing was wrong with the machines.

•

Tolentino reported to COMELEC Main and the latter issued Minute Resolution No. 981747 ordering a manual count but only in the municipality of Pata and the subsequent MR No. 98-1796 laying down rules for manual count

•

Private resondent Tan was proclaimed governor-elect of Sulu on the basis of the manual count.

•

Petitioners resolutions.

Issue: WON ADEPT members were covered by RA 6971 or the Productivity Incentives Act. •

•

NO. PTA, employer of ADEPT members, is a government-owned and controlled corporation with original charter subject to Civil Service Law, Rules, and Regulations. It is already within the scope of the incentives award system under Section 1, Rule 10 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing EO 292 issued by the Civil Service Commission.

Issue: WON AO 29 and AO 268 are violative of EO 292 and hence null and void. No. Part of control power of President. Exercising his power of control by modifying the acts of the respondents who granted incentive benefits to their employees without appropriate clearance from Office of the President. President, not the Commission has the power to fix incentives.

Pursuant to RA No. 8436 prescribing the adoption of an automated election system, the May 11, 1998 regular elections in the ARMM was decided upon with the aid of counting machines.

questioned

validity

of

tension Issues 1. WON a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of ROC is the right remedy to invalidate the disputed COMELEC resolutions

2. WON COMELEC committed GAD amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering the manual count.

Held/Ratio YES. Section 7, Article 9(A) of Consti

f)

“unless provided by this Consti or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the SC on certiorari by the aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt of copy thereof”

g) petitioner Loong was not denied due process. They were given chance to oppose manual counting, submit written reports, escort and observe manual counting.

The petition for certiorari was the proper remedy for questions regarding FINAL orders, rulings, and decision of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. NO. The order for a manual count was not arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical.

h) Automated counting could not push through. RA 8436 only provided that in case of breakdowns in one machine, other machines from other municipalities may be used. However, in the case at bar, there was nothing wrong with the machines but with the ballots.

Factual Bases: a) automated machines failed to read correctly the ballots in Pata (mayoralty candidate Anton Burahan got 0 votes even if Chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors and others said they voted for him)

i)

b) another got 100% of the votes c)

technical experts confirmed that the problem was caused by the improperly printed ballots

d) in other municipalities, ballots contained the wrong sequence code e) failures of automated counting created post election

even the military and police authorities unanimously recommended manual counting

3. Assuming manual count is illegal, WON it is proper to call for a special election for the position of governor of Sulu

Under Section 2(1) of Article 9 C: COMELEC is given the power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.

NO. Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a special election can only be held if there is a failure of election such that no election occurs because of force majeure, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous cases.

Plea for special election should be submitted to COMELEC not to the SC. COMELEC decides en banc by a majority vote of its members. (section 4 of RA No. 7166)

ground of postelection terrorism

•

Only a special election only for the position of governor would be discriminatory and will violate equal protection of laws of other candidates for other positions. Sanchez vs. COMELEC 114 SCRA 454 Nature: Petitions for certiorari to review the resolution of the COMELEC Facts: • • • •

WON COMELEC has authority to call for a special election

January 30, 1980 local elections Virgilio Sanchez: Nacionalista Party candidate for Municipal Mayor of San Fernando, Pampanga Armando Biliwang: Kilusang Bagong Lipunan candidate Biliwang was proclaimed winner by Municipal Board of Canvassers

•

February 1, 1980: Sanchez filed petition to declare null and void the elctions due to alleged large-scale terrorism

•

COMELEC denied petition. Sanchez moved for recon. COMELEC reversed decision.

•

COMELEC issued resolution which said read: o o

Annulment and setting aside the proclamation of winners of the January 30, 1980 elections To certify to the President/ Prime Minister and the Batasan Pambansa the failure of election in San Fernando so that remedial legislation may be enacted and that pending such enactment, the President/PM may appoint the municipal officials of San Fernando.

•

YES: Section 175 of 1978 Election Code “It may, motu proprio or upon written petition,

Section 8 of Election Code of 1978 similarly provides. Special elctions shall be called by the Commission for the purpose of filling a vacancy or a newly created elective position, as the case may be.

De Jesus vs. People 120 SCRA 760 Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of the resolution of the Sandiganbayan

Held/Ratio WON COMELEC has power to annul an entire municipal election on the

part of its main objective to insure free, orderly, and honest elections. • Since the submission of returns were vitiated by postelection terrorism, popular will was prejudiced. YE. Section 5 of Batasan Pambansa Bilang 52. “in case of violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or records, force majeure and other analogous cases…the COMELEC shall, on the basis of a verified petition and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the elections as soon as practicable”

•

Facts: •

Issues

and after due notice and hearing order the suspension of the proclamation of a candidate-elect or annul any proclamation…”

• •

Defeated mayoral candidate of the Nacionalista party, Ananias Hibo, filed a complaint with the COMELEC charging Rogelio de Jesus, then COMELEC registrar of Casiguran, With violation of 1978 Election Code.

•

Copy of complaint—Ministry of Justice--Provincial Fiscal of Sorsogon for investigation

•

Asst. Fiscals Manuel Genova and Delfin Tarog of the Tanodbayan conducted the investigation and issued a resolution

•

Finding the existence of prima facie case against petitioner for violation of section 89 and subsections of Section 178 of Election Code of 1978.

•

After approval by Tanodbayan, info was filed before the Sandiganbayan.

•

Petitioner question jurisdiction of Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan over the case.

What were the violations? 1. registered persons in order that they may vote on election day 2. tampered reports on number of voters: 10, 727 instead of 10, 532 Issue: Who has the power to investigate, prosecute, and try election offenses committed by a public officer in relation to his office- COMELEC and CFI or the Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan?

Issues here were rendered moot and academic. Facts: Candidates in Antique for the Batasan Pambansa in May 1984 elections • Evelio B. Javier: more popular support • Arturo Pacificador: nominee of KBL May 13, 1984: eve of elections: Pacificador and his men allegedly ambushed and killed several followers of Javier • •

Javier then questioned the canvass of elections but complaints were dismissed. Pacificador was proclaimed winner. Pending petition, second division of COMELEC, on June 7, 1984, ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case before the Commission.

Issue: WON 2nd Division of COMELEC had jurisdiction and authority to proclaim Pacificador the winner in election. Held: NO Ratio: Section 3 of Article 12-C: “All election cases may be heard and decided y division except contest involving members of the Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard and decided en banc.”

Held: COMELEC Section 2 of Article 12© of 1973 Consti: COMELEC has power to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections

Purpose: to ensure the most careful consideration of such cases

Section 182 of 1978 Election Code: The Commission shall, thru its duly authorized legal officer, have the power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code and to prosecute the same. The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government.

Guevara vs. COMELEC 104 Phil 269 Nature: Original Action in the Supreme Court. Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction Facts: • Jose Guevara published in the Sunday Times an article entitled “Ballot Boxes Contract Hit. • COMELEC ordered him to show just cause why he should not be punished for contempt. • COMELEC claimed that such article would undermine the exclusive constitutional function of Commission and its Chairman Domingo Imperial and member Sixto Brilliantes in the admin of all laws relative to the conduct of elections.

*PD No. 1296: pre-proclamation controversy

Had the employee not been an officer of the COMELEC, regular courts would have jurisdiction. Section 4 of PD No. 1606 gives Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over crimes or offenses committed by public officers…In relation to their office. However, Section 184 of the Election Cod also gave to the CFI the authority hear andAcme Steel, Asiatic Steel to manufacture and supply COMELEC ballot National Shipyards and to Steel Corp, decide all election offenses without qualification boxes as to the statusCOMELEC of the accused. cancelled contract with ACME as the latter failed to sign contract within designated time Javier vs. COMELEC 144 SCRA 194 Nature: Petition to review the decision of the COMELEC

IX. Courts and the Constitution Issue: WON COMELEC had jurisdiction and authority to investigate and punish petitioner for contempt in connection with the alleged publication Held: NO

Marcos vs. Manglapus

Ratio: •

Facts:

• •

The controversy arose from the ministerial act of the Commission in requisitioning for the necessary ballot boxes in connection with the elctions. It was a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial function. Such being the case, it could not exercise power to punish contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is inherently judicial in nature.

Libanan vs. HRET 283 SCRA 520 Nature: Special Civil Action in the SC. Certiorari Facts: • May 28, 1997: HRET affirmed proclamation of Jose Tan Ramirez as duly elected rep of Eastern Samar over Marcelino Libanan • Libanan filed an election protest before HRET claiming, among other things, that the May 8, 115 elections were marred by massive electoral irregularities perpetrated by Ramirez and his followers. • Libanan prayed for HRET to issue an order to annul election and proclamation of Ramirez and thereafter so proclaim him as duly elected Rep of Samar. • HRET said ballots had the required COMELEC watermarks and were thus valid. • Petitioners said the absence of the signature of the chairman of BEI deemed ballots void.

