2017 Beda Civil Law Pre-Week

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2017 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS Executive Committee Over-all Chairperson Chairperson for Academics

TYRONE LEWIS D. ONG ULAHMARIA JESUSA NAZARENE L. URUBIO

Chairperson for Hotel Operations

ANNA PATRICIA M. DERECHO

Vice-Chair for Operations

ROMEO VALENTINO S. GO

Vice-Chair for"Secretaria~

ARTLYN GEM G. SENORAN

Vice-Chair for Finance Vice-Chair for Audit Vice-Chair for Electronic Data Processing Vice-Chair for Logistics Vice-Chair for Membership

CLARISA G. BELO CARLO VIEL C. SAPLAN MA. CELI NE P. ENRIQUEZ RONALDO DEMETRIO L. SIOCO JOANNA KRYSTLE MUNGCAL

Content and Lay-out Editors JOSE MANUEL PENAFLOR ELAINNE ENCILA HERA MARIE YDULZURA JEANNE PAULINE DE LA PENA

REX MARK CABANSAG CHRISTIAN JASON DALUDADO KEVIN CHRIS SESE ANGELO RAY ADINA ABDUL-MAJID MAROHOMBSAR M A. JENN IFER PARAGAS JOSEF NINO ACERO

San Beda College of Law Administr~tipn ATIY. VIRGILIO B. JARA College Dean

Centralized Bar Operations A4visers ATTY. MARCIANO G. DELSON Vice Dean and Adviser . ATTY. RISEL G. CASTILLO-TALEON Prefect for Student Affairs and Co-Adviser

Centralized Bar Operations Core Group

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Kates Jastln E. Aguilar, Mark Ericson M. Magdamo, Zaire Xandra M. Reyes, Hanz Darryl p. Tiu, Angelo Ray A. Adina, Rex Mark M. Cabansag, Christian Jason 0 . Oaludado, Abdul·Majid P. Marohombsar, Ma. Jennifer R. Paragas, Kevin Chris M. Sese, Lorelei Joselle H. Bu.cu, Mara Clara M. Estrella, Gu'enave,re J. Hao, Ishihara, Rio Anne A. Marvle L Pagcaliwangan, lose Emmanuel I. Cabel, Hannah A. Caceres, Colleen F. Dilla, lrl~ lane A. Tan, John Caleb C. Anda!, Marlz Regala, Divina G. Velasco, Cheska Arla Agrupis, Mark Darryl P. Buemio, Vincent Paul C. David, Corinne Marie D. Espidol. Marie Camille Allen C. Flores, Niece Cecilio D. llojilla, Dynamagne Parinas, Clarisse Nicole V. Soliman, Elainne I. Encila, Jose Manuel P. Penaflor, Hera Marie T. Ydulzura, Martin Alec Bautista, Ivan Kevin G. Lin, Fatima J. Rodriguez. Ulpiano Z. Sarmiento. Jessica Sharla Bustamante, Jhelsea Louise Oimaano, Sophia Victoria E. Mina, Graham' Edison G. Ragsac. Mary Cyriell C. Sumanqui, Daniel P. Ang. Daniel Philip V. Barnachea, Eric Winson F. Cea, Criselda Marie G. E~guerra, Jose Christian C. Samson Ill, Kent Arvin C. Aquino, Suzanne A. Roces, Benise D. Madamba, Lorenzo Thaddeus Ruel 0. Galandines, Janelle Caryn A. Dela Cruz. Jeanne Pauline E. De La Pena

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CIVIL LAW Subject Chair MILCIELO CLAIRE S. VILLAMAYOR

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Assistant Subject Chair PATRICK DAVE F. EBID Subject Committe.e Electronic Data Processing RONIFELLE L. BARRIOS

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Subject Heads JULIENNE THERESE V. SALVACION PERSONS'AND FAMILY RELATIONS - LYLE M. REGENCIA PROPERTY HAZEL DHANE A. BAUTISTA WILLS AND SUCCESSION CHRISTINE P. MONDERIN & OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS JAMES PHILIPPE MAC AGATHA JOSEPHINE V. MATABUENA SALES AND LEASE LERYHC ANDREI T. JIMENEZ PARTNERSHIP, AGE'NCY AND TRUSTS CZARINA MAYBELLYNE V. PACIS CREDIT TRANSACTIONS RONIFELLE L. ·BARRIOS .LANDS TITLES AND DEEDS . CLARISSA KRISTEN V. SECERIO .TORTS AND DAMAGES KRIA CELESTINA MANGLAPUS CONFLICTS OF LAW Subject Committee Members MILLICENT S. J. MATIENZO, MARY SARAH D.C. GOBOLE, KENNER VICTORS. GALANG GABRIEL ALESSANDRO N. PRUDENTE, DIANE KRISTEL E. FALCOTELO, TRACIE KATHLYNNE B. B.ACARRO, JAMES BRYAN J. TAN, RENNETIEJOY G. ALFARO ANN MARY MICHELLE B. RUALO, KASHMERE TAME P. DURAN, MA. CARMELA L. DfETA, SR! MICHi CORDELLE V. DOMANTAY, ALDEN JEROME C. DAVID ANNA MICHAELA I. MARQUEZ, GUIA KARLA SALDIVIA, RONALD DERICK TORRES EDIONE B. QUINONES, KAREN CLARISSE P. PALMA, PAULINE ROSE T. DULDULAO KEIRVIN ANTHONY B. VIADO Advisers DEAN ED VINCENTS. ALBANO ATTY. NfCASIO C. CABANEIRO ATTY. JOSEPH "FERDINAND M. DECHAVEZ ATTY. EFREN VINCENT M. DIZON ATTY. CHARLITO MARTIN R. MENDOZA ATTY. BRUCE V. RIVERA ATTY. FRANCESCA LOURDES M. SENGA ,

