2010_Burke__Canaan Under Siege the History and Archaeology of Egypt's War in Canaan Durig the Earlt Eighteenth Dynasty

November 29, 2017 | Author: Jordi Teixidor Abelenda | Category: Canaan, New Kingdom Of Egypt, Eighteenth Dynasty Of Egypt, Ancient Egypt, Bronze Age
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Canaan under Siege The History and Archaeology of Egypt’s War in Canaan during the Early Eighteenth Dynasty

Aaron A. Burke

Despite the considerable attention that has been devoted to the study of the end of the Middle Bronze Age, to Late Bronze Age Canaan, and to the development of the New Kingdom Egyptian Empire in the Levant, a nuanced historical-archaeological reconstruction of the opening days of Egyptian imperialism remains lacking. In part, this deficiency is owed to the prerequisites of familiarity with, on the one hand, the history, material culture, and settlement patterns of the Levant during both the Middle and Late Bronze Ages and, on the other, with the history of Egypt’s New Kingdom campaigns. The dearth of syntheses is also owed to the adherence to entrenched and outdated models for Canaan’s political organization, which are central to understanding the changes brought about during this transition period, and the limited attention devoted to, until recently, the archaeological evidence for Egypt’s intervention in and policies toward Canaan. The continued employment of dated constructs limits our ability to nuance the development of Egypt’s military policy toward Canaan over the course of the Late Bronze Age, particularly within the LB IA (ca. 1530–1460 BC). As is argued in this article, these constructs obscure the identification of the material and ideological effects of Egypt’s dominance and the recognition of Egypt’s very gradual subjugation and effective balkanization of Middle Bronze Age territorial kingdoms in the southern Levant which began during the LB IA. What follows, therefore, is the result of an attempt to formulate a nuanced historical-archaeological reconstruction of Egypt’s early conquests in Canaan by relying not only upon archaeological data from sites and settlement patterns during the transition between the Middle and Late Bronze Ages (MB III–LB IA), but also to use evidence relating to the nature of Bronze Age warfare and a new perspective on the evolution of polities in the Levant during this period. The Close of the Middle Bronze Age It is widely agreed that during the MB III (ca. 1600–1530 BC) the southern Levant continued the settlement trend begun during the MB II and that it was characterized by a process known as settlement infilling, which resulted in the presence of a greater number of smaller settlements scattered across the landscape between larger

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fortified centers that existed during the MB II.1 The presence of a large number of cemeteries dated to the MB II–III that presumably belonged to the inhabitants of nearby, although often unidentified settlements,2 suggests that many of these settlements were unfortified and short-lived, perhaps lasting as little as a few decades during the MB II–III. Although it is not an easy process to distinguish settlements founded in the late MB II from those founded during the MB III, the prevailing political and socioeconomic conditions, which I identify as Pax Amoritica, suggest the continuation of the MB II settlement trend and associated political organization.3 Political Organization and Strategic Defenses The settlement pattern at the close of the Middle Bronze Age was intrinsically related to the nature of the political organization of the southern Levant. Canaan’s political organization at the close of the Middle Bronze Age permits a clearer articulation of Egypt’s approach to the conquest of Canaan at the start of the New Kingdom and its subsequent approach to the administration of the region. The prevailing interpretation of Canaan’s political organization during the MB II–III, which has been characterized as that of dozens of independent city-states,4 has relied nearly entirely on the retrojection of the political organization characteristic of Late Bronze Age Canaan as identified from the Amarna letters.5 As I have argued, however, the defensive strategy of the late Middle Bronze Age was inherently dictated by the largest urban, fortified settlements (i.e., political capitals), which can be identified as the dominant polities (preferably referred to as kingdoms) during the second half of the Middle Bronze Age. This can be inferred from the spatial relationship between first-tier centers and settlements around them, namely the strategic location of certain settlement types (discussed below), as well as the considerable labor required in the construction of monumental fortifications at small sites. Among the most conspicuous of these political centers were Hazor and Ashkelon,6 but probably others included small centers in the highlands, such as Shechem and Jerusalem.7 Ashkelon’s landscape is an excellent case study of the relationship between secondary sites and their political centers. Indeed, it was the settlement pattern and site types of the kingdom of Ashkelon during the MB II–III, which con1

In this article the following terms are used to designate phases of the Middle Bronze Age, replacing the MB IIA–IIC terminology: MB I (ca. 1900–1700 BC), MB II (ca. 1700–1600), and MB III (ca. 1600–1530 BC). Dates for the reigns of Egyptian pharaohs and their campaigns are based on Kitchen 2000. The LB IA (ca. 1530–1460). 2 I do not accept the supposition that cemeteries lacking association with conspicuous settlements must have belonged to pastoral nomads (contra Gonen 1981, for the Late Bronze Age). The suggestion is problematic given the dense settlement pattern of the urban Middle Bronze Age, which would have required that such cemeteries fell within the territory of one or another polity, and in light of the realization that pastoral nomads were most likely the social relations (i.e., kith and kin) of the inhabitants of MB urban settlements. Indeed, to the extent that any burials would be identified as those of pastoral nomads they are indistinguishable from those of their urban counterparts. 3 Burke 2008, 100–101. 4 Dever 1987. 5 For discussion, see Burke 2008, 119–121; also Sugerman 2009. 6 Burke 2008, 117, 125–135. 7 Burke 2008, 117–119.

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stituted a well defined defensive strategy,8 that became one of the foci of Egypt’s early efforts to subdue the region as argued below. Although in no single territory are all of these settlement types in evidence, owing to the exigencies of archaeological exploration, the defensive strategy employed appears to have focused on a settlement network comprised of sites of varying sizes and functions. Settlements ranged from large fortified centers like Hazor and Ashkelon (> 50 ha) to smaller fortified settlements, unfortified villages including those of less than 0.2 ha in size, fortresses, watchtowers, and rural agricultural estates or farmsteads.9 Along major road networks, for example, a series of towers (magdalūma), were erected to provide advanced warning of approaching threats and to protect caravans that plied the overland road and its tributaries between Aleppo and Avaris.10 These towers are today identified by means of toponyms deriving from the Arabic term májdal, and no fewer than sixty such sites can be identified in the Levant that are predominantly of late Middle and Late Bronze Age date (ca. 1700–1200 BC). In addition to the evidence for settlement hierarchy and a variety of settlement types, other lines of evidence support the identification of a period of political organization in Canaan that was dominated by large territorial kingdoms like Hazor and Ashkelon. Around Ashkelon, the spatial relationship of second-tier fortified centers reveals their location at one-day’s travel by foot throughout the coastal plain (Figure 1). Not only is this relationship meaningful because it is reflective of the potential sphere of Ashkelon’s immediate political control, but the location of its secondary and tertiary fortified settlements, which fall along an average distance of 30 km (between 25 and 33 km) from Ashkelon, reveals the employment of a consistent defensive strategy, which is characterized by the construction of rectilinear defensive layouts known during the MB II throughout the Levant.11 The considerable effort required to defend these smaller sites ranging from 1.5 to 22 ha in size also supports the recognition of a political hierarchy that was able to muster the resources needed to construct defenses at even the smallest of these sites, such as Timnah and Tel Sera‘. Within this context, the Middle Bronze Age palaces identified at ‘Ajjul and Lachish are recognized to be most likely the residences of provincial governors (e.g., OB šapitum). Thus, these second-tier centers, which were obviously oriented with a focus outward from Ashkelon, served Ashkelon’s effort to administer its hinterland and the routes leading from its territory through the coastal plain and into the highlands to the east.

