(1910) Cavalry Tactics as Illustrated by the War of the Rebellion

CAVALRY TACTICS

Illustrated by the

War

of the Rebellion

TOGETHER WITH

MANY INTERESTING FACTS IMPORTANT FOR CAVALRY TO KNOW.

BY CAPTAIN

ALONZO GRAY,

Fourteenth U. S. Cavalry.

FART

U.

S.

I.

CAVALRY ASSOCIATION,

FORT LEAVBNWORTH, KANSAS. 1910.

COPYRIGHT,

1910,

BY ALONZO GRAY.

PRKS3 OF KETCHK80N PRINTING

LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS.

CO.

PREFACE. In pursuing the subject of cavalry tactics I found that, while certain principles were accepted as correct, I was not familiar with the battles in which these principles were ap plied.

I

believe

it

to be true that there is

ciple of cavalry tactics,

any

accepted today as correct by power, which was not fully illustrated of the Rebellion. No war which has occufed A is

first-class military

during the

War

since that time has, in tics

which

no modern prin

which were

any respect, added

in daily use

to the cavalry tac

during that great struggle.

give it as my humble opinion that increased range of firearms and the addition of machine guns, increase the I

of, and necessity for, well-organized cavalry that bicycles, motorcycles and automobiles will prove to be only valuable auxiliaries to cavalry in transporting informa

sphere of action

tion

back

;

to the rear,

diture of horse flesh

;

and thus saving an unnecessary expen and that while flying machines may

bring information, by so doing they will widen the sphere of action of good cavalry and, more than ever before, as a ;

result of such information,

cavalry ready

to

it

will

be necessary to have good

move on extremely

short notice.

In looking for examples to illustrate the tactical prin ciples of cavalry operations, I have drawn mostly from the

Records of the Rebellion (indicated in references by R. but have not endeavored to give exact quotations

have quoted only so much as point involved.

The

is

at

R.),

instead

I

necessary to illustrate the

illustrations are taken

opening campaign of 1863,

;

mostly after the which time the Federal cavalry

259819

reached

erate cavalry was

Genl.

J.

The

at its best.

this time the

Confed

(Life and campaigns

of Maj.

E. B. Stuart, p. 257.)

is

why more

Federal than Confederate reports because the former are much more numerous.

reason

are quoted

Whenever or the

At

efficient condition.

anijj

enemy

s losses,

that portion of

what happens

a report states

it

to the

enemy

be the report Federal or Confederate,

should be accepted with great caution.

While the work principally

treats of tactics,

I

have in

corporated reports of such facts and expedients as are use ful for

every cavalryman to know.

It is

on

my intention to follow

"Troop

Leading of

this work, Part

Cavalry,"

I,

with a work

wherein the decisions are

based on the principles herein illustrated.

This work

undertaken in the hope that the lessons learned during our great war will not be forgotten. ALONZO GRAY.

Camp

is

Stotsenburg,

Pampanga,

March

P.

I.

31, 1910.

INTRODUCTION. A OONOI8E HISTORY OF THE ORGANIZATION AND ARMAMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CAVALRY.

The ron,

first

mounted

force, consisting of

one squad-

March

was authorized by Act of Congress March 5, 1792. of March 2, 1799, authorized three regi- March

The Act

ments of cavalry, to be composed of five squadrons of March two companies each. They were not all raised, and those which were raised were mustered out

March

5,

1792.

2,

1799

15,1802.

16,

1802.

The Act of April 12, 1808, authorized a regiment April 12, isos. of light dragoons. By Act of January 11, 1812, Congress ordered an- January 11,1812 other regiment of light dragoons. By Act of March 30, 1814, these light dragoon March The consolidated regi regiments were consolidated.

so,

isu.

ment was composed of eight troops, each consisting of five officers and 116 enlisted men. By Act of Congress, June 15, 1815, this regiment June 15, isi5. was disbanded. March im. Congress, by Act of March 2, 1833, authorized This was the begin the raising of the 1st Dragoons. 2,

The regi of ten to on horse serve composed companies or foot as might be directed. ning of our present cavalry organization.

ment

w^as

On May 23, 1836, Congress authorized the raising May 23, of another dragoon regiment which was to be just like the first. It became the 2d Dragoons. By an Act known

as the

"Ten

Regiment

Bill"

Con-

on February 11, 1847, authorized ten regiments, one of which was the 3d Dragoons and another the

gress,

Mounted Rifles. Each of these regiments was two majors, the others having only one.

to

have

Feb.

isse.

11, 1347.

At

1884>

the close of the

of

March

3, 1865.

Mexican War,

two regular regiments of First and Second Cavalry. May

4, i86i.

in the

summer

3d Dragoons were disbanded and the 1848, Mounted Rifles mustered out, but immediately recruited and sent to Oregon. B y Act of March 3, 1855, Congress authorized the

cavalry.

They became

the

By presidential order, G. O. 16, A. G. O., 1861, 3d Cavalry was added to the regular army. It consisted of three battalions, each composed of two squadrons of two companies each. This order was con firmed by Act of Congress July 29, 1861. the

August

e fi B

3,

i86i.

mounted troops were organized into one arm, called cavalry, by Act of August 3, 1861. By this act The 1st Dragoons became the 1st Cavalry; The 2d Dragoons became the 2d Cavalry; The Mounted Rifles became the 3d Cavalry; The 1st Cavalry became the 4th Cavalry; The 2d Cavalry became the 5th Cavalry; The 3d Cavalry became the 6th Cavalry. All

The Act of J^J

tioIlof

qua d rSn

1861, defines a squadron as

29,

consisting of two troops or companies. At the beginning of the war all regiments had ten tnent.

The 6th Cavalry, formerly troops or five squadrons. the 3d, was, by Act of Congress, to have twelve troops at the time of its organization. (See G .O. 16, A. G. O.,

May

%

in G.

4,

1861.)

Act of Congress July

17, 1862, promulgated O. 91, A. G. O., July 29, 1862, all United States

Each regiment to cavalry was organized as follows: have 1 colonel, 1 lieutenant colonel, 3 majors, 1 sur geon,

1

assistant

surgeon,

regimental quartermaster,

1

1

regimental

adjutant,

1

regimental commissary,

1

commis sergeant major, quartermaster sergeant, sary sergeant, 2 hospital stewards, 1 saddler sergeant, 1 chief trumpeter, 1 chief farrier or blacksmith, 12 1

companies or troops.

1

Each company or troop lieutenant, lieutenant,

1 1

second lieutenant,

sters,

5

1

privates.

G. O. No.

captain,

1

first

supernumerary second

1

2 farriers or blacksmiths,

and 78

1

quartermaster sergeant, 1 sergeants, 8 corporals, 2 team

1st sergeant,

commissary sergeant,

have

to

1

saddler,

1

wagoner,

Total 100 enlisted. 7,

A. G. O., January 7, 1863, provides company of United States cavalry

that each troop or

have from 60 to 78 privates.

shall

unteer

volunteer cavalry went out with 10 troops per al regiment. G. O. No. 126, A. G. O., September 6, 1862, directed that each regiment of volunteer cavalry should have the same organization as that prescribed for the

The

<

(See G. O. 91, A. G. O., 1862, above.) regular service. This order directed that this organization should be strict ly

adhered to by all concerned. G. O. No. 110, A. G. O., April 29, 1863, gave the

organization of the volunteer cavalry and but slightly changed the above. It provided for 2 trumpeters per of troop and fixed the enlisted strength at the minimum 82 and the maximum at 100 per troop. of July 28, 1866, Congress provided for the organization of the 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th regiments of

July 88,1866.

and by Act of February 2, 1901, it provided for the llth, 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th regiments.

Feb. 2,1901.

By Act

cavalry,

ARMAMENT. During the Mexican War the dragoons were armed with musketoons, which were carried on sling belts, ex cept when marching the sling belt was unsnapped. They also carried dragoon sabers of Prussian pattern and horse pistols.

The Mounted

were armed with percussion no sabers. The cavalry regiments were armed with sabers, rifle-carbines and Colt"s navy revolvers. (Brackett s History of U. S. Cavalry, p. 160.) During the Civil War the U. S. Cavalry was genWar erally armed with rifles or carbines, sabers and revolvers. rifles

and Colt

s

Rifles

army

revolvers, but

The

rifles carried at the commencement of the war were changed for carbines, and the single loading carbines were, in the latter part of the war, changed for repeat

See Exts. Nos. 74, 133, 151, 141. At the beginning of the war the sabers were the Prussian pattern, with a These long straight blade. ing ones.

were replaced

later by the light cavalry saber with a curved blade, which was regarded with much more favor than the Prussian saber.

The Colt s revolver was It was generally carried. loaded with powder and ball and fired with percussion caps. The

lance.

and

Only one lancer regiment went out, the 6th Penn., changed the lance for the saber in April, 1863.

it

DRILL REGULATIONS. Previous to 1896 Drill Regulations were called Tac tics. 1811.

In 1811 Anthony Finley of Philadelphia published Harries Instructions for a Volunteer

"Colonel

of 1814.

In

U.

1826.

1814 Colonel

Wm.

Duane, Adjutant General,

Book for Cavalry." It Army, published was a system of drill regulations. In 1826 a Board of Officers was convened to report "A

Scott Tactics.

Corps

Cavalry."

S.

"Hand

Complete System of Cavalry Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott

Tactics."

was president and was a member of the board were published in 1834 and were known

Lieut. Col. Z. Taylor

These

tactics

as the

"Scott Tactics."

The system was a double rank system where two troops, side

by

side,

each in double rank, constituted a

squadron, and four squadrons a regiment. The squad ron was commanded by the senior captain. While the drill differs

from

that of the present time, the principles Much of the phraseology of

are essentially the same.

our present "Scott

drill

Tactics."

regulations

is

a repetition of that of the

War

In 1841 the "

41

called the

differed

Department published what were T Poinsett

from the

"Scott

"History

on page 48

"Poinsett

Tactics

ment of 10 companies, or

The

or

Tactics,"

5

"The

or

They

"

in

providing for a regi squadrons.

of the U. S.

states:

Tactics."

Cavalry,"

system

adapted to the organization of the

was authorized by the Hon. J. R. War, on the 10th of February,

of

by Brackett,

cavalry tactics

dragoon regiments

Poinsett, Secretary of 1841. It is mainly a

translation of the tactics of the French service, and has

not yet (June eral attempts

1, 1863) been improved upon, though sev have been made, but they have all proved

I believe almost every cavalry officer of ex considers the tactics of 1841 as far superior to perience

failures.

anything which has yet been introduced into our service." The 41 tactics were used by the eastern

cavalry

during the entire war and by the regular cavalry after the war. The western cavalry used the 41 tactics till

when they began to use the Cooke tac which prescribed a single rank formation. Whenever, in a report, the term "squadron" is used, will mean a unit of two troops; while the term

the fall of 1864, tics,

it

"bat

talion"

will

mean

four troops either in single or double

rank.

Because of the almost universal use of the 41 tac tics,

it

will be necessary to describe

some of

their

im

portant features.

squadrons of a regiment in order of battle are distinguished by the denominations first, second, third, "The

fourth and. fifth; they are formed on the same line, in order of these numbers, on the commencing right with an interval of 12 paces. This is the primitive and habitual

order of the squadrons in regiments. Each squadron is composed of four platoons, distinguished by the denom inations

division,

second, third and fourth,

commencing on and second platoons form the first the third and fourth form the second division,"

first,

the right.

The

first

Battle order,

4i

10

The

"Column

of

Squadrons"

was

a

column where

each squadron was in line with full distance. In a "Close Column of Squadrons" the squadrons were closed to- 12 paces distance.

poke

s

November

Tactics

1,

War

1861, the

Department

officially

adopted the tactics written by Colonel Philip St. George Cooke. They were published in 1862 and known as the "Cooke

Tactics."

While

was ordered

it

that

"All

additions or de

partures from the exercises and maneuvers laid down are positively forbidden," as previously stated, they were not used by the eastern cavalry at all, and not by the

western cavalry till 1864. I make this statement on in formation obtained from veterans of the war and believe it

Principles/)!

to be correct.

The

principles of the Cooke Tactics differ materially from any preceding them. The single rank formation is here introduced. A troop is called a squadron and is

composed of four platoons. In 1857 the War Department published the report on foreign armies made by Captain Geo. B. McClellan. On p. 278 he recommends that the word company be changed to squadron and that the single rank formation be adopted.

Cooke acknowledges getting

his ideas

from conver

sations with McClellan.

The

introduction of the

Cooke

tactics

states

Portugal in

greatly simplified

The

Battle order.

at

all

;

in it

cavalry movements.

battle order for a regiment of ten troops

troops in line

that

was tested by the British 1833 and 1834, and it was found that

the single rank formation

is

four

four in line of troops in column of platoons 300 paces in the rear of the first line;

full distance,

one troop 50 paces behind each flank of the first line, each In case the regi in column of platoons at full distance.

ment had only eight troops, the two center troops of the second line were the missing troops. An "Open Column" is formed of subdivisions, hav-

11

ing between them the necessary distance to form line in every way. The "Close Column" is formed of troops with distance of platoon front one from the other. The "Double Column" is

of the

formed by advance from the center

by platoons at wheeling distance. Other than mentioned, these tactics are much the

same

line,

i

1

1 1

Double column f

i

as the drill regulations of the present time.

fours.

The

double column of fours does not seem to have been used

during the Civil War. After his war experience General Cooke rewrote his tactics in 1883. The double column of fours

is

then introduced.

Of

this

movement General

Cooke says new system with two lines and double column of fours as the greatest novelties was devised and was, in fact, approved by a board of :

"A

experienced

officers as early as

1868."

(Upton Board.)

General Wesley Merritt reviewed these tactics and highly commended these movements as "Valuable changes in the interest of rapidity of maneuver and celerity of formation, which are so important for the ef fective action of cavalry under the for its uses in modern warfare."

Merritt reviews C

changed conditions

When Cooke, Merritt and Upton agree that the double column of fours is invaluable in the interests of celerity, I

conclude that

:

Any

organization which will not admit of the ap plication of double column of fours is incorrect. s Assimilated Tactics were adopted by G. O. isvs Upton s Tactics A. G. O., 1873. The cavalry service never took

Upton No.

6,

kindly to the effort to unite them with infantry. The Drill Regulations of 1896 seem to be a combination of Cooke and Upton. differ from the Assim-

They

ilated Tactics chiefly in that they the cavalry to the infantry.

broke the

tie

that

Drlll Regula. tions 1896

bound

THE CONFEDERATE CAVALRY.

The Confederate cavalry under Stuart in the east early obtained a superiority over that of the Federal Government. After the Gettysburg campaign the Con federate cavalry began to deteriorate because the fine

stuart scavalry

12

quality of horses which they had when the war began could no longer be obtained. Stuart s cavalry was or and armed the same as the cavalry of the Army ganized

of the Potomac. s

cav-

^wheeler

wheeler

s

TEC-

^

i n the western armies of the Confederacy the single rank formation began to be used early in the war. Mor gan began to use it from the start. Forrest soon began

to use it, and Wheeler found that it was necessary to the conditions under which they were laboring. Wheeler wrote a set of cavalry tactics which were officially

adopted by the following order

Headquarters

Army

:

of the Tennessee,

Dalton, Ga.

February

17, 1864.

General Orders

No. 22.

The system of cavalry tactics prepared by Major General Joseph heeler is adopted for the use of the of the cavalry Army of the Tennessee.

W

By command

of General Johnston.

K. FALCONER, A.^V. G.

These

e

mSe nt

er

8

Ar

~

were used by Wheeler in 1863. (See Campaigns of Wheeler and His Cavalry, p. 375.) At the battle of Murfreesboro Wheeler s cavalry was armed with the rifle or carbine, sabers and revolvers. (Campaigns of Wheeler and His Cavalry, p. 62.) tactics

The following

report of an inspection of Wheeler s of cavalry great importance since it makes statements the use of the saber which cannot be contro regarding verted and which are agreed to by all men who saw that is

e

po\t

wS?eie?B

cavalry.

weapon extensively used during the war. ^ ^ * At east one re ^ ment f eac h brigade should be armed with pistols and sabers. This might xt<

^

be held in reserve, under ordinary circumstances, as the

charging regiment; as at present constituted, this com is virtually little else than mounted A infantry.

mand

change

in this respect

is

deemed very important, and

I

13 respectfully recommend the adoption of this suggestion at the earliest practicable moment.

earnestly and

A

light carbine

might be carried

in addition.

of regret that the saber has been so

moral influence

a matter

It is

much overlooked;

its

The

"fannade, the glitter of great. the keen blades in the air in the event of a charge, pro

duce to

in

hand

is

themselves a most terrifying effect." conflict the necessity of the saber

In a hand is

most ap

parent.

(February, 1865, Wheeler and His Cavalry,

p.

408.)

Wheeler was, without doubt, the ablest Confederate cavalry leader in the west. He was always ready to work team and play a subordinate part to his command

in the

ing general.

Ext. No.

The

2.

.

,,

the

carbines and

rifles

were

flashing:

.

and banging away

game was

came on and

at times,

and

w hen

scattering- shots,

Shelbyville,

*

at

the

long range, and then, when a change Tenn.,

work grew

hot, the spiteful sharp explo

sions swelled into a crackling roar like that of a canefire, when, in a single minute, hundreds of

brake on

boiler-like joints

Add

have burst asunder.

to

all

the

whizzing, angry whirl of countless leaden missiles which split the air about you; the hoarse, unnatural shouts of

command

Pen picture of the cavalry flght ofshelb y vine.

for in battle

all

sounds of the human voice

seem out of pitch and tone; the wild, defiant yell and the answering huzzas of the opposing line the plunging and rearing of frightened horses; the charges here and there of companies or squadrons which seem to be shot out of the main body as flames shot out of a house on fire; here and there the sharp, quick cry from some unfor ;

tunate trooper who did not hear one leaden messenger for only those are heard which have passed by; the

heavy, soggy striking of the helpless body against the ground; the scurrying away of the frightened horse, as

often into danger as out of it, whose empty saddle tells the foe that there is one rifle less to fear. All these sights

and sounds go to make up the confusing medley of a battle-field.

(Campaigns of Wheeler and His Cavalry,

p.

101.)

June 27,

14 ForreBt

Forrest was a very able man, but, like Stonewall

-

Jackson, was at his best when operating alone. He could not bear restraint and did not work well to the central idea.

Ext

? habifS fought

on

jJanyHiiijenn,

Na

The

2A.

thickly clad with cedars,

that, for the

most

however, was

now

movements, so

airy

was on

foot, which,

country, rocky and rugged, was difficult, of course, for cav-

and

part, the fighting

Forrest

s

habitual

tactics,

(Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest

November

621.

29,

s

Cavalry,

p.

1864.)

COMMENT. Forrest always had an escort, but he and his escort always participated in the thickest of the fighting. It would seem that if a general does not personally enter the heavy fighting, under the changed conditions of warfare, a large escort would be a nuisance.

Armament Forrest

s

of cavalry.

Forrest

s cavalry generally carried sabers, but selJ used them. His cavalry may be considered the high type of mounted infantry.

dom est

Morgan was essentially a raider; although fighter when the occasion demanded, he preferred sort of

warfare to working

in

a hard a loose

conjunction with other

troops, Morgan

s

cav

y.

Ext. No.

mounted

We were, in fact, not cavalry, A small body of mounted men

3.

riflemen.

usually kept in reserve to act

we fought very

on the

but

was

flanks, but otherwise

on horseback except on scouting never used sabers, and long guns were

little

We

expeditions. not exactly the weapons for cavalry evolutions. Morgan rarely fought with the army; he had to

make

his

man had

command a

ferred and usually

(Morgan Mosby.

self-sustaining one.

a pistol and some had two. s

worn was

the

Army

Nearly every

The

pistol pre

Colt.

Cavalry, by Duke.)

Mosby was a partisan and fought whenever every thing seemed to be in his favor. His force seldom ex-

15

ceeded 300 men, mounted on the best horses the state of His men were all picked men Virginia could produce. who knew the country where they were operating. With this class of horses he could always fight on his own terms.

When

not raiding or harassing trains, they scat

tered in the surrounding country

on

call.

and came together again the revolver only, ex

They were armed with

most men had two, besides carrying extra cylin ders to slip loaded into the weapon when all loads were exhausted.

cept that

16

CHAPTER

I.

ARMS AND THEIR USES REVOLVER

vs.

SABER.

EMBRACING A DISCUSSION OF THE RELATIVE MERITS OF THE REVOLVER AND SABER AND SHOWING WHEN EACH SHOULD BE USED. THE TERM PISTOL, IN ANY REPORT, MEANS REVOLVER. Bowie knives.

Ext. No.

But while a few of the Confederate

4.

armed, almost every man of them The Arkansas and and revolver. had a bowie knife Texas troops, especially, carried enormous knives, that soldiers

were

efficiently

might have made a Malay s blood run cold, but in the end these huge knives did duty far oftener as cleavers than as bayonets.

(Morgan u

1

June

fll^i

*

scaf

men threw the

p.

Cavalry, by Duke.)

s

Ext. No.

of pistol.

Colonel

5.

Wickham and

themselves into a

field

few of his on the roadside, and by a

of their pistols checked further pursuit. (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart,

fire

289.)

Forrest placed his men dismounted The first Federal charge verAlimomited immediately behind a gully. k MiS8 was checked at 60 yards. The second Federal charge Feb 2V64. Forrest s

Ext.

men

6.

Nfo.

"

The third Federal charge was reached 20 yards. The fourth Fed The Confederate rifle am eral charge went through. munition was exhausted and they fought with revolvers. was checked

at

not checked

till

40 yards. it

(Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest p.

istST"

7.

Two

strong lines of Federal infantry

and Duff, through an open field. Their front line came within 30 paces of the Con federates, who then drew their revolvers and drove the enemy back with great slaughter.

Ti^h. min go pressed 10,

Cavalry,

399.) Ext. No.

ute of revolver,

s

upon

Rucker, Bell

(Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest p.

473.)

s

Cavalry,

17 8. The 9th Penn. Cavalry had been with- Federal, use 8 dls the battery and placed in position by the sidem^nleT of the road, and by close pistol fighting, held the Gs!

Ext. No.

drawn from

"

largeTe^Ko.z^

columns of the enemy

in check.

M. McCook, R. R., Vol. 31, Part I, p. 654.) Ext. No. 9. The enemy charged in gallant style, (Col. E.

and were repulsed twice, the second time the Texans using their six-shooters at 20 paces. (Maj. Genl. I, p.

S.

D. Lee,

C

S.,

^

Texan. use

v

re-

P ooi,Mi SS .,

Fb.a, i86

R. R., Vol. 32, Part

365.)

Ext. No. 10. In one instance the 2d U. S. Cavalry 2d u. s. cavalry use revolver, disj ,1 . drove the enemy before them with their mounted pistols ( dis,

-

after the carbine

mounted)

ammunition had given

out.

(Brig. Genl. A. T. A. Torbert, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I,

Co Ml

805.)

p.

Ext. No. 11. Anderson advanced in good style, the charge with r e Confederates with sabers, supported by the 5th Georgia vers agan.t caiJ & bines does not ... with pistols. 8UCCeed Ihree times these two regiments charged the 4th Michigan, but each time they were driven back Ga Jlln a O 1864! ,

,

-

-

in confusion.

(Col. R.

H. G. Minty, R.

R., Vol. 38,

Part II

p

821.)

Ext. No. 12. The enemy relied wholly upon the saber against ve carbine and the pistol; my men preferred the saber. A^e! short but closely contested struggle ensued, which re- vaTsept^iSf^l suited in the repulse of the enemy. Many prisoners were taken and quite a number of both sides were left on the field.

(Brig. Genl. G. A. Custer, R. R., Vol. 43, Part p.

I

456.)

Ext. No. 13.

enemy and

the-

The charge was met by one from the m the me iee b broken. The men had notf.Vi iStoS

command was

weapons but difficult to

their carbines, and these were extremely load and inefficient in the melee that ensued.

The

rebels (Mosby s men) had very few sabers but were well supplied with revolvers and rode up to our men and shot them down without meeting more resistance

than

men

could

make with

carbines.

I

ascribe the dis-

^sTb^T Gap 1865

Feb>

19)

18 *

*

*

men having- neither sabers nor revolvers, and consequently being unable to engage in a melee successfully with an enemy armed with aster to

fourth, to the

two revolvers

at least

man.

to the

(Maj. Thos. Gibson, 14th Pa. Cav., R. R., Vol. 46, Parti, sabers

necea-

n

11

country.

HI11 etSj*i864.

p.

465.)

Lomax

cavalry are armed entirely and have no sabers, and the consequence is

Ext. No. 14.

with

rifles

s

on horseback, and in this open cannot country they successfully fight on foot against that they cannot fight

large bodies of cavalry. (Lieut. Genl. Jubal A. Early, C. S., R. R., Vol. 43,

Part

559.)

I, p.

Ext. No. 15. combat with an

could not stand that; but, drawing ,,. upon the monster and inflicted a severe I

.

my

Indian, revolver wins against sa ber cut. Solomon s Fork, last July 29, 1857.

saber, rushed

wound on

At

his head.

....

1

the

-

.

same moment he

fired his

..

barrel within a foot of me, the ball taking effect in

the center of the breast, glancing to the left and lodging

near

my

left nipple.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. Ext. No. 16.

saber used as a

a saber stroke

and

Colonel his horse

Munford was dismounted by was

killed.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl.

m Fieetwood,* va., 9, 1K63.

June

p.

*"^!

E. B. Stuart,

Ext. No. 17. Perceiving his danger, Colonel Davis turned upon Allen with a cut of his saber, which Allen avoided by throwing himself on the side of his horse; at the game moment h e fired and Colonel Davis fell.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl.

Revolver wins against the aber

J.

107.)

p.

individual

E. B. Stuart,

21.)

p.

^Manassas^Jirty

J.

J.

E. B. Stuart,

265.)

Ext.

No.

Colonel HamptOD, while engaging one of the enemy with his saber, was shot through the body by another, and mortally wounded. f

18.

1

.

,

,

,

.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. p.

J.

E. B. Stuart,

289.)

*In the reports of Southern Officers the engagement at Brandy Station as

"Fleetwood"

or

"Fleetwood

Hill."

is

given

19

Ext. No. 19.

Captain Latane and Captain Royall individual combat, revolver one with the sab er and the other with wins against sa .

met hand

to hand,

ber.

Royall was

the pistol, and Latane received instant death.

severely

wounded by Latane

charged close at Latane

s

men who

saber and by the

chicka hominy IBS-/.

s side.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. p.

,

J.

E. B. Stuart,

56.)

Corporal Caroll and Private Jett

Ext. No. 20.

Co.

me

U C,"

after the

hand

their sabers cut

to

hand

fight in the field,

off close to

the

f

showed

and Caroll

hilt,

s 3

forehead was gashed with a saber. (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. p.

J.

E. B. Stuart,

344, Gettysburg campaign.)

Ext. No. 21.

And

was soon, and for sev- Forrest s cavairy uses saber as ita a cutting weapon dotted with the wounded and slam the road .

eral miles, thickly

number of

whom

had been cut down by the sabers of Ky" &V i

who

the untrained but heavy-handed Confederates lowed Forrest that winter afternoon.

(Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest

s

r

ifei!*28i

i

fol

Cavalry,

p. 52.)

Pistol wins against saber ew officers with their sabers; but, eluding the f ull th?*g

Ext. No. 22. ly

by two

Forrest was assaulted simultaneous-

^^

force of their thrusts by bending his

body suddenly

11 1

for-j^jjjfjg"^ ,

ward, their sword points only touched his shoulder. Car ried a few paces ahead by the impetus of his horse, check ing and drawing which aside in time to shoot one of his opponents as he came up, he thrust his saber point into * * * the other. obliging him to run his saber

through one, and disable the other by a blow on the sword arm.

(Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest

s

Cavalry,

p.

53.) uses Terry, while engaged ^officer single-handed with a Federal trooper whom he was ham- sacremanto, Ky., Dec. Jo, oi. mering with his exhausted rifle, was run through the

Ext. No. 23.

Private

W. H.

heart by Captain Davis. (Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest 54.)

s

Cavalry,

p.

20

charge in

umn

of

Forrest

He drew

Ext. No. 24.

coi-

his

squad-

men up

for the

work

in

P en space, in a column of squadrons. The order to charge up the ravine was given, with instructions for the

an cav-

r s

and second companies of the squadrons severally to About deploy to the right and left as they advanced.

first U8 Fort Donison, Feb. 15, i86a.

the batterv a

^and

to

fa^

struggle

ensued.

Sabers,

and carbines were lavishly used, with much cost of lives on both sides. (Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest s Cavalry,

pistols

p.

Forrest

82.)

Ext.

uses

No. 25.

Forrest

resolved

to

shot-guns during part of

tje Dearly shiioh, April 7

1862.

At

charge.

twenty paces the Confederates gave a volley with their shot-guns, a formidable weapon at that distance, and rushed in with pistols and sabers.

(Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest p. saber used as shock weapon. Cpp rviiie, Va.,

s

Very many charges were made and

Ext. No. 26.

the saber used freely.

(Genl. A. Pleasonton, R. R., Vol. 27, Part saber used aa shock weapon. Brandy Station,

sturdy

men

]y

of

weap

Ford

was USed With

s

cav-

912.)

SUCCCSS.

932.)

I, p.

They outnumbered us three to one, but could not withstand the heavy saber blows of the sturdy men of Maine who rode through them and over Ext. No. 28.

(Genl. Kilpatrick, R. R., Vol. 27, Part stuart

I, p.

There were several charges and the

Ext. No. 27. Saber

(Genl. Buford, R. R., Vol. 27, Part a e as cutting

Cavalry,

Battle of Shiioh.)

146.

The charge was

Ext. No. 29.

I,

spiritedly

p.

986.)

made and

m

sabers freel y used as the heads of y men wil1 attest ^ooTbfrVug h Md., jV^isSs! 1st Vt. Lieut< Col Cav., R. R., Vol. 27, Preston, ( >

Parti, Kiipa trick U

s

be duXl8 av ann a h n a Cft e

way ne S borough

p.

till

s

cav-

wfth^lbe^."

Upwards

of 200 left in our hands

were wounded by the saber alone. (General Kilpatrick, Savannah Campaign, R. Vol. 44,

stuart

1015-)

Ext. No. 30.

p.

R.,

365.)

Ext. No. 31.

charged down

Jones brigade, with drawn sabers,

the turnpike under a fearful artillery

fire.

21

(General Stuart, C.

S.,

R. R., Vol. 27, Part

II, p. ^"

\

With an abiding

Ext. No. 32. battles,

and a firm reliance on the

Jily

1868.

6,

faith in the saber,

god of your success

will continue.

(Maj. Genl. Part

II, p.

J.

E. B. Stuart, C.

S.,

R. R., Vol. 27,

720.)

Ext. No. 33.

After driving- the whole cavalry force it enemy steadily all day long, our troops went in about 4 o clock with the saber and a yell and routed them. ,,

r

1-1

of the

1

i

(Brig. Genl. S, D. Sturgis, R. R., Vol. 32, Part

saber used to finiah the fight.

seriersviiie, iseJ

.

I,

134.)

p.

Ext. No. 34. This great disaster would have at once been retrieved but for the insufficient armament of

command. Besides the 1st and 2d Md. and a squad ron of the 8th Va., there was not a saber in the com

the

mand. In that open country, perfectly of fighting charging cavalry the men were unable to do.

level, the

I,

p.

mode C ia a ldlrybecause

was by charging, and

8s

this

have n

^s. Ne

va

(Brig. Genl. Bradley T. Johnson, C. 43, Part

only

S.,

Cr Ck Iii

4

The

Prisoners cavalry made some handsome tured with saber charges, in which most of the prisoners were cap- saber ,

i

864

R. R., Vol.

6.)

Ext. No. 35.

i

6a ~

.

,

.

,

capthe

-

fl11

_j

Cedarville, Va.,

tUred.

Aug.

(Maj. Genl. P. p.

H. Sheridan, R.

R., Vol. 43,

Part

16, 1864.

I,

19.)

Forrest was charged by a Federal p ers nal c ba t r e ol o^r who lunged at him with his saber Forrest parried twhrnust ver saber ar the thrust with his pistol, and, firing, killed his resolute ap le vi A la ^ r f Ext. No. 36.

