2015. Doctrinal Rulings in Constitutional Law

NOTES AND CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (With Constitutional Provisions & Doctrinal Rulings) April 2015 Edition

Prepared by

ATTY. LARRY D. GACAYAN Professor of Law UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS COLLEGE OF LAW Baguio City (POLITICAL LAW REVIEW, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II )

BAR REVIEWER (Political Law & Constitutional Law) C.P.R.S. BAR REVIEW CENTER Cagayan de Oro City, Zamboanga City, Davao City, Iligan City, Ozamis City, Iloilo City, Baguio City,and Tacloban City, POWERHAWS BAR REVIEW CENTER Baguio City, Santiago City, Isabela, San Fernando City, La Union, Manila, Naga City, Tacloban City, Dipolog City and Tagbilaran City COSMOPOLITAN REVIEW CENTER (CRC) University of the Cordilleras, Baguio City EXCELLENT BAR REVIEW CENTER Baguio City, Cebu City and Tacloban City HOLY TRINITY COLLEGE PRE-BAR REVIEW CENTER General Santos City UNIVERSITY OF PANGASINAN BAR REVIEW CENTER Dagupan City

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FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE (Police Power) Police power JUSTICE EMILIO GANCAYCO VS. CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY & METRO MANILA COMMISSION, G.R. No. 177933, October 11, 2011 Zoning ordinances are valid exercise of police power. Requiring building owners along the street to construct an arcade of their structures which protrudes to the sidewalk is valid. An arcade is defined as any portion of a building above the first floor projecting over the sidewalk beyond the first storey wall used as protection for pedestrians against rain or sun. It is a valid exercise of police power to promote the welfare and health of the passers-by. a. ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL VS. MAYOR OF MANILA, July 31, 1967 (Requiring customers of motels to show ID’s, name of companion, the receiving place shall be facing a public street, etc. is a valid exercise of police power to promote public morals, i.e., prevent or minimize prostitution as well as illicit relationships) b. WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION VS. CITY OF MANILA, January 20, 2009 (Prohibiting “short time” (any time less than 12 hours) in hotels and motels is unconstitutional and not a valid exercise of police power. Not all those going to hotels and motels for less than 12 hours are doing it for illicit purposes. Further, couples with illicit relationships could still use the hotels and motels by the simple expedience of paying the rate for 12 hours) c. CITY OF MANILA VS. JUDGE LAGUIO, 455 SCRA 308 (Requiring motel owners to convert their motels to flower shops, restaurants, antique shops, souvenir shops, handicrafts display centers; art galleries; records and music shops, coffee shops, etc., within 3 months or transfer the motels to other parts of the City of Manila is not a valid exercise of police power. This is so because if it is immoral to operate said motels in the Ermita-Malate area, the same will likewise be immoral to operate in any other part of the City of Manila) d. DE LA CRUZ VS. PARAS, 123 SCRA 569 (Nightclubs in Bocaue, Bulacan were ordered closed and prohibited by a Municipal Ordinance. The SC held that nightclubs are not illegal per se and therefore, they could not be prohibited but merely to be regulated) Requisites of a valid ordinance: 1. 2.

must not contravene the Constitution or any law; must not be unfair or oppressive; 2

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3. 4. 5. 6.

must not be partial or discriminatory; must not prohibit but regulate trade; must be general and consistent with public policy; and must not be unreasonable.

e. ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ, 101 Phil. 1155 (Retail Trade Nationalization Act prohibiting foreigners from engaging in retail trade is a valid exercise of police power tyo promote the economic stability of the Filipino people) f. AGUSTIN VS. EDU, 88 SCRA 195 [Early warning device promotes public safety to the motoring public and requiring every motor vehicle owner to have one is a valid exercise of police power] g. TAXICAB OPERATORS VS. BOT, 119 SCRA 597 (Phasing out of taxicabs over 6 years old in Metro Manila is a valid exercise of police power to promote public safety on the part of the riding public. However, even taxicabs more than 6 years are still allowed outside MM because they are not as dilapidated as those operating in Metro manila which are being used 24 hours daily) h. ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, 175 SCRA 343 (CARP Law is a valid exercise of police power and power of eminent domain. It promotes general welfare on the part of the people.) i.

VILLANUEVA VS. CASTANEDA, September 21, 1987 (Permit earlier issued by the Municipal Mayor for the vendors to have a Talipapa along the National Highway of San Fernando City, Pampanga, with the approval of the Municipal Council, may be validly revoked by the new mayor and could be justified under the police power to promote public health. Selling fish and meat along the national highway is dangerous to the health of the people, the same being exposed to dust and smoke from vehicles)

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PRC vs. De Guzman, et al., June 21, 2004 (Fatima College of Medicine graduates had “unusually and exceptionally high” grades in the 2 most difficult subjects of the exam, i.e., Biochemistry and Obstetrics and Gynecology during the Medical Board Examination. The NBI investigation revealed that they had “early access” to test questions. They can’t compel the PRC to give them their licenses. Valid exercise of police power by PRC in not giving said licenses to practice medicine to safeguard the heath and general welfare of the people)

5-a. Not a valid exercise of police power a. CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY VS. ERICTA, 122 SCRA 759 (Requiring private cemeteries to set aside 6% of their land area to be given free as burial places for paupers. It does not promote general welfare since only “paupers” will benefit from it and not the entire citizenry. Further, it is the obligation of local government units under the Local Government Code to have cemeteries for the constituents and not to pass on to private cemeteries)

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b. YNOT VS. IAC, 148 SCRA 659 (Prohibition of Inter-provincial transport of carabaos and carabeefs without permits from health authorities is a valid exercise of police power to promote public health. However, the Letter of Instruction which gives the Director of Animal Industry or the Chairman of the National Meat Commission to dispose of the confiscated animals “in any manner he deems fit” is unconstitutional because in order that such measure is valid, it must meet two (2) requisites: [1] valid subject---which is to promote public health in this case; and [2] the means employed is valid. Here, the means employed is not valid since the Director can use his discretion on what to do to the confiscated animals) c. DELA CRUZ VS. PARAS, 123 SCRA 569 (Prohibition on the operation of nightclubs in Bocaue, Bulacan) CHAPTER II Section 1 DUE PROCESS Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. The right to Due Process of Maliksi was violated when he was not notified of the dates when the COMELEC conducted decryption and printing of the ballot images

MAYOR EMMANUEL L. MALIKSI VS. COMELEC and HOMER T. SAQUILAYAN, G.R. No. 203302, April 13, 2013

Maliksi insists: (a) that he had the right to be notified of every incident of the proceedings and to be present at every stage thereof; (b) that he was deprived of such rights when he was not informed of the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images by the First Division; (c) that the March 28, 2012 and April 17, 2012 orders of the First Division did not sufficiently give him notice inasmuch as the orders did not state the date, time, and venue of the decryption and printing of the ballot images; and (d) that he was thus completely deprived of the opportunity to participate in the decryption proceedings. The Court grants Maliksi’s Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, and reverses the decision promulgated on March 12, 2013 on the ground that the First Division of the COMELEC denied to him the right to due process by failing to give due notice on the decryption and printing of the ballot images. Consequently, the Court annuls the recount proceedings conducted by the First Division with the use of the printouts of the ballot images. 4

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It bears stressing at the outset that the First Division should not have conducted the assailed recount proceedings because it was then exercising appellate jurisdiction as to which no existing rule of procedure allowed it to conduct a recount in the first instance. The recount proceedings authorized under Section 6, Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, as amended, are to be conducted by the COMELEC Divisions only in the exercise of their exclusive original jurisdiction over all election protests involving elective regional (the autonomous regions), provincial and city officials. The Court, by this resolution, does not intend to validate the victory of any of the parties in the 2010 Elections. That is not the concern of the Court as yet. The Court simply does not want to countenance a denial of the fundamental right to due process, a cornerstone of our legal system. a. BANCO ESPANOL VS. PALANCA, 37 Phil. 92 (Four (4) Requisites of judicial due process) b. IMELDA MARCOS VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, October 6, 1998 (The Sandiganbayan violated Imelda’s right to due process of law when Presiding Justice Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan asked 179 crossexamination questions to the witness of Ms. Marcos. It is no longer a case of asking clarificatory questions but cross-examination. Obviously, he has allied himself to the cause of the prosecution. There is no more “cold neutrality of an impartial judge”. c. PEOPLE VS. OPIDA, June 13, 1986 (When the judge took over the crossexamination before the Prosecutor could start asking questions, asks immaterial questions, order the accused to remove his shirt and describe the tattoos in his body for the record and after asking insulting questions tells the accused “Do you want me to dictate the decision now?” clearly shows his bias against the accused. No more impartial trial. He has clearly prejudged the case. d. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BENANCIO MORTERA, G.R. No. 188104, April 23, 2010 [There is no violation of the right to due process and impartial trial as a result of the comment of the Judge that “if you are not telling the truth to your own lawyer, how would I know that you are telling the truth now” as a result of his change of defense from a negative defense to self-defense in a murder case. e. DELGADO VS. CA, November 10, 1986 (The accused was represented by a non-lawyer during the trial of her case for estafa. She was not aware that Atty. Ico is not a member of the bar. She is entitled to a new trial since her right to due process was violated. Even if a real lawyer appeared for her on appeal, such defect was not cured since on appeal, the evidence presented by the non-lawyer will still be the basis in deciding said appeal) f.Consulta vs. People, February 12, 2009 (He was represented during the presentation of prosecution’s evidence by one “Atty. Jocelyn P. Reyes” who turned out to be a non-lawyer. He was represented by a PAO Lawyer 5

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during the presentation of his evidence. No violation of his right to due process since he was represented by a real lawyer during the presentation of his evidence. And therefore, all the 4 requsites of “judicial due process” are present) g. DAVID VS. AQUILIZAN, 94 SCRA 707 (The CFI, now RTC, deciding the case immediately after the filing of the answer, without presentation of evidence violates the right to due process. NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT SUCH PROCEDURE IS NOW ALLOWED IN CASES COVERED BY THE RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE SINCE THE PLEADINGS ARE UNDER OATH AND THE AFFIDAVITS OF WITNESSES ARE ALREADY ATTACHED TO THE PLEADINGS) h. ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING VS. CA, 94 SCRA 261 (THE SECRETARY OF THE DENR SECRETARY may not review his own decision when he was still the Director of Mines without violating the parties’ right to due process of law i.ANZALDO VS. CLAVE, 119 SCRA 353 (The Deputy Executive Secretary may not validly review his very own decision as the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission. There will be violation of the right to due process of law) 1. Procedural due process before administrative bodies/labor tribunals: a.

