28008829 Materialism and Idealism by Adam Weishaupt English

Materialism and Idealism. By Adam Weishaupt

Zweyte completely revised edition ^ Nuremberg, tey Ernst Christoph Grattena he ", 1737. Most Serene Prince and Lord Lord Ernst II Dukes of Saxony, Gülich, Cleve Untz Mountain, even angels and Westpyalm, Landgrave in Thuringia, Marggraf "u whites, Martinsturm in Bregenz" "Rush to Henneberg, Count of the Mark and Ra »ensperg, Lord Ravensttin and Tonn " His gracious Prince and Lord, proof his deepest respect and gratitude Dedicates Blatter

the author. Preface. 6 he so favorable reception of Publl ^ "" ^ EUMS it owes that little scripture, so soon as they appear in this altered form. Genuzt I have this opportunity as much as possible, to some, so before too vague gebruckt off " was to determine the near to be "particularly but those objections which were made to me by several gentlemen Reeensenten against my system was so much to me to answer in my opinion. I can convince myself to vorhinaus, that upon such a subject, from our sense of the A 3 Thinking would so far away, yet always remain, even for some thinkers darkness. Maybe I will later point, by his own more mature reflection, or by new objections or to some position, "len attentive made, which deserve further illumination. This may be in whose "be enough to recommend me and my writing soever Publieums of kindness, which had experienced the first issue. Regenspurg the March zo Adam Weishaupt. ^ Xass are we even thinking being''^ ^, that we have concepts and ideas, it's probably my knowledge, no one doubted. But! Whether that entity which has these concepts and perceptions, a clearly visible from our body seye entirely different character, if not rather the reason was this thinking in the structure and mechanism of the body itself, about the opinions of men had come from de "her oldest times less in agreement. It was very early realized that not a single imaginative force, seye really in the whole wide nature without an animal body: that presents each of these 4 Lung " lungskrafte on allergenaueste after that judge their bodies that they were with such Developers: that this body would facilitate the operations of the soul, or prevent, was believed to refer to the socalled temperament, the power of the body very clearly, that one watched 'finally as with the animal life at the same time, any activity of the soul of a sudden end, and stop; times "further remarked that certain parts of our 'body were excellent geschitt to resume Einträke of the outward object, and preserve it. Then there was that one could not understand how abdrüken of the natural world in an intangible "Subjett could wikeln What Change in a being without all the parts are enk and

proceed. Although it was possible even after this Vorftellungsart as little understood, "as the image of the unge nngeheuern the nightly sky in such a small space of one eye pressed together, and could pull the trigger, it still remained difficult without end, its dissolution was less satisfactory. To meet these doubts and qualend wa «ren, we calmed down but with nowhere explain thought that we were not yet known hinlanglich with all the properties of matter, was regarded from now on, the body itself as the spiritual ground of our alter-ation, and be dismissed without further ado Every body quite distinct from the thinking power. This system is the system of ar5beren materialism. Very mediocre Verstondeskrafte were sufficient to invent this system, so everything in it depends on the grease proof dish: st seems very fact that the first immediate impression on all alone with no particular AH

Contribute to reason this sentence be 'correct. And yet we become aware that the adherents of this system greatly dannt like to feel it, and flattered with the possession of a very excellent wisdom and hervorthun. This wisdom has been distributed under the age so appointed by the Epicurean school the most. Under the new "have you / a Mtt ^ 's, and the author det H / / eme must either say that this sensory 'image, we think of representation , or the parts of thinking for themselves, from which there is the

