2013 Case Digests in Political Law

CASE DIGESTS (Of Landmark Supreme Court Decisions in Political, Election and Civil Service Laws) July 2013 Edition Prepared by:

ATTY. LARRY D. GACAYAN Professor College of Law UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS Baguio City (POLITICAL LAW REVIEW, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II )

BAR REVIEWER (Political Law & Constitutional Law)

C.P.R.S. BAR REVIEW CENTER Cagayan de Oro City, Zamboanga City, Davao City, Ozamis City, Iloilo City, Baguio City,and Tacloban City, POWERHAWS BAR REVIEW CENTER Baguio City, Santiago City, Isabela, San Fernando City, La Union, Manila, Naga City, Tacloban City, Dipolog City and Tagbilaran City COSMOPOLITAN REVIEW CENTER (CRC) University of the Cordilleras, Baguio City EXCELLENT BAR REVIEW CENTER Baguio City, Cebu City and Tacloban City HOLY TRINITY COLLEGE PRE-BAR REVIEW CENTER General Santos City UNIVERSITY OF PANGASINAN BAR REVIEW CENTER Dagupan City

The Senate and the House of Representatives are

entitled to only one (1) representative in the Judicial and Bar Council, not one (1) each. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS FRANCIS ESCUDERO & NIEL TUPAS, G.R. No. 202242, April 16, 2013 MENDOZA, J.: The present case stemmed from the unexpected departure of former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona on May 29, 2012, and the nomination of petitioner, as his potential successor. In his initiatory pleading, petitioner asked the Court to determine 1] whether the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution allows more than one (1) member of Congress to sit in the JBC; and 2] if the practice of having two (2) representatives from each House of Congress with one (1) vote each is sanctioned by the Constitution. On July 17, 2012, the Court handed down the assailed subject decision, disposing the same in the following manner: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar Council is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one (1) member of Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. This disposition is immediately executory. On July 31, 2012, following respondents’ motion for reconsideration and with due regard to Senate Resolution Nos. 111, 112, 113, and 114, the Court set the subject motion for oral arguments on August 2, 2012. On August 3, 2012, the Court discussed the merits of the arguments and agreed, in the meantime, to suspend the effects of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the July 17, 2012 Decision which decreed that it was immediately executory. The decretal portion of the August 3, 2012 Resolution reads: WHEREFORE, the parties are hereby directed to submit their respective MEMORANDA within ten (10) days from notice. Until further orders, the Court hereby SUSPENDS the effect of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the Court’s July 17, 2012 Decision, which reads: “This disposition is immediately executory.” Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary of the evils of political pressure and partisan activities, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw it wise to create a separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it conceived of a body, representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process, and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). The Framers carefully worded Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution in this wise: Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. From the moment of the creation of the JBC, Congress designated one (1) representative to sit

in the JBC to act as one of the ex-officio members. Pursuant to the constitutional provision that Congress is entitled to one (1) representative, each House sent a representative to the JBC, not together, but alternately or by rotation. In 1994, the seven-member composition of the JBC was substantially altered. An eighth member was added to the JBC as the two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting simultaneously in the JBC, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. In 2001, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. It has been the situation since then. Through the subject motion, respondents pray that the Court reconsider its decision and dismiss the petition on the following grounds: 1] that allowing only one representative from Congress in the JBC would lead to absurdity considering its bicameral nature; 2] that the failure of the Framers to make the proper adjustment when there was a shift from unilateralism to bicameralism was a plain oversight; 3] that two representatives from Congress would not subvert the intention of the Framers to insulate the JBC from political partisanship; and 4] that the rationale of the Court in declaring a sevenmember composition would provide a solution should there be a stalemate is not exactly correct. While the Court may find some sense in the reasoning in amplification of the third and fourth grounds listed by respondents, still, it finds itself unable to reverse the assailed decision on the principal issues covered by the first and second grounds for lack of merit. Significantly, the conclusion arrived at, with respect to the first and second grounds, carries greater bearing in the final resolution of this case. As these two issues are interrelated, the Court shall discuss them jointly. Held: The Constitution evinces the direct action of the Filipino people by which the fundamental powers of government are established, limited and defined and by which those powers are distributed among the several departments for their safe and useful exercise for the benefit of the body politic. The Framers reposed their wisdom and vision on one suprema lex to be the ultimate expression of the principles and the framework upon which government and society were to operate. Thus, in the interpretation of the constitutional provisions, the Court firmly relies on the basic postulate that the Framers mean what they say. The language used in the Constitution must be taken to have been deliberately chosen for a definite purpose. Every word employed in the Constitution must be interpreted to exude its deliberate intent which must be maintained inviolate against disobedience and defiance. What the Constitution clearly says, according to its text, compels acceptance and bars modification even by the branch tasked to interpret it. For this reason, the Court cannot accede to the argument of plain oversight in order to justify constitutional construction. As stated in the July 17, 2012 Decision, in opting to use the singular letter “a” to describe “representative of Congress,” the Filipino people through the Framers intended that Congress be entitled to only one (1) seat in the JBC. Had the intention been otherwise, the Constitution could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided, as can be read in its other provisions. A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal that several provisions were indeed adjusted as to be in tune with the shift to bicameralism. One example is Section 4, Article VII, which provides that a tie in the presidential election shall be broken “by a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.” Another is Section 8 thereof which requires the nominee to replace the Vice-President to be confirmed “by a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.” Similarly, under Section 18, the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be revoked or continued by the Congress, voting separately, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members.” In all these provisions, the bicameral nature of Congress was recognized and, clearly, the corresponding adjustments were made as to how a matter would be handled and voted upon by its two Houses.

Thus, to say that the Framers simply failed to adjust Section 8, Article VIII, by sheer inadvertence, to their decision to shift to a bicameral form of the legislature, is not persuasive enough. Respondents cannot just lean on plain oversight to justify a conclusion favorable to them. It is very clear that the Framers were not keen on adjusting the provision on congressional representation in the JBC because it was not in the exercise of its primary function – to legislate. JBC was created to support the executive power to appoint, and Congress, as one whole body, was merely assigned a contributory non-legislative function. The underlying reason for such a limited participation can easily be discerned. Congress has two (2) Houses. The need to recognize the existence and the role of each House is essential considering that the Constitution employs precise language in laying down the functions which particular House plays, regardless of whether the two Houses consummate an official act by voting jointly or separately. Whether in the exercise of its legislative or its non-legislative functions such as inter alia, the power of appropriation, the declaration of an existence of a state of war, canvassing of electoral returns for the President and Vice-President, and impeachment, the dichotomy of each House must be acknowledged and recognized considering the interplay between these two Houses. In all these instances, each House is constitutionally granted with powers and functions peculiar to its nature and with keen consideration to 1) its relationship with the other chamber; and 2) in consonance with the principle of checks and balances, as to the other branches of government. In checkered contrast, there is essentially no interaction between the two Houses in their participation in the JBC. No mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial officers. Rather, in the creation of the JBC, the Framers arrived at a unique system by adding to the four (4) regular members, three (3) representatives from the major branches of government - the Chief Justice as ex-officio Chairman (representing the Judicial Department), the Secretary of Justice (representing the Executive Department), and a representative of the Congress (representing the Legislative Department). The total is seven (7), not eight. In so providing, the Framers simply gave recognition to the Legislature, not because it was in the interest of a certain constituency, but in reverence to it as a major branch of government. On this score, a Member of Congress, Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, from the Second District of Maguindanao, submitted his well-considered position to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno: I humbly reiterate my position that there should be only one representative of Congress in the JBC in accordance with Article VIII, Section 8 (1) of the 1987 Constitution x x x. The aforesaid provision is clear and unambiguous and does not need any further interpretation. Perhaps, it is apt to mention that the oft-repeated doctrine that “construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them.” Further, to allow Congress to have two representatives in the Council, with one vote each, is to negate the principle of equality among the three branches of government which is enshrined Considering that the Court is duty bound to protect the Constitution which was ratified by the direct action of the Filipino people, it cannot correct what respondents perceive as a mistake in its mandate. Neither can the Court, in the exercise of its power to interpret the spirit of the Constitution, read into the law something that is contrary to its express provisions and justify the same as correcting a perceived inadvertence. To do so would otherwise sanction the Court action of making amendment to the Constitution through a judicial pronouncement. In other words, the Court cannot supply the legislative omission. According to the rule of casus omissus “a case omitted is to be held as intentionally omitted.” “The principle proceeds from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration.” Pursuant to this, “the Court cannot under its power of interpretation supply the omission even though the omission may have resulted from inadvertence or because the case in question was not foreseen or contemplated.” “The Court cannot supply what it thinks the legislature would have supplied had its attention been called to the omission, as that would be judicial legislation.” Stated differently, the Court has no power to add another member by judicial construction.

The Court remains steadfast in confining its powers in the sphere granted by the Constitution itself. Judicial activism should never be allowed to become judicial exuberance. In cases like this, no amount of practical logic or convenience can convince the Court to perform either an exclusion or an insertion that will change the manifest intent of the Framers. To broaden the scope of congressional representation in the JBC is tantamount to the inclusion of a subject matter which was not included in the provision as enacted. True to its constitutional mandate, the Court cannot craft and tailor constitutional provisions in order to accommodate all of situations no matter how ideal or reasonable the proposed solution may sound. To the exercise of this intrusion, the Court declines. The Motion for Reconsideration was therefore Denied.

A candidate for the House of Representatives who was disqualified for failure to comply with the residence requirement under the Section 6, Art, VI of the Constitution could not be validly substituted. Distinctions between disqualification under Sec. 68 of the OEC and Section 78. SILVERIO TAGOLINO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL & LUCY TORRES-GOMEZ, G.R. No. 202202, March 19, 2013 Actor Richard Gomez (Richard) filed his Certificate of Candidacy seeking the congressional office of the House of Representatives for the 4 th District of Leyte. He indicated his residence as 910 Carlota Hills, Ormoc City. The same was questioned before the COMELEC by Buenaventura Juntilla, one of the candidates for the said position claiming that Richard is a resident of Colgate St., East Greenhills, San Juan City, MM. The COMELEC disqualified Richard based on Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code for lack of residence. On May 5, 2010, Lucy Torres-Gomez (Lucy) filed her Certificate of Candidacy as SUBSTITUTE of Richard. Despite the vigorous objection of Juntilla, the COMELEC allowed the substitution and Lucy was elected as Representative of the 4th District of Leyte in the May 10, 2010 elections. A case was filed before the HRET questinoning the election of Lucy on the ground that the “substitution” is not valid but the HRET sustained the validity of the said substitution Issue: the

Was there a valid substitution? Was Lucy Torres Gomez validly elected as representative of 4th District of Leyte?

Held: A valid Certificate of Candidacy is a condition sine qua non for a valid candidate substitution.Since Richard’s COC was not valid for material representation as to his residence, then there was no valid substitution. In short, since Richard is not considered a “candidate” or there was no candidate to speak of, there would be no candidate to be substituted. Unlike disqualification under Section 68 where he can be substituted because the candidate therein has all the qualifications but disqualified because of prohibited acts like election offences or because he is a permanent resident of a foreign country, a candidate disqualified under Section 78

could not be validly substituted. MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO., SR. VS. COMELEC & ERNESTO VEGA, G.R. No. 201716, JANUARY 08, 2013 In 2001, he won as Mayor. In 2004, his opponent was initially proclaimed winner but on Protest, he was declared Mayor in May, 2006 so he was able to serve 1 year of his supposed 3-year term. In 2007, he won again as Mayor. May he run for Mayor in the May 2010 elections without violating the 3-consecutive term rule? THE FACTS: For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national and local elections, Abundo vied for the position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. In both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and was proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate and accordingly served the corresponding terms as mayor. In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time, performed the functions of the office of mayor. Abundo protested Torres’ election and proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for his assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for a period of a little over one year and one month. Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other. When Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty seat relative to this electoral contest, Torres lost no time in seeking the former’s disqualification to run, the corresponding petition, docketed as SPA Case No. 10-128 (DC), predicated on the three-consecutive term limit rule. On June 16, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution finding for Abundo, who in the meantime bested Torres by 219 Votes and was accordingly proclaimed 2010 mayor-elect of Viga, Catanduanes. Meanwhile, on May 21, 2010, or before the COMELEC could resolve the adverted disqualification case Torres initiated against Abundo, herein private respondent Ernesto R. Vega (Vega) commenced a quo warranto7 action before the RTC-Br. 43 in Virac, Catanduanes, docketed as Election Case No. 55, to unseat Abundo on essentially the same grounds Torres raised in his petition to disqualify. By Decision8 of August 9, 2010 in Election Case No. 55, the RTC declared Abundo ineligible to serve as municipal mayor, disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, Decision is, hereby, rendered GRANTING the petition and declaring Abelardo Abundo, Sr. ineligible to serve as municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. In so ruling, the trial court, citing Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC found Abundo to have already served three consecutive mayoralty terms, to wit, 2001-2004, 2004-2007 and 2007-2010, and, hence, disqualified for another, i.e., fourth, consecutive term. Abundo, the RTC noted, had been declared winner in the aforesaid 2004 elections consequent to his protest and occupied the position of and actually served as Viga mayor for over a year of the remaining term, i.e., from May 9, 2006 to June 30, 2007, to be exact.

To the RTC, the year and a month service constitutes a complete and full service of Abundo’s second term as mayor. Therefrom, Abundo appealed to the COMELEC, his recourse docketed as EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010. On February 8, 2012, in EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010, the COMELEC’s Second Division rendered the first assailed Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 73, Virac, Catanduanes is AFFIRMED and the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Just like the RTC, the COMELEC’s Second Division ruled against Abundo on the strength of Aldovino, Jr. and held that service of the unexpired portion of a term by a protestant who is declared winner in an election protest is considered as service for one full term within the contemplation of the three-term limit rule. In time, Abundo sought but was denied reconsideration by the COMELEC en banc per its equally assailed Resolution of May 10, 2012. The COMELEC en banc’s Resolution reads as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit. The Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.12 In affirming the Resolution of its Second Division, the COMELEC en banc held in essence the following: first, there was no involuntary interruption of Abundo’s 2004-2007 term service which would be an exception to the three-term limit rule as he is considered never to have lost title to the disputed office after he won in his election protest; and second, what the Constitution prohibits is for an elective official to be in office for the same position for more than three consecutive terms and not to the service of the term. On June 29, 2012, the COMELEC ECAD Bailiff personally delivered the entire records of the instant case to, and were duly received by, the clerk of court of RTC-Br. 43. On June 29, 2012, or on the same day of its receipt of the case records, the RTC-Br. 43 in Virac, Catanduanes granted Vega’s Motion for Execution through an Order of even date. And a Writ of Execution19 was issued on the same day. On July 2, 2012, Sheriff Q. Tador, Jr. received the Writ of Execution and served the same at the office of Mayor Abundo on the same day via substituted service. On July 3, 2012, the Court issued a TRO20 enjoining the enforcement of the assailed COMELEC Resolutions. On July 4, 2012, Vega received the Court’s July 3, 2012 Resolution21 and a copy of the TRO. On the same day, ViceMayor Emeterio M. Tarin and First Councilor Cesar O. Cervantes of Viga, Catanduanes took their oaths of office22 as mayor and vice-mayor of Viga, Catanduanes, respectively. Core Issue: Whether or not Abundo is deemed to have served three (3) consecutive terms The pivotal determinative issue then is whether the service of a term less than the full three years by an elected official arising from his being declared as the duly elected official upon an election protest is considered as full service of the term for purposes of the application of the three consecutive term limit for elective local officials. On this core issue, We find the petition meritorious. The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundo’s three successive, continuous mayorship was effectively broken during the 2004-

2007 term when he was initially deprived of title to, and was veritably disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to which he, after due proceedings, was eventually declared to have been the rightful choice of the electorate. The three-term limit rule for elective local officials, a disqualification rule, is found in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, which provides: Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the fullterm for which he was elected. (Emphasis supplied.) and is reiterated in Sec. 43(b) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, or the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, thusly: Sec. 43. Term of Office. — (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected. To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the aforequoted constitutional and statutory provisions, the following requisites must concur. (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. Judging from extant jurisprudence, the three-term limit rule, as applied to the different factual milieus, has its complicated side. We shall revisit and analyze the various holdings and relevant pronouncements of the Court on the matter. As is clearly provided in Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution as well as in Sec. 43(b) of the LGC, voluntary renunciation of the office by the incumbent elective local official for any length of time shall NOT, in determining service for three consecutive terms, be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected. In Aldovino, Jr., however, the Court stated the observation that the law “does not textually state that voluntary renunciation is the only actual interruption of service that does not affect ‘continuity of service for a full term’ for purposes of the three-term limit rule.” As stressed in Socrates v. Commission on Elections, the principle behind the three-term limit rule covers only consecutive terms and that what the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. Put a bit differently, an elective local official cannot, following his third consecutive term, seek immediate reelection for a fourth term,34 albeit he is allowed to seek a fresh term for the same position after the election where he could have sought his fourth term but prevented to do so by reason of the prohibition. There has, in fine, to be a break or interruption in the successive terms of the official after his or her third term. An interruption usually occurs when the official does not seek a fourth term, immediately following the third. Of course, the basic law is unequivocal that a “voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall NOT be considered an interruption in the

continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.” This qualification was made as a deterrent against an elective local official intending to skirt the three-term limit rule by merely resigning before his or her third term ends. This is a voluntary interruption as distinguished from involuntary interruption which may be brought about by certain events or causes. While appearing to be seemingly simple, the three-term limit rule has engendered a host of disputes resulting from the varying interpretations applied on local officials who were elected and served for three terms or more, but whose terms or service was punctuated by what they view as involuntary interruptions, thus entitling them to a, but what their opponents perceive as a proscribed, fourth term. Involuntary interruption is claimed to result from any of these events or causes: succession or assumption of office by operation of law, preventive suspension, declaration of the defeated candidate as the winner in an election contest, declaration of the proclaimed candidate as the losing party in an election contest, proclamation of a noncandidate as the winner in a recall election, removal of the official by operation of law, and other analogous causes. This brings us to an examination of situations and jurisprudence wherein such consecutive terms were considered or not considered as having been “involuntarily interrupted or broken.” Assumption of Office by Operation of Law In Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections and Jose T. Capco, Jr. (1998) and Montebon v. Commission on Elections (2008), the Court delved on the effects of “assumption to office by operation of law” on the three-term limit rule. This contemplates a situation wherein an elective local official fills by succession a higher local government post permanently left vacant due to any of the following contingencies, i.e., when the supposed incumbent refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office. In Borja, Jr., Jose T. Capco, Jr. (Capco) was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, Capco became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent mayor, Cesar Borja. Capco was then elected and served as mayor for terms 1992-1995 and 1995 1998. When Capco expressed his intention to run again for the mayoralty position during the 1998 elections, Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was then also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification for violation of the three-term limit rule. Finding for Capco, the Court held that for the disqualification rule to apply, “it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.” There was, the Court ruled, no violation of the three-term limit, for Capco “was not elected to the office of the mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law” when a permanent vacancy occurred in that office. The Court arrived at a parallel conclusion in the case of Montebon. There, Montebon had been elected for three consecutive terms as municipal councilor of Tuburan, Cebu in 1998-2001, 20012004, and 2004-2007. However, in January 2004, or during his second term, Montebon succeeded and assumed the position of vice-mayor of Tuburan when the incumbent vice-mayor retired. When Montebon filed his certificate of candidacy again as municipal councilor, a petition for disqualification was filed against him based on the three-term limit rule. The Court ruled that Montebon’s assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 was an interruption of his continuity of service as councilor. The Court emphasized that succession in local government office is by operation of law and as such, it is an involuntary severance from office. Since the law no less allowed Montebon to vacate his post as councilor in order to assume office as vice mayor, his occupation of the higher office cannot, without more, be deemed as a voluntary renunciation of his

position as councilor. (2) Recall Election With reference to the effects of recall election on the continuity of service, Adormeo v. Commission on Elections (2002) and the aforementioned case of Socrates (2002) provide guidance. In Adormeo, Ramon Talaga, Jr. (Talaga) was elected and served as mayor of Lucena City during terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. During the 1998 elections, Talaga lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. However, before Tagarao’s 1998-2001 term ended, a recall election was conducted in May 2000 wherein Talaga won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 2001. When Talaga ran for mayor in 2001, his candidacy was challenged on the ground he had already served as mayor for three consecutive terms for violation of the three term-limit rule. The Court held therein that the remainder of Tagarao’s term after the recall election during which Talaga served as mayor should not be considered for purposes of applying the three-term limit rule. The Court emphasized that the continuity of Talaga’s mayorship was disrupted by his defeat during the 1998 elections. A similar conclusion was reached by the Court in Socrates. The petitioners in that case assailed the COMELEC Resolution which declared Edward Hagedorn qualified to run for mayor in a recall election. It appeared that Hagedorn had been elected and served as mayor of Puerto Princesa City for three consecutive terms: in 1992-1995, 1995-1998 and 1998-2001. Obviously aware of the three-term limit principle, Hagedorn opted not to vie for the same mayoralty position in the 2001 elections, in which Socrates ran and eventually won. However, midway into his term, Socrates faced recall proceedings and in the recall election held, Hagedorn run for the former’s unexpired term as mayor. Socrates sought Hagedorn’s disqualification under the three-term limit rule. In upholding Hagedorn’s candidacy to run in the recall election, the Court ruled: x x x After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he became a private citizen until the recall election of September 24, 2002 when he won by 3,018 votes over his closest opponent, Socrates. From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto Princesa was Socrates. During the same period, Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. This period is clearly an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorn’s service as mayor, not because of his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal prohibition. The Court likewise emphasized in Socrates that “an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term [and, hence], [a]ny subsequent election, like recall election, is no longer covered x x x.” (3) Conversion of a Municipality into a City On the other hand, the conversion of a municipality into a city does not constitute an interruption of the incumbent official’s continuity of service. The Court said so in Latasa v. Commission on Elections (2003). Latasa is cast against the ensuing backdrop: Arsenio A. Latasa was elected and served as mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur for terms 1992-1995, 1995-1998, and 1998-2001. During his third term, Digos was converted into a component city, with the corresponding cityhood law providing the holdover of elective officials. When Latasa filed his certificate of candidacy as mayor for the 2001 elections, the

Court declared Latasa as disqualified to run as mayor of Digos City for violation of the three-term limit rule on the basis of the following ratiocination: This Court believes that (Latasa) did involuntarily relinquish his office as municipal mayor since the said office has been deemed abolished due to the conversion. However, the very instant he vacated his office as municipal mayor, he also assumed office as city mayor. Unlike in Lonzanida, where petitioner therein, for even just a short period of time, stepped down from office, petitioner Latasa never ceased from acting as chief executive of the local government unit. He never ceased from discharging his duties and responsibilities as chief executive of Digos. (4) Period of Preventive Suspension In 2009, in the case Aldovino Jr., the Court espoused the doctrine that the period during which a local elected official is under preventive suspension cannot be considered as an interruption of the continuity of his service. The Court explained why so: Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective official’s stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended official’s continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists. (5) Election Protest With regard to the effects of an election protest vis-à-vis the three-term limit rule, jurisprudence presents a more differing picture. The Court’s pronouncements in Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections (1999), Ong v. Alegre (2006), Rivera III v. Commission on Elections (2007) and Dizon v. Commission on Elections (2009), all protest cases, are illuminating. In Lonzanida, Romeo Lonzanida was elected and had served as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in terms 1989-1992, 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. However, his proclamation relative to the 1995 election was protested and was eventually declared by the RTC and then by COMELEC null and void on the ground of failure of elections. On February 27, 1998, or about three months before the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida vacated the mayoralty post in light of a COMELEC order and writ of execution it issued. Lonzanida’s opponent assumed office for the remainder of the term. In the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy. His opponent, Efren Muli, filed a petition for disqualification on the ground that Lonzanida had already served three consecutive terms in the same post. The Court, citing Borja Jr., reiterated the two (2) conditions which must concur for the three-term limit to apply: “1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.” In view of Borja, Jr., the Court ruled that the foregoing requisites were absent in the case of Lonzanida. The Court held that Lonzanida cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections since his assumption of office as mayor “cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation.” And as a corollary point, the Court stated that Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term having been ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term, a situation which amounts to an involuntary relinquishment of office.

