2016 Last Day Bar Reviewer in Political Law & International Law

KOKO BAR POLITICAL & INTERNATIONAL LAW Selected Recent Jurisprudence1 By Prof. Alexis F. Medina2

JUDICIAL REVIEW ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY REQUIREMENT Proposed bills do not present a justiciable controversy. A proposed bill does not present an actual justiciable controversy. The filing of bills is within the legislative power of Congress and is not subject to judicial restraint. Also, the judiciary cannot speculate on the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a bill that Congress may or may not pass. (In The Matter Of: Save The Supreme Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movements v. Abolition of Judiciary Development Fund and Reduction of Fiscal Autonomy, UDK-15143, January 21, 2015) THE STANDING REQUIREMENT Assertion of a public right: If the petition is anchored on a public right, such as the people’s right to information on matters of public concern, any citizen can be the real party in interest. The requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right. There is no need to show any special interest in the result. (Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment [IDEAL] v. Power Sector Liabilities and Management Corporation [PSALM], G.R. No. 192088, October 9, 2012) Facial challenge and legal standing: A facial challenge on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness is an exception to the prohibition on third-party standing. A petitioner may mount a “facial” challenge to the constitutionality of a statute even if he claims no violation of his own rights under the assailed statute where it involves free 1 This is a working draft of capsules of recent jurisprudence, selected and organized under common

subjects. This material is subject to revision, modification or updating. Reproduction for purely academic purposes with due attribution to the author is permitted.

2 AB Political Science, University of the Philippines (UP), Diliman; Order of the Purple Feather (OPF),

UP, College of Law; Valedictorian, San Sebastian College-Recoletos, Manila, College of Law; Philippine Representative to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Trade Facilitation Preparatory Committee Meeting for Legal Review (Geneva, Switzerland, 2014); Philippine Representative, Senior Officials’ Meeting, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 2015; former Philippine Youth delegate to Japan and Southeast Asia; Litigation lawyer; formerly with the Ponce Enrile Reyes & Manlastas Law Offices (Pecabar); Professor of Constitutional Law, San Sebastian College-Recoletos, Manila, College of Law, and Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP), Manila, College of Law; former professor of Constitutional Law, New Ear University, College of Law, Quezon City; Bar Review Lecturer, Recoletos Review Center, Manila

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speech on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness of the statute. This to counter the “chilling effect” on protected speech. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014) Legal standing in actions for violation of environmental laws: The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allow for a "citizen suit," and permit any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to file an action before our courts for violations of our environmental laws; this collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature. (Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape of Tañon Strait v. Secretary Reyes, G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015) POLITICAL QUESTIONS Political questions: The conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative--'the political'-departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision. The question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. (Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230, 28 April 2010)

THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH Why PDAF/Pork Barrel System is void The PDAF/”Pork Barrel System” violates the principle of separation of powers, as it authorizes legislators to participate in the post-enactment phases of project implementation, such as project identification, fund release and fund realignment, thus allowing legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. (Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013) The PDAF/”Pork Barrel System” violates the principle of non-delegation of legislative power considering that an individual legislator is given the authority to dictate (a) how much fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that he himself also determines, two (2) acts that comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation, which is lodged in Congress. (Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013) The PDAF/”Pork Barrel System” undermines the system of checks and balance by impairing the President’s item veto power. For the President to exercise 2 | Page

his item-veto power, there must be a proper "item" which may be the object of the veto. Because PDAF is a lump-sum appropriation, the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration. The legislator‘s identification of the projects after the passage of the GAA denies the President the chance to veto that item later on. (Belgica v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013) The PDAF/”Pork Barrel System” undermines public accountability by impairing Congress’ oversight functions considering that legislators would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate. It also violates the constitutional prohibition on legislators’ intervention on matters where he may be called upon to act. (Belgica v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013) The PDAF/”Pork Barrel System” violates the constitutional principles on local autonomy as it allows district representatives who are national officers to substitute the judgement of local officials on use of public funds for local development. A Congressman can simply bypass the local development council and initiate projects on his own. (Belgica v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013)

THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH Power to transfer appropriations: The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5), must be made upon a concurrence of the following requisites, namely: (1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices; (2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for their respective offices; and (3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014) Why the transfer of funds under DAP is invalid The transfer of funds under the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) is invalid for lack of a valid law authorizing the transfer. The GAAs of 2011 and 2012 3 | Page

authorized the transfers "to augment any item in this Act", and the effect was that the 2011 and 2012 GAAs allowed the transfer of funds to augment any item in the GAAs even if the item belonged to an office outside the Executive, contravention of the Constitution. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014) The transfer of funds under DAP is invalid because DAP funds were not necessarily “savings.” Savings are realized only when the purpose for which the funds had been allocated were already satisfied, or the need for such funds had ceased to exist. Funds described as “unreleased or unalloted” are not necessarily savings. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014) The transfer of funds under DAP is invalid because DAP funds were not transferred to augment existing items in the GAA. There must be an existing item, project or activity, purpose or object of expenditure with an appropriation to which savings may be transferred for the purpose of augmentation. The power to augment cannot be used to fund non-existent items in the GAA. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014) The transfer of funds under DAP is invalid for because some of the transfers of appropriation were not made to their respective offices. Cross-border transfers, whether as augmentation, or as aid, are prohibited. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)

THE JUDICIARY The execution of a decision is but an integral part of the adjudicative function of the Supreme Court. Thus, in the execution of its continuing mandamus against agencies of the Executive Department, the Supreme Court may order such agencies to perform their assigned tasks within specific time frames or completion periods. The imposition of such time frames or completion periods is not an encroachment over the powers and functions of the Executive Branch. (Metro Manila Development Authority [MMDA] v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, G.R. Nos. 171947-48, February 15, 2011)

JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL JBC can set standards for choosing nominees to the judiciary: JBC’s policy of requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts is constitutional. The JBC has the authority to set the standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary,

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subject only to the minimum qualifications required by the Constitution and law for every position. (Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015)

COMMISSION ON AUDIT COA jurisdiction over money claims against the government. COA has primary jurisdiction over money claims against government agencies and instrumentalities, including local governments. The COA and not the RTC has primary jurisdiction to pass upon a money claim against a local government unit. (Province of Aklan v. Jody King Construction and Development Corp., G.R. Nos. 197592 & 20262, November 27, 2013) Money claims filed with COA must be liquidated. COA’s authority over money claims is limited to liquidated claims, or those determined or readily determinable from vouchers, invoices, and such other papers within reach of accounting officers. (Province of Aklan v. Jody King Construction and Development Corp., G.R. Nos. 197592 & 20262, November 27, 2013)

NATIONAL ECONOMY Constitutional requirements for a valid service contract: The Constitutional requirements for a valid service contract for the large-scale exploration and development of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils are the following: 1) the service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set standard or uniform terms, conditions; 2) the President shall be the signatory for the government; and 3) within 30 days, the President shall report it to Congress. (Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape of Tañon Strait v. Secretary Reyes, G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015) Where the 60-40 Filipino-foreign equity ownership is in doubt, the Grandfather Rule will apply. Thus, the combined totals in the Investing Corporation and the Investee Corporation must be traced (i.e., "grandfathered") to determine the total percentage of Filipino ownership. The ultimate Filipino ownership of the shares must first be traced to the level of the Investing Corporation and added to the shares directly owned in the Investee Corporation. (Narra Nickel Mining and Development Corp. v. Redmont Consolidated Mines Corp., G.R. No. 195580, April 21, 2014)

STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT An unincorporated agency without any separate juridical personality of its own enjoys immunity from suit. The State will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability only if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private 5 | Page

capacity. Contracts for the construction of public roads that the DPWH enter into are done in the exercise of its governmental functions, hence, there is no implied waiver by the DPWH simply by entering into such contract. (Mendoza v. Department of Public Works and Highways, G.R. No. 203834, July 9, 2014) An unincorporated government agency performing proprietary function is not immune from suit. An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own enjoys immunity from suit. However, if an unincorporated government agency performs proprietary, private or non-governmental functions, it is not immune from suit. The ATO was involved in the management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, which are primarily private or non-governmental functions. Hence, the ATO has no claim to immunity from suit. (Air Transportation Office v. Spouses Ramos, G.R. No. 159402, February 23, 2011)