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UNDERTAKING

This publication is the intellectual property of the San Beda College of Law Centralized Bar Operations. Any unauthorized reproduction, use, sale or purchase hereof is a violation of intellectual property laws. The user hereby recognizes the right of the San Beda College of Law Centralized Bar Operations to prosecute any ancl all actions in accordance with the law to protect its intellectual property rights from infringement. As such, the user undertakes to neither unlawfully reproduce nor cause the unlawful .reproduction of this material without the prior consent of the San Bed a College of Law Centralized Bar Operations.

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

Effectivity of Laws 1. Section 1 of P.O. No. 755 states: "Section 1. Declaration of National Policy. - It is hereby declared that the policy of the State is to provide readily available credit facilities to the coconut farmers at preferential rates; that this policy can be expeditiously and efficiently realized by the Implementation of the 'Agr.eement for the Acquisition of a Commercial Bar:ik for the Benefit of the Coconut Farmers' executed by the Philippine Coconut Authority, the, terms of which 'Agreement' are hereby incorporated by reference; xx x" A copy of the Agreement was not attached to the Presidential Decree.

2.

A breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. Where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the ·giving of herself in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality,· no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry .but because .of fraud ,and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to rnorals, good customs, or public policy (Baksh v. CA, G.R. No. 97366, February 19, 1993).

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Marriage 3.

Lea Cruz is a new Hotel and Restaurant Management graduate. Despite her efforts, she still has not been hired. Disheartened, Lea put "FUNemployed : Forever Unemployed" as her Facebook status. As fate would have it, her Tita Cherry, who is currently residing in Chicago, USA, saw it and Immediately messaged her that there Is an available position as a receptionist in the hotel she manages. However, Lea does not have a US Visa nor is she flt to apply for one, as she does not have any means to support herself.. Faced by this predicament, Tlta Cherry once again comes to the rescue. It · so happens that her nephew's cousin, Clark Kurtz, is having a vacation in the Philippines. She suggested that she marry Clark so that she will acquire American citizenship and get an easy pass going abroad. Clark agreed provided Lea pays him 150,000 pesos, which she got from her parent s. They got married in Manila and Lea was able to go to the US. Lea and Clark did not see each other thereafter.

4. Discuss the rules on Code. Philippine law does not prov1m&l'l'Ol of the Family Code - whiert-~Ol:~r:.6lJ~ foreigner - allows a Filipino~!azt~J'

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7. Michael met Nancy as a young lieutenant and after a whirlwind courtship, they were married. In the early part of his military career, Michael was assigned to different places all over the country. They did not live together until the 12th year of their marriage. One .day, while Michael was away on official business, one of his friends caught Nancy having sex with the corporal assigned as ' Michael's driver. The aide Immediately reported the matter to Michael who rushed home to confront his wife. Nancy admitted the affair and Michael sent her away in anger. Michael would later come to know from his aides , his household staff, and former neighbors who informed him that Nancy has had intimate relations with various men thro.ughout their marriage whenever Michael was away on assignment.

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9. What are the jurl~r~cl,!'.9t!a1 g .i i !": ·chp~1cal incapacity? Are these guidelines absolute? ~/ 111 • In Republic v. CA anc!\N1Q . Ii . , G. ~ 1fl, 199 , t · C laid down the guidelines, otherwise known as the fi)id' -t>octr iti a. jpplyi d 36 of the FC: Ill or In 1. Incapacity must be _ 2. .Boot cause of the psy Inca a. Medically or clinically b. Alleged in the complainL";~..-. i. Sufficiently proven by ~~~~=!:;Qr;:~~~~ ii. Clearly explained in the decision 3. Marital Obligations refer to Arts. 68-'Z , . , 221 lilfl"4.f5 of the Family Code; 4 . Plaintiff has j!urden of proof; "\..) 5. Incapacity proven to be 5.xistin·g at the time of the celebration of marriage; 6. Trial court must order the f.rosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear for the state; 7. !nterpretations of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church of the Philippines while not controlling should be given great respect; and 8. Illness is §rave enough to bring about disability to assume essential marital obligations. . . No, these guidelines are not absolute. As held in Te v. Yu-Te (G.R. No. 161793, February 13,2009), the Supreme Court stressed that the detennination is to be made on a c;ase to case basis. Each must be judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts in recognition of the verity that no case would be on "all fours" with the next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage; hence, every "trial judge .must take. pains in