This Court deviated from the ruling in Lonzanida in Ong v. Alegre owing to a variance in the factual situations attendant. In that case, Francis Ong (Ong) was elected and served as mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for terms 1995-1998, 1998-2001, and 2001- 2004. During the 1998 mayoralty elections, or during his supposed second term, the COMELEC nullified Ong’s proclamation on the postulate that Ong lost during the 1998 elections. However, the COMELEC’s decision became final and executory on July 4, 2001, when Ong had fully served the 1998- 2001 mayoralty term and was in fact already starting to serve the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente. In 2004, Ong filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position as mayor, which his opponent opposed for violation of the three-term limit rule. Ong invoked the ruling in Lonzanida and argued that he could not be considered as having served as mayor from 1998-2001 because he was not duly elected to the post and merely assumed office as a “presumptive winner.” Dismissing Ong’s argument, the Court held that his assumption of office as mayor for the term 1998-2001 constitutes “service for the full term” and hence, should be counted for purposes of the three term limit rule. The Court modified the conditions stated in Lonzanida in the sense that Ong’s service was deemed and counted as service for a full term because Ong’s proclamation was voided only after the expiry of the term. The Court noted that the COMELEC decision which declared Ong as not having won the 1998 elections was “without practical and legal use and value” promulgated as it was after the contested term has expired. The Court further reasoned: Petitioner [Francis Ong’s] contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was under protest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule. The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view is not hard to discern. Such contrary view would mean that Alegre would – under the three-term rule - be considered as having served a term by virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when another actually served such term pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an election. The Court did not apply the ruling in Lonzanida and ruled that the case of Ong was different, to wit: The difference between the case at bench and Lonzanida is at once apparent. For one, in Lonzanida, the result of the mayoralty election was declared a nullity for the stated reason of "failure of election", and, as a consequence thereof, the proclamation of Lonzanida as mayor-elect was nullified, followed by an order for him to vacate the office of mayor. For another, Lonzanida did not fully serve the 19951998 mayoral term, there being an involuntary severance from office as a result of legal processes. In fine, there was an effective interruption of the continuity of service. Ong’s slight departure from Lonzanida would later find reinforcement in the consolidated cases of Rivera III v. Commission on Elections53 and Dee v. Morales. Therein, Morales was elected mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for the following consecutive terms: 1995-1998, 1998-2001 and 2001-2004. In relation to the 2004 elections, Morales again ran as mayor of the same town, emerged as garnering the majority votes and was proclaimed elective mayor for term commencing July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007. A petition for quo warranto was later filed against Morales predicated on the ground that he is ineligible to run for a “fourth” term, having served as mayor for three consecutive terms. In his answer,

Morales averred that his supposed 1998- 2001 term cannot be considered against him, for, although he was proclaimed by the Mabalacat board of canvassers as elected mayor vis-à-vis the 1998 elections and discharged the duties of mayor until June 30, 2001, his proclamation was later nullified by the RTC of Angeles City and his closest rival, Anthony Dee, proclaimed the duly elected mayor. Pursuing his point, Morales parlayed the idea that he only served as a mere caretaker. The Court found Morales’ posture untenable and held that the case of Morales presents a factual milieu similar with Ong, not with Lonzanida. For nease of reference, the proclamation of Francis Ong, in Ong, was nullified, but after he, like Morales, had served the three-year term from the start to the end of the term. Hence, the Court concluded that Morales exceeded the three-term limit rule, to wit: Here, respondent Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the position. He served as mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent) as mayor. To reiterate, as held in Ong v. Alegre, such circumstance does not constitute an interruption in serving the full term. Respondent Morales is now serving his fourth term. He has been mayor of Mabalacat continuously without any break since July 1, 1995. In just over a month, by June 30, 2007, he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12) continuous years.55 (Emphasis supplied.) The Court ruled in Rivera that the fact of being belatedly ousted, i.e., after the expiry of the term, cannot constitute an interruption in Morales’ service of the full term; neither can Morales, as he argued, be considered merely a “caretaker of the office” or a mere “de facto officer” for purposes of applying the three-term limit rule. In a related 2009 case of Dizon v. Commission on Elections, the Court would again find the same Mayor Morales as respondent in a disqualification proceeding when he ran again as a mayoralty candidate during the 2007 elections for a term ending June 30, 2010. Having been unseated from his post by virtue of this Court’s ruling in Rivera, Morales would argue this time around that the three-term limit rule was no longer applicable as to his 2007 mayoralty bid. This time, the Court ruled in his favor, holding that for purposes of the 2007 elections, the three-term limit rule was no longer a disqualifying factor as against Morales. The Court wrote: Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales’ involuntary severance from office with respect to the 2004-2007 term. Involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. Our decision in the Rivera case was promulgated on 9 May 2007 and was effective immediately. The next day, Morales notified the vice mayor’s office of our decision. The vice mayor assumed the office of the mayor from 17 May 2007 up to 30 June 2007. The assumption by the vice mayor of the office of the mayor, no matter how short it may seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales’ continuity of service. Thus, Morales did not hold office for the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30 To summarize, hereunder are the prevailing jurisprudence on issues affecting consecutiveness of terms and/or involuntary interruption, viz: When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the official merely assumed the position pursuant to the rules on succession under the LGC, then his service for the unexpired portion of the term of the replaced official cannot be treated as one full term as contemplated under the subject constitutional and statutory provision that service cannot be counted in the application of any term limit (Borja, Jr.). If the official runs again for the same position he held prior to his assumption of the higher office, then his succession to said position is by operation of law and is considered an

involuntary severance or interruption (Montebon). An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not seek the elective position for what could be his fourth term, but later won in a recall election, had an interruption in the continuity of the official’s service. For, he had become in the interim, i.e., from the end of the 3rd term up to the recall election, a private citizen (Adormeo and Socrates). The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a municipality to a city does not, by itself, work to interrupt the incumbent official’s continuity of service (Latasa). Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the elective officer’s continued stay and entitlement to the office remain unaffected during the period of suspension, although he is barred from exercising the functions of his office during this period (Aldovino, Jr.). When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes office, his term is interrupted when he loses in an election protest and is ousted from office, thus disenabling him from serving what would otherwise be the unexpired portion of his term of office had the protest been dismissed (Lonzanida and Dizon). The break or interruption need not be for a full term of three years or for the major part of the 3-year term; an interruption for any length of time, provided the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity of service (Socrates, citing Lonzanida). When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision becomes final after said official had served the full term for said office, then his loss in the election contest does not constitute an interruption since he has managed to serve the term from start to finish. His full service, despite the defeat, should be counted in the application of term limits because the nullification of his proclamation came after the expiration of the term (Ong and Rivera). Abundo argues that the RTC and the COMELEC erred in uniformly ruling that he had already served three consecutive terms and is, thus, barred by the constitutional three-term limit rule to run for the current 2010-2013 term. In gist, Abundo arguments run thusly: 1. Aldovino, Jr. is not on all fours with the present case as the former dealt with preventive suspension which does not interrupt the continuity of service of a term; 2. Aldovino, Jr. recognizes that the term of an elected official can be interrupted so as to remove him from the reach of the constitutional three-term limitation; 3. The COMELEC misinterpreted the meaning of “term” in Aldovino, Jr. by its reliance on a mere portion of the Decision and not on the unified logic in the disquisition; 4. Of appropriate governance in this case is the holding in Lonzanida and Rivera III v. Commission on Elections. 5. The COMELEC missed the point when it ruled that there was no interruption in the service of Abundo since what he considered as an “interruption” of his 2004-2007 term occurred before his term started; and 6. To rule that the term of the protestee (Torres) whose proclamation was adjudged

invalid was interrupted while that of the protestant (Abundo) who was eventually proclaimed winner was not so interrupted is at once absurd as it is illogical. Both respondents Vega and the COMELEC counter that the ratio decidendi of Aldovino, Jr. finds application in the instant case. The COMELEC ruled that Abundo did not lose title to the office as his victory in the protest case confirmed his entitlement to said office and he was only unable to temporarily discharge the functions of the office during the pendency of the election protest. We note that this present case of Abundo deals with the effects of an election protest, for which the rulings in Lonzanida, Ong, Rivera and Dizon appear to be more attuned than the case of Aldovino Jr., the interrupting neffects of the imposition of a preventive suspension being the very lis mota in the Aldovino, Jr. case. But just the same, We find that Abundo’s case presents a different factual backdrop. Unlike in the abovementioned election protest cases wherein the individuals subject of disqualification were candidates who lost in the election protest and each declared loser during the elections, Abundo was the winner during the election protest and was declared the rightful holder of the mayoralty post. Unlike Mayor Lonzanida and Mayor Morales, who were both unseated toward the end of their respective terms, Abundo was the protestant who ousted his opponent and had assumed the remainder of the term. Notwithstanding, We still find this Court’s pronouncements in the past as instructive, and consider several doctrines established from the 1998 case of Borja, Jr. up to the most recent case of Aldovino Jr. in 2009, as potent aids in arriving at this Court’s conclusion. The intention behind the three-term limit rule was not only to abrogate the “monopolization of political power” and prevent elected officials from breeding “proprietary interest in their position”60 but also to “enhance the people’s freedom of choice.” In the words of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, “while people should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of power may bring about, care should be taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed.” In the present case, the Court finds Abundo’s case meritorious and declares that the two-year period during which his opponent, Torres, was serving as mayor should be considered as an interruption, which effectively removed Abundo’s case from the ambit of the three-term limit rule. It bears to stress at this juncture that Abundo, for the 2004 election for the term starting July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007, was the duly elected mayor. Otherwise how explain his victory in his election protest against Torres and his consequent proclamation as duly elected mayor. Accordingly, the first requisite for the application of the disqualification rule based on the three-term limit that the official has been elected is satisfied. This thus brings us to the second requisite of whether or not Abundo had served for “three consecutive terms,” as the phrase is juridically understood, as mayor of Viga, Catanduanes immediately before the 2010 national and local elections. Subsumed to this issue is of course the question of whether or not there was an effective involuntary interruption during the three three-year periods, resulting in the disruption of the continuity of Abundo’s mayoralty. The facts of the case clearly point to an involuntary interruption during the July 2004-June 2007 term. There can be no quibbling that, during the term 2004-2007, and with the enforcement of the decision of the election protest in his favor, Abundo assumed the mayoralty post only on May 9, 2006 and served the term until June 30, 2007 or for a period of a little over one year and one month. Consequently, unlike Mayor Ong in Ong and Mayor Morales in Rivera, it cannot be said that Mayor Abundo was able to serve fully the entire 2004- 2007 term to which he was otherwise entitled. A “term,” as defined in Appari v. Court of Appeals, means, in a legal sense, “a fixed and definite period

of time which the law describes that an officer may hold an office.” It also means the “time during which the officer may claim to hold office as a matter of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another.” It is the period of time during which a duly elected official has title to and can serve the functions of an elective office. From paragraph (a) of Sec. 43, RA 7160,66 the term for local elected officials is three (3) years starting from noon of June 30 of the first year of said term. In the present case, during the period of one year and ten months, or from June 30, 2004 until May 8, 2006, Abundo cannot plausibly claim, even if he wanted to, that he could hold office of the mayor as a matter of right. Neither can he assert title to the same nor serve the functions of the said elective office. The reason is simple: during that period, title to hold such office and the corresponding right to assume the functions thereof still belonged to his opponent, as proclaimed election winner. Accordingly, Abundo actually held the office and exercised the functions as mayor only upon his declaration, following the resolution of the protest, as duly elected candidate in the May 2004 elections or for only a little over one year and one month. Consequently, since the legally contemplated full term for local elected officials is three (3) years, it cannot be said that Abundo fully served the term 2004-2007. The reality on the ground is that Abundo actually served less. Needless to stress, the almost two-year period during which Abundo’s opponent actually served as Mayor is and ought to be considered an involuntary interruption of Abundo’s continuity of service. An involuntary interrupted term, cannot, in the context of the disqualification rule, be considered as one term for purposes of counting the three-term threshold. The notion of full service of three consecutive terms is related to the concepts of interruption of service and voluntary renunciation of service. The word interruption means temporary cessation, intermission or suspension. To interrupt is to obstruct, thwart or prevent. When the Constitution and the LGC of 1991 speak of interruption, the reference is to the obstruction to the continuance of the service by the concerned elected official by effectively cutting short the service of a term or giving a hiatus in the occupation of the elective office. On the other hand, the word “renunciation” connotes the idea of waiver or abandonment of a known right. To renounce is to give up, abandon, decline or resign. Voluntary renunciation of the office by an elective local official would thus mean to give up or abandon the title to the office and to cut short the service of the term the concerned elected official is entitled to. It must be stressed that involuntary interruption of service which jurisprudence deems an exception to the three-term limit rule, implies that the service of the term has begun before it was interrupted. Here, the respondent did not lose title to the office. As the assailed Resolution states: In the case at bar, respondent cannot be said to have lost his title to the office. On the contrary, he actively sought entitlement to the office when he lodged the election protest case. And respondent-appellant’s victory in the said case is a final confirmation that he was validly elected for the mayoralty post of Viga, Catanduanes in 2004- 2007. At most, respondent-appellant was only unable to temporarily discharge the functions of the office to which he was validly elected during the pendency of the election protest, but he never lost title to the said office. The COMELEC’s Second Division, on the other hand, pronounced that the actual length of service by the public official in a given term is immaterial by reckoning said service for the term in the application of the three-term limit rule, thus: As emphasized in the case of Aldovino, “this formulation— no more than three consecutive terms—is a clear command suggesting the existence of an inflexible rule.” Therefore we cannot subscribe to the argument that since respondent Abundo served only a portion of the term, his 2004-2007 “term” should not be considered for purposes of the application of the three term limit rule. When the framers of the Constitution drafted and incorporated the three term

limit rule, it is clear that reference is to the term, not the actual length of the service the public official may render. Therefore, one’s actual service of term no matter how long or how short is immaterial. In fine, the COMELEC ruled against Abundo on the theory that the length of the actual service of the term is immaterial in his case as he was only temporarily unable to discharge his functions as mayor. The COMELEC’s case disposition and its heavy reliance on Aldovino, Jr. do not commend themselves for concurrence. The Court cannot simply find its way clear to understand the poll body’s determination that Abundo was only temporarily unable to discharge his functions as mayor during the pendency of the election protest. As previously stated, the declaration of being the winner in an election protest grants the local elected official the right to serve the unexpired portion of the term. Verily, while he was declared winner in the protest for the mayoralty seat for the 2004-2007 term, Abundo’s full term has been substantially reduced by the actual service rendered by his opponent (Torres). Hence, there was actual involuntary interruption in the term of Abundo and he cannot be considered to have served the full 2004-2007 term. This is what happened in the instant case. It cannot be overemphasized that pending the favorable resolution of his election protest, Abundo was relegated to being an ordinary constituent since his opponent, as presumptive victor in the 2004 elections, was occupying the mayoralty seat. In other words, for almost two years or from July 1, 2004— the start of the term—until May 9, 2006 or during which his opponent actually assumed the mayoralty office, Abundo was a private citizen warming his heels while awaiting the outcome of his protest. Hence, even if declared later as having the right to serve the elective position from July 1, 2004, such declaration would not erase the fact that prior to the finality of the election protest, Abundo did not serve in the mayor’s office and, in fact, had no legal right to said position. Aldovino Jr. cannot possibly lend support to respondent’s cause of action, or to COMELEC’s resolution against Abundo. In Aldovino Jr., the Court succinctly defines what temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective office means, thus: On the other hand, temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not be considered an effective interruption of a term because it does not involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective break from holding office; the office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the functions of his office for a reason provided by law. We rule that the above pronouncement on preventive suspension does not apply to the instant case. Verily, it is erroneous to say that Abundo merely was temporarily unable or disqualified to exercise the functions of an elective post. For one, during the intervening period of almost two years, reckoned from the start of the 2004-2007 term, Abundo cannot be said to have retained title to the mayoralty office as he was at that time not the duly proclaimed winner who would have the legal right to assume and serve such elective office. For another, not having been declared winner yet, Abundo cannot be said to have lost title to the office since one cannot plausibly lose a title which, in the first place, he did not have. Thus, for all intents and purposes, even if the belated declaration in the election protest accords him title to the elective office from the start of the term, Abundo was not entitled to the elective office until the election protest was finally resolved in his favor. Consequently, there was a hiatus of almost two years, consisting of a break and effective interruption of his service, until he assumed the office and served barely over a year of the remaining term. At this juncture, We observe the apparent similarities of Mayor Abundo’s case with the cases of Mayor Talaga in Adormeo and Mayor Hagedorn in Socrates as Mayors Talaga and Hagedorn were not proclaimed winners since they were noncandidates in the regular elections. They were proclaimed winners during the recall elections and clearly were not able to fully serve the terms of the deposed incumbent officials. Similar to their cases where the Court deemed their terms as involuntarily interrupted, Abundo also became or was a private citizen during the period over which his opponent was serving as mayor. If in Lonzanida, the Court ruled that there was interruption in Lonzanida’s service because of his subsequent defeat in the election protest, then with more reason, Abundo’s term for 2004-2007 should be declared interrupted since he was not proclaimed winner after the 2004

elections and was able to assume the office and serve only for a little more than a year after winning the protest. As aptly stated in Latasa, to be considered as interruption of service, the “law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official steps down from office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.” Applying the said principle in the present case, there is no question that during the pendency of the election protest, Abundo ceased from exercising power or authority over the good people of Viga, Catanduanes. Consequently, the period during which Abundo was not serving as mayor should be considered as a rest period or break in his service because, as earlier stated, prior to the judgment in the election protest, it was Abundo’s opponent, Torres, who was exercising such powers by virtue of the still then valid proclamation. As a final note, We reiterate that Abundo’s case differs from other cases involving the effects of an election protest because while Abundo was, in the final reckoning, the winning candidate, he was the one deprived of his right and opportunity to serve his constituents. To a certain extent, Abundo was a victim of an imperfect election system. While admittedly the Court does not possess the mandate to remedy such imperfections, the Constitution has clothed it with enough authority to establish a fortress against the injustices it may bring. In this regard, We find that a contrary ruling would work damage and cause grave injustice to Abundo––an elected official who was belatedly declared as the winner and assumed office for only a short period of the term. If in the cases of Lonzanida and Dizon, this Court ruled in favor of a losing candidate––or the person who was adjudged not legally entitled to hold the contested public office but held it anyway––We find more reason to rule in favor of a winning candidateprotestant who, by popular vote, deserves title to the public office but whose opportunity to hold the same was halted by an invalid proclamation. Also, more than the injustice that may be committed against Abundo is the injustice that may likewise be committed against the people of Viga, Catanduanes by depriving them of their right to choose their leaders. Like the framers of the Constitution, We bear in mind that We “cannot arrogate unto ourselves the right to decide what the people want” and hence, should, as much as possible, “allow the people to exercise their own sense of proportion and rely on their own strength to curtail the power when it overreaches itself.” For democracy draws strength from the choice the people make which is the same choice We are likewise bound to protect. Petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. is DECLARED ELIGIBLE for the position of Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes to which he was duly elected in the May 2010 elections and is accordingly ordered IMMEDIATELY REINSTATED to said position.

One subject to be indicated in the title of the law HENRY R. GIRON vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 188179, JANUARY 22, 2013 This case assails the constitutionality of Section 12 (Substitution of Candidates) and Section 14 (Repealing Clause) of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9006, otherwise known as the Fair Election Act. The present Petition also seeks to prohibit the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from further implementing the aforesaid sections of the Fa1r Election Act, on the ground that these provisions would enable elective officials to gain campaign advantage and allow them to disburse public funds from the time they file their certificates of candidacy until after the elections. Petitioner Henry R. Giron

(Giron) likewise asserts that the insertion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which specifically requires: “Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.” Petitioner avers that these provisions are unrelated to the main subject of the Fair Election Act: the lifting of the political ad ban. Section 12 refers to the treatment of the votes cast for substituted candidates after the official ballots have been printed, while Section 14 pertains to the repeal of Section 67 (Candidates holding elective office) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code. Section 67 of this law concerns the ipso facto resignation of elective officials immediately after they file their respective certificates of candidacy for an office other than that which they are currently holding in a permanent capacity. On the other hand, respondent Jose Melo, then chairperson of the COMELEC, opposes the Petition and argues inter alia that this Court has already resolved the matter in Fariñas v. Executive Secretary. Issue Whether or not the inclusion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, or the “one subject-one title” rule. Held:

It is a well-settled rule that courts are to adopt a liberal interpretation in favor of the constitutionality of a legislation, as Congress is deemed to have enacted a valid, sensible, and just law. Because of this strong presumption, the one who asserts the invalidity of a law has to prove that there is a clear, unmistakable, and unequivocal breach of the Constitution; otherwise, the petition must fail. After a thorough review of the arguments raised, we find that petitioner and petitioners-inintervention were unable to present a compelling reason that would surpass the strong presumption of validity and constitutionality in favor of the Fair Election Act. They have not put forward any gripping justification to reverse our ruling in Fariñas, in which we have already ruled that the title and the objectives of R.A. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include subjects other than the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda. Below is a reproduction of our exhaustive exposition on the matter in the 10 December 2003 En Banc Decision: At the core of the controversy is Section 14, the repealing clause of Rep. Act No. 9006, which provides: [SECTION 14. Repealing Clause. —] Sections 67 and 85 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) and Sections 10 and 11 of Republic Act No. 6646 are hereby repealed. As a consequence, the first proviso in the third paragraph of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 is rendered ineffective. All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, or any part thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified or amended accordingly. The repealed provision, Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, quoted earlier, reads:

[SECTION 67]. Candidates holding elective office. — Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice- President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. xxxx The proscription [under Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution] is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well as surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. The provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject finding expression in its title. To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that — Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act. The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: “An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices.” Section 2 of the law provides not only the declaration of principles but also the objectives thereof: The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content. The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda, does not violate the “one subject one title” rule. This Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject. xxxx

Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice, action and study of the legislators and the public. In this case, it cannot be claimed that the legislators were not apprised of the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as the same was amply and comprehensively deliberated upon by the members of the House. (Emphases supplied and citations omitted) The reasoning behind Fariñas similarly applies to the claim of unconstitutionality with respect to Section 12 of the Fair Election Act. The questioned provision reads: SECTION 12. Substitution of Candidates. — In case of valid substitutions after the official ballots have been printed, the votes cast for the substituted candidates shall be considered as stray votes but shall not invalidate the whole ballot. For this purpose, the official ballots shall provide spaces where the voters may write the name of the substitute candidates if they are voting for the latter: Provided, however, That if the substitute candidate is of the same family name, this provision shall not apply.

Autonomy of local government units; control or supervision of the Executive Department over the local government units?Not in cases of national patrimony under Art. XII where the State has control over local governments. LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES and HON. ANGELO T. REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of DENR, GR. No. 175368, APRIL 11, 2013 This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, praying that the Supreme Court order to: ( 1) declare as unconstitutional Section 17(b)(3)(iii) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code of 1991 and Section 24 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076, otherwise known as the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991; (2) prohibit and bar respondents from exercising control over provinces; and (3) declare as illegal the respondent Secretary of the Department of Energy and Natural Resources' (DENR) nullification, voiding and cancellation of the Small-Scale Mining permits issued by the Provincial Governor of Bulacan. Petitioners claim that it was an act of “control” by the executive department over local government units when Art. X grants the Executive Department through the President only “supervision over local government units. Held: Control of the DENR/DENR Secretary over small-scale mining in the provinces is granted by three statutes: (1) R.A. No. 7061 or The Local Government Code of 1991; (2) R.A. No. 7076 or the

People's Small Scale Mining Act of 1991; and (3) R.A. No. 7942, otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. The 1987 Constitution provides: Article X, Section 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays, shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions. Petitioner contends that the foregoing provisions of the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991 show that the relationship between the President and the Provinces or respondent DENR, as the alter ego of the President, and the Province of Bulacan is one of executive supervision, not one of executive control. The term “control” has been defined as the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his/her duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter, while the term “supervision” is the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their function in accordance with law. Held: The petition lacks merit. Paragraph 1 of Section 2, Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) of the Constitution provides that “[t]he exploration, development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.” Moreover, paragraph 3 of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution provides that “[t]he Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens x x x.” Pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, R.A. No. 7076 or the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991, was enacted, establishing under Section 4 thereof a People's Small-Scale Mining Program to be implemented by the DENR Secretary in coordination with other concerned government agencies.

May individuals who do not belong to the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and other sectors qualified as nominees of partylist groups? May national parties join the party-list elections? ATONG PAGLAUM, INC VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203766, companion cases, February 26, 2013

and

The two issues raised before the Supreme Court are: first, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or

by cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as party-list organizations using the criteria laid down by the Supreme Court in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections (BANAT) ; and second, whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections (BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions of the Supreme Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. However, since the Supreme Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in the qualification of national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, all the present petitions are remanded for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the partylist system, and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision. The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation. Simply put, the party-list system is intended to democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. The 1987 Constitution provides: Section 5, Article VI (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector. In short, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations ; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector. The ruling of the Supreme Court in ANG BAGONG BAYANI and BANAT that major and national parties are not allowed to join the party-list is abandoned. In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters: Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.

National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in partylist elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack “well-defined political constituencies,” [A] either must belong to their respective sectors, or [B] must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

May gays, lesbians, bisexual, and transgenders be allowed as a party-list group even though they are not among those enumerated in the lConstitution as well as the party-list law as “marginalized” or “under-represented” sectors of the Philippine society? May they be disqualified because of their belief of “same sex marriage” which is allegedly contrary to the teachings of the Holy Bible and the Koran? ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582, April 7, 2010 Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that: Gays, lesbians, etc. are not included in the “marginalized groups” enumerated by the Supreme Court in the case of ANG BAGONG BAYANI VS. COMELEC; They espouse illegal doctrines like same sex marriages which is in violation of Art. 201 of the Revised Penal Code and Articles 696 and 1306 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The COMELEC likewise used the Holy

Bible and the Koran in denying Ladlad’s application since same sex marriage violated both. HELD: The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad’s application for registration on the ground that the LGBT sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related to any of the sectors in the enumeration. Respondent mistakenly opines that the SC ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/190582.htm" \l "_ftn20" \o "" “the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive”. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious matters.” HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/190582.htm" \l "_ftn24" \o "" Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/190582.htm" \l "_ftn25" \o "" The SC held that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.

Public accountability of public officials; public office is a public trust; access to official records; right to information on matters of public concern; procedure to be followed in requesting for copies of SALN and personal data sheet, and Curriculum Vitae, of justices and judges; limitations. RE: REQUEST FOR COPY OF 2008 STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NETWORTH [SALN] AND PERSONAL DATA SHEET OR CURRICULUM VITAE OF THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT AND OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE JUDICIARY, A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC, June 13, 2012 RE: REQUEST OF PHILIPPINE CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM [PCIJ] FOR THE 2008 STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH [SALN] AND PERSONAL DATA SHEETS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS JUSTICES, A.M. No. 09-8-07CA, June 13, 2012 In a letter, dated July 30, 2009, Rowena C. Paraan, Research Director of the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism(PCIJ), sought copies of the Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Networth (SALN) of the Justices of the Supreme Court for the year 2008. She also requested for copies of the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) or the Curriculum Vitae (CV) of the Justices of this Court for the purpose of updating their database of information on government officials.

In her Letter, dated August 13, 2009, Karol M. Ilagan, a researcher-writer also of the PCIJ, likewise sought for copies of the SALN and PDS of the Justices of the Court of Appeals (CA), for the same above-stated purpose. As early as 1989, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to rule on the matter of SALN disclosure in Re: Request of Jose M. Alejandrino where the Court denied the request of Atty. Alejandrino for the SALNs of the Justices of the Court due to a “plainly discernible” improper motive. In order to give meaning to the constitutional right of the people to have access to information on matters of public concern as well as accountability of public officers (AFTER THE IMPEACHMENT AND CONVICTION OF FORMER CHIEF JUSTICE RENATO CORONA BASED ON HIS SALN), the Court laid down the guidelines to be observed for requests made. Thus: 1. All requests for copies of statements of assets and liabilities of any Justice or Judge shall be filed with the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court or with the Court Administrator, as the case may be (Section 8 [A][2], R.A. 6713), and shall state the purpose of the request. 2. The independence of the Judiciary is constitutionally as important as the right to information which is subject to the limitations provided by law. Under specific circumstances, the need for fair and just adjudication of litigations may require a court to be wary of deceptive requests for information which shall otherwise be freely available. Where the request is directly or indirectly traced to a litigant, lawyer, or interested party in a case pending before the court, or where the court is reasonably certain that a disputed matter will come before it under circumstances from which it may, also reasonably, be assumed that the request is not made in good faith and for a legitimate purpose, but to fish for information and, with the implicit threat of its disclosure, to influence a decision or to warn the court of the unpleasant consequences of an adverse judgment, the request may be denied. 3. Where a decision has just been rendered by a court against the person making the request and the request for information appears to be a “fishing expedition” intended to harass or get back at the Judge, the request may be denied. 4. In the few areas where there is extortion by rebel elements or where the nature of their work exposes Judges to assaults against their personal safety, the request shall not only be denied but should be immediately reported to the military. 5. The reason for the denial shall be given in all cases. “Residence” requirement for local elective

officials. 9 ROMMEL JALOSJOS VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 19170, April 24, 2012 Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City on October 26, 1973. He migrated to Australia in 1981 when he was eight years old and there acquired Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he decided to return to the Philippines and lived with his brother, Romeo, Jr., in Barangay Veteran’s Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Four days upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate

of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. On September 1, 2009 he renounced his Australian citizenship, executing a sworn renunciation of the same in compliance with Republic Act (R.A.) 9225. From the time of his return, Jalosjos acquired a residential property in the same village where he lived and a fishpond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He applied for registration as a voter in the Municipality of Ipil but respondent Dan Erasmo, Sr., the Barangay Captain of Barangay Veteran’s Village, opposed the same. Acting on the application, the Election Registration Board approved it and included Jalosjos’ name in the Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC’s) voters list for Precinct 0051F of BarangayVeterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay Province for the May 10, 2010 elections. Erasmo promptly filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel Jalosjos’ COC on the ground that the latter made material misrepresentation in the same since he failed to comply with (1) the requirements of R.A. 9225 and (2) the one-year residency requirement of the Local Government Code. After hearing, the Second Division of the COMELEC ruled that, while Jalosjos had regained Philippine citizenship by complying with the requirements of R.A. 9225, he failed to prove the residency requirement for a gubernatorial candidate. He failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay . On motion for reconsideration, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the Second Division’s decision, ruling that Jalosjos had been a mere guest or transient visitor in his brother’s house and, for this reason, he cannot claim Ipil as his domicile. Issue: Is he a resident of Zamboanga Sibugay? Held: Yes. The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial governor to be a resident of the province for at least one year before the election. For purposes of the election laws, the requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person must not only intend to reside in a particular place but must also have personal presence in such place coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. There is no hard and fast rule to determine a candidate’s compliance with residency requirement since the question of residence is a question of intention. Still, jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/april2012/191970.htm" \l "_ftn13" \o "" It is clear from the facts that Quezon City was Jalosjos’ domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It may be taken for granted that he effectively changed his domicile from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there at the age of eight, acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years. Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by choice. On the other hand, when he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for

good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

Meaning of the word “residence” as a qualification for the position of Governor of Palawan. ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA VS. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 191938, JULY 2, 2010 The residence requirement is rooted in the recognition that officials of districts or localities should not only be acquainted with the metes and bounds of their constituencies; more importantly, they should know their constituencies and the unique circumstances of their constituents – their needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and development, and all matters vital to their common welfare. Familiarity, or the opportunity to be familiar, with these circumstances can only come with residency in the constituency to be represented. The purpose of the residency requirement is “best met by individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a given period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice.” At the same time, the constituents themselves can best know and evaluate the candidates’ qualifications and fitness for office if these candidates have lived among them. In this case, when his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan was declared cancelled, Mitra was the incumbent Representative of the Second District of Palawan. This district then included, among other territories, the Municipality of Aborlan and Puerto Princesa City. He was elected Representative as a domiciliary of Puerto Princesa City, and represented the legislative district for three (3) terms immediately before the elections of 2010. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/july2010/191938.htm" \l "_ftn7" \o "" On March 26, 2007 (or before the end of Mitra’s second term as Representative), Puerto Princesa City was reclassified as a “highly urbanized city” and thus ceased to be a component city of the Province of Palawan. The direct legal consequence of this new status was the ineligibility of Puerto Princesa City residents from voting for candidates for elective provincial officials. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/july2010/191938.htm" \l "_ftn8" \o "" On March 20, 2009, with the intention of running for the position of Governor, Mitra applied for the transfer of his Voter’s Registration Record from Precinct No. 03720 of Brgy. Sta. Monica, Puerto Princesa City, to Sitio Maligaya, Brgy. Isaub, Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan. He subsequently filed his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan as a resident of Aborlan. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/july2010/191938.htm" \l "_ftn9" \o "" Soon thereafter, respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. (the respondents) filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel Mitra’s COC. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/july2010/191938.htm" \l "_ftn10" \o "" They essentially argued that Mitra remains a resident of Puerto Princesa City who has not yet established residence in Aborlan, and is therefore not qualified to run for Governor of Palawan. Mitra insisted in his Answer that he has successfully abandoned Puerto Princesa City as his domicile of origin, and has established a new domicile in Aborlan since 2008. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/july2010/191938.htm" \l "_ftn11" \o "" To refute Mitra’s claimed residence in Aborlan – specifically, that he resides at the Maligaya Feedmill property – the respondents additionally submitted the affidavits of the 14 Punong Barangays of Aborlan and of six residents of Aborlan, all stating that Mitra is not a resident of Aborlan and has

never been seen in that municipality and that the office of the feedmill where he allegedly resided and is unlivable due to noise and pollution. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/july2010/191938.htm" \l "_ftn23" \o "" The COMELEC’s First Division disqualified Mitra and the same was affirmed by a divided En Banc based on the following: First, registration as a voter of Aborlan is not sufficient evidence that Mitra has successfully abandoned his domicile of origin. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/july2010/191938.htm" \l "_ftn33" \o "" Second, mere intent cannot supplant the express requirement of the law; the “physical presence” required to establish domicile connotes actual, factual and bona fide residence in a given locality. HELD: Mitra is a resident of Aborlan, Palawan. From the start, Mitra never hid his intention to transfer his residence from Puerto Princesa City to Aborlan to comply with the residence requirement of a candidate for an elective provincial office. Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, does not abhor this intended transfer of residence, as its Section 39 merely requires an elective local official to be a resident of the local government unit where he intends to run for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election. In other words, the law itself recognizes implicitly that there can be a change of domicile or residence, but imposes only the condition that residence at the new place should at least be for a year. Of course, as a continuing requirement or qualification, the elected official must remain a resident there for the rest of his term. Mitra’s domicile of origin is undisputedly Puerto Princesa City. For him to qualify as Governor – in light of the relatively recent change of status of Puerto Princesa City from a component city to a highly urbanized city whose residents can no longer vote for provincial officials – he had to abandon his domicile of origin and acquire a new one within the local government unit where he intended to run; this would be his domicile of choice. To acquire a domicile of choice, jurisprudence, which the COMELEC correctly invoked, requires the following: (1) residence or bodily presence in a new locality; (2) an intention to remain there; and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/july2010/191938.htm" \l "_ftn63" \o ""