Nature: Petition for mandamus and prohibition

During the term of Cory Aquino, Marcoses wanted to return to the Philippines were barred from doing so. This is a petition for the court to order respondents to issue travel documents to Marcoses and to enjoin the implementation of President’s decision to bar their return to Philippines.

Authenticating marks may be any of the following: a) COMELEC watermark b) Signature or initials or thumbprint of Chairman of BEI c) Presence of red and blue fibers

the the the the

Issue: WON Cory had constitutional authority to prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. YES Sub-issues: Do the Marcoses have right to return to the Philippines? JUSTICIABLE QUESTION. COURT HAS AUTHORITY. Is that a threat to national security? POLITICAL. PRESIDENT HAS POWER TO DECIDE. Issue WON president has power to bar Marcoses’ return

Issue: WON HRET committed GAD in ruling that the absence of the signature of the Chairman of the BEI in the ballots did not render the ballots spurious Held: NO Failure of the BEI to sign the ballot shall constitute an election offense. However, ballot shall not be considered invalid. It merely renders BEI Chairman accountable for such failure. (Section 24 of RA 7166)

the but

WON president acted arbitrarily in determining the their return poses a threat to national interest and welfare

Held/ Ratio YES. Article 2, Sec 4 and 5: The President has obligation to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. House Resolution 1342 even recognized power of President to bar the return. Resolution content: let them return (no implication of not allowing president to bar return. NO. Declaration of threat had factual bases: • Marcoses were driven out of the country for stealing millions from country’s treasury. • Their return would have

posed violence against State.

James Madison vs. James Madison, Secretary of State Nature: Facts: •

• •

•

•

•

Issue 1. Whether the Supreme Court can award the writ of mandamus in any case

The late president of the USA, Mr. Adamas nominated the petitioners to the Senate and got their consent and advice. They were to serve as justices of peace of the Columbia. Together with their appointment, commissions were to be granted for them. Such commissions were signed by the President and affixed, by Madison, as Secretary of State, with the seal of the United States. However, when petitioners asked for their commissions from the Secretary of State, the same were refused of them. Petitioners wanted court to order Madison to deliver the commissions.

Held/Ratio NO. The legal remedy for appeals differs. • The writ of manda mus in cases warrant ed by the principl es and usages of law, can be issued

•

•

•

•

•

to any court appoint ed, or persons holding office, under the he authorit y of the United States. Writ of manda mus: to require any person, corpora tion, or inferior court To fo some particul ar duty therein specifie d, Which apperta ins to their office and duty And which the court has previou sly determi ned to be conson ant to right and justice In all cases where a party has a right to have anythin g done

•

2. Whether Madbury has a right to the commission he demands

3. WON in the present case, the court may award a mandamus to James Madison, Secretary of State

And has no other specific means of compell ing its perfor mance.

YES. The President signed Madbury’s commission and the Secretary of State had affixed the seal of the US to it. At this stage, his appointment was deemed independent of the executive. Healso now had legal rights arising from his appointment; a commission was one such right. YES. The Secretary of State has two capacities: as an agent of the President, he would not be liable to a mandamus. As a ministerial officer of the US, he is liable to a mandamus. The fixing of a seal to the commissions was one of his ministerial duties together with his job as recorder of the deeds of land, letters patent, and of commissions. As such, he has duties assigned him by law, In the execution of which he is independent of all control, But that of laws.

Malabo ‘tong digest na ‘to kaya basahin nyo ulit ang case.

bidding 30% to 51% of the outstanding shares of the MHC. Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm won the bid. Petitioners herein invoke the Filipino First policy in their bid to acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation, which owns the Manila Hotel. They also invoked Sec 10, Article 12 of the 1987 Consti and claimed that • since the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation, to all intents and purposes, it has become part of the national patrimony • MHC i part of the Phils’ tourism industry and thus is part of the national economy contemplated in section 10 of Article 12. Respondents maintain that FPP is not a self-executing policy but requires implementing legislation. Issue: WON petitioners have right to 51% of the shares of Manila Hotel over the supposed winner, Renong Berhad, of the GSIS bid. HELD: YES Ratio: •

•

• •

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Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS Nature: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Prohibition and Mandamus Facts: Controversy arose when GSIS in it privatization program decided to sell thru public

National patrimony includes not only rich natural resources but also cultural heritage and mental ability or faculty of our people. Court ruled that Manila Hotel is part of our national patrimony as it has always been mute witness to the history of this nation (naks!). Manila Hotel is also part of the national economy. It is then accorded the Constitutional protection provided for in Section 10 of Article 12. When a foreign firm offers the highest bid to grants and privileges covering national economy, the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. This was done and the petitioners outbid the Malaysian

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firm the second time around. Such practice gives life and meaning to section 10 of article 12.

Peralta vs. Mathay Nature: Appeal from a decision of the Auditor General Facts: Pedro Peralta, trustee of the GSIS, was granted: • optional retirement gratuity of Php 40, 336.07 covering amounts cost of living allowances, incentive bonus, and Christmas bonus. • Such amounts were not passed in audit • Auditor General Mathay holds that such amounts should be deducted from Peralta’s gratuity Issue: WON Peralta was entitled those mentioned separate amounts which were non-deductible from the amount he already received from GSIS as trustee Held: NO Ratio: Under the GSIS act Peralta was only entitle 25 pesos for each day of actual attendance in session. Additional bonuses by way of an incentive are part of the constitutional ban against officials receiving additional or double compensation.

Tañada vs. Cuenco Nature: Original Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction Facts: In the selection of Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the Senate, upon the nomination of Primicias, elected Delgado and Cuenco from the Nacionalista Party exceeding the maximum 3 seats given to the party with the largest number of votes in the Senate. Primicias

had already nominated Laurel, Lopez, and himself for the Electoral Tribunal position. Issue: WON Court has jurisdiction over the question of the composition of the Senate House Tribunal Held: YES Ratio: The case is a question of whether or not there was a violation of Section 17, Article 6 of the Constitution “ Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of 9 members, three of whom shall be justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Reps, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein.” Issue: WON the selection and election of Delgado and Cuenco was a violation of the Constitution Held: YES Ratio: Although the Consti provision required 9 members for the Electoral Tribunal, the Senate composition at that time made it impossible for such requirement to be met. There was only one member from the minority party, Senator Tañada. To give 5 seats to the Nacionalista party would defeat the spirit of the law. The spirit behind the requirement of proportional representation in the Electoral Tribunal was to ensure impartiality in the decisions of elections, results, and qualifications of the members of either house. Santiago vs. Guingona Nature: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Quo Warranto Facts: Based on the votes of seven lakas-NUCDUMDP senators, senator Guingona was voted and formally recognized as minority leader of the Senate. Senator Santiago and Senator Tatad alleged that Guingona had been usurping; unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them belonged to Senator Tatad. This petition for quo warranto under Rule 66, Section 5, Rules of Court, sought to ouster Guingona as minority leader of the Senate and the declaration of Tatad as the rightful minority leader.

Quo Warranto: • an action for the usurpation of office or franchise or against a corporation • for violation of its charter or for misuse, non-use or forfeiture • of its rights and privileges

Issues: 1.

WON the Court has jurisdiction over the petition Held: Yes the court has jurisdiction. It is a wellsettled doctrine that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the complaint or the petition. In the case at bar, Santiago clearly claimed that there was a violation of Sec 16(1) Article 6 of the Constitution in the process of selecting a minority leader 2. WON there was an actual violation of the Consti Held: The court ruled that no violation of the Constitution occurred. Law simply states that the senate president will be voted by a majority of the members; that is more than one-half. Nowhere in the law does it say that those who didn’t vote for the person who won the position of senate president immediately form part of the minority. 3. WON Guingona was guilty of usurping; unlawfully holding and exercising the position of minority leader 4.

WON Fernan erred in recognizing Tatad as minority leader

3 and 4: held: as for issues 3 and 4, the court ruled that it no longer had jurisdiction on the matter as it was an issue of discipline to be resolved by the senate as an independent body. The consideration of who comprises the minority is for the legislature to decide upon. Petition dismissed as no violation of constitution manifested by alleged usurpation was established.

Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice Nature: Facts: On • • •

June 25, 1996: Leo Echagaray was convicted For raping his 10 year old daughter of his common law wife And was given the death penalty.

Petitioner now files this case with the following contentions: • that R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules do not pass constitutional muster for: (a) violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, (b) violation of our international treaty obligations, (c) being an undue delegation of legislative power, and (d) being discriminatory. RA no. 8177: lethal injection as the method for the imposition of death penalty Issues 1. WON lethal injection violates Section 19, Article 3 of the Constitution Par. 2 Section 19 of Article 3: “The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.”

