2015 REMINDERS for POLITICAL LAW.pdf

2015 REMINDERS for POLITICAL LAW Carlo L. Cruz SEPARATION OF POWERS 

- Unless the Constitution provides otherwise, the Executive department should exclusively exercise all roles and prerogatives which go into the implementation of the national budget as provided under the GAA as well as any other appropriation law…. Clearly, these post -enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in "the various operational aspects of budgeting," including including "the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities" and the "regulation and release of funds" in violation of the separation of powers principle. [ Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013] WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petitions for certiorari and prohibition; and DECLARES the following acts and practices under the Disbursement Acceleration Program, National Budget Circular No. 541 and related executive issuances UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being in violation of Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the doctrine of separation of powers, namely: (a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies, and the declaration declaration of the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year without complying with the statutory definition of savings contained in the General Appropriations Acts; and (b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to augment the appropriations appropriations of other offices outside the Executive. The Court further DECLARES VOID the use of unprogrammed funds despite the absence of a certification by the National Treasurer that the revenue collections exceeded the revenue targets for non-compliance with the conditions provided in the relevant General Appropriations Acts. [ Araullo  Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015] Accordingly, Accordingly, the item referred to by Section 25(5) of the Constitution is the last and indivisible purpose of a program in the appropriation law, which is distinct from the expense category or allotment class. T here is no specificity, indeed, either in the Constitution or in the relevant GAAs that the object of augmentation should be the expense category or allotment class. In the same vein, the President cannot exercise his veto power over an expense category; he may only veto the item to which that expense category belongs to… Nonetheless, this modified interpretation does not take away the caveat that only DAP projects found in the appropriate GAAs may be the subject of augmentation by legally accumulated savings. [ Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, 2 09287, February 3, 2015] Here, the Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the conduct of foreign relations for the Philippines. Philippines. Whether or not to espouse petitioners' claim against the Government of Japan is left to the exclusive determination and judgment of the Executive Department. The Court cannot interfere with or question the wisdom of the conduct of foreign relations by the Executive Department. Accordingly, we cannot direct the Executive Department, either by writ of certiorari or injunction, to conduct our foreign relations with Japan in a certain manner. [ Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230, August 13, 2014] Checks and Balances – The President’s “disapproval of a bill, commonly known as a veto, is essentially a legislative act.” [Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor , 62 Phil. 912, cited in Belgica v. Executive Secretary , G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013]

– the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which is lodged in Congress. [ Belgica v. Executive Secretary , G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013] DELEGATION OF POWERS

The 2013 PDAF Article does not constitute an "appropriation made by law" since it, in its truest sense, only authorizes individual legislators to appropriate in violation of the non-delegability principle as afore-discussed. [ Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013] Finally, it may not be amiss to state that such arrangement also raises non-delegability issues considering that the implementing authority would still have to determine, again, both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation. Since the foregoing determinations constitute the integral aspects of the power to appropriate, the implementing authority would, in effect, be exercising legislative prerogatives in violation of the principle of non-delegability. [ Belgica v. Executive Secretary , G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013] Presidential Pork Barrel  - the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds Funds may be used… This notwithstanding, notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds "to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government," remains legally effective and subsisting… subsisting … the declared unconstitutionality of the 1

aforementioned phrase is but an assurance that the Malampaya Funds would be used – as it should be used – only in accordance with the avowed purpose and intention of PD 910. [ Belgica v. Executive Secretary , G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013] Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be used "to first, finance the priority infrastructure development projects and second, to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines." The Court finds that while the second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from calamities, the first indicated purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine as a "priority". Verily, the law does not supply a definition of "priority infrastructure development projects" and hence, leaves the President without any guideline to construe the same. [ Belgica v. Executive Secretary , G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013] The proviso under Section 9 of the RH Law which states that "any product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the condition that it is not to be used as an abortifacient" is “empty “empty as it is absurd.” absurd. ” The FDA, with all its expertise, cannot fully attest that a drug or device will not all be used as an abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in every instance when the contraceptive contraceptive product or supply will be used. [ Imbong v. Ochoa , G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014] The issuance of a Barangay Protection Order by the Punong Barangay   or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and to "maintain public order in the barangay. Not violative of the principle of delegation. [ Garcia v. Drilon, G. R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013, 699 SCRA 352; Tua v. Mangrobang , G.R. No. 170701, January 22, 2014] –The Archipelago Doctrine  - teaches that the outermost points of our terrestrial domain are to be connected with straight baselines and all waters enclosed thereby shall be considered as our internal waters. As internal waters, they are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction jurisdiction of the Philippines. Archipelagic sealanes are to be laid on these waters over which foreign ships will have the right of passage as if they were open seas.

Article I

UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines and sets the deadline for the filing of application for the extended continental shelf. Complying with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as “regimes of islands” whose islands generate their  own applicable maritime maritime zones… baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article (Article 77). [ Magallona v. Ermita, G.R No. 187167, August 16, 2011] UN Convention on the Law of the Sea - Territorial Territorial Sea - provides for a uniform breadth of 12 miles from the low-water mark of the coast. Contiguous Zone - 12 miles from the outer limits of the territorial sea – exercise of “protective  jurisdiction”  jurisdiction” – in a zone of the high seas contiguous to its territorial sea, the coastal state may exercise the control necessary to prevent and punish infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulations within its territory or territorial sea. Economic Zone or Patrimonial Sea - extending 200 miles from the low water mark of the coastal state – all living and non-living resources found therein belong exclusively to the coastal state. The Continental Shelf refers to [a] the seabed and the subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters, or beyond that limit, to where the depth of the subjacent waters admits of the exploitation exploitation of the natural resources resources of the said areas, and [b] to the seabed and subsoil of similar areas adjacent to the coasts of the islands. The costal state has the EXCLUSIVE sovereign right to explore the continental shelf and to exploit its natural resources, and no one else may do so without its consent. [ Magallona v. Ermita , G.R No. 187167, August 16, 2011] Whether referred to as Philippine “internal waters” under Article I of the Constitution or as “archipelagic waters” under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath… The imposition of these passage rights [right of innocent passage and the right of transit passage through international straits] through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their right to claim all the waters landward of their baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial territorial sovereignty. [ Magallona v. Ermita, G.R No. 187167, August 16, 2011] 2

aforementioned phrase is but an assurance that the Malampaya Funds would be used – as it should be used – only in accordance with the avowed purpose and intention of PD 910. [ Belgica v. Executive Secretary , G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013] Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be used "to first, finance the priority infrastructure development projects and second, to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines." The Court finds that while the second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from calamities, the first indicated purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine as a "priority". Verily, the law does not supply a definition of "priority infrastructure development projects" and hence, leaves the President without any guideline to construe the same. [ Belgica v. Executive Secretary , G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013] The proviso under Section 9 of the RH Law which states that "any product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the condition that it is not to be used as an abortifacient" is “empty “empty as it is absurd.” absurd. ” The FDA, with all its expertise, cannot fully attest that a drug or device will not all be used as an abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in every instance when the contraceptive contraceptive product or supply will be used. [ Imbong v. Ochoa , G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014] The issuance of a Barangay Protection Order by the Punong Barangay   or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and to "maintain public order in the barangay. Not violative of the principle of delegation. [ Garcia v. Drilon, G. R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013, 699 SCRA 352; Tua v. Mangrobang , G.R. No. 170701, January 22, 2014] –The Archipelago Doctrine  - teaches that the outermost points of our terrestrial domain are to be connected with straight baselines and all waters enclosed thereby shall be considered as our internal waters. As internal waters, they are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction jurisdiction of the Philippines. Archipelagic sealanes are to be laid on these waters over which foreign ships will have the right of passage as if they were open seas.

Article I

UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines and sets the deadline for the filing of application for the extended continental shelf. Complying with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as “regimes of islands” whose islands generate their  own applicable maritime maritime zones… baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article (Article 77). [ Magallona v. Ermita, G.R No. 187167, August 16, 2011] UN Convention on the Law of the Sea - Territorial Territorial Sea - provides for a uniform breadth of 12 miles from the low-water mark of the coast. Contiguous Zone - 12 miles from the outer limits of the territorial sea – exercise of “protective  jurisdiction”  jurisdiction” – in a zone of the high seas contiguous to its territorial sea, the coastal state may exercise the control necessary to prevent and punish infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulations within its territory or territorial sea. Economic Zone or Patrimonial Sea - extending 200 miles from the low water mark of the coastal state – all living and non-living resources found therein belong exclusively to the coastal state. The Continental Shelf refers to [a] the seabed and the subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters, or beyond that limit, to where the depth of the subjacent waters admits of the exploitation exploitation of the natural resources resources of the said areas, and [b] to the seabed and subsoil of similar areas adjacent to the coasts of the islands. The costal state has the EXCLUSIVE sovereign right to explore the continental shelf and to exploit its natural resources, and no one else may do so without its consent. [ Magallona v. Ermita , G.R No. 187167, August 16, 2011] Whether referred to as Philippine “internal waters” under Article I of the Constitution or as “archipelagic waters” under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath… The imposition of these passage rights [right of innocent passage and the right of transit passage through international straits] through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their right to claim all the waters landward of their baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial territorial sovereignty. [ Magallona v. Ermita, G.R No. 187167, August 16, 2011] 2

Petitioners’ argument argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory because the baselines that RA 9522 draws do not enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text the Philippines’ continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal: SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as “Regime of Islands” under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596 and b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. [ Magallona v. Ermita , G.R No. 187167, August 16, 2011] In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant innocent passage rights over the territorial territorial sea or archipelagic archipelagic waters, subject to the treaty’s limitations and conditions for their exercise. Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a customary international law, thus automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law. No modern State can validly invoke invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international international community. The fact that for archipelagic archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of innocent passage and sea lanes passage does not place them in lesser footing vis-à-vis continental coastal States which are subject, in their territorial sea, to the right of innocent passage and the right of transit passage through international straits. The imposition of these passage rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their right to claim all the waters landward of their baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial sovereignty. More importantly, the recognition of archipelagic States’ archipelago and the waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the treatment treatment of their islands as separate islands islands under UNCLOS UNCLOS III. Separate islands islands generate their own maritime zones, placing the waters between islands separated by more than 24 nautical miles beyond the States’ territorial t erritorial sovereignty, subjecting these waters to the rights of other States under UNCLOS III. [ Magallona  Magallona v. Ermita, G.R No. 187167, August 16, 2011] The Open Seas – res communes but a state may exercise jurisdiction on the open seas over its vessels, over pirates, in the exercise of the right to visit and search an d under the doctrine of hot pursuit. Outer space , like the open seas, is res communes and NOT susceptible to discovery and occupation; it is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty. A state is responsible for whatever injury or damage any object it sends to outer space may cause.

The Bangsamoro Juridical Entity  [BJE] is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government government being fundamentally fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, the BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the  Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, territory, a government, and a capacity capacity to enter into into relations with with other states. Even assuming arguendo arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine Philippine territory, the spirit animating animating it – which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association –  runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic. Republic. [ The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain , G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008] ARTICLE II -

generally not a source of enforceable rights EXCEPT the Incorporation Clause and Section 28 on the policy of public disclosure – duty to disclose [which presents a SPLENDID SYMMETRY to Article III, Section 7 on the Right to Information]. Section 16 – on ecology – has been implemented by law; which, together with Section 14 – right to health – “need not even be written.” [Oposa v. Factoran ]

The Constitution now describes the Philippines Philippines as not only a republican but also a democratic State. NOTE provisions provisions on initiative on national legislation [Article VI (32)] and initiative on amendment of the Constitution. [Article VII (2)]. Besides, the 1987 Constitution accords to the citizens a greater participation in the affairs of government. Indeed, it provides for people's initiative, the right to information on matters of public concern (including the right to know the state of health of their President), as well as the right to file cases questioning the factual bases for the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law. These provisions enlarge the people’s right in the political as well as the judicial field. It grants them the right to interfere in the affairs of government and challenge any act tending to prejudice their interest. [Petitioner Organizations Organizations v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 147036-37, April 10, 2012] - SEE also –  Article II [23] –  The State shall encourage non-governmental, community based, or sectoral organizations that provide the welfare of the nation. Article X [14] –  The President shall provide for regional development councils xxx composed of local government officials, …  and representatives from non-governmental organizations xxx Article X [18] –  The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. x x x. Article XII [9] – The Congress may establish an independent economic and planning agency headed by the President, which shall, after consultations with the xxx various private sectors xxx Article XIII [15] – The State shall respect the role of independent people’s organizations. Article XIII [16] – The right of the people and their organizations organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels 3

of social, political and economic decision-making decision- making shall not be be abridged. Article XVI [12] – The Congress may create a consultative body to advise the President on policies affecting indigenous cultural communities, the majority of the members of which shall come from the communities. communities. Whatever good is done by the government is attributed to the State but every harm inflicted on the people is imputed not to the State but to the government alone. alone. Such injury may justify justify the replacement replacement of the government by revolution, theoretically theoretically at the behest be hest of the State, in a development known as direct State action. Parens Patriae – guardian of the rights of the people –Offensive language (low value expressions) in television may be regulated or even banned for the sake of the children. Justification –  parens patriae . [Soriano v. Laguardia , G.R. No. 164785, April 29, 2009]

A belligerent occupation would have no effect on the continued effectivity of the law on treason. Accordingly, political laws, like the Constitution, were merely suspended, subject to revival under the  jus postliminium  upon the end of the occupation. Suspension of political laws affects only the civilians, civilians, and not the soldiers or “enemies in arms.” [Ruffy v. Chief of Staff ] Also does not apply to treason [Laurel v. Misa ]. Non-political laws, like the Civil Code, remain effective, unless changed by the belligerent occupant. Judicial decisions, such as a conviction for defamation, shall remain valid even after a belligerent occupation, occupation, except those of a political complexion. Right to Self-Determination – right to freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development. Internal self-determination – a people’s pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework of an existing state. External self-determination  - the establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people. p eople. The people’s right to self-determination self -determination should not, however, be understood as extending extending to a unilateral unilateral right right of secession. [ The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain , G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008]

Distinguish the Incorporation Clause  or Doctrine of Incorporation  from the Doctrine of Transformation – accepted rules of international international law must first be enacted into legislation. [ Note – both doctrines are applicable applicable in our jurisdiction. jurisdiction. There is “transformation” when the Senate gives its concurrence to treaties.] Tax treaties are entered into "to reconcile the national fiscal legislations legislations of the contracting parties and, in turn, help th e taxpayer avoid simultaneous taxations in two different jurisdictions." Thus, laws and issuances must ensure that the reliefs granted under tax treaties are accorded to the parties entitled thereto. The BIR must not impose additional requirements that would negate the availment of the reliefs provided for under international agreements. [ Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue , G.R. No. 188550, August 19, 2013] A zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization. fertilization. [ Imbong v. Ochoa , G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014] Thus, the word “primarily” in Section 3.0I(a and G) of the RH -IRR should be declared void. To uphold the validity validity of Section 3.0I(a and G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives that have the primary effect of being an abortive would effectively open the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the “principle of no abortion” embodied in the constitutional protection protection of life must be upheld. [Imbong v. Ochoa , G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014] Education  - the academic freedom accorded to institutions of higher learning gives them the right to decide for themselves their aims and objectives and how best to attain them. They are given the exclusive discretion to determine who can and cannot study in them, as well as to whom they can confer the honor and distinction of being their graduates. This necessarily includes the prerogative prerogative to establish requirements for graduation, such as the completion of a thesis, and the manner by which this shall be accomplished by their students. The courts may not interfere with their exercise of discretion unless there is a clear showing that they have arbitrarily and capriciously exercised their  judgment. [Calawag v. University of the Philippines Visayas , G.R. No. 207412, August 7, 2013] Political Dynasties –  Section 26 (of Article II) is not self-executing due to the qualifying phrase "as may be defined by law." … since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue. [ Belgica v. Executive Secretary , G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013]

– The commencement of the terms and the regular election election of legislators may be changed by law. An increase in their salaries shall take effect after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives Representatives approving such increase.

