2016 Case Updates in Criminal Law Criminal Procedure and Evidence

April 15, 2017 | Author: Ozkar Kalashnikov | Category: N/A
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2016 CASE UPDATES Part One

CRIMINAL LAW MURDER Murder is defined under Article 24810 of the Revised Penal Code as the unlawful killing of a person, which is not parricide or infanticide, attended by circumstances such as treachery or evident premeditation. People of the Philippines v. Zaldy Salahuddin G. R. No. 206291 18 January 2016 Treachery The essence of treachery is the sudden attack by the aggressor without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor. Two conditions must concur for treachery to exist, namely, (a) the employment of means of execution gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means or method of execution was deliberately and consciously adopted. People of the Philippines v. Zaldy Salahuddin G. R. No. 206291 18 January 2016 In this case, the trial court correctly ruled that the fatal shooting of Atty. Segundo was attended by treachery because appellant shot the said victim suddenly and without any warning with a deadly weapon, thus: x x x Atty. Segundo G. Sotto, Jr., who was driving his jeep with his teenage niece as passenger sitting on his right side on the front seat, was totally unaware that he will be treacherously shot just 200 meters away from his residence. He was unarmed and was not given any opportunity to defend himself or to escape from the deadly assault. After he was hit when the gunman fired the first two shots at him and his niece and after he lost control of his jeep which bumped an interlink wire fence and stopped, he was again shot three times by the gunman. People of the Philippines v. Zaldy Salahuddin G. R. No. 206291 18 January 2016

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Evident Premeditation The essence of evident premeditation, on the other hand, is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. For it to be appreciated, the following must be proven beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of his act. People of the Philippines v. Zaldy Salahuddin G. R. No. 206291 18 January 2016 As aptly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, the trial court conceded that the specific time when the accused determined to commit the crime, and the interval between such determination and execution, cannot be determined. After a careful review of the records, the Court agrees with the CA’s finding that no evidence was adduced to prove the first and third elements of evident premeditation. People of the Philippines v. Zaldy Salahuddin G. R. No. 206291 18 January 2016 Presentation of Firearm Unnecessary to Prove Special Aggravating Circumstance of Use of Firearm In People v. Dulay [561 Phil. 764, 771-772 (2007)] the Court ruled that the existence of the firearm can be established by testimony even without the presentation of the firearm. In the said case, it was established that the victims sustained and died from gunshot wounds, and the ballistic examinations of the slugs recovered from the place of the incident showed that they were fired from a .30 carbine rifle and a .38 caliber firearm. The prosecution witnesses positively identified appellant therein as one of those who were holding a long firearm, and it was also proven that he was not a licensed firearm holder. Hence, the trial court and the CA correctly appreciated the use of unlicensed firearm as a special aggravating circumstance. People of the Philippines v. Zaldy Salahuddin G. R. No. 206291 18 January 2016 Despite the result of the ballistic examination that the slugs test-fired from the gun recovered from appellant when he was arrested, were different from the 2 slugs recovered from the body of the victim, the prosecution was still able to establish the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm in the commission of the crime. Given that the actual firearm used by appellant in shooting the victim was not presented in court, the prosecution has nonetheless proven through the testimony of Delos Reyes that the firearm used by appellant was a “short gun.” It has also established through the testimony of SPO3 Ronnie 2

Eleuterio and the Certification35 from the FESAGS of the PNP that appellant was not issued a firearms license, a permit to carry or permit to transport firearms outside of residence. People of the Philippines v. Zaldy Salahuddin G. R. No. 206291 18 January 2016 Notably, the term unlicensed firearm includes the unauthorized use of licensed firearm in the commission of the crime, under Section 536 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8294.37 Assuming arguendo that the actual firearm used by appellant was licensed, he still failed to prove that he was so authorized to use it by the duly licensed owner. The prosecution having proven that appellant was not issued a firearms license or permit to carry or permit to transport firearms, the burden of evidence is then shifted to appellant to prove his authorization to use the firearm. All told, the trial court correctly appreciated the presence of the said aggravating circumstance in imposing penalty against appellant. People of the Philippines v. Zaldy Salahuddin G. R. No. 206291 18 January 2016 Use of Motor Vehicle as Special Aggravating Circumstance Meanwhile, the use of a motor vehicle is aggravating when it is used either to commit the crime or to facilitate escape, but not when the use thereof was merely incidental and was not purposely sought to facilitate the commission of the offense or to render the escape of the offender easier and his apprehension difficult. In People v. Herbias [333 Phil. 422 (1996)] the Court held: "The use of motor vehicle may likewise be considered as an aggravating circumstance that attended the commission of the crime. The records show that assailants used a motorcycle in trailing and overtaking the jeepney driven by Saladio after which appellant’s back rider mercilessly riddled with his bullets the body of Jeremias. There is no doubt that the motorcycle was used as a means to commit the crime and to facilitate their escape after they accomplished their mission." People of the Philippines v. Zaldy Salahuddin G. R. No. 206291 18 January 2016 The prosecution has proven through the testimonies of Java and Delos Reyes that appellant was riding a motorcycle behind the unknown driver when he twice shot Atty. Segundo who thus lost control of his owner-type jeep and crashed into the interlink wire fence beside the road. The motorcycle then stopped near the jeep, and appellant shot Atty. Segundo again thrice, before leaving the crime scene aboard the motorcycle. Clearly, the trial court correctly appreciated the generic aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle in the commission of the crime. People of the Philippines v. Zaldy Salahuddin G. R. No. 206291 18 January 2016

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₱ 100,000 as Current Rate of Civil Indemnity for Murder In addition, the award of civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. Even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed because of the prohibition in R.A. No. 9346, the award of civil indemnity of ₱ 75,000.00 is proper, because it is not dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the offense. In recent jurisprudence, the Court has increased the award of civil indemnity from ₱75,000.00 to ₱100,000.00. People of the Philippines v. Zaldy Salahuddin G. R. No. 206291 18 January 2016 Moreover, in line with current jurisprudence48 on heinous crimes where the imposable penalty is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to R.A. No. 9346, the award for moral damages has been increased from ₱75,000.00 to ₱100,000.00, while the award for exemplary damages has likewise been increased from ₱30,000.00 to ₱100,000.00. Hence, while the CA correctly affirmed the trial court’s award of ₱100,000.00 as moral damages, the award of civil indemnity and exemplary damages in the amounts of ₱50,000.00 each should be both increased to ₱100,000.00. The award of moral damages is called for in view of the violent death of the victim, and these do not require any allegation or proof of the emotional sufferings of the heirs. The award of exemplary damages is also proper because of the presence of the aggravating circumstances of use of unlicensed firearm and use of a motor vehicle in the commission of the crime. People of the Philippines v. Zaldy Salahuddin G. R. No. 206291 18 January 2016 PARRICIDE Violence between husband and wife is nothing new. Marital violence that leads to spousal killing is parricide. Perceived as a horrific kind of killing, penal laws impose a harsher penalty on persons found guilty of parricide compared to those who commit the felony of homicide. People of the Philippines v. Manuel Macal G. R. No. 211062 13 January 2016 Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendants or other descendants, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. Among the three requisites, the relationship between the offender and the victim is the most crucial. This relationship is what actually distinguishes the crime of parricide from homicide. People of the Philippines v. Manuel Macal G. R. No. 211062 13 January 2016

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In parricide involving spouses, the best proof of the relationship between the offender and victim is their marriage certificate. Oral evidence may also be considered in proving the relationship between the two as long as such proof is not contested. People of the Philippines v. Manuel Macal G. R. No. 211062 13 January 2016 JUSTIFYING AND EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES Self-Defense Basic is the rule that in every criminal case, the burden of proving the guilt of the accused falls upon the prosecution which has the duty of establishing all the essential elements of the crime. However, in cases where the accused interposes the justifying circumstance of self-defense, this prosecutorial burden is' shifted to the accused who himself must prove all the indispensable ingredients of such defense, to wit: (I) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Consequently, weighed against the unshaken, straightforward and positive declaration of eyewitness Vicente that the victim was suddenly stabbed thrice without any provocation, the self-serving, uncorroborated and doubtful accused-appellant's claim of selfdefense deserves no consideration. People of the Philippines v. Nestor Roxas G. R. No. 218396 10 February 2016 After taking into account the location and the number of stab wounds sustained by the victim, the accused-appellant's claim of self-defense further crumbles. To reiterate, the first stab blow hit Severino's back jibing with Vicente's assertion that the former was stabbed from behind. Then, when the victim was totally caught by surprise with the initial attack, the second and third stab blows were delivered. Additionally, the number of wounds suffered by Severino invalidates the accused-appellant's allegation that he was only defending himself for the number of wounds inflicted are rather demonstrative of deliberate and criminal intent to end the life of the victim. Likewise weakening accusedappellant's contention that he acted in self-defense was his behavior immediately after the incident. In the case at bar, the accused-appellant himself admitted that upon seeing the victim lying on the ground, he boarded a jeep to go to his sister's place in San Pascual, Batangas before moving to Bicol where he hid from the authorities for several years. The accused-appellant's flight negates his plea of selfdefense and indicates his guilt. People of the Philippines v. Nestor Roxas G. R. No. 218396 10 February 2016

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Defense of Accident Presupposes Lack of Intent to Kill The defense invoked Article 12 paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code to release the accused-appellant from criminal liability. Pursuant to said provision, the essential requisites of accident as an exempting circumstance are: (1) a person is performing a lawful act; (2) with due care; (3) he causes an injury to another by mere accident; and (4) without fault or intention of causing it. A close scrutiny of the transcripts of stenographic notes would reveal that the accused-appellant was not performing a lawful act at the time Auria was stabbed. This can be gathered from the narration of the accused appellant during cross-examination conducted by Prosecutor Percival Dolina. People of the Philippines v. Manuel Macal G. R. No. 211062 13 January 2016 The defense of accident presupposes lack of intention to kill. This certainly does not hold true in the instant case based on the aforequoted testimony of the accused-appellant. Moreover, the prosecution witnesses, who were then within hearing distance from the bedroom, testified that they distinctly heard Auria screaming that she was going to be killed by the accused-appellant. Given these testimonies, the accused-appellant’s defense of accident is negated as he was carrying out an unlawful act at the time of the incident. It also bears stressing that in raising the defense of accident, the accused-appellant had the inescapable burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, of accidental infliction of injuries on the victim. In so doing, the accused-appellant had to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution’s evidence. As aptly pointed out by the CA, the defense failed to discharge the burden of proving the elements of the exempting circumstance of accident that would otherwise free the accused-appellant from culpability. Aside from the accused appellant’s self-serving statement, no other proof was adduced that will substantiate his defense of accidental stabbing. People of the Philippines v. Manuel Macal G. R. No. 211062 13 January 2016 Further, contrary to what the accused-appellant wants the Court to believe, his actuations closely after Auria was stabbed tell a different story. If Auria was really accidentally stabbed by him, the accused-appellant’s natural reaction would have been to take the lead in bringing his wife to a hospital. Instead, his priority was to come up with an improvised bladed weapon that he could use to hurt himself. Additionally, the fact that the accused-appellant ran away from the crime scene leaving Auria’s relatives and neighbors to tend to his dying wife is indicative of his guilt. People of the Philippines v. Manuel Macal G. R. No. 211062 13 January 2016