2. WON reimposition of the death penalty violates international treaty obligations

3. WON RA no. 8177 is undue delegation of legislative power to the Secretary of Justice and the Director of Bureau of Corrections

4. WON section 19 of the rules and regulations to implement RA No. 8177 is invalid.

Held/Ratio NO. • Although the Director of Prisons is not a trained phlebotomist, section 1 of the third par. Of RA 8177 requires that prior to the execution, all involved personal shall be trained in the task so as to avoid inflicting unnecessary pain. The Consti protects convicts only from punishment which are inherently cruel and degrading. • The pain experienced in lethal injection is only incidental to the execution not its main feature. NO • International Convention on Civil and Political Rights recognizes that capital punishment is an allowable limitation on the right to life but should be limited to most serious crimes (Article 6, section 2) • The Philippines did not sign nor ratify the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty. NO. • It is a form of delegation of legislative authority to administrative bodies. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the Bureau of Corrections which drafted the details for the lethal injection execution is a constituent unit of the Department of Justice tasked to take charge of the administration of the correctional system. • The Secretary of Justice is thus tasked to supervise the Director of the Bureau of Corrections in promulgating the Lethal Injection Manual in consultation with the DOH YES. • Section 19: Execution Procedure delegates the making of the Lethal Injection Manual solely to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections but does not include the Secretary of Justice’s authority or mode of approval or review for such manual. • Second paragraph of section 19 requires the confidentiality of the contents of the manual even with respect to convict and to the public at large. • 2nd paragraph violates Section 7 of Article 3 of Consti: the right of people to information

• 5. WON Section 17 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177 is invalid for being discriminatory and contrary to law. (Suspension of the Execution of the Death Sentence)

on matters of public concern. No legal impediment exists for the convict to have access to the contents of the manual.

YES. * Section 17 provides suspension of death penalty for 3 years for pregnant women. This is a violation of Article 83 of the RPC which only suspends execution to a year. Where there is conflict between an implementing law and a congressional statute, the statute must remain.

Respondents are hereby enjoined from enforcing and implementing Republic Act No. 8177 until the aforesaid Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are appropriately amended, revised and/or corrected in accordance with this Decision. CASE OF PARTIAL UNCONSTITUTIONALITY Arroyo vs. De Venecia Nature: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and prohibition Certiorari: to annul or modify the proceedings of any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial function without or excess of its jurisdiction or with GAOD as the law requires. Facts: • • •

Petitioners wanted RA 8240 to be declared null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the house that these rules embody the Consti mandate (Section 16 par 3 of Article 6) ‘that each House may determine the rules of its proceedings and that a violation of the rules is a violation of the Consti itself.

What happened? Representative Arroyo approved the conference committee report with Arroyo’s pending question of the presence of a quorom. RA 8240: amends certain provisions of the National Internal revenue Code by imposing so-called sin taxes (actually specific taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes. Issue: WON Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting RA No. 8240. (it was necessary to find out if Congress acted in GAOD to determine Court’s jurisdiction on the case) Held: NO Ratio: 1. The alleged violations were merely that of internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of the law. 2. The Courts cannot declare an act of legislature void on account of noncompliance of rules of procedure. Besides: • no rule of the House of Representatives was cited which specifically requires that in cases involving approval of a conference committee report, that Chair must restate the motion and conduct nominal voting. • The manner by which House No. 7198 was approved was not a unique one • Local Government Code of 1991 was approved in the same manner • The Consti does not require that yeas and nays be taken every time the House has to vote except: a) upon the last and 3rd reading of bill b) at the request of 1/5 of the members c) in repassing a bill over the veto of the President 3. Rep. Arroyo waived his objection when session reconvened. 4. Under the enroleed bill doctrine, the signing of H. No 7198 are conclusive of its due enactment.

Lopez vs. Roxas Nature: Prohibition with preliminary injunction Facts: • • •

On the November 9, 1965 general elections, Congress elected Fernando Lopez Vice President of the Philippines For getting more votes than respondent Gerardo Roxas.

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January 5, 1966, Roxas filed a petition at the Presidential Electoral Tribunal contesting the victory of Lopez.

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Petitioner contended that Presidential Electoral Tribunal should not be allowed to hear the case because Republic Act No. 1793, creating said Tribunal, is "unconstitutional", and that, "all proceedings taken by it are a nullity."

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Issues: 1. WON RA No. 1793 is inconsistent with the Constitution because the latter does not provide for election protests involving the office of the President and the vice president as this would prejudice the tenure of the president and the vice president HELD: NO RATIO: A protest regarding the validity of the victory of a presidential or vice presidential candidate does not in any way prejudice his tenure. The protest, in the first place, is a question of the validity of such person’s authority to be president or vice president. If it is discovered that such candidate won because of tampered ballots and the like, then his victory would be invalid. 2.

WON it is illegal to allow members of the Supreme Court to sit in the Presidential Electoral Tribunal as this would be a violation of the separation of powers. HELD: NO RATIO: a) the power to judge to judge matters concerning the election, returns and qualifications…is essentially judicial b) Upon the other hand, the Presidential Electoral Tribunal has the judicial power to determine whether or not said duly certified election returns have been irregularly made or tampered with, or reflect the true results of the elections in the areas covered by each, and, if not, to recount the ballots cast, and, incidentally thereto, pass upon the validity of each ballot or determine whether the same shall be counted, and, in the affirmative, in whose favor, which Congress has no power to do.

Borromeo vs. Mariano Nature: Original Action in the Supreme Court Facts:

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July 1, 1914: Andres Borromeo was took office as Judge of the 24th Judicial District

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Feburay 25, 1920: He was appointed Judge of the 21st Judicial District. • Fermin Mariano took his place even if he consistently refused to accept the appointment to the 21st Judicial District. Issue: WON a Judge of First Instance may be made a judge of another district without his consent

Held: NO Ratio: Section 155 of the Administrative Code provides: • Judges of First Instance are appointed judges of the first instance to specific judicial districts, • Until they retire, resign, or are removed through impeachment. • They can only serve as temporary judges in other districts to try land registration cases or when assigned to vacation duty.

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January 10, 1949: C.L. Dacanay, Presidential appointee to the position of Chairman of the Property requisition Committee disapproved the purchase and installation of such apparatus.

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Radiowealth Inc. took the matter up to the Auditor General.

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The Auditor General also disapproved the issuance of the amount for payment as this was a violation of section 2044 of the Revised Administrative Code because such purchase was not due to an emergency pertaining to life and property.

* Appointment to another district does not automatically create a vacancy in the former district because • only until the judge appointed to another district gives his consent can there be a vacancy

Issue: WON the Property requisition Committee and the Auditor General had the authority to disapprove such purchase and refuse to release funds for such purchase respectively.

Additional Facts:

HELD: NO.

During this period, judges of first instance are: 1. appointed by the Governor General 2. to serve until they reach the age of 65 years 3. commissioned to a specific district

RATIO: • Allowing the Property Requisition Committee (which was a creation of the Executive) and the Auditor General to prevent the purchase of such materials would be a violation to the doctrine of separation of powers. • Legislative and executive branches are barred from interfering with the powers of the courts to adjudicate cases and to administer justice • And from interfering in the said branch’s acquisition of books, office equipment, and other material necessary to the convenient transaction of the judicial body’s business.

Act NO. 396 (an obsolete law!) • Allowed the transfer of judges to different districts by order of the Civil Governor with the consent of the Commission • Repealed by Act No 2347: Judiciary Reorganization Act and Admin Acts of 1916 and 1917

# Administrative Code allows the supervision of the Bureau of Supplies on matters regarding supplies but only for departments, offices, and bureaus. The Supreme Court does not fall under any of those classifications.

Radiowealth Inc. vs. Agregado In re Sotto: Nature: petition to review by certiorari a decision of the Auditor General Facts: •

January 7, 1949, the Clerk of the Supreme Court certified the purchase of Webster teletalk and Webster Telephone Speakers for the Supreme Court, were of urgent character and necessary to public Service.

Nature: Original Action in the Supreme Court. Contempt. Facts: • •

SC held Angel Pazaro in contempt of court for refusing to divulge the source of a news published in his paper. As a result, Atty. Sotto issued written statement declaring the SC’s mistake in deciding the mentioned case as a result of

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misinterpretation of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53) which he authored. In the same statement, he further suggested a complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. SC required Sotto to appear in court to answer to questions regarding the statement as he would be punished for contempt of court. Sotto refused.

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ISSUE: WON SC’s decision to hold Sotto in contempt of Court was a violation of his freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution HELD: NO. RATIO: • Sotto’s statement threatened the stability of the judicial system and created the possibility of the furthering people’s mistrust in the SC’s capability to administer justice. • Had he only criticized or commented on the correctness or wrongness of the decision in good faith, he would not have been held in contempt of court. • However, he also: a) intimidated members of the court with the presentation of a bill to reorganize the Supreme Court b) called for the changing of the members of the SC which he labeled as incompetent and narrow minded c) embarrassed or obstructed the administration of justices

Issue: WON the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the Supreme Court, in view of the conferment upon him by the Statutes heretofore mentioned (Rep. Act 1151 and Appropriation Laws) of the rank and privileges of a Judge of the Court of First Instance. HELD: NO RATIO: • Republic Act No. 1151 which created the position of Commissioner of Land Registration entitled him to entitled to the same compensation, emoluments and privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance. • Similar grants are also given to: a) Judicial Superintendent of the Department of Justice b) Assistant Solicitors General, seven in number c) City Fiscal of Quezon City d) Securities and Exchange Commissioner •

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Noblejas vs. Tehankee Nature: Petition for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the Secretary of Justice from investigating the official actuations of the Commissioner of Land Registration, and to declare inoperative his suspension by the Executive Secretary pending investigation Facts:

Secretary of Justice Teehanke required in Noblejas as Commissioner of Land Registration to explain why the no disciplinary action should b taken against Noblejas for approving or recommending approval of subdivision, consolidation and consolidation-subdivision plans covering areas greatly in excess of the areas covered by the original titles March 17, 1968, Teehankee, with the authority of the President, suspended Noblejas due to gross negligence and conduct prejudicial to public interest.