PLDT VS. TIAMZON, 474 SCRA 761. A party like the PLDT could not present an evidence to justify its act of dismissing the private respondent for the first time on appeal without violating the right of the employee to due process of law. This is so because the employee waqs dismissed based on a different ground which he was able to prove to be false and unsubstantiated.

b. ATTY. ROMEO ERECE VS. MACALINGAY, ET AL., G.R. No. 166809, April 22, 2008 (No right to cross-examine the complainant and witnesses in an administrative case nor a formal hearing required as long as the parties were already given the opportunity to present evidence, i.e., counter-affidavit and affidavit of witnesses) c. DATUFAX MANGUDADATU VS. HRET, December 18, 2008 (Summons by registered mail is not valid since it is not one of the modes of service of summons under the Rules of the HRET or the Rules of Court. Violation of the right to due process) d. DEP ED VS. CUANAN, December 16, 2008 (Not furnished a copy of the Motion for Reconsideration of DepED before the Civil Service Commission even though the private complainants did not question the Decision of the CSC anymore. The right to due process of Cuanan was violated when the CSC reversed its decision based on the Motion for Reconsideration where no notice was given to Cuanan) 4. Procedural due process in disciplinary actions against students 6

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A. DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY VS. COURT OF APPEALS, DECEMBER 19, 2007 (A STUDENT HAS NO RIGHT TO DEMAND FOR CROSSEXAMINATION OF THE COMPLAINANT AND HIS WITNESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST HIM. IT IS SUFFICIENT THAT HE WAS GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO FILE HIS ANSWER AND OTHER EVIDENCE. Due process is deemed complied with ) B. GUZMAN VS. NU, 142 SCRA 706 (5 REQUISITES OF DUE PROCESS INVOLVING STUDENTS. PLEASE SEE THE PREWEEK REVIEWER) In administrative proceedings, does due process require that a party be assisted by counsel? LUMIQUED VS. EXENEA, 282 SCRA 125 (The fact that the petitioner who was under administrative investigation was not represented by a lawyer during the hearings of his case could not claim violation of his right to due process. Nowhere from the Civil Service Law nor the Administrative Code of 1987 could we find a provision requiring the presence of a lawyer for government officials under investigation during hearings. Further, petitioner was given several opportunities to engage the services of a lawyer but he failed to do so. 

JOSE ATIENZA ET AL VS. COMELEC and MANUEL ROXAS II, FRANKLIN DRILON AND NEREUS ACOSTA, G.R. No. 188920, February 16, 2010

There is no violation of the right to due process when the group of Drilon expelled Atienza and company without notice and hearing because administrative due process in accordance with Ang Tibay could be invoked only in bodies created by the State through which governmental acts or functions are performed. In this case, it was purely private matter among members of the Liberal Party. CHAPTER III Section 1 THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

Section 1…. nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. 

ELEAZAR QUINTO VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010, reversing the Decision dated December 1, 2009, Per CJ Puno. There is no violation of the right to equal protection if appointed government employees arfe deemed automatically resigned from their work if they file their certificates of candidacy while elected officials may continue discharging their duties even if they have filed their certificates of candidacy. This is so because there is real and substantial distinction. That is, their term of office is mandated by the Constitution to be 3 or 6 years ending up to noon of June 30 following their assumption of office. This cannot be amended or repealed by mere legislation (Mancuso vs. Taft was abandoned and reversed in US Civil Service Commission vs. National Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO and Broadrick vs. State of Oklahoma) 7

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VICTORIA GUTTIERREZ VS. DBM, G.R. No.153266, March 18, 2010. [Inclusion of allowances and other fringe benefits for government workers in the national government, state universities and colleges, including those in the local government under the Compensation and Position classification Act of 1989 while those in the AFP and PNP did not, does not violate the equal protection clause because there is real and substantial distinction. Being charged of the actual defense of the country, uniformed personnel of the government are expected to be stationed virtually anywhere in the country. They are likely to be assigned to a variety of low, moderate and high cost areas. Since their basic pay does not vary on location, the continued grant of COLA is intended to help them offset the effects of living in higher cost areas.

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LOUIS “BAROK” C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner, v. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010, Respondent., G.R. No. 192935 : December 7, 2010 (Executive Order No. 1 of President Benigno Aquino III creating the Truth Commission of 2010 “to investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the people, committed by public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration; Is unconstitutional because it singled out the administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo while not investigating the previous administrations as violative of the equal protection of the law. HAD THE EXECUTIVE ORDER DIRECTS THE INVESTIGATION OF OFFICIALS UNDER THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATIONS, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN CONTITUTIONAL, NOT SINGLING OUT JUST THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION OF PRESIDENT GLORIA ARROYO. HIMAGAN VS. PEOPLE, October 7, 1994 (Policemen charged of crimes shall be preventively suspended up to the time their cases are completed resulting in acquittal before they could be reinstated---regardless of the length of said trial while other government officials could be preventively suspended only for 90 days under the anti-graft and corrupt practices act. No violation of the equal protection clause because there is real and substantial distinction, that is, policemen have guns and if they immediately return to their work, there might be injustice committed because witness might be afraid to testify against them.

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PHIL. JUDGES ASSOCIATION VS. PRADO, November 11, 1993 [Franking privileges for the courts removed while Congress and legislature were not. It is a clear violation of the equal protection clause. There is a clear violation of equal protection because there is no real and substantial distinction why it allows the executive and legislative free use of the mails while the judiciary is not.]

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Gumabon vs. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 (Later decision of the SC stating that there is no such thing as rebellion complexed with murder and therefore, the convicts shall serve only 6 years shall also apply to those earlier convicted of rebellion complexed with murder. Otherwise, there will be violation of the equal protection clause.

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Taxicab Operators vs. BOT, September 30,l982 [There’s a valid distinction when taxicabs in Baguio City may be allowed to be used even after 6 years while Manila taxicabs should be phased out after 6 years. The real and substantial distinction being that the latter are used 24 hours daily while the former are used only for few hours and as such, after 6 years, their taxicabs are already dilapidated and dangerous to the riding public] CHAPTER IV Section 2 THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE PROVISION

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. NOTE: In Southern Hemisphere vs. Anti-Terrorism Council, October 5, 2010, the Supreme Court DISMSISED the petitions questioning the constitutionality of the AntiTerrorism Law or Human Security Act which allows the members of the Anti-Terrorism Council to issue WARRANT OF DETENTION since only a JUDGE is allowed to issue a warrant of arrest under Section 2 on the ground that the requisites of Judicial Review are not present, there being no actual case or controversy nor the petitioners have the personality to sue, they not having been the subject of a warrant of detention. DISINI VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, February 18, 2014. The provision of the Online Libel Law which provides that the DOJ has the power to restrict or to block access to a computer data by an individual is UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of the search and seizure provision as well as the freedom of expression guaranteed by the Constitution. This in effect allows the DOJ to seize and places under its control and disposition a computer data without a search warrant. The DOJ Order could not supplant a judicial search warrant. It would make the DOJ the complainant, prosecutor and judge rolled into one. LEVISTE VS. JUDGE ALAMEDA, RTC MAKATI, G,.R. No. 182677, August 3, 2010 & ALFREDO MENDOZA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, April 21, 2014 THERE ARE TWO (2) KINDS OF PROBABLE CAUSE 1. The executive determination of probable cause on whether a crime was allegedly committed and file a criminal case in court; and

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2. Judicial determination of probable cause is to be determined by the judge on whether or not he shall issue warrant for the accused and bind him for trial or whether the case shall be dismissed. 

The place to be searched AS INDICATED in the warrant is controlling

PEOPLE VS. CA, 291 SCRA 400 The search warrant says “the [4-door apartment at the rear of Abigail Variety Store in QC, not Abigail Variety store] 

As a general rule: warrantless searches and seizures as a result of an informer’s tip is not valid for lack of personal knowledge on the part of the searching party, complainant or witnesses. PEOPLE VS. ARUTA, 288 SCRA 626 [On December 13, 1988, Olongapo Police received a tip…8.5 kilos of marijuana being transported from Baguio City to Olongapo. Olongapo police just accosted the accused upon arrival in Olongapo City. Warrantless search is not valid because the police have no personal knowledge that accused was committing a crime] PEOPLE VS. MONTILLA, 284 SCRA 703 [Dasmarinas, Cavite Police received a tip on June 19, 1994…The marijuana courier will alight at the waiting shed of Barangay Salitran, Dasmarinas, Cavite…with 28 kilos of marijuana. They searched him without warrant but first, they allegedly asked for his consent---which he allegedly gave. Warrantless search is valid because of the consent given by the accused] P VS. CLAUDIO, 160 SCRA 646 [There is probable cause in the Warrantless search of a bag (behind him in a bus) by a NARCOM agent when he allegedly smelled marijuana therein. By reason of his training, he could smell marijuana and therefore, he has personal knowledge and therefore, probable cause was present making the search and arrest legal]

NOTE: In TAMBASEN VS. PEOPLE, July 14, 1995 and People vs. CA, 216 SCRA 101, the Supreme Court described a search warrant for estafa, robbery, theft and qualified theft as SCATTER-SHOT WARRANT 2. Bache vs. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [The clerk of court received the evidence of the applicant for a search warrant while the judge was hearing a case. The fact that the judge later on asked the complainant and his witnesses whether their testimony is true and they said “yes” did not validate the issuance of the search warrant] 2-a. Pendon vs. CA, Nov. 16, 1990 [When the questions asked by the judge to the applicant are pre-typed, the search warrant is not valid since there could have been no searching questions] 1-b. Quintero vs. NBI, 162 SCRA 467 [Searching parties searched different rooms simultaneously thereby resulting in no witnesses in the other rooms when searched because the witnesses are in another room. Clearly, the search is not valid for lack of one requisite] 1-d. SOLIVEN & BELTRAN VS. MAKASIAR, NOVEMBER 18, 1988 (There is no need for the complainant and her witnesses to be personally examined by a judge before he 10

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issues a warrant of arrest provided he has their affidavits infront of him and upon reading it, he is convinced of the presence of probable cause) 2-a. P. vs. Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465 (The judge may validly refuse to issue warrants of arrest if he believes that there is no probable cause for their issuance… despite the findings of probable cause by the filing Prosecutor since that was for purposes of filing only. The two (2) probable causes are different from one another (Please see Leviste vs. People, supra)) 7.JUAN PONCE ENRILE VS. JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR, ET AL., G.R.NO. 92163, June 5, 1990 [Warrant of arrest issued against Senator Enrile after 1 hour and 20 minutes from receipt of the records of the case consisting of several thousands of pages is valid. There is no need to read all the affidavits or evidence in the record of a criminal case before the Judge could issue a warrant of arrest. It is sufficient that he is convinced of the existence of probable cause upon reading several affidavits] d. Warrantless searches and seizures--when valid or not. Is "Operation Kapkap" valid? Warrantless search of alleged obscene magazines. Read: PEOPLE VS. MENGOTE, G.R. No. 87059, June, 1992 [Arrest or search without warrant because of a bulging tummy which looks like a gun tucked therein is not valid. There was no personal knowledge nor probable cause on the part of the police] PEOPLE VS. GO, 354 SCRA 338 [Search of a gun which could be seen tucked in the waist of the accused in a nightclub is valid based on the “plain view” doctrine. Likewise, the sachets of shabu seen by a policeman who arrested the accused on the front seat of his car when he opened it is admissible under the plain view doctrine] MANALILI VS. PEOPLE, October 9, 1997 [The policemen saw several suspiciouslooking men at dawn and when they approached said persons, they ran but were caught. The unlicensed firearm confiscated after the policemen searched them is admissible] PITA VS. CA, 178 SCRA 362 [Requisites before the Mayor could confiscate magazines which are allegedly obscene] 1. He must apply for a search warrant with the court; 2. Convince the court that the magazine is indeed obscene. 3. He can make seizures only after a search warrant is issued. Note: The Mayor could not justify warrantless search based on police power. This is so because he will be the complainant, prosecutor and judge rolled into one if that is allowed. Also, only a judge could declare that the publication is “obscene”, not the mayor or any other public official. Warrantless Search and seizure by a private person is valid.  