CITIZENSHIP IN GENERAL Election of citizenship: Children born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father who executed an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and took their oath of allegiance to the government upon reaching the age of majority, but failed to immediately file the documents of election with the nearest civil registry – did not lose their right to elect Philippine citizenship. Their registration of the documents of election should be allowed, if in the meanwhile positive acts of citizenship have publicly, consistently, and continuously been done. (Ma v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 183133, July 26, 2010) Reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 for those who have lost the same by naturalization before the effectivity of RA 9225 -- has no retroactive effect. A former natural-born Filipino citizen re-acquires his Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. (David v. Agbay, G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015)

STATE POWERS POLICE POWER The rational relationship test for a valid exercise of police power: (1) the interests of the public generally require its exercise and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Lacking these two requisites, the police power measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights and a violation of the due process clause. (Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College, G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013) 6 | Page

Police power and taking of property. The State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property solely to preserve or enhance the aesthetic appearance of the community. The requirement under the ordinance for owners of educational institutions to build their fences six meters back for beautification purposes is invalid for being unreasonable and oppressive as it will substantially divest the respondents of the beneficial use of their property solely for aesthetic purposes. (Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College, G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013)

EMINENT DOMAIN When taking is an exercise of eminent domain: A city ordinance requiring land owners to setback their fences by five meters to provide for parking space is tantamount to a taking of private property for public use without just compensation. The total destruction of value of the property is not required for a taking to be compensable. (Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College, G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013) Agrarian Reform: The basic law allows two (2) modes of land distribution: direct and indirect ownership. Direct transfer to individual farmers is the most commonly used method by DAR and widely accepted. Indirect transfer through collective ownership of the agricultural land is the alternative. By using the word collectively, the Constitution allows for indirect ownership of land and not just outright agricultural land transfer. Thus, allowing corporations or associations to own agricultural land with the farmers becoming stockholders or members does not violate the agrarian reform policy under the Constitution. (Hacienda Luisita Incorporated v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, G.R. No. 171101, July 5, 2011) No prescription for action for just compensation. An action for payment of just compensation does not prescribe. If private property is taken by the Government for public use without expropriation proceedings or negotiated sale, the owner’s action to recover the land or the value thereof does not prescribe. (Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways v. Spouses Tecson, G.R. No. 179334, July 1, 2013) Reckoning point for determining the value of the property. The reckoning point for determining just compensation is the value of the property at the time of taking. Just compensation must be valued at the time of taking, or the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. (Department of Agrarian Reform v. Spouses Sta. Romana, G.R. No. 183290, July 9, 2014) Even if the government taking was in 1940, and the action for payment of just compensation was only filed in 1995, the reckoning point for determining just 7 | Page

compensation is still the value of the property at the time of taking. Thus, just compensation should be fixed not as of the time of payment but at the time of taking, that is, in 1940, even though this valuation appear outdated. (Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways v. Spouses Tecson, G.R. No. 179334, July 1, 2013)

INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS & LIBERTIES RIGHT TO LIFE A general welfare in terms of economic benefits cannot override the very basic rights to life, security and safety. An ordinance to promote the constituents’ general welfare in terms of economic benefits cannot override the very basic rights to life, security and safety of the people. In the absence of any convincing reason that the life, security and safety of the inhabitants of Manila are no longer put at risk by the presence of the oil depots in Pandacan, Ordinance No. 8187 in favor of the retention of the oil depots is invalid and unconstitutional. (Social Justice Society Officers v. Lim, G.R. No. 187836, November 25, 2014) DUE PROCESS Due process in NBI investigations. There is no violation of due process in an NBI investigation if the respondents are not given an opportunity to file an answer or submit counter-evidence. The NBI does not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial powers and its findings are merely recommendatory. (Shu v. Dee, G.R. No. 182573, April 23, 2014) Preliminary investigation is not part of a trial. Requirements of administrative due process do not apply. The requirements for due process in administrative cases set in the Ang Tibay case do not apply to preliminary investigations. The purpose of the Office of the Ombudsman in conducting a preliminary investigation is to determine probable cause for filing an information, and not to make a final adjudication of the rights and obligations of the parties. The Ombudsman and the prosecution service are inherently the fact-finder, investigator, hearing officer, judge and jury of the respondent in preliminary investigations. There is nothing unconstitutional with this procedure because this is merely an Executive function, a part of the law enforcement process leading to trial in court. (Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212140-41, January 21, 2015) Procedural safeguards in student disciplinary cases: Due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those in courts of justice. Proceedings may be summary; cross-examination is not an essential part of the investigation or hearing; and the required proof in a student 8 | Page