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Absolutory Cause Article 247 is an absolutory cause that recognizes the commission of a crime but for reasons of public policy and sentiment there is no penalty imposed. The defense must prove the concurrence of the following elements: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter; and (3) that he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse. Among the three elements, the most vital is that the accused-appellant must prove to the court that he killed his wife and her paramour in the act of sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter. Having admitted the stabbing, the burden of proof is shifted to the defense to show the applicability of Article 247. As disclosed by the accused-appellant, when he saw Auria with a man, the two were just seated beside each other and were simply talking. Evidently, the absolutory cause embodied in Article 247 is not applicable in the present case. People of the Philippines v. Manuel Macal G. R. No. 211062 13 January 2016 RAPE UNDER ARTICLE 266-A OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE Elements of Qualified Rape For a charge of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the prosecution must prove that (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he accomplished such act through force, threat or intimidation, when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age or was demented. Carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape under the aforesaid provisions of law. Proof of force or intimidation is not necessary, as a mental retardate is not capable of giving consent to a sexual act. What needs to be proven are the facts of sexual congress between the accused and the victim, and the mental retardation of the latter. In the present case, the prosecution successfully established that the first rape indeed took place and that the appellant was the malefactor. People of the Philippines v. Alexander "Sander" Bangsoy G. R. No. 204047 13 January 2016 First, AAA positively identified the appellant as the person who inserted his penis into her vagina, causing her pain. xxx Notably, both the RTC and CA found AAA’s testimony credible and convincing. We see no reason to disbelieve the testimony of AAA either with respect to the first rape, which the trial and appellate courts found to be credible and straightforward. Given the victim’s mental condition, it is highly improbable that she could have concocted or fabricated a rape charge against the accused. Neither was it possible that she was

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coached into testifying against appellant considering her limited intellect. People of the Philippines v. Alexander "Sander" Bangsoy G. R. No. 204047 13 January 2016 Second, the prosecution successfully established AAA’s mental condition. Maribel Tico, a psychologist from the Philippine Mental Health Association, testified that she conducted a mental status examination on AAA, and found her to be suffering from mild mental retardation “with a corresponding [m]ental [a]ge of 7 years and 1 month.” People of the Philippines v. Alexander "Sander" Bangsoy G. R. No. 204047 13 January 2016 When a woman says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. Thus, the lone testimony of the victim in a prosecution for rape, if credible, is sufficient to sustain a verdict of conviction. The rationale is that, owing to the nature of the offense, the only evidence that can be adduced to establish the guilt of the accused is usually only the offended party's testimony. People of the Philippines v. Reynaldo Umanito G. R. No. 208648 13 April 2016 That AAA's credibility is doubtful due to the fact that she did not see the perpetrator's face, and only recognized him for his built, voice, and smell, is of no moment. As We have held before, a person may be identified by these factors for once a person has gained familiarity with another, identification is quite an easy task. Even though a witness may not have seen the accused at a particular incident for reasons such as the darkness of the night, hearing the sound of the voice of such accused is still an acceptable means of identification where it is established that the witness and the accused knew each other personally and closely for a number of years. Here, it cannot be denied that AAA personally knew appellant's built, voice, and smell, having lived with him her entire life. People of the Philippines v. Eliseo Villamor G. R. No. 202187 10 February 2016 Neither does AAA's silence on the incident nor failure to shout or wake up her siblings affect her credibility. The Court had consistently found that there is no uniform behavior that can be expected from those who had the misfortune of being sexually molested. While there are some who may have found the courage early on to reveal the abuse they experienced, there are those who have opted to initially keep the harrowing ordeal to themselves and attempted to move on with their lives. This is because a rape victim's actions are oftentimes overwhelmed by fear rather than by reason. The perpetrator of the rape hopes to build a climate of extreme psychological terror, which would numb his victim into silence and submissiveness. In fact, incestuous rape further magnifies this terror for the perpetrator in these cases, such as the victim's father, is a person normally expected to give solace and protection to the victim. Moreover, in incest, access to

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the victim is guaranteed by the blood relationship, magnifying the sense of helplessness and the degree of fear. People of the Philippines v. Eliseo Villamor G. R. No. 202187 10 February 2016. Settled is the rule that testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has, in fact, been committed. When the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. Considering that AAA was only four (4) years old when she was raped and was only five (5) years old when she took the witness stand, she could not have invented a horrible story. For her to fabricate the facts of rape and to charge the accused falsely of a crime is certainly beyond her mental capacity. People of the Philippines v. Victor Padit G. R. No. 202978 1 February 2016 Rape is a crime that is almost always committed in isolation or in secret, usually leaving only the victim to testify about the commission of the crime. Thus, the accused may be convicted of rape on the basis of the victim's sole testimony provided such testimony is logical, credible, consistent and convincing. Moreover, the testimony of a young rape victim is given full weight and credence considering that her denunciation against him for rape would necessarily expose herself and her family to shame and perhaps ridicule. People of the Philippines v. Allan Menaling G. R. No. 208676 13 April 2016 The fact that the offended party is a minor does not mean that she is incapable of perceiving and of making her perception known. Children of sound mind are likely to be more observant of incidents which take place within their view than older persons, and their testimonies are likely more correct in detail than that of older persons. In fact, AAA had consistently, positively, and categorically identified accused-appellant as her abuser. Her testimony was direct, candid, and replete with details of the rape. People of the Philippines v. Victor Padit G. R. No. 202978 1 February 2016 In the case of mentally-deficient rape victims, mental retardation per se does not affect credibility. A mental retardate may be a credible witness. The acceptance of her testimony depends on the quality of her perceptions and the manner she can make them known to the court. People of the Philippines v. Reynaldo Umanito G. R. No. 208648 13 April 2016

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Rape can be established by the sole testimony of the victim that is credible and untainted with serious uncertainty. With more reason is this true when the medical findings supported the testimony of the victim, as in this case. When the victim's testimony of her violation is corroborated by the physical evidence of penetration, there is sufficient foundation for concluding that there was carnal knowledge. People of the Philippines v. Allan Rodriguez G. R. No. 208406 29 February 2016 At any rate, it is not proper to judge by adult norms of behavior the actions of children who have undergone traumatic experiences. Certainly, a child – more so in the case of AAA who is suffering from mild mental retardation – cannot be expected to act like an adult or do what may be expected of mature people under similar circumstances. People of the Philippines v. Alexander "Sander" Bangsoy G. R. No. 204047 13 January 2016 This Court has ruled that since human memory is fickle and prone to the stresses of emotions, accuracy in a testimonial account has never been used as a standard in testing the credibility of a witness. Moreover, the Court considers AAA's alleged inconsistency in testifying, with respect to the place where the first and third rapes were committed, as a minor inconsistency which should generally be given liberal appreciation considering that the place of the commission of the crime in rape cases is after all not an essential element thereof. What is decisive is that accused appellant's commission of the crime charged has been sufficiently proved. People of the Philippines v. Ricardo Lagbo G. R. No. 207535 10 February 2016 Finally, we find no merit in the appellant’s contention that the absence of lacerations in the victim’s hymen negated sexual intercourse. The rupture of the hymen is not an essential and material fact in rape cases; it only further confirms that the vagina has been penetrated and damaged in the process. Additionally, in the present case, the genital examination on AAA was conducted on May 17, 2005, or more than one year after the rape took place. At any rate, Dr. Marjorie Rebujio, Medical officer III at the Benguet General Hospital, clarified that the lack of hymenal injuries does not mean that no sexual abuse took place. Dr. Rebujio further explained that the hymen could heal fast and that it could go back to its normal structure. People of the Philippines v. Alexander "Sander" Bangsoy G. R. No. 204047 13 January 2016 Proof of Victim’s Minority Essential in Prosecution for Qualified Rape The appellant cannot be held guilty crime of rape in its qualified form. Article 266-B of the RPC provides that rape is qualified when certain circumstances are present in its commission, such as when the victim is under eighteen ( 18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by

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consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. Hence, in a conviction for qualified rape, the prosecution must prove that ( 1) the victim is under eighteen years of age at the time of the rape, and (2) the offender is a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the victim. In other words, it is the concurrence of both the minority of the victim and her relationship with the offender that will be considered as a special qualifying circumstance, raising the penalty to the supreme penalty of death. Thus, it is imperative that the circumstance of minority and relationship be proved conclusively and indubitably as the crime itself; otherwise, the crime shall be considered simple rape warranting the imposition of the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua. If, at trial, both the age of the victim and her relationship with the offender are not proven beyond reasonable doubt, the death penalty cannot be imposed. People of the Philippines v. Reman Sariego G. R. No. 203322 24 February 2016 Thus, the best evidence to prove the age of a person is the original birth certificate or certified true copy thereof, and in their absence, similar authentic documents may be presented such as baptismal certificates and school records. If the original or certified true copy of the birth certificate is not available, credible testimonies of the victim's mother or a member of the family may be sufficient under certain circumstances. In the event that both the birth certificate or other authentic documents and· the testimonies of the victim's mother or other qualified relative are unavailable, the testimony of the victim may be admitted in evidence provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. People of the Philippines v. Reman Sariego G. R. No. 203322 24 February 2016 Penalty for Qualified Rape Sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate with a mental age of below 12 years old constitutes statutory rape.22 Notably, AAA was also below 12 years old at the time of the incident, as evidenced by the records showing that she was born on March 1, 1993. Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the death penalty shall be imposed when the victim is below 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. In the present case, however, the relationship of the appellant to the victim was not alleged. People of the Philippines v. Alexander "Sander" Bangsoy G. R. No. 204047 13 January 2016 Nonetheless, the Information averred that AAA was a mental retardate and that the appellant knew of this mental retardation. These circumstances raised the crime from statutory rape to qualified rape or statutory rape in its qualified form under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. Since the death penalty cannot be