PEOPLE VS. MENDOZA, 301 SCRA 66 SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL VS. SOLUTA, 482 SCRA 660 11

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANDRE MARTI, G.R. NO. 81561, January 18, 1991

VALID WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE: 1. Search made incidental to a valid arrest a. NOLASCO VS. PANO, 139 SCRA 541 (Note that the search shall be made only on the body of the person arrested. She could not be brought to her apartment and make searches therein when hshe was arrested on board a passenger jeepney) b. P vs. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 [ The warrantless search and arrest of the accused while plowing his field, and was not therefore committing a crime then, is illegal. c. ESPANO VS. CA, 288 SCRA 588 (If accused was arrested in the street in front of his house selling prohibited drugs, the arresting officers may not search his house without warrant based on “search incidental to a valid arrest” rule. 2. Search of moving vehicles PEOPLE VS. BELEN MARIACOS, G.R. No. 18861, June 16, 2010 (Tip that the accused has with her marijuana on her red bag at the topload of a passenger jeepney justifies the police authorities to conduct a valid Warrantless search since they have no more time to secure a search warrant) a. MUSTANG LUMBER VS. CA, 257 SCRA 430

b. PEOPLE vs. AMINNUDIN Y AHNI, JULY 6,1988 (WARRANTLESS Search and seizure on the bag of a ship passenger traveling from Zamboanga City to Iloilo City basaed on an informer’s tip is not valid, a. b. c. d. 

Papa vs. Mago, 22 SCRA 857 Pacis vs. Pamaran, 56 SCRA 16 HIZON VS. CA, 265 SCRA 517 PEOPLE VS. QUE, 265 SCRA 721

Seize of evidence in plain view a.

PEOPLE VS. VALDEZ, 341 SCRA 25 (If the policemen seized the marijuana plants without warrant because there is a tip that the house of the accused was surrounded by fully-grown marijuana plants THAT IS WHY THEY WENT THERE, the same could not be justified by the “plain view” doctrine because they went to his place expecting to see or to look for marijuana. THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE APPLIES ONLY IF THE OFFICER IS NOT SEARCHING FOR EVIDENCE AGAINS THE ACCUSED, BUT INADVERTENTLY COMES ACROSS AN INCRIMINATING OBJECT. 12

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b.

PEOPLE VS. DAMASO, 212 SCRA 547 (The police saw the M14 Rifle on top of a table inside he rented apartment of the accused AFTER THE OWNER OF SAID APARTMENT OPENED IT WITH HER OWN KEY. Seizure of the gun cannot be justified under the “plain view” doctrine because they were looking for evidence at that time and something was done before they saw it. It was not inadvertently found.

When there is waiver of right or gives his consent; a. VEROY VS. LAYAGUE, 210 SCRA 97 (The consent given by the owner of the house to the soldiers to “look for rebel soldiers” does not justify them to search for unlicensed firearm inside the house by opening cabinets therein) b. Lopez vs. Commissioner, 65 SCRA 336 (Note: In this case, the Supreme Court during martial law, held that the consent given by the woman (inside the hotel room of the suspect and who turned out to be his “manicurist”) to the authorities to conduct warrantless search inside the hotel room of the suspect, was held as valid consent justifying the admission of the seized items. c. PEOPLE VS. DAMASO, 212 SCRA 547 (Consent given by the owner of the apartment for the police to search the room being rented to Basilio Damaso is not valid. THE CONSENT MUST COME FROM THE ACCUSED OR THE SUSPECT WHO WILL GO TO JAIL IF ILLEGAL ITEMS ARE FOUND, NOT BY ANY OTHER PERSON) STOP & FRISK or search in checkpoints 1. RICARDO VALMONTE VS. GEN RENATO DE VILLA, GR No. 83988, September 29, 1989 (Random searches on checkpoints are valid provided it must only be VISUAL SEARCH, NOT BODILY SEARCH) 2. SUSAN ESQUILLO VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 182010, August 25, 2010 “Stop and Frisk”—valid exception to a Warrantless search and seizure 

Search of “Hot Logs” under the Forestry Code may be seized without warrant MUSTANG LUMBER VS. CA, 257 SCRA 430

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If the judge finds that there's probable cause, must he issue a warrant of arrest as a matter of course? 1. Samulde vs. Salvani, September 26, 1988 (Not necessarily if it involves a minor offense provided he is sure that the accused will appear in court whenever his case is scheduled for trial) 2. GOZO VS. TAC-AN, 300 SCRA 265 (Yes, he must because the case is for Murder and as such, the accused must be in jail for a non-bailable offense Searching questions 13

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a. DR. NEMESIO PRUDENTE VS. THE HON. EXECUTIVE JUDGE ABELARDO M. DAYRIT, RTC 33, Manila & People of the Philippines, GR No. 82870, December 14, 1989 (When the applicant testifies that his knowledge that the petitioner has guns and explosives in his office came from a very reliable informant, there is no probable cause since he has no personal knowledge of said fact.) b. Pendon vs. CA, Nov. 16, 1990 [Pre-typed questions as a basis of probable cause not valid. No searching questions]

1. Century Fox vs. CA, 164 SCRA 655 (The master tape must be presented if one alleges that the tapes to be seized are illegal and pirated]; otherwise, the search warrant is not valid) 2. COLUMBIA PICTURES VS. CA, 261 SCRA 144

CHAPTER IV-A THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY

Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. There are two (2) CATEGORIES of the Right to Privacy as held by the Supreme Court in DISINI VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, February 18, 2014. These are: 1. Decisional Privacy which is the right to independence in making certain important decisions; and 2. Informational Privacy which the interest in avoiding disclosures on personal matters. Further, Informational Privacy has two (2) aspects, namely: a. The right not to have personal information about a particular be disclosed; and b. The right to live freely without surveillance and intrusion.

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1. OPLE VS. TORRES, July 23, 1998 [National ID System (Admin. Order No. 308, December 12, 1996 of President Ramos) through biometrics technology where the people will have to furnish the government with their fingerprints, retinal scan, hand geometry, facial features and others to be stored in a super computer. Held: Since there is no safeguard that these informations will not be used illegally, the EO is unconstitutional. It falls short of assuring that personal information gathered from the people will be used for the specified purposes without violating the citizen’s right to privacy. 2. ZULUETA VS. CA, February 10, 1996 [The intimacies of husband and wife does not justify the latter from breaking cabinets in the clinic of the physician-husband and take the diaries, checks, greeting cards, pictures of his alleged paramours] 3. KMU VS. ERMITA, & BAYAN MUNA VS. ERMITA, April 19, 2006 & June 20, 2006 [Proclamation No. 420 of GMA requiring mandatory ID system is valid because it applies only to national government employees and within her power of control under Section 17, Art. VII of the Constitution] 4. SABIO VS. GORDON, October 17, 2006 [Limited right to privacy of government officials] CHAPTER V FREEDOM OF SPEECH, PRESS, EXPRESSION, etc.

Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. DISINI VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014 The “online Libel provision of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 as well as the Libel provision of the Revised Penal Code are constitutional and do not violate the freedom of speech, press or expression of the individual since these rights are not absolute and the State has the right to protect its citizens from defamation. Unsolicited commercial communication or “spam” is constitutional though transmitting spam amounts to trespass to one’s privacy since the person sending out the “spam” enters the recipient’s domain without permission. But these “spam” do not reduce the efficiency of computers. They can be read or deleted outright by the recipient. UNSOLICITED ADVERTISMENTS ARE LEGITIMATE FORM OF EXPRESSIONS AND DO NOT VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTED FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION. The provision which punishes one who is “aiding or abetting in the commission of a cybercrime is constitutional BUT BECOMES UNCONSTITUTIONAL IF APPLIED TO PEOPLE WHO “like”, “share” or makes “Comment” to a post. This is so because they are not the author of the said libelous post.

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Baguio Midland Courier vs. CA & Ramon Labo, Jr., 444 SCRA 28 (A private individual running for public office may be the subject of criticism like a public official in order for the electorates to see his merits and demerits under the “public figure doctrine”.

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PABLITO V. SANIDAD VS. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 90878, January 29, 1990 [The State could not dictate the time and place for a citizen to exercise his freedom of speech, expression or of the press UNLESS there is clear and present danger]

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De la Cruz vs. Ela, 99 Phil. 346 (The mayor could validly transfer the place where members of the Jehovah witnesses will conduct their prayer-rally if there is clear and present danger as a result of the previous violence that took place before involving said religious sect and the members of the Roman Catholic Church.)

Tests of obscenity in the case of MILLER VS. CALIFORNIA: a. Whether the average person applying to contemporary community standards would find the work appeals to prurient interest; b. Whether the work depicts or describes a patently offensive sexual conduct;

c. Whether the work as a whole lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. e. Pita vs. CA, 178 SCRA 362 [City Mayor Bagatsing could not just order the confiscation of copies of Pinoy Playboy because he considers the same as “obscene magazine” even without a search warrant. That will make him the complainant, prosecutor and judge rolled into one. He must: i. ii. iii. iv.

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Secure a copy of the alleged obscene publication; Apply for a search warrant; Convince the court that it is obscene; and If the court issues a search warrant, that is the only time that he could go to the sidewalks and confiscate the said magazine.