disciplinary action is only substantial evidence. Official action must meet minimum standards of fairness to the individual, which generally encompass the right of adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. (Cudia v. The Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy, G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015) EQUAL PROTECTION Favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse is not a violation of the equal protection clause. The unequal power relationship between women and men, the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence, and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women -- all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law. These substantial distinctions are germane to the purpose of preventing violence and abuse against women and children. (Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013) The policy of JBC requiring 5 years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts does not violate the equal protection clause. There is a substantial distinction between judges with 5 year experience and those with less than 5 five years. The classification is reasonable and relevant to its legitimate purpose of selecting those with proven competence. (Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015) UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES Description in search warrants: A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. The specific room in the house to be searched need not be identified. (People v. Tuan, G.R. No. 176066, August 11, 2010) Search must precede the arrest. In a search incident to a lawful arrest, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made -- the process cannot be reversed. (Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 204589, November 19, 2014) Roadside questioning of a motorist pursuant to a routine traffic stop is not necessarily an arrest that justifies a warrantless search. Also, a warrantless arrest cannot be made for an offense penalized by a fine only. Hence, no valid search incident to a lawful arrest can be made under such circumstances. (Luz v. People, G.R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012) Informant’s tip alone is not enough to justify a warrantless arrest. An informant’s tip that a pot session is going on inside a house is not sufficient justification for police officers to enter such house to effect an arrest and seizure 9 | Page

without a warrant. Personal knowledge of facts in arrests without warrant must be based upon probable cause. (People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, December 13, 2010) Airport security searches: Valid even without a warrant, because of their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. (Sales v. People, G.R. No. 191023, February 06, 2013) Requirements to establish violation of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures: To establish a violation of one’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures, one must first prove that he has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy in the place searched or the item seized; and second, his subjective expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective). (Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011) Reduced expectation of privacy for a government employee in his office. A government employee’s expectation of privacy in a regulated office environment is reduced. The employee’s privacy interest in an office is to a large extent limited by the company’s work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace. (Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011) No expectation of privacy for a government employee in his governmentissued computer if the employee is so notified based on office policy. A government employee cannot have a subjective expectation of privacy in his government-issued computer containing his personal files, if the government office implemented a policy that put its employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office computers. (Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011) Requirement for warrantless search by the government employer of a government employee’s office: reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct. A warrantless search by a government employer of an employees’ office is justified at inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct. Thus, a search of a government employee’s files in the government-issued computer, conducted in connection with investigation of work-related misconduct prompted by an anonymous letter-complaint -- is reasonable. (Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011) Overt act requirement in in flagrante delicto arrest: For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) 10 | P a g e

the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer." Trying to run away when no crime has been overtly committed, and without more, cannot be evidence of guilt. Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt. (People v. Edano, G.R. No. 188133, July 7, 2014) Reliable information alone is not enough to justify a warrantless arrest. The accused must perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. (People v. Racho, G.R. No. 186529, August 3, 2010) “Overt act” requirement in in flagrante delicto arrest: The mere act of leaving a residence of a known drug peddler is not sufficient for a valid arrest, unless there is an overt manifestation that the person had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in the criminal activity of illegal possession of shabu. (Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 204589, November 19, 2014) Police presence at the scene not required in a hot pursuit arrest. In a hot pursuit arrest, police presence at the scene while the crime was being committed is not required. It is enough that evidence of the recent commission of the crime is patent and the police officer has probable cause to believe, based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently committed the crime. (Pestilos v. Generoso, G.R. No. 182601, November 10, 2014) Arrest of someone who voluntarily surrenders to clear his name. The arrest of a person who has presented himself before the police station to clear his name and prove that he is not the accused -- is not valid, as he was neither committing nor attempting to commit an offense, and the police officers had no personal knowledge of any offense that he might have committed. (In the Matter of Petition for Habeas Corpus of Datukan Malang Salibo, v. Warden, Quezon City Jail, G.R. No. 197597, April 8, 2015) FREE SPEECH Prohibition against sending spam is invalid. The prohibition on the sending of internet “spam” under Republic Act (R.A.) 10175 (the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012) is a violation of freedom of expression. To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him; commercial speech is also entitled to protection. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014) The law penalizing “aiding and abetting the commission” of internet libel: Void for being vague and overbroad. The law penalizing “aiding and abetting” the 11 | P a g e