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imposed in view of Republic Act No. 9346 (An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines), the CA correctly affirmed the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole imposed by the RTC on the appellant. People of the Philippines v. Alexander "Sander" Bangsoy G. R. No. 204047 13 January 2016 ₱ 100,000.00 as Current Rate of Civil Indemnity for Rape In People v. Gambao, [G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013, 706 SCRA 508, 533]. the Court set the minimum indemnity and damages where facts warranted the imposition of the death penalty, if not for prohibition thereof by R.A. No. 9346, as follows: (1) ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) ₱100,000.00 as moral damages which the victim is assumed to have suffered and thus needs no proof; and (3) ₱l00,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example for the public good. We thus increase the awarded civil indemnity from ₱75,000.00 to ₱l00,000.00; moral damages from ₱75,000.00 to ₱l00,000.00; and the exemplary damages from ₱30,000.00 to ₱l00,000.00. People of the Philippines v. Alexander "Sander" Bangsoy G. R. No. 204047 13 January 2016 ANTI-CARNAPPING ACT Three amendments have been made to the original Section 14 of the AntiCamapping Act: (1) the penalty of life imprisonment was changed to reclusion perpetua, (2) the inclusion of rape, and (3) the change of the phrase "in the commission of the carnapping" to "in the course of the·commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof" This third amendment clarifies the law's intent to make the offense a special complex crime, by way of analogy vis-a-vis paragraphs 1 to 4 of the Revised Penal Code on robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons. Thus, under the last clause of Section 14 of the AntiCarnapping Act, the prosecution has to prove the essential requisites of carnapping and of the homicide or murder of the victim, and more importantly, it must show that the original criminal design of the culprit was carnapping and that the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof" Consequently, where the elements of carnapping are not proved, the provisions of the Anti-Camapping Act would cease to be applicable and the homicide or murder (if proven) would be punishable under the Revised Penal Code. People of the Philippines v. Fabian Urzais et al G. R. No. 207662 13 April 2016 VIOLATION OF THE GUN BAN

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In violations of the Gun Ban, the accused must be “in possession of a firearm…outside of his residence within the period of the election gun ban imposed by the COMELEC sans authority”. In Abenes v. Court of Appeals [544 Phil. 614 (2007)] this court enumerated the elements for a violation of the Gun Ban: “1) the person is bearing, carrying, or transporting firearms or other deadly weapons; 2) such possession occurs during the election period; and, 3) the weapon is carried in a public place.” This court also ruled that under the Omnibus Election Code, the burden to show that he or she has a written authority to possess a firearm is on the accused. We find that the prosecution was able to establish all the requisites for violation of the Gun Ban. The firearms were found inside petitioner’s bag. Petitioner did not present any valid authorization to carry the firearms outside his residence during the period designated by the Commission on Elections. He was carrying the firearms in the Cebu Domestic Port, which was a public place. Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz v. People of the Philippines, G. R. No. 209387 11 January 2016 VIOLATION OF COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002 Elements of Illegal Sale of Shabu For the successful prosecution of a case for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must be proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. xxx The dangerous drug itself, the shabu in this case, constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and in sustaining a conviction under R.A. No. 9165, the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti must definitely be shown to have been preserved. People of the Philippines v. Ronaldo Casacop G. R. No. 210454 13 January 2016 Elements of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs On the other hand, in prosecuting a case for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following elements must concur: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified as a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug. People of the Philippines v. Ronaldo Casacop G. R. No. 210454 13 January 2016 Elements of Illegal Transport of Dangerous Drugs The essential element of the charge of illegal transportation of dangerous drugs is the movement of the dangerous drug from one place to another. As defined in the case of People v. Mariacos [635 Phil. 315 (2010)] "transport" means

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"to carry or convey from one place to another." People of the Philippines v. Juan Asislo G. R. No. 206224 18 January 2016 There is no definitive moment when an accused "transports" a prohibited drug. When the circumstances establish the purpose of an accused to transport and the fact of transportation itself, there should be no question as to the perpetration of the criminal act. The fact that there is actual conveyance suffices to support a finding that the act of transporting was committed. People of the Philippines v. Juan Asislo G. R. No. 206224 18 January 2016 Elements of Illegal Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Appratus and Other Drug Paraphernalia The elements of illegal possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs under Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 are: (1) possession or control by the accused of any equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any dangerous drug into the body; and (2) such possession is not authorized by law. In this case, the prosecution has convincingly established that Saraum was in possession of drug paraphernalia, particularly aluminum tin foil, rolled tissue paper, and lighter, all of which were offered and admitted in evidence. Amado Saraum v. People of the Philippines, G. R. No. 205472 25 January 2016 Coordination with PDEA is not Required in a Buy-Bust Operation The appellant contends that the belated submission of the pre-operation report to the PDEA after the buy-bust operation violates RA 9165; and that the non-presentation of the unnamed “civilian informant” who allegedly brokered the transaction with him casts serious doubts on the factuality of the buy-bust operation. There is no merit in this contention. xxx [C]coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable requirement before police authorities may carry out a buybust operation; that in fact, even the absence of coordination with the PDEA will not invalidate a buy-bust operation. People of the Philippines v. Fernando Ranche Havana G. R. No. 198450 11 January 2016 Presentation of Informant Unnecessary in Prosecution of Drug-Related Cases Neither is the presentation of the informant indispensable to the success in prosecuting drug-related cases. Informers are almost always never presented in court because of the need to preserve their invaluable service to the police. Unless their testimony is absolutely essential to the conviction of the accused, their testimony may be dispensed with since their narrations would be merely

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corroborative to the testimonies of the buy-bust team. People of the Philippines v. Fernando Ranche Havana G. R. No. 198450 11 January 2016 Faithful adherence to the Chain of Custody Rule Vital in Prosecution of Drug-Related Cases It is material in every prosecution for the illegal sale of a prohibited drug that the drug, which is the corpus delicti, be presented as evidence in court. Hence, the identity of the prohibited drug must be established without any doubt. Even more than this, what must also be established is the fact that the substance bought during the buy-bust operation is the same substance offered in court as exhibit. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. People of the Philippines v. Anita Miranda G. R. No. 205639 18 January 2016 Statutory rules on preserving the chain of custody of confiscated prohibited drugs and related items are designed to ensure the integrity and reliability of the evidence to be presented against the accused. Their observance is the key to the successful prosecution· - of illegal possession or illegal sale of dangerous drugs. People of the Philippines v. Fernando Ranche Havana G. R. No. 198450 11 January 2016 Law enforcers should not trifle with the legal requirement to ensure integrity in the chain of custody of seized dangerous drugs and drug paraphernalia. This is especially true when only a miniscule amount of dangerous drugs is alleged to have been taken from the accused. Howard Lescano v. People of the Philippines G. R. No. 214490 13 January 2016 “In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be duly established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place; and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.” The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence beyond reasonable doubt plus the fact of its delivery and/or sale are both vital and essential to a judgment of conviction in a criminal case. And more than just the fact of sale, “[o]f prime importance therefore x x x is that the identity of the dangerous drug be likewise established beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, it must be established with unwavering exactitude that the dangerous drug presented in court as evidence against the accused is the same as that seized from him in the first place. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that in ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.” People of the Philippines v. Fernando Ranche Havana G. R. No. 198450 11 January 2016

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The Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, defines chain of custody as “duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping, to presentation in court for destruction.” People of the Philippines v. Fernando Ranche Havana G. R. No. 198450 11 January 2016 The links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy bust situation are as follows: (1) the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; (2) the turnover of the illegal drug seized to the investigating officer; (3) the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and ( 4) the turnover and submission of the illegal drug from the forensic chemist to the court. People of the Philippines v. Lee Quijano Enad G. R. No. 205764 3 February 2016 As the first step in the chain of custody, "marking" means the placing by the apprehending officer or the police poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the dangerous drug seized. It is meant to ensure that the objects seized are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually offered in evidence, as well as to protect innocent persons from dubious and concocted searches, and the apprehending officers from harassment suits based on planting of evidence. While Section 21 of R.A. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly specify a time frame for marking or the place where said marking should be done, the chain of custody rule requires that the marking should be done ( 1) in the presence of the apprehended violator, and (2) immediately upon confiscation. 17 Marking upon immediate confiscation contemplates even marking at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team. People of the Philippines v. Lee Quijano Enad G. R. No. 205764 3 February 2016 [W]hile the chain of custody should ideally be perfect [and unbroken], in reality it is not, ‘as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain.’” As such, what is of utmost importance “is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.” In the case at bench, this Court finds it exceedingly difficult to believe that the integrity and evidentiary value of the drug have been properly preserved by the apprehending officers. The inexplicable failure of the police officers to testify as to what they did with the alleged drug while in their respective possession resulted in a breach or break in the chain of custody of the drug. In some cases, the Court declared that the failure of the prosecution to offer the testimony of key witnesses to establish a sufficiently complete chain of custody of the shabu plus the irregular manner which plagued the handling of the evidence