HYPERLINK

Respondents claim that the feedmill place is beneath of what Mitra – a three-term congressman and a member of the Mitra political clan of Palawan – would occupy. Mitra has established business interests in Aborlan, a fact which the respondents have never disputed. He was then the incumbent three-term Representative who, as early as 2008, already entertained thoughts of running for Governor in 2010. Where a dwelling qualifies as a residence – i.e., the dwelling where a person permanently intends to return to and to remain HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/july2010/191938.htm" \l "_ftn76" \o "" – his or her capacity or inclination to decorate the place, or the lack of it, is immaterial. The COMELEC used a non-legal standard in disqualifying Mitra. “Residence” requirement for members of the House of Representatives. REP. DANILO RAMON FERNANDEZ VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and JESUS VICENTE,

G.R. No. 187478, December 21, 2009 Petitioner filed for candidacy as Representative of the First Legislative District of the Province of Laguna in the May 14, 2007 elections. In his Certificate of Candidacy (COC), he indicated his complete/exact address as “No. 13 Maharlika St., Villa Toledo Subdivision, Barangay Balibago, Sta. Rosa City, Laguna” (alleged Sta. Rosa residence). HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/december2009/187478.htm" \l "_ftn5" \o "" Private respondent Jesus L. Vicente (private respondent) filed a “Petition to Deny Due Course to and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and Petition for Disqualification” before the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Laguna. He claimed that Fernandez made material misrepresentation in his COC regarding his place of residence, because during past elections, he had declared Pagsanjan, Laguna as his address, and Pagsanjan is located in the Fourth Legislative District of the Province of Laguna. Private respondent likewise claimed that petitioner maintained another house in Cabuyao, Laguna, which was also outside the First District. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/december2009/187478.htm" \l "_ftn6" \o "" The COMELEC (First Division) dismissed said petition for lack of merit. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/december2009/187478.htm" \l "_ftn7" \o "" Petitioner was proclaimed as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Laguna on June 27, 2007, having garnered a total of 95,927 votes, winning by a margin of 35,000 votes over the nearest candidate. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/december2009/187478.htm" \l "_ftn8" \o "" On July 5, 2007, private respondent filed a petition for quo warranto before the HRET, docketed as HRET CASE No. 07-034, praying that petitioner be declared ineligible to hold office as a Member of the House of Representatives representing the First Legislative District of the Province of Laguna, and that petitioner’s election and proclamation be annulled and declared null and void. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/december2009/187478.htm" \l "_ftn9" \o "" The HRET ruled in favor of private respondent and held that Fernandez was not qualified to be the representative of the 1st District of Laguna since he failed to comply with the residence requirement under Section 6, Art. VI of the Constitution. Issue: Is Fernandez a resident of Sta. Rosa, Laguna where he does not even a house therein because his house is found Pagsanjan, Laguna, which is within the 4th Legislative District of Laguna? Held: Fernandez does not deny that his domicile of origin is Pagsanjan in the Fourth District of Laguna. Pagsanjan is his domicile of origin, or since his birth, where he formerly ran for provincial Board Member of Laguna in 1998, for Vice-Governor of Laguna in 2001 and for Governor of Laguna in 2004. In all his Certificates of Candidacy when he ran for these positions, he indicated under oath that his domicile or permanent residence was in Pagsanjan in the Fourth District of Laguna, not in the First District where he later ran in the last elections. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/december2009/187478.htm" \l "_ftn14" \o "" Petitioner alleges that in the questioned Decision, the HRET added a new qualification requirement for candidates seeking election to the position of Member of the House of Representatives, and that is, they must be real property owners or must have a house to reside in the legislative district where they seek election. We find the interpretation of the HRET of the residency requirement under the Constitution to be overly restrictive and unwarranted under the factual circumstances of this case. The HRET puts undue emphasis on the fact that petitioner is only leasing a townhouse in Sta. Rosa while he owns houses in Pagsanjan and Cabuyao. His ownership of properties in other places has been taken to mean that petitioner did not intend to make Sta. Rosa his permanent residence or

that he had not abandoned his domicile of origin. Although it is true that the latest acquired abode is not necessarily the domicile of choice of a candidate, there is nothing in the Constitution or our election laws which require a congressional candidate to sell a previously acquired home in one district and buy a new one in the place where he seeks to run in order to qualify for a congressional seat in that other district. Neither do we see the fact that petitioner was only leasing a residence in Sta. Rosa at the time of his candidacy as a barrier for him to run in that district. Certainly, the Constitution does not require a congressional candidate to be a property owner in the district where he seeks to run but only that he resides in that district for at least a year prior to election day. To use ownership of property in the district as the determinative indicium of permanence of domicile or residence implies that only the landed can establish compliance with the residency requirement. This Court would be, in effect, imposing a property requirement to the right to hold public office, which property requirement would be unconstitutional. Creation of a new legislative district in Camarines Sur with a population of less than 250,000; whether it violates Section 5 [4], Art. VI; Dissenting opinion of Justice Carpio SEN. BENIGNO AQUINO III & MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010 PEREZ, J.: The petitioners seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled “An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment.” Petitioners consequently pray that the respondent Commission on Elections be restrained from making any issuances and from taking any steps relative to the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716. Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009, or fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/189793.htm" \l "_ftn1" \o "" In substance, the said law created an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province. Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of 1,693,821, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/189793.htm" \l "_ftn2" \o "" distributed among four (4) legislative districts in this wise: District

st

1 District

Municipalities/Cities

Population

Del Gallego

Libmanan

Ragay

Minalabac

Lupi

Pamplona

Sipocot

Pasacao

Cabusao

San Fernando

Gainza

Canaman

417,304

2nd District

rd

3 District

th

4 District

Milaor

Camaligan

Naga

Magarao

Pili

Bombon

Ocampo

Calabanga

Caramoan

Sangay

Garchitorena

San Jose

Goa

Tigaon

Lagonoy

Tinamba

Presentacion

Siruma

Iriga

Buhi

Baao

Bula

Balatan

Nabua

474,899

372,548

429,070

Bato

Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district. The following table HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/189793.htm" \l "_ftn3" \o "" illustrates the reapportionment made by Republic Act No. 9716: District

Municipalities/Cities

Population

Del Gallego Ragay 1st District

Lupi

176,383

Sipocot Cabusao

2nd District

Libmanan

San Fernando

Minalabac

Gainza

Pamplona

Milaor

276,777

Pasacao

Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/189793.htm" \l "_ftn5" \o "" The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383. Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum population standard. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/189793.htm" \l "_ftn6" \o "" The provision reads: Article VI Section 5. (1) x x x x (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative. The petitioners posit that the 250,000 figure appearing in the above-cited provision is the minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district. The petitioners theorize that, save in the case of a newly created province, each legislative district created by Congress must be supported by a minimum population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid. Under this view, existing legislative districts may be reapportioned and severed to form new districts, provided each resulting district will represent a population of at least 250,000. On the other hand, if the reapportionment would result in the creation of a legislative seat representing a populace of less than 250,000 inhabitants, the reapportionment must be stricken down as invalid for non-compliance with the minimum population requirement. HELD: We go directly to the determination of whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province. There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must compose a legislative district. As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of the framers of the Constitution to adopt a minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative district. The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: “Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.” The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled. The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase “each city with a

population of at least two hundred fifty thousand” from the phrase “or each province” point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/189793.htm" \l "_ftn26" \o "" Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province. DISSENTING OPINION CARPIO, J.: The majority opinion wreaks havoc on the bedrock principle of our “democratic and republican State” HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/189793_carpio.htm" \l "_ftn1" \o "" that all votes are equal. Instead, the majority opinion introduces the Orwellian concept that some votes are more equal than others. The majority opinion allows, for the first time under the 1987 Constitution, voters in a legislative district created by Congress to send one representative to Congress even if the district has a population of only 176,383. In sharp contrast, all other legislative districts created by Congress send one representative each because they all meet the minimum population requirement of 250,000. The assailed Republic Act No. 9716 (RA 9716) is unconstitutional for being utterly repugnant to the clear and precise “standards” prescribed in Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution for the creation of legislative districts. Section 5(4) HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/189793_carpio.htm" \l "_ftn2" \o "" of Article VI mandates that “Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards” fixed in Section 5. These constitutional standards, as far as population is concerned, are: (1) proportional representation; (2) minimum population of 250,000 per legislative district; (3) progressive ratio in the increase of legislative districts as the population base increases; and (4) uniformity in apportionment of legislative districts “in provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area.” The assailed RA 9716 grossly violates these constitutional standards. Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is even more precise by providing that the Members of the House “shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio x x x.” The phrase “as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants” in the 1935 Constitution has been changed in the 1987 Constitution to the more precise “in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio x x x.” The addition of the phrase “on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio” was meant to stress that the rule on proportional representation shall apply uniformly in the apportionment of every legislative district. The phrase “in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants,” which precedes the phrase “provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area,” means that legislative districts in provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area shall be apportioned according to proportional representation or equal representation for equal numbers of people. Thus, there shall be one legislative district for every given number of people, whether inhabiting in provinces, cities or the Metropolitan Manila area. The phrase “on the basis of a uniform x x x ratio” means that the ratio of one legislative district for every given number of people shall be applied uniformly in all apportionments, whether in provinces, cities or the Metropolitan Manila area. Section 5(3) of Article VI mandates that “[e]ach city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand x x x shall have at least one representative.” Consequently, a population of 250,000 serves as the default minimum population applicable to every legislative district following the rule on uniformity in the apportionment of legislative districts, whether in provinces, cities or in the Metropolitan Manila area. (Note: If the above interpretation of the majority of SC Justices that there is no “there is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must compose a new legislative district of an existing province, then the

Province of Abra or Apayao could be made to have six (6) congressional districts with each district having only 30,000 population each, compared to the Provinces of Cebu and Pangasinan with six (6) legislative districts each with each district having 300,000 population. Will that not violate the constitutional requirements of “uniform and progressive ratio”?)

Creation of a separate legislative district for Malolos City, Bulacan, with a population of less than 250,000 declared unconstitutional VICTORINO B. ALDABA, CARLO JOLETTE S. FAJARDO, JULIO G. MORADA, and MINERVA ALDABA MORADA VS. COMELEC, G.R No. 188078, January 25, 2010 CARPIO, J.: Before 1 May 2009, the province of Bulacan was represented in Congress through four legislative districts. The First Legislative District comprised of the city of Malolos and the municipalities of Hagonoy, Calumpit, Pulilan, Bulacan, and Paombong. On 1 May 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos’ City Charter, by creating a separate legislative district for the city. At the time the legislative bills for RA 9591 were filed in Congress in 2007, namely, House Bill No. 3162 (later converted to House Bill No. 3693) and Senate Bill No. 1986, the population of Malolos City was 223,069. The population of Malolos City on 1 May 2009 is a contested fact but there is no dispute that House Bill No. 3693 relied on an undated certification issued by a Regional Director of the National Statistics Office (NSO) that “the projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000. Petitioners, taxpayers, registered voters and residents of Malolos City, filed this petition contending that RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representation in Congress as provided under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution. HELD: We grant the petition and declare RA 9591 unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have “a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand”. The only issue here is whether the City of Malolos has a population of at least 250,000, whether actual or projected, for the purpose of creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos in time for the 10 May 2010 elections. If not, then RA 9591 creating a legislative district in the City of Malolos is unconstitutional. The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on demographic projections, is without legal effect because Regional Director Miranda has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification. The Certification is also void on its face because based on its own growth rate assumption, the population of Malolos will be less than 250,000 in the year 2010. In addition,

intercensal demographic projections cannot be made for the entire year. In any event, a city whose population has increased to 250,000 is entitled to have a legislative district only in the “immediately following election” after the attainment of the 250,000 population. Also, the 2007 Census places the population of Malolos at 223,069 as of 1 August 2007. Based on a growth rate of 3.78%, the population of Malolos will grow to only 248,365 as of 1 August 2010. Even if the growth rate is compounded yearly, the population of Malolos of 223,069 as of 1 August 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as of 1 August 2010. All these conflict with what the Certification states that the population of Malolos “will be 254,030 by the year 2010.” Based on the Certification’s own growth rate assumption, the population of Malolos will be less than 250,000 before the 10 May 2010 elections. Incidentally, the NSO has no published population projections for individual municipalities or cities but only for entire regions and provinces. A city that has attained a population of 250,000 is entitled to a legislative district only in the “immediately following election.” In short, a city must first attain the 250,000 population, and thereafter, in the immediately following election, such city shall have a district representative. There is no showing in the present case that the City of Malolos has attained or will attain a population of 250,000, whether actual or projected, before the 10 May 2010 elections. Clearly, there is no official record that the population of the City of Malolos will be at least 250,000, actual or projected, prior to the 10 May 2010 elections, the immediately following election after the supposed attainment of such population. Thus, the City of Malolos is not qualified to have a legislative district of its own under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution. Requisites for the creation of a province from another province, i.e., Province of Dinagat Islands. Income, population and land area.

RODOLFO NAVARRO VS. ERMITA, G.R. NO. 180050, FEBRUARY 10, 2010 & APRIL, 2011 Petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al., seek nullify Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355, otherwise known as An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, for being unconstitutional. They allege that the creation of the Dinagat Islands as a new province, if uncorrected, perpetuates an illegal act of Congress, and unjustly deprives the people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of its territory, Internal Revenue Allocation and rich resources from the area. The mother province of Surigao del Norte was created and established under R.A. No. 2786 on June 19, 1960. The province is composed of three main groups of islands: (1) the Mainland and Surigao City; (2) Siargao Island and Bucas Grande; and (3) Dinagat Island, which is composed of seven municipalities, namely, Basilisa, Cagdianao, Dinagat, Libjo, Loreto, San Jose, and Tubajon. Based on the official 2000 Census of Population and Housing conducted by the National Statistics Office (NSO), HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/180050.htm" \l "_ftn2" \o "" the population of the Province of Surigao del Norte as of May 1, 2000 was 481,416, broken down as follows: Mainland

281,111

Surigao City

118,534

Siargao Island & Bucas Grande

93,354

Dinagat Island

106,951

Under Section 461 of R.A. No. 7610, otherwise known as The Local Government Code, a province may be created if it has an average annual income of not less than P20 million based on 1991 constant prices as certified by the Department of Finance, and a population of not less than 250,000 inhabitants as certified by the NSO, or a contiguous territory of at least 2,000 square kilometers as certified by the Lands Management Bureau. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities, which do not contribute to the income of the province. MAIN ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9355, CREATING THE NEW PROVINCE OF DINAGAT ISLANDS, COMPLIED WITH THE CONSTITUTION AND STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS UNDER SECTION 461 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7160, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991. HELD: At first, the Supreme Court held tha the law creating the Province of Dinagat Islands is unconstitutional for failure to comply with the requirements. It only met one of the three, i.e., income. It has a total land area of only 802.12 square kilometers, which falls short of the statutory requirement of at least 2,000 square kilometers. Moreover, based on the NSO 2000 Census of Population, the total population of the proposed Province of Dinagat Islands is only 106,951, while the statutory requirement is a population of at least 250,000 inhabitants. On Motion for Reconsideration, however, the Supreme Court reversed itself and held that since it complies with the income requirement, it needs just one other requisite to comply with the requirements to become a new province. In this case, the area requirement is deemed complied with since “[t]he land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of two or more islands.” The constitutional provision on the creation of a province in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution states: SEC. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.” Pursuant to the Constitution, the Local Government Code of 1991 prescribed the criteria for the creation of a province, thus: SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. -- (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites: (i) (ii)

a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office:

Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the

minimum requirements prescribed herein. Security of tenure of probationary government employee; due process CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION VS. GREGORIO MAGNAYE, JR., G.R. No. 183337, April 23, 2010 FACTS: In March 2001, Mayor Roman H. Rosales of Lemery, Batangas, appointed Magnaye as Utility Worker I at the Office of Economic Enterprise [Operation of Market] (OEE). After a few days, Mayor Rosales detailed him to the Municipal Planning and Development Office. In the May elections of that year, Mayor Rosales was defeated by Raul L. Bendaña, who assumed office on June 30, 2001. Thereafter, Magnaye was returned to his original assignment at the OEE. On July 11, 2001, Bendaña also placed him on detail at the Municipal Planning and Development Office to assist in the implementation of a Survey on the Integrated Rural Accessibility Planning Project. On August 13, 2001, the new mayor served him a notice of termination from employment effective the following day for unsatisfactory conduct and want of capacity. Magnaye questioned his termination before the CSC head office on the ground that Mayor Bendaña was not in a position to effectively evaluate his performance because it was made less than one and one-half months after his (Mayor Bendaña’s) assumption to office. He added that his termination was without basis and was politically motivated The CSCRO-IV dismissed Magnaye’s complaint for lack of merit. It upheld his dismissal from the service on the ground that Mayor Bendaña’s own assessment, together with the evaluation made by his supervisors, constituted sufficient and reasonable grounds for his termination. However, the CSC Decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition by the Civil Service Commission. THE ISSUE: The principal issue, therefore, is whether or not the termination of Magnaye was in accordance with the pertinent laws and the rules. HELD: The Court upholds the decision of the Court of Appeals. The CSC is of the position that a civil service employee does not enjoy security of tenure during his 6-month probationary period. It submits that an employee’s security of tenure starts only after the probationary period. The CSC position is contrary to the Constitution and the Civil Service Law itself. Section 3 (2) Article 13 of the Constitution guarantees the rights of all workers not just in terms of self-organization, collective bargaining, peaceful concerted activities, the right to strike with qualifications, humane conditions of work and a living wage but also to security of tenure, and Section 2(3), Article IX-B is emphatic in saying that, "no officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law." Consistently, Section 46 (a) of the Civil Service Law provides that “no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law after due process.” Our Constitution, in using the expressions “all workers” and “no officer or employee,” puts no

distinction between a probationary and a permanent or regular employee which means that both probationary and permanent employees enjoy security of tenure. Probationary employees enjoy security of tenure in the sense that during their probationary employment, they cannot be dismissed except for cause or for failure to qualify as regular employees. 16 Civil Service Commission has no administrative jurisdiction over offenses committed by court personnel. Only the Supreme Court. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. HERMINIGILDO ANDAL, G.R. No. 185749, December 16, 2009 CARPIO, J.: Herminigildo L. Andal (respondent) holds the position of Security Guard II in the Sandiganbayan. On 24 January 2000, he filed an application to take the Career Service Professional ExaminationComputer Assisted Test (CSPE-CAT) and was admitted to take the examination. The examination results showed that respondent passed the examination with a rating of 81.03%. On 25 January 2000, Arlene S. Vito (Vito), claiming to have been authorized by respondent to secure the results of the examination, presented a handwritten authorization allegedly signed by respondent. Upon verification and comparison of the pictures attached to the Picture Seat Plan and the identification card of respondent which Vito presented, there appeared a dissimilarity in the facial features. Bella A. Mitra, then Officer-in-Charge of the Examination, Placement and Services Division (EPSD) of the Civil Service Commission-National Capital Region (CSC-NCR), issued a Memorandum on the alleged “impersonation” of respondent and the matter was referred to the Legal Affairs Division to conduct a fact-finding investigation. On 29 November 2000, the CSC-NCR formally charged respondent with dishonesty. A formal investigation of the case was scheduled on 4 June 2001, 21 November 2001, 5 February 2002, and 10 July 2002. Notices were sent to respondent’s last known address as indicated in his Application Form but respondent failed to appear on the scheduled hearings. Respondent was deemed to have waived his right to appear at the formal investigation and the case proceeded ex parte. On 5 August 2005, the CSC-NCR rendered judgment finding respondent guilty of dishonesty and imposing upon him the penalty of dismissal from the service. Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the CSC which issued Resolution No. 062255 dated 20 December 2006, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the appeal of Herminigildo L. Andal is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the Decision dated May 25, 2005 of the Civil Service Commission National Capital Region (CSC-NCR), Quezon City, finding him guilty of Dishonesty and imposing upon him the penalty of dismissal from the service with accessory penalties of disqualification from re-entering government service, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and bar from taking any civil service examination, pursuant to Section 57 of the Uniformed Rules, is AFFIRMED. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/december2009/185749.htm" \l "_ftn4" \o "" Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the CSC judgment but the motion was denied in the CSC Resolution No. 071493 dated 1 August 2007. Respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on a petition for review under Rule 43. On 22 September 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment in favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated 25 May 2005, Resolution No. 062255 dated 20 December 2006, and Resolution No. 071493 dated 01

August 2007 in Admin. Case No. 00-12-027 are SET ASIDE and respondent Civil Service Commission is enjoined from implementing the same. Respondent Civil Service Commission is hereby ORDERED to immediately refer said administrative case for Dishonesty against petitioner Herminigildo L. Andal to the Office of the Court Administrator, Supreme Court, for appropriate action. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/december2009/185749.htm" \l "_ftn5" \o "" The CSC filed a motion for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution dated 2 December 2008. Hence, the present petition. The Issue The issue in this case is whether or not the Civil Service Commission has disciplinary jurisdiction to try and decide administrative cases against court personnel. HELD: The CSC’s authority and power to hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases are not in dispute. The question is whether the CSC’s disciplinary jurisdiction extends to court personnel in view of Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Sec. 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s administrative compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. This we have ruled in Maceda v. Vasquez HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/december2009/185749.htm" \l "_ftn10" \o "" and have reiterated in the case of Ampong v. Civil Service Commission. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/december2009/185749.htm" \l "_ftn11" \o "" In Ampong, we also emphasized that in case of violation of the Civil Service Law by a court personnel, the standard procedure is for the CSC to bring its complaint against a judicial employee before the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court. Whether the constitutional prohibition on the President to make appointments under Section 15, Art. VII extends to the Judiciary, particularly to the appointment of the Chief Justice. ARTURO DE CASTRO VS. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, G.R. No. 191032, March 17, 2010 MAIN ISSUE: May the incumbent President appoint the successor of Chief Justice Reynato Puno when he retires on May 17, 2010, considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety? HELD: The prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict. The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. In the consolidated petitions, the petitioners, submit that the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement on May 17, 2010, on the ground that the prohibition against presidential appointments under Section 15, Article VII does not extend to appointments in the Judiciary. As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article. Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial Department and defines the duties and qualifications of Members of the Supreme Court, among others. Section 4(1) and Section 9 of this Article are the provisions specifically providing for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices. In particular, Section 9 states that the appointment of Supreme Court Justices can only be made by the President upon the submission of a list of at least three nominees by the JBC; Section 4(1) of the Article mandates the President to fill the vacancy within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. Although Valenzuela HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/march2010/191002.htm" \l "_ftn67" \o "" came to hold that the prohibition covered even judicial appointments, it cannot be disputed that the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Thereby, the confirmation made to the JBC by then Senior Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado of this Court, a former member of the Constitutional Commission, about the prohibition not being intended to apply to the appointments to the Judiciary, which confirmation Valenzuela even expressly mentioned, should prevail. Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shall – an imperative, operating to impose a duty that may be enforced HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/march2010/191002.htm" \l "_ftn71" \o "" – should not be disregarded. Thereby, Sections 4(1) imposes on the President the imperative duty to make an appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. The failure by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the Constitution. The 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court was undoubtedly a special provision to establish a definite mandate for the President as the appointing power, and cannot be defeated by mere judicial interpretation in Valenzuela to the effect that Section 15, Article VII prevailed because it was “couched in stronger negative language.” Consequently, prohibiting the incumbent President from appointing a Chief Justice on the premise that Section 15, Article VII extends to appointments in the Judiciary cannot be sustained. We reverse Valenzuela. Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, we have no

doubt that the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department. The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary. NOTE: While nine (9) justices voted to allow the President to appoint the Chief Justice during the prohibited period, only five (5) justices voted to reverse IN RE VALENZUELA & IN RE: JUDGE VALLARTA. As such, the President is not allowed to make any other appointments in the judiciary during said period, except the Chief Justice. IS THE APPOINTMENT OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE MADE AS AN EXCEPTION IN SECTION 15, ART. VII? Whether the COMELEC EN BANC may directly review the Decision of RTC in connection with the election of a Municipal Mayor with a division of the COMELEC first deciding the same. SANDRA ERIGUEL VS. COMELEC and MA. THERESA DUMPITMICHELENA, G.R. No. 190526, February 26, 2010 ISSUES: May a division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) elevate an appeal to the Commission en banc without first resolving it for lack of quorum because other members inhibited themselves? And in connection with the said appeal, may the COMELEC en banc legally proceed with a fresh appreciation of the contested ballots without first ascertaining that the same have been kept inviolate? FACTS: Petitioner Sandra Eriguel (Eriguel) and private respondent Ma. Theresa Dumpit-Michelena (Dumpit) were mayoralty candidates in Agoo, La Union during the May 14, 2007 elections. On May 18, 2007, after the canvassing and counting of votes, Eriguel was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor of the Municipality of Agoo. Eriguel received 11,803 votes against Dumpit’s 7,899 votes, translating to a margin of 3,904 votes. On May 28, 2007, Dumpit filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/190526.htm" \l "_ftn2" \o "" before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Agoo, La Union contesting the appreciation and counting of ballots in 152 precincts in Agoo. Dumpit alleged that some of the ballots cast in favor of Eriguel were erroneously counted and appreciated in the latter’s favor despite containing markings and identical symbols. Dumpit also alleged that while a number of ballots containing Eriguel’s name were written by only one (1) person, the same were still counted in the latter’s favor. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/190526.htm" \l "_ftn3" \o "" Preliminary conference was then conducted on June 15, 2007. Revision of ballots followed shortly thereafter and was completed on July 18, 2007. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/190526.htm" \l "_ftn5" \o "" The results of the revision showed that Eriguel had 11,678 votes against Dumpit’s 7,839 votes, or a lead of 3,839

votes. On Dumpit’s motion, the RTC conducted a technical examination of the ballots. Senior Document Examiner Antonio Magbojos of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Questioned Documents Division conducted the technical examination for Dumpit, while Chief Inspector Jose Wacangan of the Regional Crime Laboratory Office No.1 of the Philippine National Police (PNP) conducted the examination for Eriguel. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/190526.htm" \l "_ftn6" \o "" Eight (8) other witnesses for Dumpit also testified during the trial. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/190526.htm" \l "_ftn7" \o "" On December 7, 2007, the trial court issued a decision upholding Eriguel’s proclamation. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/190526.htm" \l "_ftn8" \o "" Unsatisfied with the findings, Dumpit appealed to the COMELEC. The case was docketed as EAC No. A-01-2008, and was initially assigned to the Special Second Division composed of Presiding Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento and Commissioner Nicodemo T. Ferrer. Commissioner Ferrer, however, decided to inhibit himself. This prompted Presiding Commissioner Sarmiento to issue an Order dated July 22, 2009 elevating the appeal to the Commission en banc. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/190526.htm" \l "_ftn10" \o "" The transfer of the case to the Commission en banc was apparently made pursuant to Section 5(b), Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which states, SEC. 5. Quorum; Votes Required. – (a) x x x (b) When sitting in Divisions, two (2) Members of a Division shall constitute a quorum to transact business. The concurrence of at least two (2) Members of a Division shall be necessary to reach a decision, resolution, order or ruling. If this required number is not obtained, the case shall be automatically elevated to the Commission en banc for decision or resolution. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/190526.htm" \l "_ftn11" \o "" Thereafter, the Commission en banc proceeded to conduct a fresh appreciation of the contested ballots. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/190526.htm" \l "_ftn12" \o "" On December 9, 2009, after an exhaustive appreciation of all the contested ballots, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/190526.htm" \l "_ftn13" \o "" the Commission en banc promulgated a resolution nullifying 3,711 ballots cast in favor of Eriguel after finding the same to have been written by only one (1) or two (2) persons. The following figures were thus derived: HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/190526.htm" \l "_ftn14" \o "" Dumpit