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MAYOR ATIENZA, G,R. No. 175241, February 24, 2010

The act of the mayor in denying the application for a rally permit by the IBP at the foot of Mendiola Bridge on June 22, 2006 from 230 pm to 530 pm and instead allow them to hold said rally at the Plaza Miranda is unconstitutional. It violates the right to freedom of expression and public assembly. This is so because under Section 6 [e] of BP 880 or the Public Assembly Act of 1985 which provides that if the Mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit, HE SHALL IMMEDIATELY INFORM THE APPLICANT WHO MUST BE HEARD ON THE MATTER. The opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit, since the applicant may directly go to court after an unfavorable action on the permit. 16

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1-a. Gesite vs. CA, 444 SCRA 28 [Concerted mass actions by government officials, teachers in this case, like walkouts, mass leaves, and other work stoppage or absence from work are prohibited because it is tantamount to strike which is prohibited to government employees. 1-b. Bayan vs. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (Calibrated Pre-emptive Response is not allowed. Instead, the police should observe the Maximum Tolerance Rule. As long as there is no violence taking place during the rally, the Police may not validly disperse the rallyists just because the police believes that their utterances are libelous or seditious) 1-c. Randy David vs. Ermita, 489 SCRA 160 Reyes vs. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553; see guidelines for rallies but note the same was amended by the Public Assembly Act and IBP vs. Atienza 

Freedom from prior restraint

Read: 1. Newsounds Broadcasting Network vs. Hon. Ceasar Dy, April 2, 2009 [Closure of the Bombo AM and FM stations allegedly because their building is on an agricultural land and therefore, the Mayor did not issue a Business Permit and even ordered its closure is tantamount to prior restrain. City of Cauayan shall pay the radio stations P10M in damages and P1M in attorney’s fees. 1-a. Bro. Eliseo Soriano vs. MTRCB, April 29, 2009 (Read also the dissenting opinion of Justice Antonio Carpio) [Suspension for 3 months of the program Ang Dating Daan and 3 months suspension of the host Bro. Eli Soriano is not prior restraint but subsequent punishment. The questioned utterances of Bro. Eli Soriano is quoted as follows: “August 10, 2004 at 10 p.m. Lehitimong anak ng demonyo, sinungaling. Gago ka talaga Michael (referring to the host of the INC’s program ang Tamang Daan) , masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba? Yung putang babae and gumagana lang duon ay ang ibaba. Kay Michael, ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba? Masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.” 

The balancing-of-interest test

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AYER PRODUCTION VS. JUDGE CAPULONG, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, ET AL., 160 SCRA 861 [The Dangerous Life: the 1986 EDSA People’s Power Revolution… Senator Enrile could not validly stop the filming of the EDSA Revolution showing him as a participant because such does not violate his right to privacy. To exclude him in the movie as a participant of the revolution would distort history.As between the right to privacy of Enrile and the freedom of expression on the part of the movie producer, the latter’s right prevails. 17

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Lagunzad vs. Gonzales, 92 SCRA 476 (The mother of the late Moises Padilla may validly object to a film showing the alleged many girlfriends of her late son who was murdered to protect the privacy or memory of her late son. The right to privacy prevailed over the freedom of expression in this case. The producer is only after profits while the mother is after the good reputation of her son from the eyes of the people.) CHAPTER VI THE NON-ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION CLAUSE

Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. JAMES IMBONG ET AL VS. HON. PAQUITO OCHOA, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014 The provision of the Reproductive Health Law requiring a conscientious objector of the said law to refer to another physician a patient for the performance of a procedure which he does not want to perform as unconstitutional. It violates the freedom of religion as well as free speech. Likewise, the provision of the Implementing Rules and Regulations which provides that provincial, city or municipal health officers, chief of hospitals, head nurses, who by virtue of their offices are specifically charged with the duty of implementing the provisions of this act cannot be considered as conscientious objectors IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE. This is so because if a medical practitioner who is a conscientious objector is allowed not to perform an RH Procedure because it is against his religious belief, there is no real and substantial distinction why provincial, city or municipal health officers, chief of hospitals, head nurses should not be allowed to refrain from performing the same if it is against their religious beliefs. However, even a conscientious objector may be forced to perform a reproductive health procedure even if it is against his religious belief in lifethreatening cases. THE RIGHT TO LIFE ON THE PART OF THE MOTHER SHALL BE GIVEN PREFERENCE CONSIDERING THAT REFERRAL TO ANOTHER MEDICAL PRACTITIONER WOULD AMOUNT TO DENIAL OF MEDICAL SERVICE WHICH WOULD UNNECESSARILY PLACE THE LIFE OF THE MOTHER IN GRAVE DANGER. 

Estrada vs. Escritur, 408 SCRA 1 and 492 SCRA 1

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Requisites before a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses may validly excuse himself from criminal or administrative liability for living with another person who is not his wife or husband: a. Must be a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower Society; b. The conjugal arrangement was in conformity with their religious beliefs; c. The conjugal arrangement was with the conformity of the congregation; d. Execute Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness. 

PEOPLE VS. LAGMAN & ZOSA, 38 O.G. 1676, refusal to join the armed forces on religious grounds is not tenable because of the mandatory requirement of Section 4, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution.

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INK vs. Gironella, 106 SCRA 1 [The judge described the act of members of Iglesia ni Cristo from always present in his court during the trial of a rape case where the complainant is an INC member as “Gimmick”. The Supreme Court held that the said comment “hurts the sensibilities of the INC members” and violates their freedom of religion] American Bible Society vs. City of Manila, 101 Phil. 398 Pamil vs. Teleron, November 20, 1978 Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope, 59 SCRA 54 [Religious belief not to join unions is superior over the collective bargaining agreement] German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514 (The exercise of freedom of religion must be done in good faith) Gerona vs. Sec. of Education, 106 Phil. 11 [1959] EBRALINAG VS. SUPT. OF CEBU, March 1, 1993 (Members of the Jehovah’s witnesses may not be forced to sing the national anthem, salute the flag and recite the patriotic pledge during flag ceremonies if it is against their religion. Said constitutional right prevails over the Flag Salute Law. ANG LADLAD [LGBT---LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL and TRANSGENDER] PARTY VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010 (The fact that their belief---same sex marriage---is allegedly not sanctioned by the Bible or the Koran is not a valid ground to disqualify Ang Ladlad from participating in the party-list elections.

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CHAPTER VII THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO TRAVEL

Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in 19

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the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. 1-a. FERDINAND MARCOS, ET AL. VS. HON. RAUL MANGLAPUS, ET AL., G.R. NO. 88211, September 15, 1989 and the Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration dated October 27, 1989 [Arts. 12 and 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights] The 1987 Constitution deals with the right to “travel”, not right to return which is a different right under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As such, former President Marcos could not invoke his right to travel to justify his request in asking for travel papers from the government. This is so because what he wants deals with the right to return.  Manotoc vs. CA, 142 SCRA 149 An accused facing a BAILABLE criminal case in court [RTC or SB] may be allowed travel abroad if he can: a. prove [to the court] the urgency of the travel; b. duration of the travel; and c. consent of the surety. Note: Even if a person is facing several criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court, he could travel abroad because MTC’s are not empowered to issue HOLD DEPARTURE ORDERS. CHAPTER VIII THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INFORMATION

Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Read: RE: REQUEST FOR COPY OF 2008 STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NETWORTH [SALN] AND PERSONAL DATA SHEET OR CURRICULUM VITAE OF THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT AND OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE JUDICIARY, A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC, June 13, 2012 20

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RE: REQUEST OF PHILIPPINE CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM [PCIJ] FOR THE 2008 STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH [SALN] AND PERSONAL DATA SHEETS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS JUSTICES, A.M. No. 09-8-07-CA, June 13, 2012 It is within the right to information on matters of public concern or access to official records, etc., to request for copies of SALN of justices and judges---subject to the guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court. PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS. GRP (MOA-AD Case. There is violation of the right to information when suddenly, and without any consultation to the people of Mindanao, the government will sign already a Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain granting the MILF broad powers over many provinces in Mandanao to form part of the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity ) AKBAYAN VS. THOMAS AQUINO, July 16, 2008 (The JEPEPA Case) There is no violation of the right to information on matters of public concern if the President did not furnish the petitioner a copy of the JPEPA for its comment and suggestions before the President signs the same to become a treaty because the said petitioner could still voice out its comments and suggestions before the Senate which shall still conduct hearings before ratifying or rejecting it. HAZEL ANTOLIN VS. ATTY. ABELARDO DOMONDON, ET AL., G.R. No. 165036, July 5, 2010 ( Petitioner may validly demand for a copy of the test questions, her answers or test booklets, and copies of the answers by the examiners of the Accountancy Board Examination in accordance with her right to information. The fact that she has passed the exam on her second try does not make her request moot and academic. 3. Bantay Republika vs. COMELEC, 523 SCRA 1 (The provision of the Party-List Law prohibiting the COMELEC from divulging to the public the nominees of the party-list groups is unconstitutional. It violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. CHAPTER X – THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN

Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. 1. Barangay Matictic vs. Elbinias, 148 SCRA 83 (Even barangays may expropriate upon [1] approval of such resolution by the Barangay Council and [2] by the President of the Philippines.

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 Procedure for the exercise of said power and when may a writ of possession be issued in favor of the government  BIGLANG-AWA VS. JUDGE BACALLA, 354 SCRA 562 (The requisites in order to be entitled to a writ of possession in ordinary expropriation are: [1] Filing of a petition for expropriation sufficient in form and in substance; and [2] Deposit 100% of the assessed value of the property based on the latest tax declaration.  CITY OF ILOILO VS. JUDGE LEGASPI, 444 SCRA 269 (The requisites in order to have a writ of possession in expropriation cases involving a local government unit: [1} Filing of a petition for expropriation sufficient in form and in substance; and [2] Deposit 15% of the market value of the property based on the latest tax declaration.  REPUBLIC VS. JUDGE GINGOYON, 478 SCRA 474 [RA NO. 8974 APPLIES TO NATIONAL GOVERNMENT PROJECTS, NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS, AND BUILD OPERATE TRANSFER PROJECTS OF THE GOVERNMEN ONLY] REQUISITES IN ORDER TO BE ENTITLED TO A WRIT OF POSSESSION IN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT PROJECTS, ETC. [1} Filing of a petition for expropriation sufficient in form and in substance; and [2] Deposit 100% of the market value of the property based on the latest tax declaration or its zonal value.  However, if the expropriated land will not be used for the purpose for which it was intended, the landowner may ask for its reversion. Read: MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY VS. LOZADA, JR., ET AL., G.R. No. 176625, February 25, 2010 Taking of private property through expropriation is always subject to the condition that the property be devoted to the specific purpose for which it was taken. Corollarily, if the particular purpose or intent was abandoned, then the former owners if they desire, may seek the reversion of their property by: [1] returning the amount of just compensation received [2] plus legal interest [3] plus necessary expenses incurred in maintaining the lot as well as the [4] pecuniary value of their services in managing it to the extent that the landowner will be benefited thereby. When the Lahug Airport in Cebu City was no longer in operation, said lands intended for its expansion can no longer be used for the purpose for which it was intended. As such, reversion is justified.

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BERKENKOTTER VS. CA, December 14, 1992 (In this case, the Supreme Court declared that the just compensation to be paid by the government was not what the trial court and the commissioners had found it to be but an amount much much lower because it was found out that the landowner, in a deed of sale in favor of a private corporation, sold an adjacent portion of the lot at a very low price. The SC held that with more reason that the government should only pay the same lower amount since it will be for public purpose…even if it believes that petitioner undervalued its sale to the private corporation in order to cheat the government of capital and documentary stamps tax. In closing, the Supreme Court held that this should serve as a warning to taxpayers not to undervalue their property in the deed of sale), Manotok vs. CA, May 21,1987 (Just compensation is not what the government want to pay the landowner, nor what the landowner wants the government to pay his property, but it is the amount determined by the court as the just value of the property by taking into account several factors to determine just compensation) 

Requisite of "taking" in eminent domain cases

1. Rep. vs. Castellvi, 58 SCRA 336 Requisites of taking: 1. The expropriator must enter the property; 2. The entrance must not be just for a momentary period; 3. the entry must be under a warrant or color of title; 4. the property must be devoted for public use; and 5. the owner must be ousted from the beneficial use of his land. CHAPTER XII RIGHTS DURING CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION

Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

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(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to the rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families. 