8

Burke 2008, 81. Burke 2008, 122–125. 10 Burke 2007. 11 Burke 2008, 81. 9

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Fig 1. The kingdom of Ashkelon at the end of the Middle Bronze Age

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The precise character of the defenses of Middle Bronze Age settlements are well understood.12 At the close of the Middle Bronze Age, the average fortified settlement, such as those in the kingdom of Ashkelon, possessed substantial earthen ramparts, crowned by thick and solid mudbrick walls, studded with towers, and surrounded by a dry ditch or fosse. They were constructed with amazing regularity from their brick sizes to gate plans. Indeed, they were sufficiently well constructed to continue to function into the LB IA, which often complicates distinguishing precisely when the fortifications were no longer in service, despite our ability to more accurately date their construction. This is in part the result of the fact that the continued use, modification, and rebuilding of fortification systems was not a uniform process across each site, but was undertaken as needed, and would most often have involved either the reapplication of mud plaster, or the reconstruction or modification of the uppermost portions of walls, which were also the first portions to be destroyed. None of these efforts to maintain the fortifications provide any real potential for accurate dating as they are the most ephemeral elements of fortification systems whatever the period, and essentially escape archaeological detection. The vast majority of Canaan’s population, probably as much as 70% as in the kingdom of Ashkelon,13 inhabited fortified towns during the Middle Bronze Age. The remainder inhabited farming villages and rural agricultural estates within 15 km from these centers, and were thus at the most a few hours away from the safety of a fortified town (or conversely, the assistance of these towns), when circumstances dictated. Nevertheless, during the MB III (ca. 1600–1530 BC), there is evidence to suggest that the prevailing Pax Amoritica meant that newly founded settlements, such at Tel Michal, were inadequately prepared for sustaining a siege, having abandoned the traditional approach to wall construction.14 Similarly, while the employment of so-called casemate fortification walls afforded a greater flexibility in the use of space within ever-growing urban centers (i.e., as storage rooms), this wall type left sites, like Shechem in the highlands, with less than the ideal defenses since they were not “battle ready”.15 Indeed, these walls are hardly casemates at all, since there is no evidence to indicate that they were ever intended to be filled in as was, for example, the fortification wall around the Hittite capital of Hattuša. As a defensive strategy, therefore, it appears to have contributed to compromising the defensibility of many settlements, as there is little doubt that these walls were less effective than well-built and well-maintained, solid fortification walls of equal breadth. With the political and military context of the late Middle Bronze Age defined, it is possible to address the effects of Egypt’s expansion into Canaan during the LB IA. Egypt’s Early Empire It is generally agreed that it was Egypt’s early Eighteenth Dynasty that was ultimately responsible for the demise of Canaan’s defenses at the close of the Middle Bronze Age. Still, a variety of opinions have been voiced concerning the duration 12

Burke 2008, 47–84. Burke 2008, 134. 14 Burke 2008, 82–83. 15 Burke 2008, 61–63. 13

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and nature of Egyptian conquests in Canaan during the LB IA (ca. 1530 to 1460 BC), which spanned from the expulsion of the Hyksos16 by Ahmose through the Battle of Megiddo during the reign of Thutmose III.17 Having ruled out Hurrian invasions as a culprit,18 as previously held by a number of scholars,19 and having eliminated notions that Egyptians were incapable of the effort required or were inept in siege warfare,20 the Egyptian army remains the only viable culprit for the destructions attested across Canaan and especially, as will be discussed in detail here, in the southern coastal plain.21 Although it has also been suggested that internecine feuding between Canaanite city-states in the wake of the expulsion of the Hyksos from Egypt, as attested during the Amarna period, may have been responsible for these destructions, the suggestion requires accepting that Thutmose III’s rhetorical comments concerning chaos in Canaan at the start of his campaigns portray Canaanite infighting rather than simply a state of open rebellion by Canaanites against Egypt. Similarly incongruous is Redford’s suggestion that the site-wide destruction of MB III settlements (i.e., representing more than the destruction of the fortifications of these settlements) represented a “methodical demolition of fortifications” by the Egyptians after their conquests and were not the result of the destruction of the sites themselves.22 While it is clear that not all of the Late Bronze Age destructions evidenced in the archaeological record can be correlated with specific Egyptian references, whether textual or iconographic sources of the late Eighteenth and Nineteenth Dynasties, the absence of historical or archaeological evidence to permit the association of these destructions with either Canaanite or Hurrian culprits is significant. Thus, with no reasonable option left but to assign Egyptian agency to these destructions, attention can be focused on the unfolding nature of Egypt’s early imperial policies during the early Eighteenth Dynasty. Ellen Morris has provided the most up-to-date and thorough synthesis addressing in particular Egyptian historical sources and archaeological data of relevance for reconstructing the developmental phases of Egyptian domination from the Eighteenth to the Twentieth Dynasties.23 Of interest to the LB IA is her discussion of the 16

The term Hyksos has been widely applied in earlier scholarship to include not only the rulers of the Fifteenth Dynasty in Egypt (once thought to be of Hurrian extraction, but now recognized to be of Asiatic or, more precisely, of Amorite origin) but also the Amorite inhabitants of Canaan during the MB III. Translated as “foreign rulers” this Egyptian ascription should not be applied to groups beyond the Asiatic pharaohs and their followers who resided in the eastern Delta during the Second Intermediate Period. As was clearly the intent in previous scholarship, reference to the inhabitants of the southern Levant as Hyksos suggested an overt political and military relationship between the Fifteenth Dynasty rulers at Avaris and the Amorite rulers in Canaan. Nevertheless, to date neither historical nor archaeological data suggest more than a shared Amorite koiné in both regions, despite the distinct possibility that relationships between the Hyksos in Egypt and Amorite polities in Canaan may have been more formally arranged. 17 For a summary, see Morris 2005, 35, nn. 40–45; also Weinstein 1981, 1–2. 18 Dever 1998; Weinstein 1991. 19 Hoffmeier 1990, 1991; Na’aman 1994; Redford 1992, 137–140. 20 Burke 2009; Morris 2005, 36. 21 See also Burke 2008, 101, for summary; Weinstein 1981, 2–5. 22 Redford 2003, 50f. 23 Morris 2005.

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early and middle Eighteenth Dynasty up through the reign of Thutmose III.24 Particularly striking, of course, is the limited imprint left by Egyptian campaigns over the course of the six-decades between Ahmose’s and Thutmose’s campaigns, which will be discussed further below. Seemingly absent to date is evidence for Egyptian garrisons and fortresses that would typify Egyptian imperial presence from the LB IB onward. Indeed, Morris has characterized this “nascent empire” as “in a period of crisis prior to the campaign of Thutmose III”,25 although to do so is to embrace the mistaken assumption that the later character of the Egyptian empire was the shape intended but never realized by early Eighteenth Dynasty pharaohs. Therefore, references to the campaigns of Ahmose through Thutmose III and archaeological evidence from the LB IA serve as the starting point for consideration of the intersections of these historical events and the archaeological record. Some fundamental observations must be articulated in order to properly constrain our efforts to characterize Egyptian grand strategy and the specific tactics that were employed during the early Eighteenth Dynasty. As is evident from almost any historical survey of these early campaigns, it is impossible to speak of a tradition of annual campaigning by New Kingdom pharaohs until the first campaign of Thutmose III (ca. 1460 BC), which for the first time targeted a coalition of kings gathered at Megiddo (see discussion below). Similarly, there is no evidence that there existed from the outset of the Eighteenth Dynasty a clear Egyptian plan to systematically and mechanically subjugate Canaan via the overland route from the northern end of the Ways of Horus in the wake of Egypt’s initial victories at Avaris and Sharuhen (Tell el-‘Ajjul) by Ahmose, which is all too often assumed and would seem superficially to be most logical. This notion is a clear attempt to retroject the policy and conduct of the later New Kingdom pharaohs to the days of Ahmose. To the extent that it may be discerned, Egypt’s approach appears to have most often exploited inland marches from the coast following a markedly dendritic penetration along drainage systems (where established routes already existed), avoiding as much as possible the long slog that would have been necessary along the “coastal” highway, which was intensively overshadowed by well-fortified sites. Unexpected as Egyptian incursions from the coast seem to have been, these assaults met with nearly no opposition, and permitted, therefore, inland campaigns of considerable distance as undertaken by Amenhotep I and Thutmose I. Such efforts would have been effectively impossible along the land route during the early Eighteenth Dynasty owing to Egypt’s limited control of most of this region prior to Thutmose III, as revealed by the opposition that eventually coalesced and was mustered against the same pharaoh at Megiddo following the death of Hatshepsut. Since it is likely, however, that most of the destructions assigned to the LB IA in Canaan were the result of a number of different campaigns, which may not have been conducted by the pharaoh himself, as suggested by Morris,26 and thus some military efforts are historically unattested, an attempt can be made to address these early campaigns using the relevant archaeological data from Canaan. In what follows the archaeological evidence has been examined based on the 24