Eriguel

Total number of votes per 7,839 physical count after revision

11,678

ADD claimed/credited ballots 35

41

LESS ballots INVALIDATED 14 after appreciation

4,026

Total No. of votes AFTER Comelec appreciation

7,693

7,860

On this note, the Commission en banc set aside the RTC’s decision and declared Dumpit as the duly elected mayor of Agoo, La Union, for having garnered 167 more votes than Eriguel. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/190526.htm" \l "_ftn15" \o "" HELD: Eriguel essentially raises the following two issues: (1) procedurally, whether the Special Second Division of the COMELEC gravely abused its authority when it automatically elevated Dumpit’s appeal to the Commission en banc after only one commissioner was left to deal with the case; and (2) substantively, whether the COMELEC en banc’s fresh appreciation of the contested ballots without first ascertaining the integrity thereof violated the doctrine enunciated in Rosal v. Commission on Elections. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/190526.htm" \l "_ftn16" \o "" The petition meritorious. I. The COMELEC, in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions, is bound to follow the provision set forth in Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, which reads: SEC. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/190526.htm" \l "_ftn17" \o "" It therefore follows that when the COMELEC is exercising its quasi-judicial powers such as in the present case, the Commission is constitutionally mandated to decide the case first in division, and en banc only upon motion for reconsideration. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/190526.htm" \l "_ftn18" \o "" . This being so, the Special Second Division of the COMELEC clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion when it immediately transferred to the Commission en banc a case that ought to be heard and decided by a division. Such action cannot be done without running afoul of Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution. Instead of peremptorily transferring the case to the Commission en banc, the Special Second Division of COMELEC, should have instead assigned another Commissioner as additional member of its Special Second Division, not only to fill in the seat temporarily vacated by Commissioner Ferrer, but more importantly so that the required quorum may be attained. While the Local Government Code allows local government units to sue and be sued, a party suing such LGU may not attach its properties during the trial of the case. It is a waiver of immunity from suit but not a waiver of liability. THE MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY, BULACAN VS. HON. SIMEON DUMDUM, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 7, Cebu City et al., GR No. 168289, March 22, 2010 The case stems from a Complaint HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/march2010/168289.htm" \l "_ftn5" \o "" filed by herein private respondent Emily Rose Go Ko Lim Chao against herein petitioners, the Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan and its chief executive, Felix V. Ople (Ople) for collection of a sum of money and

damages. It was alleged that sometime in the middle of the year 2000, respondent, doing business as KD Surplus and as such engaged in buying and selling surplus trucks, heavy equipment, machinery, spare parts and related supplies, was contacted by petitioner Ople. Respondent had entered into an agreement with petitioner municipality through Ople for the delivery of motor vehicles, which supposedly were needed to carry out certain developmental undertakings in the municipality. Respondent claimed that because of Ople’s earnest representation that funds had already been allocated for the project, she agreed to deliver from her principal place of business in Cebu City twenty-one motor vehicles whose value totaled P5,820,000.00. However, despite having made several deliveries, Ople allegedly did not heed respondent’s claim for payment. As of the filing of the complaint, the total obligation of petitioner had already totaled P10,026,060.13 exclusive of penalties and damages. Thus, respondent prayed for full payment of the said amount, with interest at not less than 2% per month, plus P500,000.00 as damages for business losses, P500,000.00 as exemplary damages, attorney’s fees of P100,000.00 and the costs of the suit. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dissolve and/or Discharge the Writ of Preliminary Attachment already issued, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/march2010/168289.htm" \l "_ftn12" \o "" [1] invoking immunity of the state from suit, and [2] enforceability of the contract. On October 20, 2003, the trial court issued an Order HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/march2010/168289.htm" \l "_ftn14" \o "" denying the two motions. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but they were denied in an Order HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/march2010/168289.htm" \l "_ftn15" \o "" dated December 29, 2003. On February 13, 2003, the trial court issued an Order HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/march2010/168289.htm" \l "_ftn7" \o "" granting respondent’s prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment conditioned upon the posting of a bond equivalent to the amount of the claim. On March 20, 2003, the trial court issued the Writ of Preliminary Attachment HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/march2010/168289.htm" \l "_ftn8" \o "" directing the sheriff “to attach the estate, real and personal properties” of petitioners. ISSUES: May local government units validly invoke “state immunity from suit” in the present case? Was the trial court correct in issuing a writ of preliminary attachment against the properties of petitioner local government? HELD: Petitioners, , posit that as a municipal corporation, the Municipality of Hagonoy is immune from suit, and that its properties are by law exempt from execution and garnishment. Private respondent, for her part, counters that, contrary to petitioners’ claim, she has amply discussed the basis for the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment in her affidavit; and that petitioners’ claim of immunity from suit is negated by Section 22 of the Local Government Code, which vests municipal corporations with the power to sue and be sued. The general rule spelled out in Section 3, Article XVI of the Constitution is that the state and its political subdivisions may not be sued without their consent. Otherwise put, they are open to suit but only when they consent to it. Consent is implied when the government enters into a business contract, as it then descends to the level of the other contracting party; or it may be embodied in a general or special law HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/march2010/168289.htm" \l "_ftn34" \o "" such as that found in Book I, Title I, Chapter 2, Section 22 of the Local Government Code of 1991, which vests local government units with certain corporate powers —one of them is the power to sue and be sued. With this in mind, the Court holds that the writ of preliminary attachment must be dissolved

and, indeed, it must not have been issued in the very first place. While there is merit in private respondent’s position that she, by affidavit, was able to substantiate the allegation of fraud in the same way that the fraud attributable to petitioners was sufficiently alleged in the complaint and, hence, the issuance of the writ would have been justified. Still, the writ of attachment in this case would only prove to be useless and unnecessary under the premises, since the property of the municipality may not, in the event that respondent’s claim is validated, be subjected to writs of execution and garnishment — unless, of course, there has been a corresponding appropriation provided by law. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/march2010/168289.htm" \l "_ftn40" \o "" Grounds for refusal and/or cancellation of party list groups. ANTONIO D. DAYAO, et al vs. COMELEC AND LPGMA, G.R. No. 193643, G.R. No. 193704, January 29, 2013 The Facts The individual petitioners are dealers of different brands of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) while petitioner FPII is an association comprised of entities engaged in various industries in the country. Private respondent LPGMA is a non-stock, non-profit association of consumers and small industry players in the LPG and energy sector who have banded together in order to pursue their common objective of providing quality, safe and reasonably priced gas and oil products. The group advocates access to reasonably priced LPG by household consumers. On May 21, 2009, LPGMA sought to advance its cause by seeking party-list accreditation with the COMELEC, through a petition for registration as a sectoral organization for the purpose of participating in the May 10, 2010 elections under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act. LPGMA claimed that it has special interest in the LPG industry and other allied concerns. It averred that one of its programs is the promotion of fair trade practices and prevention of re-entry of cartels and monopolies by actively pursuing the initial gains of oil deregulation, and vigilant advocacy for the curtailment of bureaucratic and regulatory procedures and governmental practices detrimental to the entry, development and well-being of small LPG entrepreneurs. After the requisite publication, verification and hearing,9 and without any apparent opposition, LPGMA’s petition was approved by the COMELEC in its Resolution dated January 5, 2010. Four (4) months thereafter, individual petitioners lodged before the COMELEC a complaint for the cancellation of LPGMA’s registration as a party-list organization. They were later on joined by FPII as a complainant-in-intervention. The complaint was docketed as SPP No. 10-010 and it proffered in essence that LPGMA does not represent a marginalized sector of the society because its incorporators, officers and members are not marginalized or underrepresented citizens since they are actually marketers and independent refillers of LPG that control 45% of the national LPG retail market and have significant ownership interests in various LPG refilling plants. To buttress the complaint, FPII emphasized that the business of marketing and refilling LPG requires substantial working capital as it involves the purchase of LPG from importers or big oil players in the country, establishment of refilling plants and safety auxiliary equipments, purchase or lease of thousands of LPG containers, mobilization of a marketing, distribution and delivery network. FPII also alleged that LPGMA is a mere lobby group that espouses their own interests before the Congress and the Department of Energy. In response, LPGMA countered that Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution does not require that party-list representatives must be members of the marginalized and/or underrepresented

sector of the society. It also averred that the ground cited by the petitioners is not one of those mentioned in Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 and that petitioners are just trying to resurrect their lost chance to oppose the petition for registration. In its first assailed Resolution dated August 5, 2010,14 the COMELEC dismissed the complaint for two reasons. First, the ground for cancellation cited by the petitioners is not among the exclusive enumeration in Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941. Second, the complaint is actually a belated opposition to LPGMA’s petition for registration which has long been approved with finality on January 5, 2010. The ruling was reiterated in the COMELEC Resolution dated September 6, 201015 denying the petitioners’ motions for reconsideration. Pivotal to the said resolutions are the ensuing ratiocinations of the COMELEC, viz: LPGMA’s registration was approved x x x as early as 05 January 2010. Instead of opposing said registration or intervening therein after having been constructively notified thereof by its publication, [petitioners] waited almost four (4) entire months before filing the instant complaint. The purpose of publication in these kinds of cases is similar to that of land registration cases, which is “to apprise the whole world that such a petition has been filed and that whoever is minded to oppose it for good cause may do so.” This belated filing x x x is an unfortunate attempt to circumvent the obviously final and executory nature of the Resolution dated 05 January 2010. Granting the present complaint will only reward [petitioners’] inaction x x x. The [petitioners] must be reminded that the matter has already been ruled upon. In the Resolution promulgated on January 5, 2010 x x x, this Commission (First Division) has resolved to grant the Petition for Registration of LPGMA as a sectoral organization under the party-list system of representation. After a thorough evaluation of the Petition, the Commission (First Division) has concluded that LPGMA truly represents a marginalized and underrepresented sector. With respect to the said conclusion, absent any circumstance subsequent to the promulgation of the mentioned Resolution which would call for the cancellation of registration of LPGMA, the same can no longer be disturbed by this Commission. To warrant a cancellation of LPGMA’s registration, there should be a strong showing that there has been a change in the relevant factual matters surrounding the Petition x x x. Ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the COMELEC, the petitioners now implore the Court to determine the correctness of the COMELEC resolutions dated August 5, 2010 and September 6, 2010. Held: There was no valid justification for the dismissal of the complaint for cancellation. However, in light of COMELEC Resolution dated December 13, 2012, the present petitions ought to be dismissed. Section 6, R.A. No. 7941 lays down the grounds and procedure for the cancellation of party-list accreditation, viz:

Sec. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may, motu propio or upon verified complaint of bany interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds: (1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious purposes; (2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal; (3) It is a foreign party or organization; (4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes; (5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections; (6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition; (7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or (8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency bin which it has registered. For the COMELEC to validly exercise its statutory power to cancel the registration of a partylist group, the law imposes only two (2) conditions: (1) due notice and hearing is afforded to the partylist group concerned; and (2) any of the enumerated grounds for disqualification in Section 6 exists. Section 6 clearly does not require that an opposition to the petition for registration be previously interposed so that a complaint for cancellation can be entertained. Since the law does not impose such a condition, the COMELEC, notwithstanding its delegated administrative authority to promulgate rules for the implementation of election laws, cannot read into the law that which it does not provide. The poll body is mandated to enforce and administer election-related laws. It has no power to contravene or amend them. Moreover, an opposition can be reasonably expected only during the petition for registration proceedings which involve the COMELEC’s power to register a party-list group, as distinguished from the entirely separate power invoked by the complaint, which is the power to cancel. The distinctiveness of the two powers is immediately apparent from their basic definitions. To refuse is to decline or to turn down, while to cancel is to annul or remove. Adopting such meanings within the context of Section 6, refusal of registration happens during the inceptive stage when an organization seeks admission into the roster of COMELEC-registered party-list organizations through a petition for registration. Cancellation on the other hand, takes place after the fact of registration when an inquiry is done by the COMELEC, motu propio or upon a verified complaint, on whether a registered party-list organization still holds the qualifications imposed by law. Refusal is handed down to a petition for registration while cancellation is decreed on the registration itself after the petition has been approved. A resort to the rules of statutory construction yields a similar conclusion. The legal meaning of the term “and/or” between “refusal” and “cancellation” should be taken in its ordinary significance − “refusal and/or cancellation” means “refusal and cancellation” or “refusal or cancellation”. It has been held that the intention of the legislature in using the term “and/or” is that the word “and” and the word “or” are to be used interchangeably.

The term “and/or” means that effect shall be given to both the conjunctive “and” and the disjunctive “or” or that one word or the other may be taken accordingly as one or the other will best effectuate the purpose intended by the legislature as gathered from the whole statute. The term is used to avoid a construction which by the use of the disjunctive “or” alone will exclude the combination of several of the alternatives or by the use of the conjunctive “and” will exclude the efficacy of any one of the alternatives standing alone.27 However, the Resolution did not create in LPGMA’s favor a perpetual and indefeasible right to its accreditation as a party-list organization. Neither did it grant finality and indefeasibility to the factual findings of the COMELEC on the qualifications of the group. Both the accreditation and the facts substantiating the same, can be reviewed and revoked at any time by the COMELEC, motu propio, or upon the instance of any interested party thru a complaint for cancellation, as set forth in Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941. Each accreditation handed by the COMELEC to party-list organizations can be likened to the franchise granted by Congress, thru the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), to corporations or associations created under the Corporation Code. Franchise is a right or privilege conferred by law. It emanates from a sovereign power and the grant is inherently a legislative power. It may, however, be derived indirectly from the state through an agency to which the power has been clearly and validly delegated. In such cases, Congress prescribes the conditions on which the grant of a franchise may be made. The power to pass upon, refuse or deny the application for registration of any corporation or partnership is vested with the SEC by virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 902-A. R.A. No 7941, on the other hand, is the legislative act that delegates to the COMELEC the power to grant franchises in the form of accreditation to people’s organization desirous of participating in the party-list system of representation. Corporations formed under the Corporation Code become juridical entities only when they are granted registration by the SEC in the same way that people’s organizations obtain legal existence as a party-list group only upon their accreditation with the COMELEC. A party-list organization, like a corporation, owes its legal existence to the concession of its franchise from the State, thru the COMELEC. Being a mere concession, it may be revoked by the granting authority upon the existence of certain conditions. The power to revoke and grounds for revocation are aptly provided in Section 6(1) of P.D. No. 902-A, for corporations and Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 for party-list organizations. The fact that a franchise/accreditation may be revoked means that it can never be final and conclusive. A fortiori, the factual findings leading to the grant of the franchise/accreditation can never attain finality as well. Both the accreditation and the facts substantiating it can never attain perpetual and irrefutable conclusiveness as against the power that grants it. The allegation in the complaint for cancellation, that the incorporators, officers and members of LPGMA do not belong to the marginalized or underrepresented sector, is within the ambit of paragraph 5 of Section 6. In Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, the Court explained that the “laws, rules or regulations relating to elections” referred to in paragraph 5 include Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941,37 which declares the underlying policy for the law that marginalized and underrepresented Filipino citizens become members of the House of Representatives. Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or group for violation of or failure to comply with election laws and regulations. These laws include Section 2 of RA 7941, which states that a party or an organization, therefore, that does not comply with this policy must be disqualified.

The party-list system of representation was crafted for the marginalized and underrepresented and their alleviation is the ultimate policy of the law. In fact, there is no need to categorically mention that “those who are not marginalized and underrepresented are disqualified.” As state policy, it must permeate every discussion of the qualification of political parties and other organizations under the party-list system.39 All told, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint for cancellation of LPGMA’s party-list accreditation. In the ordinary course of procedure, the herein complaint should be remanded to the COMELEC considering that the poll body did not proceed to make a proximate determination of the present circumstances of LPGMA’s qualifications. In view, however of superseding incidents, the issue involved in the complaint for cancellation can be deemed to have been already settled and a remand to the COMELEC would only be circuitous and dilatory. On August 2, 2012, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 951340 which subjected to summary evidentiary hearings all existing and registered party-list groups, including LPGMA, to assess their continuing compliance with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and the guidelines set in Ang Bagong Bayani. The Resolution stated, among others, that the registration of all non-compliant groups shall be cancelled. LPGMA submitted to a factual and evidentiary hearing before the COMELEC en banc on August 28, 2012. On December 13, 2012, the COMELEC issued a Resolution identifying and listing the party-list groups found to have complied with the qualifications set by law and jurisprudence. The list of retained party-list groups included LPGMA. Evidently, the COMELEC has already determined and declared that the present factual circumstances of LPGMA meet the qualifications imposed by law on party-list groups. It will be a needless roundabout to still remand the complaint to the COMELEC for it to determine anew the present state of LPGMA's qualifications. No useful purpose will be served thereby and it will just be a tedious process of hearing the factual and evidentiary matters of LPGMA's qualifications again. The COMELEC in its Resolution dated December 13, 2012 has passed upon the issue and all other relevant questions raised in the complaint. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the consolidated petitions are hereby DISMISSED---for being moot and academic. Personality to sue; case is moot and academic ALAN PAGUIA VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AND HILARIO DAVIDE, JR., G.R. No. 176278, June 25, 2010 CARPIO, J.: ISSUE: May Congress validly limit the President’s prerogative to nominate ambassadors by legislating age qualifications despite the constitutional rule limiting Congress’ role in the appointment of ambassadors to the Commission on Appointments’ confirmation of nominees. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/june2010/176278.htm" \l "_ftn1" \o "" Does the petitioner has the personality to sue? Shall the SC dismiss the petition on said ground and defers another day the resolution of the question raised, novel and fundamental it may be? Petitioner Alan F. Paguia, as citizen and taxpayer, filed this original action for the writ of certiorari to invalidate President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s nomination of respondent former Chief

Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (respondent Davide) as Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) for violation of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7157 (RA 7157), the Philippine Foreign Service Act of 1991. Petitioner argues that respondent Davide’s age at that time of his nomination in March 2006, 70, disqualifies him from holding his post. Petitioner grounds his argument on Section 23 of RA 7157 pegging the mandatory retirement age of all officers and employees of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) at 65. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/june2010/176278.htm" \l "_ftn3" \o "" Petitioner theorizes that Section 23 imposes an absolute rule for all DFA employees, career or non-career; thus, respondent Davide’s entry into the DFA ranks discriminates against the rest of the DFA officials and employees. In their separate Comments, respondent Davide, the Office of the President, and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (respondents) raise threshold issues against the petition. First, they question petitioner’s standing to bring this suit because of his indefinite suspension from the practice of law. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/june2010/176278.htm" \l "_ftn4" \o "" Second, the Office of the President and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (public respondents) argue that neither petitioner’s citizenship nor his taxpayer status vests him with standing to question respondent Davide’s appointment because petitioner remains without personal and substantial interest in the outcome of a suit which does not involve the taxing power of the state or the illegal disbursement of public funds. Third, public respondents question the propriety of this petition, contending that this suit is in truth a petition for quo warranto which can only be filed by a contender for the office in question. Held: The petition presents no case or controversy for petitioner’s lack of capacity to sue and mootness. First. Petitioner’s citizenship and taxpayer status do not clothe him with standing to bring this suit. We have granted access to citizen’s suits on the narrowest of ground: when they raise issues of “transcendental” importance calling for urgent resolution. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/june2010/176278.htm" \l "_ftn5" \o "" Three factors are relevant in our determination to allow third party suits so we can reach and resolve the merits of the crucial issues raised – the character of funds or assets involved in the controversy, a clear disregard of constitutional or statutory prohibition, and the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest to bring the suit. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/june2010/176278.htm" \l "_ftn6" \o "" None of petitioner’s allegations comes close to any of these parameters. The same conclusion holds true for petitioner’s invocation of his taxpayer status. Taxpayers’ contributions to the state’s coffers entitle them to question appropriations for expenditures which are claimed to be unconstitutional or illegal. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/june2010/176278.htm" \l "_ftn7" \o "" However, the salaries and benefits respondent Davide received commensurate to his diplomatic rank are fixed by law and other executive issuances, the funding for which was included in the appropriations for the DFA’s total expenditures contained in the annual budgets Congress passed since respondent Davide’s nomination. Having assumed office under color of authority (appointment), respondent Davide is at least a de facto officer entitled to draw salary, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/june2010/176278.htm" \l "_ftn8" \o "" negating petitioner’s claim of “illegal expenditure of scarce public funds.” HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/june2010/176278.htm" \l "_ftn9" \o "" A supervening event has rendered this case academic and the relief prayed for moot. Respondent Davide resigned his post at the UN on 1 April 2010. 10

Power of control of the President over offices under the executive department; power to undertake “reorganization”. ATTY. SYLVIA BANDA ET AL VS. ERMITA, G.R. No. 1666620, April 20, 2010 The National Press Office was formed on July 25, 1987, during the term of former President Corazon C. Aquino (President Aquino), by virtue of Executive Order No. 285 HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/166620.htm" \l "_ftn2" \o "" which provided, among others, the creation of the NPO from the merger of the Government Printing Office and the relevant printing units of the Philippine Information Agency (PIA). On October 25, 2004, President Arroyo issued the herein assailed Executive Order No. 378, amending Section 6 of Executive Order No. 285 by, inter alia, removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO over the printing services requirements of government agencies and instrumentalities. The pertinent portions of Executive Order No. 378, in turn, provide: SECTION 1. The NPO shall continue to provide printing services to government agencies and instrumentalities as mandated by law. However, it shall no longer enjoy exclusive jurisdiction over the printing services requirements of the government over standard and accountable forms. It shall have to compete with the private sector, except in the printing of election paraphernalia which could be shared with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, upon the discretion of the Commission on Elections consistent with the provisions of the Election Code of 1987. Pursuant to Executive Order No. 378, government agencies and instrumentalities are allowed to source their printing services from the private sector through competitive bidding, subject to the condition that the services offered by the private supplier be of superior quality and lower in cost compared to what was offered by the NPO. Executive Order No. 378 also limited NPO’s appropriation in the General Appropriations Act to its income. Perceiving Executive Order No. 378 as a threat to their security of tenure as employees of the NPO, petitioners now challenge its constitutionality, contending that: (1) it is beyond the executive powers of President Arroyo to amend or repeal Executive Order No. 285 issued by former President Aquino when the latter still exercised legislative powers; and (2) Executive Order No. 378 violates petitioners’ security of tenure, because it paves the way for the gradual abolition of the NPO. HELD: As to the merits of the case, the petition raises two main grounds to assail the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 378: First, it is contended that President Arroyo cannot amend or repeal Executive Order No. 285 by the mere issuance of another executive order (Executive Order No. 378). Petitioners maintain that former President Aquino’s Executive Order No. 285 is a legislative enactment, as the same was issued while President Aquino still had legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution; HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/166620.htm" \l "_ftn12" \o "" thus, only Congress through legislation can validly amend Executive Order No. 285. Second, petitioners maintain that the issuance of Executive Order No. 378 would lead to the eventual abolition of the NPO and would violate the security of tenure of NPO employees. Anent the first ground raised in the petition, we find the same patently without merit. It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with the President’s constitutionally granted power of control over executive offices and by virtue of previous delegation of the

legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes. In Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/166620.htm" \l "_ftn13" \o "" the Court pointed out that Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 gives the President continuing authority to reorganize and redefine the functions of the Office of the President. Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of the said Code, is explicit: Sec. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office. – The President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he may take any of the following actions: (1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the immediate Offices, the President Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another; (2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from other Departments and Agencies; and (3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other Departments or agencies. (Emphases ours.) The Constitution’s express grant of the power of control in the President justifies an executive action to carry out reorganization measures under a broad authority of law. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/august2007/166052.htm" \l "_ftn26" \o "" In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to have deliberated with full knowledge of all existing laws and jurisprudence on the subject. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/august2007/166052.htm" \l "_ftn27" \o "" It is thus reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute which places an agency under the Office of the President, it was in accordance with existing laws and jurisprudence on the President’s power to reorganize. In establishing an executive department, bureau or office, the legislature necessarily ordains an executive agency’s position in the scheme of administrative structure. Such determination is primary, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/august2007/166052.htm" \l "_ftn28" \o "" but subject to the President’s continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure. As far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are concerned, the power of control may justify the President to deactivate the functions of a particular office. Or a law may expressly grant the President the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/august2007/166052.htm" \l "_ftn29" \o "" The Administrative Code of 1987 is one such law. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/166620.htm" \l "_ftn27" \o "" The issuance of Executive Order No. 378 by President Arroyo is an exercise of a delegated legislative power granted by the aforementioned Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987, which provides for the continuing authority of the President to reorganize

the Office of the President, “in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.” This brings us to the second ground raised in the petition – that Executive Order No. 378, in allowing government agencies to secure their printing requirements from the private sector and in limiting the budget of the NPO to its income, will purportedly lead to the gradual abolition of the NPO and the loss of security of tenure of its present employees. In other words, petitioners avow that the reorganization of the NPO under Executive Order No. 378 is tainted with bad faith. The basic evidentiary rule is that he who asserts a fact or the affirmative of an issue has the burden of proving it. Security of tenure of probationary government employee; due process CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION VS. GREGORIO MAGNAYE, JR., G.R. No. 183337, April 23, 2010 FACTS: In March 2001, Mayor Roman H. Rosales of Lemery, Batangas, appointed Magnaye as Utility Worker I at the Office of Economic Enterprise [Operation of Market] (OEE). After a few days, Mayor Rosales detailed him to the Municipal Planning and Development Office. In the May elections of that year, Mayor Rosales was defeated by Raul L. Bendaña, who assumed office on June 30, 2001. Thereafter, Magnaye was returned to his original assignment at the OEE. On July 11, 2001, Bendaña also placed him on detail at the Municipal Planning and Development Office to assist in the implementation of a Survey on the Integrated Rural Accessibility Planning Project. On August 13, 2001, the new mayor served him a notice of termination from employment effective the following day for unsatisfactory conduct and want of capacity. Magnaye questioned his termination before the CSC head office on the ground that Mayor Bendaña was not in a position to effectively evaluate his performance because it was made less than one and one-half months after his (Mayor Bendaña’s) assumption to office. He added that his termination was without basis and was politically motivated The CSCRO-IV dismissed Magnaye’s complaint for lack of merit. It upheld his dismissal from the service on the ground that Mayor Bendaña’s own assessment, together with the evaluation made by his supervisors, constituted sufficient and reasonable grounds for his termination. Magnaye sought recourse through a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, citing CSCRO-IV’s alleged errors of fact and of law, non-observance of due process, and grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Adopting the stance of the Office of the Solicitor General, the CA ruled in Magnaye’s favor, mainly on the ground that he was denied due process since he was not informed of what constituted the alleged unsatisfactory conduct and want of capacity that led to his termination. THE ISSUES In this petition, the Civil Service Commission submits the following for our consideration: “I. The dropping of respondent from the rolls of the local government unit of Lemery, Batangas was in accord with Civil Service Law, rules and jurisprudence. II. The respondent resorted to a wrong mode of appeal and violated the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies and the corollary doctrine of primary jurisdiction.” The principal issue, therefore, is whether or not the termination of Magnaye was in accordance with the pertinent laws and the rules.