-

officer

;

^

18(i5

adversary.

(Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest p.

s

Cavalry,

668.)

The following

is

another account of the same af

fair:

Ext. No. 37.

up

to Forrest

and

While charging, Captain Taylor ran him over the head with his saber,

hit

Sameasabove

22

and ordered him to surrender. 8 oldieru8e * the

cu t

v

l

ver an d shot

him

Forrest then drew his reAnother of our boys ran

dead.

him with his saber as he ran. (The Last Campaign, by E. N. Gilpin, published

after him, striking at in the the thick woods the revolver is superior to the saber.

ll..Apr.

the saber al-

.

two navy

1,

1865.

The enemy had used

.

most exclusively,

Near Maples- with ville,

Cavalry Journal.)

Ext. No. 38.

in

torrest and his staff were armed, each and the men with Spencer rifles

revolvers,

.

It was a contest of sabers with fire as well as pistols. the with odds of four to one against the Confed arms, erates. Forrest, Lieut. Boon and five of his men only

were wounded, while some thirty of the enemy were killed and as many as sixty were left in the hospital, near by, badly wounded.

(Campaigns of Forest and of Forrest

s

Cavalry,

p.

669.)

saber disBear Creek sta.

Ga

NoT<

16)

VsJi.

Ext. No.

The

39.

10th Ohio

lant saber charge against the

made

a most gal-

enemy posted behind

rail

dismounted, they drove the enemy in con fusion, killing and wounding many with the saber.

barricades

;

(Col. Atkins, R. R., Vol. 44,

p.

389.)

Ext. No. 40. The captain had command of the advance and did not hear the order to turn off the company s^Bjiidi so he road, charged on past the artillery, cutting right and left among the enemy until shot down by them,.

saber used an a

^wiTson

(Col. J. G. Vail, R. R., Vol. 49, Part

The following

discussion

is

I, p.

taken from

455.) "Volunteer

Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade," written by Captain Frederick Whittaker, 6th N. Y. Cavalry :

So far as the author s observation goes, he never remembers an instance in which the saber charge, resolutely pushed, failed to drive the pistols. But the individual fancy of the colonel seemed to regulate If he were an enthusiastic the matter for his regiment. swordsman he always managed to infuse the same spirit into his men, and such men depended on their sabers with Ext. No. 41.

just confidence.

The

saber

is

a

weapon

that requires

23

constant practice to keep one s hand in, and our cavalry officers as a class are entirely deficient in the practice.

In

the instances during the

all

war

which the

in

may be safely asserted that it was owing to two things want of fencing practice and

saber proved ineffective

it

(Pp. 6 and 7.) the moral effect of the charge

blunt sabers.

Now, The

till

higher

is

tremendous.

charging yell, rising and swelling higher and it overtops the sound of musketry, frightens

fierce

more men than

bullets. Very, very few troops will stand up against a charge unsupported by works; we might say none. One side or the other is sure to give way, not from the force of the weapons, but simply because they

Anything which encourages doubles their morale, and morale

are afraid.

home

See also Exts. Nos.

(P. 11.

The

1,

2,

men is

to charge

everything.

480.)

true use of the revolver lies in irregular

where

war

combats and sudden encounters of small parties take place, on horseback, in narrow lanes, among woods and fences, where the saber cannot be used. In such places, and wherever regular order is broken up, fare,

the revolver prises

is

it

single

is

invaluable.

In pursuits, patrols and sur In line charges in the

superior to the saber.

But field, the latter is always conqueror if it is sharp. one thing should be impressed upon every man never to try long shots when on horseback. The revolver on the right hip should have a cord fastened to it a yard

The men should be

practiced in firing at a target while passing at speed, and then dropping the pistol on the opposite side, to use the cord while they handle the long.

saber.

(P. 14.)

The men should be taught never to fire before the word. The moral effect of a reserved volley is tremen dous. Irregular firing during an advance is both useless and demoralizing. Thirty or forty feet from the enemy s line is the

Ext.

warriors

and

time to

fire, all

No. 42.

drawn up

steadily

We

together aiming low.

us.

It

a

saber e

is

and marching boldly fo ose orTa rtisan was my intention and that

in line of battle,

towards

(P. 15.)

overtook about 300 Cheyenne T he

24 Solomon

s

Fork,

1857.

of most company commanders to give a carbine volley and then charge with drawn pistols, and use our sabers as a dernier ressort; but,

much

to

my

surprise, the colonel

We set up a terrific Charge/ yell, which scattered the Cheyennes in disorderly flight, and we kept up the charge in pursuit. Very few of the horses fleet were company enough after the march to keep up with Indians on fresh ponies. (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B Stuart, ordered

p.

Ext. No. 43. Just then Hampton arrived with the _, N. C. and the JJeff Davis Legion, and the battle was renewed back and forth across the plain until all of .,

used in themeiee. July

3,

, T

Hampton

1863.

sabers,

20.)

in the Gettysburgcavalry fight both saber and 1st

revolver were

"Draw

Fitz

Lee

s

brigade except the Cobb Legion, and all of brigade except the 4th Va. Cav. were engaged

s

hand melee which followed. For many minutes the fight with saber and pistol raged most in the fierce

hand

to

furiously.

p.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. Battle of Gettysburg.)

saber by large bodies of cavalry,

There was

Ext. No. 44.

wooded country not suitable for the use of the

r

J.

E. B. Stuart,

340.

.

.

1

little

chance for mounted

.

dense woods, the armaand the practice of barricading

fighting in eastern Virginia, the

ment of both

making

it

parties,

impracticable to use the saber with anything and so, with the exception of Yellow

like a large force;

Tavern, the dismounted method prevailed

in

almost every

engagement. (Sheridan

s

Memoirs, Vol.

I,

p.

424.)

COMMENTS ON THE SABER AND REVOLVER. It will

War

be seen from the next chapter that during the

of the Rebellion, the same as for centuries past, the

saber was essentially a weapon for shock action. During the thick of the melee it was still to be preferred but ;

.

when

the melee began to dissolve into individual combats the saber was or should have been exchanged for the re volver.

This exchange can be effected by throwing away it to the scabbard or by dropping

the saber, returning it

and

letting

it

hang attached

to the wrist

by a sword

25

The second method of getting rid of it is quite impossible when in motion, while the third will be ac companied by some danger to the trooper if the weapon

knot.

is

as sharp as

therefore, there

it

should be.

is

Up

the present time,

to

no satisfactory way to exchange the

saber for the revolver while in action.

In the individual combat the revolver will be the

winner

almost every case. If the trooper is expert in he has nothing to fear from an individual enemy armed with a saber. (Exts. 15, 17, 18, 19, 22, 36, 37, its

in

use,

38, 41.)

The

revolver was, at times, used for collective

fire

dismounted, but only under exceptional circumstances, such as from behind a stone wall, or for defensive pur poses after the carbine ammunition had become ex (Exts. 5 to 10 and 90.) revolver should, then, be used whenever regu lar order is broken up. That is, in individ (Ext. 41.)

hausted.

The

ual combat, charging as foragers on wagon trains or ar tillery (Ext. 24), in the woods (Exts. 38, 44), on patrol

when on mounted skirmish

duty,

irregular or partisan warfare

line in close country, in

where sudden encounters

of small parties are to be expected. (Ext. 41.) In the melee the carbine is useless against the re volver.

(Ext. 13.)

As

to the type of revolver or pistol

needed the con

clusions that can be reached are that there

is

needed for

the cavalry a

weapon of large caliber or great stopping quick firing, and accurate not to exceed fifty Since the change from the saber to the revolver

power, yards. will

be

made during

the fight,

it

is

evident that the

trooper should be able to get his weapon into action with the greatest degree of rapidity. Such a contrivance as a holster with a button flap and carrying the butt to the front should be discontinued at the earliest moment.

All references to the saber as a thrusting weapon, which were observed, have been extracted. (Exts. 22, 23, 36, 37.) ficers,

who

It will

be noticed that

it

was

so used

are presumably better instructed in

by of its

use

26

than are enlisted men.

Only

a small portion of the ref

erences to the saber as a cutting

weapon have been ex

tracted.

(Exts. 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 28, 29, 37, 40, 55, 83.) only these references, but conversations with vet

Not

erans of the Civil listed

man

war

lead to the conclusion that the en

going to use his saber almost entirely as a cutting weapon. At the close of the war it was no dif is

ferent than at the beginning. It alry at the close of the war

is

believed that the cav

was

as well trained in

swordsmanship as any troops that the United States will ever put in the field. If, then, our best trained cavalry to use the saber chiefly as a cutting weapon, it better to give it a weapon adapted to the manner in which it will be used rather than one adapted to the use is

going

is

The above statements deal with and not with abstract theories. It is not

of a trained fencer. historical facts

to be inferred that the cut

is to be preferred to the thrust, since the contrary is the case, but it is reiterated that the cut has been and will be used to the almost entire exclu

sion of the thrust.

There has been a great deal of discussion

in the

U.

S.

cavalry service in years past regarding the relative merits of the revolver and saber. Such discussion is time

wasted. Each weapon has its distinct and proper uses, and neither can replace the other; neither can either of them be discontinued as a necessary part of modern cav alry

armament.

often asserted that the horse is the real weapon shock (Ext. 67), and that it makes no difference whether a trooper has a revolver or saber in his hand. It is

in the

(See Exts. 29, 30, 35, 43, and Chapter II.) The moral and glitter of a "three-foot razor is

effect of the flash

"

not to be ignored. The 41 tactics prescribed that the charge should be at a "raise saber" and it was so used all through the war. after his war as a successful cav Upton, experience alry

commander, retained

in his tactics

the

"raise saber"

for the charge

of 73, probably because he found that his

27

men men

no matter what was prescribed. Untrained instinctively use the saber as they would use a club. The Cooke tactics of 61 prescribes the "tierce as the charging position, and Cooke, after his point" Civil

used

war

it

experience,

in his tactics of

The

still

prescribed the

"tierce

point"

83.

"tierce

point"

was

officially

adopted as the

charging position of the saber in the Cavalry Drill lations of 1896.

Regu

In the effect of the saber previous to and at the in stant of contact is largely a moral one (see Exts. 1, 2,

then it would seem that this effect may be materially ) increased by carrying the saber during the charge at a "raise saber" rather than at the position of "charge

41

,

saber"

and

as

now

glitter,

used, since in the former position

and therefore

greater than

if

its

moral

effect, will

its

be

flash

much

carried at the latter.

THE LANCE. At

Vionville,

Aug.

16, 1870.

Bredow s brigade was AB & defensive weapon the lance than was armed with the With equal numbers

composed of two regiments. One saber and the other with the lance.

i^noj>etter

they charged in the same line under identical conditions and suffered equal losses. This would indicate that as a defensive weapon the lance is not superior to the saber. In our service we know very little about the lance. In the will

Mexican war we had lancers for opponents,

be seen from the following Ext. No. 45.

The

as

:

cavalry J

made one most

sabers against gallant Mexican lancers. Benna vista,

charge against the enemy on the 23d of February, and cut their way through them; but the Mexican lancers

were far from, being a contemptible enemy, and many of them were admirable horsemen. Our people had the advantage of larger horses and heavier men as a general Mexicans were much more agile, and could

thing, but the

handle their horses as well as any people on earth, while with the lance they were greatly our superiors, and used

weapon with great San Pascual.

that at

effect

both at Buena Vista and

28

We

have yet to make good lancers in the United States, as experiments, even on a small scale, have proved failures among the Americans. (History of the U. Rush

s lancers.

S. Cavalry,

by Brackett,

p.

83.)

The

6th Pennsylvania Cavalry, known as Rush"s went out at the beginning of the war with Lancers, lances which they carried through all the campaigns of the Army of the Potomac till April, 1863. They never used that weapon in any shock action, and after Stone-

man s

abandoned it as unsuited and were thereafter armed with sabers and At the battle of Beverly Ford we find them

raid in April, 1863, they

to the service,

carbines.

charging with sabers, June 9, 1863. (See Annals of the 6th Pennsylvania Cavalry,

p.

167.)

COMMENTS ON THE LANCE.

The lance cannot be used to advantage in a close wooded country such as is found everywhere along the The greatest use of the lance is in the Atlantic coast. In the melee the saber possesses a decided ad In meeting an enemy armed with the lance it vantage. shock.

would be necessary lines

to first break the continuity of his

before the saber could gain a superiority.

extracts there can be found

In these

many examples where

alry charges have been broken by magazine

fire

cav

by hold

the charging line is within very close range. The traditions of our cavalry and its training are such that we can dismount and fight on foot in a very short

ing

it

till

This dismounted

fire should be supported by should deliver the charge as soon troops, which as the lancer line is broken. If it were necessary to meet

time.

mounted

lancers,

whose

lines

were unbroken by

fire action,

with

shock action of troops armed with the saber, I would endeavor to strike the weakest point of their line with a

mass formation of some kind, either by squadrons in column of troops or in line of troops in columns of fours. Thin lines fleeing in front of lancers would soon cause their lines to become so broken that other troops held in reserve could meet them with a fair chance of success.

29

CHAPTER

II.

SHOCK ACTION AND THE USE OF SABER. m. the enemy came up and resolutely assailed the right of Roddy s position wi It was handa mounted battalion, with drawn sabers.

About 4:00

Ext. No. 46.

p.

somely done, and the Confederates were .

.

.

thrown into a

-1-j m

.

disorder. great deal of confusion, giving way s Cavalry, Forrest of and of Forrest (Campaigns p.

saber used as the shock weapon.

Wilson s Raid, Apr. i, 1865.

666.)

On came

Ext. No. 47. their sabers

*

drawn.

*

the Federal cavalry with

*

Such was the momentum

um e ^Jfa r^

of

th

Wilson Apr.

1,

s Raid, 1865.

of the Federal charge that one of their horses, striking squarely against the wheel of a piece, broke every spoke,

and

split his

own

(Campaigns p.

breast open. of Forrest and of Forrest s Cavalry,

667.)

Ext. No. 48.

The enemy

left

some two or

three

sudden succeeds

regiments at Sugar Creek, a strong position, to oppose my advance; but instead of fighting them at long range,

The 5th as they expected, I ordered a saber charge. Iowa made a most gallant charge, breaking through their

onset "where

faiL

sugar creek, Tcnn., Oct. 9,1868.

lines, etc.

(Brig. Genl. George Crook, R. R., Vol. 30, Part p.

II,

687.)

Ext. No. 49. Our rapid pursuit and vigorous use of the saber completely demoralized this force, which ,

,

was thrown direction,

,.

their

(Col. Eli I,

p.

,

.

and scattered in every men throwing away large numbers of

arms, accoutrements,

Part

.

into great confusion,

etc.

Long, Comg. 2d Brig., R.

643.)

R., Vol.

31,

pursuit should caihoun. Te Dec. 28, 1863.

30

Ext

a

m ?n tspire St?n

^

S1

ing weapon.

(Col. E.

27,

>"

d

"^ xt<

we?i conducted ber c r !tr o y 8 the !ccS?f

the ene

okoiona,

can onl y account for our small loss

movements and

the consternation

M. McCook, R.

^

^

^ w *^

R., Vol. 32,

Part

k e observed that

141.)

I, p.

we

lost

but

which shows that the enemy, by the courageous and cooll y executed saber charge, was so struck and

"

Miss.,

Z

little ^

m7esn re Feb. 22, 1864.

5

"

produced by the saber charges

Pair Garden, .

N

ra P idit y of Ollr

taken by surprise that he lost the balance of power to n give a well-aimed fire, and this explains the many horses .

shot in the legs and head. (Maj. Gust. Heinricks, 4th

Mo.

Cav., R. R., Vol.

32, Parti, p. 280.) e

Ext

aS

S

8hock wea pon by western armies

mac e one {

JiOonuHy Crp^k,

G., June 20, 1864.

N

S2

~

Pa and the 4th Mich each and two battalions of the 4th

TllC 7th

sa b er charge,

-

Mich, repulsed three saber charges made by Anderson s brigade of regular cavalry. (Col. R. G. H. Minty, R. R., Vol. 38, Part II, p. 812.)

Driving faSry ^nfs suits in

re

Ext. No. 53.

cavre-

capture

fmenV

,

antry ^ rove

Near Berryviiie,

^e

At

same time General Wilson, dashed brigade, up the Winchester pike reb^l cavalry at a run, came in contact with

with Mclntosh

the

s

Kershaw s division, charged it, and captured the 8th So. Carolina regiment (16 officers and 145 men) and its battle flag, with a loss of only two men killed and two wounded. (Maj. Gen. P. H. Sheridan, R. p.

June

atlon>

9 i863

I,

24.)

^

^xt ^ dy

R., Vol. 43, Part

^ resn

columns of the enemy arriv-

unc^ er ^le heavy blows of our sabers were driven back. For an hour and a half the contest continued in determined charges. *

n

>

(Genl. D.

McM.

Gregg, R. R., Vol. 27, Part

I,

p.

951.) infantry if

Ext. No. 55.

may

be safely charged

changing

A

six-gun battery of the rapidly toward our left front. *.

,

struck when playing front.

away

enemy was This was

ordered to be charged, but before the order could be exe cuted it withdrew, and the charge was directed against the

enemy

s

infantry, which

was attempting

to

change

31

front and meet us; they were in confusion; no time was ^an * lost; the intrepid Devin, with his gallant brigade, burst n attacking like a storm of case shot in their midst, showering saber

^Q*^^

blows on their heads and shoulders, trampling themV*- 8 ^under his horses feet, and routing them in droves in

Creck

19 1864

The brigade emerged from the fray every direction. with three stand of colors and over 300 prisoners.

W.

(Brig. Genl.

Merritt, R. R., Vol. 43, Part

I,

p.

444.)

On July 3, engagement two or Two Taverns, in which this

Ext. No. 56.

u

three

e

r

s

har

al

miles to the right of

ment

Cav.) charged in close column

(1st Mich.

Hampton

brigade, using the saber only, and driving a loss to this regiment of

s

enemy from the field, with 6 officers and 80 men. the

(Brig. Genl. G. A. Custer, R. R., Vol. 27, Part p.

I,

899.)

A

Ext. No. 57.

second, third and fourth charge

charge should be met by counter

,, r 11 was made by the enemy, each of which was repulsed or charge. met and driven back by counter charges. During all enemy s charges the loss of men and horses must have i

t

1

1

1

been severe. (Genl. Jos. Wheeler, C.

He

Ext. No. 58. .,,

,.

S.,

R. R., Vol. 44,

p.

410.)

occasionally attacked us by charg-

<

.

,

i

,

,

,

ing with his cavalry, which was invariably met by coun,

Waynesboro.

i

ter charges.

Ga., Dec. 4, 1864.

(Genl. Jos. Wheeler, C.

S.,

R. R., Vol. 44,

p.

410.)

Ext. No. 59.

I immediately ordered the charge in columns of squadrons and swept the hill clear of

close .

the enemy. (Col. P. II, p.

charge

ably met by conn ter charge.

C obb

column

s

Legion

of squad-

rons.

M.

B.

Young,

C. S., R. R., Vol. 27, Part

732.)

Ext. No. 60.

Colonel Owen, with his gallant

little

g aber

iB

used

terrible ef

regiment, took the center of the road supported by the^ 2d Va. on his right and the 5th on his left, dashed in with j^ftfSft the most spirited charge of the day, driving the regiment before him:, using the saber with terrible effect, captur

ing and killing nearly the whole regiment.

Va>

32 (Genl. Munford, C.

S.,

R. R., Vol. 27, Part

II, p.

741.)

^ xt

86 rvesuse saber de n Tenn oot i is*?

c ^ ar

"

At

No. 61-

e ^-

Thirty-seven

wounded and 42 made were

inflicted

(Col. O.

the proper moment our reserve of the enemy were killed or

prisoners.

Nearly

all

the

wounds

with the saber.

H. LaGrange, R.

R., Vol. 30, Part II, p.

683.)

Revolver

Ext. No. 62.

is

for

substituted

tro P s roc^ e the nature oVthe

^

sabers f ect

i

General Smith ordered a charge. Six s lines with drawn

forward upon the enemy

The nature

-

ye use

f

of the ground prevented the eftne saber, but the pistol was substituted for

and did most excellent from his position and

it

The enemy was driven

service. lost

fearfully

in

killed

and

wounded. (Lieut. Col. Thos. I, p.

Regiment makessix charges

in one

W ere made

(Col.

Part

I,

p.

by a division in q

r

J.

R.

Cav.,

R.,

Vol. 27,

Soon commenced

a series of charges

Lomax,

C. S., R. R., Vol. 29, Part

I,

465.)

Ext. No. 65.

made

va,. sept.

N.

1st

966:)

(Brig. Genl.

battle.

In one day six distinct regimental J & number of smaller ones.

and counter charges by the 5th, 6th and 15th Va. Cav There were five distinct charges made at this point, alry. which resulted in leaving us in possession of the railroad and station.

p. charges

R., Vol. 32, Part

besides a

Wyndham,

Ext. No. 64.

Brigade makes

Brandy station,

No. 63.

Ext. c h arges

jnBrandy^ation,

M. Browne R.

276.)

Thus

it

will be seen that six distinct .

.

.

charges were made by parts of the division after the gentwo by the 2d Brigade lateral advance toward Winchester and one by the 1st Brigade against the enemy s cavalry,

one by the 2d Brigade and one by the reserve against the enemy s infantry and artillery, and one, the final charge, in

which

p.

445.)

three of the brigades were concerned. (Brig. Genl. Wesley Merritt, R. R., Vol. 43, Part all

I,

S3 Ext. No. 66.

Baker was charged by a fresh regi- charges and C put in the Cobb Legion and broke the at- vwmm**v The Cobb Legion was again attacked/" tacking party. and again with the Jeff Davis Legion- I turned the flank; and this series of charges went on until all

Then

ment.

I

,

my

named had charged

three times and

I

regiments

had gained ground

and front of more than half a mile. and (Life Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart,

to the right

p.

311, Upperville.)

Ext. No. 67,

most

terrific,

The

made.

-The order was given

to charge. The The horse as & W ever yet magnificent, charge witnessed was j7 sborou ^ saber and the horses hoofs were about our?^; Augl 19

only weapons. (Col. E. 38, Part

H. Murray, Comg. Cav. Div., R. R. Vol.

II, p. 864.)

Ext.

No. 68.

The order fours, The result was most "By

was heard. The enemy saw the wheel and wheel"

charge.

about

Colonel

Hampton

right about

charge

i,

*

instantly

ordered the

again ordered the

"Right

:

neuvertng cavalry

and placed himself at the head of his men; but it was of no avail. In a moment they were swept to pieetwood the side of the road, and the full force of the charge f ell tVn)

8 eizes

wheel"

upon the 4th Virginia. (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. p.

very

unfortunate, cffbelaugh^

J.

mil,

E. B. Stuart

289.) Ext. No. 69.

gallantly met

as

This charge was gallantly made and TWO brigades n a any the writer ever witnessed during Jie"hSJe!

four years of active service on the outposts. Taking into (ifilSg aitlSj; Va JuneM8< estimation the number of men that crossed sabers in this "

single charge (being nearly a brigade on each side), it far the most important hand-to-hand contest be

was by

tween the two armies.

As

the blue and gray riders mixed in the smoke and dust of that eventful charge, minutes seemed to elapse

before

the

effect

was determined.

At

last the inter

mingled and disorganized mass began to recede that the field was won to the Confederates.

;

we saw

34

p.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. Battle of Brandy Station.)

J.

E. B. Stuart,

277.

Ext. No. 70.

Observing a small portion of Fed Watts was sent forward with

eral cavalry, Lieut. Col.

one squadron. His charge developed the fact that he had attacked the advance guard of a brigade, which was ad

Munford vancing to battle in column of regiments. formed the second regiment in line and was retiring to gain the advantage of a better position, when he heard the order given to the Quick decision essential to a cav alry leader.

He

march."

fuu

o-allop.

enemy

s

The impetuosity

at

.

p.

smaii losses to impetuos-

ity of the charges,

Mar. i9,-Apr.

and charged

regiment entirely through the first line of the enemy, with whom his men were thoroughly intermingled in

29, 186-i

hand fight. (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl.

hand

due

"Forward, trot,

of the charge b carried his

Groveton,Va., Aag.

column,

instantly wheeled by fours

21,

to

J.

E. B. Stuart,

106.)

Ext. No. 71.

Nothing but the impetuosity of the charges, whereby the enemy was not given time to de.

f end himself,

can account for the small

list

of casualties.

(Maj. Genl. E. Upton, R. R., Vol. 49, Part

I,

p.

475.)

Mounted coiumns should be ready to strike when the enemy breaks.

Wilson Mar.

s Raid, i9-Apr. 2i,

Ext. No. 72.

ma tenallyJ

The

fruits of

increased by J having>

our victories have been

mounted columns always J

ready J to take advantage of opportunities offering. B v t. Brig. Genl. E. F. Winslow, R. R., Vol. 49, ( Part I, p. 482.)

COMMENTS. be noticed that the saber was the only weapon used for shock action except when the ground was un It will

favorable, such as a close or

such conditions the revolver saber.

(Ext. 62.)

sults a cavalry

To

wooded country. was substituted

Under for the

secure favorable and decisive re

commander must make

a quick decision

and quickly take the

initiative. (Exts. 48, 50, 51, 68, leader will usually fail timid 70, 71, 72.) cavalry where a bold one will succeed. In many cases a bold

A

and sudden attack

will result in small losses

(Exts. 50,

35

51), and boldness will take the place of numbers.

(Ext.

79.)

up.

The pursuit should be vigorous as long as it is kept The time when it should be stopped is discussed un

der the head of

Cavalry

Pursuit."

in falling

back should be careful to move to

the flanks of supporting infantry, otherwise their con fusion is communicated to the infantry with serious con

(Ext. 53 and 471.) sequences to the latter. charge should always be met by a charge.

A

(Exts.

57, 58, 66, 92, 230.)

A

regiment can make as

many

as six charges in one

(Exts. 63, 64.) Tactical organizations launched usually not greater than a regiment day.

are

in

a charge

at

any one time

(Exts. 63, 64, 66), but an entire brigade may be charged In one case the charge of an as such. (Exts. 65, 69.) entire division

is

The charge can be caught

A

recorded. will be

in the act of

if

the

enemy

maneuvering.

(Ext. 68.) mounted column should always be held in readi

ness to take the initiative

There

(Ext. 65.)

most destructive

when opportunity

is

offered.

be a golden moment, and the would seize it must be found ready.

will at rare intervals

commander who

(Exts. 68, 72.) Ground scouts should always be sent in advance of

(Ext. 68.) attacking troops. Reserves should have sabers drawn.

at

(Ext. 61.)

Care must be exercised that cavalry does not arrive the charging point in a distressed or blown condition.

The distance over which cavalry (Ext. 95, 411, 418.) can travel at an increased gait and still be fit to deliver Frederick the a shock will depend upon their training. Great required that his cavalry should be able to pass

over 4,000 yards at a trot, 1,800 yards at a gallop, and still be able to finish 300 to 400 yards at full speed.

Modern conditions with long range fire arms, more than ever, make it necessary that cavalry be able to pass over great distances at high speed.

36

Extract 418 speaks of charging likely that the

five miles,

but

it is

language exaggerates to some extent.

See

also Extracts 411, 418.

CHARGING ARTILLERY. charge battery using only the *beT. * sept.

^fms.

They made

Ext. No. 73.

a charge across a deep

ravine and a creek, up a steep hill, the road rough and stony, and through a heavy shell fire, right up to the muzzle of the guns, two of which they brought off with

out firing a shot, using nothing but the saber. (Col. Davies, R. R., Vol. 29, Part I, p. 120.) Attack

The enemy moved

Ext. No. 74.

with

a brigade to en-

6

fh^centS and gage the 2d Iowa Cavalry, one regiment dismounted dismounted men j on the flanks. as skirmishers on both flanks of a regiment mounted. .

.

,

i.inir

,

Mounted and dismounted men of the enemy came for ward in fine style, the howitzers of the 2d Iowa firing Defense holds their The regiment lying on the ground waited until rapidly.

trauon^badlac-

.

..

.

,

fire.

y.

Federal

cav-

airy use rapid fire

during

thewa? lie

Teni

Mov

1

s

the

enemy

s

cavalry were within 50 yards (Confederate

60 yards) J

re port savs

,

sprang to their

feet,

and, with

from revolving rifles. cheers, poured in a severe 11118 tne repulse was thorough. ^ ew men reacnec^ tne fire

A

g"

l*

(Col.

Edward Hatch,

R. R., Vol. 31, Part

I, p.

245.)

Ext. No. 75.

Colonel LeGrange, by a magnificent with sabers. Fair Garden, and gallant saber charge upon the Fair Garden road, Tenn., Jan. 27, f M1 1084. captured two pieces of artillery, sabered the cannoneers Attackartiiiery

.

.

1

.

and supports and captured a large number of prisoners. (Col. E. cavalry farm in column of

squadrons

to

charge a battery. Yellow Tavern,

M. McCook, R. R, Vol.

32, Part

I, p.

140.)

From a personal examination of the discovered that a successful charge might be

Ext. No. 76.

1

ground, fe

I

made upon the right.

>

1

the battery of the enemy, keeping well to With this intention, I formed the 1st Mich.

Cav. in column of squadrons under cover of the woods. As soon as the 1st Mich, moved from the cover of the

woods brisk

the fire

enemy divined our with

shell

and

canister.

could be reached there were

Before the battery be opened and

it was impossible to pass Yet notwithstanding these Mich, advanced boldly, and when with-

three at one time.

obstacles, the 1st

opened a

five fences to

a bridge to cross, over which

more than

intention and

37

200 yards of the battery, charged it with a yell which spread terror before them. Two pieces of can non, two limbers and a large number of prisoners were in

the results of this charge. (Brig. Genl. G. A. Custer, R. R., Vol. 36, Part

among p.

I,

818.)

Note.

During

the attention of the

executed

its

charge two regiments engaged enemy in front while the 1st Mich, this

charge.

A

Ext. No. 77.

part of the 1st N.

T.

cavalry came

j

.

thundering down the narrow ridge, and Harts unsupported batteries in

striking-

McGregor

Artmery

out support res p l8M cavalry charge, using re-

volveri the flank, and riding *

-

Brandy Station, to va.,junee, ises.

..

through and between guns and caissons from right but met by a determined hand-to-hand contest from the cannoneers with pistols, sponge staffs and whatever left,

came handy to fight with. The charge was repulsed by artillerists alone, not a solitary friendly trooper being within reach of us.

else

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. p.

278.) Ext.

No. 78.

but answer

my

J.

E. B. Stuart,

don t express any opinion, There ain t no W what s the best question, way to charge charge a baJtery! "Now,

a battery? He looked me squarely in the eye for a few seconds and then said very earnestly, Lieutenant, to

tell

you the God

charge a battery.

(Morgan

s

s

truth, thar ain

t

no good way to

"

Cavalry, by Duke.)

COMMENTS. Against the charging

artillery the saber

weapon (Exts.

was frequently used

73, 75.)

The

as

best results

however, be obtained by using the revolver, since the gunners will take refuge behind their pieces and can do good execution with the revolvers with which they will,

are armed,

(Ext. 77.) frontal charge against artillery is not apt to suc ceed unless the distance is the very short (Ext. 68)

A

;

greater the distance charged the less the chance of suc cess. The flank attack offers a fair chance of success

38 unless the artillery

(Ext.

well supported by foot troops. frontal attack on artillery with

is

The

76.)

in the center and. dismounted troops on an example of the poorest kind of tactics.

mounted troops the flanks

is

(Ext 74.) The best

time to strike artillery

when

is

it

is

in

the act of limbering or unlimbering.

charging

CHARGING FOOT TROOPS. No. 79. At 4:00 p. m. the enemy pressed inwarmly along our entire line. The troops on my left gave way and an entire corps of the enemy rushed in Ext.

nk<

pushing in on our rear till they gained our were resting directly upon the only line of

and rapidity of a charge was

tain that the boldness

B

ness

s^

ra ?dft take toe place of num-

c

cou

iat

(

Var^ises

8

^

SU p er j ors

j

and

left flank, feeling cer

immediately charged his

I

army.

hospitals,

retreat of our

all

n an y manne r check a force so vastly our n num bers. The rangers broke through the ^

^ 116 ^ skirmishers without breaking their impetus and pushed on, striking the main line almost at the same time with Allen s gallant Alabamians, which threw the entire force of the

in a

enemy

most rapid and disorderly

retreat.