Morris 2005, 27–67, 115–164, 177–180. Morris 2005, 51, n. 85. 26 Morris 2005, 36. 25

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generally accepted dates assigned to the destruction of sites by their excavators. Attention is paid to clusters of settlements within regions that, I argue, are most likely to have been subject to attack during the same campaign based on the recognition of a discernible pattern of “strategic defenses” that were in place at the end of the Middle Bronze Age27 and which were necessarily faced by Egypt during this period.28 Ahmose: Sharuhen and Its Hinterland Following the siege of Avaris, Egypt’s coastally focused program of assaults began at Sharuhen, widely identified with Tell el-‘Ajjul following predominantly Kempinski’s criteria.29 Within the framework defined for the Middle Bronze Age, this campaign began what might be considered the gradual whittling away of the holdings of the kingdom of Ashkelon at the close of the MB III. Within the context of this Middle Bronze Age polity, Sharuhen served as its southern vanguard on the overland route leading to Egypt. The archaeology of the destruction of ‘Ajjul City II is well known, despite its early excavation by W. M. F. Petrie who was bound by the limits of his nascent methodology. Of particular interest are the destroyed remains of City II and Palace 2,30 which were at the time defended by a rampart (probably crowned by a wall since eradicated)31 and a fosse, which was 18 m wide, 6 m deep, and encircled the site on the north, east, and south sides.32 The siege of Sharuhen is said according to Egyptian historical records to have lasted three years, and it might be expected that some archaeological evidence remains of the considerable effort that such a lengthy siege required, particularly of the defenders. It is interesting therefore to consider the possibility that the so-called Upper and Lower Tunnels, which could never have functioned as a water system33 and was not employed for burials—as it ran directly underneath the in-use Middle Bronze Age (so-called “Hyksos”) cemetery—were undertaken to provide a secret means of access to and from the site by Sharuhen’s besieged as they sought to bring in supplies and send and receive messengers.34 Thus archaeological evidence at Tell el-‘Ajjul may substantiate a lengthy siege, and as suggested below provides a revealing glimpse into Egyptian siege tactics, namely the effectiveness of the employment of the protracted siege by the early Eighteenth Dynasty Egyptian army. The siege against Sharuhen is not likely to have been an isolated military operation and, in fact, the archaeological evidence inland from Sharuhen is sufficiently consistent in character to suggest a shared fate by its hinterland communities. A cluster of sites east of Sharuhen including Jemmeh,35 Haror,36 Sera‘,37 and Tell 27

Burke 2008, 124. See Keegan 1993, 142 for a discussion of the concept of strategic defenses. 29 Kempinski 1974. 30 Tufnell / Kempinski 1993, 53. 31 On the absence of evidence of mudbrick walls, see Burke 2008, 61. 32 Burke 2008, 231. 33 Contra Tufnell / Kempinski 1993, 50. 34 Burke 2008, 232f.; 2009, 64. 35 Van Beek 1993, 668. 36 Oren 1993a, 582. 37 Oren 1993b, 1330. 28

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Far‘ah South38 appear, strangely enough, to have escaped the destruction meted out by Egyptian troops during Ahmose’s multi-year siege of Sharuhen, or any subsequent early Eighteenth Dynasty pharaoh. Surprisingly these sites offer no evidence of destruction layers dated to the LB IA (thus through the reign of Thutmose III, despite reference in his list to Yurza; see no. 60). It is necessary, therefore, to consider if an absence of evidence for destruction is correctly interpreted as a peaceful period among these sites, particularly with the nearly continual presence of Egyptian troops at Gaza and Sharuhen during the LB IA. While it is difficult to be sure what the nature of Egypt’s actions against these settlements may have been, such settlements may have been blockaded by or may have capitulated to Egyptian troops, or their populations fled northward in the face of the Egypt’s determined effort against Sharuhen until it was considered safe to return. Such scenarios, all plausible, are impossible to tease out of the archaeological evidence in the absence of historical sources. Nevertheless, it is evident that, for whatever reasons, the siege of these settlements appears to have been unnecessary, located as they were to the rear of Sharuhen (Tell el-‘Ajjul) up the Nahals Besor and Gerar, and the absence of destruction levels dated to this period at these sites is conspicuous. Unclear is the relationship of Malhata’s destruction located further inland, which has been dated by Kochavi to the mid-sixteenth century BC.39 Before Thutmose III: The Southern Coastal Plain Following the limited evidence for campaigning beyond Avaris and Sharuhen during Ahmose’s reign, very limited historical evidence is available for campaigns by Ahmose’s successors. Still, several lines of evidence suggest that the southern coastal plain north of the Wadi Gaza (Nahal Besor), the territory largely under the sway of the Middle Bronze Age kingdom of Ashkelon, had been pacified before the arrival of Thutmose III.40 The strongest evidence for this is the conspicuous absence of the names of Canaanite towns on Thutmose III’s list located between Sharuhen, which was already held by an Egyptian garrison, and Jaffa (Yapu, no. 62). Settlements mentioned in the list within this region include only Yurza (no. 60) and Muhazzu (no. 61).41 Among the sites (at least those identified with historical toponyms) that are conspicuously absent in this list and that possess archaeological evidence of destruction levels dated to the LB IA are Ashkelon(?), Tell Nagila, Lachish, Timnah, Gezer, and Beth-Shemesh.42

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Yisraeli 1993. Kochavi 1967; 1992, 487. 40 Weinstein 1981. 41 The fact that both Tell Jemmeh and Tel Haror lack evidence for destruction layers dated to this period is interesting with respect to the question of identifying either of these sites with Yurza of this inscription, which was at least claimed to be conquered by Thutmose III, if not destroyed. The reference to Yurza in this list may be instructive, therefore, concerning the nature of what can be concluded from the sites listed. 42 Although Weinstein listed Hesi among these destructions (Weinstein 1981, 2), its stratigraphy has not permitted a clear identification of an MB III/LB IA destruction level (Fargo 1993). 39