ARTICLE VI

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Qualifications - Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 requiring candidates for senator to be certified illegal-drug free – unconstitutional – list of constitutional qualifications exclusive, may not be “enlarged” by Congress. [Social  Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board , G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008]

Indeed, there is no doubt that Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code disqualifies those with dual citizenship from running for local elective positions. There is likewise no doubt that the use of a passport is a positive declaration that one is a citizen of the country which issued the passport, or that a passport proves that the country which issued it recognizes the person named therein as its national. It is unquestioned that Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen, or that he acquired American citizenship by naturalization. There is no doubt that he reacquired his Filipino citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines and that he renounced his American citizenship. It is also indubitable that after renouncing his American citizenship, Arnado used his U.S. passport at least six times. If there is any remaining doubt, it is regarding the efficacy of Arnado’s renunciation of his American citizenship when he subsequently used his U.S. passport… Allowing the subsequent use of a foreign passport because it is convenient for the person to do so is rendering the oath a hollow act. It devalues the act of taking of an oath, reducing it to a mere ceremonial formality. The dissent states that the Court has effectively left Arnado "a man without a country". On the contrary, this Court has, in fact, found Arnado to have more than one. Nowhere in the decision does it say that Arnado is not a Filipino citizen. What the decision merely points out is that he also possessed another citizenship at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy. [ Macquiling v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 195649, July 2, 2013] To be an actual and physical resident of a locality, one must have a dwelling place where one resides no matter how modest and regardless of ownership. The mere purchase of a parcel of land does not make it one’s residence. T he fact that the residential structure where petitioner intends to reside was still under construction on the lot she purchased means that she has not yet established actual and physical residence in the barangay xxx A temporary stay in a stranger’s house cannot amount to residence… Approval of voter registration does not presuppose six-month residency in the place prior to registration. [ Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections , G.R. No. 193314, June 25, 2013] The critical issue, however, pertains to Osmeña’s bodily presence in Toledo City and the declaration he made in his COC on this point. The petitioners claim that Osmeña was only seen in Toledo City in the month of September 2012 to conduct political meetings. They also stress that the dilapidated property in Ibo, Toledo City is not even owned by Osmeña, and is not in keeping with the latter’s stature — a former Senator and a member of a political clan … The law does not require a person to be in his home twenty-four (24) hours a day, seven (7) days a week, to fulfill the residency requirement. In Fernandez v. House Electoral Tribunal , we ruled that the "fact that a few barangay health workers attested that they had failed to see petitioner whenever they allegedly made the rounds in Villa de Toledo is of no moment, especially considering that there were witnesses (including petitioner's neighbors in Villa de Toledo) that were in turn presented by petitioner to prove that he was actually a resident of Villa de Toledo, in the address he stated in his COC. x x x It may be that whenever these health workers do their rounds petitioner was out of the house to attend to his own employment or business."… Similarly, the fact that Osmeña has no registered property under his name does not belie his actual residence in Toledo City because property ownership is not among the qualifications required of candidates for local election. It is enough that he should live in the locality, even in a rented house or that of a friend or relative. To use ownership of property in the district as the determinative indicium of permanence of domicile or residence implies that only the landed can establish compliance with the residency requirement. In Perez v. COMELEC , we sustained the COMELEC when it considered as evidence tending to establ ish a candidate’s domicile of choice the mere lease (rather than ownership) of an apartment by a candidate in the same province where he ran for the position of governor… Osmeña’s actual physical presence in Toledo City is established not only by the presence of a place (Ibo, Toledo City, house and lot) he can actually live in, but also the affidavits of various persons in Toledo City. Osmeña’s substantial and real interest in establishing his domicile of choice in Toledo City is also sufficiently shown not only by the acquisition of additional property in the area and the transfer of his voter registration and headquarters, but also his participation in the community’s socio -civic and political activities. Osmeña has been proclaimed winner in the electoral contest and has therefore the mandate of the electorate Before his transfer of residence, Osmeña already had intimate knowledge of Toledo City, particularly of the whole 3rd legislative district that he represented for one term. Thus, he manifests a significant level of knowledge of and sensitivity to the needs of the said community. Moreover, Osmeña won the mayoralty position as the choice of the people of Toledo City. [ Jalover v. de la Pena, G.R. No. 209286, September 23, 2014] The prescriptive period under the HRET Rules [for the institution of election contests] does not apply to disqualification cases based on citizenship. Being a continuing requirement, one who assails a member's citizenship or lack of it may still question the same at any time, the prescriptive period notwithstanding. BUT it is the State, through its representatives designated by statute that may question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the appropriate denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not a matter that may be raised by private persons in an election case involving the naturalized citizen’s descendant. [ Limkaichong v. COMELEC , G.R. Nos. 178831-32, April 1, 2009] Party-List Representatives - The COMELEC cannot issue implementing rules and regulations that provide an additional ground - when the “nomination is withdrawn by the party” - for the substitution of a party-list nominee. RA 7941 lists only 3 grounds – death, disability and withdrawal by the nominee himself. [ Lokin v. COMELEC , G.R. No. 180443, June 22, 2010] 5

A party-list nominee who changes his sectoral affiliation within the same party will only be eligible for nomination under the new sectoral affiliation if the change has been effected at least six months before the elections. [  Amores v. HRET , G.R. No. 189600, June 29, 2010] For every four district representatives, there shall be one party-list representative. There is no need for legislation to create an additional party-list seat whenever four additional legislative districts are created by law. Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution automatically creates such additional party-list seat. [ BANAT v. COMELEC , G.R. No. 179271, July 8, 2009] The filling-up of all available party-list seats is not mandatory. Four parameters in a Philippine-style party-list election system: [1] Twenty percent of the total number of the membership of the House of Representatives is the maximum number of seats available to party-list organizations, such that there is automatically one party-list seat for every four existing legislative districts. [2] Garnering two percent of the total votes cast in the party-list elections guarantees a party-list organization one seat. The guaranteed seats shall be distributed in a first round of seat allocation to parties receiving at least two percent of the total party-list votes. [3] The additional seats, that is, the remaining seats after allocation of the guaranteed seats, shall be distributed to the party-list organizations including those that received less than two percent of the total votes. The continued operation of the two percent threshold as it applies to the allocation of the additional seats is now unconstitutional because this threshold mathematically and physically prevents the filling up of the available party-list seats. The additional seats shall be distributed to the parties in a second round of seat allocation according to the two-step procedure laid down in the Decision of 21 April 2009 as clarified in this Resolution. ( Two-Step Procedure   - The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a party’s share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation.) [4] The three-s eat cap is constitutional. The three-seat cap is intended by the Legislature to prevent any party from dominating the party-list system. [BANAT v. COMELEC , G.R. No. 179271, July 8, 2009] Parameters for party-list registration : 1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. 2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector. 3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in partylist elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition. 4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in “well -defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well -defined political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth. 5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack “well-defined political constituencies,” either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bonafide members of such parties or organizations. 6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified. [ Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections , G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013]

There is no arguing that the COMELEC Resolution dated January 5, 2010 granting LPGMA’s registration has since become final. Such finality, however, pertains only to the Resolution itself and not to the accreditation of LPGMA as a party-list organization… The Resolution did not create in LPGMA’s favor a perpetual and indefeasible right to its accreditation as a party-list organization. Neither did it grant finality and indefeasibility to the factual findings of the COMELEC on the qualifications of the group. Both the accreditation and the facts substantiating the same can be reviewed and revoked at any time by the COMELEC, motu propio, or upon the instance of any interested party thru a complaint for cancellation, as set forth in Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941. [ Dayao v. Commission on Elections , G.R. No. 193643]

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There are two kinds of congressmen – elected from legislative districts and those elected through the party-list system. Once elected, the party-list representative has the same rights, privileges and duties as the district representative. They are also subject to the same term limitation of three years for a maximum of three consecutive terms. The consistent judicial holding is that the HRET has jurisdiction to pass upon the qualifications of party-list nominees after their proclamation and assumption of office. [ Abayon v. HRET , G.R. No. 189466, February 11, 2010] No one has a vested right to any public office, much less a vested right to an expectancy of holding a public office." Under Section 2(5), Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC is entrusted with the function to "register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of government." In fulfilling this function, the COMELEC is duty-bound to review the grant of registration to parties, organizations, or coalitions already registered in order to ensure the latter’s continuous adherence to the requirements prescribed by law and the relevant rulings of this Court relative to their qualifications and eligibility to participate in party-list elections. The Arquiza Group cannot, therefore, object to the retroactive application of COMELEC Resolution N o. 9366 on the ground of the impairment of SENIOR CITIZENS’ vested right. Be that as it may, even if COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 expressly provided for its retroactive application, the Court finds that the COMELEC En Banc indeed erred in cancelling the registration and accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENS. The reason for this is that the ground invoked by the COMELEC En Banc, i.e., the term-sharing agreement among the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS, was not implemented… Indubitably, if the term-sharing agreement was not actually implemented by the parties thereto, it appears that SENIOR CITIZENS, as a party-list organization, had been unfairly and arbitrarily penalized by the COMELEC En Banc. [Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines v. Commission on Elections , G.R. Nos. 206844-45, July 23, 2013] Under Section 4 of RA No. 7941, a party-list group already registered "need not register anew" for purposes of every subsequent election, but only needs to file a manifestation of intent to participate with the COMELEC. [ COCOFED v. Commission on Elections , G.R. No. 207026, August 6, 2013;  Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy (ANAD) v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206987, September 10, 2013] The fact that COCOFED did not obtain sufficient number of votes in the elections does not affect the issue of the validity of the COMELEC’s registration. [COCOFED v. Commission on Elections , G.R. No. 207026, August 6, 2013] A party is not allowed to simply refuse to submit a list containing "not less than five nominees" and consider the deficiency as a waiver on its part. [ COCOFED v. Commission on Elections , G.R. No. 207026, August 6, 2013;  Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy (ANAD) v. Commission on Elections , G.R. No. 206987, September 10, 2013] Sectoral parties or organizations, such as ABANG LINGKOD, are no longer required to adduce evidence showing their track record, i.e. proof of activities that they have undertaken to further the cause of the sector they represent. Indeed, it is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interes t and concerns of their sector… evidence showing a track record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented sectors is only required from nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented who do not factually belong to the sector represented by their party or organization. [ Abang Lingkod Party-List v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206952, October 22, 2013] Legislative Districts – “Gerrymandering” is a term employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power. The Constitution proscribes gerrymandering, as it mandates each legislative district to comprise, as far as practicable, a contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. [Navarro v. Ermita , G.R. No. 180050, February 10, 2010]

The law clearly provides that the basis for districting shall be the number of the inhabitants of a city or a province, not the number of registered voters therein. [ Herrera v. COMELEC ] Each additional legislative district in a city need not have 250,000 inhabitants provided that the initial or original district formed in said city had, at the time of its establishment, a population of 250,000. [ Mariano v. COMELEC ] Congress may not authorize the ARMM to create provinces and cities because the power to create them inherently involves the power to create a legislative district, which only Congress possesses. The ARMM may, however, be authorized by law to create municipalities and barangays. [Sema v. COMELEC  , G.R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008] A proposed province composed of one or more islands need not comply with the 2,000 square meter contiguous territory requirement under the Local Government Code, as provided for under the exemptions in the IRR of the LGC. [ Navarro v. Ermita , G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011] Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province. The “250,000 inhabitants” requirement does not apply to creation of additional legislative districts for a province. [ Aquino v. COMELEC , G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010] A law is passed dividing Cagayan de Oro City into two legislative districts. No need for a plebiscite under Article X, Section 10, because the territory remains a single unit. [ Bagabuyo v. COMELEC , G.R. No. 176970, December 8, 2008] Inhibitions - allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation – a matter before another office of government – renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office… insofar as its post7

enactment features dilute congressional oversight and violate Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, thus impairing public accountability, the 2013 PDAF Article and other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel of similar nature are deemed as unconstitutional. [ Belgica v. Executive Secretary , G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013] Legislative power  - appropriation, taxation, expropriation - not exclusive to Congress – initiative and referendum may be exercised directly by the people – RA 6735 includes the power to amend or repeal laws.

The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight powers may be divided into three categories, namely: scrutiny  - to determine economy and efficiency of the operation of government activities; investigation – under Section 21; and supervision (or legislative veto) – which connotes a continuing and informed awareness on the part of a congressional committee regarding executive operations in a given administrative area. While both congressional scrutiny and investigation involve inquiry into past executive branch actions in order to influence future executive branch performance, congressional supervision allows Congress to scrutinize the exercise of delegated law-making authority, and permits Congress to retain part of that delegated authority. xxx. The requirement that the implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by Congress as a condition for their effectivity violates the cardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism and the rule on presentment. Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the President for approval or veto. In the absence of presentment to the President, no bill passed by Congress can become a law. (The so- called “rule on presentment” pertains to the submission of a bill to the President for his appropriate action. [VI, 27 (1)) [ Abakada Guro Party List V. Purisima , G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008;  Macalintal v. COMELEC , G.R. 157013, July 10, 2003] The power to grant immunity from prosecution is essentially a legislative prerogative – springs from its authority to define and prescribe punishment for crimes. [Quarto v. the Honorable Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo , G.R. No. 169042, October 5, 2011] The supermajority vote requirement set forth in Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 [Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 provides: “Consistent with the provisions of the Constitution, this Organic Act may be re -amended or revised by the Congress of the Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate voting separately.”] is unconstitutional for violating the principle that Congress cannot pass irrepealable laws. [ Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines , G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012] We rule out the first option – holdover for those who were elected in executive and legislative positions in the ARMM during the 2008-2011 term –  as an option that Congress could have chosen because a holdover violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution… the term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years as fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress … If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view –  like the extension of the elective term –  is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents… Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the President. [ Pimentel v. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005; Datu Michael  Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines , G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011] The President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises for the operation of a public utility that are exclusive in character. [Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution] Non-legislative powers of Congress – canvass of presidential elections [VII, 5]; declaration of existence of a state of war [VII, 23 (2)]; resolution of conflicts between the President and a majority of his Cabinet regarding his ability to discharge his functions [VII, 11] confirmation of amnesties [VII, 19], and of presidential appointments [VII, 16]; amendment or revision of the Constitution [XVII]; and impeachment [XI]. Nature of Congress  - Congress is not a continuing body. [League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC , G.R. No. 176951, November 18, 2008] The Senate as an institution is “continuing,” as it is not dissolved as an entity with each national election or change in the composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its day-to-day business the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress before it. Accordingly, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even legislative investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time. [Garcillano v. House of Representatives , G.R. No. 170338, December 23, 2008] BUT NOTE  Arnault v. Nazareno – the Senate is a continuing body for purposes of its power of contempt. Electoral Tribunals - The resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power … At the higher levels – city, provincial, and regional, as well as congressional and senatorial – exclusive and original jurisdiction is lodged in the COMELEC and in the House of Representatives and Senate Electoral Tribunals, which are not, strictly 8

and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution. Besides, when the COMELEC, the HRET, and the SET decide election contests, their decisions are still subject to judicial review –  via a petition for certiorari filed by the proper party –  if there is a showing that the decision was rendered with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. [ Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010 and June 7, 2011] Electoral Tribunals shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective “Members.” To be considered a “Member” of the House of Representatives, “there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (a) a valid proclamation, (b) a proper oath, and (c) assumption of office.” A “proper oath” is one taken before the Speaker of the House of Representatives “in open session,” consist ent with the provisions of Section 6 of Rule II (Membership) of the Rules of the House of Representatives. [ Reyes v. COMELEC , G.R. No. 207264,  June 25, 2013] Considering that Angelina had already been proclaimed as Member of the House of Representatives…,  as she has in fact taken her oath and assumed office past noon time of June 30, 2013, the Court is now without jurisdiction to resolve the case at bar… the issues concerning the conduct of the canvass and the resulting proclamation of Angelina as herein discussed are matters which fall under the scope of the terms "election" and "returns" as above-stated and hence, properly fall under the HRET’s sole jurisdiction. [ Tanada v. Commission on Elections , G.R. Nos. 207199-200, October 22, 2013] The term "election" refers to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes; "returns" refers to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns; and "qualifications" refers to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his CoC. [ Barbers v. COMELEC , G.R. No. 165691, June 22, 2005, 460 SCRA 569] Commission on Appointments  - shall rule by a majority of all its Members … The President may not be compelled to submit his “acting” appointments to the CA for confirmation. [ Pimentel v. Ermita ] Ad interim appointments, which are permanent appointments [ Matibag v. Benipayo], shall remain effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the adjournment of the next special or regular session of Congress. [ Guevarra v. Inocentes ] In a special session, the Congress may consider “general legislation or only such subjects as the President may designate.” In a regular session, “the power of the Congress is not circumscribed except by limitations imposed by organic law.” [ Araneta v. Dinglasan] Legislative Inquiries  - Section 21 relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Its aim is to elicit information that may be used for legislation. On the other hand, Section 22 pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function.   Simply stated, while both powers allow Congress or any of its committees to conduct inquiry, their objectives are different. [Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers , G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008]

The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure. New session requires a new publication of rule, unless said rules would provide that they shall continue to be effective unless changed by a subsequent Congress. [Garcillano v. House of Representatives , G.R. No. 170338, December 23, 2008] Executive privilege with respect to the privilege for diplomatic negotiations may be invoked not only against citizens’ demands for information, but also in the context of legislative investigations. [ AKBAYAN v. Aquino , G.R. No. 170516,  July 16, 2008] The subject of a legislative inquiry is a political question. [ De la Paz v. Senate , G.R. No. 184849, February 13, 2009]  Appropriations - an item of appropriation as "an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose." An "item" is indivisible because the amount cannot be divided for any purpose other than the specific purpose stated in the item. [Footnote 211, Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013] An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law which happens to be put into an appropriation bill.