However, such grant does not include exemption from investigation except with confernment of SC. Such grant only applies to judicial bodies. Commissioner of Land Registration is not a District Judge nor any member of the judiciary. Its so-called judicial functions in settling conflicts or doubts from the Register of Deeds is only incidental to its administrative function

DISMISSED. Schneckenburger vs. Moran Nature: Original Action in the SC. Prohibition: Facts: •

Petitioner was an honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila.

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Was charged with the crime of falsification of private documents. Claimed diplomatic immunity based on:

Issue: WON an honorary consul has diplomatic immunity from SC jurisdiction to try his case. HELD: NO Ratio: 1. 2.

3.

4.

A consul is not entitled to privileges and immunities of an ambassador or minister. He is subject to the laws and regulations of the country to which he is accredited. Phil Consti conferred original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls to the SC. Original jurisdiction is not equal to exclusive jurisdiction. CFI Manila has authority to try case. Article 15, section 2 of the 1935 Consti provided that the laws of the Phil Islands in force at the time of the adoption of the Consti were to continue in force until the inauguration of the Commonwealth

PETITION DENIED

Vargas vs. Rilloraza Nature: Original Action in the SC. Certiorari. 1935 Consti!!

Facts: The constitutionality of Section 14 of the People’s Court Act (CA Act No. 682) was questioned in this case. Issue 1. WON Congress had power to add to the preexisting grounds of disqualification of a Justice of the Supreme Court

2. WON a person may act as a Justice of the Supreme Court who has not been duly appointed by the President and confirmed by the COA, even only as a designee

3. WON section 14’s approval of a judge of FI, Judgeat-large of FI, or Cadastral Judge is valid and that the mentioned judges can ‘sit temporarily’ as justice of the Supreme Court to complete the quorum in cases where a justice may not sit and vote when the accused is a person who held office or position under either or both the Phil ExeCom or the Phil Rep or any B,I, A thereof

Held/Ratio NO. • Disqualification by virtue of membership in either or both the Philippine ExeCom and the Phil republic or any branch, instrumentality and/or agency thereof, is not mandated in the Consti • ALL members of the Supreme Court cannot be deprived of the authority over criminal cases where the penalty may be death or life imprisonment (treason has such penalty) • Deprivation of a judge’s authority is deprivation of judicial power. NO. • Judges of mentioned courts only have the ff. requirement: section 6, article 8 a) should have practiced law for a period of not less that five years or have held during a like period within the Philippines an officer requiring a lawyer’s diploma • However, Justices of the SC are required to be at least 40 years old and • Have served for 10 years or more as judge of a court or record or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines NO. • No temporary composition of the Supreme Court is allowed in the Constitution • Section 14 of said act does not satisfy the constitutional requirement of appointment such that members of the SC must be appointed by the President with the consent of the COA.

People vs. Gutierrez Nature: Petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction to annul and set aside an order of the CFI, Ilocos Sur. Facts: May 22, 1970: a group of armed persons descended on barrio Ora Cento, Bantay, Ilocos Sur and set fire to various houses. • they also went to Ora Este and burned houses also killing a woman named Vicenta Balboa June 10, 1970: Provincial Fiscals and prosecutors from the DOJ filed: • Criminal Case 47-V for arson with homicide • Criminal Case 48-V for arson • Charged 17 of the respondents with 82 others who conspired in the act • Trial was set for July 27-29, 1970 June 15, 1970: •

Secretary of Justice issued Administrative Order No. 221

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o o o o o June 18, 1970: •

Authorized Judge Lino Añover Of the Circuit Criminal Court of the 2nd Judicial District Of San Fernando, La Union To hold special term in Ilocos Sur From and after July 1, 1970

Secretary of Justice issued Administrative Order No. 226 o Authorize Judge Mario Gutierrez o To transfer the cases to o The Circuit Criminal Court o In the interest of justice and o Pursuant to Rep. At 5179 o As implement by Ad. Order Nos. 258 and 274 of DOJ

June 22, 1970: prosecution sought to move trial of case to Circuit Criminal Court to ensure security of witnesses and personal safety. • respondent judge refused to transfer the case and reasoned out that since the accused had already pleaded, transfer was no longer to be heard of. • Under Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 5179 request for change of venue from SC should have been done at the very inception of the cases. Petitioners filed this case to set aside decision of respondent judge and to try the cases at either San Fernando or Baguio City. Issue: WON the Secretary of Justice has the power to determine what court should hear specific cases Held: NO Ratio: • •

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violated doctrine for the separation of powers Republic Act. No. 5179 creating that Circuit Criminal Court did not and does not authorize the Secretary of Justice to transfer thereto specified and individual cases. (Although in this case, Secretary of Justice authorized, not ordered judges to transfer cases. La siyang violation actually) The change of venue in trying cases is in the interest of truth of justice. I the case at bar, witnesses said they were willing to testify as long as the proceedings would not be in Ilocos.

Writs of certiorari and mandamus prayed for are GRANTED. Added info: Section 14(a) of Rule 110 of Revised Rules of Court: criminal cases should be tried in the places where they were committed However, said section has 5 exceptions: a) piracy b) extra-territorial offenses contemplated in Article 2 c) continuing offenses d) criminal and civil actions arising from written defamation e) where the application of general rule would prevent a fair and impartial inquiry into the actual facts of the case In re Cunanan Nature: Original Action in the Supreme Court Facts: Republic Act No. 972 popularly known as the ‘Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953’ was enacted on June 21, 1953 without executive approval. (Senator Pablo Angeles David authored the bill) As a result, 1, 094 unsuccessful bar candidates were to be benefited by the act.

Purpose of the law: to overcome insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of these students when they took the bar (after the war daw kasi) Issue: WON Republic Act No. 972 was unconstitutional Held: YES. Ratio: 1. 2. 3. 4.

It was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court. Legislature exceed in its power to repeal, alter, and supplement the rules on admission to Bar. It is the job of the Supreme Court to render ultimate decision as to who is fit to practice law. Inadequate preparation is not a valid excuse for flunking the bar and is an arbitrary classification of people taking the bar. Inadequately prepared students should not be lawyers in the first place. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law.

Republic Act No. 972: An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from Nineteen Hundred and Forty-Six Up to and Including Nineteen Hundred and Fifty-Five Section 1: passing rate became 70 percent Section 2” any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any bar examination after July 4th, 1946 shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take.

In re IBP Facts: On September 17, 1971, Marcos enacted Republic Act 6397 providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar and Appropriating Funds therefor. (source of law: House Bill No. 3277) Integration mean the official unification of the entire lawyer population of the Philippines. • requires membership • and financial support • aimed to make the law profession more efficient and effective. Issues 1. WON Court has power to integrate the Philippine Bar

2. WON integration is constitutional a) compelling membership: constitutional? b) Membership fee: constitutional?

3. WON Court should ordain the integration of the Bar at this time.

Held/Ratio YES. Under Article 8, Section 3, the SC has the power ‘ to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts and the admission to the practice of law. The ACT neither confers a new power or restricts Court’s inherent power but is a mere legislative declaration that integration will promote public interest. YES. On the question of compelled membership, Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is already a member. On the question of compelled payment of fee, it was reasoned out that such amount would only be incidental to its purpose. The State may only ‘discipline’ the bar if it poses a fee that results to an unconstitutional burden. YES. Integration in other countries has resulted to: • improved discipline among members • more meaningful participation of lawyers

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hay marami pala..tingnan niyo na lang org Majority of local associations of lawyers have already approved of the bar. 96.45 per cent of lawyers also approved integration Lansang vs. Garcia Nature: Facts: Two hand grenade explosions occurred on August 21, 1971 at Plaza Miranda where the Liberal Party of the Philippines was holding a public meeting for the presentation of its candidates for the November 8, 1971 elections. Eight persons were killed and many were injured. As a result, Marcos issued Proclamation No. 889, suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Petitioners sought for writs of habeas corpus after being arrested without a warrant therefore and detained. They questioned the validity of Proclamation No. 889. Issue 1. WON Proclamation No. 889 violated par. 4 section 1 of article 3 and par 2, section 10 of article 7 of Consti

2. WON there was invasion, insurrection, or rebellion or imminent danger therof

WON public safety required the suspension of the privilege

3. WON petitioners are covered by said proclamation as amended

Held/Ratio No. Petitioners initially contended that the proclamation was made based solely on the idea that there was a conspiracy and intent to rise in arms among several groups in the country. However, court held that with the modifications thru Proclamation No. 889-A, Marcos declared that the ‘enemy groups’ had already entered into the conspiracy and have in fact joined together to engage in armed insurrection and rebellion. The Plaza Miranda incident was only one among the many violent incidences that brought forth such proclamation. YES. The existence of the CPP and the NPA were clear proof of the state of rebellion and insurrection of the country. These groups believe that force and violence are indispensable to the attainment of their goal. YES. President had in his possession records of killings of several government officials by the CPP, bombings of the COMELEC building, MERALCO, and others. YES. They have been charged for a violation of the Anti-Subversion Act and were then covered by the proclamation.