matter. - If, however, think these parts, so I can not see what wins the materialist it. These parts can not be eternally indivisible. Each matter must therefore exist to the parts that do not contain lveitere parts, which are therefore immaterial, and think this alone. The materialist can not begreiffen how lein einzsges immaterial being think, and now he thinks he sees Heller, when he said of several of these creatures, which he could conceive of any individual? .- So think nods matter, it think its parts: I see new objections beforehand. Three exits open to the enemy entkraften for my evidence, he either has to assert that all matter is divisible into the infinite, or it must be assumed that all the foundation of thinking is not nearly so in the parts lie as to the composition: or, finally, he must deny that the ultimate reason for all efficacy lies in the intangible parts of matter, that these are the only effective forces of nature. > - Should it succeed in thoroughly refute each of these objections to B 5 s "it seems to me the Uügrund of materialism. mus be a proven cache. i) It turns yellow no infinite divisible into the matter. Goods matter is divisible into the infinite, the world's smallest portion would contain as many parts as the largest, as the universe itself, or task, which is just as impossible for an infinite, smaller or larger ware. It then gives a whole without parts, or should I get to last part, then there are things such as character, composition, not the right may exist, the mere predicates and properties without Subjeet whose predicates and properties, they are and all the bodies are basically out of nothing, because I came upon no Grundtbeile from which they are made, and I only parts continued into the infinite, to tire the listener so that it is not awaiting the resolution. Soon! There is a whole without without parts: there is a predicate without Subjeet, it gives a accidence without substance. '-' Who can answer this strange effects? The matter is not divisible into the infinite, each of them, they Sey coarser or finer, is composed of parts that are no longer together: it is an aggregate of these small parts, she is the sensual image, under what seem to me such and audibly be: she is acting in addition to these parts no more than an idea, a thought of the spirits. Aberjkann not this matter made of atoms, or such parts exist, although the composition, but by no finite forces are divisible?

I answer: what do we gain when we are so far away? Here, if the talk is of the thinking power of matter, not to ask whether these atoms by no forces Portion tbeilbar are, the question is rather whether they contain parts. Since this is not denied, so we are just as much as we were bey each composition. There are then but even under this condition elements, which consists of all the body as any matter that only some of them can in no way, ur. d be separated by any finite force. What is now the thinking of such an atom more easily understood than the thinking of any other matter? If one can pull the trigger, the world in five or six elements, so closely united, why this can not happen more easily in the coarser matter? What we now need these indestructible atoms? Are Warkungen of such an atom is not quite as good the Warkungen of its parts? Why do we look for anything but the basic thinking in the source itself, in the parts, from which each Atom

Atom is? The atomic system thus leads itself to the opposite side. - Or maybe these atoms are not further compounded? - You are then immcu intangible, they are what I want, and we only argue about words. All matter, they Sey finer or coarser, divisible or un> divisible, must at the end of parts exist-hen, which contain no more parts. Now, if the materialist, I think, "must admit the force of the above reasons that all matter," lleZusammensetzung consists of parts which are no longer together, so here is nothing left but that he thought the reason for the composition itself below. che; that he thought this, which is found individually according to his teaching in any of the parts, as a result of their V look, "" tnigung. This assertion has the big "ten appearances for itself, it can be made visible was given cash world frequent the event, apparently from what appear daßdieTheile obtained by the union of properties,''which they had not before this association. The materialist can use my weapons against me: he can say, if made up of parts, none of which taken singly, has a character and extent, may create figure and extension, why not just boiled, it can be done so well that from the union of parts , none of which individually think, arises a thinking thing? This objection is of great importance that he alone can be refuted by idealistic reasons,

and few readers have enough patience to exert their minds so much as this is necessary. Thus 2) fine composition can think of / or the foundation of thinking lies not in the union of separate parts, not what to think. I want this sat first with the ei own words of Professor Garve from seinei, excellent comments about Ferguson's moral philosophy to prove that it would, I think, exhausted everything, and unite in the near future, what answer you. "What comes through COMPOSITIO, tzung new? Toe elements, I will make, have previously eMirt in the world in ten different places, but now they exist in a beysammen so close beysammen that my eyes no longer know where their limits are. In this close to each other if they continue, through forces that I do not know, and I call Cohasion. - So far, then, is nothing but the location of each Clements has been altered. - But the influence which the village has about the matter, to which he has here, too: namely it determines who should be the object, zunachst to which the thing works, and what is wrought by them. Each of the ten elements is, therefore, been transformed by the other nine (something that it has received other objects, in which it acts, which, contrary to contribute, his sphere is changed) each has something beygetrcu gen again transform each other. > - But still is not a property (because the transformation is only in each individual situation) exists, the so to speak, sprang from the midst of all, common to all software, and in none of the elements particularly eMirte, (and this is precisely the case, what we argue about what the materialist pretending and tries), it has emerged thus not a new thing, it's only at any of the things that were there before, something has changed. " "Where shall I myself among the elements, nienttn which zusammsetzen find me?" ( "Corresponds neither in the individual parts, or in the Zusammsetzung these parts, or in the mere location of the parts without regard to their influence. No fourth case is possible here.) Not in the individual parts, because they do not think. Not something that has arisen from its Zusammsetzung, because these are only characteristics of these individual parts. - Properties that are separated are also many, and from each other / how the parts themselves, where they belong, not in the mere location of the parts O "ne view of their influence. Because if I abstract Of this, it is their lag «« ne mere idea that makes the intellect, which looks at things. "