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before the same was offered in court, whittles down the chances of the government to obtain a successful prosecution in a drug-related case. People of the Philippines v. Fernando Ranche Havana G. R. No. 198450 11 January 2016 More importantly, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were duly preserved as the chain of custody remained intact. The Court has ruled in People v. Enriquez [G.R. No. 197550, 25 September 2013] that the links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation are: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court. People of the Philippines v. Romel Sapitula G. R. No. 209212 10 February 2016 Effect of Non-Compliance with Procedural Requirements anent the Custody and Disposition of Seized Drugs Compliance with Section 21 of the Implementing Rules of RA 9165 As regards the items seized and subjected to marking, Section 21(1) of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, requires the performance of two (2) actions: physical inventory and photographing. Section 21(1) is specific as to when and where these actions must be done. As to when, it must be “immediately after seizure and confiscation.” As to where, it depends on whether the seizure was supported by a search warrant. If a search warrant was served, the physical inventory and photographing must be done at the exact same place that the search warrant is served. In case of warrantless seizures, these actions must be done “at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable.” Howard Lescano v. People of the Philippines G. R. No. 214490 13 January 2016 Moreover, Section 21(1) requires at least three (3) persons to be present during the physical inventory and photographing. These persons are: first, the accused or the person/s from whom the items were seized; second, an elected public official; and third, a representative of the National Prosecution Service. There are, however, alternatives to the first and the third. As to the first (i.e., the accused or the person/s from whom items were seized), there are two (2) alternatives: first, his or her representative; and second, his or her counsel. As to the representative of the National Prosecution Service, a representative of the media may be present in his or her place. Section 21 spells out matters that are imperative. “Even the doing of acts which ostensibly approximate compliance but 17

do not actually comply with the requirements of Section 21 does not suffice.” This is especially so when the prosecution claims that the seizure of drugs and drug paraphernalia is the result of carefully planned operations, as is the case here. Howard Lescano v. People of the Philippines G. R. No. 214490 13 January 2016 Here, apart from the utter failure of the prosecution to establish an unbroken chain of custody, yet another procedural lapse casts further uncertainty about the identity and integrity of the subject shabu. We refer to the noncompliance by the buy-bust team with the most rudimentary procedural safeguards relative to the custody and disposition of the seized item under Section 21(1) Article II of RA 9165. Here, the alleged apprehending team after the alleged initial custody and control of the drug, and after immediately seizing and confiscating the same, never ever made a physical inventory of the same, nor did it ever photograph the same in the presence of the appellant from whom the alleged item was confiscated. There was no physical inventory and photograph of the item allegedly seized from appellant. Neither was there any explanation offered for such failure. People of the Philippines v. Fernando Ranche Havana G. R. No. 198450 11 January 2016 While this Court in certain cases has tempered the mandate of strict compliance with the requisite under Section 21 of RA 9165, such liberality, as stated in the Implementing Rules and Regulations can be applied only when the evidentiary value and integrity of the illegal drug are properly preserved as we stressed in People v. Guru [G.R. No. 189808, October24, 2012, 684 SCRA 544, 558]. In the case at bar, the evidentiary value and integrity of the alleged illegal drug had been thoroughly compromised. Serious uncertainty is generated on the identity of the item in view of the broken linkages in the chain of custody. In this light, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty accorded the buy-bust team by the courts below cannot arise. People of the Philippines v. Fernando Ranche Havana G. R. No. 198450 11 January 2016 Exception to Section 21 of the Implementing Rules of RA 9165 In many cases, this Court has held that "while the chain of custody should ideally be perfect, in reality it is not, as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain." Since the law itself provided exceptions to its requirements., the non-compliance with Section 21 of the IRR is not fatal and does not make the items seized inadmissible. The most important factor is "the preservation of the integrity and the evidential value of the seized items as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused." People of the Philippines v. Juan Asislo G. R. No. 206224 18 January 2016

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In the prosecution of a case for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the primary consideration is to ensure that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs have been preserved from the time they were confiscated from the accused until their presentation as evidence in court. The prosecution must establish with moral certainty that the specimen submitted to the crime laboratory and found positive for dangerous drugs, and finally introduced in evidence against the accused was the same illegal drug that was confiscated. People of the Philippines v. Juan Asislo G. R. No. 206224 18 January 2016 The records of the case show that the authorities were able to preserve the integrity of the seized marijuana, and establish in the trial that the links in the chain of custody of the same were not compromised. While it is true that the drugs were not marked immediately after its seizure and not in the presence of the accused, the prosecution was able to prove, however, that the bricks of marijuana contained in five sacks and a plastic bag confiscated during the buy-bust operation were the same items presented and identified before the court. People of the Philippines v. Juan Asislo G. R. No. 206224 18 January 2016 The fact that the apprehending officer marked the plastic sachet at the police station, and not at the place of seizure, did not compromise the integrity of the seized item. Jurisprudence has declared that "marking upon immediate confiscation" contemplates even marking done at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team. Neither does the absence of a physical inventory nor the lack of photograph of the confiscated item renders the same inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items as these would be used in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused. The Court is convinced that the integrity and evidentiary value of shabu seized from the petitioner had been preserved under the chain of custody rule even though the prescribed procedure under Section 21 ( 1 ), Article II of R.A. No. 9165, as implemented by Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR ofR.A. No. 9165, was not strictly complied with. Roberto Palo v. People of the Philippines G. R. No. 192075 10 February 2016 Evidently, the law requires "substantial" and not necessarily "perfect adherence" as long as it can be proven that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. People of the Philippines v. Glen Piad, Renato Villarosa and Nilo Davis, G. R. No. 213607 25 January 2016 Human memory is not infallible. Inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses in cases involving violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act may be excused so long as the identity of the dangerous drugs is proved beyond reasonable doubt and the chain of custody is established

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with moral certainty. People of the Philippines v. Cristy Dimaano G. R. No. 174481 10 February 2016 The purpose of Section 21 is “to [protect] the accused from malicious imputations of guilt by abusive police officers[.]" Nevertheless, Section 21 cannot be used to “thwart the legitimate efforts of law enforcement agents.” “Slight infractions or nominal deviations by the police from the prescribed method of handling the corpus delicti [as provided in Section 21] should not exculpate an otherwise guilty defendant.”Thus, “substantial adherence”89 to Section 21 will suffice. People of the Philippines v. Cristy Dimaano G. R. No. 174481 10 February 2016 In crimes committed in airports, the prosecution relies heavily on airport security personnel and procedures for evidence. Recently, cases of illegal possession of ammunition committed in airports have been on the news, with some suggesting that airport security personnel are behind this laglag-bala modus operandi. Whether or not there is truth in these reports, the public has since been more concerned with airport security procedures. The rise in cases of laglag-bala, however, does not excuse the laxity in processing other pieces of evidence. Drugs equally destroy lives, as do bullets fired with a gun. Prosecuting drug dealers and users should be given equal vigilance. People of the Philippines v. Cristy Dimaano G. R. No. 174481 10 February 2016 KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, are: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three (3) days; or (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; or (c) serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. If the victim of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention is also of no moment and the crime is qualified and becomes punishable by death even if none of the circumstances mentioned in paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 267 is present. People of the Philippines v. Jerry Pepino and Preciosa Gomez G. R. No. 174471 12 January 2016

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It is settled that the crime of serious illegal detention consists not only of placing a person in an enclosure, but also in detaining him or depriving him of his liberty in any manner. For there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained from going home. Its essence is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect such deprivation. People of the Philippines v. Jerry Pepino and Preciosa Gomez G. R. No. 174471 12 January 2016 PLUNDER Plunder, defined and penalized under Section i 53 of RA 7080, as amended, has the following elements: (a) that the offender is a public officer, who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons; (b) that he amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten' wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts described in Section 1 (d) 154 thereof; and (c) that the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth is at least Fifty Million Pesos (₱50,000,000.00). Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The Honorable Ombudsman G. R. Nos. 212593-94 15 March 2016; Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The Honorable Sandiganbayan [Third Division] and the People of the Philippines G. R. Nos. 213163-78 15 March 2016 QUASI-CRIMINAL NATURE OF CIVIL FORFEITURE CASES Civil Forfeiture as Criminal Penalty Actions for reconveyance, revision, accounting, restitution, and damages for ill-gotten wealth are also called civil forfeiture proceedings. Republic Act No. 1379 [referred to as the “Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State any Property Found to have been Unlawfully Acquired by any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Proceedings therefor] provides for the procedure by which forfeiture proceedings may be instituted against public officers or employees who "[have] acquired during his [or her] incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his [or her] salary as such public officer or employee and to his [or her] other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, [which] property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired." Republic of the Philippines v. Fe Roa Gimenez and Ignacio B. Gimenez, G. R. No. 174673, 11 January 2016 Jurisdiction over Civil Forfeiture Cases Violations of R.A. No. 1379 are placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, even though the proceeding is civil in nature, since the forfeiture

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of the illegally acquired property amounts to a penalty. Republic of the Philippines v. Fe Roa Gimenez and Ignacio B. Gimenez, G. R. No. 174673, 11 January 2016; Maj. Gen. Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, 499 Phil. 589, 614 (2005); Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 90529, August 16, 1991, 200 SCRA 667, 674676 Difference between a Civil Forfeiture Case and a Plunder Case A forfeiture case under RA 1379 arises out of a cause of action separate and different from a plunder case. ... In a prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be established is the commission of the criminal acts in furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. . . . On the other hand, all that the court needs to determine, by preponderance of evidence, under RA 1379 is the disproportion of respondent's properties to his legitimate income, it being unnecessary to prove how he acquired said properties. Xxx the forfeitable nature of the properties under the provisions of RA 1379 does not proceed from a determination of a specific overt act committed by the respondent public officer leading to the acquisition of the illegal wealth. Republic of the Philippines v. Fe Roa Gimenez and Ignacio B. Gimenez, G. R. No. 174673, 11 January 2016; Maj. Gen. Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, 499 Phil. 589, 614 (2005) ANTI-DRUNK AND DRUGGED DRIVING ACT OF 2013 The policy behind Republic Act No. 10586 is to penalize the acts of driving under the influence of alcohol, dangerous drugs and other intoxicating substances, and to inculcate the standards of safe driving and the benefits that may be derived from it through institutional programs and appropriate public information strategies. The law covers all acts of driving and/or operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, and/or dangerous drugs and similar substances. Motor vehicle refers to any land transportation vehicle propelled by any power other than muscular power, including: (1) Trucks and buses, which are motor vehicles with gross vehicle weight from 4501 kg and above; and (2) Motorcycles, which are two- or three-wheeled motor vehicles and which may include a side-car attached thereto. A driver found to have been driving a motor vehicle and committing the act of DUIA or DUID shall be penalized as follows:

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a. If the violation did not result in physical injuries or homicide, the penalty of three (3) months imprisonment, and a fine ranging from Php 20,000 Php 80,000.00 shall be imposed; b. If the violation resulted in physical injuries, the penalty provided in Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code or the penalty provided in the next preceding subparagraph, whichever is higher, and a fine ranging from Php 100,000 to Php 200,000 shall be imposed; c. If the violation resulted in homicide, the penalty provided in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and a fine ranging from Php 300,000 to Php 500,000 shall be imposed; and d. The non-professional driver’s license of any person found to have violated the law shall also be confiscated and suspended for a period of twelve (12) months for the first conviction and perpetually revoked for the second conviction. The professional driver’s license shall also be confiscated and perpetually revoked for the first conviction. The perpetual revocation of a driver’s license shall disqualify the person from being granted any kind of driver’s license thereafter. e. The prosecution for any violation of this law shall be without prejudice to criminal prosecution for violation of the Revised Penal Code, Republic Act No. 9165 and other special laws and existing local ordinances, whenever applicable. The owner and/or operator of the motor vehicle driven by the offender (including owners and/or operators of public utility vehicles and commercial vehicles such as delivery vans, cargo trucks, container trucks, school and company buses, hotel transports, cars or vans for rent, taxi cabs, and the like) shall be directly and principally held liable together with the offender for the fine and the award against the offender for civil damages unless he/she is able to convincingly prove that he/she has exercised extraordinary diligence in the selection and supervision of his/her drivers in general and the offending driver in particular.

