Francisco vs Chemical Bulk Carriers...
Francisco vs Chemical Bulk Carriers GR No. 193577 September 7, 2011 Facts:
Francisco bought diesel fuel from a certain Bacsa who allegedly was the agent of Chemical Bulk Carriers. Deliveries were then made. Later on, Chemical Bulk Carriers wrote a demand letter to Francisco demanding the latter payment for the diesel fuels it delivered. Francisco refused to pay alleging that it already paid to Bacsa as evidenced by the invoice issued by CBCI and a receipt with no letter head whatsoever issued by Bacsa to him. Issue: Whether or not CBCI gave Bacsa the authority to sell its fuel thus precluding the former from denying the transactions made by the latter Held: The owner of the goods who has been unlawfully deprived of it may recover it even from a purchaser in good faith. Thus, the purchaser of property which has been stolen from the owner has been held to acquire no title to it even though he purchased for value and in good faith. In this case, it is clear that Bacsa was not the owner of the diesel fuel. Francisco was aware of this but he claimed that Bacsa was authorized by CBCI to sell the diesel fuel. However, Franciscos claim that Bacsa was authorized is not supported by any evidence except his self-serving testimony. First, Francisco did not even confirm with CBCI if it was indeed selling its diesel fuel since it is not one of the oil companies known in the market to be selling petroleum products. This fact alone should have put Francisco on guard. Second, it does not appear that CBCI, by some direct and equivocal act, has clothed Bacsa with the indicia of ownership or apparent authority to sell CBCIs diesel fuel. Francisco did not state if the identification card presented by Bacsa indicated that he was CBCIs agent or a mere employee. Third, the receipt issued by Bacsa was typewritten on a half sheet of plain bond paper. There was no letterhead or any indication that it came from CBCI. We agree with the Court of Appeals that this was a personal receipt issued by Bacsa and not an official receipt issued by CBCI. Consequently, CBCI is not precluded by its conduct from denying Bacsas authority to sell. CBCI did not hold out Bacsa or allow Bacsa to appear as the owner or one with apparent authority to dispose of the diesel fuel.
Solidum vs People GR No. 192123 March 10, 2014
Facts: A boy named Gerald Gercayo was born with an imperforate anus. When he reached the age of three he went on an operation. Gerald was in coma and recovered his consciousness after a month. His parents filed a suit against the team of doctors who performed the operation. Long story short, among the team it was only Dr. Solidum that was held liable allegedly because he failed to monitor and regulate the anesthesia level. The lower court applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor saying that testimony of an expert witness is no longer necessary. Issue: Is the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applicable in this case? Held: No. In order to allow resort to the doctrine, therefore, the following essential requisites must first be satisfied, to wit: (1) the accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the person injured. The Court considers the application here of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur inappropriate. Although it should be conceded without difficulty that the second and third elements were present, considering that the anesthetic agent and the instruments were exclusively within the control of Dr. Solidum, and that the patient, being then unconscious during the operation, could not have been guilty of contributory negligence, the first element was undeniably wanting. Luz delivered Gerald to the care, custody and control of his physicians for a pull-through operation. Except for the imperforate anus, Gerald was then of sound body and mind at the time of his submission to the physicians. Yet, he experienced bradycardia during the operation, causing loss of his senses and rendering him immobile. Hypoxia, or the insufficiency of oxygen supply to the brain that caused the slowing of the heart rate, scientifically termed as bradycardia, would not ordinarily occur in the process of a pull-through operation, or during the administration of anesthesia to the patient, but such fact alone did not prove that the negligence of any of his attending physicians, including the anesthesiologists, had caused the injury. In fact, the anesthesiologists attending to him had sensed in the course of the operation that the lack of oxygen could have been triggered by the vago-vagal reflex, prompting them to administer atropine to the patient.
Rosit vs Davao Doctors Hospital and Dr. Gestuvo GR No. 210445 December 7, 2015 Facts: Rosit figured in a motorcycle accident and underwent an operation on his jaw. While the operation was being done Dr. Gestuvo made a reconfiguration to the screw that
is to be used in fastening the metal plate to the jaw. Dr. Gestuvo cut the screw. Later on after the operation, Rosit felt pain. He went to Cebu to see another doctor, Dr. Pangan, and had to go in another operation because the screw hit his molar thus requiring the services of the dentist. On his return to Davao, Rosit demanded that Dr. Gestuvo reimburse him for the cost of the operation and the expenses he incurred in Cebu. The trial court applied the res ipsa loquitur principle holding that "the need for expert, medical testimony may be dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of negligence." The CA ruled that the res ipsa loquitur principle is not applicable and that the testimony of an expert witness is necessary for a finding of negligence. Issue: Is the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applicable in this case? Held: After careful consideration, this Court cannot accede to the CA's findings as it is at once apparent from the records that the essential requisites for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are present. The first element was sufficiently established when Rosit proved that one of the screws installed by Dr. Gestuvo struck his molar. It was for this issue that Dr. Gestuvo himself referred Rosit to Dr. Pangan. In fact, the affidavit of Dr. Pangan presented by Dr. Gestuvo himself before the trial court narrated that the same molar struck with the screw installed by Dr. Gestuvo was examined and eventually operated on by Dr. Pangan. Dr. Gestuvo cannot now go back and say that Dr. Pangan treated a molar different from that which was affected by the first operation. Clearly, had Dr. Gestuvo used the proper size and length of screws and placed the same in the proper locations, these would not have struck Rosit's teeth causing him pain and requiring him to undergo a corrective surgery. Dr. Gestuvo knew that the screws he used on Rosit were too large as, in fact, he cut the same with a saw. 14 He also stated during trial that common sense dictated that the smallest screws available should be used. More importantly, he also knew that these screws were available locally at the time of the operation. 