"What was there before the connection These are several individual things, each with his powers and properties, which in C to the connection exists, and those are the several things, but each with different actions because there are other allegations (Objeete) has / against which it is, with every other state, because it gets different Einfiüße. ^ - Where then is the point of unification? where is the whole Compositum community that was created? where it is grown from the many new ones? " "So if from two things, which bring together, for eternity is no third, but remain only two, so I'm either (not a real thing but only one among the many distributed property that has no separate existence) and I am one of the meet individual who, (all the rest are not) I do I might have forces that do not change, I can express, as if other things come on top of me, against the outer I-I can be capable of a state in which I but it was only through the action of others must be moved. " As far as Garve. I must gestchen, as I understand the matter, has this job for me so much convincing, so much Geprag the highest truth that I can not imagine what could answer also explains the friend of the materialism that, if it is not individual instances were made of the analogy, after which he puts in to entkraften these reasons in an indirect way. He could say what I have already quoted in part above: just as in the good things, 'which is no composite or extended, resulting composite or extensive care, just as could the mere agreement Pen unthinking being is a thinking being will be brought to reality. C 2 Here

Here the only possible? Answer, and I challenge anyone to give a more satisfying. The composition or extension, as well as every other sensible 'property is not a real inner determination of individual beings, whose union produces the composition or size. All the composition, size and organization is a mere idea of a thinking being, the way they like him forces of nature appear by virtue of his Reeeptioitat. We recognize and realize these qualities in things, en "ren, none taken

singly has these properties, from the cause, because we have several of those different things that we can not imagine why all the dark to distinguish so well, we therefore "In only sensible image zusammendrangen. This our image, we call these our conception of matter, body composition, size, color, fire and water, but thinking is something to be not mere representation, something that in the representing subject itself is: it is that quality, not merely in the idea is one ansern really. The composition, or better to say, cause tons more particular things, include the reason that it can bey a thinking being, the sensual image of the composition, size and shape, that the idea arises of these properties, but they never make the composition that the force produced would itself, which has this idea that the composite parts themselves know that they bring this idea to bey, and, by others. It is an ego enftehen, and how many can, but none taken singly is I, and may differ from others, that I will. C 3 I I'm Not many. No thought, no word includes in its nature from all plurality as much as - I. Because each one thinks of the many that I should represent the whole object or only a portion? Is the last in which these parts, which I represent, because the whole appears to, because I've got the idea? But everyone thinks part of the whole subject, so everyone thinks it either on sameness, or a variety of art - it everybody thinks different, then whence arises the common idea, which I have? where is the point of the association, The subject of this predicate, it Weick in any of the individual parts is? The property, which is to be built, must have a Eubjeet whose property it is. - Come, but all the parts in their minds, quite agree, everyone thinks the whole thing on the that very selfsame way, so we have what we seek, the thinking is not a property of matter, but certain immaterial beings, and all repetitions of the other parts are disgusting and useless, they are impossible, because it is impossible that such different have representational forces in different places of the same object across the same concept. In any case, the composition is thinking, ej think their parts. But, as I will prove that the material extent, and composition of a thought, a conception of the spirits Sey? - Treat here, however, until I ^ below this object more completely, the following may serve to taste. Everyone has to admit that everything we call matter what we look at