The eligibility of respondent Magnaye has not been put in issue. THE COURT’S RULING The Court upholds the decision of the Court of Appeals. The CSC, in arguing that Magnaye’s termination was in accord with the Civil Service law, cited Section 4(a), Rule II of the 1998 CSC Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions which provides that: Sec. 4. Nature of appointment. The nature of appointment shall be as follows: a. Original – refers to the initial entry into the career service of persons who meet all the requirements of the position. xxx It is understood that the first six months of the service following an original appointment will be probationary in nature and the appointee shall undergo a thorough character investigation. A probationer may be dropped from the service for unsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity anytime before the expiration of the probationary period. Provided that such action is appealable to the Commission. However, if no notice of termination for unsatisfactory conduct is given by the appointing authority to the employee before the expiration of the six-month probationary period, the appointment automatically becomes permanent. Under Civil Service rules, the first six months of service following a permanent appointment shall be probationary in nature, and the probationer may be dropped from the service for unsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity anytime before the expiration of the probationary period. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/183337.htm" \l "_ftn5" \o "" The CSC is of the position that a civil service employee does not enjoy security of tenure during his 6month probationary period. It submits that an employee’s security of tenure starts only after the probationary period. Specifically, it argued that “an appointee under an original appointment cannot lawfully invoke right to security of tenure until after the expiration of such period and provided that the appointee has not been notified of the termination of service or found unsatisfactory conduct before the expiration of the same.” HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/183337.htm" \l "_ftn6" \o "" The CSC position is contrary to the Constitution and the Civil Service Law itself. Section 3 (2) Article 13 of the Constitution guarantees the rights of all workers not just in terms of self-organization, collective bargaining, peaceful concerted activities, the right to strike with qualifications, humane conditions of work and a living wage but also to security of tenure, and Section 2(3), Article IX-B is emphatic in saying that, "no officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law." Consistently, Section 46 (a) of the Civil Service Law provides that “no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law after due process.” Our Constitution, in using the expressions “all workers” and “no officer or employee,” puts no distinction between a probationary and a permanent or regular employee which means that both probationary and permanent employees enjoy security of tenure. Probationary employees enjoy security of tenure in the sense that during their probationary employment, they cannot be dismissed except for cause or for failure to qualify as regular employees. This was clearly stressed in the case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Rowena Paden, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/183337.htm" \l "_ftn7" \o "" where it was

written: To put the case in its proper perspective, we begin with a discussion on the respondent's right to security of tenure. Article IX (B), Section 2(3) of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides that "[n]o officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law." At the outset, we emphasize that the aforementioned constitutional provision does not distinguish between a regular employee and a probationary employee. In the recent case of Daza v. Lugo HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/183337.htm" \l "_ftn8" \o "" we ruled that: The Constitution provides that "[N]o officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law." Sec. 26, par. 1, Chapter 5, Book V, Title I-A of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 states: All such persons (appointees who meet all the requirements of the position) must serve a probationary period of six months following their original appointment and shall undergo a thorough character investigation in order to acquire permanent civil service status. A probationer may be dropped from the service for unsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity any time before the expiration of the probationary period; Provided, That such action is appealable to the Commission. Thus, the services of respondent as a probationary employee may only be terminated for a just cause, that is, unsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity. [Emphasis supplied] x x x. X x x the only difference between regular and probationary employees from the perspective of due process is that the latter's termination can be based on the wider ground of failure to comply with standards made known to them when they became probationary employees.” The constitutional and statutory guarantee of security of tenure is extended to both those in the career and non-career service positions, and the cause under which an employee may be removed or suspended must naturally have some relation to the character or fitness of the officer or employee, for the discharge of the functions of his office, or expiration of the project for which the employment was extended. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/183337.htm" \l "_ftn9" \o "" Further, well-entrenched is the rule on security of tenure that such an appointment is issued and the moment the appointee assumes a position in the civil service under a completed appointment, he acquires a legal, not merely equitable right (to the position), which is protected not only by statute, but also by the Constitution [Article IX-B, Section 2, paragraph (3)] and cannot be taken away from him either by revocation of the appointment, or by removal, except for cause, and with previous notice and hearing. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/183337.htm" \l "_ftn10" \o ""

While the CSC contends that a probationary employee does not enjoy security of tenure, its Omnibus Rules recognizes that such an employee cannot be terminated except for cause. Note that in the Omnibus Rules it cited, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/183337.htm" \l "_ftn11" \o "" a decision or order dropping a probationer from the service for unsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity anytime before the expiration of the probationary period “is appealable to the Commission.” This can only mean that a probationary employee cannot be fired at will. While unsatisfactory conduct and want of capacity are valid causes that may be invoked for dismissal from the service, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/183337.htm" \l "_ftn16" \o "" the CA observed that the Memorandum issued by Mayor Bendaña terminating Magnaye’s employment did not specify the acts constituting his want of capacity and unsatisfactory conduct. It merely stated that the character investigation conducted during his probationary period showed that his employment “need not be necessary to be permanent in status.” HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/183337.htm" \l "_ftn17" \o "" Specifically, the notice of termination partly reads: You are hereby notified that your service as Utility Worker I, this municipality under six (6) month probationary period, is considered terminated for unsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity, effective August 14, 2001. You are further notified that after a thorough character investigation made during your such probationary period under my administration, your appointment for employment need not be necessary to be automatically permanent in status. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/183337.htm" \l "_ftn18" \o "" This notice indisputably lacks the details of Magnaye’s unsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity. Section VI, 2.2(b) of the Omnibus Guidelines on Appointments and other Personnel Actions (CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38, Series of 1993, as amended by CSC Memorandum Circular No. 12, Series of 1994), provides: 2.2. Unsatisfactory or Poor Performance xxx b. An official who, for one evaluation period, is rated poor in performance, may be dropped from the rolls after due notice. Due notice shall mean that the officer or employee is informed in writing of the status of his performance not later than the fourth month of that rating period with sufficient warning that failure to improve his performance within the remaining period of the semester shall warrant his separation from the service. Such notice shall also contain sufficient information which shall enable the employee to prepare an explanation. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied] Magnaye asserts that no performance evaluation was made between March 2001 when he was hired by Mayor Rosales until August 14, 2001 when his services were terminated by Mayor Bendaña. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/183337.htm" \l "_ftn19" \o "" It was only on July 29, 2003, at Mayor Bendaña’s behest, that his two supervisors prepared and submitted the evaluation report after the CSCRO-IV directed him to file an answer to

Magnaye’s appeal. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/183337.htm" \l "_ftn20" \o "" This has not been rebutted. It being not disputed, it was an error on the part of the CSCRO-IV to rely on such belated performance appraisal. Common sense dictates that the evaluation report, submitted only in 2003, could not have been the basis for Magnaye’s termination. Besides, Mayor Bendaña’s own assessment of Magnaye’s performance could not have served as a sufficient basis to dismiss him because said mayor was not his immediate superior and did not have daily contacts with him. Additionally, Mayor Bendaña terminated his employment less than one and one-half months after his assumption to office. This is clearly a short period within which to assess his performance. In the case of Miranda v. Carreon, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/183337.htm" \l "_ftn21" \o "" it was stated: The 1987 Constitution provides that “no officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.” Under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, a government officer or employee may be removed from the service on two (2) grounds: (1) unsatisfactory conduct and (2) want of capacity. While the Code does not define and delineate the concepts of these two grounds, however, the Civil Service Law (Presidential Decree No. 807, as amended) provides specific grounds for dismissing a government officer or employee from the service. Among these grounds are inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties. In the case at bar, respondents were dismissed on the ground of poor performance. Poor performance falls within the concept of inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties which, as earlier mentioned, are grounds for dismissing a government official or employee from the service. But inefficiency or incompetence can only be determined after the passage of sufficient time, hence, the probationary period of six (6) months for the respondents. Indeed, to be able to gauge whether a subordinate is inefficient or incompetent requires enough time on the part of his immediate superior within which to observe his performance. This condition, however, was not observed in this case. x x x. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied] The CSC is the central personnel agency of the government exercising quasi-judicial functions. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/183337.htm" \l "_ftn22" \o "" “In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.” HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/183337.htm" \l "_ftn23" \o "" The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when, on the basis of the evidence on record, there is reasonable ground to believe that the person terminated was evidently wanting in capacity and had unsatisfactory conduct. In this case, the evidence against Magnaye was woefully inadequate. Moreover, Magnaye was denied due process. We ruled in Tria v. Chairman Patricia Sto. Tomas HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/183337.htm" \l "_ftn24" \o "" that the prohibition in Article IX (B) (2) (3) of the Constitution against dismissal of a civil service officer or employee "except for cause provided by law" is a guaranty of both procedural and substantive due process. Procedural due process requires that the dismissal comes only after notice and hearing, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/183337.htm" \l "_ftn25" \o "" while substantive due process requires that the dismissal be “for cause.” HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/183337.htm" \l "_ftn26" \o "" Magnaye was denied procedural due process when he received his notice of termination only a day before he was dismissed from the service. Evidently, he was effectively deprived of the opportunity to defend himself from the charge that he lacked the capacity to do his work and that his conduct was unsatisfactory. As well, during his appeal to the CSCRO-IV, he was not furnished with

the submissions of Mayor Bendaña that he could have opposed. He was also denied substantive due process because he was dismissed from the service without a valid cause for lack of any factual or legal basis for his want of capacity and unsatisfactory conduct. Thus, we reject petitioner’s argument that the CA erred when it acted upon the erroneous remedy availed of by respondent when he filed a petition for review considering that the assailed decision is not in the nature of “awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions” as prescribed under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. While Sections 71 and 72 of Rule V (B) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/183337.htm" \l "_ftn27" \o "" provide for the remedy of an appeal from decisions of its regional offices to the Commission proper, Magnaye’s petition to the CA comes under the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The CA correctly cited Republic v. Lacap, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/183337.htm" \l "_ftn28" \o "" where a violation of due process is listed to be among the noted exceptions to the rule. As discussed above, Magnaye’s dismissal was tainted with irregularity because the notice given to him comes short of the notice contemplated by law and jurisprudence. The CA correctly exercised jurisdiction over this case where standards of due process had been patently breached. Having been illegally dismissed, Magnaye should be reinstated to his former position without loss of seniority and paid backwages and other monetary benefits from the time of his dismissal up to the time of his reinstatement. In our decision in Civil Service Commission v. Gentallan, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/183337.htm" \l "_ftn29" \o "" we ruled that for reasons of justice and fairness, an illegally dismissed government employee who is later ordered reinstated is entitled to backwages and other monetary benefits from the time of his illegal dismissal until his reinstatement because he is considered as not having left his office. Jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal to determine the qualifications of nominees of the party lists DARYL GRACE ABAYON VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, ET AL., AND JOVITO PALPARAN VS. HRET, ET AL., G.R. NO. 189466, FEBRUARY 11, 2010 These two cases are about the authority of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) to pass upon the eligibilities of the nominees of the party-list groups that won seats in the lower house of Congress. The Facts and the Case In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo partylist organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections. Respondents Perfecto C. Lucaban, Jr., Ronyl S. Dela Cruz, and Agustin C. Doroga, all registered voters, filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against Aangat Tayo and its nominee, petitioner Abayon, in HRET Case 07-041. They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Respondent Lucaban and the others with him further pointed out that petitioner Abayon herself was not qualified to sit in the House as a party-list nominee since she did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an incumbent congressional district representative. She moreover lost her bid as party-list representative of the party-list organization

called An Waray in the immediately preceding elections of May 10, 2004. Petitioner Abayon countered that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) had already confirmed the status of Aangat Tayo as a national multi-sectoral party-list organization representing the workers, women, youth, urban poor, and elderly and that she belonged to the women sector. Abayon also claimed that although she was the second nominee of An Waray party-list organization during the 2004 elections, she could not be regarded as having lost a bid for an elective office. Finally, petitioner Abayon pointed out that respondent HRET had no jurisdiction over the petition for quo warranto since respondent Lucaban and the others with him collaterally attacked the registration of Aangat Tayo as a party-list organization, a matter that fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and not Abayon who was just its nominee. All questions involving her eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns of Aangat Tayo. On July 16, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order, dismissing the petition as against Aangat Tayo but upholding its jurisdiction over the qualifications of petitioner Abayon. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189466.htm" \l "_ftn1" \o "" The latter moved for reconsideration but the HRET denied the same on September 17, 2009, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189466.htm" \l "_ftn2" \o "" prompting Abayon to file the present petition for special civil action of certiorari. In G.R. 189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list group that won a seat in the 2007 elections for the members of the House of Representatives. Respondents Reynaldo Lesaca, Jr., Cristina Palabay, Renato M. Reyes, Jr., Erlinda Cadapan, Antonio Flores, and Joselito Ustarez are members of some other party-list groups. Shortly after the elections, respondent Lesaca and the others with him filed with respondent HRET a petition for quo warranto against Bantay and its nominee, petitioner Palparan, in HRET Case 07-040. Lesaca and the others alleged that Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as party-list nominee because he did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented, namely, the victims of communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and security guards. Lesaca and the others said that Palparan committed gross human rights violations against marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations. Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed membership in the House of Representatives. Palparan claimed that he was just Bantay’s nominee. Consequently, any question involving his eligibility as first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such question must be brought, he said, before that party-list group, not before the HRET. On July 23, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order dismissing the petition against Bantay for the reason that the issue of the ineligibility or qualification of the party-list group fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC pursuant to the Party-List System Act. HRET, however, defended its jurisdiction over the question of petitioner Palparan’s qualifications. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189466.htm" \l "_ftn3" \o "" Palparan moved for reconsideration but the HRET denied it by a resolution dated September 10, 2009, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189466.htm" \l "_ftn4" \o "" hence, the recourse to this Court through this petition for special civil action of certiorari and prohibition. The Issue Presented The common issue presented in these two cases is: Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan as nominees of Aangat Tayo and Bantay party-list organizations, respectively, who took the seats at the House of Representatives that such organizations won in the

2007 elections. The Court’s Ruling Petitioners Abayon and Palparan have a common theory: Republic Act (R.A.) 7941, the PartyList System Act, vests in the COMELEC the authority to determine which parties or organizations have the qualifications to seek party-list seats in the House of Representatives during the elections. Indeed, the HRET dismissed the petitions for quo warranto filed with it insofar as they sought the disqualifications of Aangat Tayo and Bantay. Since petitioners Abayon and Palparan were not elected into office but were chosen by their respective organizations under their internal rules, the HRET has no jurisdiction to inquire into and adjudicate their qualifications as nominees. But, although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189466.htm" \l "_ftn5" \o "" identifies who the “members” of that House are: Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Underscoring supplied) Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: “members x x x who shall be elected from legislative districts” and “those who x x x shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.” This means that, from the Constitution’s point of view, it is the party-list representatives who are “elected” into office, not their parties or organizations. These representatives are elected, however, through that peculiar party-list system that the Constitution authorized and that Congress by law established where the voters cast their votes for the organizations or parties to which such party-list representatives belong. Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list representatives are treated in like manner. They have the same deliberative rights, salaries, and emoluments. They can participate in the making of laws that will directly benefit their legislative districts or sectors. They are also subject to the same term limitation of three years for a maximum of three consecutive terms. It may not be amiss to point out that the Party-List System Act itself recognizes party-list nominees as “members of the House of Representatives,” thus: Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible. (Underscoring supplied) As this Court also held in Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v. Commission on Elections, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189466.htm" \l "_ftn6" \o "" a

party-list representative is in every sense “an elected member of the House of Representatives.” Although the vote cast in a party-list election is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives. Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the qualifications and grounds for disqualification of party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A. 7941, echoing the Constitution, states: Sec. 9. Qualification of Party-List Nominees. – No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election. In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue until the expiration of his term. In the cases before the Court, those who challenged the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan claim that the two do not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that they ought to represent. The Party-List System Act provides that a nominee must be a “bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent.” HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189466.htm" \l "_ftn7" \o "" It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nominee—the need for him or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his party-list organization—in the context of the facts that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparan’s relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay, respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented interests that they presumably embody. Petitioners Abayon and Palparan of course point out that the authority to determine the qualifications of a party-list nominee belongs to the party or organization that nominated him. This is true, initially. The right to examine the fitness of aspiring nominees and, eventually, to choose five from among them after all belongs to the party or organization that nominates them. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189466.htm" \l "_ftn8" \o "" But where an allegation is made that the party or organization had chosen and allowed a disqualified nominee to become its party-list representative in the lower House and enjoy the secured tenure that goes with the position, the resolution of the dispute is taken out of its hand. What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189466.htm" \l "_ftn9" \o "" provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are “elected members” of the House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189466.htm" \l "_ftn10" \o "" The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.

Appointment of USEC Maria Elena Baustista of DOTC as OIC, Marina violates the constitutional prohibition on multiple positions of members of the cabinet and their deputies or assistants. DENNIS FUNA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010 VILLARAMA, JR., J.: This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, to declare as unconstitutional the designation of respondent Undersecretary Maria Elena H. Bautista as Officer-inCharge (OIC) of the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA). FACTS: On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista (Bautista) as Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), vice Agustin R. Bengzon. Bautista was designated as Undersecretary for Maritime Transport of the department under Special Order No. 2006-171 dated October 23, 2006. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/184740.htm" \l "_ftn2" \o "" On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/184740.htm" \l "_ftn3" \o "" On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the instant petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautista’s appointment/designation, which is proscribed by the prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to hold any other office or employment. On January 5, 2009, during the pendency of this petition, Bautista was appointed Administrator of the MARINA vice Vicente T. Suazo, Jr. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/184740.htm" \l "_ftn4" \o "" and she assumed her duties and responsibilities as such on February 2, 2009. ISSUE: HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/184740.htm" \l "_ftn5" \o "" Whether or not Bautista’s concurrent positions as DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA OIC is in violation of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. HELD: The petition is meritorious. On petitioner’s personality to sue as a mere taxpayer: The courts’ power of judicial review, like almost all other powers conferred by the Constitution, is

subject to several limitations, namely: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/184740.htm" \l "_ftn21" \o "" Respondents assert that the second requisite is absent in this case. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/184740.htm" \l "_ftn22" \o "" The question on standing is whether such parties have “alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/184740.htm" \l "_ftn23" \o "" In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/184740.htm" \l "_ftn24" \o "" summarizing the rules culled from jurisprudence, we held that taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met: (1)

cases involve constitutional issues;

(2)

for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;

(3)

for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question;

(4)

for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and

(5)

for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators. [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.]

Petitioner having alleged a grave violation of the constitutional prohibition against Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants holding two (2) or more positions in government, the fact that he filed this suit as a concerned citizen sufficiently confers him with standing to sue for redress of such illegal act by public officials. The other objection raised by the respondent is that the resolution of this case had been overtaken by events considering the effectivity of respondent Bautista’s appointment as MARINA Administrator effective February 2, 2009 and her relinquishment of her former position as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport. A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/184740.htm" \l "_ftn25" \o "" However, as we held in Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/184740.htm" \l "_ftn26" \o "" supervening

events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution. Even in cases where supervening events had made the cases moot, this Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar, and public. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/184740.htm" \l "_ftn27" \o "" Resolution of the present controversy hinges on the correct application of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides: SEC. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office. On the other hand, Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B reads: SEC. 7. x x x Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. In Civil Liberties Union, a constitutional challenge was brought before this Court to nullify EO No. 284 issued by then President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987, which included Members of the Cabinet, undersecretaries and assistant secretaries in its provisions limiting to two (2) the positions that appointive officials of the Executive Department may hold in government and government corporations. Interpreting the above provisions in the light of the history and times and the conditions and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed, this Court struck down as unconstitutional said executive issuance, saying that it actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself. Noting that the prohibition imposed on the President and his official family is all-embracing, the disqualification was held to be absolute, as the holding of “any other office” is not qualified by the phrase “in the Government” unlike in Section 13, Article VI prohibiting Senators and Members of the House of Representatives from holding “any other office or employment in the Government”; and when compared with other officials and employees such as members of the armed forces and civil service employees. Respondent Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary of DOTC, she was thus covered by the stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII and consequently she cannot invoke the exception provided in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B where holding another office is allowed by law or the primary functions of the position. Neither was she designated OIC of MARINA in an exofficio capacity, which is the exception recognized in Civil Liberties Union.

The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution was held inapplicable to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein, without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise “any other office” within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/184740.htm" \l "_ftn31" \o "" Apart from their bare assertion that respondent Bautista did not receive any compensation when she was OIC of MARINA, respondents failed to demonstrate clearly that her designation as such OIC was in an exofficio capacity as required by the primary functions of her office as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport. Given the vast responsibilities and scope of administration of the Authority, we are hardly persuaded by respondents’ submission that respondent Bautista’s designation as OIC of MARINA was merely an imposition of additional duties related to her primary position as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport. It appears that the DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport is not even a member of the Maritime Industry Board, which includes the DOTC Secretary as Chairman, the MARINA Administrator as Vice-Chairman, and the following as members: Executive Secretary (Office of the President), Philippine Ports Authority General Manager, Department of National Defense Secretary, Development Bank of the Philippines General Manager, and the Department of Trade and Industry Secretary. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/184740.htm" \l "_ftn35" \o "" Finally, the Court similarly finds respondents’ theory that being just a “designation,” and temporary at that, respondent Bautista was never really “appointed” as OIC Administrator of MARINA, untenable. In Binamira v. Garrucho, Jr., HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/184740.htm" \l "_ftn36" \o "" we distinguished between the terms appointment and designation, as follows: Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official, as where, in the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives. It is said that appointment is essentially executive while designation is legislative in nature. Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise involves the naming of a particular person to a specified public office. That is the common understanding of the term. However, where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the person named. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/184740.htm" \l "_ftn37" \o "" [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.] Clearly, respondents’ reliance on the foregoing definitions is misplaced considering that the abovecited case addressed the issue of whether petitioner therein acquired valid title to the disputed position and

so had the right to security of tenure. It must be stressed though that while the designation was in the nature of an acting and temporary capacity, the words “hold the office” were employed. Such holding of office pertains to both appointment and designation because the appointee or designate performs the duties and functions of the office. The 1987 Constitution in prohibiting dual or multiple offices, as well as incompatible offices, refers to the holding of the office, and not to the nature of the appointment or designation, words which were not even found in Section 13, Article VII nor in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B. To “hold” an office means to “possess or occupy” the same, or “to be in possession and administration,” HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/184740.htm" \l "_ftn38" \o "" which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office. The disqualification laid down in Section 13, Article VII is aimed at preventing the concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants. Civil Liberties Union traced the history of the times and the conditions under which the Constitution was framed, and construed the Constitution consistent with the object sought to be accomplished by adoption of such provision, and the evils sought to be avoided or remedied. We recalled the practice, during the Marcos regime, of designating members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants as members of the governing bodies or boards of various government agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations. This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government led to abuses by unscrupulous public officials, who took advantage of this scheme for purposes of self-enrichment. The blatant betrayal of public trust evolved into one of the serious causes of discontent with the Marcos regime. It was therefore quite inevitable and in consonance with the overwhelming sentiment of the people that the 1986 Constitutional Commission would draft into the proposed Constitution the provisions under consideration, which were envisioned to remedy, if not correct, the evils that flow from the holding of multiple governmental offices and employment. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/184740.htm" \l "_ftn39" \o "" Our declaration in that case cannot be more explicit: But what is indeed significant is the fact that although Section 7, Article IX-B already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or employment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself. Evidently, from this move as well as in the different phraseologies of the constitutional provisions in question, the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/184740.htm" \l "_ftn40" \o "" [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.] Such laudable intent of the law will be defeated and rendered sterile if we are to adopt the semantics of respondents. It would open the veritable floodgates of circumvention of an important constitutional disqualification of officials in the Executive Department and of limitations on the President’s power of appointment in the guise of temporary designations of Cabinet Members, undersecretaries and assistant secretaries as officers-in-charge of government agencies, instrumentalities, or governmentowned or controlled corporations. As to respondents’ contention that the concurrent positions of DOTC Undersecretary for

Maritime Transport and MARINA OIC Administrator are not incompatible offices, we find no necessity for delving into this matter. Incompatibility of offices is irrelevant in this case, unlike in the case of PCGG Chairman Magdangal Elma in Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/184740.htm" \l "_ftn41" \o "" Therein we held that Section 13, Article VII is not applicable to the PCGG Chairman or to the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, as he is not a cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/184740.htm" \l "_ftn42" \o "" WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Power of the COMELEC to declare a failure of elections. ABDUL GAFFAR DIBARATUN VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 170365, February 2, 2010 This is a petition for certiorari HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/170365.htm" \l "_ftn3" \o "" of the Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc dated October 17, 2005 in SPA No. 02-481, which declared a failure of elections in Precinct No. 6A/7A, Barangay Bagoainguid, Municipality of Tugaya, Lanao del Sur and annulled the proclamation of petitioner Abdul Gaffar HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/170365.htm" \l "_ftn4" \o "" P.M. Dibaratun as the duly elected Punong Barangay of Barangay Bagoainguid in the July 15, 2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections. The facts are as follows: Respondent Abdulcarim Mala Abubakar, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/170365.htm" \l "_ftn5" \o "" a re-electionist candidate for the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay Bagoainguid, Tugaya, Lanao del Sur, filed a petition HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/170365.htm" \l "_ftn6" \o "" before the COMELEC to declare a failure of elections in Precinct No. 6A/7A, Barangay Bagoainguid, Tugaya, Lanao del Sur and to annul the proclamation of petitioner Abdul Gaffar P.M. Dibaratun as the duly elected Punong Barangay of Barangay Bagoainguid in the July 15, 2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections. In his petition, respondent Abubakar alleged: 3. That on July 15, 2002 at around 10:30 o’ clock in the morning, the casting of votes in the above named precinct was commenced at its designated Polling Place in Cayagan Elementary School and while only ten (10) voters had actually voted, a certain ALIPECRY ACOP GAFFAR, who is the son of respondent Punong Barangay candidate ABDULGAFFAR DIBARATUN got inside the polling place and was caught in possession of Three (3) filled up ballots where candidate ABDULGAFFAR DIBARATUN were voted which he wanted to place or insert inside the ballot box for official (sic). 4. That when said ALIPECRY GAFFAR was confronted by the petitioner’s watcher and other watchers confronted him of said official ballots, he got mad and flared up and committed violence which disrupted and stopped the casting of votes and because of the commotion, the chairman left the ballot box which was held by the companions of Alipecry Acop Gaffar and destroyed the said ballot box, took the official ballot contained therein and inserted, placed therein a bundle of substituted ballots.