(Lieut. Genl. Jos. Wheeler, C. S., R. R., Vol. 47,

Part

1131.)

p.

No.

Ext.

carairy catches in a infantry

where

I,

80.

Wilson,

1111

Mclntosh

with

made a

s

brigade

gallant charge through the long canon, leading, r geB U the advance of Ramsen s rebel infantry anc meeting 8uccwsfui opeqmm creek, division, drove it back and captured the earthworks at cafion

it

^

i

the

mouth of

the cafion.

H. Sheridan, R.

(Maj. Genl. P. I, P.

shaken charge boot to op eqnon v., *pt. 19, isbi Cre<k,

Part

47.)

Ext. No. 81.

Against

R., Vol. 43,

ordered

;

The charge

the gallant Custer led

brave horsemen rode

in.

of the left column it

;

was

boot to boot these

The enemy

s

line

broke into

The reserve fragments under the shock. and all lost to the the was followed blow, brigade a

t

h ousanc

[

enemy. (Brig. Genl. p.

445.)

W.

Merritt, R.

R.,

Vol. 43, Part

I,

39

The enemy now threw

a heavy force of infantry across the river on the left of the position, The 4th and part of the 6th N. Y. were ordered to

Ext. No. 82.

while forming. Front Boyal Vs Aug. ie, 1864.

This charge them before they could succeed in forming. 4th and the was successfully accomplished. While the 6th were charging the rebel infantry, the cavalry again advanced to turn our right. As soon as their column Y. was exposed, two squadrons of the 6th N. fully

were ordered

to

charge,

and again broke and routed

them. Part (Brig. Genl. Thos. C. Devin, R. R., Vol. 43, I,

p.

474.) ln

Ext.

No.

83.

y

a g

At this time a line of infantry ed wwie ?n th e . act of emerging. r~* I woods in our front. hey were in from the woods. .

emerged from the some disorder. General Merritt at once ordered me to the charge, which I did by changing front obliquely to

the evolution being splendidly executed by both regiments at the gallop, when, like a whirlwind, they

left,

dashed on the unfortunate infantry,

who were

vainly

endeavoring to form. It was a terrible scene. Right on, over and through the rebel lines, dashed the wild troopers, slashing right and left, pistoling those who had again seized their guns after surrender

by the

^ g*

cut geems

to

be

t

fa

grefened on foot

and taking prisoners

score.

(Brig. Genl. Thos. C. Devin, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p.

482.)

Ext.

No. 84.

deiiverThe enemy, mounted, three times edcharge by successive men in an open field, and were blows "

charged our dismounted

-

as often repulsed, but not until, mingling in our ranks,

some of

his

men were brought

to

the

ground with

clubbed guns.

(Maj. Genl. Part

I,

p.

W.

T. Martin, C.

S.,

R. R., Vol. 31,

547.)

As we moved up, the whole force (of the enemy) charged down at a gallop, and I am proud to say my men did not disappoint me. Standing firm, take Ext. No. 85.

they repulsed the grandest cavalry charge I ever witnessed. The 2d and 7th Tenn. drove back the advance

^^

Term., Dec. 24, &s\

40

and as

line,

destructive

the

same

wheeled

it

in retreat,

Each successive

fire.

poured upon them a

line of the

(Maj. Genl. N. B. Forrest, C. Part

I, p.

enemy shared

fate, etc. S.,

R. R., Vol. 12,

354.)

Ext. No. 86.

The column being attacked in rear, General Kilpatrick ordered me to withdraw my command and form for a charge on the attacking force. I formed

my h e

menta form

g in 601

"

umnoffouS couts are senTout

brigade (now reduced to a little over 700 of all ranks ) in line of re g ental column of fours (three regiments). I sent a few men from each of my columns t0 c ^ ar e as f ra g er s, and remove portions of the first fence,

charging cavairy knock down a fence, and pass on to the attack. LoTejoy station,

and moved forward

at a trot until I arrived

of the rising ground behind which we rushed forward at a gallop.

on top

we had formed, when One fence still inter-

vened between us and the rail barricades, from behind which the rebels were firing. The leading horses, in trying to leap the fence, knocked off some of the top rails, and gaps were soon made through which the col

umns

The

poured.

rebels held their position until

we

were within about ten rods, when they broke from their cover and scattered in the wildest confusion. (Col. R.

H. G. Minty, R.

R., Vol. 38, Part II, p.

814.)

COMMENTS. It is

now

generally accepted that unshaken infantry in front by cavalry. This

cannot be successfully charged is

not necessarily true. The infantry of Frederick the in solid lines, three deep, delivered a fire of 50-

Great

caliber balls as rapidly as our thin lines, with intervals, can

Then every hit

now

two yards

deliver a fire of 30-caliber bullets.

that hit a horse stopped him. Unless a 30-caliber a horse with bullet, by

ball

in a vital spot

many wounds to leave the

offered

will

now

field.

charge and still be able There will be many opportunities finish the

for a successful charge against infantry other

than directly against flank (Ext. 79)

;

its

front.

when changing

It

can be charged in

front (Ext. 55)

;

while

41

forming (Ext. 82) while in column emerging from a or from the woods (Ext. 83) when shaken by in a canon where it cannot deploy (Ext. fire (Ext. 81) ;

defile

;

;

80). infantry can be surprised by a well executed charge, it is likely that its fire will be very inaccurate. If

(Ext. 51.) It will

often be possible to support a mounted charge fire or the fire of artillery delivered from

by dismounted

a flank position; this will keep down the or divert it from the charging troops.

When

enemy

fire

s

dismounted toops break through a firing line may be checked by a mounted charge.

advance

their

(Exts. 79, 219.)

CHARGING FIELD WORKS.

A

Ext. No. 87.

portion of the 6th Mich. Cav., see-

ing that only a portion of the

At

works, charged. ceiving the

fire

cavalry charge earthwork.

enemy were behind earth

a trot they passed up the line, and the next

of the whole

hill,

re

moment

rode through and over the earthworks, passed to the h

and

ef

sabering the rebels along the entire and returned with a loss of 30 men. right

left,

line,

(Reference omitted.) Ext. No. 88.

They had constructed barricades and which we charged and captured. (Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, p.

rifle pits,

charging Todd

s

rifle

javen,

V>

776.)

Ext. No. 89. Four mounted companies from the Field works charged in flank same regiment followed in rear of Captain Abraham, and, ter bein turn |d after crossing the bridge, turned to the right and charged coiumbns, Ga., in flank the works at the lower bridge, capturing (500) prisoners and three guns at that point.

-

(Maj. Genl. E. Upton, R.

R., Vol. 49,

Part

I,

p.

475.)

Ext. No. 90. the

woods and

The enemy

s

cavalry emerged a hand-to-hand conflict ensued.

f

y^ and

rom Bt ^nee The gf^JJJ

enemy outnumbering us three to one, we retired behind a stone wall and maintained our position, repulsing the

f

j^YVeS

1

*

pis

Va

"

"

42 repeated charges of the

and

pistol firing.

Wm.

(Gal. fences

by

**"

July 8 Gettysburg,

Gamble, R.

with the

W

lst

R., Vol. 27, Part

Va and

to another until a

The

1st

933.)

-

-

->

Vt. and 5th N. Y., and drove the

which the

I, p.

Brigadier General Farnsworth moved 18th Pa followed by the 1st

Ext. No. 91.

Mounted attack of stone e ded ?a n??y

well-directed carbine

enemy by

enemy from one position was reached, behind

heavy stone wall

rebel infantry was gathered in great numbers. Vt. and the 1st W. Va., led by the gallant

Farnsworth, cleared the fence and sabered the rebels in rear,

sameasabo.

(Kilpatrick, R. R., Vol. 27, Part

I,

p.

993.)

Anyone not cognizant of the minutiae of this charge upon infantry under cover of heavy timber and stone fences will

fail

to

form a

just conception of

its

mag

nitude.

(Major Capehart, 27, Part

I,

p.

W.

ist

Va. Cav., R. R., Vol.

1019.)

COMMENTS. be seen that the mounted attack of

It will

was not

The most

unusual.

persistent

field works was the attack Gettysburg, on

on the right of the Confederate lines at July 3d, where the Confederates were behind a succes

In these attacks, the

sion of breast-high stone fences.

gallant

Farnsworth

lost his life.

It is

believed that these

attacks were the cause of the suspension of the general attack against the Federal left.

More

attention should be given in our service to

Unless cavalry can meet with defeat when

matter of jumping obstacles.

the

pass ordinary obstacles,

will

it

otherwise there should be every reason to expect success.

FORMATION USED IN CHARGING. charge in

Ext. No. 92.

coi-

umn of fours.

cavalry receiv-

*

ours an ^ wltn tne saber.

staSmnlma/ex^ standing P<

t

Totpo t0mj ^de Va

2.

"

The charge was made

.

f

it>

in

line,

It

drawn up

-111column of was received by the enemy

in the

in

road and on either

an d with an almost harmless discharge of their

June

-jiiad

pistols.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. p.

56.)

J.

E. B. Stuart,

43 Ext. No. 93.

Not 50 yards below, Colonel Percy

Windham was advancing the

N.

1st

T.

At the battle

nn

Cav. in magnificent Brandy station both sides

/ column of squadrons, with flags and guidons Hampton had formed his four (p. 271 below.) flying, of in column squadrons, and, with everything regiments in hand for action, was moving forward briskly to order, in

charge

June

f

9,1868.

attack.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. p.

J.

E. B. Stuart,

274.)

Ext. No. 94.

I

same at immediately J ordered the charge in Station. Brandy

columns of squadrons, and swept the hill clear of the enemy, he being scattered and entirely routed. (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart,

close

p.

June

9,

ises.

277.)

Ext. No. 95.

Stoneman

At

the fight at Cass Station,

MayJ

charge over a 24,,long distance deC

e8i

n

reported to have charged grog^ th e in line over an open field for about 1,000 yards. Wjheel- JJ^YnSdiS?^ S 8t n G er s cavalry, in two lines, one directly behind the other, M | 5 ^64 1864,

s

^

is

cavalry

*"

ay

supported by other troops in column, waited till the Federals had approached to within 200 yards. The Fed-

Troops which with the

strike

was by this time disorganized by its long charge. At this time Wheeler s cavalry started forward at a ceed walk, then trot and finally sounded the charge when C a e eliver about 30 yards from the enemy. ed at 3o yds (Campaigns of Wheeler and His Cavalry, p. 186, reports Wheeler successful.)

eral line

-

Ext. No. 96. mals, and were

They had

co1 rested to feed their ani- U ^ffi s about to take the road thence to Newport. Cosby creek, Tcnn.,

I

immediately charged them in column of fours, routing

their entire

(Col.

"

1864

Jan.

14,

-

command.

Wm.

J.

Ext. No. 97.

Palmer, R. R., Vol. 32, Part

Six companies were

now

I, p.

75.)

ordered up

same. !

at a gallop,

and charged

LaGrange, R. Ext. No. 98. The (Col.

in

column of

Ten n.,

fours.

1864

R., Vol. 32,

Part

I, p.

144.)

forms Brigade moved to a position forBrigade in colcharge near the front, and, forming in column of squadrons, umn of quad-

1st

.

made ready J

.

to give the final stroke to the

work of

the

opequoa creek, Va., Sept. 19,1864.

day.

44

W.

(Brig. Genl.

Merritt, R. R., Vol. 43, Part

I,

p.

445.) in

column

giments in

of reline,

Hiddle1own,Va., Oct. 19, 1864.

The 1st Brigade, in column of regi,1-1 moved forward like an immense wave,

Ext. No. 99.

Brigade attacks

m .

ments ,

line, r

,

slowly at

,

,.

but gathering strength and speed as

first,

it

progressed, overwhelmed a battery and its supports, etc. (Brig. Genl. W. Merritt, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p.

450.)

Ext. No. 100. This Division formed in three lines , AA , , of equal strength, battle, with regiments in V* .

p.

umns

The whole

re-

car

ie

!

mounted.

va^ sept i9

1

in line of

,

...

time

I,

brigades of cavalry f n r regi-were moving on parallel lines; most, if not all, of the col-

in of squad-

n C

At

Ext. No. 101.

brigades

battle,

merits

division was formed r ,. column ot battalions.

523.)

advance in line of

.

(Brig. Genl. G. A. Custer, R. R., Vol. 43, Part

o5!w!w^ Five

.

e

T8 6^

.

.

,,

this ,

..

five

.

1

brigades moved by brigade front, regiments being in One continuous and P ara ^ e l columns of squadrons. line of covered the skirmishers advance, using only heavy the carbine, while the line of brigades, as they advanced across the open country, the bands playing the national airs, presented in the sunlight one moving mass of glit

This, combined with the various and tering sabers. bright colored banners and battle flags, intermingled here and there with the plain blue uniforms of the troops, i

m

p o sin g

scenes on the

battle field inspire soldiers to

perform

brave

furnished one of the most inspiring as well as imposing scenes of martial grandeur ever witnessed upon a battle .

,

field.

(Brig. Genl. G. A. Custer, R. R., Vol. 43, Part p.

I,

456.)

COMMENTS. In forming was used

for the charge, almost every formation

:

Column of

fours 76,

(Exts. 92, 96, 97) 93,

98,

squadrons (Exts. squadrons (Exts. 56, 59, 94)

101);

;

close

column of column of

regiments each in column of fours (Ext. 86) brigade in column of regi ments each in line, making three lines of equal strength ;

line of

;

(Ext. 99)

column of

;

division

formed

battalions, also

of regiments each in making three lines of equal in line

45

(Ext.

strength

The formation depended

100).

gether on the conditions.

alto

In a lane a column of fours

When

was all that could be used. column of squadrons or

there

was room the

close column of squadrons seemed to be preferred. This gave a front of two troops and a depth of six lines. If at full distance the squad

rons in rear could be diverted to other objectives, used for a flank attack or held in reserve to fulfill the principle that victory will lie with that side which can put in the formed reserve. (Exts. 66, 95.)

last

As soon it

as the leading unit has delivered

should rally

in rear of the

64, 65, 66, 84, 233).

column (Exts.

its

shock,

52, 54, 57,

This exercise should be practiced

frequently.

The more solid the mass at the instant of impact, the greater will be the effect of the shock. The charge be made boot-to-boot. should, therefore, (Ext. 81.) Not withstanding

well-known maxim, the tendency

this

open out the rank safety

lies in

at a

time

when

is

to

the troopers

greatest riding well closed toward the guide.

If the three line

formation

is

used, the

first

line

should usually be heavier than either the support or the reserve. If time is precious and success depends upon one cast of the die, the first line should be as strong as possible

:

if

the

enemy has

reserves constantly arriving,

then numerous lines should be used.

The advanced

lines should be far line

confusion to

enough apart so that, if the overthrown, it will not communicate its the lines in rear. For this reason it is is

better to hold the troops in rear of the second line in line of

columns.

The

first

line

should be preceded by

mounted skirmishers using mounted rifle fire. (Ext. These same tactics were used by Frederick 101, 239.) the Great. The mounted skirmishers amount to the same thing as ground scouts which would be sent out from troops in the front

line.

46

After a

line

has been launched in a charge, the influence the fight by the use of

commander can only

troops held in reserve. The commander should not per sonally engage in the fight until after his last reserve is

thrown

The

place for regimental bands should be not caring for the wounded, but in the battle, inspiring with stirring martial music those engaged in the combat. in.

(Exts. 101, 223, 469.)

47

CHAPTER

III.

FIRE ACTION. MOUNTED FIRE ACTION Ext. No.

102.

I

my

ordered

and be ready

to advance carbine

enemy came dashing down

first

CARBINE.

two squadrons TWO squadrons use mounted The carbine flre.

to receive them.

the road.

The

fire

of

my JuiKj-ses!

regiment being too hot for him, the enemy wheeled and I ordered the charge. (Lieut. Col. Doster, 4th Pa. Cav., R. R., Vol. 27,

Part

I,

p.

984.)

fire Being dismounted, our men were hasMounted not the premuch greater rapidity and precision enemy, who were exposed by remaining on horse- f^ men exposes

Ext. Nb.

103.

.

.

.

able to fire with

the

back, and fired high above our heads.

H. LaGrange, R.

(Col. O. p.

^

s

Roju^Tenn *

R., Vol.

30,

Part

II,

oct

683.)

Ext. No. 104. At this place the saber companies Great havoc done with carbine mounted. did great havoc with their carbines (mounted). 88 E. 2d D. la. R. Vol. Part re^lrW" Coon, Cav., R., 32, (Maj. .

.

.

1

I,

p.

300.)

soon met the enemy 7 in considerskirmished (both mounted and dis-

Ext. No. 105. able

force

and

I

mounted) with him. (Lieut. Col. Robert Klein, 3d Ind. Cav., R. 32, Part I, p. 410.) Ext.

No.

I

sent

Upton, r 1 i fields,

By immediate

106.

Co.

I

1-11

order of

R,

Feb>

20

B<)

Vol.

General

to the left in line over the

kir-

-

i3

open 1

over which they at once charged, mounted, with carbines, upon the plainly visible lines of the enemy. (Col. John W. Noble, 3d la. Cav., R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 491.)

See also Ext. 101.

Mounted

mishers use carbine Near Knoxville,

charge Wilson

APr

-

*>

with.

s

1866

Raid, -

48

When two

Ext. No. 107.

caught

panels of the fence were

trotted through for 75 Jyards, down, the men (enemy) J J the aggressive and wins a most and came to a walk and almost halted. down gradually J complete victory. Forbes first Major platoon (mounted and 225 yards from ta

iSstantfy

1

bine yards

at 225

fire is

not

eft ec-

Pistol

lire

yar

at

first

mistake.

It

an d the squadron pistol shots.

and charge, the

created confusion

in the rear

Had

*"

ish.

Here was

to fire with carbines. .

the

tire.

was ordered

the fence)

added

to

among it

by

the order been given to

rebels

the horses,

few draw saber

firing a

would never have got

their

gun

off.

Major Forbes attempted

move

to

the

first

squadron

by the right flank. The rebels saw their chance, gave a yell, and our men, in the confusion of the moment,

The two

broke. ro

run

ca v r fo? s e ve n ^

zfon Va

Jaly

"

have on ty

rear squadrons

went off in confusion. and a chase for five

to re P rt a perfect rout

More than 100

to seven miles.

Men

horses were taken.

wounded, 37; taken prisoners by Mo<sby, about 200 men with him and used the had Mosby

killed,

12;

44. re

volver.

(Col. C. R. Lowell,

Part Mounted

mishers advance with Near Tom

s

Run,

.

aVwn

streets of

okoiona, Apr.

Miss.,

22, 1863.

"skVr-

R., Vol. 37,

.

.

to

advance and

.

.

did with success,

I

my

skir-

mishers advancing at the trot. (Brig. Genl. Thos. C. Devin, R. R., Vol. 43, Part 483.)

p.

The Confederates, advancing with through the town, mounted, began to fire with their long rifles as they came within 100 vards of the enemy. (Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest s Cavalry, Ext. No. 109.

spirit

p.

moused

was now ordered

I

enemy, which

press the

I,

Forrest s men use rifle mounted

2d Mass. Cav., R.

359.)

Ext. No. 108.

hir-

at a trot carbines.

I, p.

393.)

Ext

N

"

HO.

This change having been made, a

e

f skirmishers displayed Soeo?ao)n tem- strong nne by the enemy was evidence that the enemy s cavalry had gained our right,

^uet^burg^uiy

and were about

to attack

of our line of battle.

*

with a view of gaining the rear *

*

The

First

New

Jersey

Cavalry was posted as mounted skirmishers to the right and front in a wood.

49

(Brig.

McM.

D.

Gregg, R. R., Vol. 27, Part

I,

956.)

p.

In a few minutes the enemy came in g n enmay ra davda the road, when I ordered my first two

Ext. No. 111.

down

dashing

squadrons to advance carbines to be ready to receive them. The fire of my regiment being too hot for him, the enemy wheeled, and I ordered the charge. (Lieut. Col. p.

W.

E. Doster, R. R., Vol. 27, Part

June

c re

21) 1863

I,

984.)

COMMENTS.

Mounted carbine fire was often used. Its use was confined mostly to mounted skirmishers which preceded while forming for attack. (Exts. 108, 110, to accelerate the to be used can advantage 239.) retreat of defeated infantry, but should not replace the the

first line

It

which

saber,

mounted men

more

is is

effective.

(157.)

very inaccurate, since one

The hand

fire

is

of

always

(Ext. 103.) necessary to control the horse. Mounted carbine fire is not so accurate as revolver fire

provided the force armed with the revolvers comes to

close quarters.

(Ext. 107.)

MOUNTED FIRE ACTION Ext. No. clered in

112.

From

the Third to charge.

column of

fours.

this

REVOLVER.

point General Lee or-

The

order was executed

The regiment swept down

K

210.)

COMMENTS. It

seems strange that so little mention is made of fire when used collectively. The in

mounted revolver ference

is

that collective revolver fire

was but

little

used.

There is Captain Whittaker refers to it in Ext. 41. numerous mention of the revolver being used individ ually, and it is in this use that its chief value lies.

coi-

using revolvers

the line va

of stone fence which separated them from the enemy in the woods beyond, delivering the fire of their pistols. (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p.

charge in

,

Mar. n.

50

Badly defeated cavalry, if vigorously pursued with the revolver, will be assembled in the next county. ( Ext. 107.)

DISMOUNTED FIRE ACTION

p

f

r tat ion

rfl

on

No

however, be amiss to in tbesay that one of the lessons of his operations will be the demonstration of the great utility in war of horses

Ext

va?ueofhoiSiS ea 8

AGAINST CAVALRY.

-

-

113

It

may

not,

the rapid transportation of a body of men to the field of battle or operations, there to be employed as in

riflemen fighting on foot. (Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest p.

The

683.

s Cavalry, written was of above expression opinion

in 1867.)

snooting occasion

Newman July

sudden was

the

heavy

10 so, 1864.

Ga

We moved at a brisk trot and so movement that nearly one-half of the

Ext. No. 114.

at

a g

Sore?* do es not

.

8th

"

Ind>

an( i

although

.

,

n tne lmes without receiving a shot, the remainder of the column ran the

ot tnrou

"

to gauntlet of a heavy fire of musketry, yet, strange the enemy say, but one man was wounded, although was in some places near enough to almost touch the

horses.

Part II, (Lieut. Col. F. A. Jones, R. R., Vol. 38, p.

877.)

Ext. No.

115.

Throwing down

the fence of the

formed a long line Four companies had by this time dismounted and dropped on their knees Fire from be- behind a low f ence. They held their fire until the enemy hind a fence gteadies the men. was w tn i n 30 yards, when they opened. Then was seen which fails the effect of the volley from that long, thin line,

meadow, some 300 poured

into

it,

and dashed across with sabers drawn.

i

charge

seemed so easy to break. Every man had elbow room and took dead aim at an individual foe. Two-thirds of The cavalry j horses seemed to go down. r c ers

^

was

j

|

at

an<

once broken and recoiled.

(Morgan

s

Cavalry, by Duke.)

51

The enemy charged upon my

111-

Ext. No. 116. i

but were repulsed each time by

twice,

with heavy

my

R. R., Vol. 27, Part

repulse a charge.

966.)

I, p.

Ext. No. 117.

Three successive charges were pulsed by dismounted men. R., Vol. 27, Part

Thompson, R.

(Col.

Dismounted

men

loss.

Wyndham,

(Col.

line

carbineers mounted

Ext. No. 118. attacked the

A

-

V

1056.)

p.

same.

6*

11

when

foot,

Same

niml

92d dismounted and

part of the

enemy on

I,

re-

the

enemy

charged Nov^iSeSl

on horseback. The charge was received and repulsed, and the enemy charged in turn. (Col. Atkins, R. R., Vol. 44, p. 390.)

Ext. No. 119. the fact that the

I

attribute the loss of the

enemy could advance under

cover to within short

range of the position

rifle

gam

to

Horse artillery needs a support.

excellent

we

occuArtillery

the killing of the two wheel horses, and the pied, want of a regularly designated support.

disa-

to

(Capt. A. 40, Part

I, p.

M. Randol,

R., Vol.

The enemy was compelled

to retire

S.

carbine

terrific

&

Art.)

me

me

Early

this

in a pretty

During the

first

All

I,

morning: the

fire.

p.

921.)

enemv J

ad-

Dismounted success-

cavalry

t (Cav., Inf. J^}^h ^f J* combined part of the day they pressed

strong force.

Towards night them and drove them across upon *

carbine

jnne^r/sel

severely.

tables * *

River,

Julv 29 1864

Va>

fire.

(Genl. Buford, R. R., Vol. 27, Part

Ext. No. 121.

vanced upon

James Va

616.)

Ext. No. 120.

before the

U.

Art., R.

1st

Boonsborough,

I

turned the Md -

Jul .v

s, ises.

the Antietam.

fighting had to be on foot. (Genl. Buford, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 925.)

Ext. No.

on

my

122.

An

animated

fight ensued, princi-

foot, the

ground being entirely too soft recent rains to operate successfully with cavalry.

pally

f

advance was handsomely repulsed, in which Witcher s cavalry, on foot behind a stone fence, per formed a very gallant part, standing their ground with

enemy

s

unflinching tenacity. (Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, C.

Part

II, p.

704.)

S.,

Dismounted av

r

g

rom b e hi nd stone The ^nkstown. Md.

R. R., Vol. 27,

Jaly

10>

186bV

52

Ext. No.

Demounted cavalry fight on

.

,

123.

They had every advantage

.

,

.

,

.

in se_

,

ninelectmg position, and to drive and dislodge them I was okoiona, Miss., compelled to dismount the most of my command and Feb. 22,1864. -i r fought the last nine miles on foot.

foot for

rill

(Maj. Genl. N. B. Forrest, C. Part NO

rest for cav-

was nearly daylight, June 3d, before my command, worn and jaded from its exhaust At 10:00 ing labors, bivouacked at Linney s house. M.

I

124.

^

received orders to cross to the west side of the

^

(Maj. Genl. p.

Formation C

gthened by piaog opfl

o^ thTnanks Lithonia,

H. Wilson, R.

Part

R., Vol. 36,

I,

Ext.

No.

125.

The Third Brigade, dismounted,

with one battalion 4th regulars on each flank, charged the rebels on the Lithona road and drove them in con-

Ga., r

lUSlOn.

28, 1864.

July

J.

882.)

is

8

It

Totopotomy, drive the rebel cavalry from Haw s Shop and then swing to the left again, recross the creek near ts source, an d attack the left of the rebel infantry line

^

er.Jnne3.1864.

R. R., Vol. 32,

353.)

p.

Ext. No.

A. Tactical use, to

I,

S.,

(Col. p.

R.

H. G. Minty, R.

R.,

Vol.

38,

Part

II,

813.)

Ext. No. 126. fire

We

moved forward under

of shot and shell until within

a heavy 600 yards of the top

where the enemy were posted behind a breast work rails, and at this period a general charge was ordered, and the skirmish line, being reinforced by Reinforcement the reserve, dashed forward with a shout and a yell, of the

hill,

of

by

the

carries

It is

reserve the line

convenient

to find stones and

clubs handy

,

carrying everything before them. As we gamed the crest of the hill our ammunition failed and in some parts of .

the line the

enemy were

actually driven

from

their posi-

Clubs. Hanover Va.,

May

c

(Lieut. Col. G. A. Purington, R. R., Vol. 36, Part

H.

oil ioo4.

I, p.

Regiment n

m?ho 8e

men

<

h ie

?e?ns :

The

horses held by the reins, the maintained the position, but finding it impracticable

Ext. No. 127.

fires

e id inS

894.)

to charge the second works, they mounted, and being relieved by the infantry line, the 92d was withdrawn.

53 Eli

(Col. p.

H. Murray, R.

Vol.

R.,

38,

Part

II,

890.)

COMMENTS.

The mobility of cavalry renders it extremely val uable as a reinforcement to weak points in the line of battle.

(Ext. 113.)

A

rapidly

moving

target

does not

suffer

heavy

losses.

(Ext. 114.) From behind a

fence troops shoot with greater than in when the open. accuracy (Ext. 115.) Dismounted men can often stop with their fire a mounted charge, even though it gets as close as 50 yards.

(Exts. 115, 116, 117, 118, 120, 121, 122.) All references show that a very large part of the cavalry fighting was done on foot. formation for attack is strengthened by placing regular troops on the flanks. (Ext. 125.) The time for a skirmish line to go forward is when

A

it

receives fresh troops

Dismounted the reins,

fire,

very rare.

is

The time

from the

when

each

reserves.

man

(Ext. 126.) holds his horse by

(Ext. 127.)

to inflict severe losses

on an enemy

is

when

his attacking line breaks to the rear.

Dismounted ground

is

fire

(Exts. 85, 170.) action will be resorted to when the

unsuited to mounted action.

(Ext. 123.)

DISMOUNTED FIRE ACTION AGAINST INFANTRY. Ext. No. 128. As the enemy moved up, he exn posed his flank to me. I at once ordered General Lee to attack, which he did with the 9th and 10th Va. regi i

,

ments

,

handsomest style, leading his men in person. These regiments went in in line of battle, dismounted and reserved their fire until very near the enemy. Dein the

livering

it

regularly, they charged,

routing the enemy

completely, capturing 900 prisoners and 10 standards. (Maj. Genl. Wade Hampton, C. S., R. R., Vol. 42,

Part

cavalry attacks infantry in flank.

I,

p.

948.)

Ext. No. 129.

Although the main force remained without change of position from September 3 to 19,

.Firenotopened

ear the Inem?.

still the cavalry was employed every day in harassing ... the enemy, its opponents being principally infantry. In shenandoah these skirmishes the cavalry was becoming educated to

NO re*t for cavand they

airy,

should permit no

Valley Campaign.

.

attack infantry lines. (Maj. Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I,

Five brigades of cavalry attack m-

fm try, demountLeetown^w.va.,

..,...-

.

,

p.

46.)

About a mile from, Leetown a small was in a heavy woods, and from all met cavalry the information that could be obtained, all went to show that nothing but cavalry was in our front, and disposi tion was immediately made to attack. A brigade was sent on each flank, two to attack in front and one held in reserve. Soon after the attack was commenced, it was found that we were fighting infantry. Ext. No. 130.. f orce

(Maj. Genl. A. T. A. Torbert, R. I,

p.

R., Vol. 43,

Part

425.)

Ext. No. 131.

opinion that dismounted cavn airy is as good as reflected

This short but ..

brilliant

engagement

Al

,

great credit on the regiments engaged, and New Market established the fact that our cavalry can dismount and

with their carbines successfully repulse their own front of veteran infantry. (Brig. Genl. T. C. Devin, R. R., Vol 43, Part I,

1864.

p.

471.)

^xt ^-

It was now almost dark; the cavbeen alrymen having fighting all day on foot, owing to cavalry fight the roughness of the country, were very J much fatigued. on foot all day. miuborough General Hatch was ordered to bring up nis horses, collect Tenn,,Dec. 15, 64.., his men and bivouac on the Hillsborough pike. in rough

comr

132.

-

.

t

.

.

(Maj. Genl. p.

J.

R., Vol. 45,

Part

I,

563.)

Ext. No. 133. that

A

dispatch

Cold Harbor be held

immediately ordered

Cavalry construct breast- i)orary breastworks

works

H. Wilson, R.

its

was received directing and I therefore

at all hazards,

reoccupation, changed the temM r make them available for 1

1

so as to

for infan-

.

.

our troops, dismounted the cavalry, placing them behind Ammunition these works, and distributing ammunition in boxes along the line. While this was being done the enemy could

try to occupy,

be heard giving

commands and making

preparations to

55 attack in the morning. Just after daylight, June 1st, he to the attack, and was permitted to come close

Magazine

fire

marched

works, when he received the fire of our batteries and our repeating carbines, which were used to our

j

,

.

,

and he was driven back in confusion. Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, (Maj.

with

p.

little

.

,

1

s no different *! short range.

M

Cold Harbor, Va.,

terrible effect,

794.)

Ext.

No.

134.