This name imagine from a incredible considerable quantity of small parts there, and if C 4 I so I wanted to recognize a material object, as it is in and in front of him, I should recognize all these parts at the same time separately and distinctly. Now I ask: I would be this way nor the nanu aware of tion? Or who thinks the whole thing, if he thinks only the parts? But now I can force my present Reeeptivitat impossible to imagine all the parts separately. So I will summarize several of these parts, and think it as a whole. This grouping of the parts, as any notion of a whole which is an operation of the intellect, the imagination and Crkenntnißvermögens, 'an idea. Or do we want to deny that any notion of a whole bt one Idea is, gi is a whole lack imagination ? What is an army without a representational system that compresses its parts into a single image, and this, what it sums up what this way, denoted by a single expression '? Every idea of a whole is not real, it's just a moän "inäivi ^ us to erkenneil to look at. Since all matter and composition are also a whole, and any idea of the whole is nothing more than an idea is, it can also matter, and be no more expansion. It makes use of the still plenty of instances of the colors. Is there something in all of nature really and dyed to yourself? Are these colors is something real, existing before him? Or do they merely express the idea that with us is caused by the action of certain objects to us so susceptible being? If the materialists, such as the fire, it ignites the focal point, to adduce proof that some things from those who> could the what they themselves are not so bec 5 "cist these examples does not indicate what it was supposed to prove. This fire is created when we physically explain its origin, is squeezed from many parts of fast-moving light. But still comes out in this way is nothing new, something that was not in the parts themselves; 5enn the fire is a modification, a stronger in a narrower space faster moving mass of light. But if force will be te is squeezed, thinks none of which taken singly, may emerge from this union as a way of thinking is something that none of the parts? - I Consider also how it bey Investigations of this kind is necessary, the fire in the metaphysical sense, the fire is as such a simple idea, an effect Mehrerer hidden forces, which among us seems so susceptible to being below the sensual image of the fire, without these so-organized beings would be nothing more than a mere change of place, other than changing position and influence of these forces. But think, aware of itself be, Ethnical from another, except by

each subject! Is different, much more. This thinking is not merely an idea of another faculty of imagination: it is this strength itself, which makes us able to have these ideas, it is the power that is different from all the essence of all nature, it is something that presents the stlbst not merely presented wiro, it is something that is added from the outside, something that is within ourselves. The idea i ch excludes all subjective multiplicity. He gedultct no share-holder, he un, tcrschcidct from everything that he is not himself, and nothing is himself, I ick / What is outside of him: what is much that is external to one another, or it ceases to be a lot. This I believe, sty, the only possible solution, and answering this very serious objection. I wish that the words of my "will and ideas at his command so hours when I have need, te, my thoughts with my readers' conviction lation to explain to ma's with which I believe it himself: they were better then me to understand and find true, what I write. > - I now hasten to answer the third objection above. Here I maintain: 3) The reason lies in the effectiveness of all elements and forces which constitute all matter and all physical composition. Here is the proof. ^ ^ Is It's unlaugbar that there is in the nature of things that are not in front of best hen ards of living, which are really only in and through others, so to speak, the predicates of the subjects are, in and in which they exist. The thoughts of men are of this type, all shape and character requires a subject whose form or shape it is. So there must be some things which are of this subject, in and through which these predicates are real. Kei "ne Zusammsetzung is of this kind, none of them can exist without the parts which make this composition, each composition of a predicate, a property these parts, it will effect even through these parts. All matter is such a composition, all matter is only a Aeeidens, a predicate of a hidden subject, this subject is impossible to put together yet again, it must be immaterial. These intangible beings are therefore the only forces of nature;

ture, °, as such, does not matter, all the effects of matter are also effects of the intangible forces, of which it consists. Think is impossible is a property of matter, all the properties of matter are properties of their intangible forces, and from the existence of these properties, we recognize the existence of these forces. Here were my reasons, which I put all the finer the materialistic systems, such as the crude to meet, but they are, as everyone can easily perceived, quite the idealistic flavor, and it gains even the appearance that derMaterialismus to the idealism of his strongest where there was no single enemy. It seems that when the truth of the latter could be demonstrated on an irreversible nature, materialism ' Ground Reason would be annihilated off. Or, if all matter is nothing real, if a mere phenomenon, a mere idea, as it is possible to argue further, whether that matter think that is the reality laugnet ge