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Part Two

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE NATURE OF PROCEDURAL RULES Rules of procedure are not ends in themselves. The object of these rules is to assist and facilitate a trial court's function to be able to receive all the evidence of the parties, and evaluate their admissibility and probative value in the context of the issues presented by the parties' pleadings in order to arrive at a conclusion as to the facts that transpired. Having been able to establish the facts, the trial court will then be able to apply the law and determine whether a complainant is deserving of the reliefs prayed for in the pleading. Republic of the Philippines v. Fe Roa Gimenez and Ignacio B. Gimenez, G. R. No. 174673, 11 January 2016 Dismissal on the basis of a very strict interpretation of procedural rules without a clear demonstration of the injury to a substantive right of the defendant weighed against 19 years of litigation actively participated in by both parties should not be encouraged. Republic of the Philippines v. Fe Roa Gimenez and Ignacio B. Gimenez, G. R. No. 174673, 11 January 2016 Duty of Prosecutors in Criminal Proceedings It is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its side with clarity and persuasion, so that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion. What is required of it is to justify the conviction of the accused with moral certainty. Upon the prosecution's failure to meet this test, acquittal becomes the constitutional duty of the Court, lest its mind be tortured with the thought that it has imprisoned an innocent man for the rest· of his life. The constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty can be overthrown only by proof beyond reasonable doubt. People of the Philippines v. Fabian Urzais et al G. R. No. 207662 13 April 2016 ARRESTS Valid Warrantless Arrest Saraum was arrested during the commission of a crime, which instance does not require a warrant in accordance with Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. In arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is committing or attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer. To constitute a

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valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Amado Saraum v. People of the Philippines, G. R. No. 205472 25 January 2016 The valid warrantless arrest gave the officers the right to search the shanty for objects relating to the crime and seize the drug paraphernalia they found. In the course of their lawful intrusion, they inadvertently saw the various drug paraphernalia. As these items were plainly visible, the police officers were justified in seizing them. Considering that Saraum’s arrest was legal, the search and seizure that resulted from it were likewise lawful. The various drug paraphernalia that the police officers found and seized in the shanty are, therefore, admissible in evidence for having proceeded from a valid search and seizure. Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia are the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court has no choice but to sustain the judgment of conviction. Amado Saraum v. People of the Philippines, G. R. No. 205472 25 January 2016 Illegality of Arrest Must Be Raised Prior to Entry of Plea It is settled that any objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the acquisition by a court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be opportunely raised before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. xxx Appellant is now estopped from questioning any defect in the manner of his arrest as he failed to move for the quashing of the information before the trial court. Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his arrest was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of "not guilty" and by participating in the trial. Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz v. People of the Philippines, G. R. No. 209387 11 January 2016 At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. Simply put, the illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute the guilty when all other facts on record point to their culpability. It is much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest after a valid information had been filed, the accused had been arraigned, the trial had commenced and had been completed, and a judgment of conviction had been rendered against her. Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz v. People of the Philippines, G. R. No. 209387 11 January 2016

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SEARCHES AND SEIZURES Voluntary Submission to Routine Baggage Inspection Constitutes Consent to Search and Seizure Routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities, although done without search warrants, are not unreasonable searches per se. Constitutional provisions protecting privacy should not be so literally understood so as to deny reasonable safeguards to ensure the safety of the traveling public. Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz v. People of the Philippines, G. R. No. 209387 11 January 2016 Port authorities were acting within their duties and functions when it used x-ray scanning machines for inspection of passengers’ bags. When the results of the x-ray scan revealed the existence of firearms in the bag, the port authorities had probable cause to conduct a search of petitioner’s bag. Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz v. People of the Philippines, G. R. No. 209387 11 January 2016 Was the search rendered unreasonable at the second point of intrusion— when the baggage inspector opened petitioner’s bag and called the attention of the port police officer? We rule in the negative. The port personnel’s actions proceed from the authority and policy to ensure the safety of travelers and vehicles within the port. At this point, petitioner already submitted himself and his belongings to inspection by placing his bag in the x-ray scanning machine. The presentation of petitioner’s bag for x-ray scanning was voluntary. Petitioner had the choice of whether to present the bag or not. He had the option not to travel if he did not want his bag scanned or inspected. X-ray machine scanning and actual inspection upon showing of probable cause that a crime is being or has been committed are part of reasonable security regulations to safeguard the passengers passing through ports or terminals. Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz v. People of the Philippines, G. R. No. 209387 11 January 2016 It is not too burdensome to be considered as an affront to an ordinary person’s right to travel if weighed against the safety of all passengers and the security in the port facility. xxx Any perceived curtailment of liberty due to the presentation of person and effects for port security measures is a permissible intrusion to privacy when measured against the possible harm to society caused by lawless persons. Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz v. People of the Philippines, G. R. No. 209387 11 January 2016

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Distinction between Consented Search and Customs Search Customs searches, as exception to the requirement of a valid search warrant, are allowed when “persons exercising police authority under the customs law . . . effect search and seizure . . . in the enforcement of customs laws.” The Tariff and Customs Code provides the authority for such warrantless search. Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz v. People of the Philippines, G. R. No. 209387 11 January 2016 [T]o be a valid customs search, the requirements are: (1) the person/s conducting the search was/were exercising police authority under customs law; (2) the search was for the enforcement of customs law; and (3) the place searched is not a dwelling place or house. Here, the facts reveal that the search was part of routine port security measures. The search was not conducted by persons authorized under customs law. It was also not motivated by the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code or other customs laws. Although customs searches usually occur within ports or terminals, it is important that the search must be for the enforcement of customs laws. Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz v. People of the Philippines, G. R. No. 209387 11 January 2016 RIGHT TO BAIL Before conviction, bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. If the offense charged is punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion. In case bail is granted, the accused must appear whenever the court requires his presence; otherwise, his bail shall be forfeited. People of the Philippines v. Glen Piad, Renato Villarosa and Nilo Davis, G. R. No. 213607 25 January 2016 Jumping Bail results in Loss of Standing to Appeal When the R TC promulgated its decision for conviction, Davis and his counsel were present in the courtroom. Yet, they did not file any motion for bail pending appeal before the RTC or the CAI° Nonetheless, any motion for bail pending appeal should have been denied because Davis violated the conditions of his previous bail. Necessarily, as he previously jumped bail and no bail pending appeal was secured, the R TC should have immediately issued a warrant of arrest against him. People of the Philippines v. Glen Piad, Renato Villarosa and Nilo Davis, G. R. No. 213607 25 January 2016

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In the same manner, the CA should not have entertained the appeal of Davis. Once an accused escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail (as in this case), or flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing in court. Unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court. As no such surrender was made in this case, in the eyes of the law, Davis is a fugitive from justice and, therefore, not entitled to seek relief from the courts. People of the Philippines v. Glen Piad, Renato Villarosa and Nilo Davis, G. R. No. 213607 25 January 2016 RIGHT TO COUNSEL Right to Counsel Cannot Be Claimed in the Course of Identification in a Police Lineup The right to counsel is a fundamental right and is intended to preclude the slightest coercion that would lead the accused to admit something false. The right to counsel attaches upon the start of the investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the accused. Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of the crime under investigation. As a rule, a police lineup is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage. The right to be assisted by counsel attaches only during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed by the accused during identification in a police lineup. People of the Philippines v. Jerry Pepino and Preciosa Gomez G. R. No. 174471 12 January 2016 PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION Preliminary Investigation is not a Quasi-Judicial Proceeding The determination by the Department of Justice of the existence of probable cause is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. However, the actions of the Secretary of Justice in affirming or reversing the findings of prosecutors may still be subject to judicial review if it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Secretary Leila De Lima et al v. Mario Joel T. Reyes, G. R. No. 20930, 11 January 2016. Under the Rules of Court, a writ of certiorari is directed against “any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.” A quasijudicial function is “the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.” Otherwise stated, an administrative

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agency performs quasi-judicial functions if it renders awards, determines the rights of opposing parties, or if their decisions have the same effect as the judgment of a court. Secretary Leila De Lima et al v. Mario Joel T. Reyes, G. R. No. 20930, 11 January 2016. In a preliminary investigation, the prosecutor does not determine the guilt or innocence of an accused. The prosecutor only determines “whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.” As such, the prosecutor does not perform quasi-judicial functions. Secretary Leila De Lima et al v. Mario Joel T. Reyes, G. R. No. 20930, 11 January 2016. Also, it should be pointed out that a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the prosecution's evidence, and that the presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits. Therefore, "the validity and merits of a party's defense or accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level. Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The Honorable Ombudsman G. R. Nos. 212593-9415 March 2016; Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The Honorable Sandiganbayan [Third Division] and the People of the Philippines G. R. Nos. 213163-78 15 March 2016 Furthermore, owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary investigations, the "technical rules of evidence should not be applied" in the course of its proceedings, keeping in mind that "the determination of probable cause does not depend on the validity or merits of a party's accusation or defense or on the admissibility or veracity of testimonies presented." Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The Honorable Ombudsman G. R. Nos. 212593-94 15 March 2016; Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The Honorable Sandiganbayan [Third Division] and the People of the Philippines G. R. Nos. 213163-78 15 March 2016 Probable Cause There are two kinds of determination of probable case: executive and judicial. The executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the