July 9th, dismounted and

waded

cavalry

con-

Brigade

be-

the Chattahoochee in rear of the Third Brigade; threw up breastworks and held the ground till dark, when

General

Newton

of the 4th Corps relieved us. (Col. R. H. G. Minty, R. R., Vol. 38, Part II, p. s division

813.) Ext. No. 135.

During these combats, which were

mostly on foot (the enemy there were

s

infantry being engaged),

some

* * * telling charges made mounted. of the brigade, from long and constant pracare becoming perfect in the art of foot fighting and

The men tice,

They drove infantry from strong

skirmishing.

*

foot

flgSSS* Md<

posi- ju

J

iofwS

tions.

(Brig. Genl. p.

W.

Merritt, R.

R.,

Vol. 27, Part

I,

944.)

Ext. No. 136. To check this advance, four regi- Cavalry attack ments were dismounted and moved to the front. This int tT l flew nope tn., strong line of dismounted cavalry rushed upon the v Kov 27 1868 -

-

>

enemy,

firing volleys

from

their carbines,

and drove the

infantry line to the cover of advance woods, and there held it at bay. (Genl.

D.

McM.

Gregg, R. R., Vol. 29, Part

I,

p. 807.)

Ext. No. 137.

(My dismounted men were ordered Yankee skirmishers, which was done in v P*S5?!!, handsome style, driving them out of their camps and

to charge the

through the woods. (Brig. Genl.

Part

I, p.

903.)

J.

B. Gordon, C. S., R. R., Vol. 29,

56

caviry

ii .

,

^xt

fight a -

sept. 20, 1863.

No.

-

General

138.

s

Armstrong

division

almost entirely on foot, always up and frequently n ac vance O f the infantry. i

(Genl. Forrest, Battle of Chickamauga, R. R., Vol. 30, Part II, p. 525.)

Ext. No.

cavalry charge s

cross

.,

139.

The 2d Indiana were dismounted

and charged upon the right

at

This move-

double quick.

Oct.

M. McCook, R.

(Col. E.

R., Vol. 30, Part II, p.

676.)

Ext. No. 140. 8eviersviWe, Tenn.,Jai.26,

64.

wSSS fla?S!

crest,

a

dernarms.

U pO n

it,

1

&

. .,

whereupon

it

gave way

in disorder.

own p.

,11-11

,.

line re-established.

P.

H. Sheridan, R.

Vol.

R.,

36,

Part

During Sherman

s

march

to the sea,

them

the regular custom for cavalry to protect selves every night by throwing up log barricades.

careful

re-

connaissance

was

(See all cavalry reports, R. R., Vol. 44, and par ticularly Report 148.) Ext. No. 143. Custer found Early as he (Early)

had promised, at Waynesborough, in a well-chosen posisome cavalry tion, with two brigades of infantry and

Sun^ er

ie ti I i 11 JIi i whii? a s Sd

den auack will e

I,

800.)

Ext. No. 142. it

A

&

^e

This counter attack against the infantry was made by the 1st and 2d cavalry divisions simultaneously, and our

Barricades.

cavalry attacks b hiDd wor ks

I,

When the enemy s line reached the from our repeating carbines was opened

fire

(Genl.

bfeast

s

Ext. No. 141.

f

the tide ?! battle, Darby town. Va.. July 27, 1864.

M. Colonel Campbell

136.)

re-

rapid as our mo-

P.

brigade charged dismounted. Part (Brig. Genl. S. D. Sturgis, R. R., Vol. 32, p.

cavalry use

At 4:00

_

Custer,

R

-11

i

tne infantry occupying the breastworks. without waiting for the enemy to get up his sser

>

made by courage over the delay of a careful reconnaissance, once. at attack for the Sending three ?ig miu ntSdhis dispositions the of whue mounted regiments around the left flank enemy, he, with Attack U

d

troops turn flank.

break?.

the

,

.

<

,

other two brigades, partly mounted and partly dismounted at a g iven signal, boldly attacked and carried th e

enemy the works, while the 8th N. Y. and

1st Conn.,

which

57

were formed in column of fours, charged over the breast- cavalry should gather all the fruits of victory. works and continued the charge through the town. f -11 ml. Mar. He captured 1 1 pieces of artillery, 200 loaded wag- va.,Wayniborough. ons with teams, 17 battle flags and 1,600 officers and ,

<~>r\r\

1

1

1

-2,

men. (Maj. Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. p.

R., Vol. 46, Part

I,

476.)

No.

Ext.

The most determined

144.

.

.

made on both

.

,

was

effort

11-

,

-i

and neither would give way

sides

.

the

in

late

when Custer

evening,

dis-

attacks

infantry.

.

brigade was

s

cavalry,

mounted, in close

until column dis-

Haw

s

shop.va.,

mounted, forming in close column of attack, and charged with Gregg s division, when the enemy was driven back, leaving all his dead and his line of temporary works in our possession.

(Maj. Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. p.

Part

R., Vol. 36,

I,

793.)

On

Ext. No. 145.

reaching that place on July J J

c v airy selects 1st, battle ?, field and ,

General Reynolds found Buford s cavalry warmly en-f^^^^J iUpport gaged with the enemy, who had debouched his infantry JgJJi.

through the mountains on the Cashtown road, but was being held in check in the most gallant manner by Bu ford

s

G^J^WP*., lb63.

July

1,

cavalry.

(Maj. Genl. Meade, R.

On

R., Vol. 27,

Part

I,

p.

114.)

West

Troops should

was ordered to dismount to fight on foot. I Point. dismounted and formed the regiment in line with as

Si compelled ?)

Ext. No. 146.

arriving within one mile of

1

I

.,

,

much

.

,.

alacrity as possible, and was directed to move on rapidly across the fields towards the fort and engage the

the fort the

While crossing enemy threw shells at my

cession, the

most of which passed over without

enemy on

the right.

When we the

men

got within

to

commence

(Maj. A. Part

I,

p.

435.)

S.

the fields toward lines in rapid suc

fifty yards of the fort

firing,

I

ordered

which was done with

Bloom, 7th Ky. Cav., R.

effect.

effect.

R., Vol. 49,

do so. west Apr.

Point, Ga.,

in, 1865.

58

COMMENTS. Successful turning movements may be made for the purpose of attacking the flank or rear of an infantry line.

(Exts. 124, 128, 153, 171, 180.)

The till

the

of an attacking line should not be opened

fire

enemy

s fire

compels

it.

(Exts. 128, 146.)

Cavalry can attack infantry, and during the war if it comes to a hand-to-hand fight, cav

often did, but,

alry should at least be supplied with the rod bayonet. (Exts. 130, 131, 135, 136, 137, 141, 144.)

At

times cavalry will be called upon to fight for

long periods on

foot.

Breastworks

(Exts. 123, 129, 132.)

often be constructed by cavalry a of their with view being occupied later by infantry. will

(Exts. 133, 134.)

Ammunition in boxes can be conveniently distrib uted along the line from pack mules before the action (Ext. 133.)

begins. It

rarely be possible

will

and hold

battlefield

it

till

for cavalry to select a

occupied by infantry.

(Ext.

145.)

often be possible for cavalry to hold im portant tactical positions until relieved by infantry. Exts. Under such conditions the com 133, 127, 175, 184.) It

will

see that the cavalry be not kept to do but returned to its own legitimate sphere infantry work, of usefulness. (Ext. 187.)

mander should

DISMOUNTED FIRE ACTION AGAINST FIELD WORKS. Attack of

field

works.

Ext. No. 147.

Drove Martin from

an(j one brigade of infantry

s division

of cavalry J

their line of breast-

Big Shanty, Ga.,

June

9,

works

1864.

at

and near Big Shanty. H. G. Minty, R.

(Col. R.

R., Vol. 38,

Part

II, p.

812.) cavalry assault 0rks

S sefma%7a

I regard the capture of Selma as Ext. No. 148. the most remarkable achievement in the history of mod ern cavalry, the one illustrative of its new powers and

tendencies.

59

The .

fortifications assaulted

.

,.

and carried consisted of 1

^1

-1

1

a bastion line on a radius of nearly three miles, extend-

ing from the Alabama

river

below to the same above

Dimensions of the bastion line.

seima

Ala.,

Apr>

The

part west of the city is covered by a miry, deep and almost impassable swamp, extending from the river almost to the Summerfield road, and entirely the city.

impracticable for mounted men at all times. The profile of that part of the line assaulted is as follows: Height

of parapet, 6 to 8 ft. depth of ditch, 5 ft. width from 10 to 15 ft.; height of stockade on glacis, 5 ft.; sunk into the earth, 4 ft. The ground over which the troops ;

advanced

is

an open

;

field,

sloping slightly towards the

works, but intersected by one ravine with marshy soil, which both the right and left of Long s line experienced

The distance over which difficulty in crossing. the troops charged, exposed to the enemy s fire of mus Number of men ketry and artillery, was 600 yards. some

engaged in assault, 1,550 officers and men. The works were manned by Armstrong s brigade, regarded as the best in Forrest s corps,

and reported by him

at

more

than 1,500 men. J. H. Wilson, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, For map see Plate 70, Map 4, Atlas.) Fifteen per Loss, 46 killed and 200 wounded.

(Maj. Genl.

p.

360.

cent of

all

troops engaged. (R. R., Vol. 47, Part I,

p.

351.)

Ext. No. 149.

Detachments dismounted and pre- cavalry assault pared to assault Fort Tyler, covering the bridge. Colonel shooting down bridges are LaGrange describes it as a remarkably strong: bastioned while made with which to cross the ditcn 35 surrounded ditch 1 2 a earth-work, yards square, by feet wide and 10 feet deep, situated on a commanding -

eminence, protected by an imperfect abatis mounting two

32-pounder guns and two

field guns. M. the charge was sounded and the brave detachments rushed forward to the assault, drove the

At

1

:30

P.

fort and followed under a G* M of and withering grape musketry, to the edge of the ApY*e, ufe* ditch. This was found impassable, and Col. LaGrange

rebel

skirmishers into the fire

60

posted sharpshooters to keep down the enemy s fire and organized parties to gather material for bridges as soon as this had been done, he sounded the charge again. The ;

detachments sprang forward again, laid the bridges and rushed forward over the parapet into the work, captur ing the entire garrison of 265 men. (Maj. Genl. J. H. Wilson, R. R., Vol. 49, Part p.

Ext. No. 150.

cavairycapture earthworks.

Hnrricane e

Mls>>

Ang>

i3, i864

Colonel Starr, with the 6th

.

three or

111

,

four hours

,

severe

,

.

.

,

111.

Cav.,

.

skirmishing drove the

him across the creek, and pressing it back on the main force, captured the enemy s earth works. force in front of

(Brig. Genl. I, p.

Attack doesnqt open fire until compelled to do

I,

364.)

Edward Hatch,

R. R., Vol. 39, Part

389.)

As soon

as we uncovered the hill, about 600 yards from the earthworks, the enemy opened

Ext. No. 151.

and artillery on the line, forward until wnthin short range, steadily h e n a rapid fire was opened by our Spencers, and with a ^^ w 1865. cheer the men started for the works on the run. a destructive fire of musketry

^ ut dur-

Apr.

2,

we move d

(Brig. Genl. Eli Long, R. R., Vol. 49, Part

438.

I,

p.

Attack on Selma.)

COMMENTS.

The

Civil

field

War

furnishes

many cases of cavalry at The most noted works were those (Ext. 148), where an assault was made

works.

tacking of Selma, Ala.

on a bastioned line. Other cases are 150) from which it will appear that it if

the attackers are able to shoot

cited

(Exts. 149,

easily can be

down

the

enemy

done

s fire.

61

CHAPTER

MOUNTED AND DISMOUNTED.

COMBINED ACTION

My command

Ext. No. 152.

tahon mounted in reserve

arid

was posted one bat- in combined action the rtwo battalions dismounted serve is kept mounted.

The enemy charged

in the center.

IV.

column.

in

(Reference omitted.) Ext.

No.

The enemy had deployed

153.

.

.

.

siderable force in a strong position.

a con-

.

Mounted

immediately de-

I

waver ployed two regiments and commenced skirmishing. Find-

ing their position strong, I detached a squadron to turn their right flank. This caused the enemy J to waver, when

we charged

force

turns the enemys

-

when wavers,

enemy the

at-

column on the road, drivin him confusion. The ing enemy attempted to form a new line with his reserves, but we met him with such Enemy not given time to form line with force as to disperse him each time. and also

in line

in

(Maj. Genl. Jos. Wheeler, C. Part

Ext.

1863.

Campaign.

521.)

II, p.

battle

R. R., Vol. 30,

S.,

No.

We

154.

found the enemy

behind a stone wall and a

in

line

of

fence which had

rail

(;

avalry attack

ehlnd

t

[SJSS waif

been so fixed as to afford good protection to the men. The second brigade was immediately formed in line of battle in a corn field

on

mounted,

the

as

right,

The 39th

follows:

with

llth

the

Ky., dis- when dismoun-

Mich.

Cav., IH enemy

1SS

The 39th Kv. succeeded in reach- cavalry charge repeatedly. the s enemy position. As the regiment gamed the cynthiana, Ky.. ing wall and fence the enemy fled. The llth Mich. Cav. mounted, on the

... left.

.

repeatedly charged the rebel lines, driving them in great confusion.

David A. Minis, R.

(Col.

R., Vol.

Part

39,

I,

p.

37.)

Ext. .-I

the

enemys

ment line

No. ,

t

filed

thus

155. *

c

The dismounted *

.1

formed on Dismounted mounted regi- men in the center

line

1

<

side of the stream, while a .

,

-

-

past their rear, half of

formed, dismounted

.

it

1

n

to either flank.

men

AT-V

mounted men on

The the flanks. 6

in the

center and

S

va.*oct 27

,

ISG""

62

mounted men on the

the flanks, charged up the

enemy and captured I, p.

H. Smith, Comg.

C.

(Col.

Part

routed

Brig., R.

R., Vol.

42,

648.)

The remainder

Ext. No. 156.

Mounted men

hill,

his works.

of the 72d Ind.

was

to charge as soon as the enemy s line is broken.

brought forward, dismounted and formed on the left of 8eima,Aia.,Apr.the road, and at the sarnie time I directed Colonel Vail,

commanding the 17th Ind., to send forward four com panies armed with sabers to charge the enemy as soon was broken.

as his line

(Col. A. O. Miller,

Part Mounted men

I, p.

soon RS

as tnG GD~ .

move

1st Brig., R. R., Vol. 49,

446.)

Ext. No.

157.

received orders directing:

I

ready to charge

with saber

Comg.

command

the

mount

re adiness to

at a

moment

s

notice

Selma,Ala..Apr.

the saber as soon as the

2,1865.

enemy

s line

(Lieut. Col. B. D. Pritchard,

R. R., Vol. 49, Part Dismounted

at-

tack followed by mounted charge, Selma.Ala.,Ai)r.

No.

Ext.

The ,

.

in

and charge with

should be broken.

Comg. 4th Mich.

attack

of

....... division, dismounted, which carried ..,..,, followed with a mounted

mediately by a part of Upton

2,1865.

to

it

Cav.,

464.)

I, p.

158.

me

the led horses and hold

to

.

.

Selma by Long s was im-

the works,

,

s

division,

charge into the city

which captured many

prisoners.

(Maj. Genl. E. Upton, R.

R., Vol. 49,

Part

I,

p.

473.)

combined

Ext.

mounted and dismounted action, receive

No. 159.

Captain Abram, having failed to

.

Mountedaction ^ u

emy

breaks. 11 *

Mar.^rfse?.

my

Aldie, Va.,

Jane

formed

his battalion, dismounted,

on

would have been had he received my order and been on hand to charge mounted. (Lieut. Col. J. H. Peters, 4th la. Cav, R. R., Vol. effective as they

49, Part

is, 1863.

order,

the right of the Third Battalion, and materially assisted in routing the enemy, though his efforts were not so

I, p.

496.)

The enemy, behind a stone wall, 160. were attacked by dismounted cavalry, while mounted cavalry charged along the main road. The position was Ext. No.

carried.

63

(General p.

J.

Irving Gregg, R. R., Vol. 27, Part

I,

975.)

Dismounted men moved forward to Ga., r ,, column of cavalry followed, mounted, When the enemy broke, the mounted

Ext. No. 161. ...

on each

flank.

.

,

the attack, while a

troops charged. (R. R., Vol. 44,

p.

Dec.

,

4,

1864.

392.)

In this charge we were met by the Mountedattack ... supported by and succeeded in driving him back under cover dismountedmen.

Ext. No. 162.

,

enemy

of his dismounted sharpshooters, side of the road.

.

who were

posted in then, IMS.

woods on each

(Major Breckenridge, p.

R.

R.,

Vol.

27,

Part

II,

742.)

Ext. No. 163. Four companies were dismounted Dismounte datand thrown forward rapidly as skirmishers, a mounted SomuK?n. by S s company being sent to either flank and the remainder of Cr^.R \J s T?nii the regiment kept sheltered within supporting distance. Oct2 (Col. O. H. LaGrange, 1st Wis. Cav., R. R., Vol.

18<

30, Part II, p. 683.)

Ext. No. 164. ,

The enemy advanced ,

,

.

in three col.

,

Dismounted tack

at-

supported

men umns, one on the road, dismounted, and one on either by mountedflanks on

mounted, rendering it almost impossible for dismounted men to regain their horses

flank,

(Col.

J.

K

.Mizner, 1st Brig. Cav. Div., 16th Corps,

R. R., Vol. 31, Part

I,

p.

infantry prisoners were taken by these regiments in this movement. In the meantime the 1st N. Y. Dragoons

and the 6th Pa. Cavalry were occupying the enemy s attention in front. Here was accomplished a work of which every one connected with the brigade is justly proud a success by cavalry which has no parallel in this a single brigade contending with and taking from at least three times its numbers, one-third in

an enemy,

fantry, a naturally strong position,

by

artificial

means.

it

regain their led horses.

^Y^-

MiS8

->

580.)

Ext. No. 165. The 1st and 2d U. S. Cavalry were accordingly ordered to make a detour through the woods to our right and turn the enemy s left flank. Nearly 1 00

war

the

makes difficult myJ for the enemy to

made doubly strong

Dismountedat-

Va

"

May31

-

1864

-

64 (Brig. Genl. Wesley Merritt, R. R., Vol. 36, Part p.

I,

849.)

About 200 yards beyond this barwas charged by a large column of moving up the plank road, this column having

Ext. No. 166.

Mounted troop. e

ope? wM?e d?* ricade the advance 1

1

Sold the woods cavalry, on the flanks.

Ream

Near

static,!,, va.,

s

Jui

^.^ I,

p.

Mounted men

j

/en

Gregg, R. R., Vol. 40, Part

When

dismounted men retreat while

614.)

always unc[er the retreat

dismounted

woods.

in the

^

M

^

Genl

.

dismounted men

line of

Ext. No. 167.

should cover

.

on either flank a

fire,

the retreat

always covered by a mounted

whose imposing attitude awes the enough for the footmen

ine sta tioned behind,

for a brief space, long

enemy to get

is

away

in safety.

(Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade, Ext. No. S.

Cav.

in

col-

4th U.

charges

umn

of

breaking the en emies center.

Deploying Knipe with Hatch s

dismounted,

mighers, fours pl e

168.

s

p.

.

in

,

close

support,

General Wilson ordered the 4th U. S. Cavalry, Lieu-

Hedges commanding, to charge the enemy. Form little ing on the pike in column of fours, the gallant

tenant

command

of 200

men charged

.

ing the

enemy

1

s

center,

*i

with sabers drawn, break~T7~

*

w mle Knipe r

?

1

s

TT

s men command

j

i

and Hatch

pressed back the flanks, scattering the whole and causing them to abandon their artillery.

?

(Maj. Genl. Geo. H. Thomas, R. R., Vol. Part conduct

of

by T

\

I,

^f narrow

Jane

45>

p. 41.)

Ext. No. 169.

an

*

18.)

division as skir-

road

in a

The heads

of columns met in the

hand-to-hand saber

fight.

While

this

was in progress Captain Irving threw down the fence on the right of the road and, bringing his squadron to Cap the front, opened fire on the enemy s left flank. tain Tebbs executed a similar movement on the left of the road, while the sharpshooters were all the time Their attack was com into the enemy s rear. firing

pletely broken,

and

their

leading squadron almost de

stroyed.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. p.

299.)

J.

E. B. Stuart,

65

No. 170. which were post and

We

Ext.

with

The

an ax.

met

in

a lane,

both sides of

Fences too Stl

fences too strong to be broken country is open, the fields small,

and

all

No

estimate could be

the fences the

rail

same character

as along the lane.

made

of the opposing force, but knowing that a vigorous assault must put even a small Vig 9 rous force on a perfect equality with a large one until a should puH small force on an r 111 neld could be prepared, I at once ordered the 7th equality with a larger

-

i

1

i

.

1

,

regiment, which was in front, to charge. Before the could be reached he succeeded in enemy throwing carbines through the gates right and left, who into

poured our flanks a galling fire. The men hesitated, the leading regiment halted and retreated, losing more men than a glorious victory would have cost had the onset been boldness and vigor.

made with

(Brig. Gen.

Part

II, p.

W.

E. Jones, C.

S.,

R. R. Vol. 27

752.)

COMMENTS. In the combined

mounted and dismounted

with few exceptions, the dismounted center and the 155, 161,

163,

men were

mounted men on the flanks. The exception 164, 165.)

actions, in

the

(Exts. 152,

where the most suitable ground for a charge is along a narrow lane, running at right angles and leading to the center of the enemy s line, along which the charge will neces be in made column of fours. sarily (Exts. 153, 160, is

the

The reason

for the mounted men being on by rapid movements they can attack or threaten the enemy s flanks and rear. If the enemy it will be difficult breaks, for them to regain their led 166, 168.) the flanks

is

that

horses, provided that the mounted men are quick to take the aggressive. The reason for (Exts. 156, 164.) the formation with the mounted men in the center is

explained in Ext. 168. Dismounted men were pressing back the enemy s flanks, thus presumably weakening their center by drawing troops away from that part of their line.

large one.

Fairfleid,p a ., Jnly

3>

1863

66

Mounted troops should always be ready when the enemy s line breaks. (Exts. 153,

to

charge

156,

157,

158, 159, 161.)

When

enemy is broken, he should not be given new lines with his reserve. (Ext. 153.)

the

time to form

Dismounted sharpshooters under cover are support for a weak or timid mounted force. 162, 166.) If the terrain

is

a

good

(Exts.

not suited to retiring by successive retreat of the dismounted men

then the

formations, should be covered by mounted troops whose threatening attitude will give the dismounted men time to regain their horses.

(Exts. 167, 191.) troops meet in a lane, the head of the

When mounted

column should engage in mounted combat, while those through the fences to the right and left and endeavor to gain a flank fire on the rear of the

in rear break

s column. (Exts. 169, 170.) In a lane from which no deployment can be made,

enemy

on an equality with a large one so long condition can be maintained. (Ext. 170.)

a small force as this

is

COMBINED ACTION CAVALRY AND INFANTRY. Ext. No. 171.

cavainy, with

October

17, just

before daylight, the

SbehSd^makes rebel General Rosser, with one brigade of infantry, rid** c cu mi ies. ing behind the cavalry, attacked Brigadier General Cus-

extreme right picket from the rear. He had made a circuit of 32 miles to get in rear of our picket line.

ter s

(Maj. Genl. A. T. A. Torbert, R. R. Vol. 43, Part I, p.

432.)

(For mounting cavalry behind infantry, report of Maj. Genl. Jubal A. Early, C. S., R. 43, Part

I, p.

?

rSnem ii?

long>

also

R., Vol.

561.)

No C

see

172

On

Se P tember 22

my

division, with

tne exception of McCausland s Brigade, was dismounted and placed on the left of the line at Fishers Hill and

throw up works continuous with those of the This line was over one mile long and to be Line to hold infantry. one man to 1.7 -11 about.1 r\r\r\ men. 1,000 yards. occupied by directed to

1

67

(Maj. Genl. L. L. Lomax, C. Part

S.,

R. R., Vol. 43,

611.)

I, p.

No.

Ext. ,.

cavalry Every available cavalryman was force

173. ,

,

,

,

dismounted and placed

,.

line

of battle to strengthen

two regiments of infantry under command. the

(Munford

his

s)J

holding a

and

/-

A

i

.

,.

battle at

i

,

crampton

,1

i

I,

p.

62!

during

or on the flanks of the infantry kamauga. Sept. 19-20. 63.

battles.

W.

(Maj. Genl. Part

Gap,

confederate

and near Chickamausra. SSntry

.,1

i.

s

Md., Sept. 14,

the battle of Chic-

hghtmg dismounted, with during the

moun

tain pass.

(Munford s Defense of Crampton s Gap, Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 120.) Ext. No. 174. The command took an active part in the skirmishes

reiu-

infantry in

.

in

T. Martin, C.

S.,

R. R., Vol. 31,

545.)

(See also 138.)

At this time, meeting Major Gen- cavalry holds enemy till iu fan,. o, ^ Warren, commanding the 2d Corps, I was asked by try cau get into Ext. No. 175.

1

era!

him

TTT

to hold

my

position until he should be able to

A

Oct. 14,1863.

(Genl. D. McM. Gregg, Comg. R. R., Vol. 29, Part I, p. 357.)

The enemy

Ext. No. 176.

returned to the attack.

cedar Run. va..

sret

j -o Cedar Run.

his corps across

2d Cav. Corps.,

in front of

Custer

now

infantry attack

P

He

advanced in two lines of in-a?r^ onthenankI fantry skirmishers, supported on the flanks by cavalry. morTvaTo^o, "

(Genl. Kilpatrick, R. R., Vol. 29, Part

Ext. No.

Their cavalry force .

177. .

I,

p.

383.)

about two

is

regiments, and they keep close to infantry supports. (Maj. Genl. S. D. Lee, C. S., R. R., Vol. 31, Part I,

p.

rected

No.

me ,,1

1

After the fight General Hill

178.

my command

to put

P(

1

I, p.

<

1

di-

cavalry

in the trenches to

f

the withdrawal of the infantry. (Maj. Genl. Wade Hampton, C. S., R.

Part

cavalry

followed close by infantry sup-

26.)

Ext. j_i

weak is

.

,

Vol. 42,

R,

of infantry. Ream s station Va Au 25 1864 "

^

-

944.)

Ext. No. 179.

Whilst slightly swinging to the left, cavalry assauits redoubts deP came upon a redoubt containing four guns, which was fended by good ,

1

.

.

,

splendidly carried by assault at 1 :00 P. M. * TT ti 1i. or Match s division, dismounted, and the

.

by a portion

j.

captured guns

Nashville, Tenn. Dec. 15, 1864.

68

turned upon the enemy. A second redoubt, stronger than the first, was next assailed and carried by the same troops that captured the

first

position, taking four

more guns

and about 300 prisoners.

The infantry of McArthur s division, on the left of the cavalry, participated in both of the assaults; and, indeed, the dismounted cavalry seemed to vie with the infantry to see who should first gain the works; as they reached the position nearly simultaneously, both lay claim to the artillery and prisoners captured. (Battle of Nashville, Maj. R. R., Vol. 45. Part I, p. 38.)

wwie

Ext. No.

infantry

tacked

Wilson

180.

s

Genl.

G.

H. Thomas,

Cavalry, dismounted, at-

enemy simultaneously with Schofield and ing cuts off the eneSmith, striking him in reverse and gaining possession Nashville, of the Granny White Pike, cut off his retreat by that by turnmovement,

cavairy,

Teiin..

Dec.

the

15,

1864.

route.

(Battle of Nashville, Maj. R. R., Vol. 45, Part I, p. 40.)

Five Porks, va.,

The

Ext. No. 181.

cavalry assault works.

field

1

responded

G.

firing of the 5th

1-1

^

H. Thomas,

Corps was the

Merntt to assault, which was promptly and the works of the enemy were soon

signal to General to,

T\

Genl.

The carried at several points by our brave cavalrymen. enemy were driven from their strong line of works and ment

completely routed, the 5th Corps doubling up their left c avSiy flank in confusion, and the cavalry under General Mer-

ea

e

for *

ry

breaksf

ritt

dashing on the White

Oak

road,

capturing their

and turning it upon them and riding into their broken ranks so demoralized them that they made no serious stand after their line was carried, but took flight artillery

When

infantry

Between 5,000 and 6,000 prisoners fell into our hands, and the fugitives were driven westward and were Pursued till long after dark by Merritt s and Macin disorder.

U

be

up a 8?on g 8ible

as JOB*

Kenzie

cavalry for a distance of six miles. (Maj. Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 46, Part

-

p.

s

1105.)

I,

69

Ext. No. 182.

Hq. Dept. of the Cumberland, Oct.

1,

weak

cavalry

grMS5?2S

1863, 2:15 A. M.

Colonel McCook,

commanding Division of Cavalry. The General commanding- directs that you move with all dispatch with the balance of

your force

to

Anderson

s

*

Cross Roads

*

*

Three

regiments of infantry and a section of artillery have been ordered there to support you. (S*ig.)

A. GARFIELD,

J.

Brigadier General and Chief of Staff. (Campaigns of Wheeler and his Cavalry, p. 120.) Ext. No. 183. Hq. 1st Division,

Cavalry

Lieut. D.

May

H. How,

1864.

28,

A. A. A. G. Cavalry Command, Department of the Cumberland. *

*

Privately this thing of covering the flank of infantry seems a one-sided affair; if they are attacked I am to pitch in, while if I am attacked by a superior force I can expect no assistance. These last paragraphs of my letter are unofficial, of course.

M. McCooK,

E.

(Sig.)

Colonel Commanding.

Hq. Chief of Cavalry, Dept. of the Cumberland.

May

28,

1864.

Brigadier General E. M. McCook, Commanding 1st Division of Cavalry. Don t write unofficial remarks with official ter are necessary to have,

the former

is

;

the lat

a pleasure to

receive.

W.

(Sig.)

L. ELLIOTT,

Brigadier General, Chief of Cavalry. (R. R., Vol. 38, Part IV, Ext. No. 184.

superior numbers vicinity of his army. his

p.

336.)

Rosecrans was determined tell,

He

at

least

in

the

to

make

immediate

inaugurated a system about this time which resulted in the decided improvement of

cavalry backed y S P pSrtwhfch co ui d fl

g

b?gun by ?he c ay&i

70 his

He would

cavalry.

send out a body of cavalry

stronger than anything it was likely to encounter, and that it might never be demoralized by a complete whip ping, he would back it by an infantry force never far

and always ready to finish the alry had begun. This method benefited the (Morgan s Cavalry, by Duke.) in the rear,

BkPrnSn er e^by

latter greatly.

General Wirt Davis states that at

Ext. No. 185.

confederate

fight the cav

the Confederates supported their cavalry

Chickamauga

skirmish lines by infantry.

fortwoweeku.

Atlanta CamAug.

i-i4,

No. 186.

Ext.

TWO cavalry a a cor p of infancy in the trenches

August

1st and 3d in the 23d Corps r of the army. During this 1

relieved

Brigades, dismounted, trenches on the extreme left

14 the

to

the

.

.

time

did duty as infantry. (Col. R. G. H. Minty, R. R., Vol. 38, Part it

II,

p.

813.) cavalry

is

At the battle of Chickamauga Fornot relieved from the lines where it was Cavalry

Ext. No. 187.

kept "four

rest s

had been fighting as infantry

till

it

had been

in action

four days.

(Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest p. cavalry go

to

j!

s

Cavalry,

353.)

Ext No

Seeing our troops retiring, and their need of assistance, I immediately rushed Gamble s Brig ade to Doubleday s left, and dismounted it in time to render great assistance to our infantry, and to check -

188

-

troops at this place had partial shelter behind a low stone fence, and were in Their fire w as perfectly terrific, short carbine range.

and break the enemy

s line.

My

r

causing the enemy to break and rally on their second line, which made no further advance toward my position. (Brig. Genl. Jno. Buford, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 927.)

July

1st,

Gettysburg,

COMMENTS.

The fantry

is

mounted

combined cavalry and much the same as that of mounted and

tactical

cavalry.

action of

in

dis

71

The Rosser

s

infantry riding double behind Cavalry (Ext. 171) is very rare and of doubt case of Early

s

ful utility.