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Gaza was in place as an Egyptian garrison no later than Thutmose III’s first campaign,43 although it remains uncertain if it was already in Egyptian hands before this. The extent to which Gaza was settled during the Middle or Late Bronze Ages remains, of course, unknown. Regardless, to the north of Gaza, the next parcel of territory that faced Egyptian conquest prior to Thutmose III lay along the Nahal Shiqma at a point nearly directly inland from Ashkelon. The LB I destruction of Ashkelon identified by Phythian-Adams44 has not been corroborated as a city-wide destruction by the most recent excavations,45 despite the limited evidence of any sort for occupational remains of the LB I within the main excavation areas of the Leon Levy Expedition. If Ashkelon was subdued during this period, this action is likely to have been contemporary with the Nahal Shiqma operation along which Nagila lay. Nearby Nagila had been fortified during the MB II–III,46 but Level VII was evidently brought to an end by a conflagration.47 To Nagila’s northeast, the well-fortified Lachish48 was burned before the end of the MB III.49 At this site, another enigmatic tunnel was identified by Tufnell as the work of sapper’s,50 although this identification is considered unlikely.51 A cluster of contemporary destructions can also be identified further to the northeast of Ashkelon, again at sites that are not identified in Thutmose III’s lists. These include Timnah, Gezer, and Beth-Shemesh. Timnah X revealed thick destruction debris dated by its excavator to the late sixteenth century BC.52 The destruction of Gezer XVIII (Qasru, no. 104) has been dated by William Dever to this period.53 Although the extent of construction, or more properly maintenance, undertaken for these fortifications during the LB IA is unclear, the fortifications appear to have been in place during the transition with some additional glacis construction thereafter.54 Beth-Shemesh’s destruction, as argued by Weinstein, is likely to represent a LB IA destruction.55 Absent among references from Thutmose III’s toponyms is any name to be identified with Yavneh-Yam, which was abandoned during this period. If the destruction of the above mentioned sites during the LB IA was not the result of Thutmose III’s campaign, since there are no references to these places among Ahmose’s early campaigns, it is reasonable to suggest that to the extent that this area was pacified, as suggested by LB IA destruction layers at the above sites, this process occurred after the reign of Ahmose and before that of Thumose III, being ascribed to either Amenhotep I, Thutmose I, Thutmose II, or Hatshepsut. Unfortunately, in none of the extant sources for these rulers is mention made of specific 43

Morris 2005, 39. Phythian-Adams 1923, 65. 45 Stager 2008, 1580. 46 Burke 2008, 298–299. 47 Amiran / Eitan 1993, 1080–1081. 48 Burke 2008, 287–288. 49 Ussishkin 1993b, 898–899; Level P-4, see Ussishkin 2004, 154–160. 50 Tufnell 1958, pl. 6. 51 Burke 2008, 288. 52 Mazar 1997, 41–45. 53 Dever 1993, 501. 54 Burke 2008, 262–263. 55 Also Burke 2008; Weinstein 1981, 3. 44

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campaigns in Canaan and little evidence is available to suggest a most likely candidate among them. Thutmose I, and perhaps his predecessor Amenhotep I, made excursions into the northern Levant, but make no reference to the south.56 More tantalizing, however, is a reference to a punitive campaign by Thutmose II against the Shasu after which he also moved on to action in the northern Levant.57 The association of the Shasu with the Negev and regions east may make Thutmose II a potential candidate for the destruction of Malhata, mentioned above, that has been dated to the mid-sixteenth century. Hatshepsut’s claims concerning campaigning, as noted by Redford, were probably “plucked from the traditional jargon” and permit to “isolate but a few, and rather innocuous, excursions” including mining in Sinai and a trip to Byblos.58 Therefore, despite a relative degree of confidence that Thutmose III was not actively engaged in the subjugation of the southern coastal plain, which apparently took place before his reign, it remains impossible to associate the region’s subjugation after Ahmose’s defeat of Sharuhen with the activity of the four pharaoh’s preceding Thutmose III. Canaan under Thutmose III In his study of the Egyptian New Kingdom Empire, James Weinstein noted that “none of the westernmost sites north of Ashkelon need necessarily have been destroyed or abandoned as early as the mid-16th century B.C.” making them “quite different from most of those in the southern and inland parts of Palestine”.59 More plainly stated, there is no basis for dating the destructions of sites north of Ashkelon before the reign of Thutmose III, and it is only with the reign of Thutmose III that the destruction of sites in Canaan can plausibly be associated with specific Egyptian campaigns. The toponym list of Thutmose has been extensively discussed by Donald Redford,60 but questions nevertheless remain regarding the nature of the lists. Can they, for example, be identified as more than an itinerary? Who was the intended audience and what purpose did they serve? Answering such questions is complicated by the nature of our efforts to use them as historical sources, as discussed by Redford. It would be unreasonable, for example, to expect destructions of a singular character at all of the sites listed, which were of varying size and strategic importance, in order to identify them as conquered by Thutmose III, which seems at a minimum suggested by their inclusion in this list. Thus in this context, as underscored in the preceding section, the destroyed MB III–LB IA settlements that are not included among these toponyms are more significant. The inference being that they were destroyed by one of Thutmose III’s predecessors. As Weinstein has observed, the areas where Thutmose III claims no activity were in “south-central Palestine, in the eastern Shephelah, in the hill country, or in the southern half of the Jordan Valley”.61

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Morris 2005, 30–33. Morris 2005, 33f. 58 Redford 1992, 152. 59 Weinstein 1981, 5. 60 Redford 2003, 43–56. 61 Weinstein 1981, 11. 57

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While the prologue to this list refers generally to lawlessness and chaos in Retenu and the ensuing “rebellion against His Majesty” the pharaoh as the basis for Thutmose III’s campaign,62 the context for this statement is none other than the coalition formed by the king of Qadesh to meet the pharaoh in battle. Thutmose III, while fortunate to have caught the Canaanite armies (or at least most of them, allowing for considerable exaggeration by the pharaoh) at Megiddo, was as prepared for open battle as he was for siege warfare against Canaanite towns. The destruction of Megiddo IX is traditionally identified as the result of the Egyptian siege,63 although Weinstein has noted that there is no clear evidence of a destruction associated with this Egyptian action.64 It is fair, therefore, to characterize the defeat of the coalition and, by extension, the armies of its individual participants as the defeat or conquest of the individual towns from which these armies were levied. There simply would have been no substantive defense left for these communities to muster during any effort by Thutmose III to force the capitulation of these towns, and certainly no hope of their defense by neighboring allies, most of whom we may conclude were also routed at Megiddo. In this respect, the circumstances surrounding Thutmose III’s campaign in year 23, which was of considerable luck for the pharaoh, are entirely unique when compared to the campaigns of his predecessors and the usual circumstances encountered in Canaan by his successors. In this fashion the aftermath of his campaign must be regarded as similarly unique, and in every respect far more extensive than the conquests of nearly any other Eighteenth Dynasty pharaoh. The central fact for rectifying the historical context of MB III–LB IA destructions north of Ashkelon given their identification with Egyptian campaigns is that by a process of elimination these destructions can be assigned to no later a pharaoh than Thutmose III, if they are not to be downdated to the LB IB or later. LB IA destructions and abandonments, which are not accounted for by the campaigns of earlier pharaohs include sites in the central coastal plain, the hill country, the Upper Galilee, the north coast, and the Jordan Valley. Whether in cases relating to the aftermath of Megiddo, these destruction levels were either fits of orgiastic plundering by Egyptian soldiers or systematic, although undocumented, sieges is not likely to be demonstrated. Nevertheless, all of these sites were destroyed at some point prior to the start of the LB IB, and for the reasons cited above unlikely to have been the work of Thutmose III’s predecessors. In the central coastal plain, destructions that may be the work of Thutmose III during this period are attested at Jaffa, Gerisa, Aphek, Michal, and Mevorakh. Jacob Kaplan identified a destruction layer that he attributed to the conquest of Canaan at Jaffa dated to this transition.65 Gerisa’s fortified MB III settlement was destroyed,66 while Aphek’s Palace III of the MB III (’Apuqn?, no. 66) was destroyed in the midsixteenth century BC according to Beck and Kochavi.67 Ze‘ev Herzog has attributed the late Middle Bronze Age destruction of Tel Michal to tectonic activity, down-