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existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon. Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The Honorable Ombudsman G. R. Nos. 212593-94 15 March 2016; Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The Honorable Sandiganbayan [Third Division] and the People of the Philippines G. R. Nos. 213163-78 15 March 2016 The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant. Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The Honorable Ombudsman G. R. Nos. 212593-94; Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The Honorable Sandiganbayan [Third Division] and the People of the Philippines G. R. Nos. 213163-78 Finding of Probable Cause may be based on Hearsay Assuming arguendo that such whistleblower accounts are merely hearsay, it must be reiterated that xxx probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, so long as there. is substantial basis for crediting the same. As aforestated, the modus operandi used in advancing the PDAF scam as described by the whistleblowers was confirmed by Tuason herself, who admitted to having acted as a liaison between Janet Napoles and the office of Senator Enrile. The Ombudsman further pointed out that the collective statements of Luy, Sula, Sufias, and Tuason find support in the following documentary evidence: (a) the business ledgers prepared by witness Luy, showing the amounts received by Senator Enrile, through Tuason and Reyes, as his 'commission" from the so-called PDAF scam; (b) the 2007-2009 Commission on Audit (COA) Report documenting the results of the special audit undertaken on PDAF disbursements - that there were serious irregularities relating to the implementation of PDAF-funded projects, including those endorsed by Senator Enrile; and ( c) the reports on the independent field verification conducted in 2013 by the investigators of the FIO which secured sworn statements of local government officials and purported beneficiaries of the supposed projects which turned out to be inexistent. Clearly, these testimonial and documentary evidence are substantial enough to reasonably conclude that Reyes had, in all probability, participated in the PDAF scam and, hence, must stand trial therefor. Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The Honorable Ombudsman G. R. Nos. 212593-94 15 March 2016; ; Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The Honorable Sandiganbayan [Third Division] and the People of the Philippines G. R. Nos. 213163-78 15 March 2016

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Judicial Review of Ombudsman's Determination of Probable Cause At the outset, it must be stressed that the Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine the existence of probable cause and to decide whether or not an Information should be filed. Nonetheless, this Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman's action when there is a charge of grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman's exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The Honorable Ombudsman G. R. Nos. 212593-94 15 March 2016; Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The Honorable Sandiganbayan [Third Division] and the People of the Philippines G. R. Nos. 213163-78 15 March 2016 In assessing if the Ombudsman had committed grave abuse of discretion, attention must be drawn to the context of its ruling - that. is: preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not there is reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person charged should be held responsible for it. Being merely based on opinion and belief, "a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction." Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The Honorable Ombudsman G. R. Nos. 212593-94 15 March 2016; Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The Honorable Sandiganbayan [Third Division] and the People of the Philippines G. R. Nos. 213163-78 15 March 2016 Authority of the Justice Secretary to Conduct Review Motu Propio The Secretary of Justice exercises control and supervision over prosecutors and it is within her authority to affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the resolutions of her prosecutors. Secretary Leila De Lima et al v. Mario Joel T. Reyes, G. R. No. 20930, 11 January 2016. Section 4 of Republic Act No. 10071 also gives the Secretary of Justice the authority to directly act on any “probable miscarriage of justice within the jurisdiction of the prosecution staff, regional prosecution office, and the provincial prosecutor or the city prosecutor.” Accordingly, the Secretary of Justice may step in and order a reinvestigation even without a prior motion or petition from a party in order to prevent any probable miscarriage of justice. Secretary Leila De Lima et al v. Mario Joel T. Reyes, G. R. No. 20930, 11 January 2016.

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The Secretary of Justice has the discretion, upon motion or motu proprio, to act on any matter that may cause a probable miscarriage of justice in the conduct of a preliminary investigation. This action may include, but is not limited to, the conduct of a reinvestigation. Furthermore, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 questioning the regularity of preliminary investigation becomes moot after the trial court completes its determination of probable cause and issues a warrant of arrest. Secretary Leila De Lima et al v. Mario Joel T. Reyes, G. R. No. 20930, 11 January 2016. Under Rule 112, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, however, the Secretary of Justice may motu propio reverse or modify resolutions of the provincial or city prosecutor or the chief state prosecutor even without a pending petition for review. Secretary Leila De Lima et al v. Mario Joel T. Reyes, G. R. No. 20930, 11 January 2016. Justice Secretary’s Review of Resolutions Not a Ministerial Function The Department of Justice is not a court of law and its officers do not perform quasi-judicial functions. The Secretary of Justice’s review of the resolutions of prosecutors is also not a ministerial function. An act is considered ministerial if “an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard for the exercise of his or its own judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.” In contrast, an act is considered discretionary “[i]f the law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed.” Considering that “full discretionary authority has been delegated to the executive branch in the determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation,” the functions of the prosecutors and the Secretary of Justice are not ministerial. Secretary Leila De Lima et al v. Mario Joel T. Reyes, G. R. No. 20930, 11 January 2016. Justice Secretary’s Determination of Probable Cause May be subject to Judicial Review However, even when an administrative agency does not perform a judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial function, the Constitution mandates the exercise of judicial review when there is an allegation of grave abuse of discretion. xxx Therefore, any question on whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming, reversing, or modifying the resolutions of prosecutors may be the subject of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Secretary Leila De Lima et al v. Mario Joel T. Reyes, G. R. No. 20930, 11 January 2016.

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CRIMINAL INFORMATION As embodied in Section 14 (1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. Further, paragraph 2 of the same section, it provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused has a right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. It is further provided under Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court that a complaint or information to be filed in court must contain a designation given to the offense by the statute, besides the statement of the acts or omissions constituting the same, and if there is no such designation, reference should be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. People of the Philippines v. Raul Yamon G. R. No. 207816 24 February 2016 In Patula v. People [685 Phil. 376, 388 (2012)] the Court emphasized the importance of the proper manner of alleging the nature and cause of the accusation in the information: x x x An accused cannot be convicted of an offense that is not clearly charged in the complaint or information. To convict him of an offense other than that charged in the complaint or information would be violative of the Constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. Indeed, the accused cannot be convicted of a crime, even if duly proven, unless the crime is alleged or necessarily included in the information filed against him. People of the Philippines v. Raul Yamon G. R. No. 207816 24 February 2016 Criminal Information Should be Filed by Officer Properly Authorized to Do So The filing of an Information by an officer without the requisite authority to file the same constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity which cannot be cured by silence, waiver, acquiescence, or even by express consent. Hence, such ground may be raised at anystage of the proceedings. Girlie M. Quisay v. People of the Philippines G. R. No. 216920 13 January 2016 [T]he Pasiya or Resolution finding probable cause to indict petitioner of the crime charged, was validly made as it bore the approval of one of the designated review prosecutors for OCP-Makati, SACP Hirang, as evidenced by his signature therein. Unfortunately, the same could not be said of the Pabatid Sakdal or Information filed before the RTC, as there was no showing that it was approved by either the City Prosecutor of Makati or any of the OCPMakati’s division chiefs or review prosecutors. All it contained was a Certification from ACP De La Cruz which stated, among others, that “DAGDAG KO PANG PINATUTUNAYAN na ang paghahain ng sakdal na ito ay may nakasulat na naunang pahintulot o pagpapatibay ng Panlunsod na Taga-Usig”28 – which translates to “and that the

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filing of the Information is with the prior authority and approval of the City Prosecutor.” Girlie M. Quisay v. People of the Philippines G. R. No. 216920 13 January 2016 In [previous cases] the Court had already rejected similarly-worded certifications, uniformly holding that despite such certifications, the Informations were defective as it was shown that the officers filing the same in court either lacked the authority to do so or failed to show that they obtained prior written authority from any of those authorized officers enumerated in Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Girlie M. Quisay v. People of the Philippines G. R. No. 216920 13 January 2016 Here, aside from the bare and self-serving Certification, there was no proof that ACP De La Cruz was authorized to file the Pabatid Sakdal or Information before the RTC by himself. Records are bereft of any showing that the City Prosecutor of Makati had authorized ACP De La Cruz to do so by giving him prior written authority or by designating him as a division chief or review prosecutor of OCP-Makati. There is likewise nothing that would indicate that ACP De La Cruz sought the approval of either the City Prosecutor or any of those authorized pursuant to OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32 in filing the Pabatid Sakdal. Quite frankly, it is simply baffling how ACP De La Cruz was able to have the Pasiya approved by designated review prosecutor SACP Hirang but failed to have the Pabatid Sakdal approved by the same person or any other authorized officer in the OCP Makati. Girlie M. Quisay v. People of the Philippines G. R. No. 216920 13 January 2016 In view of the foregoing circumstances, the CA erred in according the Pabatid Sakdal the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions solely on the basis of the Certification made by ACP De La Cruz considering the absence of any evidence on record clearly showing that ACP De La Cruz: (a) had any authority to file the same on his own; or (b) did seek the prior written approval from those authorized to do so before filing the Information before the RTC. Girlie M. Quisay v. People of the Philippines G. R. No. 216920 13 January 2016 In conclusion, the CA erred in affirming the RTC's dismissal of petitioner's motion to quash as the Pabatid Sakdal or Information suffers from an incurable infirmity - that the officer who filed the same before the RTC had no authority to do so. Hence, the Pabatid Sakdal must be quashed, resulting in the dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner. As a final note, it must be stressed that "[t]he Rules of Court governs the pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts of the Philippines. For the orderly administration of justice, the provisions contained therein should be followed by all litigants, but especially by the prosecution arm

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of the Government." Girlie M. Quisay v. People of the Philippines G. R. No. 216920 13 January 2016 Failure to Move for Quashal of Information deemed Acquiescence However, since appellant entered a plea of not guilty during arraignment and failed to move for the quashal of the Informations, he is deemed to have waived his right to question the same. Section 9 of Rule 11 7 provides that "[t]he failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule." People of the Philippines v. Ireneo Jugueta G. R. No. 202124 5 April 2016 It is also well-settled that when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose upon him the proper penalty for each offense. Appellant can therefore be held liable for all the crimes alleged in the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and 7702G, i.e., 2 counts of murder and 4 counts of attempted murder, respectively, and proven during trial. People of the Philippines v. Ireneo Jugueta G. R. No. 202124 5 April 2016 To Ensure Proper Conviction, Information Must Contain All Necessary Allegations [T]he Information merely alleged that "the accused is an uncle by affinity of the latter," failing to clearly state that appellant herein is AAA's relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or· affinity, as expressly required by the aforecited ruling. Appellant herein cannot, therefore, be properly ·convicted of rape in its qualified form resulting in a higher award of damages. Hence, in view of the failure of the Information to expressly allege the qualifying circumstance of relationship, as well as the absence of any discussion as to the existence of such qualifying circumstance that would warrant the imposition of the death penalty, the Court finds the award of damages in the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P75,000.00 as moral damages improper. Accordingly, both awards of civil indemnity and moral damages are reduced to P50,000.00 each, in line with existing jurisprudence. People of the Philippines v. Edgardo Perez G. R. No. 208071 09 March 2016