PEOPLE VS. MAHINAY, February 1, 1999 [11 rights of the suspect under custodial investigation which expanded the Miranda Doctrine. It is now called the “Expanded Miranda Doctrine” or the “Mahinay Docxtrine”.

LUMANOG VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 182555, September 7, 2010 (ROLANDO ABDILLA CASE) Even if the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence if there are other evidence sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, still, the accused may be convicted. 1-a. Requisites of a valid extrajudicial confession: 

PEOPLE VS. TUNIACO, G.R. No. 185710, January 10, 2010 Though the lawyer who assisted them at the Police Station is a PAO Lawyer and who was already inside the Police Station when the accused was brought in, and since ATTY. BESINGA, the PAO Lawyer who assisted them, IS NOT BEHOLDEN TO THE POLICE, the confession is admissible. The requisites of a valid confession are: 1. The confession must be voluntary; 2. The confession must be made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel; 3. The confession must be express; and 4. The confession must be in writing and signed by the suspect…and the counsel. 

PEOPLE VS. FELIXMINIA, March 20, 2002 (Even though the extrajudicial confession was inadmissible for it was in violation of Section 12, Art. III of the Constitution, the accused could be convicted because of circumstantial evidence which is enough to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

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P. VS. GALIT, 135 SCRA 465 [SINCE THE EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION (obtained through force and violence) IS INADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE AND IT is the only evidence TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, HE IS ENTITLED TO ACQUITTAL---even if said confession speaks of gospel truth]

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PEOPLE VS. SAMOLDE, 336 SCRA 32 and PEOPLE VS. CABILES, 284 SCRA 199; PEOPLE VS. TAN, 286 SCRA 207 [A suspect’s confession, whether verbal or in writing, when taken without the assistance of counsel, without a valid waiver of such assistance, regardless of the absence of coercion, or the fact that it was voluntarily given, IS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE, EVEN IF THE APPELLANT’;S CONFESSION WERE GOSPEL TRUTH.

PEOPLE VS. ANTONIO LAUGA, G.R. No. 186228, March 15, 2010

Confession made to the BANTAY BAYAN members without being informed of his rights nor with the assistance of counsel is inadmissible in evidence. This is so because Bantay Bayan is a police auxiliary and as such, they are extension of the police who are bound to tell him his rights. The Expanded Miranda Doctrine is not applicable in the following instances. 

When there is no need to inform the accused/suspect of his rights nor is there a need for the assistance of counsel, that is, if there is voluntary and spontaneous confession or admission of the person even before he could be informed of his rights 1. PEOPLE VS. TAMPUS, MARCH 28, 1980 [A convict in New Bilibib confessed to the jail guards spontaneously of having killed a member of the other gang therein] 2. P VS. TAYLARAN, 108 SCRA 373 [The accused went to the police and said: “I killed my mother-in-law since she is a ‘barang’”. The confession is admissible because he uttered it to the police when he voluntarily surrendered. It was voluntary and spontaneous]

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Also in the following, the confession is admissible even if there is no compliance with the Miranda doctrine, as amended. 1. PEOPLE VS. JUDGE RUBEN C. AYSON, RTC 6, BAGUIO CITY, 175 SCRA 216 (Investigator is a private person like the lawyer or security officer of the Philippine Airlines who did not inform the accused of his rights nor was he assisted by a lawyer when he investigated the accused resulting in his confession. The same is admissible as evidence because Section 12 Art. III, does not apply to administrative investigations conducted by private persons) 2. PEOPLE VS. MAQUEDA, 242 SCRA 565 (Admission to a private individual, DEAN RAY SALVOSA, then UC President, without informing him of his rights is admissible in evidence)cvbn 3. KIMPO VS. CA, 232 SCRA 53 [Confession given upon investigation made by a private individual] 4. PEOPLE VS. ORDONO, 334 SCRA 673 [Confession made to a Radio announcer] 5. PEOPLE VS. ZUELA, 323 SCRA 589; PEOPLE VS. ANDAM [Confession made to the Municipal Mayor] 25

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6. PEOPLE VS. ENDINO, 353 SCRA 307 [Confession in a Videotaped interview with newsmen] 7. PEOPLE VS. JOSE TING LAN UY, JR., 475 SCRA 248. [The sworn statement or extrajudicial admission used in convicting him was given to a personnel of the National Power Corporation who investigated him without informing him of his rights, is admissible] PEOPLE VS. BARIQUIT, 341 SCRA 600 [Custodial investigation begins when a person is taken into custody for the commission of a crime. THE PLACE OF INTERROGATION IS NOT DETERMINATIVE OF THE EXISTENCE OR ABSENCE OF CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION BUT THE TONE AND MANNER OF QUESTIONING BY THE POLICE AUTHORITIES. So even while the policemen and the suspect are just walking in the highway towards the police station, there is already custodial investigation in this case as a result of the questions asked of the suspect pointing to him as a suspect. They should have informed him of his rights even while walking in the street. 1-a. People vs. Marcos Jimenez, Dec. 10, 1991 (The suspect shall be assisted by counsel from the moment the custodial investigation commences)  When shall the constitutional rights of the accused as mentioned above demandable? How about during police line-up? A. No because the suspect is not under custodial investigation during police line-up. He is not required to answer questions which might incriminate him. Though in one case, the Supreme Court held that he should be assisted by a lawyer during the police line-up to prevent the investigator from “making improper suggestions” to the witnesses. 1. P vs. Usman Hassan, 157 SCRA 261 2. Gamboa vs. Judge Cruz, 162 SCRA 642  3. DE LA TORRE VS. CA, 294 SCRA 196 4. PEOPLE VS. HATTON THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL, 57 SCRA 481 1. PEOPLE VS. PATUNGAN, 354 SCRA 413 [The suspect was under coercive and uncounselled investigation by the police without a lawyer for 2 and a half days. Then he was brought to the IBP for the signing of his extrajudicial confession. The same is inadmissible in evidence. 2. PEOPLE VS. OBRERO, 332 SCRA 190 . The police investigator of Western Police District provided the accused a “counsel” to assist him during the custodial investigation in the person of Atty. De Los Reyes, the Station Commander of the WPD, where he belongs. The confession is inadmissible because Atty. De Los Reyes is not a “competent and independent counsel of his own choice”. The position of said lawyer is adverse to the suspect] 26

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3. PEOPLE VS. JEREZ, 285 SCRA 393 [However, a lawyer provided by the investigators to the suspect during custodial investigation is deemed engaged by the accused WHERE HE NEVER RAISED ANY OBJECTION AGAINST THE FORMER’S APPOINTMENT DURING THE COURSE OF THE INVESTIGATION AND THE ACCUSED THEREAFTER SUBSCRIBES TO THE VERACITY OF HIS STATEMENT BEFORE THE FISCAL. 4. PEOPLE VS. REYES, G.R. No. 178300, March 17, 2009 [PAOCTF of Col. Cesar Mancao] [Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond Yao were strangled to death after they were kidnapped though the parents agreed to the P5M ransom. When arrested, the suspects were provided by the PAOCTF Investigator, COL. CESAR MANCAO, ATTY. UMINGA and ATTY. ROUS to assist them. Both lawyers are lawyers of PAOCTF or friends of the PAOCTF officials. They informed them of their rights and assisted them during the entire time of the investigation. The SC said the confessions are admissible. This is so because a confession is admissible when: a. where the accused failed to present credible evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on their persons; b. where they failed to complain to the officers who administered the oaths; c. where they did not institute any criminal or administrative action against their alleged intimidators for maltreatment; d. where there appeared to be no marks of violence on their bodies; and e. where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to buttress their claim. (People vs. PIA, 229 Phil. 577 [1986] The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying anything which might incriminate him; but rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion on the accused to admit something else. THE COUNSEL SHOULD NEVER PREVENT AN ACCUSED FROM FREELY AND VOLUNTARILY TELLING THE TRUTH. (PEOPLE VS. BASE, 385 Phil. 803 [2000] 5. PEOPLE VS. MARCOS JIMENEZ, G.R. No. 82604, December 10, 1991 [The lawyer who assists the suspect under custodial investigation should be the latter’s choice and not merely foisted on him by the police. ALSO, THE LAWYER SHALL BE PRESENT TO ASSIST HIM FROM THE FIRST QUESTION ASKED OF HIM] 6. PEOPLE VS. JUANERIO, 267 SCRA 608 The suspect was Assisted by a lawyer applying at the NBI, and who was accepted as NBI Investigator several days later. Not valid confession. There is violation of the right to counsel because said lawyer could not be considered “competent and independent counsel of his own choice”] 7. Could the Fiscal also represent the accused, who is his “kumpare”, during custodial investigation to satisfy the requirement of the Constitution that the accused must be assisted by counsel? In P. vs. Matos-Viduaya, September 11, 1990, the Supreme Court held “No. The Fiscal is representing the complainant or the People of the Philippines so as if the accusede had no lawyer during the custodial investigation)

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CHAPTER XIII THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BAIL

Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. Is bail available in extradition cases? 1. US GOVERNMENT VS. JUDGE PURGANAN & MARK JIMENEZ, 389 SCRA 623 [No right to bail in an extradition case since it is not criminal and nature where the constitutional right applies] 2. RODRIGUEZ VS. PRESIDING JUDGE, 483 SCRA 290 3. GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG VS. JUDGE OLALIA, JR., 521 SCRA 470 [A prospective extraditee may be allowed on bail if [1] he can prove by CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE that he is not a flight risk and [2] that he is ready and willing to comply with the processes of the extradition court. A clear and convincing evidence is an evidence greater than mere preponderance of evidence but below proof beyond reasonable doubt] But the Question is: Is it possible for a prospective extraditee to convince the court “that he is not a flight risk” and be allowed to post bail? No! The reason why extradition is being requested is because said prospective extradite COMMITTED FLIGHT WHEN HE WAS ABOUT TO BE PROSECUTED BY THE REQUESTING COUNTRY. Is bail by “recognizance” allowed after conviction by final judgment? 1. ATTY. ADALIM-WHITE VS. JUDGE BAGTAS, 475 SCRA 175 (No. The judge committed gross ignorance of the law when he granted “recognizance” to an accused who was convicted with finality of frustrated murder by no less than the Supreme Court. Bail is allowed only during the trial of a criminal case when he is still presumed innocent, but never after conviction by final judgment) 2. Ignacio vs. Villaluz, 66 SCRA 38 [Purely cash bond as demanded by the judge for the accused who is facing numerous criminal cases in his court in order that he be released from detention, is not allowed. Otherwise, that is tantamount to removing the three (3) other modes of posting bail like [2] property bond; [3] surety bond; and [4] recognizance. 3. Marcos vs. Cruz, 67 and 70 Phil. Bail is a matter of discretion when the accused Ferdinand Marcos was charged of murder and the evidence of guilt is 28

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strong which normally, is not bailable. Yet, he was allowed bail considering that the probability of flight is nil. He just graduated from the UP College of Law with honors and will be reviewing and taking the Bar Examinations.