A General Appropriations Act contains an estimate of revenues and funding sources, which are usually (1) taxes, (2) capital revenues (like proceeds from the sales of assets), (3) grants, (4) extraordinary income (like dividends of government corporations) and (5) borrowings. Unprogrammed funds arise or exist when the estimated revenues are exceeded by actual receipts, e.g., unexpected large dividends from government institutions like the Social Security System and Government Service Insurance System. Savings occur when estimated expenditures are not spent, e.g. “(a) 9

the PAPs (projects, activities or programs) for which the appropriation had been authorized was completed, finally discontinued, or abandoned; or (b) there were vacant positions and leaves of absence without pay; or (c) the required or planned targets, programs and services were realized at a lesser cost because of the implementation of measures resulting in improved systems and efficiencies.” The “act or practice” of transferring funds “prior to the end of the fiscal year,” which did not meet any of those three instances, is unconstitutional. [ Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287,  July 1, 2014] An appropriation made by law under the contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution exists when a provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or determinable amount of money and (b) allocates the same for a particular public purpose… the 2013 PDAF Article cannot be properly deemed as a legal appropriation under the said constitutional provision precisely because it contains post-enactment measures which effectively create a system of intermediate appropriations. These intermediate appropriations are the actual appropriations meant for enforcement and since they are made by individual legislators after the GAA is passed, they occur outside the law …  the real appropriation made under the 2013 PDAF Article is not the P24.79 Billion allocated for the entire PDAF, but rather the post-enactment determinations made by the individual legislators which are, to repeat, occurrences outside of the law. .. the 2013 PDAF Article does not constitute an "appropriation made by law" since it, in its truest sense, only authorizes individual legislators to appropriate in violation of the non-delegability principle. [ Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013] Enrolled Bills - That the provision was a product of amendments introduced during the deliberation of the Senate Bill does not detract from its validity…  This Court has subscribed to the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill to refuse invalidating a provision of law, on the ground that the bill from which it originated contained no such provision and was merely inserted by the bicameral conference committee of both Houses. [ Central Bank Employees Association v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and t he Executive Secretary , G.R. No. 148208, December 15, 2004] Log-rolling legislation  - refers to the process in which several provisions supported by an individual legislator or minority of legislators are combined into a single piece of legislation supported by a majority of legislators on a quid pro quo basis: no one provision may command majority support, but the total package will. [ Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013]

Instances when vote needs to be recorded – at the request of 1/5 [16, 4], vote on third reading [26, 2], overriding vote in case of veto [27, 1], HR impeachment vote [XI, 3, 3]. Presidential certification [economic emergency] does away with the requirements of three readings on separate days and distribution of final copies three days before enactment. [ Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance ] Note Article VII, Section 10 –  simultaneous vacancies in the offices of the President and the Vice-President - The bill calling such special election shall be deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article V1 of this Constitution and shall become law upon its approval on third reading by the Congress. No special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next presidential election. The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule … a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth… Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving "sustainable human development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation. [ Imbong v. Ochoa , G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014] Although not provided for in the Constitution, Congress has established the so-called Conference Committee, composed of representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives, which is a “mechanism for compromising differences” between their respective versions of a bill or joint resolution. It has been ruled that “it is within the power of a conference committee to include in its report an entirely new provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate b ill” and whatever changes may be agreed upon by the Conference Committee need not undergo another “three readings” in the Senate and the House of Representatives. [ Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance ] Partial veto – general rule – approve entirely or disapprove in toto, except with respect to appropriations bills.

In contrast, what beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely provide for a singular lump-sum amount to be tapped as a source of funding for multiple purposes. Since such appropriation type necessitates the further determination of both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation which must still be chosen from the multiple purposes stated in the law, it cannot be said that the appropriation law already indicates a "specific appropriation of money and hence, without a proper line-item which the President may veto.” As a practical result, the President would then be faced with the predicament of either vetoing the entire appropriation if

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he finds some of its purposes wasteful or undesirable, or approving the entire appropriation so as not to hinder some of its legitimate purposes. [ Belgica v. Executive Secretary , G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013] For the President to exercise his item- veto power, it necessarily follows that there exists a proper "item" which may be the object of the veto. An item, as defined in the field of appropriations, pertains to "the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill." Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must be an item characterized by singular correspondence –  meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a "line-item." [ Belgica v. Executive Secretary , G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013] Power of Taxation   - Since building permit fees are not charges on property, they are not impositions from which petitioner is exempt. [ Angeles University Foundation v. City of Angeles, G.R. No. 189999, June 27, 2012] Double taxation  - petitioner should not have been subjected to taxes under Section 21 of the Manila Revenue Code for the fourth quarter of 2001, considering that it had already been paying local business tax under Section 14 of the same ordinance. [Swedish Match Philippines, Inc. v. The Treasurer of the City of Manila , G.R. No. 181277, July 3, 2013] Inititatives – Any proposal to enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress shall be valid only if ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than forty-five days but not later than ninety days after the certification by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition.

– The President is granted Ordinance Powers under Chapter 2, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) and may issue any of the following: xxx Sec. 2. Executive Orders. —  Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive orders. Sec. 3.  Administrative Orders. —  Acts of the President which relate to particular aspect of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders. Sec. 4. Proclamations. — Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order. Sec. 5.  Memorandum Orders. —  Acts of the President on matters of administrative detail or of subordinate or temporary interest which only concern a particular officer or office of the Government shall be embodied in memorandum orders. Sec. 6.  Memorandum Circulars . —  Acts of the President on matters relating to internal administration, which the President desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the departments, agencies, bureaus or offices of the Government, for information or compliance, shall be embodied in memorandum circulars. Sec. 7. General or Special Orders. — Acts and commands of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be issued as general or special orders. ARTICLE VII

The President may not invoke Section 17 of Article XII, which would authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without authority from Congress. BUT the President alone can declare a state of national emergency; however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. [ David v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006] A verbal pronouncement to the effect that E.O. No. 304 is suspended should not have been given weight. An executive order is valid when it is not contrary to the law or Constitution. [Civil Code, Article 7] [ Republic of the Philippines v. Bayao, G.R. No. 179492, June 5, 2013] We have held that an administrative regulation adopted pursuant to law has the force and effect of law. ( Spouses  Almeda v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 309) Thus, the rules, guidelines and policies regarding the Order of National Artists jointly issued by the CCP Board of Trustees and the NCCA pursuant to their respective statutory mandates have the force and effect of law. Until set aside, they are binding upon executive and administrative agencies, including the President himself/herself as chief executor of laws. [ Almario v. Executive Secretary , G.R. No. 189028, July 16, 2013] Executive Power   - Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created within the ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under his continuing "delegated legislative authority to reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O. 292. [ Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal  Affairs Investigative and Adjudication Division, G.R. No. 196425, July 24, 2012]

As Chief Executive, the President has the general responsibility to promote public peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless violence… While the President does not possess constituent powers – as those powers may be exercised only by Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people through initiative and referendum –  she may submit proposals for constitutional change to Congress in a 11

manner that does not involve the arrogation of constituent powers. It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. [The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, GR No. 183591, October 14, 2008] Executive Privilege - The President’s “executive privilege” covers all presidential communications. [ AKBAYAN v.  Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008] However, the privilege accorded to presidential communications is not absolute, one significant qualification being that “the Executive cannot, any more than the other branches of government, invoke a general confidentiality privilege to shield its officials and employees from investigations by the proper governmental institutions into possible criminal wrongdoing.” This qualification applies whether the privilege is being invoked in the context of a judicial trial or a congressional investigation conducted in aid of legislation.

Executive privilege, which includes conversations and correspondence between the President and the public official covered by this executive order ( Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, May 23, 1995; Chavez v. Public Estates Aut hority, G.R. No. 133250, July 9. 002); military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national security should not be divulged ( Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, May 23, 1995; Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,  G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998); information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements ( Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government , G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998); discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings ( Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998); and matters affecting national security and public order ( Chavez v. Public Estates Authority , G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002), MAY BE INVOKED against this legislative power. BUT note that executive officials are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power —  the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose information, must, therefore, be clearly asserted, and not merely implied. In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the President the power to invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state that the autho rity is “By order of the President,” which means that he personally consulted with her. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such power. [3] That a type of information is recognized as privileged does not, however, necessarily mean that it would be considered privileged in all instances. For in determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the question that must be asked is not only whether the requested information falls within one of the traditional privileges, but also whether that privilege should be honored in a given procedural setting. [ Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public [1] “Secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries  is not violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to information.”  [People’s Movement for Press Freedom (PMPF) v. Manglapus ] “Information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest.” [ Chavez v. PCGG] Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting no exception. It bears emphasis; however, that such privilege is only presumptive. [2] Informer’s Privilege - the privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of a person or persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law. [3] Privilege accorded to presidential communications , which are presumed privileged without distinguishing between those which involve matters of national security and those which do not, the rationale for the privilege being that a frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power. It bears emphasis, however, that the privilege accorded to presidential communications is not absolute, one significant qualification being that “the Executive cannot, any more than the other branches of government, invoke a general confidentiality privilege to shield its officials and employees from investigations by the proper governmental institutions into possible crimi nal wrongdoing.” This qualification applies whether the privilege is being invoked in the context of a judicial trial or a congressional investigation conducted in aid of legislation. [4] Deliberative Process Privilege  - covers documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. Notably, the privileged status of such documents rests, not on the need to protect national security but, on the “obvious realization that officials will not communicate candidly among themselves if each remark is a potential item of discovery and front page news,” the objective of the privilege being to enhance the quality of agency decisions. T he so-called “deliberative process privilege” refers to the decision -making of executive officials. [ AKBAYAN v. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008] Presidential Communications Privilege applies to decision-making of the President ; rooted in the constitutional principle of separation of power and the President’s unique constitutional role . The elements of presidential communications 12

privilege are - 1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential   and non-delegable presidential power.” 2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of th e President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President. The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. Deliberative Process Privilege  applies to decision-making of executive officials; based on common law privilege.

Unlike the deliberative process privilege, the presidential communications privilege applies to documents in their entirety, and covers final and post-decisional materials as well as pre-deliberative ones As a consequence, congressional or judicial negation of the presidential communications privilege is always subject to greater scrutiny than denial of the deliberative process privilege. [ Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officer , G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008] Power of Appointment  - In Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary , [G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991, 194 SCRA 317] this Court explained that the prohibition contained in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not apply to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary function of said official's office.

The 1987 Constitution in prohibiting dual or multiple offices, as well as incompatible offices, refers to the holding of the office, and not to the nature of the appointment or designation, words which were not even found in Section 13, Article VII nor in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX -B. To “hold” an office means to “possess or occupy” the sa me, or “to be in possession and administration,”   which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office. [Funa v. Ermita, G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010] The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General was unconstitutional and void for being in violation of the constitutional prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution… It is equally remarkable, therefore, that Agra’s designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice was not in an ex officio  capacity, by which he would have been validly authorized to concurrently hold the two positions due to the holding of one office being the consequence of holding the other. [ Funa v. Agra, G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013] A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face. He may also be one who is in possession of an office, and is discharging its duties under color of authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned. In order to be clear, therefore, the Court holds that all official actions of Agra as a de  facto Acting Secretary of Justice, assuming that was his later designation, were presumed valid, binding and effective as if he was the officer legally appointed and qualified for the office. This clarification is necessary in order to protect the sanctity of the dealings by the public with persons whose ostensible authority emanates from the State. Agra’s official actions covered by this clarification extend to but are not limited to the promulgation of resolutions on petitions for review filed in the Department of Justice, and the issuance of department orders, memoranda and circulars relative to the prosecution of criminal cases. [ Funa v. Agra,  G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013] Assuming that Gaite was a de facto officer of the Office of the President after his appointment to the Securities and Exchange Commission, any decision he renders during this time is presumed to be valid, binding, and effective. [Espiritu v. del Rosario , G.R. No. 204964, October 15, 2014] Section 15 [of Article VII, on prohibited or “midnight” appointments] does not apply to the Judiciary. Under the Constitution, it is mandatory for the JBC to submit to the President the list of nominees to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court in order to enable the President to appoint one of them within the 90 -day period from the occurrence of the vacancy. [ De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, G. R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010] Confirmation is required only for the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. [ Sarmiento v. Mison ] Commissioner of Human Rights not subject to confirmation; not included in the first sentence. [ Bautista v. Salonga ] NLRC commissioners do not require confirmation. [ Calderon v. Carale ] Constitutional Commissioners require confirmation. Members of the Judiciary do not require confirmation, only JBC nomination. Judicial and Bar Council [regular members] require confirmation. Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsmen do not require confirmation, just JBC nomination. The Vice-President, when appointed to the Cabinet, requires no confirmation. 13

Now that the Philippine Coast Guard is under the DOTC and no longer part of the Philippine Navy or the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the promotions and appointments of respondent officers of the PCG, or any PCG officer from the rank of captain and higher for that matter, do not require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. [Soriano III v. Lista , G.R. 153881, March 24, 2003] Given that the President derives his power to appoint OICs in the ARMM regional government from law, it falls under the classification of presidential appointments covered by the second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution; the President’s appointment power thus rests on clear constitutional basis. [Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines , G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012] The petitioners also jointly assert that RA No. 10153, in granting the President the power to appoint OICs in elective positions, violates Section 16, Article X of the Constitution, which merely grants the President the power of supervision over autonomous regions… There is no incompatibility between the President’s power of supervision over local governments and autonomous regions, and the power granted to the President, within the specific confines of RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs… Once the President has appointed the OICs for the offices of the Governor, Vice Governor and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, these same officials will remain in office until they are replaced by the duly elected officials in the May 2013 elections. Nothing in this provision even hints that the President has the power to recall the appointments he al ready made. Clearly, the petitioners’ fears in this regard are more apparent than real. [ Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines , G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012] The power granted to the President, via RA No. 10153, to appoint members of the Regional Legislative Assembly is comparable to the power granted by BP 881 (the Omnibus Election Code) to the President to fill any vacancy for any cause in the Regional Legislative Assembly (then called the Sangguniang Pampook). [Section 35. Filling of vacancy. Pending an election to fill a vacancy arising from any cause in the Sangguniang Pampook, the vacancy shall be filled by the President, upon recommendation of the Sangguniang Pampook: Provided, That the appointee shall come from the same province or sector of the member being replaced.] [ Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philip pines , G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012] Generally, the power to appoint vested in the President includes the power to make temporary appointments, unless he is otherwise specifically prohibited by the Constitution or by the law, or where an acting appointment is repugnant to the nature of the office involved. [ Cabiling v. Pabualan , G.R. Nos. L-21764 and L-21765, May 31, 1965, 14 SCRA 274] Generally, the purpose for staggering the term of office is to minimize the appointing authority’s opportunity to appoint a majority of the members of a collegial body. It also intended to ensure the continuity of the body and its policies. A staggered term of office, however, is not a statutory prohibition, direct or indirect, against the issuance of acting or temporary appointment. It does not negate the authority to issue acting or temporary appointments that the Administrative Code grants. [ General v. Urro , G.R. No. 191560, March 29, 2011] The President is without any power to remove elected officials, since the power is exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code. [ Salalima v. Guingona, Jr .]; Sangguniang Barangay of Don Mariano Marcos v. Martinez , G.R. No. 170626, March 3, 2008] The authority of the CSC is only to determine whether or not the appointees possess the legal qualifications and the appropriate eligibility, nothing else. [ Lopez v. Civil Service Commission ] The CSC may not approve as “temporary” an appointment designated as “permanent” by the appointing authority. [Luego v. Civil Service Commission ] The CSC classified the position of Graft Investigation Officer III as belonging to the Career Executive Service; appointee to the position required to acquire CES eligibility [CES officers, under the Administrative Code, are appointed by the President]. Ombudsman challenges the classification, saying that it impairs his appointment prerogative as guaranteed under the Constitution. SC: classification would result in absurdity – [a] it would vest in the President the power to appoint an employee of the Ombudsman, in violation of the Constitution, or [b] it would include in the CES a position not occupied by a presidential appointee, contrary to the Administrative Code. The CSC may not classify a position [Graft Investigation Officer III of the Office of the Ombudsman] as belonging to the Career Executive Service and require an appointee thereto to acquire CES eligibility, because CES officers are appointed by the President. This derogates the appointing power of the Ombudsman. A CES appointment not effected by the President is contrary to the provisions of the Administrative Code. [ Office of the Ombudsman v. Civil Service Commission, 451 SCRA 570] An ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments does not constitute a term of office. The period from the time the ad interim appointment is made to the tim e it lapses is neither a fixed term nor an unexpired term. [ Fetalino v. Commission on Elections , G.R. No. 191890, December 04, 2012]

14

In the voting held on January 28, 2014, by a vote of 8-7, the Court resolved to reverse its September 4, 2012 Decision insofar as petitioner Gonzales is concerned (G.R. No. 196231). We declared Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 unconstitutional by granting disciplinary jurisdiction to the President over a Deputy Ombudsman, in violation of the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. However, by another vote of 8-7, the Court resolved to maintain the validity of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 insofar as Sulit is concerned. The Court did not consider the Office of the Special Prosecutor to be constitutionally within the Office of the Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled to the independence the latter enjoys under the Constitution. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to declare Section 8(2) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. This ruling renders any further ruling on the dismissal of Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III unnecessary, but is without prejudice to the power of the Ombudsman to conduct an administrative investigation, if warranted, into the possible administrative liability of Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III under pertinent Civil Service laws, rules and regulations. [ Gonzales v. Office of the President , G.R. No. 196231, January 28, 2014, Resolution on Motion for Reconsideration] Power of control  - if a certain power or authority is vested by law upon the Department Secretary, then such power or authority may be exercised directly by the President, who exercises supervision and control over the departments. [ Araneta v. Gatmaitan, 101 Phil. 328]