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examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid st1bstituting its own judgment for .that of the trial court." ·10. Plaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and had five children. Plaintiff filed a case for foe nullity of the marriage due to Psychological Incapacity alleging that her husband failed to provide mate1ial support to the family and have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment. The RTC declared the marriage null and void under Art. 36 which was however reversed by CA. The plaintiff now contends that personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not a .requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Is the contention tenable? Yes. According to the Supreme Court ip Marcos v. Marcos, (G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000), the personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. The totality of the evidence presented may determine such incapacity. The mandated guidelines in the case of Republic v. P/lo/ina incorporated the three basic requirements earlier _ by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be characte1ized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) inc!Jrability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be de F LA~N

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11. What are the grou~~..annul a valid marriage?, A marriage may b~:_aqp.u,fled bf sed on)lny of tll\a.ifi. ollowihg ~xclusive g~· . under Article 45 of the 1'.~ Family Code, that mi.tst ljXist atu heAmte.bfJhe "1M.rla"~' "(AY,FFJS')" 1. Absence of_ pareti1~~ 1 {c se~1 ( 1;v ear t~~bel@W:N2:1 , years of ct9~); '-..l 2. Y11sound m!nd; ~ . . ~ ~ 3. Consent obtaine~ Fraud in the following insfan'ces: · a. Non-disclosure o- 91previous coqviction by {IJ,'101 judgmept fl cri · '.[p~ng moral turpitude; · b. Concealment~~~e of pregn~nc.y by,,a.man 0thetJIJa~hustfa1J.$.-7 c. Conceal ment~ se~qally ransmissibl_e oiSJ{£lSe>.N:l~rdless of itrh ture; g addiction, ha~i~al ~1~dl'i s ' 0 o exua r sbianism; d. Concealment o r1fl • , 4. Consent obtained;t>N;o~e. int1.f1id~tion i:>riG~ 5. !~potency that con)iau,.~s jlnd apg~a.r,~ o)~d Clll Ii!! 6. Serious § exually tr~ ml~ible dise~se ~tia peq ~!t0 cura e.

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12. What are the rounds fo;)e al s.e aration (.'.'.'\ The following are the exclus1v~ - r. u ~ or legal separ t•o ,u d l'ticle 55 of the Family Co,de: (PAA· . ID-LAMBS) . . .,,.--. --~~~ 1. Repeated f.hys1cal violence or gress y abu§_lve.:eof\l'duc · 2. ,Attempt to corrupt or induce to engage"'(ii·prostihltitr>~'· 3. Attempt on life; V ""-.) 4. Final judgment involving more than 6 years of Imprisonment; 5. Qrug addiction or habitual alcoholism; 6. .besbianism or homosexuality; 7. Unjustified Abandonment for· more than 1 year; 8. Compulsion by physical violence or Moral pressure to change religious or political affiliation; 9. g_igamy; and . 10. §exual infidelity or perversion.

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13. Distinguish Legal Separation from Declaration of Nullity, Annulment, and Absolute Divorce

\ Legitimate

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1 Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Marta's share in ·the conjugal partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any special portion of Marta's share without an actual partition of the property being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree . Until then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract quota in Marta's share. Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his ' undivided share; hence. Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the

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interest of his co-owners. Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rita as co-owners without the consent of the other co-owners was not necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were thereby effectively transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Marta's share (Heirs of Protacio Go, Sr. v. Ester Servacio, G.R. No. 157357, September 7, 2007). 16. Distinguish Art. 147 from Art. 148 of the Family Code.

Both must be capacitated to marry each other, AND there is NO MARRIAGE or m~rriage is VOID:

In cases of cohabitation not falling under Art. 147.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, share of party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited: 1. In favor of their common children.2. In case of default or waiver by any or all common children or their descendants each vacant share shall belong to respective . surviving descendants 3. In their a~sence, to the innocent party.

1. If one of the parties is validly married to another,

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his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the ACP or CPG . existing in such valid marriage. 2. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his/her share shall be forfeited in the same {Tlanner provided for in Art. 147. 3. The above rules apply even if both parties are in bad faith.