62

Redford 2003, 9. Aharoni 1993, 1010. 64 Weinstein 1981, 11. 65 Kaplan 1972, 78. 66 Herzog 1993, 481. 67 Beck / Kochavi 1993, 67. 63

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playing the presence of considerable amounts of brick and ash from the settlement that were present during the construction of the LB I rampart.68 Nevertheless, the contemporaneous destruction of the site with others during this period throughout the coastal plain, as well as the lack of unequivocal evidence for a tsunami, makes such an ascription unlikely. The evidence from Tel Mevorakh is instructive in that it illustrates the transition of a roadside fortress, which was well-fortified throughout the Middle Bronze Age,69 into an unfortified roadside sanctuary (Stratum XI) during the LB I70 with no interruption in occupation, as appears to have been the case at most settlements that were destroyed in this period. Stern attributes Mevorak’s destruction at the end of the MB III to Thutmose III’s campaigns.71 Accompanying these destructions is the apparent abandonment of Megadim, 2 km north of ‘Atlit during the MB–LB transition.72 It is particularly remarkable that no hill country sites are mentioned among the campaigns of Egyptian New Kingdom pharaohs, and Shechem and Jerusalem only receive first mention during the Late Bronze Age in the Amarna period and are never identified among the targets of New Kingdom campaigns. It is tempting to infer that the hill country was not only not a central object of Egyptian campaigning because of the difficulty it posed for military operations, but that these sites receive no mention because they were also not located on major thoroughfares and thus never a part of regular itineraries. Nevertheless, a number of MB III–LB IA destructions are attested in the hill country, and these suggest some level of military activity, most likely by Egypt, but probably without the participation of the pharaoh on what were undoubtedly considered high-risk missions. The destructions of a number of excavated sites in the hill country have been attributed to Egyptian activity in this period without further refinement. These include Tell Beit Mirsim,73 Beth-Zur,74 Beth-El,75 Shechem XV,76 Shiloh,77 Gibeon,78 as well as Dothan, and Taanach. Dothan was claimed to have been destroyed during this transition by Joseph Free, but this assertion was not corroborated by the recent publication of the excavation’s results,79 and indeed the identification is no longer accepted between the site and any reference in Thutmose’s list.80 Thutmose III’s campaign against Megiddo also hit nearby Taanach (no. 42), which shows evidence of destruction during this period.81 Numerous destructions have also been identified north of Megiddo. Along the

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Herzog 1989, 38. Burke 2008, 295–296. 70 Stern 1984, 4–6. 71 Stern 1984, 37–39. 72 Broshi 1993, 1001. 73 Greenberg 1993, 178. 74 Sellers 1933, 9. 75 Kelso 1993, 193. 76 Campbell 2002, 137–139, and passim. 77 Finkelstein 1993, 61–62; Watkins 1997, 29. 78 See summary by Weinstein 1981, 3. 79 Master et al. 2005, 49–55. 80 Ussishkin 1993a, 372. 81 Glock 1993, 1432. 69

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north coast northwest of Megiddo, Akko,82 and Achzib,83 were destroyed in this period. Kabri, though not evidently destroyed, was abandoned at the end of the MB III.84 In the Upper Galilee, both Tel Dan (Laish, no. 31?), Stratum IX, and Hazor (no. 32), Stratum XVI/3,85 were destroyed. It should be noted, however, that the destruction of Hazor XVI/3 is attributed to Ahmose by Ben-Tor,86 despite an absence of evidence for this pharaoh’s presence this far north. In the Jordan Valley, Jericho, Tel Kitan, Tell Deir ‘Allā, Tell Abu Kharaz, and Pella all experienced destructions during the LB IA.87 Jericho88 and Tel Kitan Level IV89 both produced evidence of destructions. Tell Deir ‘Alla also appears to have experienced a site-wide destruction at the end of the Middle Bronze Age.90 The casemate fortifications of Phase IV/2 of Tell Abu Kharaz were destroyed during this period,91 and its subsequent fortifications, which are dated to the LB I on the presence of Base-Ring I ware, were rebuilt during Phase V and destroyed again.92 The mudbrick fortification wall of Pella Phase VIC (possibly Pihilu, no. 33) was also part of a fiery destruction.93 Although Redford has attempted to enfeeble the nature of Egypt’s efforts during this period by characterizing its early military campaigns as incompetent and deconstructing every dimension of them from Egypt’s early siege tactics to the very significance of the toponyms listed at Karnak, it is worthwhile to consider the methods and strategy of Egypt’s expanding empire as effectively the emulation of the ways and means of Middle Bronze Age warfare.94 No unequivocal evidence exists to the contrary to support the suggestion that Egypt was less accustomed to siege warfare, wary of losses associated with sieges, or generally unprepared to build an empire. The history of Egyptian warfare before the New Kingdom, in fact, suggests otherwise. Although Egypt’s military intervention in the Levant during the Middle King82

Dothan 1993, 20. Prausnitz / Mazar 1993, 32. 84 Kempinski 2002, 451. 85 Ben-Tor 1993. 86 Ben-Tor 1993, 606. 87 Tel Hadar is also claimed by its excavator to have been both founded and destroyed during the LB I (Kochavi 1997, 451). 88 Kenyon 1993, 680. 89 Eisenberg 1993, 881. 90 Van der Kooij 2006, 223. 91 Fischer 2006b, 342. 92 Fischer 2006b, 342–345. 93 Bourke et al. 2006, 26. Bourke et al. maintain that the Phase VIC destruction, which is designated an earthquake destruction albeit fiery, occurred during the MB III occupation at Pella since the excavators identify two subsequent constructional phases assigned to the MB III (Bourke et al. 2006, 26–28). Nevertheless, elsewhere Bourke notes that at best Phase VIC must be characterized as MB III–LB IA in character (Bourke 2006, 246). Given that the radiocarbon dates presented for sites in the Jordan Valley (Fischer 2006a) do not offer sufficient resolution to permit subphasing of the MB I–III sequence, there is at this point no reason to exclude the Pella Phase VIC destruction from inclusion with other contemporary destructions during this transition and hence no reason not to consider Pella’s destruction as most likely the work of Thutmose III. 94 Burke 2008, 94–102. 83

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dom in the southern Levant may not have constituted an empire,95 an increasing body of evidence suggests that Middle Kingdom campaigns provided a potential template for New Kingdom intervention in the Levant.96 This activity along with a history of internecine feuding between Egyptian nomes during two preceding intermediate periods establishes that Egypt possessed no less capable a tradition of siege warfare than any of its neighbors.97 The New Kingdom did, however, face a well defended landscape at the end of the Middle Bronze Age that required the efforts of more than a single pharaoh to subdue over the course of the early Eighteenth Dynasty and considerable effort thereafter to retain these and newly added conquests. The Aftermath of Early Eighteenth Dynasty Campaigns The transition from the MB III to LB I, which is maintained was the result almost entirely of Egypt’s increasing imperial presence, brought about substantial changes in settlement patterns,98 urbanization,99 and political organization during the Late Bronze Age,100 and from the LB IB was accompanied by the presence of Egyptian garrisons. Several observations are added here to the discussion concerning the effects of early Eighteenth Dynasty campaigns on political organization, the nature of Thutmose’s Canaanite campaigns, and Canaanite defenses during the Late Bronze Age. In the first place, it is possible to identify the political and military process of the balkanization of Middle Bronze Age kingdoms whereby these Canaanite kingdoms were broken into their constituent base units (i.e., provinces), which then formed the basis of much smaller Late Bronze Age polities (often called city-states). Insofar as we can discern, these were always vassals of Egypt and not independent as city-states are so often identified. In light of the understanding available concerning the status quo during the MB III for the landscape of the kingdom of Ashkelon,101 the above historical framework reveals the process by which large territorial states, such as Ashkelon and Hazor, were gradually dismantled, being fragmented into their districts by means of a protracted period of siege warfare waged against their hinterland settlements. The net effect was a loss of control by the capital city over its hinterland, particularly the critical second-tier settlements that formed its strategic defenses and the accompanying populations that served in its army. Divested of control of these settlements, kingdoms such as Ashkelon did indeed experience a manpower shortage, as suggested by Bunimovitz.102 However, rather than the product of attrition and deportation, this shortage was most likely the result of an inability to adequately organize the necessary, but existing, labor and cooperation from among multiple settlements within their ever-diminishing former territories, which had been inherent to the strategic framework of MB II–III kingdoms. It was not until after the reign of Thutmose III that substantive deportations were undertaken. With the dev95