Memorandum Circular No. 58, which provides that no appeal from or petition for review of decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice on preliminary investigations of criminal cases shall be entertained by the Office of the President, except those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, is well within the purview of the doctrine of qualified political agency . [ Angeles v. Gaite , G.R. No. 165276, November 25, 2009] But the doctrine of qualified political agency could not be extended to the acts of the Board of Directors of TIDCORP despite some of its members being themselves the appointees of the President to the Cabinet… Such Cabinet members sat on the Board of Directors of TIDCORP ex officio, or by reason of their office or function, not because of their direct appointment to the Board by the President. Evidently, it was the law, not the President, that sat them in the Board. [Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines v. Manalang-Demigillo ] Such "executive control" is not absolute. The definition of the structure of the executive branch of government, and the corresponding degrees of administrative control and supervision is not the exclusive preserve of the executive. It may be effectively limited by the Constitution, by law, or by judicial decisions. All the more in the matter of appellate procedure as in the instant case. Appeals are remedial in nature; hence, constitutionally subject to this Court’s rulemaking power. The Rules of Procedure was issued by the Court pursuant to Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, which expressly empowers the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning the procedure in all courts. Parenthetically, Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 18 expressly recognizes an exception to the remedy of appeal to the Office of the President from the decisions of executive departments and agencies. Under Section 1 thereof, a decision or order issued by a department or agency need not be appealed to the Office of the President when there is a special law that provides for a different mode of appeal. In the instant case, the enabling law of respondent BOI, E.O. No. 226, explicitly allows for immediate judicial relief from the decision of respondent BOI involving pet itioner’s application for an ITH. E.O. No. 226 is a law of special nature and should prevail over A.O. No. 18. In this case, a special law, RA 7394, likewise expressly provided for immediate judicial relief from decisions of the DTI Secretary by filing a petition for certiorari with the "proper court." Hence, private respondent should have elevated the case directly to the CA through a petition for certiorari. [ Moran v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 192957, September 29, 2014] Faithful Execution of Laws - The President’s discretion in the conferment of the Order of National Artists should be exercised in accordance with the duty to faithfully execute the relevant laws. [ Almario v. Executive Secretary , G.R. No. 189028, July 16, 2013]

The creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. [Section 17, Article VII] [ Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010] Since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body and it is not one of those agencies whose decisions, orders or resolutions are appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, the resolution of the Secretary of Justice finding probable cause to indict petitioners for estafa is, therefore, not appealable to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review under Rule 43. [Santos v. Go , G.R. No. 156081, October 19, 2005] Commander-in-Chief  - Pursuant to the doctrine of command responsibility, the President, as the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP, can be held liable for affront against the petitioner’s rights to life, liberty and security as long as substanti al evidence exist to show that he or she had exhibited involvement in or can be imputed with knowledge of the violations, or had failed to exercise necessary and reasonable diligence in conducting the necessary investigations required under the rules. The Court also stresses that rule that the presidential immunity from suit exists only in concurrence with the president’s incumbency. [ Rodriguez v. Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805 , November 15, 2011, citing Estrada v. Desierto , G.R. Nos. 146710-15, 146738, March 2, 2001, 353 SCRA 452] 15

It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power that the President does not have. Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the President’s proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court. [ Fortun v. Arroyo , G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012] In Marcos v. Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines [89 Phil, 246 (1951)], this Court ruled that a court-martial case is a criminal case and the General Court Martial is a "court" akin to any other courts. In the case of Ramon Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army , 43 Off. Gaz., 855, we did not hold that the word "court" in general used in our Constitution does not include a Court-Martial; what we held is that the words "inferior courts" used in connection with the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to "review on appeal certiorari or writ of error, as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments of inferior courts in all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment," as provided for in section 2, Article VIII, of the Constitution, do not refer to Courts-Martial or Military Courts. The fact that a judgment of conviction, not of acquittal, rendered by a court-martial must be approved by the reviewing authority before it can be executed (Article of War 46), does not change or affect the character of a court-martial as a court. A judgment of the Court of First Instance imposing death penalty must also be approved by the Supreme Court before it can be executed. [ Garcia v. Executive Secretary , G.R. No. 198554, July 30, 2012] The power to confirm a sentence of the President, as Commander-in-Chief, includes the power to approve or disapprove the entire or any part of the sentence given by the court martial. [ Garcia v. Executive Secretary , G.R. No. 198554, July 30, 2012] Pardoning Power   - criminal and administrative remedies for violation of conditional pardon are not mutually exclusive and may be successively availed of by the President for the punishment of the conditional pardon. – recommitment/criminal prosecution for violation of conditional pardon/criminal prosecution for new offense if violation of the condition constitutes a separate criminal offense. [ Culanag v. Director of Prisons ]

A conditional pardonee committed usurpation of public functions. New case dismissed for lack of witnesses. President ordered his commitment. SC sustained saying mere commission, not conviction required for recommitment. [Espuelas v. Provincial Warden of Bohol  , affirmed in Sumulong v. Gonzales ] The Pardon included a preambular clause which read: “WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office.” Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy… The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action. A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The first sentence refers to the executive clemency extended to former President Estrada who was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of plunder and imposed a penalty of reclusion  perpetua. The latter is the principal penalty pardoned which relieved him of imprisonment. The sentence that followed, which states that "(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights," expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion per petua… The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon conditional… Contrary to Risos -Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office," neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that former President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to seek public elective office have been restored… This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term "civil and political rights" as being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the enactment, usually introduced by the word "whereas." Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative language of the statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon. [Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC , G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015]

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 Amnesty  commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. x x x Pardon  is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. x x x” [ Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago , G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012] Treaties - The power to ratify treaties is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The President may not be compelled to submit a treaty to the Senate for concurrence. [ Pimentel v. Executive Secretary ] Executive Agreements do not require the concurrence of the Senate for their validity. An executive agreement may not amend a treaty. [ Adolfo v. CFI of Zambales]

The Contract Agreement xxx between Northrail and CNMEG does not partake of the nature of an executive agreement. It is merely an ordinary commercial contract that can be questioned before the local courts. [China National  Machinery & Equipment Corporation v. Sta. Maria , G.R. No. 185572, February 7, 2012] Presidential Immunity - The President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. [Rubrico v. Arroyo , G.R. No. 183871, February 18, 2010] –  Judicial Power   - It is an opportune time for the Court to assert its role as republican schoolmaster  (Lerner, Ralph, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 Sup. Ct. Rev. 127), a teacher in a vital national seminar . (Rostow, Eugene, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1952)) There are times when the controversy is of such character that, to prevent its recurrence and to assure respect for constitutional limitations, this Court must pass on the merits of a case. ( Rufino v. Endriga, 528 Phil. 473) [ Almario v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 189028, July 16, 2013] ARTICLE VIII

A  facial objection  is meritorious if, expressly and on the face of the petition, what is evident as cited grounds are erroneous applications of the law rather than grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. [Liberal Party v. COMELEC , G.R. No. 191771, May 6, 2010] In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that i s launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment. [See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987)] These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one's freedom of expression, as they are modes which [sic] one's thoughts are externalized. In this  jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues ( Romualdez v. Commission on Elections , 576 Phil. 357 (2008); Romualdez v. Hon. Sandiganbayan , 479 Phil. 265 (2004); Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 421 PhiI. 290 (2001)), it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. 109 (Resolution, Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, 594 Phil. 305, 316 (2008)) The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution. Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people. [ Imbong v. Ochoa , G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014] The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise of judicial power under Art. VIII of the Constitution, because the execution of the Decision is but an integral part of the adjudi cative function of the Court… With the final and executory judgment in  MMDA, the writ of continuing mandamus issued in  MMDA means that until petitioner-agencies have shown full compliance with the Court’s orders, the Court exercises continuing jurisdiction over them until full execution of the judgment. [ MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay , G.R. Nos. 171947-48, February 15, 2011] 17

The Supreme Court as guardian of the legal profession has ultimate powers over attorneys. Its authority to discipline lawyers stems from its constitutional prerogative to regulate the practice of law and the admission of the persons to engage therein (Section 5(5), Article X, The 1973 Philippine Constitution; In Re Cunanan, 94 Phil. 534, 1954). Apart from the constitutional mandate, the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over attorneys is an inherent power incidental to its proper administration of justice and essential to an orderly discharge of its judicial functions ( Tejan v. Cusi, 57 SCRA 154; In Re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562; Hilado v. David, 84 Phil. 573; In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Edillon, G.R. No. AC-1928 [IBP Adm. Case No. DD-1] August 3, 1978). Furthermore, attorneys are the court's constituency - to aid in the administration of justice ( Doge S. State , 39 NE 745). A lawyer occupies what may be termed a quasi-judicial office since he is in fact an officer of the court, and like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice ( Kerlin v. Culkin, 60 ALR 851) [ People v. Sesbreno ] Requisites for Judicial Inquiry – Actual Case or Controversy  - The “moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. [David v. Arroyo ]

The expiration of the term generally renders an election protest moot and academic [ Sales v. COMELEC , G.R. No. 174668] BUT said case may still be resolved for purposes of formulating controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and the public [ Atienza v. Villarosa], or in the case of determining a question involving the one-year residency requirement for those running for public office, which is one capable of repetition, under the doctrine of repetition yet evading review. [ Gayo v. Verceles ]; or notwithstanding the election and proclamation of a new set of municipal officers, to prevent a repetition of the acts complained of [ Albaña v. Commission on Elections ]; or despite the approval by the Civil Service Commission of the questioned appointments, to avoid a repetition [  Altres v. Emple, G.R. No. 180986, December 10, 2008]; or the demise of one of the accused, to prevent a miscarriage of justice against a co-accused [Constantino v. People , G.R. No. 140656, September 13, 2007]; or even the separation of the petitioner from government service, because other penalties may be imposed upon her [ Pagano v. Nazarro , G.R. No. 149072, September 21, 2007]. By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. [ Pimentel v. Aguirre] Locus Standi - A perusal of private respondents’ petition for declaratory relief would show that they have failed to demonstrate how they are left to sustain or are in immediate danger to sustain some direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed provisions of RA 9372. Not far removed from the factual milieu in the Southern Hemisphere cases, private respondents only assert general interests as citizens, and taxpayers and infractions which the government could prospectively commit if the enforcement of the said law would remain untrammeled. As their petition would disclose, private respondents’ fear of prosecution was solely based on remarks of certain government officials which were addressed to the general public. They, however, failed to show how these remarks tended towards any prosecutorial or governmental action geared towards the implementation of RA 9372 against them. In other words, there was no particular, real or imminent threat to any of them. [ Republic of the Philippines v. Roque , G.R. No. 204603, September 24, 2013] Earliest Opportunity – if not raised in pleadings, cannot be considered at trial and, if not considered at trial, cannot be considered on appeal. In criminal cases, constitutional question can be raised any time in the discretion of the court. In civil cases, question can be raised at any stage if it is necessary to the determination of the case itself. In every case, except where there is estoppel or laches [ Tijam v. Sibonghanoy ], constitutional question may be raised at any stage if it involves the jurisdiction of the court. Necessity of Deciding Constitutional Questions – justification - separation of powers [ trias politica principle]

When a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar law or provision. A law or provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion … The clause, "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 amending Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void. [SameerOverseas Placement Agency, Inc. v. Cabiles , G.R. No. 170139, August 5, 2014] Theory of Relative Constitutionality  - While R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure well within the legislature’s power, we hold that the enactment of subsequent laws exempting all rank-and-file employees of other GFIs leeched all validity out of the challenged proviso… The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the statute may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its application to another … A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical operation 18

becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the light of changed conditions. [ Central Bank Employees Association v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and the Executive Secretary] Operative Fact Doctrine  - The general rule is that an unconstitutional law is void. The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. [ Planters Products Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation, G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008]

The operative fact doctrine also applies to executive orders and executive acts subsequently declared as invalid. [Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Cou ncil, G.R. No. 171101, November 22, 2011] Clearly, for the operative fact doctrine to apply, there must be a "legislative or executive measure," meaning a law or executive issuance, that is invalidated by the court. From the passage of such law or promulgation of such executive issuance until its invalidation by the court, the effects of the law or executive issuance, when relied upon by the public in good faith, may have to be recognized as valid. In the present case, however, there is no such law or executive issuance that has been invalidated by the Court except BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03. [ Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation , G.R. No. 187485, October 8, 2013] Fiscal autonomy  - means freedom from outside control. Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS from the payment of legal fees without transgressing another equally important institutional safeguard of the Court’s independence - fiscal autonomy. [ Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for Payment of Legal Fees ] Fiscal autonomy recognizes the power and authority of the Court to levy, assess and collect fees [ Bengzon v. Drilon] including legal fees… Any exemption from the payment of legal fees granted by Congress to government-owned or controlled corporations and local government units will necessarily reduce the JDF and the SAJF. Undoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally infirm for it impairs the Court’s guaranteed fiscal autonomy and erodes its independence. [In the Matter of Clarification of Exemption from Payment of All Court and Sheriff’s Fees, A.m. No. 12-2-03-0, March 13, 2012]

Regional Trial Courts (RTC) have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of statutes, exec utive orders, presidential decrees and other issuances. [Planters Products Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation , G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008] Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute. [ Garcia v. Drilon , G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013] BUT note British American Tobacco v. Camacho , G.R. No. 163583, August 20, 2008 – the Court of Tax Appeals cannot pass upon the constitutionality of a statute. Rule-Making Authority - Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the SC.

The National Power Corporation [A.M. NO. 05-10-20-SC, March 10, 2010], the GSIS [A.M. No. 08-2-01-0, February 11, 2010] and the Land Bank of the Philippines [Land Bank of the Philippines v. Rivera , G.R. No. 182431, November 17, 2001] are not exempt from paying filing fees. Christina's directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting custody over him. Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied. To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy available to victims of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a public official or employee or a private individual. It is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the right to life, liberty and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of life. [ Yusay v. Segui , G.R. No. 193652, August 5, 2014]  Administrative Supervision  - administrative jurisdiction over a court employee belongs to the Supreme Court, regardless of whether the offense was committed before or after employment in the judiciary. [ Ampong v CSC, G.R. No. 167916, August 26, 2008]

This provision empowers the Court to oversee all matters relating to the effective supervision and management of all courts and personnel under it. Recognizing this mandate, Memorandum Circular No. 26 of the Office of the President, dated July 31, 1986, considers the Supreme Court exempt and with authority to promulgate its own rules and regulations on foreign travels. [ Leave Division v. Heusdens , A.M. No. P-11-2927, December 13, 2011] The Court rules that the subject provision – which requires retiring government employees to secure a prior clearance of pendency/non-pendency of administrative case/s from, among others, the CSC – should not be made to apply to employees of the Judiciary. To deem it otherwise would disregard the Court’s constitutionally -enshrined power of administrative supervision over its personnel … A  prior clearance of pendency/non-pendency of administrative 19

case/s from the Office of the President (albeit some court personnel are presidential appointees, e.g., Supreme Court  Justices) or the Office of the Ombudsman should not equally apply to retiring court personnel. Verily, the administrative supervision of court personnel and all affairs related thereto fall within the exclusive province of the  Judiciary. It must, however, be noted that since the Constitution only accords the Judiciary administrative supervision over its personnel, a different treatment of the clearance requirement obtains with respect to criminal cases. As such, a clearance requirement which pertains to criminal cases may be imposed by the appropriate government agency, i.e., the Office of the Ombudsman, on retiring court personnel as it is a matter beyond the ambit of the Judiciary’s power of administrative supervision. [ Re: Request for Guidance/Clarification on Section 7, Rule III of Republic Act No. 10154 Requiring Retiring Government Employees to Secure a Clearance of Pendency/Non-pendency of Case/s from the Civil Service Commission, A.M. No. 13-09-08-SC, October 1, 2013] The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether an administrative aspect is involved therein. [ Caoibes, Jr. v. Ombudsman]  JBC   - The regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council have staggered terms. Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. [ Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council , G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012] A vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. A vacancy in the lower courts must be filled within ninety days from the submission of the list of nominees. [Vacancies in the Offices of the Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsmen shall be filled within three months after they occur.]