IN case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, the President can: 1) call out the armed forces 2) suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus 3) put Philippines or any part therof under martial law

Lacson vs. Romero Nature: Original Action in the Supreme Court Facts: July 25, 1946: Antonio Lacson was appointed by President as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental August 6, 1946: Comm on Appointments confirmed appointment August 10, 1946: took oath May 17, 1949: President nominated Lacson to post of provincial fiscal of Tarlac upon recommendation of Secretary of Justice Romero was nominated for Negros Oriental. May 19, 1949: both nominations were confirmed by COA. Lacson neither accepted nomination nor assumed Tarlac office. However after said event: • •

Romero appeared in Negros Courts as prov fiscal Paguia, the Auditor and Alfabeto, the Treasurer refused to give Lacson salary because they already believed Romero to be the provincial fiscal.

Agabin question: Ahh, what are the steps for the aah… appointment of fiscal? 1. nomination by President 2. to make nomination valid and permanent, COA must confirm 3. acceptance thereof by the appointee manifested thru his assumption of office Issues 1. WON COA’s appointment of Lacson to Tarlac created a vacancy in the Negros fiscal office 2. WON nomination and confirmation of Lacson to Tarlac served as removal of Lacson from office 3. WON President can remove at any time, a fiscal he himself appointed to office

Held/Ratio NO. Since Lacson declined to accept the nomination, there was no vacancy. YES. However, no reason was presented as to why Lacson was to be removed. He did not even accept nomination. NO. Article 12 section 4 provides that ‘no officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended for causes provided by law.’ Section 671 of RAC as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 177 section 8 classifies provincial fiscals as person embraced in unclassified civil service.

Final Decision: Lacson is provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental Anu-ano ba causes for a civil service officer’s removal from office? 1. 2. 3.

Section 686 of RAC: falsification of DTR Section 687: political activity and contribution to political fund drunkenness, gambling, immoral conduct

What is the Civil Service Commission? • a vigorous and non-partisan instrument for development of an honest and efficient civil service • Chairman, 2 commissioners, 35 yrs old on day of election, natural born citizens, did not run for office in elections immdtly preceding appointment Question to Sir: Had the transfer really constituted a promotion, can it be said that it was valid?

Garcia vs. Executive Secretary Nature: Original Petition in the Supreme Court. Quo Warranto and prohibition with preliminary injunction.

Mondano, Jose VS. Silvosa, et. al. (gov of Surigao) Nature: Original Action in the Supreme Court. Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction

Facts: Facts: On February 18, 1962, Dr. Paulino Garcia, presidential appointee for the position of Chairman of the National Science Development Board was subjected to a preventive suspension of 60 days by the Executive Secretary. The reason for such act was the need to investigate on his acts of dishonesty and other violations of the RPC (administrative cases). Juan Salcedo Jr. was then appointed as Acting Chairman. Petitioner wanted: a) to be reinstated to his position after April 19, 1962; the last day of his 60 day suspension despite the fact that investigation was still no over b) the court to declare Salcedo guilty of unlawfully holding the position of Chairman

At the endorsement to the provincial governor of Surigao, the Assistant Executive Secretary requested for immediate investigation of Jose Mondano’s acts of rape and concubinage. Mondano was mayor of Mainit, Surigao Admin Order NO. 8 suspended Mondano and investigation commenced.

Issue: WON Section 35 of Civil Service Act applied to Garcia, a presidential appointee.

The provincial fiscal himself could not file a complaint of rape without sworn statement of offended party.

Section 35 of Civil Service Act: Lifting the preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation- When the admin case against the officer of employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the Commissioner of Civil Service within a period of 60 days after the date of suspension, the respondent shall be reinstated in the service. IF the respondent officer or employee is exonerated, he shall be restored to his position with full pay for the period of suspension. Held/Ratio: YES The provision only provides for officers and employees. No specific mention of WON that official is a presidential appointee. The suspension is not meant to be a penalty for the crime. It is an administrative disciplinary action. It is not necessary that the Commissioner of Civil Service would eventually decide the case. It is assumed that the cases of all civil service officers would pass through the Commissioner of Civil Service for scrutiny and investigation. Effect: Garcia reinstated. Salcedo asked to vacate.

Issue: WON said investigation was valid Held/Ratio: No Section 2188 of RAC: provincial governor is authorized to receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption, or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime of moral turpitude.

Decision: Investigation unauthorized.

was

illegal

and

Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board Nature: Appeal from the decision of CFI, Manila Facts: CFI denied petition for writs of habeas corpus and/or prohibition, certiorari, and mandamus for his case. On May 12, 1952, Special Prosecutor Emilio L. Galang charged petitioner before the Deportation Board. The crimes: • purchasing $130,000 with license from Central Bank and remitted it to Hong Kong • attempted bribery of Phil and US officials (Chief of the Intelligence Division of the CB and member of US Air Force) In effect Deportation Board issued a warrant of arrest for petitioner (E.O. No 398, series of 1951). Upon fixing of bonds, petitioner was temporarily set free.

Issues: 1. WON President has authority to deport aliens Held: Yes. Section 69 of Act NO. 2711 of RAC: No alien can be deported by prexy EXCEPT upon prior investigation, conducted by said executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which such action is contemplated. * In effect, Prexy (Quezon, May 29, 1936) created the Deportation Board to conduct investigations. 2.

WON Deportation Board also has authority to file warrants of arrest

Yes but only after investigation has resulted to the actual order of deportation. Arrest would have been deportation to take effect.

necessary

for

However, in the case at bar, investigations were still ongoing and no order for deportation was yet made. Decision: E.O. No 398, series of 1951: declared illegal Deportation may be effected in 2 ways: 1. by order of President, after due investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of the RAC 2. by Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation by the Board of Commissioners under Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613 Crime was an act profiteering, blackmarketing of US dollars

hoarding

or

Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff Nature: Original Action in the SC. Prohibition Facts: Ramon Ruffy, Jose L. Garcia, Prudente Francisco, Dominador Adeva, and Adres Fortus allegedly killed Lt. Col Jurado. At the time of the time, Ruffy was already relieved of his assignment as Commanding Officer, Bolo Battalion. However, the other four remained officers of the Bolo Area of the 6th Military Division.

Petitioners questioned the jurisdiction of the General Court Martial of the Philippine Army over the case. They also sought for the records of their cases’ proceedings to be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Issues: 1. WON petitioners were under jurisdiction of General Court Martial of the Philippine Army Held: YES Garcia, Francisco, Adeva, and Fortus were still officers of the Bolo Area deriving authority from the General Headquarters of the 6th Military Division when they killed Jurado. The Japanese occupation did not invalidate the existence of the Philippine Army and the status of officers drafted to carry out military activities. These officers did not cease in their active duty during the occupation. 2. WON Supreme Court had power of judicial review over the case held: NO “Court Martials are agencies of executive character and one of the authorities for the ordering of courts martial has been held to be attached to the constitutional functions of the President as Commander-in-chief, independent of legislation.”

Kuroda vs. Jalandoni Nature: Original Action in the SC. Prohibition Facts: Shigenori Kuroda, formerly Liuetentant General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of the Japanse Imperial Forces in the Philippines during the period covering 1943 and 1944, • who is now charged before a Military Commission • convened by the Chief of Staff of the AFP with • having unlawfully disregarded and failed • to discharge his duties as such commander • to control the operations of members of his command, • permitting them to commit brutal crimes against civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces • in violation of the law and customs of war • •

Petitioner questions: the constitutionality of E.O. No 68 the participation of Melville Hussey and Robert Port in the proceedings of the case

Issues: 1. • • •

Issues WON E.O. No 68 was constitutional established a National War Crimes Office prescribed rules and regulations governing the trial of accused war criminals issued by President on July 29, 1947

Held/Ratio YES. •

•

•

•

2. WON 2 American attorneys, Hussey and Port can participate in the case even if they were not qualified to practice law in the Philippines under Rules of Court

Section 3 of Article 2 provides: The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation. Part of President’s power as Commander-in-Chief to consummate unfinished aspect of war, namely, the trial and punishment of war criminals. Although Philippines was not a signatory of the Hague Convention, the crime was committed when we were under the US, a signatory country. Had we not been under US, it would still have been valid becoz said E.O. was pursuant to the general application of national policy against war.