5.

That due to the facts adverted to above, the casting of votes was stopped and it was never resumed nor continued. Only Ten (10) voters had actually voted out of One Hundred Fifty One (151) registered voters.

6.

That even candidates for Barangay Chairmen and Barangay Kagawad were unable to cast their votes because the casting of votes was illegally disturbed, disrupted, interrupted and stopped by Alipecry Acop Gaffar despite the presence of numerous registered voters ready to cast their votes. x x x x

9. The Election Officer knowing fully that there was really a failure of election in the said precinct recommended that a special election be called for the said precinct. 10. That unknown to the petitioner, the respondent Board of Election Inspectors, in conspiracy and connivance with respondent – Abdulgaffar Dibaratun, surreptitiously and clandestinely canvassed the election returns and then illegally proclaimed the respondent Abdulgaffar Dibaratun and issued Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of Winning Candidates dated July 16, 2002 which was ant[e]dated xerox copy of which is hereto attached as Annex “C” hereof. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/170365.htm" \l "_ftn7" \o "" Respondents therein filed their Answer denying the allegations of herein private respondent. They contended that as 10 voters had actually voted, there was no failure of elections in the aforementioned precinct. They further contended that the petition was filed out of time. In the Resolution dated October 17, 2005, the COMELEC en banc granted the petition, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (en banc) RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to GIVE DUE COURSE to the instant petition. ACCORDINGLY, the proclamation of respondent Abdulgaffar P.M. Dibaratun as the duly elected Punong Barangay of Barangay Bagoainguid, Tugaya, Lanao del Sur is hereby ANNULLED and he is thus ORDERED to CEASE AND DESIST from exercising the powers and responsibilities of the said office. Pending the conduct of the special elections yet to be scheduled by this Commission and until no Punong Barangay has been duly elected and qualified, the incumbent Punong Barangay shall continue to exercise the powers and duties of such office in a hold-over capacity in accordance with Section 5 of R.A. No. 9164 (An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections, Amending Republic Act No. 7160, As Amended, Otherwise Known as The ‘Local Government Code of 1991,’ and For Other Purposes). Let the Office of the Deputy Executive Director for Operations (ODEDO), this Commission, furnish a copy of this Resolution to the Provincial Election Supervisor of Lanao del Sur for the implementation of the same upon its finality. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/170365.htm" \l "_ftn8" \o "" I S S U E: The main issue is whether or not the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in declaring a failure of elections in Precinct No. 6A/7A of

Barangay Bagoainguid, Tugaya, Lanao del Sur and in annulling the proclamation of petitioner as the elected Punong Barangay. The petition is unmeritorious. The 1987 Constitution vests in the COMELEC the broad power to enforce all the laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections, as well as the plenary authority to decide all questions affecting elections except the question as to the right to vote. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/170365.htm" \l "_ftn10" \o "" Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code provides for the instances when the COMELEC may declare failure of elections, thus: SEC. 6. Failure of election. – If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect. In its Resolution, the COMELEC en banc, citing Banaga, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/170365.htm" \l "_ftn11" \o "" enumerated the three instances when a failure of elections may be declared by the Commission: (1) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes; (2) the election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes; or (3) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes. The COMELEC en banc based its decision to declare a failure of elections in Precinct No. 6A/7A on the second instance stated in Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code, that is, the election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes. The COMELEC en banc held that in this case, it was undisputed that after only 10 registered voters cast their votes, the voting was suspended before the hour fixed by law by reason of violence. This was supported by the affidavits submitted by both petitioner and private respondent, who only disagreed as to the perpetrator of the violence as each party blamed the other party. The findings of fact of the COMELEC en banc are binding on this Court. The grounds for failure of election (i.e., force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous cases) involve questions of fact, which can only be determined by the COMELEC en banc after due notice to and hearing of the parties. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/170365.htm" \l "_ftn16" \o "" An

application for certiorari against actions of the COMELEC is confined to instances of grave abuse of discretion, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/170365.htm" \l "_ftn17" \o "" amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The COMELEC, as the administrative agency and specialized constitutional body charged with the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, has the expertise in its field so that its findings and conclusions are generally respected by and conclusive on the Court. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/170365.htm" \l "_ftn18" \o "" Thus, the Court agrees with the COMELEC that the elections in Precinct No. 6A/7A were suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting due to violence. Only 10 voters were able to cast their votes out of 151 registered voters; hence, the votes not cast would have affected the result of the elections. The concurrence of these two conditions caused the COMELEC en banc to declare a failure of elections. When there is failure of elections, the COMELEC is empowered to annul the elections and to call for special elections. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/170365.htm" \l "_ftn19" \o "" Public respondent, therefore, did not commit grave abuse of discretion in its resolution of the case. National territory; Full disclosure of government transactions/negotiations; and right to information on matters of public concern. THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, represented by Governor Jesus Sacdalan and Vice Governor Emmanuel Pinol vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), et al., G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008 CARPIO MORALES, J.: On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The MILF is a rebel group which was established in March 1984 when, under the leadership of the late Salamat Hashim, it splintered from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) then headed by Nur Misuari, on the ground, among others, of what Salamat perceived to be the manipulation of the MNLF away from an Islamic basis towards Marxist-Maoist orientations. The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize, however, for upon motion of petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same. On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piñol filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order . Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional .

MAIN ISSUE: Whether there is a violation of the people’s right to information on matters of public concern (1987 Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (1987 Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28) including public consultation under Republic Act No. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991) If it is in the affirmative, whether prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is an appropriate remedy; HELD: Petitioners invoke their constitutional right to information on matters of public concern, as provided in Section 7, Article III on the Bill of Rights: Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law As early as 1948, in Subido v. Ozaeta , the Court has recognized the statutory right to examine and inspect public records, a right which was eventually accorded constitutional status. The right of access to public documents, as enshrined in both the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution, has been recognized as a self-executory constitutional right . In the 1976 case of Baldoza v. Hon. Judge Dimaano , the Court ruled that access to public records is predicated on the right of the people to acquire information on matters of public concern since, undoubtedly, in a democracy, the pubic has a legitimate interest in matters of social and political significance. x x x The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the nation’s problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision-making if they are denied access to information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. As has been aptly observed: “Maintaining the flow of such information depends on protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases.” x x x In the same way that free discussion enables members of society to cope with the exigencies of their time, access to information of general interest aids the people in democratic decision-making by giving them a better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation so that they may be able to criticize and participate in the affairs of the government in a responsible, reasonable and effective manner. It is by ensuring an unfettered and uninhibited exchange of ideas among a well-informed public that a government remains responsive to the changes desired by the people . That the subject of the information sought in the present cases is a matter of public concern faces no serious challenge. In fact, respondents admit that the MOA-AD is indeed of public concern .

In previous cases, the Court found that the regularity of real estate transactions entered in the Register of Deeds , the need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws the civil service eligibility of a public employee the proper management of GSIS funds allegedly used to grant loans to public officials the recovery of the Marcoses’ alleged ill-gotten wealth and the identity of party-list nominees among others, are matters of public concern. Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large. Matters of public concern covered by the right to information include steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract. In not distinguishing as to the executory nature or commercial character of agreements, the Court has categorically ruled: x x x [T]he right to information “contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction.” Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects. Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes fait accompli. This negates the State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a situation which the framers of the Constitution could not have intended. Such a requirement will prevent the citizenry from participating in the public discussion of any proposed contract, effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. We can allow neither an emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a retreat by the State of its avowed “policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest “. Intended as a “splendid symmetry “ to the right to information under the Bill of Rights is the policy of public disclosure under Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading: Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest . The policy of full public disclosure enunciated in above-quoted Section 28 complements the right of access to information on matters of public concern found in the Bill of Rights. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands . The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with the people’s right to know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be accountable by following such policy . These provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold public officials at all times accountable to the people . WHEREFORE, respondents’ motion to dismiss is DENIED. The main and intervening petitions are GIVEN DUE COURSE and hereby GRANTED. The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared CONTRARY TO LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION.

Impeachment; meaning of “no impeachment proceedings shall be instituted against the same official more than once within a period of one year.” MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ VS. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, RISA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, DANILO D. LIM, FELIPE PESTAÑO, EVELYN PESTAÑO, RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN); MOTHER MARY JOHN MANANZAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON OF PAGBABAGO; DANILO RAMOS, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP); ATTY. EDRE OLALIA, ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLE’S LAWYERS (NUPL); FERDINAND R. GAITE, CHAIRPERSON, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT, G.R. No. 193459 , February 15, 2011 CARPIO MORALES, J.: THE FACTS: On July 22, 2010 before the 15th Congress opened its first session on July 26, 2010 (the fourth Monday of July, in accordance with Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution) private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, et al. (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn2" \o "" against petitioner, upon the endorsement of Party-List Representatives Arlene Bag-ao and Walden Bello. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn3" \o "" A day after the opening of the 15 th Congress or on July 27, 2010, Atty. Marilyn Barua-Yap, Secretary General of the House of Representatives, transmitted the impeachment complaint to House Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn4" \o "" who, by Memorandum of August 2, 2010, directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn5" \o "" On August 3, 2010, private respondents Renato Reyes, Jr., et al., (Reyes group) filed another impeachment complaint HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn6" \o "" against petitioner with a resolution of endorsement by Party-List Representatives Neri Javier Colmenares, Teodoro Casiño, Rafael Mariano, Luzviminda Ilagan, Antonio Tinio and Emerenciana de Jesus. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn7" \o "" On even date, the House of Representatives provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 14th Congress. By letter still of even date, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn8" \o "" the Secretary General transmitted the Reyes group’s complaint to Speaker Belmonte who, by Memorandum of August 9, 2010, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn9" \o "" also directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business. On August 10, 2010, House Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales II, as chairperson of the Committee on Rules, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn10" \o "" instructed Atty. Artemio Adasa, Jr., Deputy Secretary General for Operations, through Atty. Cesar Pareja, Executive Director of the Plenary Affairs Department, to include the two complaints in the Order of Business, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l

"_ftn11" \o "" which was complied with by their inclusion in the Order of Business for the following day, August 11, 2010. On August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m., during its plenary session, the House of Representatives simultaneously referred both complaints to public respondent. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn12" \o "" After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both complaints sufficient in form, which complaints it considered to have been referred to it at exactly the same time. Meanwhile, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress was published on September 2, 2010. On September 6, 2010, petitioner tried to file a motion to reconsider the September 1, 2010 Resolution of public respondent. Public respondent refused to accept the motion, however, for prematurity; instead, it advised petitioner to await the notice for her to file an answer to the complaints, drawing petitioner to furnish copies of her motion to each of the 55 members of public respondent. After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 7, 2010, found the two complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn13" \o "" sufficient in substance. The determination of the sufficiency of substance of the complaints by public respondent, which assumed hypothetically the truth of their allegations, hinged on the issue of whether valid judgment to impeach could be rendered thereon. Petitioner was served also on September 7, 2010 a notice directing her to file an answer to the complaints within 10 days. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn14" \o "" Six days following her receipt of the notice to file answer or on September 13, 2010, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition. The following day or on September 14, 2010, the Court En Banc RESOLVED to direct the issuance of a status quo ante order HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn15" \o "" and to require respondents to comment on the petition in 10 days. The Baraquel group which filed the first complaint, the Reyes group which filed the second complaint, and public respondent (through the OSG and private counsel) filed their respective Comments on September 27, 29 and 30, 2010. Oral arguments were conducted on October 5 and 12, 2010, followed by petitioner’s filing of a Consolidated Reply of October 15, 2010 and the filing by the parties of Memoranda within the given 15-day period. PROCEDURAL ISSUE Respondents raise the impropriety of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition. They argue that public respondent was not exercising any judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function in taking cognizance of the two impeachment complaints as it was exercising a political act that is discretionary in nature, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn17" \o "" and that its function is inquisitorial that is akin to a preliminary investigation. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn18" \o "" Held: The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.

There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official. Francisco characterizes the power of judicial review as a duty which, as the expanded certiorari jurisdiction HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn21" \o "" of this Court reflects, includes the power to “determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn22" \o "" In the present case, petitioner invokes the Court’s expanded certiorari jurisdiction, using the special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition as procedural vehicles. The Court finds it well-within its power to determine whether public respondent committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of its functions and prerogatives that could translate as lack or excess of jurisdiction, which would require corrective measures from the Court. Indubitably, the Court is not asserting its ascendancy over the Legislature in this instance, but simply upholding the supremacy of the Constitution as the repository of the sovereign will. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn23" \o "" An aspect of the “case-or-controversy” requirement is the requisite of ripeness. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn25" \o "" The question of ripeness is especially relevant in light of the direct, adverse effect on an individual by the challenged conduct. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn26" \o "" In the present petition, there is no doubt that questions on, inter alia, the validity of the simultaneous referral of the two complaints and on the need to publish as a mode of promulgating the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the House (Impeachment Rules) present constitutional vagaries which call for immediate interpretation. The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to invoke judicial power. Petitioner cannot thus be considered to have acted prematurely when she took the cue from the constitutional limitation that only one impeachment proceeding should be initiated against an impeachable officer within a period of one year. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES Whether public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its two assailed Resolutions. Petitioner basically anchors her claim on [1] alleged violation of the due process clause (Art. III, Sec. 1) and [2] of the one-year bar provision (Art. XI, Sec 3, par. 5) of the Constitution. Held: [1] Due process of law Petitioner alleges that public respondent’s chairperson, Representative Niel Tupas, Jr. (Rep. Tupas), is the subject of an investigation she is conducting, while his father, former Iloilo Governor Niel Tupas, Sr., had been charged by her with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan. To petitioner, the actions taken by her office against Rep. Tupas and his father

influenced the proceedings taken by public respondent in such a way that bias and vindictiveness played a big part in arriving at the finding of sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints against her. The Court finds petitioner’s allegations of bias and vindictiveness bereft of merit, there being hardly any indication thereof. Mere suspicion of partiality does not suffice. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn27" \o "" The act of the head of a collegial body cannot be considered as that of the entire body itself. So GMCR, Inc. v. Bell Telecommunications Phils. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn28" \o "" teaches: First. We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority vote out of the three members of the commission in order to validly decide a case or any incident therein. Corollarily, the vote alone of the chairman of the commission, as in this case, the vote of Commissioner Kintanar, absent the required concurring vote coming from the rest of the membership of the commission to at least arrive at a majority decision, is not sufficient to legally render an NTC order, resolution or decision. Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications Commission. He alone does not speak and in behalf of the NTC. The NTC acts through a three-man body x x x. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn29" \o "" In the present case, Rep. Tupas, public respondent informs, did not, in fact, vote and merely presided over the proceedings when it decided on the sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn30" \o "" Even petitioner’s counsel conceded during the oral arguments that there are no grounds to compel the inhibition of Rep. Tupas. Petitioner further contends that the “indecent and precipitate haste” of public respondent in finding the two complaints sufficient in form and substance is a clear indication of bias, she pointing out that it only took public respondent five minutes to arrive thereat. An abbreviated pace in the conduct of proceedings is not per se an indication of bias, however. So Santos-Concio v. Department of Justice HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn32" \o "" holds: Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer cannot per se be instantly attributed to an injudicious performance of functions. For one’s prompt dispatch may be another’s undue haste. The orderly administration of justice remains as the paramount and constant consideration, with particular regard of the circumstances peculiar to each case. The presumption of regularity includes the public officer’s official actuations in all phases of work. Consistent with such presumption, it was incumbent upon petitioners to present contradictory evidence other than a mere tallying of days or numerical calculation. This, petitioners failed to discharge. The swift completion of the Investigating Panel’s initial task cannot be relegated as shoddy or shady without discounting the presumably regular performance of not just one but five state prosecutors. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn33" \o "" (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied) In another vein, petitioner, pursuing her claim of denial of due process, questions the lack of or,

more accurately, delay in the publication of the Impeachment Rules. To recall, days after the 15th Congress opened on July 26, 2010 or on August 3, 2010, public respondent provisionally adopted the Impeachment Rules of the 14th Congress and thereafter published on September 2, 2010 its Impeachment Rules, admittedly substantially identical with that of the 14th Congress, in two newspapers of general circulation. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn41" \o "" Citing Tañada v. Tuvera, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn42" \o "" petitioner contends that she was deprived of due process since the Impeachment Rules was published only on September 2, 2010 a day after public respondent ruled on the sufficiency of form of the complaints. She likewise tacks her contention on Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution which directs that “Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Differentiating Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn44" \o "" which held that the Constitution categorically requires publication of the rules of procedure in legislative inquiries, public respondent explains that the Impeachment Rules is intended to merely enable Congress to effectively carry out the purpose of Section 3(8), Art. XI of Constitution. Even Neri concedes that the unpublished rules of legislative inquiries were not considered null and void in its entirety. Rather, x x x [o]nly those that result in violation of the rights of witnesses should be considered null and void, considering that the rationale for the publication is to protect the rights of witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and proceedings are considered valid and effective. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn57" \o "" (emphasis and underscoring supplied) Petitioner in fact does not deny that she was fully apprised of the proper procedure. She even availed of and invoked certain provisions HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn58" \o "" of the Impeachment Rules when she, on September 7, 2010, filed the motion for reconsideration and later filed the present petition. The Court thus finds no violation of the due process clause. [2] The one-year bar rule Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: “No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.” Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to public respondent. On the other hand, public respondent, respondent Reyes group and respondent-intervenor submit that the initiation starts with the filing of the impeachment complaint and ends with the referral to the Committee, following Francisco, but venture to alternatively proffer that the initiation ends somewhere between the conclusion of the Committee Report and the transmittal of the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate. Respondent Baraquel group, meanwhile, essentially maintains that under either the prevailing doctrine or the parties’ interpretation, its impeachment complaint could withstand constitutional scrutiny. Contrary to petitioner’s asseveration, Francisco HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn59" \o "" states that the term “initiate” means to file the complaint and take initial action on it. HYPERLINK

"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn60" \o "" The initiation starts with the filing of the complaint which must be accompanied with an action to set the complaint moving. It refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint. The initial action taken by the House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice. Petitioner misreads the remark of Commissioner Joaquin Bernas, S.J. that “no second verified impeachment may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action” HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn61" \o "" which contemplates a situation where a first impeachment complaint had already been referred. Bernas and Regalado, who both acted as amici curiae in Francisco, affirmed that the act of initiating includes the act of taking initial action on the complaint. From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn62" \o "" of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn63" \o "" (emphasis and underscoring supplied) The Court, in Francisco, thus found that the assailed provisions of the 12th Congress’ Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings ─ Sections 16 HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn64" \o "" and 17 HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn65" \o "" of Rule V thereof ─ “clearly contravene Section 3(5) of Article XI since they g[a]ve the term ‘initiate’ a meaning different from filing and referral.” HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn66" \o "" Petitioner highlights certain portions of Francisco which delve on the relevant records of the Constitutional Commission, particularly Commissioner Maambong’s statements HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn67" \o "" that the initiation starts with the filing of the complaint. Petitioner fails to consider the verb “starts” as the operative word. Commissioner Maambong was all too keen to stress that the filing of the complaint indeed starts the initiation and that the House’s action on the committee report/resolution is not part of that initiation phase. To the next logical question of what ends or completes the initiation, Commissioners Bernas and Regalado lucidly explained that the filing of the complaint must be accompanied by the referral to the Committee on Justice, which is the action that sets the complaint moving. Francisco cannot be any clearer in pointing out the material dates. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn73" \o "" (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied) These clear pronouncements notwithstanding, petitioner posits that the date of referral was considered irrelevant in Francisco. She submits that referral could not be the reckoning point of initiation because “something prior to that had already been done,” HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn74" \o "" apparently citing Bernas’ discussion. The Court cannot countenance any attempt at obscurantism. What the cited discussion was rejecting was the view that the House’s action on the committee report initiates the impeachment proceedings. It did not state that to determine the initiating step, absolutely nothing prior to it must be done. Following petitioner’s line of reasoning, the verification of the complaint or the endorsement by a member of the House – steps done prior to the filing – would already initiate the impeachment proceedings. Contrary to petitioner’s emphasis on impeachment complaint, what the Constitution mentions is impeachment “proceedings.” Her reliance on the singular tense of the word “complaint” HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn75" \o "" to denote the limit prescribed by the Constitution goes against the basic rule of statutory construction that a word covers its enlarged and plural sense. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn76" \o "" The Court, of course, does not downplay the importance of an impeachment complaint, for it is the matchstick that kindles the candle of impeachment proceedings. The filing of an impeachment complaint is like the lighting of a matchstick. Lighting the matchstick alone, however, cannot light up the candle, unless the lighted matchstick reaches or torches the candle wick. Referring the complaint to the proper committee ignites the impeachment proceeding. With a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed, more than one lighted matchsticks light the candle at the same time. What is important is that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle. A restrictive interpretation renders the impeachment mechanism both illusive and illusory. For one, it puts premium on senseless haste. Petitioner’s stance suggests that whoever files the first impeachment complaint exclusively gets the attention of Congress which sets in motion an exceptional once-a-year mechanism wherein government resources are devoted. A prospective complainant, regardless of ill motives or best intentions, can wittingly or unwittingly desecrate the entire process by the expediency of submitting a haphazard complaint out of sheer hope to be the first in line. It also puts to naught the effort of other prospective complainants who, after diligently gathering evidence first to buttress the case, would be barred days or even hours later from filing an impeachment complaint. Placing an exceedingly narrow gateway to the avenue of impeachment proceedings turns its laudable purpose into a laughable matter. One needs only to be an early bird even without seriously intending to catch the worm, when the process is precisely intended to effectively weed out “worms” in high offices which could otherwise be ably caught by other prompt birds within the ultra-limited season.

Moreover, the first-to-file scheme places undue strain on the part of the actual complainants, injured party or principal witnesses who, by mere happenstance of an almost always unforeseeable filing of a first impeachment complaint, would be brushed aside and restricted from directly participating in the impeachment process. Further, prospective complainants, along with their counsel and members of the House of Representatives who sign, endorse and file subsequent impeachment complaints against the same impeachable officer run the risk of violating the Constitution since they would have already initiated a second impeachment proceeding within the same year. Virtually anybody can initiate a second or third impeachment proceeding by the mere filing of endorsed impeachment complaints. Without any public notice that could charge them with knowledge, even members of the House of Representatives could not readily ascertain whether no other impeachment complaint has been filed at the time of committing their endorsement. The question as to who should administer or pronounce that an impeachment proceeding has been initiated rests also on the body that administers the proceedings prior to the impeachment trial. As gathered from Commissioner Bernas’ disquisition HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn77" \o "" in Francisco, a proceeding which “takes place not in the Senate but in the House” HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn78" \o "" precedes the bringing of an impeachment case to the Senate. In fact, petitioner concedes that the initiation of impeachment proceedings is within the sole and absolute control of the House of Representatives. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn79" \o "" Conscious of the legal import of each step, the House, in taking charge of its own proceedings, must deliberately decide to initiate an impeachment proceeding, subject to the time frame and other limitations imposed by the Constitution. This chamber of Congress alone, not its officers or members or any private individual, should own up to its processes. The Constitution did not place the power of the “final say” on the lips of the House Secretary General who would otherwise be calling the shots in forwarding or freezing any impeachment complaint. Referral of the complaint to the proper committee is not done by the House Speaker alone either, which explains why there is a need to include it in the Order of Business of the House. It is the House of Representatives, in public plenary session, which has the power to set its own chamber into special operation by referring the complaint or to otherwise guard against the initiation of a second impeachment proceeding by rejecting a patently unconstitutional complaint. Under the Rules of the House, a motion to refer is not among those motions that shall be decided without debate, but any debate thereon is only made subject to the five-minute rule. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn80" \o "" Moreover, it is common parliamentary practice that a motion to refer a matter or question to a committee may be debated upon, not as to the merits thereof, but only as to the propriety of the referral. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn81" \o "" With respect to complaints for impeachment, the House has the discretion not to refer a subsequent impeachment complaint to the Committee on Justice where official records and further debate show that an impeachment complaint filed against the same impeachable officer has already been referred to the said committee and the one year period has not yet expired, lest it becomes instrumental in perpetrating a constitutionally prohibited second impeachment proceeding. Far from being mechanical, before the referral stage, a period of deliberation is afforded the House, as the Constitution, in fact, grants a maximum of three session days within which to make the proper referral. As mentioned, one limitation imposed on the House in initiating an impeachment proceeding deals with deadlines. The Constitution states that “[a] verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter.” In the present case, petitioner failed to establish grave abuse of discretion on the allegedly

“belated” referral of the first impeachment complaint filed by the Baraquel group. For while the said complaint was filed on July 22, 2010, there was yet then no session in Congress. It was only four days later or on July 26, 2010 that the 15 th Congress opened from which date the 10-day session period started to run. When, by Memorandum of August 2, 2010, Speaker Belmonte directed the Committee on Rules to include the complaint in its Order of Business, it was well within the said 10day session period. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn82" \o "" There is no evident point in rushing at closing the door the moment an impeachment complaint is filed. Depriving the people (recall that impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic) of reasonable access to the limited political vent simply prolongs the agony and frustrates the collective rage of an entire citizenry whose trust has been betrayed by an impeachable officer. It shortchanges the promise of reasonable opportunity to remove an impeachable officer through the mechanism enshrined in the Constitution. But neither does the Court find merit in respondents’ alternative contention that the initiation of the impeachment proceedings, which sets into motion the one-year bar, should include or await, at the earliest, the Committee on Justice report. To public respondent, the reckoning point of initiation should refer to the disposition of the complaint by the vote of at least one-third (1/3) of all the members of the House. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn83" \o "" To the Reyes group, initiation means the act of transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn84" \o "" To respondent-intervenor, it should last until the Committee on Justice’s recommendation to the House plenary. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn85" \o "" The Court, in Francisco, rejected a parallel thesis in which a related proposition was inputed in the therein assailed provisions of the Impeachment Rules of the 12 th Congress. The present case involving an impeachment proceeding against the Ombudsman offers no cogent reason for the Court to deviate from what was settled in Francisco that dealt with the impeachment proceeding against the then Chief Justice. To change the reckoning point of initiation on no other basis but to accommodate the socio-political considerations of respondents does not sit well in a court of law. As pointed out in Francisco, the impeachment proceeding is not initiated “when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action . This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.” HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn87" \o "" Allowing an expansive construction of the term “initiate” beyond the act of referral allows the unmitigated influx of successive complaints, each having their own respective 60-session-day period of disposition from referral. Worse, the Committee shall conduct overlapping hearings until and unless the disposition of one of the complaints ends with the affirmance of a resolution for impeachment or the overriding HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn88" \o "" of a contrary resolution (as espoused by public respondent), or the House transmits the Articles of Impeachment (as advocated by the Reyes group), HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn89" \o "" or the Committee on Justice concludes its first report to the House plenary regardless of the recommendation (as posited by respondent-intervenor). Each of these scenarios runs roughshod the very purpose behind the constitutionally imposed one-year bar. Opening the floodgates too loosely would disrupt the series of steps operating in unison under one proceeding. The Court does not lose sight of the salutary reason of confining only one impeachment proceeding in a year. Petitioner concededly cites Justice Adolfo Azcuna’s separate opinion that concurred with the Francisco ruling. HYPERLINK

"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn90" \o "" Justice Azcuna stated that the purpose of the one-year bar is two-fold: “to prevent undue or too frequent harassment; and 2) to allow the legislature to do its principal task [of] legislation.” It becomes clear that the consideration behind the intended limitation refers to the element of time, and not the number of complaints. The impeachable officer should defend himself in only one impeachment proceeding, so that he will not be precluded from performing his official functions and duties. Similarly, Congress should run only one impeachment proceeding so as not to leave it with little time to attend to its main work of law-making. The doctrine laid down in Francisco that initiation means filing and referral remains congruent to the rationale of the constitutional provision. Petitioner complains that an impeachable officer may be subjected to harassment by the filing of multiple impeachment complaints during the intervening period of a maximum of 13 session days between the date of the filing of the first impeachment complaint to the date of referral. As pointed out during the oral arguments HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/193459.htm" \l "_ftn92" \o "" by the counsel for respondent-intervenor, the framework of privilege and layers of protection for an impeachable officer abound. The requirements or restrictions of a one-year bar, a single proceeding, verification of complaint, endorsement by a House member, and a finding of sufficiency of form and substance – all these must be met before bothering a respondent to answer – already weigh heavily in favor of an impeachable officer. Aside from the probability of an early referral and the improbability of inclusion in the agenda of a complaint filed on the 11th hour (owing to pre-agenda standard operating procedure), the number of complaints may still be filtered or reduced to nil after the Committee decides once and for all on the sufficiency of form and substance. Besides, if only to douse petitioner’s fear, a complaint will not last the primary stage if it does not have the stated preliminary requisites. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Jurisdiction of the HRET; Distinctions of the grounds for disqualification under Secs. 68 and 78 under the Omnibus Elections Code; Grounds for suspension of proclamation of winning candidate. FERNANDO GONZALES VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192856, March 8, 2011 VILLARAMA, JR., J.: Petitioner Fernando V. Gonzalez and private respondent Reno G. Lim both filed certificates of candidacy for the position of Representative of the 3rd congressional district of the Province of Albay in the May 10, 2010 elections. Lim was the incumbent congressman of the 3rd district while Gonzalez was former Governor of Albay, having been elected to said position in 2004 but lost his re-election bid in 2007. On March 30, 2010, a Petition for Disqualification and Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy (COC) was filed by Stephen Bichara [SPA No. 10-074 (DC)] on the ground that Gonzalez is a Spanish national, being the legitimate child of a Spanish father and a Filipino mother, and that he failed to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority in accordance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625. It was further alleged that Gonzalez’s late registration of his certificate of birth with the Civil Registry of Ligao City on January 17, 2006, even if accompanied by an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship, was not done within a reasonable time as it was in fact registered 45 years after Gonzalez reached the age of majority on September 11, 1961.