At Fisher s Hill the cavalry threw up earth works, same as infantry, to be occupied at the rate of one man to 1.7 yards. (Ext. 172.) This line would seem It was not so since the cavalry was armed to be weak. the

with repeating carbines

was

Cavalry

at this time.

often

thrown

the

into

to

battle

strengthen infantry. (Exts. 138, 173, 174, 183, 188.) Extract 175 illustrates the case of cavalry holding a

enough

position long

to enable infantry to complete its

maneuver. It is

sometimes thought that the Manchurian war

furnished a

new method

of handling

weak cavalry

>

namely, following it up by light infantry behind which it took refuge when driven back. This use of cavalry was frequently resorted to during the war of the Rebellion. (Exts. 177, 182, 184, 185.)

In principle the system attributed to Rosecrans (Ext. 184) is altogether wrong. Cavalry should not be imbued

with the idea that a like the tail of a

lot

of infantry must follow it around The correct idea is expressed

comet.

by Sheridan (Ext. 238), namely, that cavalry ought to fight the enemy s cavalry, and infantry the enemy s in fantry.

It is

true that cavalry, the

a subordinate arm, and, under the

same

as artillery

commanding

should work to the central idea, and while doing

and

will fight anything.

difficult

to replace to

is

general, so,

can

Good cavalry

expend

it

is, however, too on foot troops massed

behind entrenchments, and its possibilities are likewise too great to kill its mobility by tying it to infantry sup ports.

Cavalry can often cover the withdrawal of infan try by being placed in trenches, thus enabling the in fantry to get away without molestation or their absence

being discovered. Wilson s cavalry screened the move ment of Grant s army across the James River. (See also Exts. 178, 249.)

72

180 furnishes a good

Extract

of the

illustration

ability of cavalry to make a turning movement and cut off the retreat of defeated troops and thus secure a rich

reward in prisoners and

trophies.

happen more frequently

that cavalry acts as than that for infantry acts as support infantry support E. M. McCook has some Colonel for cavalry. However, It will

ideas of his

own on

the subject, as expressed in Ext.

183.

of cavalry in trenches for longer than hours is very demoralizing to the cavalry

The putting twenty-four (Ext. 186.) not, as a rule,

fighting of men in the trenches will compensate for the damage to their horses

The

from

resulting

neglect.

COMBINED ACTION combined da

cavlery

!cticm!

mSS&m^SS.

WITH ARTILLERY.

men, except about 200 who were distributed equally on his right and left in one flanks, the Confederate commander disposed them Ext. Nb. 189.

line of battle

Dismounting

with his

artillery,

his

occupying three positions,

Freeman s battery in the center and a section of on each flank, a few paces in advance of the dismounted

Morton

s

men.

(Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest p.

ar tfnery

a

Cavalry,

211.)

Ext.

handStuart hi8 h rse n s

s

No.

190.

The

successful

resistance

which

Stuart was enabled to oppose to the Federal advance the skillful handling of his "was in great measure due to Stuart s fondness for the use of artillery was artillery.

almost

excessive;

Pelham

s

skill

in

its

management

Stuart and Pelham imparted to amounted genius. the horse artillery an independency of action and celerity to

movement which characterized it to the end of the war, and which was nowhere equalled or imitated, except in Achievements of the same arm of the Federal service.

of

the batteries attached to both Federal and Confederate record and the careful cavalry are worthy of a separate men. of attention military of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, and

(Life

p.

173.)

Campaigns

73

CHAPTER

V.

DELAYING ACTIONS AND ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF RIVER CROSSINGS.

Ext. No. 191.

Morgan ordered

the

command

to

A

charge win disconcert

often

on the Augusta road and charged with the mount-

retreat

ed reserve to cover the withdrawal.

(Morgan Ext. No. .

.

i

Cavalry by Duke.)

s

The army, the siege of Knoxville Rear of retreating army covered M1 commenced its retreat toward Rogersville. by cavalry. 192.

.

being raised, General Morgan

division followed, covering the rear of General McLaw s division on the south side of the s

XV

e

Dec

pa?gn

VGS!

General Armstrong s division performed the same service on the Knoxville and river roads. Holston.

(Maj. Gen. Part

I,

p.

W.

T. Martin, C.

S.,

R. R., Vol. 31,

548.) e

3

With 973 men

Ext. No. 193.

the First Brigade 7ooo for io houS had disputed the advance of 7,000 rebels from 7 o clock vance only five miles. in the

morning

until 5 o clock in the evening,

and

at the

chickam-anga 1

end of that time had fallen back only five miles. (Col. R. H. G. Minty, R. R., Vol. 30, Part

iff* I,

p.

923.)

Ext.

No.

For

194.

five

and a half hours, over

seven miles of country, the unequal contest continued, J

My p.

gallant brigade was cut to pieces and slaughtered. (Col. G. B. Hodge, C. S., R. R., Vol. 30, Part

II,

COMMENTS. retreated

Rosecrans, Wheeler

s

from Perry ville followed by

cavalry covered his retreat.

Ext.

261.

ville

The retreat of Hood s army after the was covered by Forrest s cavalry.

battle of

vance seven miles in five hours.

728.)

When Bragg

onebrigadedelays a large force so that they d

Nash

tat? cS VMM!

74

Cavalry is particularly fitted for the work of delay ing the advance of a victorious army. Its mobility en ables

to take

it

advantage of the terrain

in places

where

horses can be kept close up. Under this condition it can delay its retirement with impunity. If horses cannot its

be kept close up, and owing to unfavorable terrain are sent to the rear, cavalry will still have an advantage over foot troops in that they carry no packs and are stimulated by the assurance of safety upon regaining their horses.

The

further use of cavalry in delaying actions by the following extracts.

is

fully

illustrated

RETIRING BY SUCCESSIVE FORMATIONS. Ext. No. 195.

Retire by alter-

barricades.

I

I

received orders to retire behind

moved back by

same time checking the

rebel

alternate platoons, at the

advance

till

we

arrived at

the barricades.

(Capt. Forman, R. R., Vol. 44,

p.

376.)

Their cavalry having turned our J were compelled to fall back which was done

Ext. No. 196.

Retire b

suepositions,

flanks,

we

by taking successive positions till we reached the town. (Genl. J. Wheeler, R. R., Vol. 44, p. 410.) Ext. No.

Brigades sueHranily Station. ;

mand behind

197.

I

received orders to retire

my com-

the line of the 2 d Brigade and reform them,

which was done, and I then held a position under cover of which the 2d Brigade withdrew and again took up a

-

position near the river.

(Brig. Genl. H. E. Davies, R. R., Vol. 29, Part p.

I,

386.)

Ext. No. 198.

being repulsed, the enemy and take*upnew commenced extending his flanks which his numerical su.... positions. ,,. P enorit y enabled him to do, compelling me to form fresh when outflank-

Upon

.

,

Tenn., Oct.

7,

i8(>3.

j-

nes

n

t | ie

^^ ^^

(Col. G. B. p.

Lmeretires sueby regi-

cessively

ment. al tion Teiin 29, 1863.

Dec"

Hodge,

C. S., R. R., Vol. 30, Part II,

728.)

Ext. No. .,,

artillery S

withdraw those he was enveloping.

199.

The

retreat rr

under a heavy .

and small arms, was effected

.

fire

of

.

in perfect order,

the regiments falling back in succession to advantageous

75

points,

and then fighting

until,

having checked the enemy

they could gain another point of vantage. Genl. W. T. Martin, C. S., R. R., Vol. 31, (Maj.

sufficiently,

Part

p.

I,

548.)

Ext. No. 200. The regiment fell back slowly and good order for some distance by alternate battalions, and then resumed its march in column. (Lieut. Col. T. M. Browne, R. R., Vol. 32, Part I, .

in

p.

276.)

Ext. No. 201. i

cessive lines

-

r

1

Was Ordered j

were formed

in

my

back as SUC-

tO fall T\ IT

rear.

My

Regiment retires successively by battalions.

Brigade retires

by

successively

regiment was regiment.

formed some seven or eight times during the day on the rear and flanks of the brigade. (Maj. C. T. Cheek, 5th Ky. Cav., R. R., Vol. 32, Part

I,

p.

310.)

Ext. No. 202. Now the fighting became fierce and desperate, charge after charge received and as often repulsed.

I

found

it

Regiment

impossible to hold a given line longer In this manner we fought

than to deliver a single volley. our way back five miles.

(Lieut. Col. J. B. Park, R. R., Vol. 38, Part II, p.

828.)

Each regiment then fell back alterformed lines for two miles, when we reached Shoal Creek, and I found to my surprise, the 6th 111. pack train, artillery and ambulances all safe on the opposite side, and the regiment dismounted to cover the crossing. Ext. No. 203.

nately and

(Col. D. E. Coon, R. R., Vol. 45, Part

Ext. No. 204.

The

first

I, p.

Regiments fan two

^fl

C

AIa>

im.

585.)

position held by Stuart

stuart

retires

was about three miles west of Middleburg. Here he de-f^tloTan^ layed the enemy as long as prudence permitted, and then ^^bur Va retired en echelon of regiments, covered

by his artillery. This order of retiring was maintained throughout the en tire day, and at no time was the enemy able to cause any

serious disorder in his ranks.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. p.

308.)

J.

E. B. Stuart,

June21

1863 >

-

76

stampede ensues because the retirement is not

made

success-

iveiy.

The Yankees pressing on my rear P Such management I never saw before. retired by echelon, and the cavalry in

Ext. No. 205.

,-,

captured 8 men.

Had

.

the batteries

.

same way, we could have held our position or driven back their cavalry by a counter charge from ours. But

*"the

was ordered and a disgraceful stampede ensued. (Col. T. T. Munford, C. S., R. R., Vol. 12, Part I,

a retreat

p.

731.)

Ext. No. 206.

Brigades faii

ToineTsTiTie Tenn., NOV.

s,

ss!

I

determined to draw

off as

soon as

we cou ^ do so successfully, and for this purpose ordered McCulloch s brigade to dismount and skirmish with the enemy until Siemens could be formed in his rear to cover This was accomplished easily and in good his retreat. order, each brigade forming alternately in rear of the we were out of reach of the enemy.

other until

(Brig. Genl.

Part

I, p.

J.

R. Chalmers,

:.

S.,

R. R., Vol. 31,

248.)

COMMENTS.

From

reading these extracts

method of withdrawing was by mations.

It is possible,

it is

clear that the usual

alternate successive for

at times, to pit the

whole

fight

In this case, when the on one good strong position. for himself (Ext. No. m-an smash comes, it will be every 205). No mention has been observed, in any of the re in a de ports, of intentionally using this latter method

laying action. It will

not

known

ble, that

when

frequently happen that

circumstances,

to the firing line, render a retirement desira

a successful retirement

may

be

made under cover

of the confusion caused by a vigorous attack (Exts. 191,

218,440,441). In the method of

retiring

by alternate formations,

battalions or regiments seem to be the favorite tactical units (Exts. 199, 200, 201, 203, 204).

We

find in Extract

up for an entire day by

204 Stuart first

s

cavalry keeping this to the new line

getting back

alternate regiments supported

by

artillery

whose

fire

cov-

77

ered the withdrawal of the advanced

movement was executed 195), and sometimes by

Sometimes the

line.

alternately by platoons

(Ext.

entire brigades (Exts. 197, 206).

ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF A RIVER CROSSING

FORDS.

advanced rapidly to the creek, but Dismounted men ford and attack a battery. findingf it impossible from abrupt and miry banks to cross Culpeper, C. H., with horses, I dismounted 100 men with carbines, who, Va., Sept. is, i86. Ext. No. 207.

I

wading and swimming hill

the stream, charged rapidly

up the

towards the battery.

(Col.

Mann,

R. R., Vol. 29, Part

I,

p.

127.)

The reserve brigade was ordered to Dismounted men attack the ~ ,-, r Servers Ford; this was done in fine ford supported by mounted men. style by Col. Lowell, who threw over dismounted men, opequau creek, closely supported by the 5th U. S. Cavalry and part of Ext. No. 208.

.

effect a crossing at

the 2d Mass. Cav. mounted. (Brig. Genl.

W.

Merrittt, R. R., Vol. 43, Part

I,

p.

443.)

Ext. No. 209.

The enemy, about 300

~ strong, oc

ar

cupied a well chosen position behind earthworks upon the | opposite side,

already on

commanding

fire,

[^v a ^*

C V r ca va i?v

rough

The bridge was Swor^?

the bridge.

but the 9th Ohio Cav., 92d

111.

Mtd.

Inf.

take

Hear

jjanrjgi,

g

(Dismounted) gallantly dashed through the swamp, the men wading in the water up to their arm pits, crossed the felled by our pioneers, and under cover of artillery, gallantly carried the works, driving the enemy in confusion toward the town of Barn-

stream on trees of a rapid

fire

well.

(Maj. Genl. p.

J.

Kilpatrick, R. R., Vol. 47, Part

I,

858.)

They made another attempt some

Enemy allowed

distance leftward, and were suffered to get well into the

the stream before

Ext. No. 210.

firing

on them.

stream without molestation, when Captain Forrest at tacked with vigor, and repulsed them with loss.

(Campaigns of Forrest and of p.

Forrest"s

Cavalry,

239.)

Ext. No. 211.

The Federals were

forced to retire

to their fortifications, eastward of the stream,

which

va

ry

1

1

d ^J a c r Ss ^ J and is shallow ford,

78 dismount on the other side to attack field works,

some 250 yards broad

at this point, but shallow, and with an excellent ford, across which, under cover, secured by eight pieces of artillery that had been previously placed "

in a favorable position, the

Confederates dashed boldly

Dismounting his men as soon as they reached the other bank, they were formed as infantry, and pushed up with the loss of eight or ten in the

men

face of the Federals.

killed

or

wounded before

the Federals

abandoned

their position.

(Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest TO

Ext. No. 212.

recross art-

with OCOver

illery is sent r

the c?os 8in

Morton

s

Ford,

Va., Nov. 27, 1863.

s

Cavalry,

355.)

p.

I

determined to recross the

river.

^s

^ le enem y began a brisk attack on my skirmishers, I directed them to stand firm and at once sent my main body across the ford, having my guns in position and placing a battalion in the houses at the ford,

I

ordered

the skirmishers in at the gallop. They retired, followed the which were checked by the s closely by enemy cavalry

guns and the men posted

mand

at the ford

and the whole com

crossed the river without losing a man.

(Brig. Genl. H. E. Davies, Jr. R.R., Vol.29, Parti, p.

815.)

BRIDGES. cavalry crones bri

dge under

cover of

artillery.

N.c.,ApJfl 17/65!

Another battalion of the same regiwas dismounted and placed as near the bridge as The second shot from our artil shelter could be found. lery dismounted the rebel gun, a few more discharges drove them from their rifle pits, when the dismounted battalion charged across the bridge on the sleepers and Ext. No. 213.

m en

t

drove the rebels from the ford. (Brig. Genl. A. C. Gillem, R. R., Vol. 49, Part p.

335.)

Ext. No. 214.

cavalry crosses

b ridge

under

cover of carbine Position

fire,

r d D) oct. i% i863

Va

"

I,

tion

on the opposite

The enemy J occupied side of

a strong posi-

Broad Run which could only

be crossed at a bridge and a ford one mile below. After a determined effort of over two hours, General Custer

had succeeded in pushing his command up to the bridge and on the hills to the right of the road overlooking the

79

enemy

s position.

I

ordered General Custer to charge the

The charge was successfully made, the buildings on the opposite side were gained and held by our sharp shooters and in a few minutes General Custer s entire

bridge.

brigade had crossed. (Genl. Kilpatrick, R. R., Vol. 29, Part

Ext. No. 215. the 3d

Lieut. Col. Pritchard

Ohio Cav. had orders

to

I,

382.)

p.

commanding

push forward and save ^SThaV been

He

the double bridges over the Flint River.

carried out

his orders faithfully and energetically and saved t Al bridges, although every preparation had been made to

burn them, and captured the battalion which had been to destroy them.

left

Captain Hudson led his battalion at the unknown bridges, dashed into the rebel

gallop over these battalions with sabers, and captured the entire force. (Col. R. H. G. Minty, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I,

p.

445.) there a charge was ordered, chavrge s ?udc executed with such precipitancy that the guard Sv

Ext. No. 216.

and was

From

at the bridge, consisting of a force of fifty

men, was com-

pletely surprised, receiving no knowledge of our approach until the head of the column struck the bridge at the gal lop,

which was swept

enemy

time to

fire

but to no

fired,

like a hurricane, not

allowing the

A

few scattering shots were The whole force then broke and

a volley.

effect.

fled.

(Lieut. Col. B. D. Pritchard, R. R., Vol. 49, Part p.

I,

465.)

Ext. No. 217.

I

again

moved forward

at a

f ast

on time to save the bridge over the Tabesofkee Creek. Here we found the enemy in line, about 300 strong, and attacked them. The advance trot in order to be

charged, mounted, over the burning bridge until stopped by the plank being torn up. They then dismounted, as did also the two advance companies, and I double quicked

them across the bridge, and after a sharp five

minutes, drove the

meantime

I

enemy

fight of

off in confusion.

had part of the companies

at

about In the

work extinguish-

ai

p intRiverneai u Ga Aji. ii865:

,

|

"

80

on the bridge, the men carrying water in their The fire was hats, caps, and everything else available. minutes in about fifteen to admit sufficiently suppressed ing the

fire

of horsemen crossing, and, leaving men still at work against the flames, I crossed the command and pushed on. (Lieut. Col. F. White, R. R., Vol. 49, Part

I,

p.

458.)

wagon e

o

vi

atteck r

fnd r i yer

under

cover o1it ,

Led horses and are

At 2:00 p. m. Wheeler had his and horses carried to the south side of the tnen charged the enemy s line and before they

Ext. No. 218.

Retiring across

trains

HC

-

could recover from their consternation, he had, by a rapid movement, reached the river with his dismounted men

sent ancl hurried

and swung

them across the pontoons, it

around

cut loose the bridge

to the south side of the river just

reached the other bank. enemy and His Cavalry, of Wheeler (Campaigns in force

as the

p.

196.)

COMMENTS.

sists

In the attack of a ford or bridge, the whole trick con in keeping down the enemy s fire till the crossing

can be effected and a deployment made on the opposite This may be done by rifle fire (Ext. 214), artillery side. fire (Exts. 209, 213), or by both combined (Ext. 212).

The method

of employing it will depend upon the ground. If high banks overlook the crossing, position fire (Ext. 214) is desirable. Often a bold clash will turn the trick

(Exts. 211, 215, 216, 217). This method is particularly applicable where the defenders can be surprised (Ext.

216). Extract 212 furnishes a good illustration of with drawing from the firing line and crossing while under fire.

Under

these circumstances, horses and trains should

be sent ahead (Ext. 218). The method here used by General Wheeler will often be possible, namely, deliver a vigorous attack and cross

under cover of the confusion caused to the enemy s ranks. The cutting loose of one end of a pontoon bridge

was also resorted Potomac after the

to

by Lee

s

army when- crossing

battle of Gettysburg.

the

81

Usually some method can be found by which the The mobility of cavalry will en

crossing can be turned.

able it to reconnoitre, in a short time, a considerable distance to both flanks of the crossing, while other troops are engaging the s in front. attention If a cross enemy ing can be found, it will be cheaper to turn the position than to force it.

When will suffer

the defense

is

sufficiently strong, the

more by permitting

the stream (Ext. 210).

his

column

enemy

to get well into

82

CHAPTER

VI.

MISCELLANEOUS TACTICS. THE BATTLE OF BOONEVILLE. This battle I,

p.

156.

officer.

It is

As

it

described in Sheridan

is

s

Memoirs, Vol.

well worth the study of every cavalry

was the

first

fight

manded independent cavalry, and

where Sheridan com is

so full of

good cav

in full.

here quoted time showed a fine conception of were the correct use of cavalry. The details of the battle mater a had and probably well known to General Grant, recommended Sheri ial influence on the latter when he

alry tactics that

Sheridan

it

is

at this

dan for the command of the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac. It resulted in Sheridan s immediate promotion, gave

him

the

of an infantry division, brought his to the attention of higher commanders,

command

sterling qualities

and who shall say that it did not, in this indirect manner, nation, have an important bearing on the destiny of the cavalry

out-

out.

morning of July 1, 1862, a between five and six thousand men, cavalry command of ad under the Confederate General James R. Chalmers, The vanced on two roads converging near Booneville. Boone and head of the enemy s column on the Blackland Ext. No. 219.

ville

On

the

road came in contact with

my

miles pickets three

under and a half west of Booneville. These pickets, Michi Second the of Lieutenant Leonidas S. Scranton, of every gan Cavalry, fell back slowly, taking advantage arrived at the tree or other cover to fire from till they ubbornl

W

?n

roads joined. At this juncP oint where the converging timber, tion there was a stron P osition in tne Protecting reinforced and here Scranton made a firm stand, being the road on as out had he men few pickets presently by a "

83 to his left, a

second company I had sent him from camp, and subsequently by three companies more, all now com manded by Captain Campbell. This force was dismount ed and formed in line, and soon developed that the

enemy was present in large numbers. Up to this time Chalmers Advance, by had shown only the heads of his columns, and we had ^not^pio^d

11,

<

.

doubts as to his purpose, but now that our resistance forced him to deploy two regiments on the and left

till compelled do 80 b ? fire

to

-

right

of the road,

became apparent that he meant business, and that there was no time to lose in preparing to repel it

his attack.

Battle of BooneYille

Julj

/ s. e J86?, JJHilt

Full information of the situation sent me, till I

and

was immediately J

authorized to do so slowly, taking advantage of every means that fell in his way to prolong: the nVhtinsr. Be,,

tore this

m

-r,

-frompt report

directed Campbell to hold fast, if possible, could support him, but if compelled to retire he was I

T I

.

.

,

to

Stubborn reiietb r advance

had stationed one battalion of the Second Iowa ance ..,

troops

Booneville, but Colonel

that regiment,

>

enables

Edward Hatch, command ing StJ melt rthe

was now directed

one company to the north of

to leave

attack-

for the protection of our camp a little the station, and take the balance of the

Second Iowa, with the battalion in Booneville except two saber companics, and form the whole in rear of Captain Campbell,

Digmounte d UP poTtSd

bymou n t-

84

and support him by a charge should dismounted line. While these preparations were being made, the Con federates attempted to drive Campbell from his position

ed troops which to protect his flanks are ordered to eharge if the enbreak his ene

emy

^

breaks the

dismounted line.

.

mvJ

In this they a direct attack through an open field. by J ~ ,. fire until their our men, reserving however, for the enemy came within about thirty yards, then opened on him with such a shower of bullets from our Colt s

Fire is reserved the enemy

-

till

.

gets within thirty failed,

rifles

that

it

soon became too hot for him and he was

Foiled in this move, repulsed with considerable loss. Chalmers hesitated to attack again in front, but began both flanks of Campbell s line by force of

overlapping

toward a strong line on which to a had selected in his rear for retire

numbers, compelling Campbell to position

I

make our main As soon as

resistance.

enemy saw this withdrawing he again as charged in front, but was again as gallantly repelled for a in the first assault, although the encounter was the

short time so desperate as to have the character of a hand to hand conflict, several groups of friend and foe

At this of their guns. using on each other the butts Hatch with the juncture the timely arrival of Colonel Second Iowa gave a breathing

spell

and

to Campbell,

made the Confederates so chary of direct attacks that he was enabled to retire and at the same time 1 found op ;

of the reinforcement to the portunity to make disposition best advantage possible, placing the Second Iowa on the left

of the

right with

new all

line

the

and strengthening Campbell on

men

its

available.

In view of his numbers, the enemy soon regained confidence in his ability to overcome us, and in a little while again began his flanking movements, his right pass

and approaching ing around my left flank some distance, forbidden to had I which our camp and transportation, Fearing that the enemy would and transportation, I de envelop and capture the camp termined to take the offensive, commander Remembering- a circuitous wood road that I had be

makes thorough

"

moved out

to the rear.

.

t

r

become familiar with while making the map heretofore

85

mentioned, I concluded that the most effective plan would rounding his be to pass a small column around the enemy s left, by kn^wiedgew^ich isof immense fit" of this to him and strike his rear a road, mounted charge way by J & advantage when hia camp te attacked with an advance of our main line on his simultaneously

11-11-

-

I knew that the attack in rear would be a most ed^mSan^ushazardous undertaking, but in face of such odds as the rear? enemy had the condition of affairs was most critical, and

front.

1

could be relieved only by a bold and radical change in our tactics; so I at once selected four saber companies,

from the Second Michigan and two from

Sheridan stakes

two*^^S?o?one S *

the Second w Ins

Iowa, and placing Captain Alger, of the former regiment, in command of them, I informed him that I expected of them the quick and desperate work that is usually im posed on a forlorn hope.

-

Forlorn hope.

To

carry out the purpose now in view, I instructed Captain Alger to follow the wood road as it led around the left of the enemy s advancing forces, to a point where it joined the Blackland road, about three miles from Booneville, and directed him,

land road, to turn up of the enemy s line.

upon reaching the Blackimmediately, and charge the rear Under no circumstances was he to

it

deploy the battalion, but charge in column right through whatever he came upon, and report to me in front of if at all If he possible for him to get there. break through the enemy s line, he was to go ahead as far as he could, and then if any of his men were left, and he was able to retreat, he was to do so by the same route he had taken on his way out. To con

Booneville, failed

to

duct him on this perilous service

I

sent along a thin,

sallow, tawny-haired Mississippian named Beene, whom I had employed as a guide and scout a few before,

days

on account of

his intimate

knowledge of the roads, from

the public thoroughfares down to the insignificant by paths of the neighboring swamps. With such guidance I felt sure that the column would get to the desired point

without delay, for there was no danger of its being lost or misled by taking any of the which by-roads many traversed the dense forests through which it would be

Useofgui(3e

-

86 I also informed Alger that I should obliged to pass. take the reserve and join the main line in front of Booneville for the purpose of making an advance of my whole

force,

and that as a signal he must have

his

loudly when he struck the enemy s rear, my attack might be simultaneous with his.

in

men

cheer

order that

gave him one hour to go around and come back w?h <?ra^?ng through the enemy, and when he started I moved to the helms put ail of front with the balance of the reserve, to put every thing I his reserves into the firing line, had into the fight. This meant an inestimable advantage to the enemy in case of our defeat, but our own safety A commander

I

3

demanded the hazard. All along the attenuated line ~ s tiring md isignal for simui- the fighting was now sharp, and the enemy J taneous attack Prearranged

canno^

usually

.

.

,.

,

fear of disaster to

cateci sucn numerical strength that

for Alger increased my anxiety terribly as the time set Reheard. of it was the cheering arrived and no sound 1

Time agreement better than lyinga sound signal.

>

,

knowledge of the astray, and confident

however, on the fact that Beene

s

roads would prevent his being led of Alger s determination to accomplish the purpose for which he set out, as soon as the hour was up I ordered

my

whole

ment

my

line

forward.

a locomotive

horses ran into

tunately, because

mand

courage

of

rived.

was well known throughout

that in the morning,

when

I

first

the

com

discovered the

had called for assistance; and my troops, now thinking that reinforcements had arrived by rail from Rienzi, where a division of infantry was encamped, and inspired bv this belief, advanced with

large

e p ae?ief that a* siBtance had ar-

it

mo

Fortunately, just at this

and two cars loaded with grain for Booneville from Corinth. I say for

numbers of the enemy,

I

T

,

,

renewed confidence and wild cheering. Meantime the engineer of the locomotive blow his whistle loudly, so that the enemy might also learn that a train had come; and from the

fact that in a

few moments he began

to

this

before our small force, I thought that had some effect. Soon his men broke, and ran stratagem in the utmost disorder over the country in every direc give

way

however, that his precipitous retreat was due to the pressure on his left from the Second Iowa,

tion.

I

found

later,

87

with the front attack of the Second Michigan, and the demoralization wrought in his rear by Alger,

in concert

who had

almost entirely accomplished the purpose of his expedition, though he had failed to come through, or so near that I could hear the signal agreed upon before leaving Booneville.

After Alger had reached and turned up the Blackfirst thing he came across was the Con

land road, the

federate headquarters; the officers and orderlies about which he captured and sent back some distance to a farm house. Continuing at a gallop, he soon struck the rear

of the enemy s line, but was unable to get through, nor did he get near enough for me to hear his cheering; but as he had made the distance he was to travel in the time allotted, his attack

and mine were almost

coincident,

and

the enemy, stampeded by the charges in front and rear, fled toward Blackland, with little or no attempt to cap ture Alger

s

command which might

readily have bee**

me at Booneville, Good Alger cavalry minus many hats, having returned by their original route. Si^to^lSF i5 out They had sustained little loss except a few men wounded way done.

troops soon rejoined

s

and a few temporarily missing. Among these was Alger himself, who was dragged from his saddle by the limb of a tree that, in the excitement of the charge, he

was The missing had been dismounted in one way or another, and run over by the enemy in his

unable to flank.

but they all turned up later, none the worse except for a few scratches and bruises. effective strength

flight

;

My

was 827

and Alger s command com prised ninety officers and men. Chalmers was composed of six regiments and two battalions, and though I have been unable to find any returns from which to verify his actual numbers, yet, from the statements of prisoners and from information obtained from citizens along his line

in this fight

all told,

of march, it is safe to say that he had in action not less than five thousand men. Our casualties were not many forty-one in

His loss in killed and wounded was most severely wounded forty men

all.

considerable, his

88 falling into our hands,

having been

left at

farm houses

in the vicinity of the battle field. Sheridan disobeys orders, but on account of his jngcomplete victory 8 "stifled

^Had

whippfitm^hit diff av

The

victory in face of such odds .

anc as i

to ret i re

P ose

f

it Jjustified

my

..,.

disinclination

from Booneville without

saving

my

was most

.

gratify-

.

in fact, refusal

fighting (for the pur-

transportation, as directed

by superior

"

lr e nt mltter

authority when I applied in the morning for reinforce ments), it was to me particularly grateful. It was also

very valuable in view of the fact that it increased the confidence between the officers and men of my brigade A

victory

and me, and gave us the balance of the month not only from the dangers ofcomparative rest, but entire immunity In of a renewed effort to gobble my isolated outpost. immediate from addition to all this, recommendation my was promptly tendered through oral and writ

infi

ence between

superiors ten congratulations and their satisfaction at the result of the battle took definite form a few days later, in an ap ;

plication for

my

(Sheridan

s

promotion.

Memoirs,

pp.

156 to 165 inclusive.)

COMMENTS. General Sheridan here displayed the same character He istics which he afterwards displayed in the valley. order in withdraw to loved a fight and disobeyed orders to save his transportation.

He

here used the same tac

which were so popular with Forrest, viz:

tics

enemy in front while a him simultaneously in rear. the

Holding

turning movement attacked He had made a thorough

reconnaissance of the surrounding country and mapped He personally knew every road and trail in the vicin it. and utilized them to the best advantage. ity of his camp His outposts were well out and resisted stubbornly till the

main body could form for defense.

often thought that if the attack can hundred yards, a charge will be prac get to within two here Such will seldom ever be the case.

In our

drill it is

We

ticable.

find

Sheridan

s

men

within thirty yards.

the

enemy gets They were armed with revolving

holding their fire

till

89 carbines and could deliver a rapid

fire

as fast as with our

rifle.

present

be noticed often in these extracts that

It will

fire is

enemy gets to within very short range. be noted that prearranged signals which de pend on sound are not to be relied upon. Sound signals failed in the battles of Seven Pines, Malvern Hill, Gettys held

till

the

It will

burg, and nal

many

better

is

if

A

others during the rebellion. time sig the conditions are known to the com

In case a time signal is agreed upon, care should be exercised to see that watches agree.

mander.

We

here see the commander playing with the cour of his men, and keeping up their spirits by making age them believe in conditions which did not exist.

In this fight Sheridan staked his whole reputation result. The people of the United States seem to

on the

lay great stress on a commander gaining a victory in his All through the war we see many careers fight.

first

ruined because the first fight,

as

commander was unfortunate

while those

who were

heroes and were permitted

former experience

A

them in future operations. not justified in withdrawing from a he has put all his reserves into the firing line.

commander

till

fight

in his

fortunate were greeted to continue with their

to support is

CAVALRY SHOULD NOT SURRENDER. Ext. No. 220. forth

Forrest declared that he would lead

Forrest s a

cav-

who desired to accompany him, and then in-of ry Fon Doneison when 17,000 how many would make the attempt. The answer troops surrender

all ,

quired

.

was unanimous that they would follow him to the last. Orders were issued accordingly for an immediate move ment. About 4 o clock a. m. Forrest was ready and took Cavalry should the road through Dover. About 500 officers and men not surrender, formed the column. * * * Thus assured, Forrest Tenn., Feb. 15, 62! returned to his command, that meanwhile had continued on the road to the crossing of the creek eastward of Dover. The creek expanded by backwater to a breadth of about 100 yards, lined with ice, it was supposed to be Forrest dashed through the ice as their "swimming."