YES. • •

Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed by special law not Rules of Court. Lawyers appearing in Military Commission need not be lawyers qualified to practice law in the Philippines.

Estrada vs. Desierto Facts:

Cases at bar: 1. Petition for prohibition with a prayer for a write of preliminary injunction for Case Nos. until his term as President is over : (February 5, 2001) Court G.R. No. 146710-15 OMB 0-00-1629:

Ramon A. Gonzales

October 23, 2000

Bribery and graft and corruption

OMB 0-00-1754:

Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption

November 17, 2000

Plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption

OMB 0-00-1755:

Graft Free Philippines Foundation, Inc.

November 24, 2000

Plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct

Romeo Capulong, et. al.

November 28, 2000

Malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds and property, plunder, etc.

OMB 0-00-1756:

OMB 0-00-1757:

OMB 0-00-1758:

Leonard de Vera, et. al.

Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr.

Bribery, plunder, indirect bribery, violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080 December 4, 2000

Plunder, graft and corruption

2. Quo Warranto: confirm him as lawful and incumbent President of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge his duties. (February 6, 2001) Court GR No. 146738 Issue 1. WON the petitions present a justiciable controversy

Held/Ratio YES. Section 1, Article 8 Consti: but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government •

• • • 2. If 1 is yes, WON Estrada resigned as President (section 8, Article 7)

EDSA 2 is intra constitutional. Arroyo swore under 1987 Consti. Such action poses legal questions as to the constitutional validity of her presidency. The issues for resolution require proper interpretation of certain provisions in the Consti. The issues call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve interpretation of petitioner’s right against prejudicial publicity.

YES. Totality test: Was there intent to resign?

Was the intent coupled with acts of relinquishment? Based on Angara diary, Estrada himself requested that they help each other to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. Here, intent to resign was implied. Negotiations soon followed. The terms of the negotiations included: a. 5 day transition period after resignation b. guarantee of safety of petitioner and family c. agreement to open 2nd envelope to clear petitioner’s name No argument as to whether or not the terms of negotiations implied willingness to resign was made by petitioner. WON Estrada is only temporarily unable to act as President

 NO. Congress had already declared support for Gloria as President. Court no longer has power of judicial review on legislative branch’s act of recognizing legitimacy of Arroyo government.

3. WON conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal prosecution of Estrada. If not, WON whether Estrada is immune from criminal prosecution

NO. The walk out aborted the impeachment trial. Estrada resigned. No need for impeachment in order allow suits to be filed against him. Feb. 7, 2001=Senate Resolution No. 83Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio

4. WON the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity

No post-tenure immunity for cases like plunder, bribery, graft and corruption NO. There is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the prelim investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. Publicity per se does not create bias.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED.

IBP vs. Zamora Nature: Special Action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temp. restraining order Petitioner sought to nullify order of Pres. Estrada commanding the deployment of the Phil. Marines to join PNP in visibility patrols around metropolis. Such deployment was to be temporary. Invoked: Section 18, Article 7 of Consti Powers as Commander-in-Chief Issue: WON such order was constitutional

Held: YES

Issue 1. WON petitioner has legal standing

2. WON President’s action of deployment is subject to judicial review

3. WON the act violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of PNP

Held/ Ratio NO. Petitioner does not possess requisites of standing to raise the issues in the petition. IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case. The National President signed the petition without a formal board resolution authorizing hi to file action. NO. Deployment of military personnel falls under the Commander-in-Chief powers of president (Section 18, Article 7) to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. NO. Characteristic of deployment: • permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement (done in elections, administration of Red Cross, anti-drug enforcement activities etc.) • marines under the leadership of the Metro Manila Police Chief • even equipment of Marines: from PNP

Marcos vs. Manglapus Nature: Petition for mandamus and prohibition Facts: During the term of Cory Aquino, the Marcoses wanted to return to the Philippines but were barred from doing so. This is a petition for the court to order the respondents to issue travel documents to the Marcoses and to enjoin the implementation of the President’s decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Issue: WON Cory had constitutional authority to prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. YES Sub-issues: Do the Marcoses have right to return to the Philippines? AUTHORITY.

JUSTICIABLE QUESTION. COURT HAS

Is that a threat to national security? POLITICAL. PRESIDENT HAS POWER TO DECIDE.

Issue WON president has power to bar Marcoses’ return

WON president acted arbitrarily in determining the their return poses a threat to national interest and welfare

Held/ Ratio YES. Article 2, Sec 4 and 5: The President has obligation to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. House Resolution 1342 even recognized power of President to bar the return. Resolution content: let them return (no implication of not allowing president to bar return. NO. Declaration of threat had factual bases: • Marcoses were driven out of the country for stealing millions from country’s treasury. • Their return would have posed violence against State.

Araneta, Salvador vs. Gatmaitan Nature: Original Action in the Supreme Court. Prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction. Facts: San Miguel Bay became the center for the dispute over trawl fishing. Sustenance fishermen complained about the operations alleging that those operations depleted the resources of that marine area. In effect, President issued E.O.s 22, 66, and 80 which had the effect of prohibiting trawl fishing in the said area. Issues: 1. WON President has authority to issue E.O.s 22, 66, and 80

2. WON E.O.s were valid 3. WON it was undue delegation of powers to President

Held/Ratio YES. Section 10(1) of Article 7 of Consti gives president control over executive departments. Dept of Agriculture and Natural Resources is subject to the general supervision and control of Pres. VALID and issued with authority of law NO. Act no. 4003 of Legislature as amd. By Commonwealth Act No. 471 intended to prohibit devices like trawl nets that deplete food supply from sea and it authorized Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources who in turn is under supervision of President.

Aytona, Dominador vs. Castillo, Andres Nature: Original Action in the Supreme Court. Prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction. Facts: December 29, 1961: Garcia appointed Dominador Aytona as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank Aytona takes oath December 30, 1961: Macapagal assumed presidential position December 31, 1961: Macapagal issued Administrative Order No. 2 all ad interim appointments made by Garcia after December 13, 1961 (when Macapagal was proclaimed by Congress). January 1, 1962: Macapagal appointed Andres Castillo for CB position

Issue: WON Aytona’s appointment was valid HELD: No. • • • •

Malacañan submitted appointments on the same day they were issued. Commission on Appointments was not in session After proclamation, Garcia’s administration was caretaker administration. Such appointments obstruct political policies of successor

POI: The President has authority to issue ad interim appointments if: a. there are vacancies b. the appointees have been approved by Commission on Appointments (by way of advice) Sarmiento, Ulpiano vs. Mison (Comm of the Bureau of Customs) Nature: Petition for prohibition Facts: Petitioners sought to prohibit in their appointed jobs: Salvador Mison: Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs Guillermo Carague: Secretary of the Department of Budget Petitioners alleged that those appointments were void by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Teka…may right be prexy to appoint? OO NAMAN Section 16, Article 7 of 1987 Consti: “The President shall nominate, and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint …” Who can the President appoint? a. heads of exe depts., ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointment are vested in him in this Consti b. all other officers of the govt whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law c. those whom the president may be authorized by law to appoint d. officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone * The first groups requires consent and confirmation by COA (by virtue of statutory construction)

Issue: WON Commission appointments to be valid.

on

Appointments’confirmation

was

required

for

mentioned

presidential

Held: No. Only the first group of appointees requires explicitly the need for consent and confirmation. The second sentence of provision says: He shall also appoint… No explicit reference to the need of COA’s consent was then mentioned. Appointments valid.

Demetria vs. Alba

• •

Nature: Petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to review the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 (Budget reform Decree of 1977) Facts: Petitioners, members of the National Assembly/Batasan Pambansa questioned the constitutionality of the presidential decree. • authorizes illegal transfer of public money • does not specify purpose and objective of proposed transfer of funds • allows president to override the safeguards in approving appropriations • undue delegation of legislative powers to executive • such transfers are without or excess or their jurisdiction Issue: WON PD No. 1177 is unconstitutional. Held: PD No. 1177 is unconstitutional and void. P.D. No. 1177 paragraph 1 of Section 44: The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriation Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment. Vs. Section 16 (5), Article 8 of 1973 Consti: No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commission may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. •

President could only transfer funds to augment an item. • Such transfer may be made if there are savings. Tañada vs. Angara Nature: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari

PD 1177 overextends powers of President. Allowed him to indiscriminately transfer funds from one dept to another.