Weinstein 1975. E.g., Allen 2008; Burke 2008, 98–100; Larkman 2007; Marcus 2007. 97 Schulman 1964, 1982. 98 Bunimovitz 1995. 99 Gonen 1984. 100 Finkelstein 1996; Jasmin 2006; Na’aman 1997. 101 Burke 2008, 125–135. 102 Bunimovitz 1994. 96

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astation of so many settlements over such a relatively short period of time, and the sustained presence of Egyptian forces that threatened the region on a continual basis from the reign of Thutmose III onward, finding an adequate opportunity to reassert Canaanite independence proved effectively impossible. Canaan was therefore kept on its proverbial toes by the persistent activity of New Kingdom armies on nearly annual campaigns. Just as the first major attempt to mobilize a coalition against Egypt emerged, Thutmose III arranged to take this force by surprise and to deny them the opportunity to meet the Egyptian army in open battle. The true genius of Thutmose was his strategy, which was to prevent an open battle between massive Egyptian and Canaanite armies in the coastal plain or Jezreel Valley, and not the tactical employment of the element of surprise. Unprepared for a long siege with such an enormous population within the walls of Megiddo, Thutmose guaranteed that the coalition had no hope of success where under normal conditions Megiddo’s population might have hoped for the appearance of a relieving army. Instead, the lengthy siege would have permitted detachments of Egyptian troops to range across northern Canaan, entering if not besieging, sacking, and plundering to the extent that they wished numerous defenseless settlements whose able-bodied men were ensnared at Megiddo. Such a scenario therefore would account for the subjugation of many places on the long list of toponyms of Thutmose III at Karnak. Furthermore, we may account for the difference between the maximalist interpretation, which asserts unequivocally that the siege of all of the listed sites occurred, and the minimalist assertion that the list is effectively meaningless as a historical document. Wherever the truth may lie on this continuum, Thutmose was effectively able to eradicate a substantial source of future resistance by the Canaanite populations north of Jaffa, who may have been enticed by their southern neighbors in the coastal plain to assist them in liberating their lands. What this process reveals is that annual and sustained Egyptian campaigns beginning with the reign of Thutmose III through the end of the LB IB, at the least, into regions that lay beyond the limits of the most recent Egyptian campaigns resulted in unconquered regions, mostly to the north, being effectively thwarted from organizing support for regions, mostly in the south, that had already fallen under Egyptian control. The only hope offered to regions that were not entirely devastated by Egypt’s victories under Thutmose III was, therefore, in the maintenance or, whenever possible, rapid rebuilding of their fortifications. This appears to have taken place where rulers remained able to muster the requisite manpower and they perceived that they could effectively oppose Egyptian siege efforts in the years to come, despite the perception of a largely unfortified landscape throughout the Late Bronze Age.103 Although space does not permit a treatise on the continued fortification of settlements during the remainder of the Late Bronze Age, a clear pattern does exist. The bulk of fortified Late Bronze Age settlements in Canaan were located beyond the primary area of early Egyptian forays into Canaan, particularly in most northern Canaan, the highlands, and Transjordan, all of which were areas on the periphery of Thutmose III’s conquests. Sites fortified during later stages of the Late Bronze Age

103

Gonen 1984.

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include Hazor, Akko,104 Shechem,105 Bethel,106 Tell el-Oreme,107 Karnei Hittin,108 in addition to recent evidence from Beth-Shemesh, and several sites in Jordan including Tell Safut,109 Sahab,110 Tell el-Fukhar,111 and Tell Zera‘a.112 If an Egyptian policy was in place across Canaan subverting the construction of walls, the existence of Late Bronze Age walls at these sites will need to be explained. Furthermore, Egyptian reliefs dating to the LB II period show settlements such as Ashkelon with walls,113 despite the lack of archaeological evidence to support this. It would seem, therefore, that certain areas within Canaan from the LB IB onward remained beyond Egypt’s real control and that Egyptian control was largely limited to the coastal plain, Jezreel Valley and the upper Jordan Valley. By the end of the LB IA, it is not possible to assert that Egypt had meaningful control of Transjordan or much of the region to the north and northeast of the Jezreel Valley. This reconstruction would be in line with the bulk of toponyms of Thutmose III that can be precisely located and the location of the battle of Megiddo, which can be called the epicenter of Thutmose’s military activity in Canaan. It can also be argued that an additional observation regarding the shift in policy introduced most likely by Thutmose III was the emplacement of Egyptian garrisons and some level of administration albeit probably rudimentary, which was now necessary to facilitate the ever-increasing distance required to subdue neighboring Canaanite enclaves who threatened Egypt’s most recent acquisitions. Of particular interest, for example, is the potential for identifying additional evidence for the earliest Egyptian garrisons, which are often attributed to Thutmose III.114 In addition to Gaza discussed earlier, one such garrison may have been added at Jaffa and is also alluded to in the Tale of the Capture of Jaffa.115 Morris has identified Gaza and Jaffa, among others, as harbor bases (Egy. ḫtm) that were probably founded during the reign of Thutmose III.116 Although uncertainty has existed concerning the date that is to be assigned to its foundation, recent efforts to process and publish Kaplan’s excavations by the Jaffa Cultural Heritage Project have yielded a fresh glimpse of a heavily Egyptianized LB I settlement that bears the earmarks of an Egyptian garrison, possessing one of the largest collections of Egyptian and Egyptianizing vessels yet attested in the southern Levant.117 Based on the Egyptian dates for certain ce104

Dothan 1993, 21. Campbell 2002, 169ff. 106 Kelso 1968, 11, 16. 107 Fritz 2000, 508. 108 See Gonen 1984, Table 1. 109 Wimmer 1997, 449. 110 Ibrahim 1975, 78–80; 1987, 76f.; 1989, 519. 111 De Vries 1992, 717. 112 Vieweger / Häser 2005, 14, abb. 13; 2007, 151. 113 Stager 1985. 114 Redford 2003, 255–257. 115 Simpson 2003, 72–74. 116 Morris 2005, 138–139, n. 190. 117 The Jaffa Cultural Heritage Project under the direction of the author and Martin Peilstöcker are working to publish the Bronze and Iron Age remains of Jaffa excavated by Jacob Kaplan from 1955–1974. The initiative has been supported since 2008 by a grant from the WhiteLevy Program for Archaeological Publications. 105