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TRIAL IN ABSENTIA The holding of trial in absentia is authorized under Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides that after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. It is established that notices have been served to the counsel of the petitioner and his failure to inform his counsel of his whereabouts is the reason for his failure to appear on the scheduled date. Thus, the arguments of the petitioner against the validity of the proceedings and promulgation of judgment in absentia for being in violation of the constitutional right to due process are doomed to fail. Napoleon Senit v. People of the Philippines G. R. No. 192914 11 January 2016 DUTIES OF THE ACCUSED Accused’s Primary Duty is to be Interested in His Own Case It is Petitioner’s [Accused’s] duty, as a client, to be in touch with his counsel so as to be constantly posted about the case. It is mandated to inquire from its counsel about the status and progress of the case from time to time and cannot expect that all it has to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of the case. It is also its responsibility, together with its counsel, to devise a system for the receipt of mail intended for them. Napoleon Senit v. People of the Philippines G. R. No. 192914 11 January 2016 The Court finds that the negligence exhibited by the petitioner, towards the criminal case against him in which his liberty is at risk, is not borne of ignorance of the law as claimed by his counsel rather, lack of concern towards the incident, and the people who suffered from it. While there was no showing in the case at bar that the counsel of the petitioner was grossly negligent in failing to inform him of the notices served, the Court cannot find anyone to blame but the petitioner himself in not exercising diligence in informing his counsel of his whereabouts. The Court also agrees with the Comment of the OSG that there is neither rule nor law which specifically requires the trial court to ascertain whether notices received by counsel are sufficiently communicated with his client. Napoleon Senit v. People of the Philippines G. R. No. 192914 11 January 2016

APPEALS IN CRIMINAL CASES At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's

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decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law. People of the Philippines v. Godofredo Comboy G. R. No.218399 02 March 2016

Part Three

EVIDENCE BURDEN OF PROOF AND BURDEN OF EVIDENCE When petitioner claimed that someone planted the illegal firearms in his bag, the burden of evidence to prove this allegation shifted to him. The shift in the burden of evidence does not equate to the reversal of the presumption of innocence. Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz v. People of the Philippines, G. R. No. 209387 11 January 2016 In criminal cases, the prosecution bears the onus to prove beyond reasonable doubt not only the commission of the crime but likewise to establish, with the same quantum of proof, the identity of the person or persons responsible therefor. This burden of proof does not shift to the defense but remains in the prosecution throughout the trial. However, when the prosecution has succeeded in discharging the burden of proof by presenting evidence sufficient to convince the court of the truth of the allegations in the information or has established a prima facie case against the accused, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused making it incumbent upon him to adduce evidence in order to meet and nullify, if not to overthrow, that prima facie case. Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz v. People of the Philippines, G. R. No. 209387 11 January 2016 QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE Required Quantum of Evidence in Civil Forfeiture Cases To stress, the quantum of evidence required for forfeiture proceedings under Republic Act No. 1379 is the same with other civil cases — preponderance of evidence. [Exec. Order No. 14-A (1986), sec. 1, entitled Amending Executive Order No. 14.] Republic of the Philippines v. Fe Roa Gimenez and Ignacio B. Gimenez, G. R. No. 174673, 11 January 2016

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Required Quantum of Evidence in Criminal Cases The basis of the acquittal is reasonable doubt, which simply means that the evidence of the prosecution was not sufficient to sustain the guilt of accusedappellant beyond the point of moral certainty. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, however, is a burden particular to the prosecution and does not apply to exculpatory facts as may be raised by the defense; the accused is not required to establish matters in mitigation or defense beyond a reasonable doubt, nor is he required to establish the truth of such matters by a preponderance of the evidence, or even to a reasonable probability. People of the Philippines v. Fabian Urzais et al G. R. No. 207662 13 April 2016 Equipoise Rule The equipoise rule states that where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfil the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. The equipoise rule provides that where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional . presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of the accused. People of the Philippines v. Fabian Urzais et al G. R. No. 207662 13 April 2016 DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE Definition of Demurrer to Evidence A Demurrer to evidence is "an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue." We have also held that a demurrer to evidence "authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant having to submit evidence on his part, as he would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff's evidence shows that he is not entitled to the relief sought." Republic of the Philippines v. Fe Roa Gimenez and Ignacio B. Gimenez, G. R. No. 174673, 11 January 2016; Oropesa v. Oropesa, G.R. No. 184528, April 25, 2012, 671 SCRA 174. Guidelines in the Resolution of a Demurrer to Evidence A demurrer to evidence may be issued when, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. Where the plaintiff’s evidence together with such inferences and conclusions as may reasonably be drawn therefrom does not warrant recovery against the defendant, a demurrer to evidence should be

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sustained. A demurrer to evidence is likewise sustainable when, admitting every proven fact favorable to the plaintiff and indulging in his favor all conclusions fairly and reasonably inferable therefrom, the plaintiff has failed to make out one or more of the material elements of his case, or when there is no evidence to support an allegation necessary to his claim. It should be sustained where the plaintiff's evidence is prima facie insufficient for a recovery. Republic of the Philippines v. Fe Roa Gimenez and Ignacio B. Gimenez, G. R. No. 174673, 11 January 2016; Spouses Condes v. Court of Appeals, 555 Phil. 311, 324 (2007) citing Heirs of Emilio Santioque v. Heirs of Emilio Calma, 536 Phil. 524 (2006). What should be resolved in a motion to dismiss based on a demurrer to evidence iswhether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief based on the facts and the law. The evidence contemplated by the rule on demurrer is that which pertains to the merits of the case, excluding technical aspects such as capacity to sue. Republic of the Philippines v. Fe Roa Gimenez and Ignacio B. Gimenez, G. R. No. 174673, 11 January 2016; Casent Realty Development Corporation v. Philbanking Corporation, 559 Phil. 793, 801-802 (2007) There is likewise serious reversible error, even grave abuse of discretion, when the Sandiganbayan dismisses a case on demurrer to evidence without a full statement of its evaluation of the evidence presented and offered and the interpretation of the relevant law. After all, dismissal on the basis of demurrer to evidence is similar to a judgment. It is a final order ruling on the merits of a case. Republic of the Philippines v. Fe Roa Gimenez and Ignacio B. Gimenez, G. R. No. 174673, 11 January 2016 Effect of an Order Granting Demurrer to Evidence An order granting demurrer to evidence is a judgment on the merits. This is because while a demurrer "is an aid or instrument for the expeditious termination of an action," it specifically "pertains to the merits of the case. Republic of the Philippines v. Fe Roa Gimenez and Ignacio B. Gimenez, G. R. No. 174673, 11 January 2016; Nepomuceno, et al. v. Commission on Elections, et al, 211 Phil. 623, 628 (1983); Oropesa v. Oropesa, G.R. No. 184528, April 25, 2012, 671 SCRA 174, 185; Casent Realty Development Corporation v. Philbanking Corporation, 559 Phil. 793 (2007); Nepomuceno, et al. v. Commission on Elections, et al, 211 Phil. 623 (1983); Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 341 Phil. 432, 440 (1997) Demurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant having to submit evidence on his [or her] part, as he [or she] would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff's evidence shows that he [or she] is not entitled to the relief sought. The order of dismissal must be clearly supported

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by facts and law since an order granting demurrer is a judgment on the merit. Republic of the Philippines v. Fe Roa Gimenez and Ignacio B. Gimenez, G. R. No. 174673, 11 January 2016; Uy v. Chua, 616 Phil. 768, 783-784 (2009) BEST EVIDENCE RULE Original Documents as Primary Evidence Save for certain cases, the original document must be presented during trial when the subject of the inquiry is the contents of the document. This is the Best Evidence Rule provided under Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. Republic of the Philippines v. Fe Roa Gimenez and Ignacio B. Gimenez, G. R. No. 174673, 11 January 2016; Dantis v. Maghinang, Jr., G.R. No. 191696, April 10, 2013, 695 SCRA 599, 611. [T]he best evidence rule applies only when the subject of the inquiry is the contents of the document. xxx Where the issue is only as to whether such document was actually executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible (5 Moran, op. cit., pp. 76-66; 4 Martin, op. cit., p. 78). Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible without need for accounting for the original. Republic of the Philippines v. Fe Roa Gimenez and Ignacio B. Gimenez, G. R. No. 174673, 11 January 2016 Thus, when a document is presented to prove its existence or condition it is offered not as documentary, but as real, evidence. Parol evidence of the fact of execution of the documents is allowed. Republic of the Philippines v. Fe Roa Gimenez and Ignacio B. Gimenez, G. R. No. 174673, 11 January 2016 Secondary Evidence In case of unavailability of the original document, secondary evidence may be presented133 as provided for under Sections 5 to 7 of Rule 130, Rules of Court. Republic of the Philippines v. Fe Roa Gimenez and Ignacio B. Gimenez, G. R. No. 174673, 11 January 2016 Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court's discretion, whenever in the case in hand the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring production. Republic of the Philippines v. Fe Roa Gimenez and Ignacio B. Gimenez, G. R. No. 174673, 11 January 2016

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Abella is challenging the probative value of the above handwritten agreement on the ground that it is a mere photocopy. Abella reasons that since the contents of said agreement are in issue, the best evidence rule applies. The original of the agreement is the best evidence of Abella making representations that she had the power to send private complainants abroad to work. The non-presentation of the original copy of the handwritten agreement is not fatal to the prosecution’s case. Miguel personally testified before the RTC as to the circumstances of her recruitment by Abella. Abella made verbal, and not only written, promises to Miguel of employment abroad. The handwritten agreement merely substantiates Miguel’s testimony at best. In People v. Pabalan [331 Phil. 64, 77-78 (1996)] we affirmed the sufficiency of testimonial evidence to prove receipt by therein accused-appellant of placement fees, even in the absence of documentary evidence such as receipts issued by accused-appellant. People of the Philippines v. Fe Abella G. R. No. 195666, 20 January 2016 CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES Witness Credibility Subject to Court Determination To reiterate, settled is the rule that the findings and conclusion of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect because the trial courts have the advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses as they testify. The determination by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses, when affirmed by the appellate court, as in this case, is accorded full weight and credit as well as great respect, if not conclusive effect. People of the Philippines v. Ma. Fe Torres Solina G. R. No. 196784 13 January 2016

