23 Pp vs Reyes and 31 DBP vs Mangawang

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MIZPAH R. REYES G.R. Nos. 74226-27 July 27, 1989 FACTS: Spouses Julio Rizare and Patricia Pampo owned a parcel of land in Lipa City registered in their names under a TCT. Both are now deceased and were survived by the following children: the accused Mizpah R. Reyes and the complainants. In 1983, the complainants discovered from the Register of Deeds (RD) that the subject property had already been transferred in the name of Mizpah Reyes, single, under a TCT. They alleged that the conveyance was through a deed of sale executed and signed by their parents. Upon examination in the RD of the document, they found that the signature of their parents were falsified and that accused also made an untruthful statement that she was single although she was married. The N.B.I. found that the signature of Julio Rizare was genuine but that of Patricia Pampo was forged. The complainants filed 2 informations against Reyes for falsification and for allegedly making an untruthful statement of fact in the deed of sale. The trial court granted the motion of Reyes to quash the informations stating that the lapse of more than twenty (20) years before the two informations were filed, the crimes for which the accused, Mizpah Reyes, are charged have already prescribed. The People now filed an appeal in the CA who affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that the prescriptive period started when the deed of sale was registered in the RD and not when the falsification was discovered. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: W/N the petitioner’s action against Reyes has already prescribed. HELD: Yes, the action has already prescribed. The rule is well-established that registration in a public registry is a notice to the whole world. The record is constructive notice of its contents as well as all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable. This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. The notarized deed of sale was registered on May 26, 1961. The criminal informations for falsification of a public document having been filed only on October 18, 1984, or more than ten (10) years from May 26, 1961, the crime for which the accused was charged has prescribed. The Court of Appeals, therefore, committed no reversible error in affirming the trial court's order quashing the two informations on the ground of prescription.

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LAZARO MANGAWANG, ET AL., G.R. No. L-18861 June 30, 1964 FACTS: Gavino Amposta applied with the Director of Lands for the issuance of a homestead patent over a parcel of land. Pending action on his application, cadastral proceedings were instituted by the government wherein Amposta filed an answer praying for the adjudication of the same land in his favor. In 1920, the cadastral court rendered decision awarding the land to Amposta. Since no advice on this matter was given either to the Bureau of Lands or to the Governor General, the latter issued in favor of Amposta a Homestead Patent covering the same land, and an Original Certificate of Title No. 100 issued to him. In 1922, the cadastral court issued a decree of registration of the land in favor of Amposta pursuant to the decision rendered in the cadastral case, and an Original Certificate of Title No. 2668 was issued to him covering the same property. In1941, Amposta sold the land to Santos Camacho surrendering to him Original Certificate of Title No. 100, and because of this transfer said title was cancelled and transfer Certificate of Title No. 5506 was issued in the name of Camacho. In 1946, Santos Camacho sold the land to Bonifacio Camacho as a result of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 248 was issued to the latter. In 1948, Bonifacio Camacho mortgaged the land to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (now Development Bank of the Philippines), and having failed to pay the loan as agreed upon the land was sold at public auction to said bank as the highest bidder. The period of redemption having elapsed without Camacho being able to redeem the property, a final deed of sale was executed in favor of the bank, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6961 was issued in its name. Meanwhile, in 1947, Gavino Amposta again sold the same property to Lazaro and Arsenio Mangawang for the sum of P2,000.00, the vendees executing a mortgage on the land to secure the payment of the balance. Having paid the balance of the purchase price, and an absolute deed of sale was executed in their favor. In connection with this transaction, Amposta surrendered to the vendees the title that was issued to him in the cadastral case, which was later substituted by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1098 issued in the name of the vendees. The Mangawang brothers took possession thereof, and upon learning of this transfer, the DBP, which as already stated became the owner of the property, commenced the present action against them in the Court of First Instance of Bataan to recover its possession and damages. The court rendered decision awarding the land to the Mangawang brothers. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: W/N the Mangawang brothers have better right over the subject property. HELD: Since both purchasers apparently have acted in good faith the Court cannot but conclude that the sale made by Amposta to Santos Camacho is the valid one considering that when Amposta sold the same land to the Mangawang brothers he had nothing more to sell even if the title he surrendered to them is one issued covering the same property. In legal contemplation, therefore, Amposta sold a property he no longer owned, and hence the transaction is legally ineffective. On the other hand, the case can also be treated as one of double sale, where a person sells the same land to two different persons who are unaware of the flaw that lies in its title, and where the law adjudicates the property to the purchaser who first registers the transaction in his name in the registry of property. In applying this principle, the Court cannot conclude that the title should likewise be adjudicated to appellant whose

predecessor-in-interest acquired and registered the property much ahead in point of time than the appellees. Verily, the title acquired by the latter is invalid and ineffective, contrary to the finding of the court a quo.