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CIV!ltAW Paternity and Filiation 17. Pia had a relationship with a married man who had legitimate·children. A son was born out of that illicit relationship in 1981. Although the putative father did not recognize the child in his certificate of birth, he nevertheless provided the child with all the support he needed and spent time regularly with the child and his mother. When the man died in 2000, the child was already 18 years old so he flied a petltlon to be recognized as an illegltlmate child of the putative father.and sought to be given a share in his putative father's estate. The legitimate family opposed, saying that under the Family Code his action cannot prosper because he did not bring the action for recognition during the lifetime of his putative father. ·

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19. May the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child be determined in the case for -the partition of the estate of a decedent-father? No, It cannot. The legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child cannot be contested as a collateral issue in another action for a different purpose. However, this procedural rule is applicable only to actions where the legitimacy - or illegitimacy - of a child is at issue (Geronimo v. Santos, G.R. No.197099, September .. 28, 2015) . The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code actually fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law. The obvious intention of the law is to prevent the status of a child born in wedlock from being in a state of uncertainty for a long time. It also aims to force early action to settle any doubt as to the paternity of such child, so that the evidence material to the matter, which must necessarily be facts occurring during the period of the conception of the child, may .still be easily available (Tison v. ·CA, G.R. No. 121 027, July 31 ,1997).

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20. Distinguish the rights of a legitimate child from an illegitimate child.

General,ly required to use mother's surname.

Right to bear father's surname.

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Exception: If child's filiation has been expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil regi ster, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father (R.A. No. 9255, Sec. 1) .

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Adoption 22. Ben and Jerry, both male and single, lived together as common law spouses and agreed to raise a son of Ben's living brother as their child without legally adopting him. Ben worked while Jerry took care of their home and the boy. In their 20 years of cohabitation they were able to acquire real estate assets registered In their names as co-owners. Unfortunately, Ben died of cardiac arrest, leaving no will. Ben was survived by his biological siblings, Jeny, and the boy. a) b)

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1 25. What are the grounds for the rescission of adoption? Upon the p~tition of the adoptee, with the assistance of the Department if a minor or if over 18 years of age but is incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded on any of the following · · grounds committed by the adopter(s): a. Repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling; b. Attempt on the life of. the adoptee; . c. sexual assault or violence; and d. abandonment and failure to comply with parental obligations. Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code(RA 8552, Sec. 19).

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26. What are the effects of rescission of adoption? The effects are the following: . 1. The parental authority of the adoptee's biological parent(s}, if known, or the legal custody of the Department'shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated; 2. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished; 3. The court shall order th~ Civil Registrar to cancel the amended certificate of birth of the adoptee and restore his/her original birth certificate; and 4. Succession rights shall revert to its status prior to adoption, but only as of the date of judgment of judicial rescission. Vested rights acquired prior to judicial rescission shall be respected (R.A. No.

8552, Sec. 20).

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27. Distinguish the Rules on Domestic Adoption and Inter-Country Adoption in the Philipplne.s

Filipino Citizen (a) Legal age; (b) Of good mor (c) Not convicte turpitude; (d) Emotionally a

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CIVIL LAW his/her Filipino spouse; or (iii) ·one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the 4th degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouse. [Sec. 7(b)]

Only a legally free child may be the subject of intercountry adoption. [Sec 8]

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Legally-free child means a child who has been voluntarily or involuntarily committed to the Department, in accordance with the Chila

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28. Spouses Maria and ReVh:!ll the couple stayed 1 custody of Maria's m Reynaldo died; Mari 1

29 .. Can a mother lose her rtght to the custody of her illegitimate son just because she .signed an agreement that she is turning over the child to his father and waiv~d she waived her rights? No. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines provide illegitimate children shall be under ·the parental authority of their mother. The right to take the custody of a.son shall be exercised by the one who enjoys parental authority over him. Such right may not be renounced, waived or transferred to another person, except in the cases authorized by law. Hence, in t~e absence of exceptions under .the Family Code, the mother is still the parent vested with parental authority of the illegitimate child therefore, she has the right over the child's custody. ·