The rule is that the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded respect if not conclusive effect. This is truer if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court. When the trial court's findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this Court. People of the Philippines v. Ricardo Lagbo G. R. No. 207535 10 February 2016 Admissibility of Identification Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru lineups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose x x x In

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resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. People of the Philippines v. Jerry Pepino and Preciosa Gomez G. R. No. 174471 12 January 2016 Even assuming arguendo the appellants' out-of-court identification was defective, their subsequent identification in court cured any flaw that may have initially attended it. We emphasize that the "inadmissibility of a police lineup identification x x x should not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an independent in-court identification." We also stress that all the accused-appellants were positively identified by the prosecution eyewitnesses during the trial. People of the Philippines v. Jerry Pepino and Preciosa Gomez G. R. No. 174471 12 January 2016 DEFENSE OF DENIAL AND ALIBI Accused-appellant's defense of denial cannot overcome the positive testimonies of the witnesses presented by the prosecution. As is well-settled in this jurisdiction, greater weight is given to the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses than the accused's denial and explanation concerning the commission of the crime. People of the Philippines v. Ma. Fe Torres Solina G. R. No. 196784 13 January 2016 In seeking his acquittal, appellant raises the defenses of denial and alibi. However, such defenses, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. They are considered with suspicion and always received with caution, not only because they are inherently weak and unreliable but also because they are easily fabricated and concocted. Denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of prosecution witnesses who were not shown to have any ill-motive to testify against the appellants. People of the Philippines v. Zaldy Salahuddin G. R. No. 206291 18 January 2016 In order for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is also not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the offense was committed, but it must likewise be shown that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the

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time of its commission. People of the Philippines v. Zaldy Salahuddin G. R. No. 206291 18 January 2016 NATURAL REACTION OF VICTIMS TO VIOLENCE Jurisprudence holds that the natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the appearance of their assailants and observe the manner the crime was committed. xxx It is known that the most natural reaction of a witness to a crime is to strive to look at the appearance of the perpetrator and to observe the manner in which the offense is perpetrated. Most often the face of the assailant and body movements thereof, create a lasting impression which cannot be easily erased from a witness's memory. Experience dictates that precisely because of the unusual acts of violence committed right before their eyes, eyewitnesses can remember with a high degree of reliability the identity of criminals at any given time. People of the Philippines v. Jerry Pepino and Preciosa Gomez G. R. No. 174471 12 January 2016 Common human experience tells us that when extraordinary circumstances take place, it is natural for persons to remember many of the important details. This Court has held that the most natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the features and faces of their assailants and observe the manner in which the crime is committed. x x x. All too often, the face of the assailant and his body movements create a lasting impression on the victim’s mind and cannot thus be easily erased from his memory. Cordero positively identified both accused-appellants Devincio and Vicente as two of his kidnappers. He saw both accused-appellants’ faces before he was blindfolded. Thus, it cannot be said that the length of time between the crime and the identification of the accusedappellants, which was only 26 days, had any effect on Cordero’s memory, to render his positive identification flawed. People of the Philippines v. Vicente Lugnasin and DeVincio Guerrero G. R. No. 208404 24 February 2016 HEARSAY The term “hearsay” as used in the law on evidence, signifies evidence which is not founded upon the personal knowledge of the witness from whom it is elicited and which consequently does not depend wholly for its credibility and weight upon the confidence which the court may have in him; its value, if any, is measured by the credit to be given to some third person not sworn as a witness to that fact, and consequently, not subject to cross examination. If one therefore testifies to facts which he learned from a third person not sworn as a witness to those facts, his testimony is inadmissible as hearsay evidence. People of the Philippines v. Victor Padit G. R. No. 202978 1 February 2016

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The reason for the exclusion of hearsay evidence is that the party against whom the hearsay testimony is presented is deprived of the right or opportunity to cross-examine the person to whom the statements are attributed. Moreover, the court is without opportunity to test the credibility of hearsay statements by observing the demeanor of the person who made them. People of the Philippines v. Victor Padit G. R. No. 202978 1 February 2016 DIRECT EVIDENCE AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE Certainly, it is not only by direct evidence that an accused may be convicted, but for circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction, following. are the guidelines: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is as such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Decided cases expound that the circumstantial evidence presented and proved must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. All the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rationale except that of guilt. People of the Philippines v. Fabian Urzais et al G. R. No. 207662 13 April 2016 DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS Possessor as Culprit The application of disputable presumption found in Section 3 U), Rule 13 1 of the Rules of Court, that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and doer of the whole act, in this case the alleged carnapping and the homicide/murder of its owner, is limited to cases where such possession is either unexplained or that the proffered explanation is rendered implausible in view of independent evidence inconsistent thereto. In the instant case, accused-appellant set-up a defense of denial of the charges and adhered to his unrebutted version of the story that the vehicle had been sold to him by the brothers Alex and Ricky Bautista. Though the explanation is not seamless, once the explanation is made for the possession, the presumption arising from the unexplained possession may not anymore be invoked and the burden shifts once more to the prosecution to produce evidence that would render the defense of the accused improbable. And this burden, the prosecution was unable to discharge. People of the Philippines v. Fabian Urzais et al G. R. No. 207662 13 April 2016

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Regular Performance of Duty Reliance on the legal presumptions that the police officers regularly performed their official duty and that the integrity of the evidence is presumed to be preserved will be inadequate to uphold appellant's conviction. After all, the burden of proving the guilt of an accused rests on the prosecution which must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. When moral certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt becomes a matter of right, irrespective of the reputation of the accused who enjoys the right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is shown. People of the Philippines v. Lee Quijano Enad G. R. No. 205764 3 February 2016 RECANTATION A retraction is looked upon with considerable disfavor by the courts. It is exceedingly unreliable for there is always the probability that such recantation may later on be repudiated. It can easily be obtained from witnesses through intimidation or monetary consideration. Like any other testimony, it is subject to the test of credibility based on the relevant circumstances and, especially, on the demeanor of the witness on the stand. People of the Philippines v. Allan Menaling G. R. No. 208676 13 April 2016 Before allowing the recantation, the court must not be too willing to accept it, but must test its value in a public trial with sufficient opportunity given to the party adversely affected to cross-examine the recanting witness both upon the substance of the recantation and the motivations for it. The recantation, like any other testimony, is subject to the test of credibility based on the relevant circumstances, including the demeanor of the recanting witness on the stand. In that respect, the finding of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great weight on appeal unless cogent reasons necessitate its re-examination, the reason being that the trial court is in a better position to hear first-hand and observe the deportment, conduct and attitude of the witnesses. People of the Philippines v. Allan Menaling G. R. No. 208676 13 April 2016 CASE LIST 1. Amado Saraum v. People of the Philippines, G. R. No. 205472 25 January 2016 2. Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz v. People of the Philippines, G. R. No. 209387 11 January 2016 3. Girlie M. Quisay v. People of the Philippines G. R. No. 216920 13 January 2016 4. Howard Lescano v. People of the Philippines G. R. No. 214490 13 January 2016 5. Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The Honorable Ombudsman G. R. Nos. 212593-94 15 March 2016

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6. Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The Honorable Sandiganbayan [Third Division] and the People of the Philippines G. R. Nos. 213163-78 15 March 2016 7. Napoleon Senit v. People of the Philippines G. R. No. 192914 11 January 2016 8. People of the Philippines v. Alexander "Sander" Bangsoy G. R. No. 204047 13 January 2016 9. People of the Philippines v. Allan Menaling G. R. No. 208676 13 April 2016 10. People of the Philippines v. Allan Rodriguez G. R. No. 208406 29 February 2016 11. People of the Philippines v. Anita Miranda G. R. No. 205639 18 January 2016 12. People of the Philippines v. Cristy Dimaano G. R. No. 174481 10 February 2016 13. People of the Philippines v. Edgardo Perez G. R. No. 208071 09 March 2016 14. People of the Philippines v. Eliseo Villamor G. R. No. 202187 10 February 2016 15. People of the Philippines v. Fabian Urzais et al G. R. No. 207662 13 April 2016 16. People of the Philippines v. Fe Abella G. R. No. 195666, 20 January 2016 17. People of the Philippines v. Fernando Ranche Havana G. R. No. 198450 11 January 2016 18. People of the Philippines v. Glen Piad, Renato Villarosa and Nilo Davis, G. R. No. 213607 25 January 2016 19. People of the Philippines v. Godofredo Comboy G. R. No.218399 02 March 2016 20. People of the Philippines v. Ireneo Jugueta G. R. No. 202124 5 April 2016 21. People of the Philippines v. Jerry Pepino and Preciosa Gomez G. R. No. 174471 12 January 2016 22. People of the Philippines v. Juan Asislo G. R. No. 206224 18 January 2016 23. People of the Philippines v. Lee Quijano Enad G. R. No. 205764 3 February 2016 24. People of the Philippines v. Ma. Fe Torres Solina G. R. No. 196784 13 January 2016 25. People of the Philippines v. Manuel Macal G. R. No. 211062 13 January 2016 26. People of the Philippines v. Nestor Roxas G. R. No. 218396 10 February 2016 27. People of the Philippines v. Raul Yamon G. R. No. 207816 24 February 2016 28. People of the Philippines v. Reman Sariego G. R. No. 203322 24 February 2016 29. People of the Philippines v. Reynaldo Umanito G. R. No. 208648 13 April 2016 30. People of the Philippines v. Ricardo Lagbo G. R. No. 207535 10 February 2016 31. People of the Philippines v. Romel Sapitula G. R. No. 209212 10 February 2016 32. People of the Philippines v. Ronaldo Casacop G. R. No. 210454 13 January 2016 33. People of the Philippines v. Vicente Lugnasin and DeVincio Guerrero G. R. No. 208404 24 February 2016 34. People of the Philippines v. Victor Padit G. R. No. 202978 1 February 2016 35. People of the Philippines v. Zaldy Salahuddin G. R. No. 206291 18 January 2016 36. Republic of the Philippines v. Fe Roa Gimenez and Ignacio B. Gimenez G. R. No. 174673 11 January 2016 37. Roberto Palo v. People of the Philippines G. R. No. 192075 10 February 2016 38. Secretary Leila De Lima et al v. Mario Joel T. Reyes, G. R. No. 20930, 11 January 2016.

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