commission of internet libel is void for being vague and overbroad. The terms "aiding or abetting" unnecessarily sweep broadly, thereby invading the area of protected freedoms, generating a chilling effect on those who express themselves in cyberspace. Also, netizens are not given "fair notice" or warning as to what is criminal conduct and what is lawful conduct. Its vagueness also causes a chilling effect on the freedom of expression. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014) Why Comelec regulation of political speech on oversized tarpaulins posted on private property by non-candidates during elections is void Speech with political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection. Tarpaulins put up by private individuals that contain statements of their approval or criticisms of public officials’ vote on the RH Law, as part of these private individuals’ advocacy campaign against the RH Law, and not paid for by any candidate or political party – are not election propaganda subject to Comelec regulation. (The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015) Prohibiting non-candidates from posting on their private property tarpaulins containing their opinions that may affect elections is a content-based regulation that is presumed invalid. A content-based prior restraint will only be valid it if passes the clear and present danger test. (The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015) Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by noncandidates or who do not speak as members of a political party which are principally advocacies of a social issue during elections -- is unconstitutional. Regulation of election paraphernalia involving speech of persons who are not candidates is valid, if what is regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a whole, has for its principal object the endorsement of a candidate only. The regulation (a) should be provided by law, (b) reasonable, (c) narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing the opportunity of all candidates to be heard and considering the primacy of the guarantee of free expression, and (d) demonstrably the least restrictive means to achieve that object. The regulation must only be with respect to the time, place, and manner of the rendition of the message. (The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015) The act of the Comelec in restraining private individuals from posting tarpaulins expressing political views in their own private property is an impermissible encroachment on the right to property. The Comelec prohibition is a deprivation of property without due process. (The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015) Why the aggregate-based time air-time limits on campaign advertising is invalid 12 | P a g e

Restriction on freedom of speech and of the press: The Comelec’s rule -- limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes for political campaigns or advertisements -- is unreasonable and arbitrary, as it unreasonably restricts the freedom of speech and of the press. It unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people. (GMA Network v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014) Violation of the right to suffrage: The COMELEC’s aggregate time-limit rule [rule limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes for political campaigns or advertisements] violate the people’s right to suffrage by restricting the right of the people to be adequately informed for the intelligent exercise of their right to determine their own destiny. (GMA Network v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014) Why the Comelec prohibition on posting of an election campaign material during an election period in Public Utility Vehicles (PUVs) and transport terminals is void The Comelec prohibition on posting of an election campaign material during an election period in Public Utility Vehicles (PUVs) and transport terminals --constitutes a prior restraint on the right to free expression. Prior restraints are presumed invalid. (1United Transport Koalisyon [1-Utak] v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015) A content-neutral regulation, which merely controls the time, place or manner of speech, is valid if the following requisites concur: first, the government regulation is within the constitutional power of the Government; second, it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; third, the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and fourth, the incidental restriction on freedom of expression is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. Prohibiting owners of PUVs and transport terminals from posting election campaign materials is an invalid content-neutral regulation because, first, it is not within the constitutionally delegated power of the Comelec, and second, there is no necessity to restrict the right to free speech of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals. (1United Transport Koalisyon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015) Prohibiting owners of PUVs and transport terminals from posting election campaign materials cannot be justified under the captive-audience doctrine. The commuters are not forced or compelled to read the election campaign materials posted 13 | P a g e

on PUVs and transport terminals, nor are they incapable of declining to receive the messages contained therein. (1-United Transport Koalisyon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015) RELIGIOUS FREEDOM Benevolent Neutrality and the conscientious objector. Pursuant to the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality, the conscientious objector's claim to religious freedom would warrant an exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless the government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the accomplishment of an important secular objective. To compel a conscientious objector to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction would be violate "the principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the right to free exercise of religion. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, 8 April 2014) Exception: Life threatening cases: The government may compel healthcare providers to give reproductive health care, because the right to life of the mother should be given preference. If it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering the life of the child may be resorted to even if is against the religious sentiments of the medical practitioner. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, 8 April 2014) RIGHT TO PRIVACY Reasonable expectation of privacy test. The "reasonable expectation of privacy" test should be used to determine whether there is a violation of the right to privacy. The reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy depends on a twopart test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable. (Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013) Surveillance cameras should not pry into or cover places where there is reasonable expectation of privacy. (Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013) Expectation of privacy and use of privacy tools in Facebook. To have an expectation of privacy in Facebook posts, a user must show intention to keep certain posts private through the use of privacy tools. A Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or deny access to his or her post or profile detail should not be denied the informational privacy right which necessarily accompanies said choice. (Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College, G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014) An ordinance requiring property owners such as private schools to expose their property by limiting the height of fences to one meter and requiring fences in excess of one meter to be at least 80% see-thru is a violation of the right to privacy of the 14 | P a g e