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SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW "" 17 r.2'l .ktis name wa.s r,.f@~ta!file and 111 sex reglst,re;J)'~s "male". He further alle~~t'he is a m!lte""transsexual, that .is, "anatomically male but~tJel ~thinks and acts as a female" aiTd tnat he ha~ always 'de~ttfJl " d ~ms:e f'Wifn girls since child e t eeling trapped ·in a man's bo d~ '" ppnsulted severa oc • rs ll-tfi'e u~~\ · y,- he mtea States. He u.., d ent psychological examin!ltion, ho~o~~ treatm n Jl! it:@l€9n@tft'iol ·\\itt,fuPtNo transfonn himself to a "woman" culmin~tte.cJ.r~n Janua!:Y,: 27, 2001 when he., unde~ent se~\ceass gnment surgery in Bangkok, Thailancf~Me;!~en sought to have h1& n9rhe JJI. hi birt~ cert't!..,~hanged from "Rolen Cruz" to "Mely Cruz. ' a11d his sex "male"~ to "femal~. Can Roh(n cbapge his name? On the other hand, can R6~ change his..se.l bn the gro~d. of sex reassign~nt?"' . No, Rolen cannot c~q~~'is n mEJ\ Ri,U~11'\ AcP~ .wh.lch•g-qvernsJpqhange of first name .and . enumerates the grc;iune~pnereof f~uc l cnage ~9.fl ngt §a.f\9tloo1a ch~sf:1'first narT)e on the. ground .. of sex reassignmen~s~rnbing~ petiti er's first•tN~ife!' ii,: CJ~clare~91~e may only create grave complications in the Cl~ l~~ist and t public~~~ :erqre~·pers\i.~ ~ legally change his given name, he must pres~ aper o reasqpabl~ ca . • ~~11ng (ea~,plll;justifying such change. In addition, he must sho .t at'tie wt,11 be pr~jt,rdiaed~:!!Ml~e of his tru~..{no~efficial name. Lastly, while a t!C ·The characteristics Of property of pu61ioil"Oi]l.n.J.9n· e fullowing: 1.) it is outside the commerce of man

except insofar as they may be the object,,ef)epair or 1 ~o.'(ement or other similar things (Roman Catholic Bishop v. Municipality of Buruanga, 486\~CRA 229); 2.)-..it is Inalienable, however, when it is no longer needed for public use or service, it may be declared as patrimonial property; 3.) It cannot be acquired by prescription (Harty v. Municipality of Victoria, 13 Phil. 152); 4.) It cannot be burdened with easements (Art. 613); 5.) It is not subject to attachment or execution (Manila International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals, 495 SCRA 591; and 6.) It cannot be registered under the Property Registration Decree (PD No.

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33. What is the classification of a building constructed from strong materials? Buildings are always Immovable under the Code. A building treated separately from the land on which it stood is immovable property and the mere fact that the parties to a contract seem to have dealt with it separate and apart from the land on which it stood in no wise changed its character as immovable property. (Punsalan; Jr, v. Lacsamana, G.R. NO.L-55729, Mar.26, 1963) ·

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34. Give an instance when a movable property becomes immovable property. .Machinery which is movable by nature becomes immovable under Art. 415, when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner (Davao Sawmil Co. v. Casrillo, 61 Phil709) Ownership

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Quieting of Title

38. What are the req.uisites for an action to quiet title to prosper? For an action to quiet titl e to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action ; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy." (Manaquil v. Moico, G.R. No. 180076, November 21, 2012) Co-Ownership

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CIVIL LAW perpetrated by anotf'ier, the 1a·w imposes the loss upon the party who, by his, misplaced confidence, has enabled the fraud to be committed, cannot be applied in a case which is covered by an express provision of the Civil Code specifically Article 559." (Consuelo S. de Garcia, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et a/s., L20264, January 30, 1971; 37 SCRA, p. 129).

42. X steals the ring of B. X pledges the same to R Pawnshop. B does not readily discover the theft committed by X. And so when X fails to redeem the ring, R Pawnshop sells the same at public auction where Y is the highest bidder and buyer in good faith of the ring. Upon learning of this, 8 sues Y to recover the ring. Decide. B cannot recover the ring from Y unless B ind~mnifies Y for what the latter pays for the ring. This is so because Y acquires the ring at public auction, a situation excepted from the rule in Article 559 of the Civil Code that the owner who is unlawfully deprived of his personal property may recover the same without paying any indemnity. Usufruct