90

pioneer just as he had but lately been their scout. Pass ing entirely across, the water proved not deeper than to

The whole command now moved over and took up the march for Cumberland City. (Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest s Cavalry,

the saddle skirts.

91.)

p.

Ext. No. 221.

cavalry of the

er^virginia^do not at first surrender at Appomattox. Appomattox,v Aprlf9,1865.

hearing that the

Upon

Army

of

Northern Virginia had surrendered, the men generally dispersed and rode off to their homes, subject to reassemI rode out in blingf for a continuation of the struggle.

,,-.,.,

.

W. H.

person with a portion of

me

nearest to

F.

Lee

and previous

at the time,

.

,

be recalled that

views

my

was

action

in

.

division, the

s

to the negotia

between the commanders of the two armies.

tions

that

.

,

It will

accordance with the

had expressed in the council the night before a surrender was compelled the next day, I would extricate the cavalry, provided it could be done

I

if

try to

without compromising the action of the commanding general.

(Maj. Genl. Fitzhugh Lee, C. Parti, Escape of the

SSSr?

Harp

"

sept. 14, 1862.

p.

R. R., Vol. 46,

S,,

1303.)

At the capture of Harper s Ferry, F. Colonel B. Davis, 8th N. Y. Cavalry marched 1862, ou at t ie ieac of 1,500 horsemen and not only escaped Ext. No. 222.

j

j.

i

|

surrender, but inflicted serious loss on the Confederates

by capturing Longstreet

s

ordnance

train.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. p.

out,

when

rounded,

way sur-

with

saber.

Brandy Station. Va.. oct, 11, 1863.

E. B. Stuart,

122.)

Heavy masses

Ext. No. 223. Cutter cuts

J.

.

.

.

of rebel cavalry were r

seen covennsr the heipfhts in front ot

mvJ

t

advance;

my

rear guard was hotly engaged with a superior force and n a heavy column was enveloping each flank. Leaving 1

1

1

and 7th Michigan Cavalry to hold the force in rear in check, I formed the 5th Michigan Cavalry on my right in column of battalions on my left I formed the the 6th

;

column of squadrons. After Michigan Cavalry ordering them to draw their sabers I informed them that we were surrounded, and all we had to do was to open 1st

in

91

a

way with our

They gave three hearty cheers up Yankee Doodle which excited the

sabers.

and the band struck

command to the highest pitch. Simul-| i^ le Yankee taneously both regiments moved forward to the attack. After a series of brilliant charges we succeeded in reach ing the river which we crossed in good order. 1

enthusiasm of the

(Genl. G. A. Custer, R. R., Vol. 29, Part

Ext. No. 224.

I, p.

390.)

was finally completely surroundabandon everything that would imI

ed and compelled to pede me in order to cut

my way

I

through.

took Colonel

cutting Kear

way

Lovejoy

A 29, i864.

Jones with me and got through 1,200 men by a charge in column, and crossed the river below Franklin. Brig. Genl. E. M. McCook, R. R., Vol. 38, Part II, p.

762.)

Ext. No. 225.

General

Van Dorn

attacked

and

captured the town of Holly Springs, Mississippi, on the 20th of December. The attack was sudden and over

cavalry refuse to surrender.

Holly

springs,

powering, and the garrison was speedily captured. Six companies of the 6th Illinois Cavalry under the brave

Major Mudd, refused

to surrender

and cut

their

way

through the ranks of the enemy and escaped. (History of the U. S. Cavalry, Brackett, p. 266.) Ext. No. 226. ets reported the

At

enemy

5 :00 p.

m.

in force in

my patrols my rear.

and pickformed

I

charging column on the pike. The 1 6th Illinois, dismounted, on the right and the 8th Michigan, L dismounted, on the left of the pike; led horses of both

the 5th

Iowa

in

.

The formation WftS

n

*

^

r

an

attack but to cut a way out when

surrounded. regiments to follow at safe distance in their respective rears; the 14th Illinois was placed in column of fours to

the left and rear of the 8th Michigan and parallel to the As soon as the enemy s fire was drawn, the 5th Iowa.

dismounted men were to immediately fall back, mount and follow out the 5th Iowa which was to go through with sabers.

In fifteen minutes

we

struck the

enemy

in

line barricaded and posted in out houses and buildings.

The movement was entirely successful. Out of 1,500 brought out safe not more than 30 were missing.

Permit

me

to

add the

fact of

opinion that

growing lot%? captured"

92

93 confidence amongst our troops that ,

good cavalry can Duck

never be captured.

(Maj.

J.

M. Young, R. R., Vol. 45, Part I, IMPROPER USE OF CAVALRY.

Ext. No. 227.

River

Tenn., Nov. 28,

,

The

officers

p.

64!

604.

and men were in pretty of were con-gjJ*JJ

condition, so far as health and equipment

good

cerned, but their horses were thin and very

much worn

out by excessive, and, it seemed to me, unnecessary picket duty, the picket line almost encircling the infantry and artillery camps of the army, covering a distance, if stretched out on a continuous line, of nearly

The enemy, more

wise,

60

miles.

had been husbanding the During winter horses should be e t ey horses by sending them to

strength and efficiency of his the rear, in order to bring- them out in the spring in good condition for the impending campaign. (Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 36, Part

I,

J|

r

^%

t

ra

to the

Rapidan Jamet, Apr. 1864

p.

787.)

Ext. No. 228. ,

,.

,

As was ...

difficult to

it

overcome the

.

.

established custom of wasting cavalry for the protection of trains, and for the establishment of cordons around a

...

.

sleeping infantry force,

we had

,

.

.

,

to bide our time.

(Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 36, Part

I,

cavalry should not be wasted for the protection of Rapidan to the James, Apr. 1864.

p.

787.)

Ext. No. 229.

The enemy

here

again

made an

error in tactics by sending a large force to attack my rear, thus weakening his force in front, enabling me to

strength on that which opposed my front, r vi 11 j with a small rear guard. (Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, p.

throw all andj /-fight 1

*.

my 1

this force

Cannot oppose C

g e fo?ce

bya

rear with a\arge Yei iow Tavern Va..

May

11, 1884.

790.) s charge, with Chapman on first at a walk, then executed; brilliantly then dashing at the enemy s line and battery,

Ext. No. 230. his flank, at a trot,

-Ouster

was

capturing the guns and gunners and breaking the

line,

which was simple enough

in

stationary position. Stuart,

commanding

wounded.

to

receive the charge

In this assault General the

enemy

s

cavalry,

J.

a

E. B.

was mortally

Cavalry should

94 (Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 36, Part

I,

p.

790.)

tr

ra?ns

n to

e

P roceec^ via

to

cav-

alr y-

On the New

Ext. No. 231.

Marching cavairy in rear of in-

and

in rear of the rest of the

Lynchbnrg Cam paign, June, 1864.

the arrival of in the rear.

my No opportunity division at

morning- of the 23d I was Castle, in rear of the train

army. From that time till Loup Creek it was marched has been offered to obtain

forage or subsistence for the men, everything having been taken by the troops marching in my front. As a of the

many

consequence

men

my command

of

have

from hunger and fatigue, whilst bv the way I J J from the same cause.

perished by the roadside Night marche be p iefy bad forca v .

their horses fell

would respectfully call attention to the fact that my marching has been done principally during the night time, thus affording little opportunity for rest or sleep. (Brig. Genl. A. N. Duffle, R. R., Vol. 37, Part I, p. 144.)

COMMENTS.

the

When Army

Sheridan took of the

Potomac

command

of the cavalry of he found the conditions as

The horses had been worn out an infantry camp on a line around doing picket duty

stated in Extract 227. in

of nearly sixty miles while the Confederates habitually sent their horses to the rear in winter to recuperate. The ;

use of cavalry for train guards is not to be encouraged. It is a great waste of cavalry and besides the duty can be better done by infantry. In case of an attack the in

fantryman from the ground can do much more effective shooting than can a man on a horse. The rate of speed of a train being cavalry,

it

is

much slower than

the rate of march, of

very wearing on horses to hold them

down

to the rate of travel of the train.

The marching

of cavalry in rear of infantry trains that there will be nothing left for the cavalry to

means eat, and when

this

condition

is

combined with night

marching

the situation could not be worse for a cavalry

command

(Ext. 231).

95

Extract 229 illustrates an error in the use of cavalry

Sheridan to a fight by attack Sheridan fought to the rear with a small ing his rear. rear guard and kept on his Richmond raid without seri

where Stuart

tried to bring

ous opposition.

STREET FIGHTING.

A

Ext. No. 232.

made

the

men

fierce

force their

I once began. into the houses whence

fight

way

street fighting.

at

middle

the they were fired upon. Details were posted to fire on the in front of of the street in every house, mates when they showed themselves and prevent them in

The

offensive

septf?! 1862

.

from maintaining an accurate and effective fire. Other were made to break doors of the houses and enter them. Artillery was brought into the town and turned upon the houses in which the most stubborn resistance was kept up. details

(Morgan

s

Cavalry, by Duke.)

The

Ext. No. 233.

street

through which he neces-

Formation for street fighting is of fours.

column

narrow regiment could only sarily passed was be operated in column of fours. A sufficient interval was, however, preserved between his squadrons, which Attack by suce S were employed successively in charging the head of the ea ch forming in so

that his

,

rear after deliv-

enemy s advancing column. As one squadron retired ering its wow. Booiisboi r Md., r irom ji the charge, to torm again in rear ot the regiment, Sept. 15, 1862. 0,

r

1

the one in front took

up the

battle.

By

a rapid series of

executed attacks the 9th regiment thus covered the retreat of the remainder of the brigade and gave it time

\vell

to take position

w est of Boonsboro. 7

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. p.

].

E. B. Stuart,

125.)

Ext. No. 234.

I

had pressed up

to

within

500 Dismounted clear the

yards when the enemy retired precipitately through the town. I charged half way through the main street, an on the left, but a hot fire from the enclosures and gardens 1st

me

now dismounted five squadrons of the N. Y., cleared the town, and charged through with

forced

the rest of

back.

I

my command.

troops

\

Va>)

Sept

-

24)

1864>

96

(Brig. Genl. T. C. Devin, R. R., Vol. 43, Part

I,

p

476.)

NIGHT OPEBATIONS. This

is

Ext No.

a fine

illustration

of

o

,

-p,-

?tudy

On October 28, 1863, a part of the the 12th Corps under Brig. Genl. Geary, at Wauhatchie two and one-half miles from the

xtensivecami>ecl

235.

r

Ulvision

-

,

.

,

*

Wauhatchie, llth Corps. Tenn., Oct. 28, 29,

Between 12 midnight and 1 :00 a. m. on a bright moonlight night, his camp was attacked and the attack repulsed.

When the attack began, General Hooker immediate ordered General Carl Schurz to double quick his di ly vision to the aid of Geary, and at the same time sent word

to General

Howard, who was

in

immediate com

mand

of both divisions, that such orders had been given. General Schurz started promptly with three brigades,

marching at low the one

Each brigade had orders

their head. in front of

ceived orders to occupy a neighboring hill. ordered there got off the road and into a

where

was obliged

it

to halt

to fol

Schurz, while en route, re

it.

;

but

it

The brigade boggy thicket

eventually succeeded

reaching the hill. The second brigade did not follow the first and halted without orders. The third brigade,

in

not having orders to halt, marched past the second. Then an aide of General Howard began to give orders in the

name

of his general, and the two brigades were formed in line of battle with no enemy near. At about this time

a few prisoners were brought in and an order to escort

them

to

was

issued

Chattanooga one entire brigade started ;

off with them.

General Hooker came up and found everything be done ing except relieving General Geary s small com mand lie thereupon got mad and made remarks, Finally one brigade reached Geary at 5 :30 a. m. ;

followed by another at 7 :00 a. m. Schurz asked for a court of inquiry and was held blameless.

The

court

found that

"It

was

right

and

97

proper that he (Hooker) should give expression to his righteous indignation in his official report."

The whole operation is maneuvers, when undertaken country.

It is

believed that

a fine illustration of night after dark in an unknown

all

the points are covered by

this concrete

example. (See the report of the Court of Inquiry, R. R., Vol. 31, Parti, p. 206.) Ext. No. 236. for half an hour eral bodies of

directions,

and

Remaining

in possession of the pike

we withdrew upon

infantry, which,

by mistake got

fired several volleys

Friendly troops

the approach of sev-

coming up

in

opposite

30 18

to shooting into each other

before finding out their error. S., R. R., Vol. 45, Part

(Brig. Genl. L. S. Ross, C. I, p.

770.)

Ext. No. 237.

I reached the head of Winslow s Formation for 4 o clock and found the troops marching- to before dart 8 ,1 .. the attack made the position assigned them by General Upton WinslowJ U8t after dark

brigade at

.

.

,.

.

dici

.

not arrive

after dark, but General

till

Upton

over a short distance succeeds -

pro-

posed to make the assault in the night, and coinciding Apr.^isS. with him in judgment, I ordered the attack. Three hun dred men of the 3d Iowa were dismounted and moved forward and forced across the road under a heavy fire of artillery. At 8 :00 p. m. the troops were ready. Gen erals Upton and inslow directed the movement in

W

r

per troops dashed forward during the attack the rebel guns threw out perfect storm of canister and grape. son.

The

;

General Upton swept away all opposition and took pos session of the foot and railway bridges.

(Maj. Genl. p.

J.

H. Wilson, R.

R., Vol. 49, Part

I,

363.)

COMMENTS.

A

very poor opinion is held of night operations. Their chief use will be limited to an attack over a short space of ground directly to the front after the troops

have worked into position by daylight as illustrated in Ext. 237.

-

98

Another application will be where the troops can work into position under the cover of darkness and make the attack at daybreak (Ext. 275). correct use to a v

During the period of

Ext. Njo. 238.

my

immedi-

"

afr^corps*

ate control of the Corps, I tried to carry into effect, as far as possible, the view I had advanced before and dur

ing the opening of the Wilderness campaign,

our cavalry ought to fight the enemy

s

i.

cavalry,

e.,

"that

and our

for there was great infantry the enemy s infantry" of of the the spirit danger breaking Corps if it was to be pitted against the enemy s compact masses of foot ;

troops posted behind intrenchments, and unless there was some adequate tactical or strategical advantage to be gained, such a use of

(Sheridan Battle tactics of a corps, three lines.

front

one-half

2d

mile.

labers.

would not be

Memoirs,

Ext. No. 239.

Our

p.

of battle in corps front

line

.

was always formed one of

its

m^e

l

in

one way.

8d line in col-

apart, L

.

,

Each brigade detached

regiments to cover its whole front, often half n w ^^ a chain of skirmishers. Two more

re giments followed behind each

umn of fours.

justified.

453, Vol. I.)

..

line have a

drawn

s

it

in

line,

wing

with sabers drawn.

brigade formed a third

line in

at

about 200 yards

The

column of

rest

(Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade, For the offena d be aSan? tn n a and for ^nutuai the

SSt

-^ xt

-

^

^40.

The

of

the

fours. p.

18.)

only principle to establish for

employment of a body of cavalry as considerable as division is the division of this mass of troops into

many lines

T he disposing arranged for mutual support. in echelons should be considered as most favorable lines

for safe offensive.

(Cooke s New Cavalry Tactics, p. 266.) Ext. No. 241. The enemy was dismounted behind the crest of a hill. Their formation was defective in that instead of forming a straight, uniform line, they were formed in the shape of a perhaps to meet my movement to ^ an ^ them. When we charged over the hill, although the enemy had some advantage in firing upwards, it was more than counterbalanced by the fact that the men 7

A

straight line

A

sharp salient

"V,"

eak part

?iine

f

upon

their flanks could not fire at us at

all,

while our

99

whole

line

could

fire

of their formation.

without

difficulty

upon any portion

After a short, but hot

fight,

they

gave way.

(Morgan

s

Cavalry, by Duke.)

Ext. No. 242.

This

movement was made

at

a

Marching

a

same (plank) road a of column about 13 miles in length march making

cavalry

ing by the flank of the enemy.

t^n^^S n

walk, with three

divisions on the

I

preferred

this,

however,

corps>

e

from separate roads, com- meS ! s gimm n binations rarely working as expected, and generally fail- R^wan to the JaB ing, unless subordinate commanders are prompt and fully to the combinations arising

i-

understand the situation; besides, an engagement was imminent, and it was necessary that the force be well to gether.

(Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 36, Part

I,

p.

789.)

111

Ext. No. 243.

There was no lack of courage, but Evils of a divided command. e an of absence concert and of sustained movement Yazoo city, Miss., clearly in this operation; and, worst of all, a divided command, ,.

.

Mar>

for though General Richardson claimed to be the senior, he waived the chief command in deference to the fact that General

Ross had a superior knowledge of the the It would appear, therefore, that each brigade was handled in the attack as a separate force,

atre of operations.

with other

p.

regard to the movements or purposes of the an incongruity in war utterly hostile to success. (Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest s Cavalry, little

405.)

18<

5>

100

CHAPTER VII. SECUEITY AND INFORMATION. ADVANCE GUARD. Advance guard

preceded by guides.

Ext. No. 244.

Captain Rup-er, who took and maintained his position at the head of the advance guard, in charge of the guides, and who conducted the column, .

.

and whose services were almost indispensable to me. (Maj. Genl. L. H. Rousseau, R. R., Vol. 38, Part p.

HOW

II,

909.)

No.

Ext.

to enter a

245.

On

scouts dashed through the

arriving at Woodstock the town followed by the advance

guard.

(Maj. C. C. Brown, 22d N. Y. Cav., R. Part Morgan has a permanent a dvance guard.

I, p.

Ext. No. 246. Morgan appreciated the necessity of having an advance guard which could be thoroughly relied on,

selected men.

and disinclined

to trust to details

changed every

day for that duty, had organized a body of twenty-five men selected with great care from the entire force under his

Selection a re-

R., Vol. 46,

532.)

command,

to constitute a continuous

advance guard

for the expedition. So well did this body perform its it became an honor that duty eagerly sought and a reward J ,

ward for bravery, for gallantry.

order of march,

This guard habitually marched at a distance of 400 yards in front of the column. Three videttes were, as connecting

files,

placed between

distances of 100 yards.

it

and the column with

Their duties were to transmit in

formation and orders between the column and the ad

vance guard, and to regulate the gait of the former so that it would not press too closely on the latter. Six videttes

yards

were thrown out in front of the guard; 125 main body of the advance guard

in front of the

101

was a group of four riding in pairs with a distance of 50 yards between each pair, and 125 yards in front of them was the other pair. It was found best to keep the same men always on the same duty. The advance videttes were required

to carefully

examine on

all

sides

and

re-

investigating

they came to cross roads one or both gal them as the case might require for 200 or

Places of such

When

port.

loped

down

300 yards and remained till men were sent from the head SSrs IS? of the column to relieve them, when they returned to their posts.

As soon

as they notified the

tol

commander of

the advance guard that they were about to leave their posts, he took

measures

to supply their places. The two them in the chain galloped to the front, and the other two moved up respectively fifty yards. Two men were sent from the guard to fill the places of

videttes next to

the

last.

(Morgan

s

Cavalry, by Duke.)

Ext. No. 247.

The

an advance guard for a Formation of In the point should be a advance guard* sergeant and two men, connecting files should extend back for a mile 100 yards apart, then about 30 men with size of

corps should be one brigade.

for another mile, total

70 men; then the with a In this way signals can leading brigade battery. be transmitted back two miles in two minutes. At each side road the leading man rides out one quarter connecting

mile or the last

files

more and file

the connecting files move up. When goes past the lookout takes his place in rear.

The employment enemy is known

all

of flankers and skirmishers, unless the to be near, hardly pays for the con

sumption of horse flesh occasioned by constantly riding over broken ground. The flanking should be done by scouts

who

travel light.

(Volunteer Cavalry, The Lessons of a Decade, 90.)

p.

102

COMMENTS. Attention as used by

invited to the system of advance

is

guard

Morgan (Ext. 246).

Captain Whittaker also highly recommends this sys

tem (Ext. 247).

The system prescribed

in the cavalry drill regulations

In a close country the flank cannot be and in an open country a used, ing groups more open formation will be used. will find little application.

SCBEENING. the

screening

march

of

an

in-

lantry column,

During Sherman s march to the sea !* was commanded by Kilpatnck. The infantry marched in four strong columns. The cavalry repeatedly attacked barricades both mounted and dismounted. The enemy was not able to touch a train Ext. No. 248.

his cavalry

or annoy the flanks. The cavalry crossed the entire front of the three times, and

marched 541 miles

33 days. (General Kilpatrick, R. R., Vol. 44, p. 366; General Sherman, R. R., Vol. 44, p. 368.) screens

Ext. No. 249.

the

withdrawal of infantry from the

2

battle line.

a.

From

army

in

also,

the evening of June 12th

m. of the 14th Mclntosh

s

till

brigade covered the rear

of the army, crossed the Chickahominy at Long s bridge and on the afternoon of the 14th reached Charles City

On

court house.

the 15th and 16th both brigades

were

making demonstrations from Mary s church upon the enemy be

kept unceasingly active in Philip

s

house and

tween White Oak

p.

St.

Swamp and Malvern

Hill.

(Maj. Genl. J. H. Wilson, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, 884. Covering of Grant s army while crossing the

James.) screening

the oftar

Suitrj?*

from^wiSchwrter! July 18 186L Va>

Ext No

-

250.

So

movement which Stuart made of his

skillfully

was

this

screened by the disposition cavalry that General Patterson does not appear to have been aware of it until the 21st of July, on which day

were actively engaged at Bull Run. (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart,

Johnston

p.

34.)

s

forces

103

To

Ext. No. 251.

conceal

my movements .

.

1

as far as

,

,

cavalry screens the movements

of infantry, the enemy, Brig. Genl. Ashby, who a mained in front of Banks during the march against Mil- ^jfaj i? i862. till roy, was directed to continue to hold that position

from

possible

the following day,

when he was

to join the

has re-

1

"

main body,

leaving, however, a covering force sufficient to prevent

information of our movements crossing our lines. (Lieut. Genl. T. J. Jackson, C. S., R. R., Vol. 12, Part

I, p.

701.)

Ext No.

May

252.

7,

1864,

crossed

Taylor

s

^ch^cterMie corps befoi* and Ridge, through Nickajack Trace, forced back the rebel e*., cavalry, covering and masking the movements of the

^e^a^,

20th Corps.

May

moved

8,

tion with the

of the

enemy his til

Army

Tennessee on Resaca, drove the and infantry skirmish line back behind cavalry of the

Army s

Villanow and opened communica of the Tennessee. Led the advance

to

works, masking the movements of our infantry un enemy was too great to contend with

the force of the

was relieved by the infantry and the com mand took post on the right of our army then in line of longer,

when

I

battle before Resaca.

(Genl.

J.

Kilpatrick, R. R., Vol. 38, Part II,

Ext. No. 253.

You may depend upon r

it,

p.

857.)

we can tions Enemy s inteucannot be .

.

or divine discovered as never discover the whereabouts of the enemy, J long as he fills his intentions, so long as he fills the country with a cloud

We

must break through that and find him. (Maj. Genl. J. Hooker, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p.

of cavalry.

45.)

COMMENTS.

The

subjects of security and information are dis tinctly different. Security embraces advance, rear and flank guards, outposts and screening; while information

embraces

all

kinds of reconnaissance, the employment of

a spy and scout system, and the strategic use of cavalry. Security will usually find troops on the defensive

(Ext 250),

while reconnaissance and the strategic use of

alry *

104 cavalry will usually involve them in combat. See Strategic Use of Cavalry.

(Ext. 252.)

The defeat of the enemy s cavalry may prevent it from gaining information of the main body that is fol lowing.

(Ext. 252.) offensive screen will naturally result from a cavalry fight just preceding a battle, and not far from

The

main body.

the

The

(Ext. 252.) (299.) defensive screen is well illustrated in extract

253.

The formations used by

cavalry on screening duty will necessarily be different from those used when seek ing information. In screening cavalry may be disposed In this case, if the enemy as indicated in extract 253.

approaches, the screen, in falling back, gathers strength as it retires while the cavalry seeking the information will try and break the screen and locate the enemy s main ;

body. In order to do this, officer s patrols may be sent out which will endeavor to locate the weak points in the screen. The aggressors can then concentrate their forces in

at the

an effort to break the screen (Ext. 253) (299)

weak

leaving the duty

point,

own

of screening their

forces to the divisional cavalry.

Screening means separation, while the penetration of an enemy

s

screen

means concentration.

OUTPOSTS.

Ext. No. 254.

pickets should

be

sup

"

pSfll.

On

October 31, 1863, the 4th Ind.

Cav. went into Fayetteville and

put out unsupported At about 8 town.

of the pickets at the principal exits p.

m. twenty

men appeared from

to the challenge said,

"Friends

the

town and

in

to relieve the

answer

pickets."

They advanced and shot down the pickets and passed on and fired on the videttes. (Maj.

Ext

Reserve found useful.

J.

No

P. Leslie, R. R., Vol. 31, Part

255.

My

I,

p.

pickets were attacked

236.) at

o clock this morning by a small scouting party. mediately pursued them with the reserve, capturing

I

etc.

10

im six,

105

Wm.

(Col.

Palmer, R. R., Vol. 31, Part

J.

I,

p.

440.)

The

Ext. No. 256. established

division

marched

to

Auburn; I headquarters about a mile from Auburn,

my

Division picket*

throwing out my picket a distance of ^4 mile beyond. (M. H. Avery, 10th N. Y. Cav., R. R., Vol. 29, Part

I, p.

368.)

Ext. No. 257. ,

r

in

28, about noon, the pickets notice ,, advance various fords and enemy enemy

outpost

.

at

s

s

J.

H. Wilson, R.

givet of

the

advance

at several points at the same time.

such force as to leave no doubt of his intention.

(Maj. Genl. p.

On Nov.

.

gave notice of the

R., Vol. 45, Part

550.)

Ext. No. 258.

In May, 1862,

Morgan s squadron and Lebanon, Tenn., quartered three companies in buildings, and put horses in stables; the night was rainy and bleak and the pickets sought shelter in a neigh

went

into

The next mornig

boring house.

prised the picket and then the all of Morgan s command and

(Morgan

s

lead8 to disaster.

the Federal cavalry sur

town and captured nearly all

of his horses.

Cavalry, by Duke.)

Ext. No. 259.

Morgan

s

death occurred because of

quartering in towns and also because of improper outThe picket was posted beyond a by-road post duty.

unguarded

by-

roads should not be left in rear of

through which the enemy entered. "The town, had the instructions been obeyed and the pickets correctly posted,

would have been perfectly protected.

The enemy gained an unaccountable error admittance, unchallenged, through in the picketing the roads on the left."

(Morgan Ext.

May

s

Cavalry, by Duke.)

No. 260.

Orders issued by General Bragg

from Corinth, direct: m. retrograde movement to com

29th, 1862, for retreat 3d.

mence

At 10:00

p.

as already indicated.

4th.

At 12

:00 p. m. rear

guard

to follow the

move

ment. 5th.

will be called in at 9:00 Outposts 1

p.

m., their

outposts

re-

placed by cave infan y

"

places supplied by cavalry.

fry retre at

106

Three rockets

6th.

camp fires kept

the cavalry

at 3 :00 a.

fires will

camp The above orders were ;

m. to be sent up by

be kept up. sent to Col. Joseph Wheeler,

who

entirely misled the Federal forces as to what was confronting them the next day.

cavalry covers the retreat of an

army.

(Campaigns of Wheeler and His Cavalry, p. 7.) Ext. No. 261. During Bragg s retreat from Perry-

.,,,. Wheeler

ville,

,

,,

r

i

cavalry covered the retreat of his army. -,

s

From

Bryantville General Bragg wrote Wheeler: "Your No cav services have been most valuable and brilliant. alry force was ever more handsomely handled army better covered." While covering Bragg

and no s

army

Wheeler s cavalry was engaged in thirty engagements and innumerable skirmishes. (Campaigns of Wheeler and His Cavalry, p. 25.) COMMENTS. .

Outposts should be well out and so arranged that

the advance troops can be promptly supported as trated by the battle of Booneville. (Ext. 219.)

The

evils resulting

illustrated

illus

from the absence of supports are

by extracts 254, 258; while the advantages of

supports are likewise illustrated by extracts 255 and 257. mile from the main body of a division out The

%

If post (Ext. 256) is regarded as altogether too little. the outpost is well out, care should be exercised that by

roads do not enter behind the outpost. (Ext. 259.) Divisional cavalry remains on outpost till the in It should then be brought fantry outposts are posted. in

If this is not done, the behind the infantry lines. all be rendered unserviceable by excessive

horses will

work

a very short time.

in

Only enough should be

left

out to do the patrolling in front of the infantry outpost The divisional cavalry may be sent out again early in the

up the duties of the infantry while the withdrawn. (Ext. 260.)

morning latter is

to take

107

FLA.NK GUARD. Ext. No. 262.

The 22d N. Y. Mounted

of were Flank guard column. infantry nanry coumn. detailed to guard the flank of the infantry and were re- Brpeditio* tained on duty with the infantry till the expedition re- R Dec 7 12 1864

Rifles

-

-

->

turned.

(Bvt. Brig. Gen. C. H. Smith, R. R., Vol. 42, Part

649.)

I, p.

Ext. No. 263.

During this movement his rear and cavalry acts as a were covered by Stuart s cavalry, and he received ?SSd tod Jackcorrect information concerning the Federal forces, which ^MMMBM, Aug. were now rapidly concentrating upon him. flanks

(Jackson s retirement from, Manassas Aug. 2d, Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart,

1862. p.

103.)

No. 264. During the engagement, Colonel cavalry P rotects the flank of ,i e with a portion of his command, Asnby, including Chew s infantry during battery, which rendered valuable service, remained on Kerartowi, Y*., our right, and not only protected our rear in the Ext.

A

11

i

vicinity

of the Valley turnpike, but also served to threaten the enemy s front and left. Colonel Ashby fully sustained his

deservedly high reputation by the able manner in which he discharged the important trust confided to him. (Maj. Genl. T. J. Jackson, C. S., R. R., Vol. 12,

Parti,

p.

383.)

Ext. No. 265.

In

countries

infected

with guer-

and bushwhackers, flankers will have to be used scour the country and beat them up on the flank. rillas

(Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of a Decade,

p.

91.)

COMMENTS. will

Flftnk

to buthwnacktr 8 up

The use of cavalry as a flank guard for other troops most frequently ocur while on the march. (Exts.

262, 263, 273.) In battle, cavalry will frequently be found on the flank of infantry either as a support or as a part of the firing line. (Exts. 264, 272.)

108

CONVOYING RAILROAD TRAINS. Guarding

Ext. No. 266.

the

Trains are

run

to

and from the

rear of

Sherman

army

tront in sections under convoy. One follows another as against close as may be, so as to be able to assist each other in

airy.

s

.

case of attack.

Each

train or section has a strong

guard

;

when

forces are combined quite an army can be organ ized on the roadside for the defense of the cars. At any All rate, no mere guerrilla force can capture a train. the bridges are stockaded and the towns fortified, so that a run of a few miles brings a train into a place of com

parative safety.

(Campaigns of Wheeler and His Cavalry, No. 267.

Ext.

position of the dur- j ing an advance, danger

commaader

Again,

at

the

,

.

265.)

,

.

btuart was always present. with his advance guard and was ever ready to seize and

improve an opportunity. (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. p. Active cavalry plays the mis- r^. chief with the

communications

p.

time and place of He habitually rode

J.

E. B. Stuart,

164.)

Ext. No. 268. -..-..

February

2,

1863,

-r-^

The Honorable E. M. Stanton. * * * One rebel cavalryman takes on an average

three of

our infantry to watch our communications, while our progress is made slow and cautious, and we command the forage of the country only by sending large train * * *

guards.