property owners. (Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College, G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013) THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA Writ of habeas data: There must be a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other for the writ to be granted. (Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012) Right to privacy must yield to an overriding legitimate state interest. An application for a writ of habeas data may be denied if the right to privacy in life, liberty or security must yield to an overriding legitimate state interest, such as dismantling of private armed groups (PAGs). The state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa. Thus, the act of the police in collecting information on individuals suspected of maintaining PAGs, such as Gamboa, and in sharing and forwarding such information to a government body tasked to investigate PAGs was not an unlawful act that violated or threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or security. The fact that the PNP released information to the government investigating commission without prior communication to Gamboa and without affording her the opportunity to refute the same cannot be interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to privacy since that act is an inherent and crucial component of intelligence-gathering and investigation. (Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012) The right to privacy is not absolute. It may succumb to an opposing or overriding state interest deemed legitimate and compelling. (Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012) RIGHTS UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION Not applicable in administrative investigations. Rights in custodial interrogation apply only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation. Thus, an employee’s written statement given during an administrative inquiry conducted by an employer in connection with an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in the course of his employment -- is admissible as evidence against the employee, even if he was not assisted by a lawyer when he signed the written statement. (Tanenggee v. People, G.R. No. 179448, June 26, 2013) RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION Mandatory drug testing for those arrested: when invalid. Mandatory drug testing of a person arrested for alleged extortion violates a person’s right to privacy guaranteed under constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures, 15 | P a g e

and the right against self-incrimination. The constitutional right against selfincrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. However, a drug test result is immaterial evidence in prosecuting non-drug offenses. Moreover, to impose mandatory drug testing on the accused for all persons arrested regardless of the crime or offense for which the arrest was made is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution. We cannot condone drug testing of all arrested persons regardless of the crime or offense for which the arrest is being made. (Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014) OTHER RIGHTS Academic freedom gives institutions of higher learning the right to impose disciplinary sanctions, which includes the power to dismiss or expel students who violate disciplinary rules. The power to discipline students is subsumed in the academic freedom to determine what may be taught, how it shall be taught and who may be admitted to study. (Cudia v. The Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy, G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015)

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWERS Prior opportunity to be heard is required before an administrative agency enforces rules and regulations that substantially adds to or increases the burden of those governed. Thus, the Comelec should have conducted prior hearings before promulgating the resolution on aggregate-based air time limits for political advertising, as this administrative rule introduces a radical change, and adversely affects, or imposes a heavy and substantial burden on the citizenry. Consequently, the new Comelec resolution is ineffectual. (GMA Network v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014) QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS The essence of due process as applied to administrative proceedings means a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In administrative proceedings, a formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary, and technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied. Also, the presence of counsel is not indispensable in the conduct of administrative proceedings. Defects in procedural due process may be cured when the party has been afforded the opportunity to appeal or to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. (Vivo v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, G.R. No. 187854, November 12, 2013)

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A party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of petitioner’s capacity to represent herself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. (Carbonel v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 187689, September 7, 2010) The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative powers. Adjudication signifies the exercise of the power to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties. Hence, if the only purpose of an investigation is to evaluate the evidence submitted to an agency based on the facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial discretion and judgment. (Encinas v. PO1 Agustin and PO1 Caubang, G.R. No. 187317, April 11, 2013) The results of a fact-finding investigation is not a “judgment on the merits” for purposes of the application of the doctrine of res judicata. A fact-finding investigation for purposes of determining whether a formal charge for an administrative offense should be filed is an exercise of administrative powers, not judicial or quasi-judicial powers, as such investigation is not an adjudication upon the rights, obligations, or liabilities of the parties involved. (Encinas v. PO1 Agustin and PO1 Caubang, G.R. No. 187317, April 11, 2013)