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ramic forms, such as the flowerpot-shaped beer jars as well as their stratigraphic situation, an early to mid-fifteenth century date for the assemblage appears likely.118 This is, therefore, the first archaeological evidence that has been presented that can substantiate the garrison’s existence at such an early date. While the overall dimensions of this fortress complex are unknown, the site’s topography allows for a substantial fortress with dimensions quite possibly as large as those of the Egyptian fortress constructed at Sesebi in Nubia.119 Within Canaan and excluding Ullaza, Jaffa was therefore the most northerly of Egypt’s garrisons, with Gaza to the south being the only other one known to have been founded by at least the reign of Thutmose III. In light of our ability to confirm the existence of a garrison at Jaffa, it is unnecessary to suggest that the “notable lack of archaeological evidence for Egyptian buildings on Canaanite soil strongly suggests that the usurpation of Canaanite structures may have been a normative practice in the Eighteenth Dynasty”.120 Conclusions The foregoing reconstruction of the early history of New Kingdom expansion into Canaan reveals a number of important observations concerning the historical process and its archaeological correlates during the LB IA. Three historical phases can be discerned in the development of Egypt’s early empire that included 1) campaigns by Ahmose up to the Nahals Besor and Beersheba; 2) campaigns by Ahmose’s successors to the north of this region up through and including sites just to the north of Ashkelon; and 3) conquests by Thutmose III from Jaffa through the Galilee followed by the establishment of early garrisons as for example at Jaffa. The archaeology related to these events reveals that there are a variety of outcomes for MB III fortification systems during the LB IA and later. Many Canaanite cities were walled until Egyptian (or in some instances other unidentified assailants may have) destroyed them during the LB IA (e.g., ‘Ajjul). Some remained fortified or maintained their fortifications (e.g., Hazor), although most often only the rear walls of domestic structures (e.g., Timnah) or casemate walls (e.g., Tell Abu Kharaz) could be expected to provide any security, while other sites were abandoned for lack of means and motivation, particularly at sites that experienced substantial decreases in their population (e.g., Haror). Second, Late Bronze Age fortification strategies, despite a disruption associated with Egyptian sieges, continued MB II–III fortification strategies, namely, a yielding of more and more land to the construction of houses at the edge of these old mounds, which resulted from a gradual demographic increase in the population over the course of the second millennium, and the need to employ casemate wall construction to facilitate the building of multi-purpose structures. Third, examples of fortified MB cities, especially in areas away from main international routes, as in Transjordan, reveal a degree of continuity between the fortification strategy of the Middle and Late Bronze Ages (e.g., Tell Abu Kharaz). However, these sites are less likely to have been of significant concern to the Egyptian empire and appear initially to be 118

Burke / Mandell, forthcoming. Blackman 1937. 120 Morris 2005, 152f. 119

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located well off of the main routes secured by Egypt. In light of the observations made here, it is difficult to imagine an Egyptian policy, as suggested by Gonen, whereby in addition to meeting foreign armies in occasional set-piece battles, besieging the cities of insurgents, while staving off ambushes, the Egyptians deliberately destroyed the fortifications of conquered Canaanite towns during the LB IA. Likewise, it is difficult to accept that Canaanites were conscripted, convinced, or compelled to deliberately destroy their own fortifications by the Egyptians. It is more likely, as reconstructed above, that MB III fortifications either 1) were subject to destruction during Egyptian siege in the LB IA (e.g., ‘Ajjul, Shechem), 2) fell into disrepair over a lengthy period of time being abandoned and not maintained (e.g., Tel Haror), or 3) were gradually replaced by the modest walls of residences that later formed the perimeter wall of some settlements (e.g., Timnah). A deliberate Egyptian policy is unnecessary to account for the outcomes attested in the archaeological record. To these reasons it may be added that New Kingdom pharaohs, in their effort to maintain control of the region, would have recognized that the defense of Canaan’s individual settlements—as Egypt’s vassals—was in the best interest of the empire’s ability to both maintain its holdings, particularly against would-be aggressors, and to expand its territory during subsequent campaigns. The metaphor is that of the chain that is only as strong as its weakest link; a weak city constituted a weak link in a network of defended settlements. Vassals perpetually concerned with their own defense are also not well disposed to provide predictable tribute, whether annual or otherwise, and would have been subject to the deprecations of their neighbors beyond the reach of Egypt and would have been more likely therefore to ally themselves against their Egyptian overlords. It would have been antithetical, therefore, to the maintenance of Egypt’s control of Retenu to prohibit what constituted the “strategic defenses” of Egypt’s Levantine empire.121 The fortification of settlements that were added to Egyptian control particularly on the edge of Egyptian territorial expansion would have been critical to the defense of these settlements in the face of both Mitannian and later Hittite attempts to conquer this same territory. Walled settlements, like many types of weaponry, work both ways and thus cannot be considered, in and of themselves, counterproductive to Egyptian efforts to control Canaan. It appears, therefore, that following the conquest of Canaan and, especially, the southern coastal plain—particularly in the wake of Egyptian sieges—freestanding defensive walls were not constructed, although the rear walls of domestic buildings served to provide a modest enclosure and defense of these settlements. Rather than an Egyptian policy, the political and socioeconomic milieu,122 with Egyptian forces in such close proximity and often garrisoned within these towns, is likely to have 121

That walls were more important to the power wishing to maintain control of a community or territory, than they were to the inhabitants of a settlement itself, is supported by the fact that no other ancient Near Eastern empire, whether Assyrian, Babylonian, or Achaemenid, ever appears to have adopted a common policy of prohibiting or limiting the construction of fortifications. Indeed, the singular case where such an effort was attempted demonstrates the point. The Samaritans wished to block Judah’s efforts to rebuild the fortifications of Persian period Jerusalem during the fifth century BC, at first by insinuating that to do so was to rebel against the king despite the king’s approval of the plan (Nehemiah 2, 19). 122 E.g., Bunimovitz 1994.

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been sufficiently repressive to have resulted in the neglect of one of the most important activities of Canaanite rulers during the preceding centuries. Bibliography Aharoni, Y., 1993: Megiddo: The Neolithic Period to the End of the Bronze Age. In E. Stern (ed.): The New Encyclopedia of Archaeological Excavations in the Holy Land (vol. 3) (2nd English edition). Jerusalem. Pp. 1003–1012. Allen, J. P., 2008: The Historical Inscription of Khnumhotep and Dahshur: Preliminary Report. BASOR 352, 29–39. Amiran, R. / Eitan, A., 1993: Nagila, Tel. In E. Stern (ed.): The New Encyclopedia of Archaeological Excavations in the Holy Land (vol. 3) (2nd English edition). Jerusalem. Pp. 1079–1081. Beck, P. / Kochavi, M., 1993: Aphek. In E. Stern (ed.): The New Encyclopedia of Archaeological Excavations in the Holy Land (vol. 1). New York. Pp. 64–72. Van Beek, G. W., 1993: Jemmeh, Tell. In E. Stern (ed.): The New Encyclopedia of Archaeological Excavations in the Holy Land (vol. 2) (2nd English edition). Jerusalem. Pp. 667–674. Ben-Tor, A., 1993: Hazor. In E. Stern (ed.): The New Encyclopedia of Archaeological Excavations in the Holy Land (vol. 2) (2nd English edition). Jerusalem. Pp. 594–606. Blackman, A. M., 1937: Preliminary Report on the Excavations of Sesebi, Northern Province, Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1936–37. JEA 23, 145–151. Bourke, S. J., 2006: Pella and the Jordanian Middle and Late Bronze Ages. In P. M. Fischer (ed.): The Chronology of the Jordan Valley during the Middle and Late Bronze Ages: Pella, Tell Abu al-Kharaz, and Tell Deir ‘Alla. Vienna, Pp. 243– 256. Bourke, S. J. / Sparks, R. T. / Schroder, M., 2006: Pella in the Middle Bronze Age. In P. M. Fischer (ed.): The Chronology of the Jordan Valley during the Middle and Late Bronze Ages: Pella, Tell Abu al-Kharaz, and Tell Deir ‘Alla. Vienna, Pp. 9–58. Broshi, M., 1993: Megadim, Tel. In E. Stern (ed.): The New Encyclopedia of Archaeological Excavations in the Holy Land (vol. 3) (2nd English edition). Jerusalem. Pp. 101–1003. Bunimovitz, S., 1994: The Problems of Human Resources in Late Bronze Age Palestine and its Socioeconomic Implications. UF 26, 1–20. ― 1995: On the Edge of Empires—Late Bronze Age (1500–1200 BCE). In T. E. Levy (ed.): The Archaeology of Society in the Holy Land. New York. Pp. 320– 331. Burke, A. A., 2007: Magdalūma, Migdālîm, Magdoloi, and Majādïl: The Historical Geography and Archaeology of the Magdalu (Migdāl). BASOR 346, 29–57. ― 2008: “Walled Up to Heaven”: The Evolution of Middle Bronze Age Fortification Strategies in the Levant. Winona Lake. ― 2009: More Light on Old Reliefs: New Kingdom Egyptian Siege Tactics and Asiatic Resistance. In J. D. Schloen (ed.): Exploring the Longue Durée: Essays in Honor of Lawrence E. Stager. Winona Lake. Pp. 57–68.