As a meaningful guidepost, jurisprudence provides the definition and scope of supervision. It is the power of oversight, or the authority to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. It ensures that the laws and the rules governing the conduct of a government entity are observed and complied with. Supervising officials see to it that rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. Based on this, the supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC covers the overseeing of compliance with its rules… As disclosed by the guidelines and lists of recognized evidence of qualification laid down in JBC- 009, "integrity" is closely related to, or if not, approximately equated to an applicant’s good reputation for honesty, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards. That is why proof of an applicant’s reputation may be shown in certifications or testimonials from reputable government officials and non-governmental organizations and clearances from the courts, National Bureau of Investigation, and the police, among others. In fact, the JBC may even conduct a discreet background check and receive feedback from the public on the integrity, reputation and character of the applicant, the merits of which shall be verifiedand checked. As a qualification, the term is taken to refer to a virtue, such that, "integrity is the quality of person’s character."  xxx A simple reading of the above provision undoubtedly elicits the rule that a higher voting requirement is absolute in cases where the integrity of an applicant is questioned. Simply put, when an integrity question arises, the voting requirement for his or her inclusion as a nominee to a judicial post becomes "unanimous" instead of the "majority vote" required in the preceding section. Considering that JBC-009 employs the term "integrity" as an essential qualification for appointment, and its doubtful existence in a person merits a higher hurdle to surpass, that is, the unanimous vote of all the members of the JBC, the Court is of the safe conclusion that "integrity" as used in the rules must be interpreted uniformly. Hence, Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 envisions only a situation where an applicant’s moral fitness is challenged. It follows then that the "unani mity rule" only comes into operation when the moral character of a person is put in issue. It finds no application where the question is essentially unrelated to an applicant’s moral uprightness… These two issues (illicit relationship and insider trading) can be properly categorized as "questions on integrity" under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009. They fall within the ambit of "questions on integrity." Hence, the "unanimity rule" may come into operation as the subject provision is worded … After careful calibration of the case, the Court has reached the determination that the application of the "unanimity rule" on integrity resulted in  Jardeleza’s deprivation of his right to due process. [ Jardeleza v. Sereno, G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014] Decisions - A minute resolution is not a binding precedent. The constitutional requirement under the first paragraph of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution that the facts and the law on which the judgment is based must be expressed clearly and distinctly applies only to decisions, not to minute resolutions. A minute resolution is signed only by the clerk of court by authority of the justices, unlike a decision. It does not require the certification of the Chief  Justice. Moreover, unlike decisions, minute resolutions are not published in the Philippine Reports. Finally, the proviso of Section 4(3) of Article VIII speaks of a decision. Indeed, as a rule, this Court lays down doctrines or principles of law which constitute binding precedent in a decision duly signed by the members of the Court and certified by the Chief Justice. [ Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue , G.R. No. 188550, August 19, 2013]

Section 14 does not apply to decisions in administrative proceedings, like those rendered by the Office of the President. BUT note the cardinal rights of parties in administrative proceedings in the landmark case of  Ang Tibay v. CIR. [Solid Homes, Inc. v. Laserna , G.R. No. 166051, April 8, 2008]

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ARTICLE IX-A - rules

of procedure should not encroach upon the constitutional prerogatives of other bodies, like the rule-making authority [or the competence to admit to the practice of law] of the Supreme Court. [ Philippine Lawyers  Association v. Agrava] Section 5 (a) of Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure and Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution require that a majority vote of all the members of the Comelec, and not only those who participated and took part in the deliberations, is necessary for the pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order or ruling. [ Marcoleta v. COMELEC , G.R. No. 181377, April 24, 2009] Final decisions, orders or rulings of Constitutional Commissions may be appealed to the Supreme Court by way of a petition for certiorari under Rule 64, with respect to the COMELEC and the COA, and Rule 43 with respect to the CSC. The COMELEC’s contempt power can be exercised only in connection with its power of adjudication, and may not be invoked in connection with its exercise of purely administrative functions. [ Guevara v. COMELEC , G.R. No. 181377, April 24, 2009] The Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the COMELEC, only final orders, rulings or decisions of the COMELEC en banc, unless the Resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity. [Blanco v. COMELEC , G.R. No. 180164, June 17, 2008] Only orders or rulings issued in connection with the COMELEC’s quasi -judicial power can be the subject of certiorari proceedings under section 7. Resolutions awarding contracts should be the subject of ordinary civil actions before trial courts. [ Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop v. Ferrer ] Staggering of Terms/Reappointments in the Constitutional Commissions – [1] The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions, after the expiration of the uneven terms of office of the first set of commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of seven (7) years; an appointment for a lesser period is void and unconstitutional. The appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full term of seven (7) years in case of the expiration of the term as this will result in the distortion of the rotational system prescribed by the Constitution. [2] Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death, resignation, disability or impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor, but such appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion as this will likewise disrupt the staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D). [3] Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were appointed for a full term of seven years and who served the entire period, are barred from reappointment to any position in the Commission. Corollarily, the first appointees in the Commission under the Constitution are also covered by the prohibition against reappointment. [4] A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the length of service as commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed seven (7) years and provided further t hat the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal by impeachment. The Court clarifies that “reappointment” found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX (D) means a movement to one and the same office (Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman). On the other hand, an appointment involving a movement to a different position or office (Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a new appointment and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under the Constitution. [5] Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. [ Funa v. The Chairman, Commission on Audit , G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012]

– Rule-Making Authority  - But while the grant of the CSC’s rule -making power is untouchable by Congress, the laws that the CSC interprets and enforces fall within the prerogative of Congress. As an administrative agency, the CSC’s quasi-legislative power is subject to the same limitations applicable to other administrative bodies. The rules that the CSC formulates must not override, but must be in harmony with, the law it seeks to apply and implement. [Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines v. Civil Service Commission , G.R. No. 182249, March 5, 2013] ARTICLE IX-B

Government Instrumentalities - The MIAA is a government “instrumentality” that does not qualify as a “government owned or controlled corporation.” The term government “instrumentality” is broader than the term “government owned or controlled corporation.” The fact that two terms have separate definitions means that while a government “instrumentality” may include a “government -owned or controlled corporation,” there may be a government “instrumentality” that will not qualify as a “government-owned or controlled corporation.” [ Manila International  Airport Authority v. City of Pasay, G.R. No. 163072, April 2, 2009]

UP ranks with MIAA, a government instrumentality exercising corporate powers but not organized as a stock or nonstock corporation. While said corporations are government instrumentalities, they are loosely called government 21

corporate entities but not government-owned and controlled corporations in the strict sense. [ Lockheed Detective and Watchman Agency, Inc. v. University of the Philippine , G.R. No. 185918, April 18, 2012]  Jurisdiction  - Based on all of the foregoing, the inescapable conclusion is that the CSC may take cognizance of an administrative case filed directly with it against an official or employee of a chartered state college or university. This is regardless of whether the complainant is a private citizen or a member of the civil service and such original  jurisdiction is shared with the Board of Regents of the school. [ Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 176162, October 9, 2012]

Which quasi-judicial agency has jurisdiction to hear and decide complaints for illegal dismissal against an adjunct government agency engaged in proprietary function? The Armed Forces of the Philippines Commissary and Exchange Services (AFPCES) is a unit/facility of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) organized pursuant to Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 31, which was issued on November 20, 1972 by then President Ferdinand Marcos. Since it cannot be denied that petitioners are government employees, the proper body that has jurisdiction to hear the case is the CSC. [ Hidalgo v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 179793, July 5, 2010] The charge against the respondent in an administrative case need not be drafted with the precision of an information in a criminal prosecution. It is sufficient that he is apprised of the substance of the charge against him; what is controlling is the allegation of the acts complained of, not the designation of the offense. It must be stressed that what the law requires is to simply inform the civil servant of the nature and cause of accusation against him in a clear and concise manner for the purpose of giving him the right to confront the allegations against him. [ Dadubo v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 106498, June 28, 1993, 223 SCRA 747] The failure to designate the offense specifically and with precision is of no moment in this administrative case. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence he may have in support of his defense. [ Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v.  Marquez, G.R. No. 191877, June 18, 2013] Formal charges issued by petitioner Government Service Insurance System President without prior conduct of a preliminary investigation are null and void. [ Salva v. Valle, G. R. No. 193773, April 2, 2013] RA 4670 –Magna Carta for Public School Teachers –  schools have exclusive jurisdiction over public school teachers. But SC has declared that the CSC and the Ombudsman have concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over public school teachers. Where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the body that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. In this case, it was CSC which first acquired jurisdiction over the case because the complaint was filed before it. Thus, it had the authority to proceed and decide the case to the exclusion of the DepEd and the Board of Professional Teachers. [ Pat-og v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 198755,  June 5, 2013] Period of preventive suspension pending investigation cannot be deducted from the penalty, because preventive suspension is not a penalty. [Quimbo v. Gervacio ] Preventive suspension pending appeal is actually punitive; so, if exonerated, respondent is entitled to be reinstated with full pay for the period of suspension [pending appeal]. However, if penalty or conviction is affirmed, the period of preventive suspension pending appeal becomes part of the penalty of suspension or dismissal. [ Gloria v. CA] The present legal basis for an award of back salaries is Section 47, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 – “(4) An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, and in case the penalty is suspension or removal, the respondent shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins an appeal.” This provision, however, on its face, does not support a claim for back salaries since it does not expressly provide for back salaries during this period; our established rulings hold that back salaries may not be awarded for the period of preventive suspension [Hon. Gloria v. CA, 365 Phil. 744 (1999)] as the law itself authorizes its imposition so that its legality is beyond question. To resolve the seeming conflict, the Court crafted two conditions before an employee may be entitled to back salaries: a) the employee must be found innocent of the charges and b) his suspension must be unjustified. [Bangalisan v. CA, 342 Phil. 586 (1997)] The reasoning behind these conditions runs this way: although an employee is considered under preventive suspension during the pendency of a successful appeal, the law itself only authorizes preventive suspension for a fixed period; hence, his suspension beyond this fixed period is unjustified and must be compensated. [ Civil Service Commission v. Cruz , G.R. No. 187858, August 9, 2011] Preventive Suspension Periods – CSC – 90 days/Public officers with pending criminal cases – 90 days/Local elective officials (Local Government Code) – 60 days/Anti-Graft Law – suspension pendente lite –  90 days/Ombudsman –  six months.

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An illegally terminated civil service employee is entitled to back salaries limited only to a maximum period of five years, and not full back salaries from his illegal termination up to his reinstatement. [ Yenko v. Gungon , G.R. Nos. 165450 & 165452, August 13, 2009, 595 SCRA 562] The illegally dismissed government employee shall be paid back salaries at the rate he was receiving when he was terminated unqualified by salary increases and without deduction from earnings received elsewhere during the period of his illegal dismissal. [ Balquidra v. CFI of Capiz, Branch II . No. L40490, October 28, 1977, 80 SCRA 123] Being an incumbent at the time, Galang would have continued to receive RATA, Meal Allowance and Rice Subsidy, separate from his salary, had he not been illegally dismissed from service. [Galang v. Land Bank of the Philippines , G.R. No. 175276, May 31, 2011] As a matter of law, a department secretary’s decision confirming the removal of an   officer under his authority is immediately executory, even pending further remedy by the dismissed public officer. [ Bangalisan v. CA, 342 Phil. 586 (1997); and Aquino v. Navarro, No. L-50695, March 18, 1985, 135 SCRA 361] It appears that Section 43 of the Civil Service Rules is self-contradicting. While the second paragraph provides that a penalty of removal "shall be executory only after confirmation by the Secretary concerned," the third paragraph states: "Pending appeal, the penalty imposed shall be executory, including the penalty of removal from the service without need for the confirmation by the department secretary to which the agency is attached." The CSC should look into the implication and/or consequence of its amendment of the rules and should clarify how the newly enacted paragraph can operate, without conflict, with the reenacted provisions of the old Section 43. In any case, even if we were to assume that the new rules now declare that a penalty of removal shall be executory pending appeal, without need for confirmation by the secretary of the Department to which the agency is attached, this rule cannot and should not be applied to petitioner’s case.  Resolution No. 07-0244 became effective 15 days after 21 March 2007, the day it was published, or a few months before the CSC denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. This Court cannot declare that the amendment of the Civil Service Rules while the case of petitioner was pending proves the lack of impartiality on the CSC’s part as petitioner claims. However, it can and does now declare that the CSC had no right to retroactively apply the amended provision to petitioner’s case.   Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. When petitioner was dismissed, the old Section 43 of the Civil Service Rules was still in effect. The aforecited provision clearly states that the penalty of removal is not executory, pending appeal, unless the penalty is confirmed by Secretary of the Department where the dismissed employee works. Petitioner now claims that because the penalty of dismissal imposed by Commissioner Señeres was never confirmed by the Secretary of Labor, it could not have been executed while his appeal to the CSC was ongoing; thus, he should have been allowed to continue to work and receive his salary. We agree. [ Barcelona v. Lim , G.R. No. 189171, June 3, 2014] The government party that can appeal the decision in administrative cases must be the party prosecuting the case and not the disciplining authority or tribunal which heard the administrative case. [ CSC v. Dacoycoy , cited in Office Ombudsman v. Liggayu , G.R. No. 174297, June 20, 2012]  Appointments/Security of Tenure  - The mere fact that a particular position belongs to the career service does not automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant. Such right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it. [ Amores v. CSC , G.R. No. 170093, April 29, 2009]

Acceptance of a temporary appointment divests the temporary appointee of constitutional security of tenure against removal without cause even if he is a civil service eligible. [ Romualdez v. CSC ] A person’s acceptance of a temporary appointment results in the termination of official relations with his former permanent position, to which he may not demand reinstatement if his temporary appointment is not renewed. [ Tolentino v. de Jesus ] Where a temporary employee acquires civil service eligibility during his tenure as such, his temporary appointment does not thereby automatically become permanent. [ Maturan v. Maglana ] Even if appointment is temporary, appointee may not be removed at will if appointment is for a fixed period. [ Ambas v. Buenaseda] A government employee holding a casual or temporary  employment cannot be terminated within the period of his employment except for cause. Thus, they may be laid-off anytime before the expiration of the employment period provided any of the following occurs: (1) when their services are no longer needed; (2) funds are no longer available; (3) the project has already been completed/finished; or (4) their performance are below par. Equally important, they are entitled to due process especially if they are to be removed for more serious causes or for causes other than the reasons mentioned in CSC Form No. 001. This is pursuant to Section 2, Article IX(B) of the Constitution and Section 46 of the Civil Service Law. The reason for this is that their termination from the service could carry a penalty affecting their rights and future employment in the government. [ PCSO v. Lapid, G.R. No. 191940, April 12, 2011] RA 6850 – temporary  employees who have been in their positions for 7 years may be granted civil service eligibility that will qualify them for permanent appointment to their positions. A  probationary  employee may only be terminated for a just cause, that is, unsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity. [Daza v. Lugo , G.R No. 168999, April 30, 2008] 23

Primarily confidential – one which denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which ensures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings or betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state [ De los Santos v. Mallare ]; or one declared to be so upon recommendation of the CSC [ Salazar v. Mathay ] BUT see PAGCOR v. Angara [involving token attendants at the PAGCOR, whose positions are, by law, classified, as primarily confidential], citing PAGCOR v. Rilloraza, CSC v. Salas and Pinero v. Hechanova – an executive or legislative declaration that a position is primarily confidential, highly technical or policy-determining is not conclusive upon the courts, the true test being the nature of the position. These employees still have security of tenure, and are exempt only from the requirement of competitive examinations. Examples – private secretaries [ Corpus v. Cuaderno ] – bodyguards [Borres v. CA] – city legal officer [ Cadiente v. Santos] and provincial attorney [ Grino v. CSC ]

A driver is not a confidential employee. [ Re: Vehicular Accident - A.M. No. 2008-13-SC, November 19, 2008] Policy-determining, highly technical and primarily confidential employees, are exempted from the competitive examination requirement for eligibility; they enjoy security of tenure. [ Corpus v. Cuaderno] To be sure, both career and non-career service employees have a right to security of tenure. All permanent officers and employees in the civil service, regardless of whether they belong to the career or non-career service category, are entitled to this guaranty; they cannot be removed from office except for cause provided by law and after procedural due process. ( Jocom v. Judge Regalado, 278 Phil. 83, 94 (1991), citing Tapales v. President and Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines, 117 Phil. 561 (1963)) The concept of security of tenure, however, labors under a variation for primarily confidential employees due to the basic concept of a "primarily confidential" position. Serving at the confidence of the appointing authority, the primarily confidential employee’s term of office expires when the appointing authority loses trust in the employee. When this happens, the confidential employee is not "removed" or "dismissed" from office; his term merely "expires" ( Ingles v. Mutuc, 135 Phil. 177, 182 (1968)) and the loss of trust and confidence is the "just cause" provided by law that results in the termination of employment. In the present case where the trust and confidence has been irretrievably eroded, we cannot fault Governor Pimente l’s exercise of discretion when he decided that he could no longer entrust his confidence in Gonzales. Security of tenure in public office simply means that a public officer or employee shall not be suspended or dismissed except for cause, as provided by l aw and after due process. It cannot be expanded to grant a right to public office despite a change in the nature of the office held. In other words, the CSC might have been legally correct when it ruled that the petitioner violated Gonzales’ right to security of tenure when she was removed without sufficient just cause from her position, but the situation had since then been changed. In fact, Gonzales was reinstated as ordered, but her services were subsequently terminated under the law prevailing at the time of the termination of her service; i.e., she was then already occupying a position that was primarily confidential and had to be dismissed because she no longer enjoyed the trust and confidence of the appointing authority. Thus, Gonzales’ termination fo r lack of confidence was lawful. She could no longer be reinstated as provincial administrator of Camarines Norte or to any other comparable position. This conclusion, however, is without prejudice to Gonzales’ entitlement to retirement benefits, leave cre dits, and future employment in government service. [ The Provincial Government of Camarines Norte v. Gonzales , G.R. No. 185740, July 23, 2013] A valid order of abolition must not only come from a legitimate body, it must also be made in good faith. An abolition is made in good faith when it is not made for political or personal reasons, or when it does not circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil service employees. Abolition of an office may be brought about by reasons of economy, or to remove redundancy of functions, or a clear and explicit constitutional mandate for such termination of employment. Where one office is abolished and replaced with another office vested with similar functions, the abolition is a legal nullity. When there is a void abolition, the incumbent is deemed to have never ceased holding office. [CAAP Employees’ Union v. CAAP , G.R. No. 190120, November 11, 2014] Nepotism –  appointment or designation of relatives within the 3rd degree of consanguinity of affinity prohibited except – [1] persons appointed in a confidential capacity [2] teachers [3] members of the AFP [4] physicians –  applies even to designations.