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·CiVILLAW The owner of the servient estate retains ownership of the portion on which the easement is established, and may use the same in such manner as not to affect the exercise of the easement. It gives the holder of the easement an incorporeal interest on the land but grants no title thereto. Therefore, an acknowledgment of the easement is an admission that the property belongs to another. It is. settled that road right of way is a discontinuous apparent easement in the context of Article 622 of the Civil Code, which provides that continuous non-apparent easements, and discontinuous ones, whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of title. But the phrase with existing "Right of Way" in the TCT is not one of the modes of acquisition of the eas~ment by virtue of a title. Acquisition by virtue of title, as used in Art. 622 of the Civil Code, refers to "the juridical act which gives birth to the easement, such as law, donation, contract, and will of the testator." What really defines a piece of land is not the area mentioned in its description, but the boundaries tj1erein laid down, as enclosing the land and indicating its limits. An encumbrance "subject to 3 meters wide right of way" was annotated on TCT No. 107915, which covers Lot No. 5808-F2"'B of Aurora. As the owner of the servient estate, Aurora retained owoership of the road right of way even assuming that said encumbrance was for the benefit of Lot No. 5808-F-2-A of the Mary. The latter could not claim to own even a portion of the road right of way because Article 630 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "[t]he owner of the se~ient estate retains ownership of the portion on which the easement is established, and ma~~"tpe sam~';lo s~ · · snner as not to affect the exercise of the easement." ~~t?. the right of Wft_Y r[ghtfull~"belo9EiiJ19: ~ 1.l'iel\l as ttfd r repailj.ng 10\sss#lnd damages, and upon evidence of the viol;:ltLo< Qf the {'ronditiOJ_t stipulafed the it:U..ured Rarty is ~Q.UQ...QJiQed to prove losses and damages suffered, ~~.toe! exte;~t ql 'frif jame i'1 ,0f,Qer to deman(;! ~e eQ.foil"p~ent of the penal clause _agreed upon, which '~~njxcer;1tiqfi\to ~~e dd,mnwn a~ ,gan"2tral loss al)C!,JoJ(e.mnity clause (Palacios .v. Municipality of _Cavit~l}-flo. ~59S, [Nove'tnberr~,~~8],r and debtor ~q~eM t i~ 1276 of the Civil Code although a majority of the members of thet,lf~rds,.i5f the two or~iza~ partie~ to the contract are the same persons, if the said entities keep thetr:OWn j>ie~tie~d"e'W!ties. (Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa Manila Railroad Co. v. Credit Union, G .~~l"t:-14~~ 20, 1960) .. · 84. A and B were co-owners of a piece of property worth P1,00_0,000. For some repairs thereon, B paid P200,000. Because they were co-owners, A had to share in said expenses, and so A owed B P100,000. A sold his share in the property to C and B also sold his share In the property to C. Later B brought this action to recover P100,000 from A. A claimed that since C is now the owner of the property, Cowes himself..,and therefore said merger had extinguished his debt to B. Should A pay B? YES, mere transfer to a third person of rights belonging to both the debtor and.the creditor BUT not the · · credit as against the debt does not result in merger. The rights of creditor and debtor are not merged in one same person by the fact that the things pertainin_g to said creditor and debtor which were the subject of the obligation were transferred to him where said transfer did not include, among the rights and obligations transferred, the credit that the creditor had against the debtor. (Paras, 2008·, p. 457; Testate Estate of Mota v. Serra, G.R. No. 22825, [February 14, 1925])

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CIVIL 'L AW 85. A sued B, as administrator of the estate of X, praying for a personal judgment for P30,000.00 with Interest ·and the foreclosure of mortgage securing said debt. This mortgage was a first lien on a parcel of land in question assessed at P28,000.00. . It appeared that A purchased the land from Y who, 'in turn', purchased the same at a sheriff's sale under an execution upon a judgment against D. The trial court denied the prayer of C. Was the denial correct? YES, when A acquired through Y the equity of X in the very same land conveyed to him (A) as mortgagee, a merger of rights took place which had the effect of extinguishing the debt of X in favor of A. This extinction of the obligation and merger of rights by which A became the owner of the land, occurred when he acquired the rights of Y. (De Leon, 20.10, p.377; Enriquez v. Ranola, G.R. No. 40908, [September 8, 1934], 60 PHIL 561-565) .. Compensation

89. Jose subscribed 160 shares of stock, at par value, in a·company whose authorized capital st ock was P300,000. At the time of the subscription, and without his knowledge and consent, the company increased the ~apital stoc!< to P600,000. Can the company compel Jose to pay for s aid shares? · NO, because not having given his consent to said increase constitutes a novation by changing the principal conditions (Art. 1291, Civil Code). Said increase in authorized capital stock diluted the expected ownership of the subscriber in the corporation amounting to a change in the principal conditions of the agreement. Hence, he is not bound by the contract thus novated and is relieved of the obligation contracted·by him in the Original contract, which became extinguished as a consequence of said novation (art. 1231 , Civil Code); even if he made some partial payments, not having been informed of said increase at the time of having made them. (National Exchange Co .. Ltd. v. Ramos, G.R. No. 27850, December 24, 1927)

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90. A rented a house from B. In the contract of lease, the lessee A was given authority to assign the lease to strangers." Be~ause of this A leased it to C. Is A released from his obligation towards the lessorB? · NO, under Art. 1292 of the Civil Code the only situation where a novation having the effect of extinguishing a prior obligation will be implied, in·the absence of express stipulation, is where the new and old obligations are incompatible in every respect. In the case under consideration the new obligation assumed by the successive entities taking over the lease was not at all incompatible with the continued liability of the original lessee. (Rios v. Jacinto, G.R. No. 23893, March 23, 1926)

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91. D owes~ P1,000,000. F, a friend of D, approaches C and tells him: "I will pay you wha~ D owes you." C agrees. Is there expromision so as to relieve D of his obligation? NO, the mere fact that the creditor receives a guaranty or accepts payments from a third person who has agreed to assume the obligation, when there is no agreement- that the first debtor shall be released from responsibility, does not constitute novation, and the creditor can still enforce the obligation against the original debtor. (Magdalena Estates, Inc. v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. L-18411, December 17, 1966)