(Sig.) W. S. ROSECRANS, Maj. Gen. (Campaigns of Wheeler and His Cavalry, p. 78.)

COMMENTS.

The annoyance caused by munications

is

cavalry to a line of com illustrated in extract 268, where Rose-

crans states that one cavalryman takes three infantrymen to watch his line of communications. Extract 266 also verifies this statement.

If the total

number of men who

were watching Sherman s line of communications while at Atlanta were known it would probable be more than three infantrymen to each cavalryman.

109

WEAKNESS OF A FLANK. Ext. No. 269.

At

Wickham

the court house

s

brig-

^

akncss of a

fla

ade was struck in the flank by a gallant charge and scattered in

all

(Brig. Genl. p.

s,i864.

directions. J.

H. Wilson, R.

R., Vol. 36,

Part

I,

878.)

Ext. Nb. 270.

about 3 :00

p.

The

m. by a

attack on the

enemy was made ue

of caval

half wheel of the whole line,

left

with a division of cavalry

turning

each flank of the

cedarCreek,va.,

enemy, the whole line advancing. (Maj. Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 43, Part 33.

I, p.

Battle of Winchester or

Ext. No. 271.

Cedar Creek.)

In the affair at Fisher

s

Hill the

cavalry ^ave way, but it was flanked. This could have been remedied if the troops had remained steady, but a

weakness

a flank

P anic

of

causes a -

Fisher va., sept.

s 2-2,

Hill, 1864.

panic seized them at the idea of being flanked, and with out being defeated, they broke, many of them fleeing shamefully. (Lieut. Genl. Jubal A. Early, C. S., R. R., Vol. 43,

Part

I, p.

558.)

Ext. No. 272. As soon as General Gregg was A t aware of Stuart s presence he wisely assumed the aggressive, and forced upon Stuart a battle in which he July gain but the glory of fighting; while Gregg himself had performed the paramount duty of protecting the right flank of the Federal army.

had nothing

to

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. p.

J.

Gettysburg

^

1863<

E. B. Stuart,

341, Gettysburg campaign.)

Ext. No. 273. linas,

1865,

During the campaigns of the Caro- campaign of Sherman used his cavalry to protect his leftc^r^piote^s f

and trains against the Confederate cavalry under shlrman??rmy Wheeler and Hampton.

flank

(R. R., Vol. 57, Part Ext. No. 274.

I.)

This change having been made, a

line of skirmishers displayed

strong enemy was evidence that the enemy s cavalry had gained our right, and were about to attack, with a view of gaining the rear of our line of battle.

by the

The importance of

successfully

stuart

threat-

right* at

Gettysburg, Pa., Jn

110

resisting

an attack

at this point,

which,

if

succeeded in by

the enemy, would have been productive of the most serious consequences, determined me to retain the brigade

of the Third Division until the enemy were driven back. (Brig. Genl. D. McM. Gregg, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p.

956.)

COMMENTS.

is

The great advantages in having cavalry on the flanks here further illustrated. Its great mobility enables it

270 and 271; presence on the flanks will check a turning movement of the hostile cavalry. (Exts. 272, 274.)

to acomplish the results reported in extracts

while

its

SURPRISE. Ext. No. 275.

surprise.

The enemy during

the night, under

Wade Hampton,

taking advantage of the darkness of the night and the inclemency of the weather, it being quite the rainy, moved heavy columns of cavalry through

open pine woods to attacking the

improper out-

our camp, preparatory on the following morn-

to the vicinity of

camp

at daylight

posts.

ing.

At early dawn we were awakened from our slum bers by the deadly missile and fiendish shouts of the rebel cavalry charging into our camp in three different places, rear and both flanks.

individual kjuJuw g a

S C

cross Mar< "

fo! i865

It

was individual bravery

that saved the

day on

this

men

but beoccasion fighting, not in organized bodies, afford that could hind trees, stumps, and anything pro in a state of almost men of the tection. fought Many ;

before nudity, not having had time to dress themselves them. the rebels were upon

(Maj. C. T. Cheek, 5th Ky. Cav., R. Parti, p. 899.) Avoid

encios-

^lar Ft. Brown, Texae,A P r.2V46

.

R., Vol. 47,

Captain Thornton sent his men inside a corral to feed their horses and soon followed himHe f oun(j fa s command suddenly surrounded and gelf Ext. No. 276.

the entire

command was

killed or captured.

(History of U. S. Cavalry, Brackett,

p.

55.)

Ill

COMMENTS. It is

an old military

maxim

that a surprise

is

inex

cusable.

INFORMATION. Ext. No. 277.

The cavalry

that crossed at Seneca

information

Ford have passed on up through Westminster and Hanover some 6,000 to 8,000 strong. The people are all so frightened that accurate information

is

not to be ob-

tained.

(Maj. Genl. G. G. Meade, R.

R., Vol. 27, Part

I,

69.)

p.

Ext. NO. 278.

I T

PTMills *

A model report

c^mander 10:40 p. m. Gettysburg, June 30 8 b g have the honor to state the following facts: A. campaign Jaie

1 1

1863.

1

composed of Anderson, Heth and Pender, is massed back of Cashtown, 9 miles from this pace. His pickets, composed of infantry and in are artillery, There is a road from Cashtown running sight of mine. through Mummasburg and Hunterstown on to York pike at Oxford, which is terribly infested with roving .

corps,

cavalry detachments. Rumor says Ewell is coming over the mountains from Carlisle. One of his escort was cap tured today near He says Rodes, com Heidlersburg. manding a division of Swell s, has already crossed the

mountains from

Carlisle.

When

will the reserve be re

and where are

my wagons? I have no need of can find no forage. I have kept General them, Reynolds informed of all that has transpired. The in lieved,

as

closed I

is

I

in reply to

my

last dispatch.

am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, JNO. BUFORD,

To

Brigadier-General of Volunteers. General Alfred Pleasonton. (R. R., Vol. 27, Parti,

p. 924.) Truthful but entered this place at 11 a. m. to- inexperienced - ^ HI 6 G GXftggGrfttG Found everybody in a terrible state of excitement day. fnemTwh^nf on account of the enemy s advance this HeSSSmSSt" T? AT 0*7 o A r^xi. JNO. Z/5A. 4-

T 1

4

upon place. had approached within half a mile of the town when

112 the head of

my column

entered.

His force was

terribly

exaggerated by reasonable and truthful but inexperienced men. On pushing him back toward Cashtown, I learned

from reliable men that Anderson s division was march ing from Chambersburg, by Mummasburg, Abbottstown, on toward York. (Genl. Jno. Buford, R. R., Vol. 27, Part

B Ala oet 28!i863?

I, p.

Stuart

s

S??*?

of

S.

General e

8 b

janl,

:30 p. m. today I discovered

command

D. Lee, C.

S.,

is

following closely. R. R., Vol. 31, Part

No

report had been received that had crossed the Potomac, and the ab-

^ie Federal Army

sence of the cavalry rendered * * * curate information.

f

concenTration.

1

923.)

29.)

Ext. Nfo. 280.

cavalry

campaign,

My

tne en eniy retiring.

(Maj. Genl. Absence

About

Ext. No. 279.

Keeping touch.

I, p.

the Federal

Army was

it

impossible to obtain acBy the route he pursued,

interposed between his

command

and our main body, preventing any communication with him until his arrival at Carlisle. The march toward Gettysburg was conducted more slowly than it would have been had the movements of the Federal Army been

known. (General R. E. Lee, R. R., Vol. 27, Part

II, p.

307.)

SPIES.

A spy from the enemy, who came after soon my arrival, was killed by my camp

Ext. No. 281.

Execution of a

into

my

order.

(Brig. Genl. I,

uee spies.

of

false

p.

Wm. W.

Averell, R. R., Vol. 37, Part

147.)

^ xt ^

Sheridan suspected two of

^^*

his spies

O f playing double. He had them shadowed and found his Instead of letting them know suspicions to be correct.

1

that he

was aware of

their treachery he utilized their

services to give false information to the enemy.

(See Sheridan

s

Memoirs, Vol.

11, p. 109.)

113 SCOUTS.

Ext. No. 283.

mounted, leave saber live off the country.

Scouts should go in pairs, well scout organiza tion necessary, and packs with baggage train, and

A

well organized scout organization should be kept at headquarters. They should not dress in the enemy s uniform, Horses should be (p. 85.)

shod with rubber pad shoes. (Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of a Decade,

p.

86.)

Ext. No. 284.

To

General Garfield.

General Crittenden wishes to

know

if

you intend to

couriers or re

establish a line of couriers between department head and his own at Shellmound. * * *

quarters

(Sig.) J. J. McCooK, Aide de Vol. 30, Part III, p. 348.) (R. R.,

Camp.

Ext. No. 285. I at once prepared to establish a line Line ie: of couriers to Loudon and Kingston, and the 5th Ohio

of

cour-

Cavalry was assigned to that duty. (General Eli Long, Comg. 2d Brig., R. R., Vol. 31, Part II, p. 563.)

COMMENTS. This shows that the use of relay posts is not entirely a German idea, but was used in our Civil War.

At this moment (4:00 p. m.) I restrength of ceived information from Colonel Garrard that the enemy ^TmelaSto was crossing infantry at Fain s Island Ford and that an point. & given Ext. No. 286.

of his command had watched them wading the Pain s island Ford, Tenn., Jan. r stream for more than an hour, estimating the force at 28 1864 officer

-

three brigades.

(Brig. Genl. S. D. Sturgis, R. R., Vol. 32, Part P-

I,

1370 Ext. No. 287.

Headquarters

Army

of the Potomac.

June 28, Maj. Genl. H.

W.

18634:45 p.m.

Halleck, General-in-Chief.

The following statement has been furnished me.

It

confirmed by information gathered from various other sources regarded as reliable.

is

114 I

propose to move

this

army tomorrow

in the di

rection of York.

GEO. G. MEADE, Major General.

Thomas McCammon,

illustrates the of valu-

amount that

^STe

n e( zln s

if

1

0^-

Hagerstown,

left there

the/Ko Rebel cavalry came

first

blacksmith, a good man, from

on horseback a week ago

m. today. Monday. Gen-

at 11 a.

last

Jenkins having 1,200 mounted infantry, said to be ^ked from Jackson s men, and 300 or 400 cavalry of m s own. The cavalry went back and forth, out of Penn eral

paign i863

June<

sylvania, driving horses came yesterday a week

and ago

cattle,

and the

first

General Ewell

s

infantry

men.

He

last Saturday, and was at the Catholic church Sunday, with General Rodes and two other gen On Monday he left in the direction of Greenerals.

came personally

same or morning. Rebel troops have passed every day, more a or or four three some since brig regiments days less, all of Longade, and some days, yesterday, for instance, street s command passed through excepting two brigades. Saw Longstreet yesterday. He and Lee had their head the town limits, quarters at Mr. Grove s, just beyond left there this a. m. and toward Greencastle, last night, Think A. P. Hill went through last Tues at 8 o clock. Heard from J. D. Roman, prominent lawyer and the afternoon,

in

castle,

Rodes

having

left

the

;

day.

leading Confederate sympathizer, the clerk

s

office last

who was

talking in

re night; said that their officers

now in Mary ported their whole army, 100,000 strong, the land or Pennsylvania, excepting cavalry. Mr. Logan, register of wills,

and Mr. Protzman, very

fine

men

in

and Hagerstown, have taken pains to count the rebels, make them over 80,000. They counted the ar made it 275 guns. Some of the regiments have

could not tillery;

men two that I saw, 150. Largest regiment saw was a Maryland regiment, and that was about Don t think their regiments would range 400. Great

only 175 that

700.

I

amount of transportation; great many wagons captured Horses in good condition. Ewell rides at Winchester. in a wagon. 2,000 comprise the mounted infantry and

115

Saw Wilcox s brigade wagons yesterday or day Saw Kershaw s wagons in town yesterday.

cavalry.

before.

Kershaw

s

brigade

in

is

corps.

Know Hood

through

Hood

s

McLaw

division, Longstreet s

s

and Armistead. Have passed division and Armistead s brigade. Pick-

Longstreet s corps. The Union men Hagerstown would count them, and meet tonight. Of ficers and men in good condition; say they are going to Lots of Confederate money; carry it in Philadelphia. ett s division is in

in

and give $5 for cleaning a horse; $5 for two shoes on a horse, rather than 50 cents United States

flour barrels,

money. (R.

R,

Vol. 27, Part

Ext. No. 288. i

1

unobserved.

I, p.

Stuart

s

T

>~

65.)

march was 1 12th 1

Captain 1 Logan,

charge of the pickets in the

vicinity,

not,

/-

-MI 111.

i

Cav.,

however,

who

March Stuart

s

of column

had observed three

for

and one-

halfhours

was apprised bv a Chambersburg enemy was Raid. Oct. 1862. -

citizen as early as half past 5 o clock that the

crossing at McCoy s Ferry, and he immediately moved out his reserve to support of his interior pickets, who had

been attacked but not surprised. servation of Stuart

s

column

until

He

remained

9 o clock

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. p.

J.

a.

in

ob

m.

E. B. Stuart,

139.)

Ext. No. 289. Climbing a tree, about 7 p. m., Forsought to satisfy himself of the situation, and discovered the enemy in a disordered retreat into Chatta

important

rest

nooga, which lay in full view beneath him, a scene of wild chaos and tumult. This state of affairs was immediately

Reportmade to

ff e communicated, in written dispatches, both to Generals PTr?o ?s at the Bragg and Polk. n a r

-^

(Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest

s

Cavalry, p.f863.

ge

Sept

y

21>

351.)

Ext. No. 290.

Marching by

roads

unfrequently

information of

traversed and bridle paths, he would have kept his mo.1 by the blowing of r tions perfectly secret but for a system of communicating horns. intelligence adopted about this time by the Home Guards ,

,.

,.

.

.

of southern Kentucky. Conch shells and horns were blown along his route by these fellows, the sound of

116

which, transmitted a long distance, traveled faster than his column.

(Morgan wthout

i>

t

e? ng to

T Fi ih er 8 ?-,

Hiii,

sept. 22, is*:

Cavalry, by Duke.)

Ext No 291. withdraw from -

a C

s

it

was

his intention

front,

and

this,

learned that

I

-

the

enemy

s

too,

on

tne indefinite report of a signal officer that a "brigade or division" of Confederates was turning his right flank, and that he had not seriously attempted to verify the in

formation.

(Sheridan Boldness scouting ca

of parties

ence o1 ^firge

Movement

^ ^^

w the

to 1864.

James, June,

s

Memoirs, Vol.

Ext. Nb. 292.

j t ]1

II, p.

43.)

the evening and night of

During

boldness of the

enemy

which we had been coming

s

scouting parties, more or less

in collision

every day, perceptibly increased, thus indicating the pres ence of a large force, and thus evidencing that his shorter

march had enabled him

line of

to bring to

my

front a

strong body of cavalry.

(Sheridan D

n p -

8p 8

ca i t S red

di s

s

Memoirs, Vol.

I,

p.

419.)

On

April 4, 1865, Sheridan captured a dispatch. signed by Lee s Commissary General, which he forwarded to

its

destination.

As

a result of this dispatch several

were sent as ordered and captured by on the lookout for them. The fol who was Sheridan, lowing is the dispatch with Sheridan s comments trains of rations

:

Ration return a basis for an e

?ney

s

st?ength

Pursuit D a t T e oi rorks, Apr.

after

five

i

i,

65.

Ext.

No. 293.

"The

House, short of provisions. l

to Burkville Junction. y *

Army

is

at

Amelia Court

Send 300,000 rations quick-

1

There was thus revealed not only the important fact that Lee was concentrating at Amelia Court House, but also a trustworthy basis for estimating his troops.

(Sheridan important

s

Memoirs, Vol.

Ext. No. 294.

dis-

It

2, p.

175.)

was of the utmost importance

8

Ee sent in dupiicate.

After battle of

Waynesboro, Va., Mar. 2, 1865.

that General Grant should receive these dispatches with-

out chance of failure, in order that

I

might depend abso.

on securing supplies at the White House there fore I sent the message in duplicate, one copy overland direct to City Point by two scouts, and the other down

lutely

the

;

James River (Sheridan

s

in a small boat.

Memoirs, Vol.

II, p.

120.)

117

COMMENTS.

The information

obtained from independent cavalry by strategic reconnaissance is much more accurate and valuable than that obtained from civilians. The former will be trained military observers (Ext. latter,

under

278), while the

stress of excitement, will either not

terribly exaggerate.

(Exts. 277, 278A.)

know

or

Occasionally

found who, in a systematic the about matter of way, go observing an enemy passing a town and succeed in getting a report to the through intelligent citizens will be

This extract general of their own forces. (Ext. 287.) is a fine illustration as to what be accomplished by may It will be noted, however, that Gen Meade was careful to verify it from, other sources. The information obtained from spies will be more

intelligent civilians. eral

or less valuable, depending upon the reliability of the spy, his intelligence

and opportunity for observation.

Even

a spy that plays double

A

may be utilized. (Ext. 282.) well organized scout system should be maintained

in every

All officers should be army. (Ext. 283.) trained in the matter of estimating the number of troops seen. (Exts. 286, 288.) Autumn maneuvers furnish an excellent opportunity to

make

application of this valuable of officers should be detailed

A

number accomplishment. daily to observe and report on the number of troops seen. It is desirable to send important duplicate reports

Each report should mention the

to different superiors.

fact that a duplicate one has been sent to the other su perior.

A

(Exts. 289, 294.) novel method of communicating information

is

illustrated in extract 290.

A

commander who

out seeking to verify

it

hastily acts will

on information with

usually

make a

mistake.

(Ext. 291.)

always be necessary to have at headquarters a bureau of information, where different reports can be compared and conclusions drawn from the multitude of It will

reports received.

(Exts. 287, 292, 293.)

118

The absence of information is as much of a handi commander as the possession of it is an advan cap to a

Had Stuart s cavalry been present (Ext. 280.) at Gettysburg to furnish Lee with information, the field would have been in Lee s possession instead of in

tage.

(Ext. 280.) Lee then could have fought a de fensive battle, which he was never known to lose. When contact is gained the cavalry should not again

Meade

lose

s.

(Ext. 279.)

it.

STRATEGIC USE OF CAVALRY.

My command

Ext. No. 295.

keepa

stuart

has been fighting al* * General Bu-

*

most constantly for four days. movl ford sent a party to the top of the Blue Ridge, that saw Lee s a rebel camp about two miles long on the Shenanaoan,

r

of of

days,

ment

se eg c s tr ust J a n d 8cre e ni ng.

"

below Ashby

s

Ga Pmake

,

,

,

army.

The atmosphere was so hazy out anything more beyond.

Gettysburg tha t they could not (General A. Pleasonton, R. R., Vol. 27, Part

p.

I,

913.) strategic use. h Cam a

During the

Ext. No. 296.

entire

movement

(

Sher-

"

P ?gi i8M

man

march kept formed of the strength and all to the sea)

s

my

superiors fully in

the

movements of the

I

enemy. (General

How a river

to

of

strategy.

S.,

R. R., Vol. 44,

9, 1863.

411.)

p.

his dispositions at BevExt. No. 297. Regarding _ n^.u An erlev Ford, Brandy Station, or Fleetwood, June ytn, * good 1, 1353 General Stuart says: "On a field geographically

Fleetwood. Va.,

June

Wheeler, C.

defend

line.

example

J.

IT

-

,

,

.

,

,

wooded, presenting to the enemy so many avenues of approach, I deemed it inju so extensive, and

much

dicious to separate

guard

all

of

it

my command

into

detachments to

the approaches, as in such case the

enemy could

concentrate upon any one and, overwhelming it, take the * * * I conceived it to be my policy others in detail. concentrated, except sufficient to watch and delay the enemy as to his real move, and then

to keep

strike

my command

him with my whole

(General

Part

II, p.

J.

681.)

force."

E. B. Stuart, C.

S.,

R. R., Vol. 27,

119

Ext. No. 298.

About midnight

I

received a com-

strategic ob3e

obtain early information of the JJ,** tetj Va a paign enemy s movements in the direction of Sperryville. Agree- i 8 6 ably to my orders, Colonel Gregg, commanding 2d Brig

munication asking that

I

Oct>

informa 2d Brigade to move to the east side of the Rappahannock, leaving one regiment on the west side to be in a position to support the 1st Maine should ade, sent one regiment to obtain the required

tion.

it

I

directed the

be compelled to return. (D. McM. Gregg, R. R., Vol. 29, Part Ext. No. 299.

I, p.

356.)

Believing- this attack of the

enemy,

A

fine illustra

tion of strategic

who had shown only cavalry and artillery, was but a ue of cavalry. James City, Va., f f T ^ cover of the movement of other troops, I ordered Gen- Oct. 10, ises. .

eral if

1

,

1

Davis to make an attack from his right and discover,

possible, the

movements of

the enemy.

The

attack

was made and the enemy s cavalry was driven back three miles and a heavy column of infantry and a large wagon train discovered to be moving in the direction of Woodville.

(Kilpatrick, R. R., Vol. 29, Part

Ext. No. 300.

By

I,

p.

381.)

watchfulness and great activity, J

successful strategic use.

good judgment on the part of General Hatch, every movement of the enemy and indication of his intention

Florence

A

i

a

.,

were promptly reported to Generals Stanley, Schofield and Thomas. (Maj. Genl. J. H. Wilson, R. R., Vol. 45, Part I, p.

556.)

Colonel Coon s brigade made a Reconnaissance Ext. No. 301. in force disclose* in ~ forced reconnaissance, met the enemy s cavalry in force, fJn tre y and after a severe engagement, discovering the march of A1 h 5j CiJ eis^ the rebel infantry, was compelled to join the main force .

nemy>8

on the east side of the creek. (Maj. Genl. J. H. Wilson, R. p.

R., Vol. 45, Part

I,

557.)

The question then arose in my mind should pursue my course on to Lynchburg, leaving General Early in my rear, or to go out and fight him with my cavalry against his infantry and what cavExt. No. 302.

whether

mcavalry

fights

I

n

^ Cleave *arle **

120

Expedition

a ^ r y he could collect, defeat him,

to

Va>

and open a way through in my own hands

Rock Fish Gap, and have everything

M*ri865?

for the accomplishment of that portion of my instruc tions which directed the destruction of the Central Rail

road and the James River Canal. I decided upon the latter course.

(Maj. Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. I,

Stuart

s

p.

strateg?/ success.

476.) Ext. No. 303.

chick-

Part

R., Vol. 46,

June

11,

1862, General

B.

E.

J.

men and horses make a "scout move

Stuart was ordered to take only such as could stand the expedition and ment" to the rear of McClellan s -

Successful raid conn- etc., increases dence in com-

army with

a view of

intelligence of his operations, communications, ,

,

.

-

...

.,

soon as the object of the expedition /~n mander, and was accomplished. This was known as the Chickahominy morale of nis command. The results following were increased morale of Raid. Has a

depressing effect on the

enemy.

Chickahominy Raid, jaoe

i2-i5,

and

to return as

1

i

the Confederate cavalry; loss in confidence in McClellan; accurate information as to the location of the Federal

army, and incidentally the capture of 165 prisoners, 260 _ horses, destruction of two schooners and seventy-five

wagons. (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. p. Confederate cav alry.

Chancellorsville

campaign, April,

E. B. Stuart,

52.)

Ext. No. 304.

strategic use of

J.

The

General Lee reports:

cavalry

of the army, at the time of these operations, was much j reduced. To its vigilance and energy we were indebted ,

i

,

for timely information of the enemy s movements before the battle, and for impeding his march to Chancellors ville."

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. p.

same

staff officer

make

re-

Hidden

in

the woods,

Stuart re

enemy for a long time. Satisfied that he was witnessing the movement of a large of his part Q Meade s armv S tuart sent Major Vcnable, sta ^ to conve y tm s information to General Lee. mained

sent to

E. B. Stuart,

228.)

Ext. No. 305.

as above.

J.

in

observation of the

>

,

6

sb

junf

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. p.

392.)

J.

E. B. Stuart,

121

Ext. No. 306.

Cavalry that

sticks

close to the

must be employed on Army distant expeditions to cut the enemy s lines, to be worth For its full strategical its cost in strategic combinations. effect cavalry is obliged to live on the country after the loses half its strength.

first

It

three days.

(Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade,

p.

63.)

COMMENTS. Cavalry operating strategically will be on the offen sive and a considerable distance from its main body, while the opposing cavalry will be defensively screening its

own

in

which

Extract 295 well illustrates this matter, appears that Pleasonton s cavalry fought

forces. it

Stuart s for four days and then only succeeded in slipping a small strategic patrol through, which observed and re ported the Confederate camp.

Cavalry operating strategically will endeavor to break through the enemy s screen and observe the num bers and dispositions of the

enemy and what they are

doing.

Cavalry can be screening defensively, and, while using good strategy, will not be strategically used. ( Ext. 297.) Cavalry performing a defensive role may take the

A

offensive and thus be used strategically. (Ext. 299.) forced reconnaissance amounts to a strategic use. (Ext.

301.)

The

strategic use will require great activity,

fulness and

watch

good judgment on the part of the command

er.

(Exts. 296, 300.) Tactical use may also involve the use of strategy. Here Sheridan concluded to fight the (Ext. 302.)

enemy

A

infantry rather than leave it in his rear. successful raid may be merged with strategic use

s

depending upon the object of the raid. (Ext. 303.) In the reference quoted, other important results followed

which were unforeseen; such as the increased morale of the raiders, etc.

While cavalry

strategically used

effect

may

on the enemy, not get

all

the

Theoretical 81

122

information desired,

it

may

assist the

commander

s

plans

so as to produce great tactical results. (Ext. 304.) When cavalry, on a strategic mission, obtains val

uable information, a staff officer should be sent with the

commanding

general.

it

to

The messenger will then be and make explanations, thus

answer questions elucidating matters which would otherwise remain ob able to

scure to the

For

commanding

its full

(Ext. 205.) cavalry will be employed

general.

strategic effect,

on distant expeditions and be obliged to (Ext. 306.) When war fore be well organized at its

try.

is

live

declared

it

on

the coun

should there

war strength and ready

to

move on very short notice. Skeleton organization or war inflation will deprive cavalry of its mobility and therefore its strategical importance at a time when it is most needed.

123

CHAPTER VIII. MISCELLANEOUS USE OF CAVALRY. CONSTRUCTION

BRIDGES Ext. No. 307.

would be necessary stream running 60

Forrest

General

OF.

learned

that

improvised Hickahala Creek, a deep from tel poles and the He floor of neigh feet broad, with full banks. it

to bridge

boring mills.

spread detachments about to collect lumber from the cot- Bridge 60 feet long made^in 60 ton-gm floors, which they carried four miles on their minutes. .

shoulders.

At

cable

found a narrow flatboat Memphis,

the creek they

about 20 feet long.

Aug.*

Out of grapevines a strong twisted

was made and fastened

to a tree

on each side of

They cut down dry cedar telegraph poles and fastened them together with grapevines for floating These were attached to the grapevine cable with piers.

the river.

grapevines and the flatboat was attached likewise in the center as a pontoon. Telegraph poles were used for balks and on these the flooring placed.

from the gin

The bridge was completed

mills

in sixty minutes.

command began crossing at once in column men leading their horses, and the artillery,

was The

of twos, the

unlimbered,

was taken over by hand. Six miles beyond, Cold Water River, twice as wide, was crossed in the same way. The bridge over the latter stream was constructed in less than three hours.

(Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest p.

s

Cavalry,

535.)

was found on examination that Mountedtroo the railroad bridge at the White House had been but Cards iom su?n Sf Sake partially burned, and could be repaired, and General Her- t?y railway bridge j, ^1 1ntt was at once put on this duty. By sending mounted passable for cavExt. No. 308.

It

.

1

j

1

parties through the surrounding country, each man bringing back a board, it was made passable in one day.

Rapidan es S<3.

to the

Apr Augl "

124 (Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 36, Part

I,

p.

792.)

Today we built a novel bridge over Our artillery had mired down and r^ TT for the column to ford. General Upton

Ext. No. 309.

improvised

one of the creeks. and fence

rails.

.

.

it

1iri

was impossible

.

r

i

ordered every trooper to carry a fence

1

rail

on

j.

his shoul

and when we came to the crossing we found a couple of caissons in midstream, for a foundation, and on them rested two forked pine trees for piers, across which ran der,

saplings for stringers; every man threw his fence rail for a flooring, and, swaying and swinging, the command

crossed the rude bridge.

(The Last Campaign, by E. N.

Gilpin, published in

the Cavalry Journal.)

Ext. No. 310.

Bridge bunt of

We

Mud

crossed

River that night bottom boats laid

on a bridge constructed of three flat endwise, tightly bound together and propped, where the water was deep, by beams passing under the bottom of each one and resting on the end of the next; each re ceiving this sort of support, they mutually braced each Planks were placed across the intervals between

other.

the boats and the

wagons and The bridge was

horses,

crossed without trouble.

artillery

built in

were about

two hours.

(Morgan eers.

s

Cavalry, by Duke.)

Ext. No. 311.

cavalry are their own pion-

immediately made a heavy detail

I

rom

the 2d

Iowa Cavalry

Hatchie, which the 7th

Aia.??cF. iJ$L

.

.

f ln

111.

,

,

.

,

,

to finish a bridge across the

Cav. had been sent in advance

to construct.

(Col. D. E. Coon, 2d la. Cav., R. R., Vol. 45, Part I,

580.)

p.

Ext. 312.

At night cav-

Col.

Chapman

reached the Chickahominy

expecting to find the bridges ready for him to cross. The officer in charge of the pontoons , Tr .. _, seemed somewhat timid. General Warren, commanding

fiTaceoTflre^d just after dark, d 8 e

&de wEi!e

ii>n

toneers construct

abridge.

.

^, the

5th Corps,

.

-

would give him no

assistance.

Colonel

Chapman was therefore compelled to take the matter in The stream at this place divided into two branches,

hand.

125 in the center, and was unfordleaving a small island Colonel Chapman dismounted the 22d N. Y. and able. 3d Ind. The former pushed along the stream to a point

of the old bridge, and by means of fallen trees and overhanging limbs succeeded in The 3d Ind., launching a pontoon, getting across. face of a sharp fire from the enemy, in the across pushed of the stream in a line of rifle bank south the posted on at the rebels, driving pits hastily formed, and dashed them in confusion from the works. Nothing could have

about 50 yards above the

site

been more steady and dashing than the conduct of these

two regiments. The night was very dark, the difficulties to be overcome by no means trifling, and the enemy s not re strength entirely uncertain. The whole affair did soon was the hour constructed, half an over bridge quire and by midnight the entire brigade had crossed. (Brig. Genl. J. H. Wilson, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, ;

p.

883.)

was ordered to bridge the river Bridge bunt from scows and r if possible. This I effected by means of scows or ferry- piank. a ig&. boats, lashed together, anchored, and covered with lum- May Ext. No. 313.

I

3,

ber procured by tearing

down

the store-houses of the

The bridge was amply

ferry.

sufficient

to

cross the

corps.

(Col. T. C. Devin, 6th N. Y. Cav., R. R., Vol. 36,

Parti,

p.

836.)

Ext. No. 314.

make

The 17th Cavalry was detached

a demonstration

as

if

we

to

intended to cross at

cavalry

and hold

force cross-

ening while gineers construct

Iwo canvas pontoon boats were put upp ntoon Perry. . Rapidan to the the beyond range of the enemy s guns, and then taken to James, Apr., 1864. the river banks by the engineers, preceded by a regiment Jones

-

,

brigade, who drove the enemy from the op posite bank, while the boats were put in the river and

of Custer

s

two squadrons dismounted ferried over at once and held the opposite bank till the pontoon bridge was laid. (Brig. Genl. A. T. A. Torbert, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I,

p.

804.)

126

Selma was taken April 2d, 1865. were ordered to be constructed in the 3d pontoons _ bama River, April assistwithout city shops. April 6th canvas pontoon tram under Major ance of

cavalry 7 ge ?ong ove r

Ext. No. 315.

make

Aia-

6

three

.

.

Major Hubbard was ordered to begin the construction of a bridge over the Alabama River. April 8th the bridge was completed. It consisted of 30 canvas pontoons, 16 wooden pontoons made in the

Hubbard

pieted in

_.