Nepotism is defined as an appointment issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: (1) appointing authority; (2) recommending authority; (3) chief of the bureau or office; and (4) person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee. Here, it is undisputed that respondent Cortes is a relative of Commissioner Mallari in the first degree of consanguinity, as in fact Cortes is the daughter of Commissioner Mallari… In the present case, respondent Cortes' appointment as IO V in the CHR by the Commission En Banc, where his father is a member, is covered by the prohibition. Commissioner Mallari's abstention from voting did not cure the nepotistic character of the appointment because the evil sought to be avoided by the prohibition still exists. His mere presence during the deliberation for the appointment of IO V created an impression of influence and cast doubt on the impartiality and neutrality of the Commission En Banc. [ Civil Service Commission v. Cortes , G.R. No. 200103, April 23, 2014] In the local government career service, the prohibition against nepotism extends to the relatives of the appointing or recommending authority, within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. The nepotism rule covers all 24

kinds of appointments whether original, promotional, transfer and reemployment regardless of status including casuals and contractuals except consultants. [ Galeos v. People , G.R. Nos. 174730-37, February 9, 2011] Personnel Movements  - The principal distinctions between a detail [movement from one agency to another - Executive Order 292, Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 5, Section 26 (6)] and reassignment [reassignment from one organizational unit to another in the same agency -E.O. 292, Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 5, Section 26 (7)] lie in the place where the employee is to be moved and in its effectivity pending appeal with the CSC. Based on the definition, a detail requires a movement from one agency to another while a reassignment requires a movement within the same agency. Moreover, pending appeal with the CSC, an order to detail is immediately executory, whereas a reassignment order does not become immediately effective. [ Republic of the Philippines v. Pacheco , G.R. No. 178021, January 25, 2012] Dual Appointments/Incompatible Offices   - Under Section 13 of RA 9369, which reiterates Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. Upon the other hand, an elected official is not deemed to have resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elected office or position. In fine, an elected official may run for another position without forfeiting his seat. [Quinto v. COMELEC , G.R. No. 189698, [MR] February 22, 2010]

Elective officials can be appointed to civilian posts during their t erm, but they shall be considered as having forfeited their elective seats upon acceptance of said civilian posts. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including Government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. Not applicable to President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants, who can hold other offices only if allowed under the Constitution. [Article VII, Section 13] – [Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary ] The appointment of Dr. Posadas as TMC Project Director falls within the prohibition against holding of multiple positions since there is no distinction in Section 7, Article IX-B as to the employment status, i.e., whether permanent, temporary or coterminous. Petitioners failed to cite any law to justify Dr. Posadas’ holding of concurrent positions as Chancellor and TMC Project Director. [ Posadas v. Sandiganbayan , G.R. Nos. 168951 & 169000, July 17, 2013] The Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao has the power to appoint officers in the region's civil service. However, if there is no regional law providing for the qualifications for the position at the time of appointment, the appointee must satisfy the civil service eligibilities required for the position in the national government to be appointed in a permanent capacity. [ Buena v. Benito , G.R. No. 181760, October 14, 2014] Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation. Thus, entitlement to separation pay does not disqualify the separated employee who is likewise qualified to receive loyalty award pursuant to the CSC Memorandum Circular. Verily, when an employee has complied with the statutory requirements for the grant of loyalty award under the CSC Memorandum Circular, his right to receive what is due him by virtue thereof becomes vested and may not thereafter be revoked or impaired. Otherwise, it would be ridiculous, if not deleterious, to deprive employees who were forced to relinquish their livelihood, of an award they have duly earned throughout their service in the government, simply because they accepted the separation pay due them from the separation or displacement. After all, being terminated from service as a consequence of the restructuring of the electric power industry or privatization of NPC assets was not their choice, but staying in the government despite that, is. Thus, not unless the loyalty award was considered in the computation of the separation pay, the same should not be withdrawn from the employees enumerated in the ND. [ National Transmission Corporation v. Commission on  Audit, G.R. No. 204800, October 14, 2014] In this case, Ocampo is not claiming two (2) sets of retirement benefits for one and the same creditable period. Rather, Ocampo is claiming a set of retirement benefits for each of her two (2) retirements from the ERB. In other words, each set of retirement benefits claimed by Ocampo is based on distinct creditable periods i.e., one for her term as member of the ERB and another for her term as chairman of the same agency. What Ocampo is merely claiming, therefore, is that she is entitled to two (2) sets of retirement benefits for her two (2) retirements from the ERB under Republic Act No. 1568, as amended. Hence, in order to resolve her claim, what is only required is an interpretation of Republic Act No. 1568, as amended. [ Ocampo v. Commission on Audit, G .R. No. 188716, June 10, 2013] – Commissioners – re: complaint for disbarment against COMELEC Commissioners - an impeachable officer who is a member of the Bar cannot be disbarred without first being impeached [Jarque v. Ombudsman, In Re: Raul M. Gonzales and Cuenco v. Fernan ] It bears emphasis that the provision that majority of Comelec members should be lawyers pertains to the desired composition of the Comelec. While the appointing authority may follow such constitutional mandate, the appointment of a full complement of lawyers in the Comelec membership is not precluded. [ Marcoleta v. Borra, A.C. No. 7732, March 30, 2009] ARTICLE IX-C

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Powers - Power to enforce and administer election laws includes the power to annul an illegal registry of voters; cancel a proclamation made by a board of canvassers; oust a candidate already proclaimed; reject nuisance candidates; postpone or continue elections [ Ocampo v. COMELEC ]; declare a failure of elections [ Omnibus Election Code/Sanchez v. COMELEC ]

Considering that there is an existing line item appropriation for the conduct of recall elections in the 2014 GAA, we see no reason why the COMELEC is unable to perform its constitutional mandate to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of x x x recall." Should the funds appropriated in the 2014 GAA be deemed insufficient, then the COMELEC Chairman may exercise his authority to augment such line item appropriation from the COMELEC's existing savings, as this augmentation is expressly authorized in the 2014 GAA. [ Goh v. Bayron and COMELEC , G.R. No. 212584, November 25, 2014] The petitions question the constitutionality of the limitations placed on aggregate airtime  allowed to candidates and political parties, as well as the requirements incident thereto, such as the need to report the same, and the sanctions imposed for violations… There is no question that the COMELEC is the office constitutionally and statutorily authorized to enforce election laws but it cannot exercise its powers without limitations - or reasonable basis. It could not simply adopt measures or regulations just because it feels that it is the right thing to do, in so far as it might be concerned. It does have discretion, but such discretion is something that must be exercised within the bounds and intent of the law. The COMELEC is not free to simply change the rules especially if it has consistently interpreted a legal provision in a particular manner in the past. If ever it has to change the rules, the same must be properly explained with sufficient basis… The law, on its face, does not justify a conclusion that the maximum allowable airtime should be based on the totality of possible broadcast in all television or radio stations. Senator Cayetano has called our attention to the legislative intent relative to the airtime allowed - that it should be on a "  per station" basis. This is further buttressed by the fact that the Fair Election Act (R.A. No. 9006) actually repealed the previous provision, Section ll(b) of Republic Act No. 6646, which prohibited direct political advertisements -the so-called "political ad ban." If under the previous law, no candidate was allowed to directly buy or procure on his own his broadcast or print campaign advertisements, and that he must get it through the COMELEC Time or COMELEC Space, R.A. No. 9006 relieved him or her from that restriction and allowed him or her to broadcast time or print space subject to the limitations set out in the law. Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 9006, felt that the previous law was not an effective and efficient way of giving voice to the people. Noting the debilitating effects of the previous law on the right of suffrage and Philippine democracy, Congress decided to repeal such rule by enacting the Fair Election Act … The assailed rule on "aggregate-based" airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason for imposing the "aggregate-based" airtime limits - leveling the playing field - does not constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of government. And, this is specially so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive measure. In this particular instance, what the COMELEC has done is analogous to letting a bird fly after one has clipped its wings. [ GMA Network, Inc. v. COMELEC , G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014] A COMELEC resolution required newspapers to provide it with free space of not less than ½ page for the common use of political parties and candidates. SC: Unconstitutional – constituted “taking” of private property without payment of just compensation. [ Philippine Press Institute v . COMELEC, 244 SCRA272] BP 881, Section 92 required radio and TV stations to give free air time to the COMELEC to be used as the COMELEC hour for broadcasting information regarding candidates. Challenged as unconstitutional for constituting taking without just compensation, the SC said the law was a valid regulation by the State of the use of the State’s air waves. Valid exercise of the police power. [ Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines v. COMELEC , 289 SCRA 337] A failure of election may be declared only in the three instances stated in Section 6 of the OEC: the election has not been held; the election has been suspended before the hour fixed by law; and the preparation and the transmission of the election returns have given rise to the consequent failure to elect, meaning nobody emerged as the winner. Furthermore, the reason for such failure of election should be force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes. Finally, before the COMELEC can grant a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of election, the concurrence of 2 conditions must be established, namely: (1) no voting has taken place in the precincts concerned on the date fixed by law or, even if there was voting, the election nevertheless resulted in a failure to elect; and (2) the votes cast would affect the result of the e lection. [ Presbiterio v. COMELEC , G.R. No. 178884, June 30, 2008] The annulment of election can only be done when the COMELEC finds that an election was vitiated by widespread and pervasive terrorism and election frauds, which resulted in the submission at gunpoint of falsified and tampered election returns, and it is impossible to purge the illegal from the valid returns, so that there are no returns worthy of faith and credit and from which would be gauged a fair and true expression of the popular will. [Sanchez v. COMELEC; Sangcopan v. COMELEC , G. R. No. 170216 , March 12, 2008] The prohibition on conducting special elections after thirty days from the cessation of the cause of the failure of elections is not absolute. It is directory, not mandatory, and the COMELEC possesses residual power to conduct 26

special elections even beyond the deadline prescribed by law. [ Cagas v. Commission on Elections , G.R. No. 209185, October 25, 2013] The COMELEC en banc can order a correction of the Statement of Votes to make it conform to the election returns. [Duremdes v. Commission on Elections , cited in Flauta v. COMELEC , G.R. No. 184586, July 22, 2009] Under Section 5, Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, correction of manifest errors in the tabulation or tallying of results during the canvassing may be filed directly with the Commission, even after a proclamation of the winning candidates. Despite the proclamation of the winning candidates, the COMELEC still has jurisdiction to correct manifest errors in the election returns for the Sangguniang Bayan candidates. A “manifest error” is one that is visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding; that which is o pen, palpable, incontrovertible, needing no evidence to make it more clear. [ Abainza v. Arellano, G.R. No. 181644, December 8, 2008] The [restrictive and exclusive] grounds that must support a pre-proclamation controversy are limited by the Omnibus Election Code to the following: (a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers; (b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 of this Code; (c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and (d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the results of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or candidates. [Section 243] [ Villamor v. Commission on Elections ] A pre-proclamation controversy is not proper after a proclamation has been made, only if there had been a valid proclamation. [ Duremdes v. Commission on Elections ] Election Protests  - The abduction of a voter, the killing of a political leader, the threats which prevented the holding of the campaign sorties, and the intimidation of voters, or of terrorism [also massive vote-buying and bribery] are proper grounds for an election protest, not a pre-proclamation controversy [ Abayon v. COMELEC and Raul Daza , G.R. No. 181295, April 2, 2009]

The COMELEC has quasi-judicial, quasi-legislative and administrative powers. Its CONTEMPT power may be xercised in connection with its quasi-judicial power, i.e., an investigation into alleged massive electoral fraud. [ Bedol v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179830, December 3, 2009]  Appeals – The Supreme Court has declared as unconstitutional a law providing that decisions of the municipal or metropolitan trial courts in barangay elections may be appealed to regional trial courts. [ Flores v. COMELEC ]

Trial courts of limited jurisdiction have exclusive original jurisdiction over election protests involving barangay officials, which include the SK chairman. [ Fernandez v. COMELEC , G.R. No. 176296, June 30, 2008] Since it is the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to take cognizance of an appeal from the decision of the regional trial court in election contests involving elective municipal officials, then it is also the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. [ Galang v. Geronimo , G.R. No. 192793, February 22, 2011; see also Bulilis v. Nuez, G. R. No. 195953, August 9, 2011] There is no question, therefore, that the Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for certiorari assailing the denial by the COMELEC First Division of the special affirmative defenses of the petitioner. The proper remedy is for the petitioner to wait for the COMELEC First Division to first decide the protest on its merits, and if the result should aggrieve him, to appeal the denial of his special affirmative defenses to the COMELEC en banc along with the other errors committed by the Division upon the merits … Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC. [ Ambil v. Commission on Elections , G.R. No. 143398, October 25, 2000, 344 SCRA 358, 365-366; Cagas v. Commission on Elections , G.R. No. 194139, January 24, 2012] Under the exception, therefore, the [Supreme] Court may take cognizance of a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to review an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC on the ground of the issuance being made without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of  jurisdiction when it does not appear to be specifically provided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that the matter is one that the COMELEC en banc may sit and consider, or a Division is not authorized to act, or the members of the Division unanimously vote to refer to the COMELEC en banc. Of necessity, the aggrieved party can directly resort to the Court because the COMELEC en banc is not the proper forum in which the matter concerning the assailed interlocutory order can be reviewed. [ Kho v. Commission on Elections , G.R. No. 124033, September 25, 1997, 279 SCRA 463, 471-473; Cagas v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 194139, January 24, 2012]

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Divisions/En Banc  - The COMELEC sitting en banc does not have the authority to hear and decide election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies in the first instance, as the COMELEC in division has such authority. The COMELEC en banc can exercise jurisdiction only on motions for reconsideration of the resolution or decision of the COMELEC in division. Pursuant to Rule 18 of the Omnibus Election Code, decisions and resolutions of any division of the COMELEC in special cases become final and executory after the lapse of five days, unless a timely motion for reconsideration is lodged with the COMELEC en banc. [ Pacificador v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 178259, March 13, 2009]

No fault, let alone grave abuse of discretion, can be asc ribed to the COMELEC when the Spe cial First Division issued the questioned writ of preliminary injunction. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, it cannot be said that the First Division and the Special First Division are two distinct bodies and that there has been consequent transfers of the case between the two. Strictly speaking, the COMELEC did not create a separate Division but merely and temporarily filled in the vacancies in both of its Divisions. The additional term "special," in this case, merely indicates that the commissioners sitting therein may only be doing so in a temporary capacity or via substitution. The COMELEC First Division exercises jurisdiction over the cases that were assigned to it before the substitution was made, including SPR (AEL) No. 04-2014. This jurisdiction was not lost by the subsequent formation of the Special First Division since this only entailed a change in the Division’s composition of magistrates. Indeed, the case was not reassigned or re -raffled anew. If anything, it was only petitioner’s naivety that misled him into interpreting the designation of the division as a "special" one, meaning it is distinct from the first. Corollarily, petitioner is also mistaken in claiming that the  jurisdiction was eventually "re-acquired" by the First Division from the Special First Division by ruling on the motion to quash since the First Division never lost jurisdiction to begin with. [ Villarosa v. Festin and COMELEC , G.R. No. 212953, August 5, 2014] Only final orders of the COMELEC in Division may be raised before the COMELEC en banc. Clearly, the assailed status quo ante Order, being interlocutory, should first be resolved by the COMELEC First Division via a motion for reconsideration. [ Cayetano v. COMELEC , G.R. No. 193846, April 12, 2011] The Special Second Division of the COMELEC clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion when it immediately transferred to the Commission en banc a case that ought to be heard and decided by a division. Such action cannot be done without running afoul of Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution. Instead of peremptorily transferring the case to the Commission en banc, the Special Second Division of COMELEC, should have instead assigned another Commissioner as additional member of its Special Second Division, not only to fill in the seat temporarily vacated by Commissioner Ferrer, but more importantly so that the required quorum may be attained. [ Eriguel v. COMELEC , G.R. No. 190526, February 26, 2010] Thus, it is the Court, under its power to review decisions, orders, or resolutions of the COMELEC provided under Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution and Section 1, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that has  jurisdiction to hear the instant petition. In this case, the COMELEC En B anc cannot be compelled to resolve Layug’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated June 15, 2010 that was filed on July 28, 2010 after said Resolution had already attained finality. In fact, the COMELEC Second Division denied the same Motion in its Order dated August 4, 2010 precisely for the reason that it was filed out of time. [ Layug v. Commission on Elections , G.R. No. 192984, February 28, 2012] Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or under Section 40 of the Local Government Code, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of conviction is notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from running for public office. The law itself bars the convict from running for public office, and the disqualification is part of the final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of the court is addressed not only to the Executive branch, but also to other government agencies tasked to implement th e final judgment under the law…The above-cited constitutional provision requiring a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc may take action is confined only to cases where the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial power. It finds no application, however, in matters concerning the COMELEC’s exercise of administrative functions… In  Aratea v. COMELEC   (G.R. No. 195229, October 12, 2012, 683 SCRA 105), the Court similarly pronounced that the disqualification of a convict to run for public office, as affirmed by final judgment of a competent court, is part of the enforcement and administration of all laws relating to the conduct of elections. Applying these principles to the case at bar, it is clear that the COMELEC En Banc did not exercise its quasi-judicial functions when it issued Resolution No. 9613 as it did not assume jurisdiction over any pending petition or resolve any e lection case before it or any of its divisions. Rather, it merely performed its duty to enforce and administer election laws in cancelling petitioner’s CoC on the basis of his perpetual absolute disqualification, the fact of which had already been established by his final conviction. In this regard, the COMELEC En Banc was exercising its administrative functions, dispensing with the need for a motion for reconsideration of a division ruling under Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the same being required only in quasi-judicial proceedings. [Romeo Jalosjos v. The Commission on Elections , G.R. No. 205033, June 18, 2013]

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Certificates of Candidacy - The certificate of candidacy of a green card holder who states therein that he is a resident may be denied due course or cancelled on the ground of material misrepresentation. [ Ugdoracion v. COMELEC , G.R. No. 179851, April 18, 2008]

The use of a name other than that stated in the certificate of birth is not a material misrepresentation, as “material misrepresentation” under the earlier-quoted Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code refers to “qualif ications for elective office.”  A petition for disqualification based on material misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy is different from an election protest. The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed elected by the board of canvassers is really the lawful choice of the electorate. [  Justimbaste v. COMELEC , G.R. No. 179413, November 28, 2008] Section 68 –  petition for disqualification –  based on commission of prohibited acts [ e.g., vote-buying, terrorism, overspending, unlawful electioneering] and the possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country; may be filed anytime after the deadline for filing of CoCs but before proclamation; may be validly substituted; person disqualified is prohibited from continuing as a candidate. Section 78 –  petition to deny due course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy   [CoC] –  based on false material misrepresentations [on material matters - statements regarding age, residence, citizenship or non-possession of naturalborn Filipino status , eligibility , as when one, although precluded from running for a fourth term because of the threeterm limit rule; claims to be eligible despite his disqualification on the basis of an accessory penalty  in connection with his conviction in a criminal case]; the false representation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. In other words, it must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one’s qua lification for public office; may be filed not later than 25 days from the filing of the questioned CoC; may not be validly substituted; person disqualified is not treated as a candidate at all – has been likened to a petition for quo warranto , but is filed before, and not after, proclamation.