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I In this case, the agreement between the parties is the formal expression of the parties rights, duties and obligations. It is the best evidence of the parties, it is the law -between them. The MOA stated its terms clearly and leaves no doubt that the amount shall be paid in lump sum and not based on the number of units constructed. ·

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RESCISSIBLE CONTRACTS 94. A entered into an agreement with B for the construction of a three-story dotmitory in strict accordance to the plans and specifications. The General Conditions and Specifications which prescribed the minimum acceptable compressive strength of the building was thereafter delivered to 8. Upon knowledge of B deviating from the said plans and ~pecifications, A conducted several testing which showed that samples failed the required 3000 psi which meant that the building was structurally defective. As a result, A filed a complaint for rescission of the contract. B contends that rescission was not proper, arguing that the applicable rule is Article 1385 of the Civi l Code. Is B correct? ., No, B seems to· be confused over the right of rescission which is used in two different context in the Civil Code. · Under the law on contracts, there are rescissible contracts as enumerated under Article 1381, and dght of rescission under Article 1191. The applicagle.,r,ule is not 1381 in relation to 1385 but 1191 because the construction con:ract obliges B tGrbull~ar.~tiri ,whi~E!~-t~oPligation to pay upon the completion. Article 1191~iJ.o ecenomlc pr~u fee to one of the parties,..Qttt based on the breach of faOfVDyfane of them loat viofates reciprocity. The rig~t to r-nd arose~ failed to follow the stipulated pl~£~d specifications3 ~

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l\ 95. Sometime in 19~9'V~ed,@@di.~ l~fio@sJi!it{jvFini!JJttii$fl.~11drr-'l~~f whom .was X. In

order for X to obtam aA9an, W sold the lot to X. X obtained a loa~ fro"J.... . l':v.. and-1Ttortgaged the same to the latter but X tRil~d',\o pay, tfle loan, hence he rtro)1gage s fore~~~n January 1, 1983, Y sold the. lot to A, wtu:} aid the full pr~. After th~ s.alei ·W \anlf her chft94iled for the annulment of the sale and pa'ftiti~6lof di e lot ag!ins X f!Od Y. T.'1~ sal~ was d~~reCJ to be valid only with respect to the shares an~ ~ an~}VOJ'1.i with fe.$1>.eci t o t~e' shard~of.Jile other heirs, ordering the r~turn of the sc.iU. portion. T~ deblsi~d bs:htra1etif29~h

121 . A, B, and C forrttt l:/partfl,r, h the government to San Juanico bridge\ After the com~letion of the project, the bridges ~.e.Fe turned over by the partners to the gov~f'oment ana tile partriership wa§ ,c(issotved. Tlie s.EJ1plier of the materials subsequently sue'd:"A'iclr the collectiO}l of indebte'dness tb h iiri. A m~~...to,,.-di.s miss the complaint against him on the~ro.-qnd tliat ABd Partr:ier{hjp ~ liable for. th~ det;it. yvj!J, the complaint against lie? Ye~. because despifei t e.1disso}u.!!,9n ~ftth~a~nc:~s'tjp·t~e~1:mrtAarshi~n~erminated but continues . ~ners~·p affa~rs is completa'.q. OissoJution is !~ . ~ge in the relation of the until the winding u~f ac partr:iers caused by a y ~rtne ceasin~ to be a~oefr'a1~~n l\J.rl)'.t~g on\~_gJ!.bt:fsiness (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1828). Winding up i~lrt~ctua roc~~~9f~,ettli g~g:gon~r~ b ~iqess;er affairs after dissolution and the partnership ls~ t _ i ·ate "Wtlen ~u ·ttie ershi~""~ ffairs a e co Rleted. ·

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122. Will the ·dissolution iet e1,artnersh;p CflsFti r e p~n r fQ 1ia1;?il y State the rules. · · . No. The dissolution ofya trfership ~aes.no!Jtse ~it@ · e·existihg}Ha~y of any partner. A partner liabrllty an agreement to that effect is discharged from between himself, the parfrfera·p cre~itor, ~Cftlie person ; r partfl~i~1JY'continuing the business, and such agreement may b~~t~'1~m tie ·cau1Se of dealjmg betv.J~~creditor having knowledge of the dissolution and the pe~ pa~ ersn1p bontinµitfg the t:5~n~ss . . . . ·.