4.

Villasenor vs. Abano, 21 SCRA 312 [Please memorize the 10 Factors to consider in granting bail…which later on became Section 9, Rule 114 of the December 1, 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure] a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i. j.

financial ability of the accused to give bail; nature and circumstances of the offense; penalty of the offense charged; character and reputation of the accused; age and health of the accused; the weight of the evidence against the accused; probability of the accused appearing in trial; forfeiture of other bonds; the fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and the pendency of other cases in which the accused is under bond.

5. P vs. IAC, January 10,1987, 147 SCRA 219 6. Manotoc vs. CA, May 30,1986 (Note again: The 3 Factors to consider in allowing/disallowing an accused to travel abroad) 7. Garcia vs. Domingo, 52 SCRA 143 8. P vs. San Diego, 26 SCRA 522 [Bail application should be decided only after the prosecution has presented all its intended witnesses in a bail hearing as part of its right to due process of law. Granting bail to the accused even while the prosecution has still one or 2 witnesses to present in the bail hearings is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court) 9. PEOPLE VS. BUCALON, G. R. No. 176933, October 2, 2009 The accused who charged of Murder filed a Demurrer to Evidence after the prosecution rested its case. The court denied the Demurrer to Evidence and held that though Murder was not duly proven, the evidence shows that the accused could be held liable for Homicide. He then asked for bail which was granted by the court. Issue: Could the court validly grant bail even though there was no petition for bail? Held: The trial court is correct. The Demurrer to Evidence is equivalent to a petition for bail and since the court held that he could be convicted of Homicide only, which is bailable, then the trial court could validly allow him to be out on bail. CHAPTER XIV DUE PROCESS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

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30 Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused: Provided, that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

1. P vs. Terrobias, 103 SCRA 321 [One week trial and conviction does not violate the right to due process because all the requisites of due process in judicial proceedings as enumerated in Banco Espanol vs. Palanca are all present.] 

PEOPLE VS. MALBOG, October 12, 2000 , 342 SCRA 620. When the alleged rape victim was left in the motel for 45 minutes by the accused for him to buy her a new dress, her nursing uniform being crumpled and stained with semen and when she did not leave nor seek help from hotel authorities because she is ashamed of her outfit, the Supreme Court held that such act is unbelievable and contrary to common human experience. She gave more importance to her looks than the possibility that the accused will rape her again when he returns. The Supreme Court held that in consonance with the presumption of innocence on the part of the accused, “Mas vale que queden castigar diez presuntos, que se castigue uno inocente.” [It is better to acquit ten (10) accused who are possibly guilty of the crime they are charged of than to convict one who is innocent]

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MALILLIN VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 172953, April 30, 2008 (Search of shabu inside the room was conducted with a warrant. Several policemen with witnesses participated. When the witnesses have left the room since no shabu was found, one policeman who was left suddenly said he found a shabu. Presumption of innocence applicable to support acquittal. It is unbelievable)

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PEOPLE VS. SATURNO, 355 SCRA 578 (IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME, THE WIFE OF ONE OF THE 4 VICTIMS TOLD THE INVESTIGATORS SHE did not see the assailant. After about a week, she said it is the accused. Presumption of innocence dictates that he should be acquitted)

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Dumlao vs. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 [Presumption of innocence makes a law prohibiting all those who are charged of the crimes of rebellion and other political crimes from running for public office, UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

3. Presumption of innocence in the order of trial 30

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Read: 1. Alejandro vs. Pepito, 96 SCRA 322 [Reverse Order of trial not allowed] 2. Sacay vs. Sandiganbayan, July 10, l986 [Reverse order of trial is valid if the accused consents thereto] 3.Sec. 3(3), Rule 119 , 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure , as amended. 3-a. Presumption of innocence in “drugs” cases/Obligations of arresting officers/Chain of Evidence Rule under Section 21 of RA No. 9165 Read: PEOPLE VS. PAJARIN, G.R. NO. 190460, January 12, 2011 If the alleged shabu was not marked by the arresting officers after the buy-bust operation at the place where the arrest and seizure were made but marked by the investigator when it was turned over in the police station, there is violation of Section 21 and the accused shall be acquitted based on his presumption of innocence. The integrity of the shabu is now doubtful. 

PEOPLE VS. LORENZO, GR NO. 184760. April 23, 2010 (Non-compliance by the arresting officers of Section 21) of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act entitles the accused to acquittal based on his presumption of innocence)

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SAPIA ANDONGAN, G.R. No. 184595, June 29, 2010 The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties could not prevail over the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. For, among other things, it is incredible for an allegedly known drug-peddler to be standing at a corner of a street at 7:50 in the evening instead of plying her trade secretly, and with only a 0.146-gram sachet worth P500.00 of prohibited drugs in her possession the value of which happens to be what a poseur-buyer wants to buy.

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PEOPLE VS. RONALDO DE GUZMAN, G.R. No. 186498, March 26, 2010 

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BONDAD VS. PEOPLE, December 10, 2008 (No pictures)

JULIUS CACAO VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 180870, January 22, 2020. Conflict of the testimonies of prosecution witnesses on who delivered the seized evidence to the evidence custodian entitles the accused to acquittal based on his constitutional presumption of innocence.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.TOKOHISA KIMURA and AKIRA KIZAKI, G.R. No. 130805, April 27, 2004, the Supreme Court held that said failure of the arresting officers to mark the seized illegal drugs at the place of apprehension is fatal. It was held that:

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“In People vs. Laxa, the policemen composing the buy-bust team failed to mark the confiscated marijuana immediately after the alleged apprehension of the accused-appellant. One policeman admitted that he marked the seized items only after seeing them for the first time in the police headquarters. PEOPLE VS. OBMIRANIS, December 16, 2008 MALLILLIN VS. PEOPLE, April 30, 2008 PEOPLE VS. MONALYN CERVANTES, March 17, 2009 PEOPLE VS. MARIAN CORECHE, August 14, 2009 PEOPLE VS. PARTOZA, May 8, 2009

    

3-b. Effect of inconsistent testimonies of arresting/searching officers LEJANO VS. PEOPLE, DECEMBER 14, 2010 (The Hubert Webb Case) Inconsistent testimony of the prime witness, Jessica Alfaro, on material points results in acquittal. AGUSTIN VS. PEOPLE, April 30, 2008 (One witness said, 5 of them entered the room and searched for a gun. He said SPO4 Jara searched the room but when the latter testified, he said, he was outside guarding the premises. The accused is entitled to acquittal) PEOPLE VS. ANGUS, August 3, 2010 The mere fact that there is evidence showing that the accused and his wife were quarreling the night before her body was found is not enough circumstantial evidence to prove his guilt for parricide. Presumption of innocence justifies his acquittal. The equipoise rule Read: PEOPLE VS. DE LOS SANTOS, 355 SCRA 415 PEOPLE VS. SATURNO, 355 SCRA 578 The right to counsel in criminal proceedings: 

PEOPLE VS. JOHN HILARIO, G.R. No. 161070, April 14, 2008

Even if the decision of conviction is already final and executory, the case may be reopened IF THERE IS GROSS NEGLIGENCE COMMITTED BY COUNSEL THEREBY VIOLATING THE RIGHT OF THE SAID ACCUSED TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW . Two 32

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counts of murder with conviction, he directed his PAO Lawyer to file appeal but he failed. His Petition for Relief is granted) Requisites: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Matter involves life, liberty or property; existence of special or compelling circumstances; merit of the case; not entirely the fault of the party; not dilatory or frivolous; other party not prejudiced.

1. HILARIO VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 167756, April 8, 2008 1-a P vs. Holgado,85 Phil. 752 1-b. Delgado vs. CA, 145 SCRA 357 (Please see due process) 1-c. CONSULTA VS. PEOPLE, FEBRUARY 12, 2009 (Discussed in due process) 1. P vs. Cuison, 193 Phil. 296 2. PEOPLE VS. YAMBOT, 343 SCRA 20 3. PEOPLE VS. NADERA, 324 SCRA 490 (Oleby and Maricris Nadera testified with no cross-examination from the accused’s lawyer, a PAO Lawyer. Worse, accused did not even testify. The Supreme Court remanded the case for another trial as the accused’s right to counsel was violated) 4. PEOPLE VS. BERMAS, April 21, 1999 6. The right to be present during trial 1. Aquino vs. Military Commission, 63 SCRA 546 (The accused must be present during: a. Arraignment; b. when he is to be identified by the prosecution witnesses; and c. during the promulgation of decision. The accused may validly waive his right to be present if: a. he will manifest to the court, verbally or in writing that he is waiving his right to be present; AND b. THAT WHENEVER A PROSECUTION WITNESS MENTIONS HIS NAME, HE ADMITS THAT HE OR SHE IS REFERRING TO HIM. 2. P vs. Judge, 125 SCRA 269 7. The right to Speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases. Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. JAIME BERNAT VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, May 20, 2004. [His case was submitted for decision as of August 23, 1994 but it was only about 8 years later that there was a Notice of

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Promulgation of the Decision. He claimed there is a gross violation of his right to speedy trial Held: THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL WAS VIOLATED CANNOT BE BASED ON MERE MATHEMATICAL RECKONING OF TIME. PARTICULAR REGARD TO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SHALL ALSO BE CONSIDERED] The delay must be VEXATIOUS, CAPRICIOUS AND OPPRESSIVE TO VALIDLY INVOKE VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL and this is so if the following requisites are satisfied: a. Length of the delay; b. Reasons for the delay; c. Assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and d. Prejudiced caused by the delay. 1. Tatad vs. SB, 159 SCRA 70 2. DUTERTE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 289 SCRA 721 (On February 18, 1992, the case was submitted for Resolution by OMB and the Information was filed only on February 22, 1996. Violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases is very obvious) 3. ANGCHANGCO VS. OMBUDSMAN, 269 SCRA 301 (October 22, 1999 when the complaint was filed against him before the Ombudsman up to May 26, 2004, no case filed whether administrative or criminal against a government employee who long retired. There is violation of speedy disposition of cases) 4. CAPT. WILFREDO ROQUERO VS. THE CHANCELLOR OF UP MANILA, G.R. No. 181851, March 9, 2010 No formal offer of evidence by the complainant against him for 5 years is a clear violation of his right to speedy disposition of cases. The administrative case shall be dismissed. 