In  Aratea v. COMELEC , the Supreme Court acknowledged that there may be instances when the grounds for both Sections 68 and 78 may overlap, as when a candidate who represents that he is a resident of the place where he seeks election but is actually a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country, in which case, he would clearly also not be a resident of the place where he seeks election for at least one year immediately preceding the day of the election. In such cases, the Court clarified that one who would like to assail the candidacy of that person may avail himself of either remedy. When a candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC has a ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge its receipt. [See Section 76 of the Omnibus Election Code; Cerafica v. COMELEC , G.R. No. 205136, December 2, 2014] The cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of an ineligible candidate who has assumed office renders the officer a de facto officer. [Svetlana Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections , G.R. No. 193314, June 25, 2013] Substitution - A candidate may be substituted if he dies, is disqualified or withdraws. Substitutions in cases of death or disqualification may usually be made until midday of election day. An earlier deadline is usually prescribed for substitutions by reason of withdrawal. Under Section 12 of R.A. No. 9006, in order to obviate confusion, the name of the substitute candidate should, as much as possible, bear the same surname as that of the substituted candidate. [Federico v. Commission on Elections , G.R. No. 199612, January 22, 2013]

Thus, in Federico v. Commission on Elections , the Court invalidated the substitution of a candidate for mayor who withdrew her candidacy for purposes of substituting her husband as candidate for governor because of the latter’s death. It said that, while her substitution of her husband because of his death may have been valid because said substitution may be done until midday of election day, her substitution as a candidate for mayor was invalid because the deadline for the same had long prescribed. The Court stressed that her substitution as a mayoralty candidate was not by reason of her death or disqualification. A candidate whose certificate of candidacy is cancelled or denied due course may likewise not be substituted. [Talaga v. Commission on Elections , G.R. No. 196804, October 9, 2012; Tagolino v. HRET and Lucy Torres , G.R. No. 202202, March 19, 2013; see Miranda v. Abaya, G.R. No. 136351, July 28, 1999, 311 SCRA 617] “A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes.” [ Aratea v. Commission on Elections , G.R. No. 195229, October 9, 2012] Since Hans Roger withdrew his certificate of candidacy and the COMELEC found that Luna complied with all the procedural requirements for a valid substitution, Luna can validly substitute for Hans Roger. The COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in declaring that Hans Roger, being under age, could not be considered to have filed a valid certificate of candidacy and, thus, could not be validly substituted by Luna. The COMELEC may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form. In Sanchez vs. Del Rosario, the Court ruled that the question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate for non-age is beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the COMELEC. Section 74 of the Election Code provides that the certificate of candidacy shall state, among others, the date of birth of the person filing 29

the certificate. Section 78 of the Election Code provides that in case a person filing a certificate of candidacy has committed false material representation, a verified petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy of said person may be filed at any time not later than 25 days from the time of filing of the certificate of candidacy. If Hans Roger made a material misrepresentation as to his date of birth or age in his certificate of candidacy, his eligibility may only be impugned through a verified petition to deny due course to or cancel such certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Election Code. In this case, there was no petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacyof Hans Roger. The COMELEC only declared that Hans Roger did not file a valid certificate of candidacy and, thus, was not a valid candidate in the petition to deny due course to or cancel Luna’s certificate of candidacy. In effect, the COMELEC, without the proper proceedings, cancelled Hans Roger’s certificate of candidacy and declared [ Cerafica v. COMELEC , G.R. No. 205136, December 2, 2014] Nuisance candidates – stray votes - “We hold that the rule in Resolution No. 4116 considering the votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as such in a final judgment, particularly where such nuisance candidate has the same surname as that of the legitimate candidate, not stray but counted in favor of the latter, remains a good law.” [De la Cruz v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 192221, November 13, 2012] Disqualification - Vote-buying  has its criminal and electoral aspects. Its criminal aspect to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused cannot be the subject of summary hearing. However, its electoral aspect to ascertain whether the offender should be disqualified from office can be determined in an administrative proceeding that is summary in character. ( Blanco v. COMELEC , G.R. No. 180164, June 17, 200) The petitioner who was earlier found administratively, and not criminally, liable for vote-buying, and disqualified under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, is disqualified only from continuing as a candidate. [ Blanco v. COMELEC , G.R. No. 122258] Second Placers  - a subsequent disqualification of a winning candidate will not entitle his opponent, the candidate who received the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner. [ Ocampo v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal]

NOTE - in subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court, it made clear that its earlier rulings holding that the secondplacer cannot be proclaimed winner if the first-placer is disqualified or declared ineligible should be limited to situations where the certificate of candidacy of the first-placer was valid at the time of filing but subsequently had to be cancelled because of a violation of law that took place, or a legal impediment that took effect, after the filing of the certificate of candidacy. If the certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then legally the person who filed such void certificate of candidacy was never a candidate in the elections at any time. All votes for such non-candidate should therefore be considered as stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such non -candidate can never be a first-placer in the elections. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio  is cancelled on the day, or before the day, of the election, prevailing jurisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate are stray votes. [ Cayat v. COMELEC , G.R. No. 163776, April 24, 2007, 522 SCRA 23] If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled one day or more after the elections, all votes for such candidate should also be stray votes because the certificate of candidacy is void from the very beginning. This, according to the Supreme Court, is the more equitable and logical approach on the effect of the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy that is void ab initio. Otherwise, a certificate of candidacy void ab initio can operate to defeat one or more valid certificates of candidacy for the same position. [ Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections , G.R. No. 193237, October 9, 2012] The rule on succession in Section 44 of the Local Government Code cannot apply in instances when a de facto officer is ousted from office and the de jure officer takes over. The ouster of a de facto officer cannot create a permanent vacancy as contemplated in the Local Government Code. There is no vacancy to speak of as the de jure officer, the rightful winner in the elections, has the legal right to assume the position. [ Svetlana Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections , G.R. No. 193314, June 25, 2013] Political Parties - the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an incident of its power to register political parties. [Atienza v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188920, February 16, 2010]

Political coalitions need to register in accordance with the established norms and procedures, if they are to be recognized as such and be given the benefits accorded by law to registered coalitions. [ Liberal Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191771, May 6, 2010] Prosecution of Election Offenses  - It is clear that the grant of the “exclusive power” to investigate and prosecute election offenses to the COMELEC was not by virtue of the Constitution but by BP 881, a legislative enactment. [ BANAT v. COMELEC , G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009]

It is clear that the Chief State Prosecutor, all Provincial and City Fiscals, and/or their respective assistants have been given continuing authority, as deputies of the Commission, to conduct a preliminary investigation of complaints involving election offenses under the election laws and to prosecute the same. Such authority may be revoked or withdrawn anytime by the COMELEC, either expressly or impliedly, when in its judgment such revocation or withdrawal is necessary to protect the integrity of the process to promote the common good, or where it believes that 30

successful prosecution of the case can be done by the COMELEC. [ Dino v. Olivarez, G.R. No. 170447, December 4, 2009] Not all criminal offenses committed during the election period are election offenses. Under the present law, the Comelec and other prosecuting arms of the government, such as the DOJ, now exercise concurrent jurisdiction in the investigation and prosecution of election offenses. [ Arroyo v. Department of Justice , G.R. No. 199082, July 23, 2013] Election/Campaign Periods  - The election period may be changed by resolution of the Commission on Elections. The election period may, under the Constitution, commence earlier than ninety days before the day of election. Special case – Article VII, Section 10 – special election, to be called within 7 days after vacancy, and must be held not earlier than 45 days nor later than 60 days from such call.

“Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy.” [Penera v. COMELEC , G. R. No. 181613, November 25, 2009] ARTICLE IX-D 

- Petitioner, a sociedad anonimas, is DECLARED a private domestic corporation subject to the  jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission. [ Philippine Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 169752, September 25, 2007] The Boy Scouts of the Philippines is a public corporation and its funds are subject to the COA’s audit jurisdiction. [ Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit , G.R. No. 177131, June 7, 2011] Local water districts, such as the LMWD, are GOCCs with special charter. P.D. No. 198 constitutes the special charter by virtue of which local water districts exist. [ Feliciano v. Aranez  , G.R. No. 165641, August 25, 2010] LGUs, though granted local fiscal autonomy, are still within the audit jurisdiction of the COA. [ Veloso v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 193677, September 6, 2011] Section 2[2] – the critical function of the COA authorizes it to VETO disbursements. Riel v. Wright – Insular Auditor denied a claim for payment of his salary for services as a temporary clerk of the Senate on the ground that his services were unnecessary. SC: invalid/this is a matter within the peculiar province of the Legislature and for which its members are responsible to their constituents. Insular Auditor cannot question the necessity of an appropriation. BUT in  Matute v. Hernandez –  Insular Auditor refused to authorize payment under a contract, which was novated without a second public bidding. SC: valid because the Insular Auditor can reject an account that is demonstrably unlawful.

The Court had therefore previously upheld the authority of the COA to disapprove payments which it finds excessive and disadvantageous to the Government; to determine the meaning of “public bidding” and when there is “failure” in the bidding; to disallow expenditures which it finds unnecessary according to its rules even if disallowance will mean discontinuance of foreign aid; to disallow a contract even after it has been executed and goods have been delivered. Likewise, we sustained the findings of the COA disallowing the disbursements of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation for failure to submit certain documentary requirements and for being irregular and excessive. We have also ruled that the final determination of the Department of Finance and the BIR as to a person’s entitlement to an informer’s reward is conclusive only upon the executive agencies concerned and not on the COA, the latter being an independent constitutional commission. The COA is traditionally given free rein in the exercise of its constitutional duty to examine and audit expenditures of public funds especially those which are palpably beyond what is allowed by law. [ Barbo v Commission on Audit , G.R. No. 157542, October 10, 2008] - in Rodolfo S. de Jesus and Catbalogan Water District v. COA , the Court upheld the authority and jurisdiction of the COA to rule on the legality of the disbursement of government funds by a water district and declared that such power does not conflict with the  jurisdiction of the courts, the DBM, and the LWUA. [ Sanchez v. Commission on Audit , G.R. No. 127545, April 23, 2008] Monetary claims must be acted upon by the COA within 60 days. Failure to do so within said period would not result in the automatic approval of the claim pursuant to section1 of CA 327. SC: NO, claimant can file petition for mandamus to compel COA to render a decision. [ Pacete v. Acting Chairman of the COA ] While the determination of leave benefits is within the functions of the Civil Service Commission as the central personnel agency of the government, the duty to examine accounts and expenditures relating to such benefits properly pertains to the Commission on Audit. Even as the Supreme Court recognizes the Civil Service Commission’s  jurisdiction in this case, it is not exclusive as it is shared with the Commission on Audit. [ Civil Service Commission v. Pobre, 438 SCRA 334] 31

Be that as it may, assuming for the sake of argument that execution by garnishment could proceed in this case against the funds of petitioner, it must bear stress that the latter is a government-owned or controlled corporation with a charter of its own. Its juridical personality is separate and distinct from the government and it can sue and be sued in its name. As such, while indeed it cannot evade the effects of the execution of an adverse judgment and may not ordinarily place its funds beyond an order of garnishment issued in ordinary cases, it is imperative in order for execution to ensue that a claim for the payment of the judgment award be first filed with the Commission on Audit (COA). [NHMFC v. Abayari , G.R. No. 166508, October 2, 2009] An absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution or vice versa. The criminal case filed before the Office of the Ombudsman is distinct and separate from the proceedings on the disallowance before the COA…With respect to the liability of petitioner, we likewise affirm the COA’s ruling that he is personally and solidarily liable for the disallowed amount. The doctrine of separate personality of a corporation finds no application because CDA is not a private entity but a government agency created by virtue of Republic Act No. 6939 in compliance with the provisions of Section 15, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, respondents satisfactorily established that petitioner acted in bad faith when he prevailed upon the DAP-TEC to modify the initial result of the technical evaluation of the computers by imposing an irrelevant grading system that was intended to favor one of the bidders, after the bids had been opened. [ Versoza v. Carague , G.R. No. 157838, March 8, 2011] This Court agreed that employees who have erroneously received rice allowances ( Agra v. Commission on Audit , G.R. No. 167807, December 6, 2011, 661 SCRA 563; De Jesus v. Commission on Audit , 451 Phil. 812, 824 (2003)), productivity incentive bonuses (De Jesus v. Commission on Audit ; Blaquera v. Hon. Alcala , 356 Phil. 678), representation and transportation allowances (RATA) (De Jesus v. Commission on Audit ), anniversary bonuses (Id.), year-end bonuses (Id.), and cash gifts (Id.) no longer need to refund the same . xxx Analogously, when Mrs. Gruba received the survivorship pension benefits, she accepted them in good faith, knowing that this Court positively pronounced that she was entitled to them in the Resolution dated January 17, 2012. When we revoked this Resolution, such revocation should only apply prospectively in the interest of equity and fairness. [ Re: Application for Survivorship Benefits , A.M. No. 14155Ret., November 19, 2013] – Local Autonomy   - Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local matters and thereby subvert genuine local autonomy, the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other similar forms of Congressional Pork Barrel is deemed unconstitutional. [ Belgica v. Executive Secretary , G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013] ARTICLE X

Recall - Section 70 of the Local Government Code – Percentage requirements – at least 25% in the case of LGUs with a voting population of not more than 20,000/At least 20% in the case of LGUs with a voting population of at least 20,000 but not more than 75,000, provided petitioners shall not be less than 5,000/At least 15% in the case of LGUs with a voting population of at least 75,000 but not more than 300,000, provided petitioners shall not be less than 15,000/At least 10% in case the voting population exceeds 300,000, provided petitioners shall not be less than 45,000

The LGU did not have the authority to grant franchises to operate a CATV system because it was the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) that had the power under EO Nos. 205 and 436 to regulate CATV operations. [Batangas CATV, Inc. v. Court of Appeals ] Based on law and jurisprudence, the office of the mayor has quasi-judicial powers to order the closing and demolition of establishments. This power granted by the LGC, as earlier explained, We believe, is not the same power devolved in favor of the LGU under Sec. 17 (b )(2)(ii), as above-quoted, which is subject to review by the DENR. The fact that the building to be demolished is located within a forestland under the administration of the DENR is of no moment, for what is involved herein, strictly speaking, is not an issue on environmental protection, conservation of natural resources, and the maintenance of ecological balance, but the legality or illegality of the structure. [  Aquino v.  Municipality of Malay, Aklan, G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014] Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution confines the President’s power over LGUs to one of general supervision. Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body. It does not allow the supervisor to annul the acts of the subordinate. Here, what the DOE seeks to do is to set aside an ordinance enacted by local officials, a power that not even its principal, the President, has. Thus, the President and his or her alter egos, the department heads, cannot interfere with the activities of local governments, so long as they act within the scope of their authority. Accordingly, the DOE cannot substitute its own discretion for the discretion exercised by the sanggunian of the City of Manila. In local affairs, the wisdom of local officials must prevail as long as they are acting within the parameters of the Constitution and the law. [ Social Justice Society v. Atienza , G.R. No. 156052, February 13, 2008] Governors do not have emergency military powers. Respondents cannot rely on paragraph 1, subparagraph (vii) of Article 465 [of the Local Government Code], as the said provision expressly refers to calamities and disasters, whether man-made or natural. [ Kulayan v. Tan, G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012] 32