15 Yet, he did not avail of such items and went ahead with the larger screws and merely sawed them off. Even assuming that the screws were already at the proper length after Dr. Gestuvo cut the same, it is apparent that he negligently placed one of the screws in the wrong area thereby striking one of Rosit's teeth. In any event, whether the screw hit Rosit's molar because it was too long or improperly placed, both facts are the product of Dr. Gestuvo's negligence. An average man of common intelligence would know that striking a tooth with any foreign object much less a screw would cause severe pain. Thus, the first essential requisite is present in this case. Anent the second element for the res ipsa loquitur doctrine application, it is
sufficient that the operation which resulted in the screw hitting Rosit's molar was, indeed, performed by Dr. Gestuvo. No other doctor caused such fact. The CA finds that Rosit is guilty of contributory negligence in having Dr. Pangan operate on him during the healing period of his fractured mandible. What the CA overlooked is that it was Dr. Gestuvo himself who referred Rosit to Dr. Pangan. Nevertheless, Dr. Pangan's participation could not have contributed to the reality that the screw that Dr. Gestuvo installed hit Rosit's molar. Lastly, the third element that the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the person injured was satisfied in this case. It was not shown that Rosit's lung disease could have contributed to the pain. What is clear is that he suffered because one of the screws that Dr. Gestuvo installed hit Rosit's molar. Clearly then, the res ipsa loquitur doctrine finds application in the instant case and no expert testimony is required to establish the negligence of defendant Dr. Gestuvo.
Alano vs Magud-Logmao Gr No. 175540 April 7, 2014 Facts: A certain Arnelito Logmao was brought to East Avenue Medical Center because he fell from the overpass thereby causing him injuries. EAMC made an error in the entry of his name in the data sheet i.e., Angelito Logmaso. Due to lack of space and equipments in EAMC, he was transferred to the National Kidney Institute where Dr. Alano was the director. He was treated in NKI but later on was found to be brain dead. There was a constant search for the family of the patient. Police, Radio, and Television Networks were utilized. The doctor who attended to Arnelito asked permission from Dr. Alano to remove the well-functioning organs of Arnelito to be used in transplantation. Dr. Alano replied in a letter addressed to the said doctor that all efforts should be first exhausted by the team in finding the family of Arnelito and if all the requirements are already complied by the team, it is authorized to remove the organs. Later on, Arnelito’s family came in the story and filed a case for damages against Dr. Alano. Issue: Whether respondent adduced evidence sufficient to hold Dr. Alano liable for damages Held: Ultimately, it is respondent's failure to adduce adequate evidence that doomed this case.1âwphi1 As stated in Otero v. Tan,8 "[i]n civil cases, it is a basic rule that the
party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence. The parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defense offered by their opponent." 9 Here, there is to proof that, indeed, the period of around 24 hours from the time notices were disseminated, cannot be considered as reasonable under the circumstances. They failed to present any expert witness to prove that given the medical technology and knowledge at that time in the 1980's, the doctors could or should have waited longer before harvesting the internal organs for transplantation.
BJDC Construction vs Lanuzo GR No. 181151 March 24, 2014 Facts: BJDC Construction was a contractor of a road-reblocking project in Camarines Sur. One evening a motorist, a certain Lanuzo, bumped into the barricades placed by BJDC in its site thereby causing the death of the said motorist. The heirs of the deceased motorist filed a case for damages against BJDC alleging that BJDC failed to place adequate lighting in its site thus causing the mishap of Lanuzo. BJDC denied the said allegations and contended that it did not lack in placing the necessary safety and precautionary measures in its site. It alleged that it placed proper signage and lighting and that the cause of the mishap was Lanuzo’s own negligence because he did not wear a helmet and was negligently overtaking another motorcycle. Issue: 1.) Whether the heirs of Lanuzo sufficiently proved the negligence of BJDC 2.) Whether the deceased Lanuzo was negligent Held: 1.) Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.10 It is basic that whoever alleges a fact has the burden of proving it because a mere allegation is not evidence. Upon a review of the records, the Court affirms the findings of the RTC, and rules that the Lanuzo heirs, the parties carrying the burden of proof, did not establish by preponderance of evidence that the negligence on the part of the company was the proximate cause of the fatal accident of Balbino. In order that a party may be held liable for damages for any injury brought about by the negligence of another, the claimant must prove that the negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of the injury. Proximate cause is defined as “that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred. 2.) Nor could the Lanuzo heirs justly posit that the illumination was not adequate, for it cannot be denied that Balbino’s motorcycle was equipped
with headlights that would have enabled him at dusk or night time to see the condition of the road ahead. That the accident still occurred surely indicated that he himself did not exercise the degree of care expected of him as a prudent motorist. According to Dr. Abilay, the cause of death of Balbino was the fatal depressed fracture at the back of his head, an injury that Dr. Abilay opined to be attributable to his head landing on the cemented road after being thrown off his motorcycle. Considering that it was shown that Balbino was not wearing any protective head gear or helmet at the time of the accident, he was guilty of negligence in that respect. Had he worn the protective head gear or helmet, his untimely death would not have occurred.