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Hoffmeier, J. K. 1990: Some Thoughts on William G. Dever’s “‘Hyksos,’ Egyptian Destructions, and the End of the Palestinian Middle Bronze Age”. Levant 22, 83– 89. ― 1991: James Weinstein’s ‘Egypt and the Middle Bronze IIC/Late Bronze IA Transition in Palestine’. Levant 23, 117–124. Ibrahim, M. M., 1975: Third Season of Excavations at Sahab, 1975 (Preliminary Report). ADAJ 20, 69–82. ― 1987: Sahab and Its Foreign Relations. ADAJ 31, 73–81. ― 1989: Sahab. In D. Homès-Fredericq / J. B. Hennessy (eds.): Archaeology of Jordan II. 2, Field Reports: Surveys and Sites L–Z. Leuven. Pp. 516–520. Jasmin, M., 2006: The Political Organization of the City-States in Southwestern Palestine in the Late Bronze Age IIB (13th Century BC). In A. M. Maeir / P. D. Miroschedji (eds.): “I Will Speak the Riddles of Ancient Times”: Archaeological and Historical Studies in Honor of Amihai Mazar on the Occasion of His Sixtieth Birthday (vol. 1). Winona Lake. Pp. 161–191. Kaplan, J., 1972: The Archaeology and History of Tel-Aviv-Jaffa. BA 35(3), 66–95. Keegan, J., 1993: A History of Warfare. New York. Kelso, J. L., 1968: The Excavation of Bethel. Cambridge, MA. ― 1993: Bethel. In E. Stern (ed.): The New Encyclopedia of Archaeological Excavations in the Holy Land (vol. 1) (2nd English edition). Jerusalem. Pp. 192–194. Kempinski, A., 1974: Tell el-‘Ajjûl—Beth-Aglayim or Sharuhen? IEJ 24(3–4), 145– 152. ― 2002: Tel Kabri: The 1986–1993 Excavation Seasons. Tel Aviv. Kenyon, K. M., 1993: Jericho. In E. Stern (ed.): The New Encyclopedia of Archaeological Excavations in the Holy Land (2nd English edition). Jerusalem. Pp. 674–681. Kitchen, K. A., 2000: Regnal and Genealogical Data of Ancient Egypt (Absolute Chronology I). The Historical Chronology of Ancient Egypt: A Current Assessment. In M. Bietak (ed.): The Synchronisation of Civilisa-tions in the Eastern Mediterranean in the Second Millennium B.C.: Proceedings of an International Symposium at Schloss Haindorf, 15th–17th November 1996 and at the Austrian Academy, Vienna, 11th–12th of May 1998. Vienna. Pp. 39–52. Kochavi, M. 1967: Notes and News: Tel Malhata. IEJ 17, 272–273. ― 1992: Malhata, Tel. In D. N. Freedman (ed.): The Anchor Bible Dictionary (vol. 4). New York. Pp. 487–488. ― 1997: Hadar, Tel. In E. M. Meyers (ed.): The Oxford Encyclopedia of Archaeology in the Near East (vol. 2). New York. Pp. 450–452. van der Kooij, G., 2006: Tell Deir ‘Alla: The Middle and Late Bronze Age Chronology. In P. M. Fischer (ed.): The Chronology of the Jordan Valley during the Middle and Late Bronze Ages: Pella, Tell Abu al-Kharaz, and Tell Deir ‘Alla. Vienna. Pp. 199–226. Larkman, S. J., 2007: Human Cargo: Transportation of Western Asiatic People during the 11th and 12th Dynasty. JSSEA 34, 107–113. Marcus, E. S. 2007: Amenemhet II and the Sea: Maritime Aspects of the Mit Rahina (Memphis) Inscription. ÄuL 17, 137–190. Master, D. M. / Monson, J. M. / Lass, E. H. E. / Pierce, G. A. (eds.), 2005: Dothan I: Remains from the Tell (1953–1964). Winona Lake.

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Alter Orient und Altes Testament Veröffentlichungen zur Kultur und Geschichte des Alten Orients und des Alten Testaments

Band 372

Herausgeber Manfried Dietrich • Oswald Loretz • Hans Neumann

Lektor Kai A. Metzler

Beratergremium Rainer Albertz • Joachim Bretschneider Stefan Maul • Udo Rüterswörden • Walther Sallaberger Gebhard Selz • Michael P. Streck • Wolfgang Zwickel

2010 Ugarit-Verlag Münster

Studies on War in the Ancient Near East Collected Essays on Military History Edited by Jordi Vidal

2010 Ugarit-Verlag Münster

Studies on War in the Ancient Near East Collected Essays on Military History Edited by Jordi Vidal Alter Orient und Altes Testament, Band 372

© 2010 Ugarit-Verlag, Münster www.ugarit-verlag.de Alle Rechte vorbehalten All rights preserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photo-copying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. Herstellung: Hubert & Co, Göttingen Printed in Germany ISBN 978-3-86835-035-7

Printed on acid-free paper

Contents Jordi Vidal Introduction.................................................................................................................1 Juan Carlos Moreno García War in Old Kingdom Egypt (2686–2125 BCE)..........................................................5 Aaron A. Burke Canaan under Siege. The History and Archaeology of Egypt’s War in Canaan during the Early Eighteenth Dynasty .......................................................43 Trevor R. Bryce The Hittites at War....................................................................................................67 Juan-Pablo Vita The Power of a Pair of War Chariots in the Late Bronze Age. On Letters RS 20.33 (Ugarit), BE 17 33a (Nippur), and EA 197 (Damascus region) ................87 Jordi Vidal Sutean Warfare in the Amarna Letters......................................................................95 Jaume Llop Barley from Ālu-ša-Sîn-rabi. Chronological reflections on an expedition in the time of Tukultī-Ninurta I (1233–1197 BC).................................................. 105 Davide Nadali Assyrian Open Field Battles. An Attempt at Reconstruction and Analysis ............ 117 John MacGinnis Mobilisation and Militarisation in the Neo-Babylonian Empire............................. 153 Rocío Da Riva A lion in the cedar forest. International politics and pictorial self-representations of Nebuchadnezzar II (605–562 BC)...................................... 165 Indices..................................................................................................................... 193

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