Three-Term Limit –  [1] When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the official merely assumed the position pursuant to the rules on succession under the LGC, then his service for the unexpired portion of the term of the replaced official cannot be treated as one full term as contemplated under the subject constitutional and statutory provision that service cannot be counted in the application of any term limit ( Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections and  Jose T. Capco, Jr ., G.R. No. 133495, September 3, 1998, 295 SCRA 157). If the official runs again for the same position he held prior to his assumption of the higher office, then his succession to said position is by operation of law and is considered an involuntary severance or interruption ( Montebon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 180444, April 8, 2008, 551 SCRA 50). [2.] An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not seek the elective position for what could be his fourth term, but later won in a recall election, had an interruption in the continuity of the official’s service. For, he had become in the interim, i.e., from the end of the 3rd term up to the recall election, a private citizen ( Adormeo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 147927, February 4, 2002, 376 SCRA 90 and Socrates v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 154512, November 12, 2002, 391 SCRA 457). [3] The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a municipality to a city does not, by itself, work to interrupt the incumbent official’s continuity of service ( Latasa v. Commission on Elections. G.R. No. 154829, December 10, 2003, 417 SCRA 601). [4] Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the elective officer’s continued stay and entitlement to the office remain unaffected during the period of suspension, although he is barred from exercising the functions of his office during this period ( Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC , G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009, 609 SCRA 234). [5] When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes office, his term is interrupted when he loses in an election protest and is ousted from office, thus disenabling him from serving what would otherwise be the unexpired portion of his term of office had the protest been dismissed ( Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections , G.R. No. 135150, July 28, 1999, 311 SCRA 602 and Dizon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 182088, January 30, 2009, 577 SCRA 589). The break or interruption need not be for a full term of three years or for the major part of the 3-year term; an interruption for any length of time, provided the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity of service (Socrates v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 154512, November 12, 2002, 391 SCRA 457, citing Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 135150, July 28, 1999, 311 SCRA 602). [6] When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision becomes final after said official had served the full term for said office, then his loss in the election contest does not constitute an interruption since he has managed to serve the term from start to finish. His full service, despite the defeat, should be counted in the application of term limits because the nullification of his proclamation came after the expiration of the term ( Ong v. Alegre , G.R. Nos. 163295 & 163354, January 23, 2006, 479 SCRA 473 and Rivera III v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 167591 & 170577, May 9, 2007, 523 SCRA 41). [Discussed in  Abundo v. Commission on Election, G.R. No. 201716, January 8, 2013]

There can be no quibbling that, during the term 2004-2007, and with the enforcement of the decision of the election protest in his favor, Abundo assumed the mayoralty post only on May 9, 2006 and served the term until June 30, 2007 or for a period of a little over one year and one month. Consequently, unlike Mayor Ong in Ong and Mayor Morales in Rivera, it cannot be said that Mayor Abundo was able to serve fully the entire 2004-2007 term to which he was otherwise entitled. [ Abundo v. Commission on Election, G.R. No. 201716, January 8, 2013] Punong barangay of municipality of Sorsogon for 1st two terms. By the time he was elected for his 3rd term, the municipality had been merged with another municipality to form the City of Sorsogon. Territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants the same. Latasa v. COMELEC affirmed. Disqualified to run for a fourth term. [ Laceda v. COMELEC , G.R. No. 182867, November 25, 2008] A winner who dislodges in a recall election an incumbent elective local official merely served the balance of the latter’s term of office; it is not a full three -year term. It also goes without saying that an incumbent elective local official against whom a recall election is initiated and who nevertheless wins in a recall election must be viewed as being a continuing term of office and not as a break in reckoning three consecutive terms. - A recall election term then, not being a full three-year term, is not to be counted or used as a basis for disqualification whether it is held prior or subsequent to the nine-year full three-term limit. [ Mendoza v. COMELEC ] A provincial board member cannot be elected and serve for more than three consecutive terms. But then, the Court is now called upon to resolve the following questions. First. What are the consequences to the provincial board member’s eligibility to run for the same elective position if the legislative district, which brought him or her to office to serve the first two consecutive terms, be reapportioned in such a way that 8 out of its 10 town constituencies are carved out and renamed as another district? Second. Is the provincial board member’s election to the same position for the third and fourth time, but now in representation of the renamed district, a violation of the three-term limit rule? Reapportionment is "the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation." The aim of legislative apportionment is to equalize population and voting power among districts. The basis for districting shall be the number of the inhabitants of a city or a province and not the number of registered voters therein … From 2004 to 2007 and 2007 to 2010, Naval had been elected and had served as a member of the Sanggunian, Second District, Province of Camarines Sur. On October 12, 2009, the President approved Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9716, which reapportioned the legislative districts in Camarines Sur… Notably, 8 out of 10 towns were taken from the old Second District to form the present Third District. The present Second District is composed of the two remaining towns, Gainza and Milaor, merged with five towns from the old First District. In the 2010 elections, Naval once again won as among the members of the Sanggunian, Third District. He served until 2013. In the 2013 elections, Naval ran anew and was re-elected as Member 33

of the Sanggunian, Third District… Clearly, the drafters of our Constitution are in agreement about the possible attendant evils if there would be no limit to re-election. Notwithstanding their conflicting preferences on whether the term limit would disqualify the elected official perpetually or temporarily, they decided that only three consecutive elections to the same position would be allowed. Thereafter, the public official can once again vie for the same post provided there be a gap of at least one term from his or her last election. The rule answers the need to prevent the consolidation of political power in the hands of the few, while at the same time giving to the people the freedom to call back to public service those who are worthy to be called statesmen. The compromise agreed upon by the drafters of our Constitution was a result of exhaustive deliberations. The required gap after three consecutive elections is significant. Thus, the rule cannot be taken with a grain of salt. Nothing less than its strict application is called for … In sum, the Court finds no compelling reason to grant the reliefs prayed for by Naval. For the Court to declare otherwise would be to create a dangerous precedent unintended by the drafters of our Constitution and of R.A. No. 9716. Considering that the one-term gap or rest after three consecutive elections is a result of a compromise among the members of the Constitutional Commission, no cavalier exemptions or exceptions to its application is to be allowed.  Aldovino  affirms this interpretation. Further, sustaining Naval’s arguments would practically allow him to hold the same office for 15 years. These are the circumstances the Constitution explicitly intends to avert. Certainly, the Court accords primacy to upholding the will of the voting public, the real sovereign, so to speak. However, let all the candidates for public office be reminded that as citizens, we have a commitment to be bound by our Constitution and laws. Side by side our privileges as citizens are restrictions too. [ Naval v. COMELEC , G.R. No. 207851, July 8, 2014] – Impeachment  - a COMELEC Commissioner may not be charged with libel without first being impeached. [The RTC, not the Ombudsman, or the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over libel charges against public officers.] [People v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 154473, April 24, 2009] ARTICLE XI

BETRAYAL OF PUBLIC TRUST  - "acts which are just short of being criminal but constitute gross faithlessness against public trust, tyrannical abuse of power, inexcusable negligence o f duty, favoritism, and gross exercise of discretionary powers." In other words, acts that should constitute betrayal of public trust as to warrant removal from office may be less than criminal but must be attended by bad faith and of such gravity and seriousness as the other grounds for impeachment. [Gonzales v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231, September 4, 2012]

Hence, where betrayal of public trust, for purposes of impeachment, was not intended to cover all kinds of official wrongdoing and plain errors of judgment, this should remain true even for purposes of removing a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor from office. Hence, the fact that the grounds for impeachment have been made statutory grounds for the removal by the President of a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor cannot diminish the seriousness of their nature nor the acuity of their scope. Betrayal of public trust could not suddenly "overreach" to cover acts that are not vicious or malevolent on the same level as the other grounds for impeachment. [ Gonzales v. Office of the President , G.R. No. 196231, September 4, 2012] The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment. Indubitably, an impeachment is not a judicial proceeding, but rather a political exercise. [ Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives, G.R. No. 193459, March 8, 2011] “…Initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint AND referral to the House of Committee on Justice…” Impeachment proceedings are subject to judicial review. [ Francisco v. HR , G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003] Referring the complaint to the proper committee ignites the impeachment proceeding. With a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed, more than one lighted matchsticks [sic] light the candle at the same time. What is important is that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle. [ Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives , G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011] No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year. Contrary to petitioner’s emphasis on impeachment complaint, what the Constitution mentions is impeachment “proceedings.” Suffice it to state that the Constitution allows the indictment for multiple impeachment offenses, with each charge representing an article of impeachment, assembled in one set known as the “Articles of Impeachment.”  It, therefore, follows that an impeachment complaint need not allege only one impeachable offense. [ Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives , G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011] A person no longer in office may still be impeached – penalty: disqualification from public office. Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally understood —that is, to make known. It is within the discretion of Congress to determine on how to promulgate its Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that the Judiciary is permitted to determine that to promulgate a decision means to deliver the decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication … To reiterate, when the Constitution uses the word “promulgate,” it does not 34

necessarily mean to publish in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. Promulgation, as used in Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution, suitably takes the meaning of “to make known” as it should be generally understood. [Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives , G.R. No. 193459, March 8, 2011] Sandiganbayan -Original Jurisdiction – [a] violations of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, where the accused are officials occupying the following positions, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity –  Official of the Executive Branch with the position of regional director or higher or with a salary grade level 27, including provincial governors, vice-governors, board members, provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial department heads/city mayors, vice-mayors, city councilors, city treasurers, assessors, engineers and other city department heads/officials of the diplomatic service from consuls or higher/PA-PAF colonels or PN captains and all officers of higher rank/officers of the PNP while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher/city or provincial prosecutors and their assistants and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor/presidents, directors, trustees or managers of GOCCs, state universities or educational institutions or foundations / Members of Congress and officials with SG27 and up / Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the Constitution / Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions without prejudice to the Constitution / All other national and local officials with SG27 or higher. / [b] other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by public officials and employees mentioned above in relation to their office [where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six years or a fine of P6,000.00 [Madarang v. Sandiganbayan] / [c] civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A issued in 1986 – sequestration cases.

Original Jurisdiction over petitions for writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus , injunction and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, provided that jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the SC. The Sandiganbayan has appellate Jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or their appellate jurisdiction. Consequently, we agree with the CA’s consolidated decision promulgated on September 30, 2008 that the RTC (Branch 138), not the Sandiganbayan, had jurisdiction because Civil Case No. 04-1049 did not involve a sequestrationrelated incident but an intra-corporate controversy. [Note –  POTC is a sequestered corporation.] [ Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation v. Africa , G.R. No. 184622, July 3, 2013] All these judicial pronouncements demand two concurring elements to be present before assets or properties were considered as ill-gotten wealth, namely: (a) they must have "originated from the government itself," and (b) they must have been taken by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates by illegal means. [Republic of the Philippines v. Reyes-Bakunawa , G.R. No. 180418, August 28, 2013] The Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction over the criminal action involving petitioner notwithstanding that he is a private individual considering that his criminal prosecution is intimately related to the recovery of illgotten wealth of the Marcoses, their immediate family, subordinates and close associates. [  Africa v. Sandiganbayan , G.R. No. 172222, November 11, 2013] Violations of RA No. 3019 by a municipal mayor come within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because under RA No. 6758, otherwise known as the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, municipal mayors are local officials clas sified as Grade “27.” [ Binay v. Sandiganbayan; Caballero v. Sandiganbayan ,- G.R. Nos. 137355-58, September 25, 2007] - The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines. [ People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 169004, September 15, 2010] Carandang was correct in insisting that being a private individual he was not subject to the administrative authority of the Ombudsman and to the criminal jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because Radio Philippines Network, Inc. (RPN) was not a government-owned or -controlled corporation, although sequestered by the PCGG; hence, he was not a public official or employee. [ Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 116033, February 26, 1997, 268 SCRA 747] [ Carandang v. Desierto, G.R. No. 148076, January 11, 2011] Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over presidents, directors, trustees or managers of all GOCCs, whether or not with original charters. [ People v. Sandiganbayan ]  Judges may be prosecuted before the Sandiganbayan even if they come under the administrative supervision of the SC. Administrative charges shall defer filing of criminal charges based on the same offense by the Special Prosecutor before the Sandiganbayan. [ Orap v. Sandiganbayan ] BUT see Balsamo v. Suan   [citing Rallos v. Gako   and Calleja v. Santelices] – an administrative case against a judge must be held in abeyance if the basis for the administrative case is a case pending review by or appeal before the CA. 35

While it is true that the interlocutory order issued by the RTC is reviewable by certiorari, the same was incorrectly filed with the CA. Magno should have filed the petition for certiorari with the Sandiganbayan, which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the RTC since the accused are public officials charged of committing crimes in their capacity as Investigators of the National Bureau of Investigation. [ Magno v. People, G.R. No. 171542, April 6, 2011] Ombudsman - The OMBUDSMAN is the ACTIVIST WATCHMAN! [ Ombudsman v. Racho , G.R. No. 185685, January 31, 2011]

We rule that subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department are subject to the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself… Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 (providing that the President may remove a Deputy Ombudsman) should be declared void. [ Gonzales v. Office of the President , G.R. No. 196231, January 28, 2014, Resolution on Motion for Reconsideration] It is only the Office of the Ombudsman, which includes her Deputies, that is endowed with constitutional independence. The inclusion of the Office of the Special Prosecutor with the Office of the Ombudsman in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 6770 does not ipso facto mean that the Office of the Special Prosecutor must be afforded the same levels of constitutional independence as that of the Ombudsman and the Deputy Ombudsman. The law simply defines how the Office of the Special Prosecutor is attached and, therefore, coordinated with the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, the provision of Section 8, Paragraph (2) of Republic Act No. 6770 which provides for the power of the President to remove the Special Prosecutor is valid and constitutional. [ Gonzales v. Office of the President , G.R. No. 196231, January 28, 2014, Resolution on Motion for Reconsideration, Concurring and Separate Opinion of J. Leonen] The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate any act or omission of a public officer or employee applies only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. In cases cognizable by regular courts, the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with other investigative agencies of government. [ Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodriguez , G.R. No. 172700, July 23, 2010] When the City Prosecutor is deputized by the Office of the Ombudsman, he comes under the “supervision and control” of the Ombudsman which means that he is subject to the power of the Ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse or modify the prosecutor’s decision. [Estandarte v. People , G.R. Nos. 156851-55, February 18, 2008] The Ombudsman can conduct preliminary investigations and prosecute criminal cases involving public officers and employees; not only those within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, but those falling within the jurisdiction of regular courts as well. [ Uy v. Sandiganbayan , G.R .No. 105965-70, March 20, 2001] The Ombudsman need not conduct a preliminary investigation upon receipt of a complaint. Indeed, we have said in Knecht v. Desierto [353 Phil. 494 (1998)] and later in  Mamburao, Inc. v. Office of the Ombudsman [398 Phil. 762 (2000)] and Karaan v. Office of the Ombudsman   [476 Phil. 536 (2004)] that should investigating officers find a complaint utterly devoid of merit, they may recommend its outright dismissal. Moreover, it is also within their discretion to determine whether or not preliminary investigation should be conducted. The Court has undoubtedly acknowledged the powers of the Ombudsman to dismiss a complaint outright without a preliminary investigation in The Presidential Ad Hoc FactFinding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto . [437 Phil. 702 (2002)] We reiterate that the Ombudsman has full discretion to determine whether a criminal case should be filed, including whether a preliminary investigation is warranted. The Court therefore gives due deference to the Ombudsman’s decision to no lon ger conduct a preliminary investigation in this case on the criminal charges levelled against respondent Velasco. [ Judge Angeles v. Gutierrez, G.R. Nos. 189161 & 189173, March 21, 2012] The Ombudsman can investigate on its own or on complaint by any person any act or omission of any public official or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, or improper It does not require that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or arise from the performance of official duty. [See Santos v. Rasalan , citing Vasquez v. Hobilla-Alinio , G.R. Nos. 118813-14, April 8, 1997, 271 SCRA 67, 74] The Court has repeatedly ruled that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officials is not exclusive, but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government in relation to the offense charged. [Honasan v. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of Justice , G.R. No. 159747, April 13, 2004, 427 SCRA 46] Therefore, with respect to petitioners, the Ombudsman may share its authority to conduct an investigation concerning administrative charges against them with other agencies [like the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission or the Civil Service Commission]. [ Lacson v. Executive Secretary , G.R. Nos. 165399 and 165475, May 30, 2011] The administrative disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman over a public school teacher is not an exclusive power but is concurrent with the proper committee of the DepEd, which has concurrent jurisdiction under the provisions of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. [ Office of the Ombudsman v. Medrano, G.R. No. 177580, October 17, 2008] 36