In his Answer, Gonzalez denied having willfully made false and misleading statement in his COC regarding his citizenship and pointed out that Bichara had filed the wrong petition under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) to question his eligibility as a candidate. Gonzalez also argued that the petition which should have been correctly filed under Section 78 of the OEC was filed out of time. He asserted that he is a Filipino citizen as his Alien Certificate of Registration was issued during his minority. However, he took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Justice of the Peace in Ligao, Albay on his 21 st birthday on September 11, 1961. Since then he had comported himself as a Filipino considering that he is married to a Filipina; he is a registered voter who voted during elections; he has been elected to various local positions; he holds a Philippine passport; and most importantly, he has established his life in the Philippines as a Filipino. Gonzalez contended that he is deemed a natural-born Filipino citizen under the 1987 Constitution which includes in the definition of natural-born citizens “[t]hose born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.” On May 8, 2010, the COMELEC’s Second Division issued the assailed resolution which decreed: WHEREFORE, premises considered, we resolve to, as we do hereby, GRANT this Petition. Respondent Fernando Vallejo Gonzalez is hereby declared disqualified to be a candidate for the position of Member of the House of Representatives, 3rd District, Province of Albay, in the forthcoming National and Local Elections on May 10, 2010. Finding the petition to be both a petition for disqualification and cancellation of COC, the Second Division ruled that the same was filed on time. On the election of Philippine citizenship by Gonzalez, it held that what Gonzalez submitted is a mere photocopy of his oath of allegiance which was not duly certified by the National Statistics Office, and hence there was no compliance with the requirement of filing with the nearest civil registry, the last act required of a valid oath of allegiance under C.A. No. 625. Further, the Second Division found that in the late registration of Gonzalez’s birth on January 17, 2006, he declared that he is a citizen of the Philippines; this at best, was his own conclusion, and at worst, conflicts with his purported oath of allegiance for it would have been a superfluity to express his choice of Philippine citizenship by taking the oath of allegiance if he was already a Filipino citizen. And the fact that Gonzalez attended formal schooling in this country, worked in private firms and in the government service, should not take the place of the stringent requirements of constitutional and statutory provisions on acquisition of Philippine citizenship. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/192856.htm" \l "_ftn7" \o "" Gonzalez thru counsel received a copy of the aforesaid resolution on May 11, 2010 at 5:20 p.m. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/192856.htm" \l "_ftn8" \o "" On even date, Lim petitioned the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) to consider the votes cast for Gonzalez as stray or not counted and/or suspend his proclamation, citing the Second Division’s May 8, 2010 resolution disqualifying Gonzalez as a candidate for the May 10, 2010 elections. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/192856.htm" \l "_ftn9" \o "" The PBOC, however, dismissed the petition stating that the period for filing of a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC resolution has not yet lapsed, and hence the same is not yet final and executory. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/192856.htm" \l "_ftn10" \o "" Based on the results of the counting and canvassing of votes, Gonzalez emerged as the winner having garnered a total of 96,000 votes while Lim ranked second with 68,701 votes. On May 12, 2010, the PBOC officially proclaimed Gonzalez as the duly elected Representative of the 3 rd district of Albay. Gonzalez took his oath of office on the same day. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/192856.htm" \l "_ftn12" \o "" On May 13,

2010, Bichara filed a Very Urgent Motion to Suspend the Effects of the Proclamation of Fernando V. Gonzalez. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/192856.htm" \l "_ftn13" \o "" On May 14, 2010, Gonzalez filed a motion for reconsideration of the May 8, 2010 resolution. Gonzalez reiterated that the Second Division’s finding that Bichara’s petition is both a petition for disqualification and to cancel COC is not borne by the petition itself and contrary to Section 68 of the OEC and COMELEC Resolution No. 8696. Applying Section 78 of the OEC which is the proper petition based on alleged deliberate misrepresentation and false statement in the COC, Gonzalez contended that Bichara’s petition was filed out of time. It was further argued that the subsequent election, proclamation and taking of oath of office of Gonzalez are events warranting the dismissal of SPA No. 10-074 (DC). Stressing that the voice of the people must be respected in this case, Gonzalez pointed out that his not being a Filipino was never an issue in the previous elections where he ran and won (Ligao City Mayor for three terms and Governor of Albay from 2004-2007). He claimed that the petition filed by Bichara, who ran against Gonzalez’s wife, Linda Passi Gonzalez (for re-election as Ligao City Mayor) in the recently concluded elections was indicative of harassment considering that a similar petition for disqualification and cancellation of COC was also filed against his wife by Anna Marie C. Bichara, said to be a sister of the petitioner in SPA No. 10-074 (DC). HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/192856.htm" \l "_ftn14" \o "" On May 22, 2010, Lim filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene as Petitioner stating that being a candidate for the same position, he has legal interest in the success of the petition in SPA No. 10-074 (DC). In its Resolution dated July 23, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc denied the motion for reconsideration and affirmed its finding that Gonzalez failed to prove with sufficient evidence that he had fully complied with the requirements for electing Philippine citizenship under C.A. No. 625. The Commission likewise held that the proclamation of Gonzalez by the PBOC was premature and illegal. Finally, the motion to intervene filed by Lim was found to be proper and was accordingly granted. The dispositive portion of the resolution reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (En Banc) RESOLVED to, as it does hereby: 1. ANNUL the invalid proclamation of the respondent Fernando V. Gonzalez as the elected Member of the House of Representative as he is DISQUALIFIED to run and be voted for the position of Member of the House of Representatives in the May 10, 2010 elections; 2. DENY for utter lack of merit the Motion for Reconsideration of respondent FERNANDO V. GONZALEZ; and 3. AFFIRM the Resolution of the Second Division declaring respondent Fernando V. Gonzalez DISQUALIFIED to run and be voted for as such. 4. Immediately CONSTITUTE a Special Provincial Board of Canvassers of Albay who will PROCLAIM RENO G. LIM as the duly elected Member of the House of Representative of the Third District of Albay for being the bona fide candidate who garnered the highest number of votes in the May 10, 2010 elections. SO

ORDERED.

HYPERLINK

"http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/192856.htm" \l "_ftn17" \o "" Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented from the majority ruling denying the motion for reconsideration of Gonzalez, stating that the people of the 3 rd District of Albay has already spoken as to who is their choice of Representative in the Lower House of Congress and in case of doubt as to the qualification of the winning candidate, the doubt will be resolved in favor of the will of the people. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/192856.htm" \l "_ftn18" \o "" A separate opinion was written by Commissioner Armando C. Velasco stating that the COMELEC no longer has jurisdiction to decide on the matter of the qualifications of Gonzalez, the winning candidate who had already been proclaimed, taken his oath and assumed the office as Representative of the 3rd District of Albay, for which reason the COMELEC’s jurisdiction ends and that of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) begins. He likewise disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that Gonzalez’s proclamation was invalid considering that: (1) records are bereft of indication that the PBOC had been ordered to suspend the proclamation of Gonzalez; (2) the May 8, 2010 Resolution disqualifying Gonzalez had not yet become final and executory; (3) the date of said resolution was not a previously fixed date as required by Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696, as the records do not show that the parties have been informed of said date of promulgation beforehand; and (4) the three-day period for the filing of a motion for reconsideration should be reckoned from the date of receipt by Gonzalez of copy of the resolution which is May 11, 2010, hence the PBOC acted well within its authority in proclaiming Gonzalez. Commissioner Velasco also disagreed with the majority ruling that Gonzalez’s motion for reconsideration was pro forma, and maintained that said motion was timely filed which effectively suspended the execution of the May 8, 2010 Resolution. Lastly, he found the order to constitute a Special Provincial Board of Canvassers for the purpose of proclaiming intervenor Lim without basis. Since the May 8, 2010 Resolution was not yet final on election day, the votes cast for Gonzalez cannot be considered stray. Besides, a minority or defeated candidate like Lim cannot be deemed elected to the office in cases where the winning candidate is declared ineligible. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/192856.htm" \l "_ftn19" \o "" Gonzalez filed the instant petition on July 29, 2010 while Lim filed a Very Urgent Motion For the Issuance of Writ of Execution which the COMELEC granted on August 5, 2010. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/192856.htm" \l "_ftn20" \o "" On August 18, 2010, Lim was proclaimed by a Special Board of Canvassers and subsequently took his oath of office before Assistant State Prosecutor Nolibien N. Quiambao. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/192856.htm" \l "_ftn21" \o "" In a letter dated August 23, 2010, Lim requested Speaker Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr. for the administration of his oath and registration in the Roll of the House of Representatives representing the 3rd District of Albay. However, Speaker Belmonte refused to grant Lim’s request saying that the issue of qualification of Gonzalez for the position of Member of the House of Representatives is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET, citing this Court’s ruling in Limkaichong v. Commission on Elections HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/192856.htm" \l "_ftn22" \o "" / HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/192856.htm" \l "_ftn23" \o "" . Gonzalez contends that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the assailed resolutions insofar as – 1. It would install the Respondent Reno G. Lim as the Third District of Albay’s Representative even though Lim never won the election, and who never became a

legal party in the case; 2. It would hold that the petitioner Gonzalez is not a Filipino citizen; 3. It would go on to convene a “Special Board of Canvassers of Albay” created for the sole purpose of proclaiming the respondent Lim as the actual winner of the May 10 elections in the Third District of Albay; x x x the Commission’s resolutions, insofar as it was: 4. Issued with such great speed and haste that its mistakes are glaring; 5. Issued without the required (valid) certification; 6. Insofar as it did not hold that the respondent Reno [G.] Lim had committed more than one act of forum-shopping. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/192856.htm" \l "_ftn24" \o "" I S S U E S: (1) whether the petition in SPA No. 10-074 (DC) was timely filed; (2) whether Gonzalez was validly proclaimed as the duly elected Representative of the 3rd District of Albay in the May 10, 2010 elections; and (3) whether the COMELEC had lost jurisdiction over the issue of Gonzalez’s citizenship. HELD: I THE PETITION TO DISQUALIFY GONZALES WAS NOT TIMELY FILED A petition to cancel a candidate’s COC may be filed under Section 78 of the OEC which provides: SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Underlining supplied.) A petition for disqualification of a candidate may also be filed pursuant to Section 68 of the same Code which states: SEC. 68. Disqualifications. -- Any candidate who, in an action or protest in

which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having: (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. The prohibited acts covered by Section 68 refer to election campaign or political activity outside the campaign period (Section 80); removal, destruction or defacement of lawful election propaganda (Section 83); certain forms of election propaganda (Section 85); violation of rules and regulations on election propaganda through mass media; coercion of subordinates (Section 261 [d]); threats, intimidation, terrorism, use of fraudulent device or other forms of coercion (Section 261 [e]); unlawful electioneering (Section 261 [k]); release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds (Section 261 [v]); solicitation of votes or undertaking any propaganda on the day of the election (Section 261 [cc], sub-par.6). As to the ground of false representation in the COC under Section 78, we held in Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/192856.htm" \l "_ftn26" \o "" that in order to justify the cancellation of COC, it is essential that the false representation mentioned therein pertain to a material matter for the sanction imposed by this provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate – the right to run for the elective post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. Although the law does not specify what would be considered as a “material representation”, the Court concluded that this refers to qualifications for elective office. Citing previous cases in which the Court interpreted this phrase, we held that Section 78 contemplates statements regarding age, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/192856.htm" \l "_ftn27" \o "" residence HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/192856.htm" \l "_ftn28" \o "" and citizenship or non-possession of natural-born Filipino status. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/192856.htm" \l "_ftn29" \o "" Furthermore, aside from the requirement of materiality, the false representation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. In other words, it must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one’s qualification for public office. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/192856.htm" \l "_ftn30" \o "" Significantly, we pointed out in Salcedo II the two remedies available for questioning the qualifications of a candidate, thus: There are two instances where a petition questioning the qualifications of a registered candidate to run for the office for which his certificate of candidacy was filed can be raised under the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), to wit: “(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof which provides that:

and “(2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof, viz: ‘Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. - Any voter contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election.” The only difference between the two proceedings is that, under Section 78, the qualifications for elective office are misrepresented in the certificate of candidacy and the proceedings must be initiated before the elections, whereas a petition for quo warranto under Section 253 may be brought on the basis of two grounds - (1) ineligibility or (2) disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, and must be initiated within ten days after the proclamation of the election results. Under Section 253, a candidate is ineligible if he is disqualified to be elected to office, and he is disqualified if he lacks any of the qualifications for elective office. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/192856.htm" \l "_ftn31" \o "" (Emphasis supplied.) Clearly, the only instance where a petition questioning the qualifications of a candidate for elective office can be filed before election is when the petition is filed under Section 78 of the OEC. The petition in SPA No. 10-074 (DC) based on the allegation that Gonzalez was not a naturalborn Filipino which was filed before the elections, is in the nature of a petition filed under Section 78. The recitals in the petition in said case, however, state that it was filed pursuant to Section 4 (b) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 and Section 68 of the OEC to disqualify a candidate for lack of qualifications or possessing some grounds for disqualification. The COMELEC treated the petition as one filed both for disqualification and cancellation of COC, with the effect that Section 68, in relation to Section 3, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, is applicable insofar as determining the period for filing the petition. Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure on Disqualification of Candidates provides: Section 1. Grounds for Disqualification. – Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate. xxxx Sec. 3. Period to File Petition. -- The petition shall be filed any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation. (Emphasis supplied.) On the other hand, the procedure for filing a petition for cancellation of COC is covered by Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which provides:

Section 1. Grounds for Denial of Certificate of Candidacy. -- A petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy for any elective office may be filed with the Law Department of the Commission by any citizen of voting age or a duly registered political party, organization, or coalition or political parties on the exclusive ground that any material representation contained therein as required by law is false. Sec. 2. Period to File Petition. – The petition must be filed within five (5) days following the last day for the filing of certificate of candidacy. In Loong v. Commission on Elections, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/192856.htm" \l "_ftn32" \o "" we categorically declared that the period for filing a petition for cancellation of COC based on false representation is covered by Rule 23 and not Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Further, we held that Section 3 of Rule 25 allowing the filing of a petition at any time after the last day for filing of COC’s but not later than the date of proclamation, is merely a procedural rule that cannot supersede Section 78 of the OEC. We quote the following pertinent discussion in said case: x x x Section 78 of the same Code states that in case a person filing a certificate of candidacy has committed false representation, a petition to cancel the certificate of the aforesaid person may be filed within twenty-five (25) days from the time the certificate was filed. Clearly, SPA No. 90-006 was filed beyond the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. We do not agree with private respondent Ututalum’s contention that the petition for disqualification, as in the case at bar, may be filed at any time after the last day for filing a certificate of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation, applying Section 3, Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. xxxx The petition filed by private respondent Ututalum with the respondent Comelec to disqualify petitioner Loong on the ground that the latter made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy as to his age, clearly does not fall under the grounds of disqualification as provided for in Rule 25 but is expressly covered by Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure governing petitions to cancel certificate of candidacy. Moreover, Section 3, Rule 25 which allows the filing of the petition at any time after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation, is merely a procedural rule issued by respondent Commission which, although a constitutional body, has no legislative powers. Thus, it can not supersede Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code which is a legislative enactment. We also do not find merit in the contention of respondent Commission that in the light of the provisions of Section 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed even beyond the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code, as long as it is filed within a reasonable time from the discovery of the ineligibility. Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 are here re-quoted: “SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has

been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.” “SEC. 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. - The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.” It will be noted that nothing in Sections 6 or 7 modifies or alters the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code for filing the appropriate action to cancel a certificate of candidacy on account of any false representation made therein. On the contrary, said Section 7 affirms and reiterates Section 78 of the Code. We note that Section 6 refers only to the effects of a disqualification case which may be based on grounds other than that provided under Section 78 of the Code. But Section 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 also makes the effects referred to in Section 6 applicable to disqualification cases filed under Section 78 of the Code. Nowhere in Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 is mention made of the period within which these disqualification cases may be filed. This is because there are provisions in the Code which supply the periods within which a petition relating to disqualification of candidates must be filed, such as Section 78, already discussed, and Section 253 on petitions for quo warranto. Thus, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain candidate fails to file the petition within the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code for whatever reasons, the election laws do not leave him completely helpless as he has another chance to raise the disqualification of the candidate by filing a petition for quo warranto within ten (10) days from the proclamation of the results of the election, as provided under Section 253 of the Code. x x x HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/192856.htm" \l "_ftn33" \o "" (Additional emphasis supplied.) In the more recent case of Fermin v. Commission on Elections, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/192856.htm" \l "_ftn36" \o "" we stressed that a petition filed under Section 78 must not be interchanged or confused with one filed under Section 68. A petition which is properly a “Section 78 petition” must therefore be filed within the period prescribed therein, and a procedural rule subsequently issued by COMELEC cannot supplant this statutory period under Section 78. We further distinguished the two petitions as to their nature, grounds and effects, to wit: Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC,

therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a “Section 78” petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate. At this point, we must stress that a “Section 78” petition ought not to be interchanged or confused with a “Section 68” petition. They are different remedies, based on different grounds, and resulting in different eventualities. Private respondent’s insistence, therefore, that the petition it filed before the COMELEC in SPA No. 07-372 is in the nature of a disqualification case under Section 68, as it is in fact captioned a “Petition for Disqualification,” does not persuade the Court. Considering that the Dilangalen petition does not state any of these grounds for disqualification, it cannot be categorized as a “Section 68” petition. In support of his claim that he actually filed a “petition for disqualification” and not a “petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC,” Dilangalen takes refuge in Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, specifically Section 1 thereof, to the extent that it states, “[a]ny candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law x x x may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate,” and COMELEC Resolution No. 7800 (Rules Delegating to COMELEC Field Officials the Authority to Hear and Receive Evidence in Disqualification Cases Filed in Connection with the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections x x x We disagree. A COMELEC rule or resolution cannot supplant or vary the legislative enactments that distinguish the grounds for disqualification from those of ineligibility, and the appropriate proceedings to raise the said grounds. In other words, Rule 25 and COMELEC Resolution No. 7800 cannot supersede the dissimilar requirements of the law for the filing of a petition for disqualification under Section 68, and a petition for the denial of due course to or cancellation of CoC under Section 78 of the OEC. As aptly observed by the eminent constitutionalist, Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, in his separate opinion in RomualdezMarcos v. Commission on Elections: Having thus determined that the Dilangalen petition is one under Section 78 of the OEC, the Court now declares that the same has to comply with the 25-day statutory period for its filing. Aznar v. Commission on Elections and Loong v. Commission on Elections give ascendancy to the express mandate of the law that “the petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy.” Construed in relation to reglementary periods and the principles of prescription, the dismissal of “Section 78” petitions filed beyond the 25-day period must come as a

matter of course. We find it necessary to point out that Sections 5 and 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6646, contrary to the erroneous arguments of both parties, did not in any way amend the period for filing “Section 78” petitions. While Section 7 of the said law makes reference to Section 5 on the procedure in the conduct of cases for the denial of due course to the CoCs of nuisance candidates (retired Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., in his dissenting opinion in Aquino v. Commission on Elections explains that “the ‘procedure hereinabove provided’ mentioned in Section 7 cannot be construed to refer to Section 6 which does not provide for a procedure but for the effects of disqualification cases, [but] can only refer to the procedure provided in Section 5 of the said Act on nuisance candidates x x x.”), the same cannot be taken to mean that the 25-day period for filing “Section 78” petitions under the OEC is changed to 5 days counted from the last day for the filing of CoCs. The clear language of Section 78 certainly cannot be amended or modified by the mere reference in a subsequent statute to the use of a procedure specifically intended for another type of action. Cardinal is the rule in statutory construction that repeals by implication are disfavored and will not be so declared by the Court unless the intent of the legislators is manifest. In addition, it is noteworthy that Loong, which upheld the 25-day period for filing “Section 78” petitions, was decided long after the enactment of R.A. 6646. In this regard, we therefore find as contrary to the unequivocal mandate of the law, Rule 23, Section 2 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure x x x. As the law stands, the petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC “may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy.” Since the petition in SPA No. 10-074 (DC) sought to cancel the COC filed by Gonzalez and disqualify him as a candidate on the ground of false representation as to his citizenship, the same should have been filed within twenty-five days from the filing of the COC, pursuant to Section 78 of the OEC. Gonzales filed his COC on December 1, 2009. Clearly, the petition for disqualification and cancellation of COC filed by Lim on March 30, 2010 was filed out of time. The COMELEC therefore erred in giving due course to the petition. II. PROCLAMATION WAS VALID Even assuming arguendo that the petition in SPA No. 10-074 (DC) was timely filed, we find that the COMELEC gravely erred when it held that the proclamation of Gonzalez by the PBOC of Albay on May 12, 2010 was premature and illegal. Section 72 of the OEC, was amended by Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which reads: Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. -- Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with

the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor may[,] during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis supplied.) In its July 23, 2010 Resolution, the COMELEC ruled that the motion for reconsideration of the Second Division’s May 8, 2010 Resolution filed by Gonzalez on May 14, 2010 was pro forma and hence did not suspend the execution of the May 8, 2010 resolution disqualifying him as a candidate. Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 provides: SEC. 7. Motion for reconsideration. A motion to reconsider a Decision, Resolution, Order or Ruling of a Division shall be filed within three (3) days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro-forma, suspends the execution or implementation of the Decision, Resolution, Order or Ruling. Within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing thereof, the Clerk of the Commission shall notify the Presiding Commissioner. The latter shall within two (2) days thereafter, certify the case to the Commission en banc. The Clerk of the Commission shall calendar the Motion for Reconsideration for the resolution of the Commission en banc within three (3) days from the certification thereof. Section 13, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure on the Finality of Decisions or Resolutions provides that – (c) Unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed, a decision or resolution of a Division shall become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days in Special actions and Special cases and after fifteen (15) days in all other actions or proceedings, following its promulgation. Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure also states: SEC. 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration. -- A motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma, suspends the execution or implementation of the decision, resolution, order or ruling. The Commission En Banc in its July 23, 2010 Resolution said: As found by this Commission, the motion for reconsideration merely mentioned that respondent was already proclaimed as the winning candidate for Representative of the 3rd District of Albay. Nothing was, however, averred nor any document was submitted to attest to the fact that that respondent has complied with all the legal requirements and procedure for the election of Philippine citizenship as laid down in Commonwealth Act No. 625 which specifically requires that the oath of allegiance should be filed with the nearest civil registry. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/192856.htm" \l "_ftn38" \o ""

We have held that mere reiteration of issues already passed upon by the court does not automatically make a motion for reconsideration pro forma. What is essential is compliance with the requisites of the Rules. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/192856.htm" \l "_ftn39" \o "" Indeed, in the cases where a motion for reconsideration was held to be pro forma, the motion was so held because (1) it was a second motion for reconsideration, or (2) it did not comply with the rule that the motion must specify the findings and conclusions alleged to be contrary to law or not supported by the evidence, or (3) it failed to substantiate the alleged errors, or (4) it merely alleged that the decision in question was contrary to law, or (5) the adverse party was not given notice thereof. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/192856.htm" \l "_ftn40" \o "" In the case at bar, the motion for reconsideration HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/192856.htm" \l "_ftn41" \o "" filed by Gonzalez failed to show that it suffers from the foregoing defects. Although the motion repeatedly stressed that the people of the Third District of Albay had spoken through the winning margin of votes for Gonzalez that they chose the latter to represent them in the House of Representatives, it also reiterated his position that the petition filed by Bichara is time-barred, adding that it was just an act of political harassment. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/192856.htm" \l "_ftn42" \o "" The COMELEC thus seriously erred in ruling that Gonzalez’s motion for reconsideration was pro forma. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the May 8, 2010 resolution of the Second Division having been timely filed, the said resolution had not become final and executory. Considering that at the time of the proclamation of Gonzalez who garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Representative in the 3rd district of Albay, the said Division Resolution declaring Gonzalez disqualified as a candidate for the said position was not yet final, he had at that point in time remained qualified. Therefore, his proclamation on May 12, 2010 by the PBOC was valid or legal. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/192856.htm" \l "_ftn43" \o "" Moreover, the May 8, 2010 resolution cannot as yet be implemented for not having attained finality. Despite recourse to this Court, however, we cannot rule on the issue of citizenship of Gonzalez. Subsequent events showed that Gonzalez had not only been duly proclaimed, he had also taken his oath of office and assumed office as Member of the House of Representatives. We have consistently held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/192856.htm" \l "_ftn44" \o "" In Perez v. Commission on Elections, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/192856.htm" \l "_ftn45" \o "" we declared that the Court does not have jurisdiction to pass upon the eligibility of the private respondent who was already a Member of the House of Representatives at the time of filing of the petition for certiorari. III COMELEC LOSES JURISDICTION UPON PROCLAMATION AS A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/192856.ht m" \l "_ftn46" \o "" Under Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives.