Facts: Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of the Dept of Trade and Industry signed the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations (Final Act) Petitioners sought: 1. for the nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the concurrence (Senate Resolution No. 97) of the Philippine Senate in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the WTO 2. for the prohibition of its implementation Issues 1. WON Court has jurisdiction

2. WON WTO agreement violated Consti mandate on economic nationalism

3. WON WTO Agreement unduly limits legislative power (a provision in the agreement says that Congress could not pass laws for national interest and general welfare if it were inconsistent with agreement)

Held/Ratio YES. Petitioners alleged that WTO agreement violated the Consti mandate to ‘develop a selfreliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos (Sec 19, Art 2) xxx to give preference to qualified Filipinos (Sec 10, Art 12) and to promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials, and locally produced goods (Section 12, Art 12). NO. While the Consti mandates economic nationalism, it also: • recognizes the need for business exchange with the world • exchanges need to be based on equality and reciprocity • Consti is only against unfair foreign competition. • Consti does not rule out foreign competition. WTO provided: * protection for weak economies thru oneon-one negotiations with developed countries YES but that is not unconstitutional per se. • Treaties do limit absoluteness of sovereignty. • By surrendering state power, nations reap greater benefits which are results of the provisions of international law

Constitutional!

Emmanuel Pelaez vs. Auditor General Nature: Original Action in the Supreme Court. Prohibition with preliminary injunction Facts: Emmanuel Pelaez, vice president of the Phils. instituted this special civil, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the auditor general and his reps and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in the implementation of the ff. exe. orders from the prexy which the latter claimed as pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Rev.Admin. Code. E.O. Nos 93-21, E.O. 121, E.O. 124, E.O. Nos 126-129 ( creating 33 municipalities)

Section 68 of Rev. Admin Code -grants the prexy the power to create municipalities with the necessary stipulations provided by the legislative branch Pelaez maintained that section 68 of the Rev. Admin. Code had already been repealed by Section 3 of Republic Act. No. 2370. “ Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.” Teka, di ba iba naman ung pinag-usapan ng dalawang laws? As in barrios and municipalities? - Oo nga. Pero ang logic kasi dito, barrios make up municipalities and because the president is not granted the power to create barrios, lalo na kaya ang municipalities which are made up of barrios. Issue: WON the president has authority to create new municipalities Held: The court granted the petition on ff grounds: 1.

2.

3.

The creation of municipalities is not an administrative function but one, which is essentially and eminently legislative in character. (Section 3 of rep. Act 2370). It is only administrative in as much as it allows the adoption of means and way to carry into effect the law creating the said municipalities. Section 10 (1) of Article VII of Consti- grants prexy control over exe. institutions and general supervision of LGs as prov. By law. This only grants him the authority to check whether the offices are performing their duties as provided by law. In the case at bar, the prexy did more than that. By creating new municipalities, he is in effect submitting local officials to submit to his dictation, something denied of him by consti. Sec. 68 of Rev. Admin Code must be deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of the 1935 Consti, which grants the prexy control over exe. branches and units (e.g. municipalities) but not the power to create or abolish new ones (this one’s legislative)

E.O.s declared NULL and Void. May opinions pa. Basahin nyo na lang. It’s’ like historical kasi so medyo fun siya. (boink.)  J. Antonio Araneta vs Fiscal of Manila, Eugenio Angeles Nature: Prohibition and Mandamus Facts: Maraming kaso pala ‘to. 1.

2.

3.

4.

J. Antonio Araneta under prosecution for the violation of E.O. No. 62 E.O. No. 62-regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings Prays of writ of prohibition to judge and fiscal Leon Ma. Guerrero E.O. NO. 192- aims to control exports from the Phils. ( pertinent to case at bar: forbids export of shoes) Seeks a writ of mandamus to compel Admin. Of the Sugar Quota Office and the Commissioner of Customs to permit the exportation of shoes Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr (pres. Of Nacionalista party) E.O. No. 225- appropriates funds for the operation of the Gov. of the Phils. Applies for writ of prohibition to restrain the treasurer of the Phils from disbursing money under this E.O. Antonio Barredo E.O. No 226- appropriates Php 6,000,000 to defray expenses in connection with and incidental to the holding of elections to be held in Nov. 1949

Asks court to prevent respondents from disbursing such amount E.O.s in question: 62, 192, 225, 226 Basic premise of the petitioners: such E.O.s are (Commonwelath Act NO. 671) have ceased to exist.

null and void because Emergency Powers Act

Act. No 671. An act declaring a state of total emergency as a result of war involving the Phils. And authorizing the president to promulgate rules and regulations to meet such emergency. Bakit legal ‘to despite sepation of powers? Section 26 of article 6 in the Consti: the Congress may grant the prexy te power to promulgate rules and reg. To carry out declared natl policy, given nec. Stipulations only in time of war or other national emergency. Issue: WON the E.O.s included in the case at bar are null and void. Held: The court held that E.O.s Nos. 62, 192, 225, and 226 were null and void; issued without authority of law as they were issued after May 25, 1946 when Congress first met ion regular session and Act no. 671 became inoperative. Legal Basis: Act No. 671 Section 3: limits the emergency powers of prexy to the time the legislature was prevented from holdings sessions due to enemy action or other causes brought on by war “ the prexy shall as soon as practicable upon the convening of the Congress of the Phils report thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him under the powers herein granted.” (in effect, as soon as this meeting occurs, the emergency powers or the prexy are deemed inoperative unless reenacted with authority from legislature) mas makapal pa ung pages for opinions compared to pages for the court’s decision. Kakastress. ______________________________________________ People and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp vs. Jose O. Vera, judge ad interim of the CFI of Manila Nature: Original Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and prohibition Facts: Petitioners pray for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and of prohibition so that the CFI of Manila may not entertain further the application for probation of Mariano Cu Unjieng. In effect, the latter would be committed to prison in accordance with the final judgment of conviction rendered by court. Final Conviction: indeterminate penalty ranging from 4 years and two months of prision correctional to 8 years of prision mayor, to pay costs and with reservation of civil action to Hongkong and Shanghai Banks. Wait… ano ba ‘tong case ni Mariano Cu Unjieng? Ahmm, di ko yata nadiscover kung ano ginawa niya. Basta crim. Case ‘to. So malamang Mariano did sumthin bad against Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corps. (grabe. Duh nito ah.) Issue: 1.

WON the constitutionality of Act. No. 4221 has been properly raised in these proceedings • Act 4221- Probation Act - prescribes in detailed manner the procedure for granting probation to accused persons after their conviction has become final and before they have served their sentence Held: the constitutional issue has been sufficiently presented not only in the Sc but also in the trial court. Judge Vera however declined to pass upon the question on the ground that the private prosecutor had no authority to raise the question because his rights were not affected by the statute.

Simply stated, the constitutionality of any statute is relevant to every person who will be, sooner or later, affected by it. The People of the Philippines, thus have every right to raise the question of constitutionality of such statute which may, sooner or later, affect them (huh? Intindihan nyo ba?) Possible Sir Agabin Question: But was it right to raise the issue of constitutionality only after the proceedings of the case? Shouldn’t they have done that before?

2.

Possible Answer: In most cases, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity. However, the exception to that general rule applies to cranial cases wherein the question may be raised for the first time at any stage of proceedings either in the trail court or on appeal if it is nec. to the decision of the case. if issue 1 is in the affirmative, WON said act is constitutional. The constitutionality of Act 4221 is challenged on 3 grounds: 1. it encroaches upon the pardoning power of the executive (probation is different from pardon. It is a purely judicial act which does not exempt probationer from the entire punishment which the law inflicts. Executive pardon is against the crim. law which binds and directs judges.

Added info: definitions Pardon: an act of grace, a remission of guilt, a forgiveness of offense Commutation: a remission of a part of the punishment, a substitution of a less penalty for the one originally imposed Reprieve or respite: withholding of sentence for an interval of time 2. it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power (the court ruled in the affirmative. Because Act 4221 is improper and is an unlawful delegation of leg. Power, it is deemed unconstitutional and void. Decisions of the judicial bodies are deemed final. Act 4221 may delay or modify such decision by virtue of the authority vested by legislature on it. Di nga tlga ‘to pwede di ba?) 3. it denies equal protection of laws Act 4221 is unconstitutional and void. Writ of prohibtion is granted. ______________________________________________ US vs. ANG TANG HO Nature: Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Manila Facts:

Act No. 2868 An act penalizing the monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances…yada yada yada. On August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamtion fixing the price at which rice should be sold (E.O. No. 53). On August 8, 1919, Ang Tang Ho was charged and subsequently found gulity with a violation of the mentioned proclamation for selling rice at an excessive price ( .80/ganta). Issue: WON E.O. No. 53 is constitutional and valid. Held: The court ruled that E.O. No 53 is unconstitutional and void. Act No. 2868 is a general rule regarding the regulation of palay, rice, and corn sales. It does not however grant the Governor General the power to fix the prices of rice without justifiable cause. Such specific stipulations are for the legislature to decide. (basahin niyo ung orig to get the full idea of what the act was all about.) Gualberto J. De La Llana (judge Brnach 2, City Court of Olongapo) vs. Manuel Alba, Minister of Budget

Nature: Petition directly filed with the Supreme Court for the adjudication of the Constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 Facts:

Batas Pambansa Blg. 129: An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes. * Cabinet Bill no. 42…sponsored by Chairman of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights, and Good Govt. Petitioners sought to enjoin Minister of Budget, Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and Minister of Justice from taking any action in implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 Issue: WON Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is unconstitutional Held: The court’s opinion was: Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is not unconstitutional. 1.

lack of standing of petitioners? Judge de la Llana and the other petitioners are members of the bar. They are not devoid of any personal and substantial interest over the issue of the constitutionality of the statute in dispute.