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of the partnership incurred . The individual property of a ctecea:l;,f'!!rtner shall be while he was a partner, but subjeCft~.2tpay~r!l oJl;il~ep°'ca@te debts. (Art. 1835)

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123. X. transferred his two (2) parcel children to enable them to build their residence. One year after the trans{;f.'~~ti;k,~~~s ~children of X) resold said lots dividing the proceeds among themselves, treating the same as capital gains and paying proper income tax therefor. In April 2017, the Commissioner of BIR required the petitioners to pay corporate income tax. The Commissioner's tf'!eory is that they formed an unregistered partnership or joint venture, which theory was sus~ined by the CTA. Is the decision proper? Why? . No. There was no partnership. To regard the petitioners as having formed an unregistered partnership ·· would result in oppressive taxation. Their original purpose was to divide the lots for residential purposes, but they were compelled to resell. Art. 1769 (3) provides that "The sharing of gross returns does not Itself establish a partnership, whether or not the persons sharing them have a joint or common right or interest In any property from which the returns are derived. There must be an unmistakable intention to form a · partnership or joint venture.

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124. X and Y entered into a contract of partnership where they intended to operate a fishspond, not to engage in a fishpond business. Is there a need to comply with the requirement that an inventory be attached to the public instrument? Why? . No. While it is true that Art. 1773 provides that a contract of partnership is void, whenever immovable property is contributed thereto, if an inventory of the said property is not made, signed by the parties, and attached to the .public instrument; however, in this case, the purpose of the partnership is operation of a fishpond. Since there is no real right involved or the fishpond itself was not contributed, the requirement that an inventory signed by the parties must be attached to the contract need not be complied with.

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128. What is the doctrine of apparent auth1,>!Yt? One who clothes another with apparent~uthority as hi gent and holds him out to the public as such cannot be permitted to deny the authority of such person to act as his agent to the prejudice of innocent third persons dealing with such person in good faith and in honest belief that he is what he appears to be. (Cuison vs. CA, G.R. No. 88539, October 26, 1993) 129. When may an act of an agent be binding upon the principal even if he acted beyond the scope of his authority? Explain. Under Art. 1898 and 1910, an agent's act even if done beyond the scope of his authority, may binq the principal if he ratifies them, whether expressly or tacitly. It must be stressed though that only the principal, and not the agent, can ratify unauthorized acts, which the principal ·must have knowledge of. The principal must have full knowledge at the time of ratification of all material facts and circumstances relating to the unauthoriz~d act of the person who assumed to act as agent.

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'130. When may an agent sue in his own name? Explain. An agent may sue or be sued solely in its own name and without joining the principal when the following elements concur: (a) the agent acted in his own name during the transaction; (2) the agent acted for the benefit of an undisclosed principal; (3) the transaction did not involve a property of the undisclosed principal. Art. 1883 provides that if an agent acts in his own name, the principal has no right of action against the persons with whom the agent has contracted; neither have such persons against the principal. In such case, the agent is the one directly bound in favor of the person with whom he has contracted, as if the transaction were his own except wpen the contract involves things belonging to the principal. The provisions of this article shall be understood to be without prejudice to the actions between the principal and the agent. (V-Gent Inc. v Morning Star Travel and Tours, Inc. G.R. No. 186305, July 22, 2015).

135. What Is the concept of trust de son tort? . Atrust de son tort (constructive trust) is a form of implied trust created by equity to meet the demands of justice. There is a constructive trust when a property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the .person obtaining it, is by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1456) 136. Distinguish Resulting Trust from Constructive Trust . a. As to intent, in resulting trust, the intent of the parties to create a trust is presumed or implied by law from the nature of their transaction. In constructive trust, the trust is created irr~spective of or even contrary to the intention of the parties ta promote justice, frustrate fraud, and to prevent unjust enrichment.

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As to the reckoning point for the prescriptive period, in resulting trust, the 10-year prescriptive period shall be counted from the time repudiation is made known to the beneficiary. In constructive trust, the 10-year prescriptive period shall be counted from the time the constructive trust arise~

137. What is the Trust Pursuit Rule? -

Equity will pursue the property that is wrongfully converted by the fiduciary, or otherwise compel restitution to the beneficiary. A trust will follow the property through all changes in its state and form even into the hands of a transferee other than a bona fide purchaser for value, provided its product or proceeds are capable of identification (Estate of Margarita Cabacungan v. Marilou Laigo, G.R. No. 175073, Augusf15. 2011)

138. Can a Trustee claim title over the property held in trust by acquisitive prescription? Whether the trust is express or implied, as a general rule, the trustee cannot acquire absolute ownership over the trust by acquisitive prescription. However, if (1) he repudiates the right of the beneficiary, and (2) such act of repudiation is brought to the knowledge of such beneficiary, and (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive, he may be able to acquire,,absolute ownership over the trust but only (4) after the lapse of the period fixed by law (ten:o/9ar~rom the• ime tf1e ~ptrdia,tion is made known to the beneficiary in cases of~p[fss or resultin trust jyh!le~n ye~rs ft0~m~onsnvctjve trust arises). These requisites must be st~!,