THE LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS NEPOTISM The prohibition against nepotism applies to appointments made by a group of individuals acting as a body. A relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of a member of the body that is the appointing authority (such as the Civil Service Commission) cannot be appointed by such body. (Civil Service Commission v. Cortes, G.R. No. 200103, April 23, 2014) LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS The Arias Doctrine: Heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. There should be other grounds than the mere signature or approval appearing on a voucher to sustain a conspiracy charge and conviction. Even if the head of office erred in his assessment of the extrinsic and intrinsic validity of the documents presented to him for endorsement, his act is all the same imbued with good faith because the otherwise faulty reliance upon his subordinates. (Jaca v. People, G.R. No. 166967, January 28, 2013)

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Exception to the Arias Doctrine: If there are peculiar circumstances that should have prompted a head of office to exercise a higher degree of circumspection, he must go beyond what his subordinates had prepared or recommended. (Rivera v. People, G.R. No. 156577, December 3, 2014) The Arias Doctrine will not apply if the documents in question bore irregularities too evident too ignore. In such case, the head of office must exercise a higher degree of circumspection, and go beyond what their subordinates had prepared. (Lihaylihay v. People, G.R. No. 191219, July 31, 2013) The Arias Doctrine applies only to heads of offices, not to public officials whose duty is to examine each voucher to ascertain whether it was proper to sign it. (Bacasmas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 189343, July 10, 2013) The Arias Doctrine applies only where the head of an office is being held to answer for his act of relying on the acts of his subordinate. It is not applicable when the head of an office is being held liable for relying on other independent offices. (Jaca v. People, G.R. No. 166967, January 28, 2013)

ELECTION LAW JURISDICTION OF ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS Party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of Representatives; once the party or organization has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins (Abayon v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 189466, February 11, 2010) The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) has no jurisdiction to rule on the alleged nullity of naturalization of the father of a Member of the House. To rule otherwise would operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father which is not permissible. (Villando v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149, August 23, 2011) The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) has no jurisdiction over an action wherein an individual seeks to be seated as the second nominee of a winning party list organization, as such action is not an election protest nor an action for quo warranto. (Lokin v. Comelec, G.R. Nos. 179431-32, June 22, 2010) JURISDICTION OF THE COMELEC The Supreme Court has no power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC. (Cagas v. Comelec, G.R. No. 194139, January 24, 2012) 18 | P a g e

When the COMELEC is exercising its quasi-judicial powers such as in an appeal from an election protest decided by a trial court, the Commission must decide the case first in division, and en banc only upon motion for reconsideration. (Eriguel v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190526, February 26, 2010) A decision, order or resolution of a division of the Comelec must be reviewed by the Comelec en banc via a motion for reconsideration before the final en banc decision may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari. (Cagas v. Comelec, G.R. No. 194139, January 24, 2012) DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES An allegedly false nickname in the CoC is not a “material misrepresentation” that is a ground to cancel or deny due course to a CoC under Section 78. (Villafuerte v. Comelec, 25 February 2014) Stating under oath in the CoC that one is eligible to run for public office, when one is not, is a false material misrepresentation. (Hayudini v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 207900, April 22, 2014) Opportunity to be heard is required before cancellation of or denial of due course to a CoC. (Cerafica v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205136, December 2, 2014) For cancellation of/denial of due course to a CoC for material misrepresentation, there must be a verified petition. (Cerafica v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205136, December 2, 2014) Cancellation of CoCs: In the exercise of quasi-judicial functions of the Comelec, the Comelec in Division should first decide the case. (Cerafica v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205136, December 2, 2014) Nuisance candidates: Comelec must give the candidate opportunity to be heard before cancellation of/denial of due course of CoC. (Timbol v. Comelec, G.R. No. 206004, February 24, 2015) PARTY-LIST ELECTIONS CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENT FOR ELECTION Natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship must (1) take the oath of allegiance under RA 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the