The right to an impartial trial

1. ATTY. LAURO D. GACAYAN VS. JUDGE FERNANDO PAMINTUAN, RTC 3, BAGUIO CITY, 314 SCRA, September 17, 1999 (If the judge orders the arrest of the witnesses presented before a previous judge and examines them without notice to the prosecutor and to the defense counsel, it is obvious that the right to impartial trial was violated) 1-a. PEOPLE VS. OPIDA, June 13, 1986 (The judge conducted “cross-examination on the accused and his sole witness. He was so cruel on the accused. He even asked him to remove his shirt and described the tattoos on his body for the record. After he was true cross-examining the accused, he said “Do you want me to dictate the decision now”? There was violation of the accused’s right to impartial trial and to due process of law. There was no longer “cold neutrality of an impartial judge.”

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1-b. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BENANCIO MORTERA, G.R. No. 188104, April 23, 2010 [There is no violation of the right to due process and impartial trial as a result of the comment of the Judge that “if you are not telling the truth to your own lawyer, how would I know that you are telling the truth now” as a result of his change of defense from a negative defense to self-defense in a murder case. 2. Olaguer vs. Chief of Staff, May 22, 1987 (The military commission appointed by then President Marcos to try the petition when Marcos himself is the complainant and was the one who created the Military Commission and appointed its members, is not an impartial tribunal. 3. Ignacio vs. Villaluz,May 5, 1979 (When the judge stated in his Decision in the Arson case against the accused that “he burned the capitol in order to remove the evidence against him in the malversation case, it is obvious that he has prejudged the cause of the accused in the malversation case. His right to impartial trial was violated. He is now lacking the “cold neutrality of an impartial judge.” 4. P vs. Sendaydiego, 81 SCRA 120 5. Dimacuha vs. Concepcion, 117 SCRA 630 

Right to a public trial

1. Garcia vs. Domingo, July 25,1973 (Hearing held inside the chambers of the Judge on Saturdays, without objection on the part of the parties do not violate the accused’s right to public trial as long as there is no showing that people who wanted to watch the proceedings were prevented from doing so) 1. P vs. Tampus, March 28,1980 (Trial inside New Bilibid Prison for a convict therein instead of thetrial to be held in the premises of the CFI or RTC of Muntinlupa did not violate the right to public trial on the part of the accused. 

The right to be informed of the nature and cause of



PEOPLE VS. JERRY NAZARENO, G.R. No. 167756, April 8, 2008

accusation

The information reads “that sometime from January, 1990 up to December 6, 1998, in Barangay Codon, Municipality of San Andres, province of Catanduanes….by force, intimidation…had sexual intercourse with the complainant without her consent” (Note: The information for rape covers a period of almost 9 years) No violation of the right to be informed since the date and time is not an integral part or element of the crime of rape. Further, the accused waived said right when he never questioned the information before he entered his plea. He should have asked for a Bill of Particulars or Moved to quash the Information. He did not. Clearly, he slumbered on his rights and awakened too late. 35

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1-a. P vs. Crisologo, 150 SCRA 653 (A deaf-mute accused is entitled to a sign language interpreter from arraignment up to promulgation. Absence of said interpreter violates his right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him and that his conviction shall be set aside in favor of a new trial. 1-c. P vs. Resavaga, 159 SCRA 426 (While the caption of the criminal case shows that he is being charged of “Homicide”, he can be convicted of Murder if the evidence so warrant. There is no violation of the right to be informed of the cause and accusation against him because the information read to him alleges treachery and evident premeditation. He was therefore informed of the murder charge against him. The material allegations prevail over the caption. 2. Ko Bu Lin vs. CA, 118 SCRA 573 

The right to meet witnesses face to face or the

right of confrontation

DELACRUZ VS. PAPA, December 8, 2010 The witness failed to return for cross-examination because he was sickly and never did so up to the time of his death. His testimony shall be expunged from the record. Read: 1. P vs. Valero, 112 SCRA 661 [Poisoned bread. Case vs. a deafmute. The testimony of a prosecution witness who testified that he was informed by a neighbor that he saw the accused gave the poisoned bread to the victims is inadmissible being hearsay and it violates the accused’s right to confrontation or the right to meet witnesses face to face.] 2. P vs. Bundalian, 117 SCRA 718 [Libel complainant already dead. There is no violation of the right to confrontation even if the complainant could no longer be cross-examined. The guilt or innocence of the accused is based on the written article, not the testimony of the complainant] 3. P vs. Seneris, 99 SCRA 92 (But if there is partial crossexamination, the testimony could not be fully expunged. Only the parts where no cross-examination was conducted)

4. Ortigas, JR. vs. Lufthansa, 64 SCRA 610 (Failure of the witness to return for cross-examination makes his testimony hearsay and shall be expunged from the records of the case. It violates the right of the other party to confront witnesses face to face. 

Trial in absentia

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Borja vs. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 420

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P vs. Salas, 143 SCRA 163 (An accused who jumped bail after he was arraigned may be convicted for murder if the evidence so warrants. It was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC to declare in its Decision that he shall be tried after his arrest. There is a valid trial in absentia.

13. Right to secure witnesses and production of

evidence.

1. Cavili vs. Hon. Florendo, 154 SCRA 610 2. Fajardo vs. Garcia, 98 SCRA 514 Note: The fact that the physician who examined the accused when brought to the hospital could no longer testify since he is already working abroad does not violate the right of the accused to secure witnesses or production of evidence since his medical records is still in that hospital and could be testified on by other physicians. CHAPTER XVI THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS. PDEA, November 3, 2008 random drug testing to students in HS & College valid because it is not intended for criminal prosecution but to help the youth through early detection of drug use. RANDOMNESS AND SUSPICIONLESS. No violation of their right against self-incrimination. ATTY. MANUEL LASERNA, J. VS. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD, G.R. No. 158633, November 3, 2008 [Mandatory drug testing for persons charged of an offense punishable by 6 yrs. And 1 day up IS VIOLATIVE OF THE RIGHT AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION 1. Chavez vs. CA, 24 SCRA 663 (An accused may not be presented as a witness for the prosecution. This is absolute. It will violate his right against self-incrimination) 2. Galman vs. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 294, read including the concurring and dissenting opinions (There are 2 kinds of immunity statutes: Transactional immunity and use immunity. In transactional immunity, the witness is immune from criminal prosecution only in the case where he shall testify. In use immunity, the witness is immune from prosecution not only in the case where he is testifying but also in other criminal acts he might mention in his testimony.) 3. Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 (There is no violation of the right against selfincrimination if a woman charged of adultery will be ordered to undergo examination to determine whether she is pregnant or not. It does not involve “testimonial compulsion.” (There is violation of the right against self-incrimination if an accused of falsification is made to give a sample of his handwriting. This is so because writing is not a mechanical act but one which involves the use of one’s intelligence. 37

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4. Beltran vs. Samson, 50 Phil. 570 5. Bagadiong vs. Gonzales, 94 SCRA 906 6. US vs. Tang Teng, 23 Phil. 145 7. Cabal vs. Kapunan, Jr. December 29, 1962 CHAPTER XVII THE RIGHT AGAINST INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE

Section 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations. (2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted. 1. Aclaracion vs. Gatmaitan, 64 SCRA 131 (Forcing a resigned court stenographer to transcribed her notes taken during her stint in court does not violate her right against involuntary servitude. Note that she took the same when still in court and was paid her salaries during said period. Otherwise, the court may not be able to decide the case without said transcript of stenographic notes) 2. Caunca vs. Salazar, supra (Forcing a housemaid to still work for the employer because she has been paid her salaries up to the end of the year, even though she wants to leave already, violates her right against involuntary servitude) CHAPTER XVIII RIGHT AGAINST CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

Section 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. (2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.

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Is death as a penalty, cruel or unusual punishment? No death through lethal injection is the most humane way of implementing the death penalty (Leo Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice)

1. P vs. Estoista, 93 Phil. 647 [It is cruel and unusual if the penalty is disproportionate to the crime committed and shocking to the conscience of the community] 2. People vs. Villanueva, 128 SCRA 488; 3. VENIEGAS VS. PEOPLE, 115 SCRA 79; 4. PEOPLE VS. CAMANO, 115 SCRA 688 CHAPTER XX THE RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. DISINI VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, February 18, 2014. If the same libelous article is published in a newspaper and at the same time posted in the internet, the author could not be charged separately under the Libel provisions of the Revised Penal Code and the “online libel” provision of the Cybercrime Law. That would amount to double jeopardy. He can be the subject of only one criminal information for his act. Dismissal of a criminal case based on a Demurrer to Evidence results in double jeopardy and that no appeal nor petition for certiorari under Rule 65 may be entertained, as a general rule. Private complainant may not, without the participation of the Solicitor General, question said dismissal before the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. LITO BAUTISTA vs. SHARON CUNETA-PANGILINAN, SHARON G. CUNETA -PANGILINAN, G. R. No. 189754, October 24, 2012 The petitioners who are editor and assistant editor of the tabloid Bandera were charged of two (2) counts of Libel before the RTC of Mandaluyong City based on the complaint of actress Sharon Cuneta-Pangilinan. In Criminal Case No. MC02-4872, the Information dated February 4, 2002 reads: 39

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That on or about the 24th day of April, 2001, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together with x x x with deliberate intent to bring SHARON G. CUNETA-PANGILINAN into public dishonor, shame and contempt, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with malice and ridicule, cause to publish in Bandera (tabloid), with circulation in Metro Manila, which among others have the following insulting and slanderous remarks, to wit: MAGTIGIL KA, SHARON! Sharon Cuneta, the mega-taba singer-actress, I’d like to believe, is really brain-dead. Mukhang totoo yata yung sinasabi ng kaibigan ni Pettizou Tayag na ganyan siya. Magsalita ka, Missed Cuneta, at sabihin mong hindi ito totoo. xxx Dios mio perdon, what she gets to see are those purportedly biting commentaries about her katabaan and kaplastikan but she has simply refused to acknowledge the good reviews we’ve done on her. xxx In Criminal Case No. MC02-4875, the Information dated February 4, 2002 reads: That on or about the 27th day of March, 2001, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together with Jane/John Does unknown directors/officers of Bandera Publishing x x x with deliberate intent to bring SHARON G. CUNETA-PANGILINAN into public dishonor, shame and contempt did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with malice and ridicule, cause to publish in Bandera (tabloid), with circulation in Metro Manila, which, among others, have the following insulting and slanderous remarks, to wit: “She doesn’t want kasi her husband to win as a senator because when that happens, mawawalan siya ng hold sa kanya,” our caller opines. Pettizou is really sad that Sharon is treating her husband like a wimp. “In public,” our source goes on tartly, “pa kiss-kiss siya. Pa embrace-embrace pero kung silang dalawa [na] lang parang kung sinong sampid kung i-treat niya si Kiko.” My God Pete, Harvard graduate si Kiko. He’s really