As this Court explained in Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/192856.htm" \l "_ftn47" \o "" :

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The use of the word “sole” emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred x x x. The exercise of the power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as “intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature” x x x. Earlier, this grant of power to the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm “as full, clear and complete” x x x. Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal x x x and it remained as full, clear and complete as that previously granted the legislature and the Electoral Commission x x x. The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution. Limkaichong v. Commission on Elections HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/192856.htm" \l "_ftn48" \o "" recently reiterated this settled rule on the COMELEC’s loss of jurisdiction over a petition questioning the qualifications of a candidate upon his election, proclamation and assumption of office. In said case, petitioner Limkaichong faced two disqualification cases alleging that she is not a naturalborn Filipino because her parents were Chinese citizens at the time of her birth. By Decision dated April 1, 2009, this Court upheld the validity of Limkaichong’s proclamation and the HRET’s jurisdiction over the issue of disqualification of Limkaichong. Thus: The Court has held in the case of Planas v. COMELEC, that at the time of the proclamation of Defensor, the respondent therein who garnered the highest number of votes, the Division Resolution invalidating his certificate of candidacy was not yet final. As such, his proclamation was valid or legal, as he had at that point in time remained qualified. Limkaichong’s situation is no different from that of Defensor, the former having been disqualified by a Division Resolution on the basis of her not being a natural-born Filipino citizen. When she was proclaimed by the PBOC, she was the winner during the elections for obtaining the highest number of votes, and at that time, the Division Resolution disqualifying her has not yet became final as a result of the motion for reconsideration. xxxx The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should now present his case in a proper proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a Member of the House of Representatives with respect to the latter’s election, returns and qualifications. The use of the word “sole” in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 250 of the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals’ jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members. In the case of Gonzalez, the COMELEC said that the applicable rule is Section 16 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 promulgated on October 6, 2009 which specifically governs the

proceedings for the May 10, 2010 Automated Elections. Said provision reads: SEC. 16. Effects of Disqualification. -- Any candidate who has been declared disqualified by final judgment shall not be voted for and the votes cast in his favor shall not be counted. If, for any reason, he is not declared disqualified by final judgment before the election and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes, the case shall continue and upon motion of the petitioner, complainant, or intervenor, the proclamation of such candidate may be ordered suspended during the pendency of the said case whenever the evidence is strong. a) where a similar complaint/petition is filed before the election and before the proclamation of the respondent and the case is not resolved before the election, the trial and hearing of the case shall continue and referred to the Law Department for preliminary investigation. b) where the complaint/petition is filed after the election and before the proclamation of the respondent, the trial and hearing of the case shall be suspended and referred to the Law Department for preliminary investigation. In either case, if the evidence of guilt is strong, the Commission may order the suspension of the proclamation of respondent, and if proclaimed, to suspend the effects of proclamation. (Emphasis supplied.) We also hold that there is no basis for the COMELEC’s order constituting a Special Provincial Board of Canvassers for the purpose of proclaiming Lim who got the next highest number of votes in the May 10, 2010 elections for the position of Representative of the 3 rd District of Albay. It is wellsettled that the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office. The votes intended for the disqualified candidate should not be considered null and void, as it would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/192856.htm" \l "_ftn60" \o "" The second placer is just that, a second placer – he lost in the elections and was repudiated by either the majority or plurality of voters. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/192856.htm" \l "_ftn61" \o "" Private respondent Lim argues that the second placer rule will not apply in this case because Gonzalez was disqualified to be a candidate before election under the assailed COMELEC resolutions which became final and executory after five (5) days without a restraining order issued by this Court. The effect of the ruling on Gonzalez’s disqualification retroacts to the day of election (May 10, 2010). The exception to the second placer rule is predicated on the concurrence of the following: (1) the one who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (2) the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate’s disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/192856.htm" \l "_ftn63" \o "" These facts warranting the exception to the rule are not present in the case at bar. As noted by Commissioner Velasco, the date of promulgation of the resolution declaring Gonzalez disqualified to be a candidate in the May 10, 2010 was not a previously fixed date as required by Section 6 HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/192856.htm" \l "_ftn64" \o "" of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 as the records do not show that the parties were given prior notice thereof. In fact, Gonzalez through his counsel received a copy of the May 8, 2010 Resolution only on

May 11, 2010, one day after the elections. And as we held in Bautista v. Commission on Elections "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/192856.htm" \l "_ftn65" \o ""

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Thus, when the electorate voted for Bautista as Punong Barangay on 15 July 2002, it was under the belief that he was qualified. There is no presumption that the electorate agreed to the invalidation of their votes as stray votes in case of Bautista’s disqualification. The Court cannot adhere to the theory of respondent Alcoreza that the votes cast in favor of Bautista are stray votes. A subsequent finding by the COMELEC en banc that Bautista is ineligible cannot retroact to the date of elections so as to invalidate the votes cast for him. As held in Domino v. COMELEC: Contrary to the claim of INTERVENOR, petitioner was not notoriously known by the public as an ineligible candidate. Although the resolution declaring him ineligible as candidate was rendered before the election, however, the same is not yet final and executory. We have declared that not even this Court has authority under any law to impose upon and compel the people to accept a loser, as their representative or political leader. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/192856.htm" \l "_ftn67" \o "" The wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the disqualified winner to the repudiated loser. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/192856.htm" \l "_ftn68" \o "" The COMELEC clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the proclamation of private respondent Lim who lost by a wide margin of 29,292 votes, after declaring Gonzalez, the winning candidate, disqualified to run as Member of the House of Representatives. Immunity from suit of Air Transportation Office AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE VS. SPOUSES DAVID AND ELISEA RAMOS, G.R. No. 159402, February 23, 2011 BERSAMIN, J.: FACTS: Spouses David and Elisea Ramos (respondents) discovered that a portion of their land registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-58894 of the Baguio City land records with an area of 985 square meters, more or less, was being used as part of the runway and running shoulder of the Loakan Airport being operated by petitioner Air Transportation Office (ATO). On August 11, 1995, the respondents agreed after negotiations to convey the affected portion by deed of sale to the ATO in consideration of the amount of P778,150.00. However, the ATO failed to pay despite repeated verbal and written demands. Thus, on April 29, 1998, the respondents filed an action for collection against the ATO and some of its officials in the RTC (docketed as Civil Case No. 4017-R and entitled Spouses David and Elisea Ramos v. Air Transportation Office, Capt. Panfilo Villaruel, Gen. Carlos Tanega, and Mr. Cesar de Jesus). In their answer, the ATO and its co-defendants invoked as an affirmative defense the issuance of Proclamation No. 1358, whereby President Marcos had reserved certain parcels of land that included the respondents’ affected portion for use of the Loakan Airport. They asserted that the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the action without the State’s consent considering that the deed of sale had been entered into in the performance of governmental functions.

On November 10, 1998, the RTC denied the ATO’s motion for a preliminary hearing of the affirmative defense. After the RTC likewise denied the ATO’s motion for reconsideration on December 10, 1998, the ATO commenced a special civil action for certiorari in the CA to assail the RTC’s orders. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari, however, upon its finding that the assailed orders were not tainted with grave abuse of discretion. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/159402.htm" \l "_ftn6" \o "" Subsequently, February 21, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision on the merits, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/159402.htm" \l "_ftn7" \o "" disposing: WHEREFORE, the judgment is rendered ORDERING the defendant Air Transportation Office to pay the plaintiffs DAVID and ELISEA RAMOS the following: (1) The amount of P778,150.00 being the value of the parcel of land appropriated by the defendant ATO as embodied in the Deed of Sale, plus an annual interest of 12% from August 11, 1995, the date of the Deed of Sale until fully paid; (2) The amount of P150,000.00 by way of moral damages and P150,000.00 as exemplary damages; (3) the amount of P50,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees plus P15,000.00 representing the 10, more or less, court appearances of plaintiff’s counsel; (4) The costs of this suit. SO ORDERED. The CA, which affirmed the RTC’s decision on May 14, 2003, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/159402.htm" \l "_ftn8" \o "" viz: IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION that the awarded cost therein is deleted, while that of moral and exemplary damages is reduced to P30,000.00 each, and attorney’s fees is lowered to P10,000.00. ISSUE The only issue presented for resolution is whether the ATO could be sued without the State’s consent. Ruling The petition for review has no merit. The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign immunity or nonsuability of the State, is expressly provided in Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution, viz: Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent. The immunity from suit is based on the political truism that the State, as a sovereign, can do no wrong. Moreover, as the eminent Justice Holmes said in Kawananakoa v. Polyblank: The territory [of Hawaii], of course, could waive its exemption (Smith v. Reeves, 178 US 436, 44 L ed 1140, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 919), and it took no objection to the proceedings in the cases cited if it could have done so. xxx But in the case at bar it did object, and the question raised is whether the plaintiffs were bound to yield. Some doubts have been expressed as to the source of the immunity of a sovereign power from suit without its own permission, but the answer has been public property since before the days of Hobbes. Leviathan, chap. 26, 2. A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. “Car on peut bien recevoir loy d'autruy, mais il est impossible par nature de se donner loy.” Bodin, Republique, 1, chap. 8, ed. 1629, p. 132; Sir John Eliot, De Jure Maiestatis, chap. 3. Nemo suo statuto ligatur necessitative. Baldus, De Leg. et Const. Digna Vox, 2. ed. 1496, fol. 51b, ed. 1539, fol.

61. Practical considerations dictate the establishment of an immunity from suit in favor of the State. Otherwise, and the State is suable at the instance of every other individual, government service may be severely obstructed and public safety endangered because of the number of suits that the State has to defend against. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/159402.htm" \l "_ftn11" \o "" Several justifications have been offered to support the adoption of the doctrine in the Philippines, but that offered in Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the Philippines HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/159402.htm" \l "_ftn12" \o "" is “the most acceptable explanation,” according to Father Bernas, a recognized commentator on Constitutional Law, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/159402.htm" \l "_ftn13" \o "" to wit: [A] continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the well-known propensity on the part of our people to go to court, at the least provocation, the loss of time and energy required to defend against law suits, in the absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacle, could very well be imagined. An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own enjoys immunity from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for damages against the agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is violated. However, the need to distinguish between an unincorporated government agency performing governmental function and one performing proprietary functions has arisen. The immunity has been upheld in favor of the former because its function is governmental or incidental to such function; it has not been upheld in favor of the latter whose function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of government but was essentially a business. Should the doctrine of sovereignty immunity or non-suability of the State be extended to the ATO? In its challenged decision, the CA answered in the negative, holding: On the first assignment of error, appellants seek to impress upon Us that the subject contract of sale partook of a governmental character. Apropos, the lower court erred in applying the High Court’s ruling in National Airports Corporation vs. Teodoro (91 Phil. 203 [1952]), arguing that in Teodoro, the matter involved the collection of landing and parking fees which is a proprietary function, while the case at bar involves the maintenance and operation of aircraft and air navigational facilities and services which are governmental functions. We are not persuaded. Contrary to appellants’ conclusions, it was not merely the collection of landing and parking fees which was declared as proprietary in nature by the High Court in Teodoro, but management and maintenance of airport operations as a whole, as well. Thus, in the much later case of Civil Aeronautics Administration vs. Court of Appeals (167 SCRA 28 [1988]), the Supreme Court, reiterating the pronouncements laid down in Teodoro, declared that the CAA (predecessor of ATO) is an agency not immune from suit, it being engaged in functions pertaining to a private entity. It went on to explain in this wise: xxx

The Civil Aeronautics Administration comes under the category of a private entity. Although not a body corporate it was created, like the National Airports Corporation, not to maintain a necessary function of government, but to run what is essentially a business, even if revenues be not its prime objective but rather the promotion of travel and the convenience of the travelling public. It is engaged in an enterprise which, far from being the exclusive prerogative of state, may, more than the construction of public roads, be undertaken by private concerns. [National Airports Corp. v. Teodoro, supra, p. 207.] xxx True, the law prevailing in 1952 when the Teodoro case was promulgated was Exec. Order 365 (Reorganizing the Civil Aeronautics Administration and Abolishing the National Airports Corporation). Republic Act No. 776 (Civil Aeronautics Act of the Philippines), subsequently enacted on June 20, 1952, did not alter the character of the CAA’s objectives under Exec. Order 365. The pertinent provisions cited in the Teodoro case, particularly Secs. 3 and 4 of Exec. Order 365, which led the Court to consider the CAA in the category of a private entity were retained substantially in Republic Act 776, Sec. 32(24) and (25). Said Act provides: Sec. 32. Powers and Duties of the Administrator. – Subject to the general control and supervision of the Department Head, the Administrator shall have among others, the following powers and duties: xxx (24) To administer, operate, manage, control, maintain and develop the Manila International Airport and all government-owned aerodromes except those controlled or operated by the Armed Forces of the Philippines including such powers and duties as: (a) to plan, design, construct, equip, expand, improve, repair or alter aerodromes or such structures, improvement or air navigation facilities; (b) to enter into, make and execute contracts of any kind with any person, firm, or public or private corporation or entity; … (25) To determine, fix, impose, collect and receive landing fees, parking space fees, royalties on sales or deliveries, direct or indirect, to any aircraft for its use of aviation gasoline, oil and lubricants, spare parts, accessories and supplies, tools, other royalties, fees or rentals for the use of any of the property under its management and control. xxx From the foregoing, it can be seen that the CAA is tasked with private or non-governmental functions which operate to remove it from the purview of the rule on State immunity from suit. For the correct rule as set forth in the Teodoro case states: xxx

Not all government entities, whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suits is determined by the character of the objects for which the entity was organized. The rule is thus stated in Corpus Juris: Suits against State agencies with relation to matters in which they have assumed to act in private or nongovernmental capacity, and various suits against certain corporations created by the state for public purposes, but to engage in matters partaking more of the nature of ordinary business rather than functions of a governmental or political character, are not regarded as suits against the state. The latter is true, although the state may own stock or property of such a corporation for by engaging in business operations through a corporation, the state divests itself so far of its sovereign character, and by implication consents to suits against the corporation. (59 C.J., 313) [National Airports Corporation v. Teodoro, supra, pp. 206-207; Italics supplied.] This doctrine has been reaffirmed in the recent case of Malong v. Philippine National Railways [G.R. No. L-49930, August 7, 1985, 138 SCRA 63], where it was held that the Philippine National Railways, although owned and operated by the government, was not immune from suit as it does not exercise sovereign but purely proprietary and business functions. Accordingly, as the CAA was created to undertake the management of airport operations which primarily involve proprietary functions, it cannot avail of the immunity from suit accorded to government agencies performing strictly governmental functions. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/159402.htm" \l "_ftn18" \o "" The CA correctly appreciated the juridical character of the ATO as an agency of the Government not performing a purely governmental or sovereign function, but was instead involved in the management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the State’s immunity from suit. We uphold the CA’s aforequoted holding. We further observe the doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for compensation arising from the taking without just compensation and without the proper expropriation proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiffs’ property. Thus, in De los Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the trial court’s dismissal based on the doctrine of nonsuability of the State of two cases (one of which was for damages) filed by owners of property where a road 9 meters wide and 128.70 meters long occupying a total area of 1,165 square meters and an artificial creek 23.20 meters wide and 128.69 meters long occupying an area of 2,906 square meters had been constructed by the provincial engineer of Rizal and a private contractor without the owners’ knowledge and consent was reversed and the cases remanded for trial on the merits. The Supreme Court ruled that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was not an instrument for perpetrating any injustice on a citizen. In exercising the right of eminent domain, the Court explained, the State exercised its jus imperii, as distinguished from its proprietary rights, or jus gestionis; yet, even in that area, where private property had been taken in expropriation without just compensation being paid, the defense of immunity from suit could not be set up by the State against an action for payment by the owners. Lastly, the issue of whether or not the ATO could be sued without the State’s consent has

been rendered moot by the passage of Republic Act No. 9497, otherwise known as the Civil Aviation Authority Act of 2008. R.A. No. 9497 abolished the ATO, to wit: Section 4. Creation of the Authority. – There is hereby created an independent regulatory body with quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative powers and possessing corporate attributes to be known as the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP), herein after referred to as the “Authority” attached to the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) for the purpose of policy coordination. For this purpose, the existing Air transportation Office created under the provisions of Republic Act No. 776, as amended is hereby abolished. xxx Under its Transitory Provisions, R.A. No. 9497 established in place of the ATO the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP), which thereby assumed all of the ATO’s powers, duties and rights, assets, real and personal properties, funds, and revenues, viz: CHAPTER XII TRANSITORTY PROVISIONS Section 85. Abolition of the Air Transportation Office. – The Air Transportation Office (ATO) created under Republic Act No. 776, a sectoral office of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), is hereby abolished. All powers, duties and rights vested by law and exercised by the ATO is hereby transferred to the Authority. All assets, real and personal properties, funds and revenues owned by or vested in the different offices of the ATO are transferred to the Authority. All contracts, records and documents relating to the operations of the abolished agency and its offices and branches are likewise transferred to the Authority. Any real property owned by the national government or government-owned corporation or authority which is being used and utilized as office or facility by the ATO shall be transferred and titled in favor of the Authority. Section 23 of R.A. No. 9497 enumerates the corporate powers vested in the CAAP, including the power to sue and be sued, to enter into contracts of every class, kind and description, to construct, acquire, own, hold, operate, maintain, administer and lease personal and real properties, and to settle, under such terms and conditions most advantageous to it, any claim by or against it. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/159402.htm" \l "_ftn21" \o "" With the CAAP having legally succeeded the ATO pursuant to R.A. No. 9497, the obligations that the ATO had incurred by virtue of the deed of sale with the Ramos spouses might now be enforced against the CAAP. Publication of Rules; equal protection; due process AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., MANUEL B. VILLAR, JOKER P. ARROYO, FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN, PIA S. CAYETANO, and ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO VS. SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE represented by SENATE PRESIDENT JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GR No. 187724, March 8, 2011. CARPIO, J.:

The Case Before the Court is a petition seeking to enjoin the Senate Committee of the Whole (respondent) from conducting further hearings on the complaint filed by Senator Maria Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal (Senator Madrigal) against Senator Villar pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 706 (P.S. Resolution 706) on the alleged double insertion of P200 million for the C-5 Road Extension Project in the 2008 General Appropriations Act. THE FACTS: On 15 September 2008, Senator Panfilo Lacson (Senator Lacson) delivered a privilege speech entitled “Kaban ng Bayan, Bantayan!” In his privilege speech, Senator Lacson called attention to the congressional insertion in the 2008 General Appropriations Act, particularly the P200 million appropriated for the construction of the President Carlos P. Garcia Avenue Extension from Sucat Luzon Expressway to Sucat Road in Parañaque City including Right-of-Way (ROW), and another P200 million appropriated for the extension of C-5 road including ROW. Senator Lacson stated that C5 is what was formerly called President Carlos P. Garcia Avenue and that the second appropriation covers the same stretch – from Sucat Luzon Expressway to Sucat Road in Parañaque City. Senator Lacson inquired from DBM Secretary Rolando Andaya, Jr. about the double entry and was informed that it was on account of a congressional insertion. Senator Lacson further stated that when he followed the narrow trail leading to the double entry, it led to Senator Villar, then the Senate President. On 8 October 2008, Senator Madrigal introduced P.S. Resolution 706, which reads: WHEREAS the Senate President has repeatedly and publicly “advocated” (sic) the construction of the C-5 Road/Pres. C.P. Garcia Avenue Extension linking Sucat Road in Parañaque City to the South Luzon Expressway; WHEREAS it was discovered that there was a double insertion of P200 million for the C-5 Road Extension project in the 2008 General Appropriations Act; WHEREAS Committee on Finance Chair Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile confirmed that the double insertion for the C-5 Road Extension Project was made by the Senate President; WHEREAS this double insertion is only the tip of the iceberg; WHEREAS there is overwhelming evidence to show that the Senate President, from the time he was member of the House of Representatives, used his influence on the executive to cause the realignment of the C-5 Road Extension project to ensure that his properties in Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City and Barangays Pulang Lupa and Mayuno Uno, Las Piñas would be financially benefited by the construction of the new road; WHEREAS there is overwhelming evidence to show that the Senate President, through his corporations, negotiated the sale of his properties as roads right of way to the government, the same properties affected by the projects he proposed; WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, TO DIRECT THE COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND PRIVILEGES TO INVESTIGATE THE CONDUCT OF SENATE PRESIDENT MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR. FOR USING HIS POSITION OF POWER TO INFLUENCE PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN RELOCATING THE C-5 ROAD EXTENSION PROJECT TO DELIBERATELY PASS THRU HIS PROPERTIES, AND TO NEGOTIATE THE OVERPRICED PURCHASE OF ROAD RIGHTS OF WAY THRU SEVERAL PROPERTIES ALSO OWNED BY HIS CORPORATIONS REDOUNDING IN HUGE PERSONAL FINANCIAL BENEFITS FOR HIM TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE, THEREBY RESULTING IN A BLATANT CONFLICT OF INTEREST.

(Sgd.) M.A. MADRIGAL On even date, P.S. Resolution 706 was referred to the Committee on Ethics and Privileges (Ethics Committee) which at that time was composed of the following members: Sen. Pia S. Cayetano - Chairperson Sen. Loren Legarda - Member in lieu of Sen. Madrigal Sen. Joker Arroyo - Member Sen. Alan Peter Cayetano- Member Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago- Member Sen. Gregorio Honasan - Member Sen. Panfilo Lacson - Inhibited and replaced by Sen. Rodolfo Biazon On 17 November 2008, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Senator Enrile) was elected Senate President. The Ethics Committee was reorganized with the election of Senator Lacson as Chairperson, and Senators Richard Gordon, Gregorio Honasan, Loren Legarda, and Mar Roxas as members for the Majority. On 16 December 2008, Senator Lacson inquired whether the Minority was ready to name their representatives to the Ethics Committee. After consultation with the members of the Minority, Senator Pimentel informed the body that there would be no member from the Minority in the Ethics Committee. Thereafter, the Senate adopted the Rules of the Senate Committee on Ethics and Privileges (Committee Rules) which was published in the Official Gazette on 23 March 2009. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/187714.html" \l "sdfootnote9sym" On 20 April 2009, Senator Villar delivered a privilege speech where he stated that he would answer the accusations against him on the floor and not before the Ethics Committee. On 27 April 2009, Senator Lacson delivered another privilege speech where he stated that the Ethics Committee was not a kangaroo court. However, due to the accusation that the Ethics Committee could not act with fairness on Senator Villar’s case, Senator Lacson moved that the responsibility of the Ethics Committee be undertaken by the Senate, acting as a Committee of the Whole. The motion was approved with ten members voting in favor, none against, and five abstentions. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/187714.html" \l "sdfootnote12sym" Respondent Senate Committee of the Whole conducted its hearings on 4 May 2009, with eleven Senators present, and on 7 May 2009, with eight Senators present. On both hearings, petitioners objected to the application of the Rules of the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole. The petitioners raised the following grounds in support of the petition: 1. The transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole is violative of Senator Villar’s constitutional right to equal protection; 2. The Rules adopted by the Senate Committee of the Whole for the investigation of the complaint filed by Senator Madrigal against Senator Villar is violative of Senator Villar’s right to due process and of the majority quorum requirement under Art. VI, Sec. 16(2) of the Constitution; and 3. The Senate Committee of the Whole likewise violated the due process clause of the Constitution when it refused to publish the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole in spite of its own provision [which] require[s] its effectivity upon publication. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/187714.html" \l "sdfootnote13sym" 13 The Issues 1.

Whether Senator Madrigal, who filed the complaint against Senator Villar, is an indispensable party in this petition;

2.

Whether the petition is premature for failure to observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or prior resort; 3. Whether the transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole is violative of Senator Villar’s right to equal protection; 4. Whether the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee as Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is a violative of Senator Villar’s right to due process and of the majority quorum requirement under Art. VI, Section 16(2) of the Constitution; and 5. Whether publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required for their effectivity. HELD: 1. In this case, Senator Madrigal is not an indispensable party to the petition before the Court. While it may be true that she has an interest in the outcome of this case as the author of P.S. Resolution 706, the issues in this case are matters of jurisdiction and procedure on the part of the Senate Committee of the Whole which can be resolved without affecting Senator Madrigal’s interest. The nature of Senator Madrigal’s interest in this case is not of the nature that this case could not be resolved without her participation. 2. Respondent asserts that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction “simply calls for the determination of administrative questions, which are ordinarily questions of fact, by administrative agencies rather than by courts of justice.” Citing Pimentel v. HRET, respondent avers that primary recourse of petitioners should have been to the Senate and that this Court must uphold the separation of powers between the legislative and judicial branches of the government. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case. The Court has ruled: x x x It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of fact are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of the court. x x x The issues presented here do not require the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of respondent for their resolution. On the contrary, the issues here are purely legal questions which are within the competence and jurisdiction of the Court, and not an administrative agency or the Senate to resolve. 3. Petitioners allege that the transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar to the Senate Committee of the Whole violates his constitutional right to equal protection. Petitioners allege that the Senate Committee of the Whole was constituted solely for the purpose of assuming jurisdiction over the complaint against Senator Villar. Petitioners further allege that the act was discriminatory and removed Senator Villar’s recourse against any adverse report of the Ethics Committee to the Senate as a body. 4. Petitioners allege that the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee by the Senate Committee of the Whole is violative of Senator Villar’s right to due process. Considering the circumstances of this case, the referral of the investigation by the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole is an extraordinary remedy that does not violate Senator Villar’s right to due process. In the same manner, the adoption by the Senate Committee of the Whole of the Rules of the Ethics Committee does not violate Senator Villar’s right to due process. The Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate its own rules of proceedings has been recognized and affirmed by this Court. Thus:

First. Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states: “Each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings.” The only limitation to the power of Congress to promulgate its own rules is the observance of quorum, voting, and publication when required. As long as these requirements are complied with, the Court will not interfere with the right of Congress to amend its own rules. 5. Petitioners assail the non-publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole. Respondent counters that publication is not necessary because the Senate Committee of the Whole merely adopted the Rules of the Ethics Committee which had been published in the Official Gazette on 23 March 2009. Respondent alleges that there is only one set of Rules that governs both the Ethics Committee and the Senate Committee of the Whole. In Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, the Court declared void unpublished rules of procedure in Senate inquiries insofar as such rules affect the rights of witnesses. The Court cited Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution which mandates: Sec. 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective Committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. (Emphasis supplied) The Court explained in the Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration: The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules of its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in the subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice. Lest the Court be misconstrued, it should likewise be stressed that not all orders issued or proceedings conducted pursuant to the subject Rules are null and void. Only those that result in violation of the rights of witnesses should be considered null and void, considering that the rationale for the publication is to protect the rights of the witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and proceedings are considered valid and effective. (Emphasis supplied) In the recent case of Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al., HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/187714.html" \l "sdfootnote27sym" 27 the Court further clarified: x x x inquiries in aid of legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution is the sole instance in the Constitution where there is a categorical directive to duly publish a set of rules of procedure. Significantly notable in Neri is that with respect to the issue of publication, the Court anchored its ruling on the 1987 Constitution’s directive, without any reliance on or reference to the 1986 case of Tañada v. Tuvera. Tañada naturally could neither have interpreted a forthcoming 1987 Constitution nor had kept a tight rein on the Constitution’s intentions as expressed through the allowance of either a categorical term or a general sense of making known the issuances. The Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of the House or Senate. Since rules of the House or the Senate that affect only their members are internal to the House or Senate, such rules need not be published, unless such rules expressly provide for their publication before the rules can take effect. In this case, the proceedings before the Senate Committee of the Whole affect only members of the Senate since the proceedings involve the Senate’s exercise of its disciplinary power over one of its members. Clearly, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole are internal to the Senate.

However, Section 81, Rule 15 of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole provides: Sec. 81. EFFECTIVITY. These Rules shall be effective after publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. Hence, in this particular case, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole itself provide that the Rules must be published before the Rules can take effect. Thus, even if publication is not required under the Constitution, publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required because the Rules expressly mandate their publication. Respondent cannot dispense with the publication requirement just because the Rules of the Ethics Committee had already been published in the Official Gazette. To reiterate, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole expressly require publication before the Rules can take effect. To comply with due process requirements, the Senate must follow its own internal rules if the rights of its own members are affected. WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition in part. The referral of the complaint by the Committee on Ethics and Privileges to the Senate Committee of the Whole shall take effect only upon publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole.

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