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filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections. (Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 198742, August 10, 2012) The mere act of running for public offices does not suffice to serve as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. (Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 198742, August 10, 2012) Effect of use of foreign passport after oath of renunciation: Recantation of oath of renunciation. (Maquiling v. Comelec, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013) RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT FOR ELECTION There is no hard and fast rule to determine a candidate’s compliance with residency requirement since the question of residence is a question of intention. Still, jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time. To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence somewhere. (Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 191970, April 24, 2012) A candidate is not required to have a house in a community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate own the house where he lives would make property a qualification for public office. (Jalosjos v. Comelec, G.R. No. 191970, April 24, 2012) Similarly, the fact that a candidate has no registered property under his name does not belie his actual residence because property ownership is not among the qualifications required of candidates for local election. It is enough that he should live in the locality, even in a rented house or that of a friend or relative. To use ownership of property in the district as the determinative indicium of permanence of domicile or residence implies that only the landed can establish compliance with the residency requirement. (Jalover v. Osmena, G.R. No. 209286, September 23, 2014) The law does not require a person to be in his home twenty-four (24) hours a day, seven (7) days a week, to fulfill the residency requirement. (Jalover v. Osmena, G.R. No. 209286, September 23, 2014) Subjective non-legal standards (such as, a man of stature does not live in a dilapidated house or a feedmill) cannot be used to determine residence. (Jalover v. Osmena, G.R. No. 209286, September 23, 2014) 20 | P a g e

Winning the elections cannot cure the defect of candidacy; disqualification is not a matter of popularity. (Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 198742, August 10, 2012) Burden of proof: To successfully challenge a winning candidate’s qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles. (Jalover v. Osmena, G.R. No. 209286, September 23, 2014) Rule in case of doubt as to the winning candidate’s qualification: Courts must respect the decision of the people and resolve all doubts in favor of the people’s manifest will. (Jalosjos v. Comelec, G.R. No. 191970, April 24, 2012) THREE-TERM LIMIT RULE The three-term limit rule must be strictly applied. In case of legislative reapportionment, where the district is practically the same as the district that previously elected the same candidate, the three-term limit rule applies. (Naval v. Comelec, G.R. No. 207851, July 8, 2014)

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS POWER OF LGUS TO ENACT ORDINANCE An ordinance to promote the general welfare in terms of economic benefits cannot override the very basic rights to life, security and safety of the people. In the absence of any convincing reason that the life, security and safety of the inhabitants of Manila are no longer put at risk by the presence of the oil depots in Pandacan, Ordinance No. 8187 in favor of the retention of the oil depots is invalid and unconstitutional. (Social Justice Society Officers v. Lim, G.R. No. 187836, November 25, 2014) LGU PARTICIPATION IN NATIONAL PROJECTS National government agencies must conduct prior public consultation and secure the approval of local government units for national government projects affecting the ecological balance of local communities, pursuant to Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government Code. The lack of prior public consultation and approval is not corrected by the subsequent endorsement. (Boracay Foundation v. Province of Aklan, G.R. No. 196870, June 26, 2012) CONVERSION OF LGUS

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Why conversion of a component city into a Highly Urbanized City (HUC) requires approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite for the entire province: The creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units involve a material change in the political and economic rights of the local government units directly affected as well as the people therein. Thus, the Constitution requires the approval of the people “in the political units directly affected.” Similarly, conversion will lead to material change in the political and economic rights of not only of the component city but of the entire province. (Umali v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 203974, April 22, 2014) The conversion of a component city into an HUC is substantial alteration of boundaries. “Boundaries” should not be limited to the mere physical one, but also to its political boundaries. With the city’s newfound autonomy, it will be free from the oversight powers of the province, which, in effect, reduces the territorial jurisdiction of the latter. (Umali v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 203974, April 22, 2014) LGUs whose boundaries are to be altered and whose economy would be affected are entitled to participate in the plebiscite to approve the conversion. (Umali v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 203974, April 22, 2014) Economic impact of conversion: The conversion of a component city into a highly urbanized city will adversely impact the economic rights of the province, as this will result in reduction of the province’s Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA), and reduction in tax collections due to reduction of taxing jurisdiction, and loss of shares in provincial taxes imposed in the city to be converted. (Umali v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 203974, April 22, 2014) Political impact of conversion: Administrative supervision of the province over the city will effectively be revoked upon conversion. (Umali v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 203974, April 22, 2014)

INTERNATIONAL LAW IMMUNITY OF A FOREIGN STATE FROM SUIT A complaint based on an act of a foreign government done by its foreign agent is barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suits without its consent. Thus, Philippine courts cannot have jurisdiction over US Navy officers for acts committed in their official capacity. (Arigo v. Swift, G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014)

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IMMUNITY OF WARSHIPS FROM THE JURISDICTION OF COASTAL STATES: EXCEPTION UNDER UNCLOS Under UNCLOS, the flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage. (Arigo v. Swift, G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014)

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