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intelligent as compared to Sharon who appears to be brain dead most of the time. Upon arraignment, petitioners each entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, a joint pre-trial and trial of the cases ensued. On November 14, 2006, after the prosecution rested its case, petitioners filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File the Attached Demurrer to Evidence. In their Demurrer to Evidence, which was appended to the said Motion, Bautista and Alcantara alleged that the prosecution's evidence failed to establish their participation as Editor and Associate Editor, respectively, of the publication Bandera; that that the subject articles written by Ampoloquio were not libelous due to absence of malice. On April 25, 2008, the RTC issued an Order16 granting petitioners’ Demurrer to Evidence and dismissed the above criminal cases. On August 19, 2008, respondent Sharon Cuneta-Pangilinan filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, seeking to set aside the RTC Order dated April 25, 2008 which granted petitioners' Demurrer to Evidence and ordered the dismissal of the cases against them. In a Decision dated May 19, 2009, the CA granted respondent's petition, thereby reversing and setting aside the RTC Order dated April 25, 2008 and ordered that the case be remanded to the trial court for reception of petitioners' evidence. Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2009 which, however, was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated September 28, 2009. Hence, petitioners filed this petition claiming that the petition for Certiorari filed by Sharon Cuneta-Pangilinan violated their right against double jeopardy. Held: The petition is impressed with merit. Petitioners allege that the Order of the RTC, dated April 25, 2008, granting the Demurrer to Evidence was tantamount to an acquittal. As such, the prosecution can no longer interpose an appeal to the CA, as it would place them in double jeopardy. Petitioners contend that respondent's petition for certiorari with the CA should not have prospered, because the allegations therein, in effect, assailed the trial court's judgment, not its jurisdiction. In other words, petitioners posit that the said Order was in the nature of an error of judgment rendered, which was not correctible by a petition for certiorari with the CA. At the onset, it should be noted that respondent took a procedural misstep, and the view she is advancing is erroneous. The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Supreme Court and the CA is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Section 35 (1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code explicitly provides that the OSG shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. It shall have specific powers and functions to represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and the CA, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. The 41

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OSG is the law office of the Government. To be sure, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. The private complainant or the offended party may question such acquittal or dismissal only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned. Thus, the Court has definitively ruled that in a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal of the criminal aspect may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, only by the State through the solicitor general. As a rule, only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not undertake such appeal. In the case at bar, the petition filed by the respondent before the CA essentially questioned the criminal aspect of the Order of the RTC, not the civil aspect of the case. Consequently, the petition should have been filed by the State through the OSG. Since the petition for certiorari filed in the CA was not at the instance of the OSG, the same should have been outrightly dismissed by the CA. Finally, although the conclusion of the trial court may be wrong, to reverse and set aside the Order granting the demurrer to evidence would violate petitioners’ constitutionallyenshrined right against double jeopardy. Had it not been for this procedural defect, the Court could have seriously considered the arguments advanced by the respondent in seeking the reversal of the Order of the RTC. The granting of a demurrer to evidence should, therefore, be exercised with caution, taking into consideration not only the rights of the accused, but also the right of the private offended party to be vindicated of the wrongdoing done against him, for if it is granted, the accused is acquitted and the private complainant is generally left with no more remedy. In such instances, although the decision of the court may be wrong, the accused can invoke his right against double jeopardy. Thus, judges are reminded to be more diligent and circumspect in the performance of their duties as members of the Bench, always bearing in mind that their decisions affect the lives of the accused and the individuals who come to the courts to seek redress of grievances, which decision could be possibly used by the aggrieved party as basis for the filing of the appropriate actions against them. Requisites for a valid invocation of double jeopardy: 1. There must be a valid complaint or information; 2. It must be filed in a court of competent jurisdiction; 3. The accused must have been validly arraigned; and 4. The accused was: a. acquitted; or b. convicted; or c. case dismissed without his expressed consent. 42

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Note: Dismissal of a criminal case based on : 1. speedy trial; or 2. Demurrer to Evidence -is equivalent to acquittal and as such, all the requisites are present to invoke double jeopardy. Indeed, the dismissal was with his consent and it seems, the 4 th requisite is not present because there was consent to the dismissal since he himself was the one who moved for it. Such an interpretation is not correct because the applicable one is : The accused was : a. acquitted.” PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, IMELDA MARCOS, JOSE CONRADO BENITEZ and GILBERT DULAY, G.R. No. 153304-05, February 7, 2012 As a rule, once the court grants the demurrer, the grant amounts to an acquittal; any further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy, PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 559 SCRA 449. Notably, the proscription against double jeopardy only envisages appeals based on errors of judgment, but not errors of jurisdiction. Jurisprudence recognizes two grounds where double jeopardy will not attach, these are: (i) on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 491 SCRA 185, June 16, 2000; and/or (ii) where there is a denial of a party’s due process rights, PEOPLE VS. VELASCO, 340 SCRA 207, SEPTEMBER 13, 2000. A judgment of acquittal sought to be reviewed on the basis of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or on the ground of denial of due process implies an invalid or otherwise void judgment. If either or both grounds are established, the judgment of acquittal is considered void; as a void judgment, it is legally inexistent and does not have the effect of an acquittal. Thus, the defense of double jeopardy will not lie in such a case. The petitioner claims that the special prosecutor failed in her duty to give effective legal representation to enable the State to fully present its case against the respondents, citing Merciales v. Court of Appeals where we considered the following factual circumstances - (1) the public prosecutor rested the case knowing fully well that the evidence adduced was insufficient; (2) the refusal of the public prosecutor to present other witnesses available to take the stand; (3) the knowledge of the trial court of the insufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence when the demurrer to evidence was filed before it; and (4) the trial court’s failure to require the presentation of additional evidence before it acted on the demurrer to evidence. All these circumstances effectively resulted in the denial of the State’s right to due process, attributable to the inaction of the public prosecutor and/or the trial court. Merciales was followed by Valencia v. Sandiganbayan, 473 SCRA 279, where we recognized the violation of the State’s right to due process in criminal proceedings because of sufficient showing that the special prosecutor haphazardly handled the 43

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prosecution. In upholding the prosecution’s right to present additional evidence under the circumstances, Valencia took into account the fact that the former special prosecutor rested his case solely on the basis of a Joint Stipulation of Facts that was not even signed by the accused. Speedy trial; double jeopardy when not applicable in petition under Rule 65 to increase the penalty as a result of grave abuse of discretion ARTEMIO VILLAREAL VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 151258, February 1, 2012 AND people of the Philippines vs. THE HOMORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, et al., G.R. No. 154954, February 1, 2012 [THE LENNY VILLA HAZING CASE] The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state from appealing the judgment in order to reverse the acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either through a regular appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court or through an appeal by certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule 45 of the same Rules. This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the lower court’s acquittal of the accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in the following recognized exceptions: (1) where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, tantamount to a deprivation of due process; (2) where there is a finding of mistrial, People vs. COURT OF APPEALS & GALICIA, 516 SCRA 383 or (3) where there has been a grave abuse of discretion. IVLER VS. JUDGE PEDRO, Presiding Judge, METC 71 OF PASIG CITY, G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010 After the petitioner pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries and was sentenced to censure, he could not be tried anymore of the 2 nd case of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide and damage to property which arose from the same act. Double jeopardy has set in. A reckless imprudence case could not be the subject of two informations even though they are not grave or less grave felonies. They can still be complexed as an exception to Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code. LEJANO VS. PEOPLE, January 18, 2011 and PEOPLE VS. HUBERT WEBB ET AL. After the acquittal of the accused by the SC on December 14, 2010, double jeopardy has set in and no motion for reconsideration may be entertained. PEOPLE VS. JUDGE RELOVA, 148 SCRA 292 (Given several times already in the bar exams) When the accused were earlier charged of theft of electricity based on a City Ordinance and the case was dismissed due to prescription, charging them again for theft of electricity under the Revised Penal Code violates the right of the accused against double 44

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jeopardy. When an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, acquittal or conviction in either shall bar prosecution in the other. DAYAP BS. SENDIONG, JANUARY 29, 2009 [Acquittal through demurrer to evidence is final and could not be appealed. Double jeopardy has set in but civil aspect may still proceed if there is no express finding that accused has not committed the crime] PEOPLE VS. DOMINGO, G.R. No. 184343, March 2, 2009 [If an accused of Murder was convicted of Homicide only in the RTC but appeals the same to the higher court, he could not complain of double jeopardy if the appellate court sentences him of Murder since that is the evidence found during the review of the case on Appeal] 1. CUDIA VS. CA, 284 SCRA 173 [Petitioner was arrested of illegal possession of firearm in Mabalacat, Pampanga but it was the City Prosecutor of Angeles City who signed the information. The dismissal of the case by the RTC of Pampanga, despite objection of the accused does not result in double jeopardy because one requisite is missing: there was no valid complaint or information..] PEOPLE VS. BALISACAN, 17 SCRA 1119 [This case was the subject of several Bar Examination question already] [The accused entered a plea of guilty to a charge of homicide but prayed for him to present his evidence for incomplete self-defense. It was granted by the Court. After hearing his evidence, he was acquitted instead because the evidence he presented satisfied all the requisites of complete self-defense. No double jeopardy since there was no valid plea. One requisite for the valid invocation of double jeopardy is absent] PEOPLE VS. GALANO, 75 SCRA 193 [Charged of estafa in Batangas. During trial, it was shown that the elements of the crime actually took place in Manila. No double jeopardy if a new information will be filed in Manila because one of the requisites for the valid invocation of double jeopardy is absent: filed in a court of competent jurisdiction] 8. P vs. Judge Hernando, 108 SCRA 121 (Even the RTC made an erroneous appreciation of the evidence during the trial resulting in its acquittal of the accused, the fact that the SC believes that the evidence guilt is strong to convict, the same cannot be done. Double Jeopardy has set in from the time the decision of acquittal was promulgated. Appeal is not allowed without violating the right of the accused against double jeopardy. 9. Esmena vs. Judge Pogoy, 102 SCRA 861 10. Mazo vs. Mun. Court, 113 SCRA 217 [Dismissal of a criminal case based on Demurrer to Evidence is equivalent to acquittal. Double jeopardy has set in and no motion for reconsideration or appeal is allowed.] 11. Andres vs. Cacdac, 113 SCRA 217 14. P vs. Fuentebella, 100 SCRA 672 (Double jeopardy may not be invoked if the case was dismissed based on the accused’s invocation of “speedy trial” if the same is not done in good faith. The state is also entitled to due process in criminal prosecution. CHAPTER XXI 45

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RIGHT AGAINST EX-POST FACTO LAW, BILL OF ATTAINER, ETC. Section 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted. Ex post facto law applies only to penal laws. It’s requisites are: 3. It is a penal law; 4. it is given retroactive effect; and 5. it is prejudicial to the accused. LACSON VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, January 20, 1999 Specific instances when there is ex post facto law: a. which makes an act criminal before the passing of the law and which was innocent when committed, and punishes such action; b. which aggravates the crime or makes it greater when it was committed; c. when it changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the penalty when the crime was committed; d. which alters the legal rules of evidence and now receives less or different testimony to convict the accused; e. a law that alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage, in relation to an offense; f. which assumes or regulates civil rights and remedies but in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful; and g. deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or proclamation of amnesty. ************************************************************************

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