2.

arbitrariness of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 Petitioners did not take notice of context of the promulgation of such statute.

3.

On August 7, 1980, a Presidential Committee on Judicial reorganization was organized thru an E.O. which was later amended by E.O. N0. 619-A dated September 5, 1980. the law is simply a response to the need for institutional reforms which would result in: a. more efficiency in the disposal of cases b. improvement of quality of justice c. modifications of court jurisdictions

* Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 also results in the abolition of certain inferior courts in the process of modifying court jurisdictions. However, this is not a violation of powers since such abolitions will be done in good faith and for the attainment of a better judicial system as was the intended purpose of the statue in the first place.

Olaguer vs. Military Commission No. 34 Nature: Petitions for certiorari and prohibition to review the order of the Military Commission No. 34 Facts: • • •

May 30, 1980: petitioners were charged for subversion (PD No. 885-Revised Anti-Subversion Law) upon the recommendation of the respondent Judge Advocate General (Gen. Hamilton Dimaya) and the approval of the respondent Minister of National Defense (Juan Ponce Enrile)

Respondent Chief of Staff of AFP (General Romeo Espino) created the Military Commission No. 34 to try the case. July 30, 1980: amended charges to: 1) unlawful possession of explosives and incendiary devices; 2) conspiracy to assassinate Marcoses; 3) conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Tangco, Roño, and Corpus;

5) arson of 9 buildings 6) attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez, Valencia, and Generals Espino and Ver 7) conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion Petitioners claimed that: • military commissions cannot try civilians for offenses committed during martial law • the proceedings of Military Commission No. 34 violated due process of law Issues 1. WON military commissions can try civilians for offenses committed during martial law when civil courts were open

Held/Ratio NO. • • • • •

2. WON Military Commission NO. 34 violated due process of law (unconstitutional)

Military Tribunals are executive institutions. Provided by legislature for the President as Commander-in-Chief To aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing discipline therein Case at bar involves criminal offenses. Only judiciary can interpret what constitutes criminal offense Besides, Proclamation No. 2045 (January 17, 1981-lifted martial law) divest Military Commission No. 34 of its ‘supposed’ authority to try civilians.

YES.

•

•

violated Section 18, Article 7: state of martial does not suspend Consti nor shall it supplant functioning of civil courts to military tribunals (gist lang ‘to) so long as civil courts are open, proceedings have to be done in those places except when the offenses are merely administrative in nature

Decision: Military Commission NO. 34: unconstitutional Execution of petitioners permanently suspended

Ang-Angco vs. Castillo Nature: Original Petition in the SC. Certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory injunction Facts: • • •

Commissioner of Customs Manuel Manahan filed an administrative complaint against Collector of Customs Ang-Angco; For grave neglect of duty and observance of a conduct prejudicial to the interest of the customs service

IN RESPONSE TO THAT: • President Magsaysay created a committee to investigate on Ang-Angco’s case. • At the time of Magsaysay’s death, investigation was still ongoing.

• • • • •

After Magsaysay’s death, Executive Secretary Castillo, with authority from President, Rendered final judgment on Ang-Angco’s case finding the latter GUILTY of conduct prejudicial to the best interst of the customs service And considered him resigned from the position.

Wait…ano case ni Ang-Angco?? He authorized the release of Pepsi-Cola’s 1,188 units of concentrates which were held by customs for lack of dollar allocation or remittance to foreign exchange. He did that under the verbal expression of approval of release by Secretary of Finance Hernandez. Initially, he did not issue approval because he said Collector of Customs had no jurisdiction over case. Issue: WON Executive Secretary, with authority from President can render final judgment on an administrative case without submitting such direct action to the Commissioner of Civil Service and remove official from office Held: NO Ratio: Under Section 16(i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959:

• •

the Commissioner of Civil Service has original and exclusive jurisdiction to decided administrative cases of all officers and employees in the classified service limitation to that provision: the Commissioner’s decision may be appealed to the Civil Service Board of Appeals, whose decision shall be final (Section 18, Republic Act 2260)

But..aah..does the President have aah..the power to remove anybody from office? Yes. • Section 79 of RAC provides an implied vested power on President, as Department Head of the Civil Service Commission. • HOWEVER, it also provides that the removal should be pursuant to Civil Service Act of 1959 AND

•

•

Civil Service Act of 1959 provides that officers and employees who belong to the classified service (Collector of Customs is an example) shall be tried by the Commissioner of Civil Service or the Civil Service Board of Appeals. (grabe ang galing ng logic ng decision na ‘to. to quote a friend: what an orgasmic piece of legislation) AND President’s control is only refers to matters of general policy: means a settled or definite course or method adopted and followed by govt

Also, officials cannot be arbitrarily removed from office by heads (section 4, article 12 of Consti). Decision: Ang-Angco reinstated to position.

Monsanto vs. Factoran Nature: Petition to review the resolution of the Deputy Executive Secretary Facts: • • • THEN:

March 25, 1983: Sandiganbayan convicted Salvacion Mosanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) And three other accused Of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents

• • • •

petitioner appealed and filed a motion of reconsideration upon court’s decision to affirm prior ruling of conviction. During the pendency of the motion, Marcos granted petitioner absolute pardon. Petitioner then asked for reinstatement to her position but was denied by Fulgenio Factoran, then Deputy Executive Secretary. Factoran said reappointment was necessary.

Issue: WON a public officer. Who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment Held: NO. Ratio: • • • • •

The petitioner was convicted by Sandiganbayan of estafa has an accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification. Temporary absolute disqualification bars convict from public office; this lasts until end of term of sentence. The effect of Marcos’ pardon was simply to remove principal penalty BUT NOT the accessory penalty UNLESS the pardon expressly provides that accessory penalties are to be removed also. WHY?? Because pardon is not necessarily a declaration that no crime was committed. Pardon excuses one from serving the punishment of the crime but does not dissolve the crime itself.

Decision: Not reinstated to office. No backpays or paybacks ba tama na term?

Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion Nature: Petition for… Facts: Issue: WON private respondent Mark Jimenez is entitled to the due process right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. Held: NO. Ratio:

1.

PD No. 1069 (RP-US Extradition Treaty) provides the time when an extraditee shall be furnished a copy of the petition for extradition.

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2. 3.

it does not provide the right of the extraditee to demand from the Secretary of Justice copies of the extradition request from US while the request is still undergoing evaluation

giving the private respondent copy of the request might serve as notice to flee Private respondent assailed that an extradition proceeding is like a criminal proceeding and thus he has the right to a notice and a hearing HOWEVER, COURT SAID: a. extradition proceedings do not involve determination of guilt b. extradition is summary in nature; crim is full blown c. extradition: president has final discretion to extradite him THUS: • due process safeguards do not necessarily apply to the former 4. Was provisional arrest a threat to his liberty? No. Provisional arrest happens only upon receipt of request for extradition. US had not requested for that arrest

5. Was warrant of arrest for the temporary detention a threat to his liberty? No. It was only issued upon filing of the petition for extradition. In the case at bar, extradition process was still at evaluation level. Threat to respondent’s liberty was hypothetical. Decision: no need to provide copies. REVERSED.

Lansang vs. Garcia Nature: Facts: Two hand grenade explosions occurred on August 21, 1971 at Plaza Miranda where the Liberal Party of the Philippines was holding a public meeting for the presentation of its candidates for the November 8, 1971 elections. Eight persons were killed and many were injured. As a result, Marcos issued Proclamation No. 889, suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Petitioners sought for writs of habeas corpus after being arrested without a warrant therefore and detained. They questioned the validity of Proclamation No. 889. Issue 1. WON Proclamation No. 889 violated par. 4 section 1 of article 3 and par 2, section 10 of article 7 of Consti

2. WON there was invasion, insurrection, or rebellion or imminent danger therof

WON public safety required the suspension of the privilege

3. WON petitioners are covered by said proclamation as amended

Held/Ratio No. Petitioners initially contended that the proclamation was made based solely on the idea that there was a conspiracy and intent to rise in arms among several groups in the country. However, court held that with the modifications thru Proclamation No. 889-A, Marcos declared that the ‘enemy groups’ had already entered into the conspiracy and have in fact joined together to engage in armed insurrection and rebellion. The Plaza Miranda incident was only one among the many violent incidences that brought forth such proclamation. YES. The existence of the CPP and the NPA were clear proof of the state of rebellion and insurrection of the country. These groups believe that force and violence are indispensable to the attainment of their goal. YES. President had in his possession records of killings of several government officials by the CPP, bombings of the COMELEC building, MERALCO, and others. YES. They have been charged for a violation of the Anti-Subversion Act and were then covered by the proclamation.

IN case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, the President can: 1) call out the armed forces 2) suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus 3) put Philippines or any part therof under martial law