,

.

engineers

arrived.

and 3 barges. General Wilson states that the was 870 feet long. Major Hubbard states that bridge the bridge was 700 feet long. Forty-nine boats would bridge 50 bays, which at 17J/2 feet each would make a

city shops,

the bridge 875 feet long. By reason of strong current It was crossed. while a bridge was broken twice with being p ?8ai threeVays repaired and on April 10th the three cavalry divisions, while the bridge d had crossed consisting of I/, 000 men, and all equippage val r y

7 00 cro 88

ii

.

.

d*

Wilson

s

Raid,

A

Rate of crossing pontoon 27 men per minute or two miles per hour. Wilson s Raid, Apr.,i865.

The bridge was

bridge was dismantled.

ancl the

con-

structed by cavalry.

(Major Hubbard, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 412, and Maj. Genl. J. H. Wilson, p. 362.) Ext. No. 316. April 8th, at 4:10 p. m., I com the Alabama River on the pontoon nienced crossing: bridge (870 feet loner) which had that moment been i-k

1

,

.

oc

.

7 :Z5 completed, and had the entire division across by to had the that fact the crossing p. m., notwithstanding done of in be stopped three times damage consequence

by driftwood. The division consisted of about 5,500 men. The rate of crossing was 27 or 28 men per minute, or about two miles per hour. to the bridge

(Col. R.

Parti,

p.

H. G. Minty,

Com

d.

Div., R. R., Vol. 49,

442.)

COMMENTS. In these extracts

must

be.

we

see

how

resourceful cavalry streams and other

We find them bridging wide

pioneer work. The pioneer work can naturally belongs to cavalry. To be sure, engineers do it, but they are seldom in the right place at the right

wise doing their

time for cavalry. cavalry, as

it

own

If this

work

is

going to

did, then cavalry should have

fall

men

to the

regu-

127

and organized to larly trained cavalry will be found men who

In the volunteer it. can be collected into an

do

Wilson s in 1865. improvised pioneer detachment, as was has a mounted detach (Ext. 315.) The Engineer Corps

ment for the purpose of accompanying cavalry troops. their They are numerically so small, and in time of war would be in such demand for other duties, that the pioneer work would again, just as it did during the services

War

the cavalry service. the cavalry pioneer organization, then, ought to be in not in the engineers. fall to

of the Rebellion,

The and

USE OF CAVALRY TO STOP ROUTED INFANTRY.

The

5th U. S. Cavalry, attached to ,. j division headquarters, was immediately deployed across the fields, and, together with the officers and orderlies of

Ext. No. 317.

,

,

i

,

Cavalry used to routed in-

stop

fantry. S

r

(ceda?cre ek% ct: 19 1864

much to prevent the infantry go forced everyone to stop and form ing to the rear, and staff,

did

(Brig. Genl.

W.

the division

line.

p.

Merritt, R.

R., Vol.

43,

Part

I,

449.) Ext. No. 318.

I

found large numbers of the

in-

Routed troops j checked by use of the saber and

j

fantry retiring this point,

by

it

companies, checked the rout at

regiments,

With some

stragglers.

squads and

difficulty I

being necessary

.

cedar creek, va. Oct. 19,1864.

in several instances to fire

on the crowds retiring and to use the saber frequently. (Brig. Genl. Thos. C. Devin, R. R., Vol. 43, Part

478.)

I, p.

Ext. No. airy force, -n^t

31-9.

from 300 t-

On to

the 8th instant a Federal cav-

400 strong, landed r

f

cavalry used as

at Greenville, c

ici

i nd ian Bayon, j Miss.. June 8, 1864.

This force consisted of four companies of land sent up from Vicksburg, the rest were cavalry cavalry" Miss.

of the marine boats, and the raid was under General Ellet of the Marines.

(Captain Perry Evans, 9th Tex. Cav., R. R., Vol. Part I, p. 232.) 39, Ext. No. 320.

The nature

of the battle was such

cavalry could not be used in front; I therefore formed ours into line in rear to stop stragglers of

that

cry

128

Tenn.,

whom

When

there were many.

would be enough had recovered from their fright, they would be sent to reinforce some part of the line which needed support, without regard to

make a show, and

of them to

there

after they

their companies, regiments or brigades.

(Memoirs of General U.

S. Grant, Vol.

I, p.

344.)

SWIMMING STREAMS. Regiment

River.

Meridian Expe dition, Jan., 1864.

The

Ext. No. 321.

swims Tennesee

swam

and

their horses,

larger portion of lost several horses,

myJ

regiment

some arms,

but no men.

Shanks, 7th Ind. Cav., across the Tennessee River, Jan. 25, 1864, R. R., Vol. 32, Part I, (Col. J. P. C.

p.

Brownlow performed one of

Ext. No. 322.

Naked men 8

272.) his

r

I ordered only guns and characteristic feats today. ammunition. cross at Cochran s Ford. It was deep, jane 9, 1864.

a detachment to

and he took them

nothing but guns, cartridge boxes and hats. drove the enemy out of their rifle pits, captured a

over naked

They

;

non-commissioned

officer

boats on the other side.

and three men, and the two They would have got more, but

the rebels had the advantage in running through the bushes with clothes on. It was certainly one of the fun niest sights of the war,

naked men

(Brig. Genl. E. II, a Va y C riye r af ni gTt a

P iTnt"n 01 **

p.

and a very successful raid for

make.

to

M. McCook,

R. R., Vol. 38, Part

761.)

Ext

-

No

-

323.

muddy, they had

to

The river being very deep and swim the horses. It being very dark,

could only be done by the aid of boats or canoes; three of the latter were found on the opposite shore. The canoes were laden with arms and equipments and it

placed in each, who guided the horses across. Daylight the next morning found them (283 men) com paratively safe upon the north bank of the river. three

men

(Lieut. Col. II, p.

784.)

H.

P.

Lampson, R.

R., Vol. 38,

Part

129

No. 324.

Ext.

Two

of

Capehart

s

TWO

(regiments) 8

swam

the river above the bridge, charged Rosser and

routed him.

(Maj. Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R.

R., Vol. 46,

Part

^

regiments ve

"

e a n d oah River, Mar. 1,1865.

I,

475.)

p.

The dismounted men and

Ext. No. 325.

Dismounted prisoners men cross swift stream m groups forded the stream in groups or sixty, holding: r of fifty J J & by locking arms each other by the arm. It was impossible for a single footman to ford, the water being breast high, with a f

,

.

,

.

..

rapid current. (Col.

Part

I, p.

J.

L.

Thompson, N. H. Cav., R.

R., Vol. 46,

529.)

We reached JJohnson s FerryJ at sun- crosses cavalry brigade large river down. I ordered the 8th Iowa to begin crossing at ona and at sundown the next day the whole command (65 officers and 1,734 men) was west of the Black Warrior Ext. No. 326.

men with their equipments crossing in a single and the horses swimming, losing only two or

River, the flatboat three.

(Brig. Genl. p.

J.

T. Croxton, R. R., Vol. 49, Part

I,

421.)

Ext. No. 327. T?

April 15th began crossing Sipsey

cavalry Sade

crosses

bri-

in

11 two da ys at two rork at r* Calloway s and Lindsays Ferries, having & no crossings with means of crossing men and equipments but in canoes and i

1

t

-r

.

the horses by ty.

1

i

were over

65

T. Croxton, R. R., Vol. 49, Part

I,

April

1

all

\

and 1,734 men).

officers

(Brig. Genl. p.

7th

(

swimming. T>A

J.

in

Wilson s Raid, A P r.i5,i865.

423.)

Ext. No. 328.

mained ,

to

facilitate

Enough the

debris of the old bridge re- cavalry cross of another. As^mmingTjy

construction

their side.

,

abandoned warehouse was

hand, and the party ckickahominy was at once set to work to tear down this house and con- fseT June 14 vey the timbers to the bridge. In a wonderfully short time a footway was constructed, over which the cavalry men at once commenced to pass, holding the bridles of large,

their horses as they

swam by

at

their side.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. p.

64.)

J.

E. B. Stuart,

130

cavalry crosses

byTw^m m

e

! n g animals and fer rying guni and wagons.

Dec., 1862.

Ext. No. 329.

Meanwhile, the animals, detached from the vehicles and artillery, were being- driven into the river and

made

swim

to

across, as also the horses of

many as 1,000 animals were at one time in the river, which was about 600 yards broad with favorable banks. The ferriage of the artillery and wagons was very much slower. Loaded upon the old flatboat, it was poled up stream a distance of nearly half a mile, and, pushed out into the stream, was caught and

the cavalry.

Quite as

On carried by the current gradually to the other bank. this means its return trip the process was reversed. By about 1,000 cavalry, 5 pieces of artillery with caissons, 60 wagons and 4 ambulances crossed the Tennessee River

from 12

:00 m.

till

8:00

p.

m. with one

flat

bottom boat.

(Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest p.

s

Cavalry,

220.)

COMMENTS. not believed that large organizations did much swimming with the troopers on their horses. Rivers of It is

any magnitude must be crossed either by bridging or by ferrying the men and equipments and swimming the animals.

(Ext. 239.)

Streams necessitating a swim of from

fifty to

sixty

may be crossed by large commands, but those neces tried by organiza sitating a longer swim should only be trained. Untrained tions that have been previously feet

horses quickly lose their heads, paw the air and finally go over backwards. Even if the trooper is floating by

go with grave danger to himself, though he may be a good swimmer. Under such circumstances a line of lariats with empty the horse, he will be compelled to

let

canteens for floats should be stretched across the stream on the down-stream side. Men who lose their horses

can quickly gain the line marked by the floating canteens and reach the shore with no difficulty. The line should be held by men on shore, who can move it up or down stream.

If possible, a

and ready

to take out

row boat should be kept manned

men who

lose their horses.

A

large

131 blanket roll will furnish buoyancy till the blanket gets wet through. It is better to leave the rifle in the scab bard. Then it will surely go ashore with the horse. If held in the hand, and the horse goes over, it is sure to be lost.

PLUNDER Ext.

PILLAGE.

The commanding

No. 330.

general directs

any person found guilty of such disgraceful conduct be stripped of his uniform, his head shaved, then branded on his left cheek with the letter T as a Thief, and that

drummed

Pillage .

Brand.

ing

out of the service.

(G. O. No. 11, Hq. Army of the Ohio, Aug. 31, 1863. R. R., Vol. 30, Part IV, p. 262.)

Ext. No. 331. of P mEvery crime in the catalogue of in- a Effect S e on troops. r T tamy has been committed, I believe, except rapine and Moorefieid, w. i

i

murder.

1

i

1

and sack of private dwellings took believe a higher tone of morals and dis

Va

"

Ang>

?

w

Pillage

place hourly.

I

may be infused in any soldier. Had there been plunder there would have been more fighting at

cipline less

Moorefieid on Sunday. (Brig. Genl. Bradley T. Johnson, C. S., R. R., Vol. 43, Parti, p. 8.)

Ext. No.

Wheeler s command was plunder plunder, and officers and men be-2Sff"" haved unbecomingly on this trip, thinking more of their 332.

.General

de-

much demoralized by

plunder than of fighting the enemy. (Maj. Genl. S. D. Lee, C. S., R. R., Vol. 31, Part 25.)

I, p.

Word was

Ext. No. 333.

shaw

to

sent to

Gordon and Ker-

swing around and advance with their

divisions,

but they stated in reply that a heavy force of cavalry in their front, and that their ranks were so de-

had got pleted

by the number of men who had stopped

camps

to plunder that they could not

(Lieut. Genl.

Part

I,

p.

562.)

J.

A. Early, C.

in the

advance them.

S.,

R. R., Vol. 43,

victory incom-

132

fs

The enemy, eager to plunder, failed TTT us up. rallied and at once ad retook the cavalry camp, and, en

Ext. No. 334.

By stopping to plunder, victory

turned to de- to

irn promptly follow

We

1

1

vanced upon him. We couraged by our success, charged the enemy, who was endeavoring to harness up the battery horses, and plun

my headquarters, not twenty steps distant, and forced him out of the camp with great slaugh finally ter. re-established our line and for an hour and a dering

We

half foiled every attempt of the enemy to retake it. (Maj. Genl. J. Kilpatrick, R. R., Vol. 47, Part "

p.

After

*5e

bt -

d

x

to

A

General 2,

"

t ent.

6

The cavalry corps commanded by H. Wilson, which captured Selma, Ala., April J. 1865, was composed of well organized and disciplined Ext. No. 335.

captur-

n

I,

861.)

Lieut. Col. E. Kitchell, 98th

troops. k

Apr 2*1865

my men

after

till

we went

111.,

says

:

into camp,

"I

kept

and did

together not permit them to straggle or go in search of plunder or captured property in the city, although quite a num ber of them, following the general example, did find their

way

there during the night time." (R. R., Vol. 49, Parti, p. 452.)

Ext. No. 336.

pursuit discon-

I

am now

to record the fact that so

advance troops many Ashby command, both cavalry and infantry, stop to pillage. Winchester, forgetful of their high trust as the advance of a pursuing army, deserted their colors, and abandoned themselves

of

s

.

.

,

,.

,

an extent as to make

it necessary for further that gallant officer to discontinue pursuit. (Lieut. Genl. T. J. Jackson, C. S., R. R., Vol. 12,

to pillage to such

Parti,

p.

704.)

COMMENTS.

The branding would not now be

of

men

as ordered

in

extract 330

The permitted. (A. W. 38, 98.) Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual punishments, and since branding would be so classed, it was not legal

at the time of the order quoted.

Pillage

is

a serious

The military offense and calls for drastic punishment. from of condition pillage discipline resulting deplorable is

described in extracts 331, 332.

The

offense

is

so grave

133 that A.

W. 42

victory,

men who

authorizes the death penalty. In time of stop to plunder will neutralize the ad

vantages gained (Exts, 333, 336) and sometimes con vert a victory into a defeat. is

very

troops.

difficult

to stop,

(Ext. 334.)

even

among

well

Plundering disciplined

(Ext. 335.)

PURSUIT. Ext. No. 337.

The next day

I received orders from R0 uted enemy Genl. Sheridan to start out at daylight and whip 282* Maj. Sh * * * the rebel cavalry or get whipped myself. v a ii ey "Smp^l^

After a spirited engagement for about two hours, the enemy, seeing that they were being flanked and se

18

verely pressed in front, gave way in great confusion, which was immediately taken advantage of by both di vision commanders.

The enemy endeavored were unable

to rally several times, but

to stand the desperate charges made in a perfect rout for

men, and they were driven

by our twenty

miles.

(Maj. Genl. A. T. A. Torbert, R. I,

R., Vol. 43,

Part

431.)

p.

Ext. No. 338.

His retreat was so rapid that pur- pursuit by disd n by dismounted men was impossible, and the 1 st iSipos?ibie 6 Mich., supported by two regiments of the reserve brigade, were sent forward and drove the enemy for two suit

jaS^V^

miles, returning with

many prisoners. (Brig. Genl. G. A. Custer, R. R., Vol. 36, Part

p.

I,

819.)

now became apparent that the Bear pursuit 8 our enemy, up rear, had made a great mis- S uit take, and he began to see it, for, when we leisurely took the Negro Foot road to Richmond, a doubt arose in his James May 1864t Ext. No. 339.

It

^

in following

mind

as to whether his tactics were good, whereat he hauled off from the rear, and urged his immediately

horses to the death so as to get in between

Richmond

and our column. (Maj. Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. p.

790.)

R., Vol. 36,

Part

I,

134 Ext. 340.

Parallel pur-

Having

notified the

commanding general

C ee 8

SU

on the morning of June 8th that Sheridan, with a heavy Rlpida n ?o the es Jnne 8 of cavalry and artillery, had crossed the Pamunkey, force 1864 I was ordered to take one division in addition to my own and follow him. Supposing that he would strike at Gurdonsville and Charlottsville, I moved rapidly with my division so as to interpose my command between him and the places named above, at the same time directing Maj. Genl. Fitzhugh Lee to follow as speedily as pos sible. In two days march I accomplished the object in view that of placing myself ini front of the enemy. 1

(Maj. Gen. Parti, p. 1095.)

Ext. No. 341.

nd

our

valley o?t 8 i864

I, p.

g

The enemy,

C. S., R. R., Vol. 36,

after being charged

by were broken, and ran; they were fol lowed by our men on the jump twenty-six miles. (Maj. Genl. P. H. S heridan, R. R., Vol. 43, Part

Rear pursuit.

Method

Wade Hampton,

"

a ^ ant cavalry,

31.)

Ext. No. 342.

of

The

pursuit

was immediately con-

Knipe and Hatch moving in parallel columns alone the Columbia pike, Johnson down the Carter s Creek pike, and Croxton on the Lewisburg pike. The

uccess ~ ti nue( t

fSi^ur suit

Franklin, Tenn., Dec. 17, 1864.

flanking columns were directed to push rapidly forward and endeavor to pass around the flanks of the enemy s rear guard, composed almost entirely of infantry, while a strong force of skirmishers across the pike should press it continuously and compel it to form line as frequently as possible.

(Maj. Genl. p.

Pursuit

not

x

"

>

J.

H. Wilson, R.

R., Vol. 45,

Part

I,

565.)

N

the cavalry would soon followed by the infantry, was artillery, for the purpose of pretwo for forward hours, pressed a reforming of the enemy, but venting, by artillery fire,

Ext come up, -

-

343.

Hoping

the

as nothing was heard of the cavalry, and as but little or nothing could be accomplished without it in the ex hausted condition of the infantry, between which and the

135

enemy

the distance

was constantly

increasing, I ordered

the halt. (Lieut. Genl. T.

Part

7QC

I, p.

J.

Jackson, C.

S.,

R. R., Vol. 12,

)

COMMENTS. desiiable to have a well organized mounted force ready to take up the pursuit in case of victory. It

is

(Ext. 338.) The approved method of making a pursuit described in extract 342, namely, flanking columns should take up the pursuit on parallel roads, endeavoring is

to cut in

on the enemy

s

column (Sheridan

at

Appomat-

tox), while troops following in rear endeavor to compel the enemy to deploy as frequently as possible. Only the parallel pursuit

can meet with great results when cavalry

is

pursuing cavalry. (Exts. 339, 340.) Fresh infantry can pursue defeated infantry, but exhausted infantry cannot. In this case cavalry is neces (Ext. 343.)

sary.

The

distance that a pursuit should be kept up will depend upon the progress of the general engagement. If

cavalry defeats cavalry at the beginning of a battle, they should not pursue to the extent of becoming disorgan

should rally and be kept in readiness to con tribute to the general result. decisive cavalry victory ized, but

A

would amount

nothing if the general engagement was an enemy is defeated in a general engagement, then there should be no limit to the pursuit. In that to

If

lost.

push

case,

it

as far

and as long as

possible.

(Exts. 337,

341.) RAIDS.

Ext. No. 344.

Should a raid be contemplated, a conditions diversion should be made in its favor by an at-SJS ble to a strong d tack on the enemy in force, or a demonstration to his

bn?g{ V a?, Set 25,

No raid could succeed if attacked and opposite flank. To prepare and start compelled to fight at its outset. a raiding party after a general action has commenced, and when the enemy s attention is diverted, would be

much more

favorable for

its success.

1863

136

(General Alfred Pleasonton, R. R., Vol. 29, Part II, p.

Sheridan Richmond

s

raid.

383.)

Ext.

No. 345.

In May, 1864, General Sheridan on Richmond, Va. He was gone 16 days; average march, 18 miles; longest march, 30 miles. Horses that failed were shot by the rear guard. (See Sheridan s report, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, p.

made a

raid

792.) method

of*

Ext

-

Na

His fav o rit e strategy on

^46.

>n-

ductingaraid.

tant expeditions or

was

his

impor-

to place himself

by long moving sometimes for days and

"raids"

and swift marches

in the very nights without halt except to feed horses heart of the territory where were the objects of his en

He

on this method to confuse, if not to surprise, his enemy, and prevent a concentration of his forces. He would then strike right and left. He rarely declined to fight advancing, but after commencing his retreat he would use every effort and stratagem to avoid terprise.

relied

battle.

(Morgan

Ex ^

successful raid

vs

s

Cavalry, by Duke.)

Grierson continued his movement

^o. 347.

about 1,000 men, breaking the New Orleans and fw?y fro mthewith railroad, arriving at Baton Rouge May 2d. This "bto^ibdd, Jackson Apr.-May, i ra ^ was Q f g- reat importance, for Grierson had attracted r

enemy from

the attention of the

the

main movement

against Vicksburg. (Memoirs of General U. S. Grant, Vol. if

raiding party

pay of

for the loss

The

Ext. No. 348. r

, ,

,

.

in safety J all his

raid

is

I,

p.

489.)

the point

commander cannot join 1,1 work may be thrown away.

If a

of greatest danger.

men and army J horses.

close of a

his T

r

If

through, the losses in men and horses will more than counterbalance the gains of the ,

he has to cut his

raid. Duties of

woods

the

the best

way

(P. 93.)

A

cavalry general on a raid must be always awake, or at least take as little sleep as nature will permit. He

must surround himself with pickets that stretch for miles and keep his corps encamped in as small a space as possible. Woods are best for this purpose, on many ac-

137

number of

troops, furnish fuel horses. for for fires, and hitching posts They are easily defensible in case of surprise or attack, and by pushing out pickets to the edge of the open ground the grand requirements of a perfect camp ground are fulfilled, viz.,

They hide

counts.

the

wood, water and security. Water is almost invariably to be found in or near the woods. Security against at tack is gained by felling a few trees on the flanks of the In the summer, by tak fires ing the precaution to camp early, and put out the after dark, a whole corps of cavalry may be buried in to entangle

camp

the

an enemy

in.

woods without giving a sign of

its

presence.

(Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of a Decade, Kilpatrick started

Ext. No. 349.

reach the

95.)

p.

on the night of

the

back again

a

rail-

expedition soon repaired.

alry is

Kilpatrick R aw, Aug.

s

18-22,

g

former position on our left by the 22d. affairs contributed, however, but very little

little

to the

grand

result.

They annoyed,

it

is

true,

but any

thus done to a railroad by any cavalry expedi

soon repaired. (Memoirs of General U.

tion

damage

to

by any cav

in his

These

damage

Any

done

Macon road about road

18th of August He succeeded in doing so, and passed enTonesboro. J around the Confederate lines of Atlanta, and was tirely to

is

As many J

Ext. No. 350. serviceable

weak

too

from the

to cope

effects

S. Grant, Vol. II, p.

of of

myJ

are cavalry J

Stoneman

s

172.)

still

raid,

with the numbers of the enemy

un-

Raid leaves cavalry unservicth e be-

am !J^.a^

I if

f

as ^gjf burs cam

"

large as represented.

(Genl. Jos. Hooker, R. R., Vol. 27, Part

Ext. No. 351.

Upon

I,

p.

33.)

the suggestion of the former

(Stuart) that he could damage the enemy and de-stuart s cavalry during Gettyshis passage of the river by getting in his rear, he was lay authorized to do so, and it was left to his discretion q^a^e ?nformawhether to enter Maryland east or west of the officer .

.

1

1

Ridge; but he was instructed to lose no time in placing command on the right of our column as soon as he it also

his

.

.

fe

cavalry

much

re-

n n m moving northward. be\?and m b condition It was expected that as soon as the Federal Army should cross the Potomac, General Stuart would give notice of campaign, ises.

could perceive the enemy

-

~

138

movements, and nothing having been heard from him Maryland, it was inferred that * * * The move the enemy had not left Virginia. ments of the army preceding the battle of Gettysburg had been much embarrassed by the absence of the cavalry. * * * The ranks of the cavalry were much reduced its by long and arduous march, repeated conflicts, and in sufficient supplies of food and forage. its

since our entrance into

(General R. E. Lee, R. R., Vol. 27, Part

316,

II, pp.

321, 322.)

COMMENTS.

A

to

raid,

be successful, will have to be started

without much preparation. If suspected by the enemy, A strong diversion should be made it will not succeed. in its favor, as stated in extract 344.

The most

successful raider the

His method

Morgan.

is

war produced was

described in extract 346.

Raids are seldom worth their cost in horse

and the damage done

flesh,

to the cavalry will operate later to

the detriment of the raiders, as illustrated by Stoneman s raid (Ext. 350), which left the Federal cavalry weak at the beginning of the Gettysburg campaign, and Stuart s raid (Ext. 351), which left his ranks reduced after his

long march, and left General Lee without the informa tion he had a right to expect, and further much em barrassed him in the movements of his

army preceding

the battle of Gettysburg. It

may

was worth

well be doubted

if

Sheridan

s

Richmond

raid

He

accomplished no lasting results the of death Stuart, while he left Grant s army except without its eyes, while Lee, by use of his cavalry, was its

cost.

s movements and successfully between the Federal army and Rich army the North Anna.

enabled to ascertain Grant interpose his

mond

at

If the raiders cannot rejoin in safety, the raid

be counted as a failure.

may

139

The most son

successful raid during the

war was

Grier-

(Ext. 347), which drew a large number of troops

s

Grant"s army when it was ma Pemberton into Since Grierson Vicksburg. neuvering marched with only 1,000 men, he did not greatly deplete

away from opposing

the Federal forces.

The results of a raid will necessarily be temporary and the damage soon repaired; and, as stated by Grant, they "contribute very little to the grand result." (Ext. 349.) Successful raids will generally be made in a friendly country, or at least in a country where many sympa thizers are

found to give information.

As long

as Morgan stayed in Kentucky and Ten was completely successful; but as soon as he crossed the Ohio River, where he could no longer obtain the information necessary to enable him to elude his pur suers, his raid was a most complete failure.

nessee he

CAPTURE OF STEAMBOATS. Ext. No. 352. cavalry from

During the same month a party of capture 111. and the 1st Ark. cavalry, un-

the 10th

der Lieut. Col. Stewart, captured a steamboat near Buren, Arkansas, and about 300 prisoners.

(History of the U.

S. Cavalry,

On

Ext. No. 353.

by Brackett,

p.

Van

Jan

of by

1863< "

277.)

cavalry cap Major John F. Wes- ture three steamboats. three steamMontgomery

April 13

ton captured and brought to boats loaded with cotton, bacon, salt and corn, (Col. W. Cooper, 4th Ky. Cav., R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p.

433.)

Ext. No. 354. M1 ville, f

T

.,

A

Dispatch to N. Y. Herald: Nashs rebel cavalrv, J} with a batterv J attacked three or four boats at Harpeth

Jan. 14. ...

,

TT1

,

Wheeler

of artillery, Shoals yesterday.

One

or two hundred sick and

wounded

were captured and the men paroled. One gunboat sur rendered. Her guns were thrown overboard and the boat burned. The others also taken were burned. (Campaigns of Wheeler and His Cavalry, p. 64.)

cavairycap-

ture gunboat and other boats load

ed with wounded -

140

CHAPTER

IX.

TRAINS, TRANSPORTATION

t

cavalry rain s, where

marched. Savannah Cam paign, 1864.

SUPPLIES.

WHERE MARCHED; ATTACK AND DEFENSE.

TRAINS field

AND

Ext. No. 355.

In the Savannah campaign the cavmarched with the trains of the infantry columns, while the cavalry did the screening and pro .

.

.

a lry field trains

tected the flanks.

(Col. Heath, R. R., Vol. 44, p. 400.) Supplytrainan

encumbrance

to

n

enemy

s country. Meridian Expe-

Jan

dition,

Ext. No. 356. The Supply train Was a heavy encumbrance W1 during the whole march; it caused a week s delay, while it was little use to the main column, which lived off the country nearly all the time and could have done so entirely. (Col. G. E. 32, Part

Disposition field trains

battle

is

when

Fieetwood, Va.,

p.

~.

cept two

Jr.,

Brig., R. R., Vol.

Comg.

264.)

Ext. No. 357.

of

expect-

I,

Waring,

tent flies

With

all .

packed

camp equipage exwagons and in readiness his

,

.,

in

.

...

for an early start, Stuart himself bivouacked on the night * * * of the 8th on Fieetwood Hill. Every scrap of camp was removed toward Culpeper Court House,

and there remained nothing upon the hill except the ad jutant and his couriers. (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, pp. 263, 269.)

Ext. No. 358.

Cavalry trains are

an

encum-

brance to cavalry column.

Cam

"

Mav

Kingston, Colonel Long,

Commanding Cavalry

23, 1864.

Brigade.

Let Cavalry with a train is worse than useless. the when in fall train with your cavalry infantry your can act effectively on the south flank of Blair s column. *

*

*

(Sig.)

W.

T.

SHERMAN,

Maj. Genl., Cmdg. (R. R., Vol. 38, Part IV,

p.

296.)

141

The

Ext. No. 359.

train

a corps front and rear, but

was strongly guarded by Guard in and rear

front of a

,

the

flanks

were exposed,

long train

is

not

sufficient.

While the 12th and /th regiments kept up a brisk skir- Near Ely Ford, Va, Nov. 27, 1863 mish with the corps that was marching in rear, I suc ceeded in destroying 35 or 40 wagons, brought 8 loaded with ordnance stores, 7 ambulances, 230 mules and horses, and 95 prisoners with the loss of 2 men killed and 3 wounded. ,

.

.

(Brig. Genl. T. L. Rosser, C. S., R. R., Vol. 29,

Parti,

p.

904.)

Ext. No. 360.

General Wheeler, with 1,500 rebel .

,

,

.

cavalry and some artillery, attacked a

cavalry useful as support to in-

wagon tram mov- fantry escort, X

6

ing from Knoxville to Chattanooga, and escorted by in- paign, Deo. 28 *es! fantry, convalescents, etc. Colonel Long at once mounted a small portion of his

command and charged

whose ranks had been broken by scattering them in every direction.

the infantry escort,

(Colonel Long, R. R., Vol. 31, Part Ext. No. 361.

the enemy,

I, p.

435.)

have the honor to report the ar- Train suocess acked at rival at this place with all the brigade train but about ^figtt We were attacked at daylight eight or ten wagons. yesterday morning, and a disgraceful panic ensued, re I

.

sulting in the entire destruction of the Reserve Brigade train and a portion of ours, with battery forges, etc., the off of all the mules, the capture of a large of prisoners, etc. (Maj. W. E. Beardsley, 6th N. Y. Cav., R. R., Vol.

running

number

43, Parti, p. 484.)

COMMENTS.

These extracts go

to

show

clearly that a cavalry

column, when operating against an enemy, has little use for trains. Cavalry must have trains, but, when oper ating against an enemy, the trains must

infantry column.

358) This

:

"Cavalry

To

quote with a train

General is

will necessitate cavalry often

march with the Sherman (Ext.

worse than

useless."

camping without its baggage. It must then be prepared to live on saddle bag or emergency rations. (Exts. 355, 356, 358.) The best

142

system will be for each troop to have a led horse or mule with a pack saddle. The Moore cross-tree saddle is a good type for this purpose. On one side of the sad dle should be carried a water can, inside of which should be a nest of camp kettles and other necessities for cook ing; on the other side should be a similar water can carrying one day s rations for the carried as a

troop; top pack should be a picket rope with iron pins. This will avoid individual the horses from cooking, keep get ting burned on small lariat ropes, and enable the com mand to always have a supply of boiled water, which is

considered so indispensable to modern warfare. The command will then have one day s field rations, two sad dle bag or haversack rations and one ration,

emergency baggage wagons connect with it only once three days no great harm will be done. When a battle is expected, the trains must be sent to

so that in

if

the rear.

the

(Ext. 357.)

The most suitable escort for trains is infantry, dis mounted cavalry, or convalescents. Es (Ext. 360.) cort duty

is

very trying on cavalry, and, besides, a horse as rapidly or with as much precision as a

man cannot fire man on foot.

Trains should have a flank guard

if possible.

(Ext.

at daybreak.

(Ext.

359.)

The

best time to attack a train

is

361.)

TRANSPORTATION. Allowance

of transportation.

Ext. No. 362.

Headquarters Army, Adjutant General

War General Orders

Office,

Department.

Washington, D. C., October 18, 1862.

No. 160.

The following

s

regulations are established for

Trains and Baggage

:

Army

143 1.

There will be allowed wagons Headquarters Army Corps Div. or Brig

to

4 3

Full regiment of Infantry

6

Light battery or Squadron of Cavalry

3

cavalry regi20 wagons.

ment

In no case will this allowance be exceeded, but al ways proportionately reduced according to the number of officers and 2.

men

actually present.

The wagons allowed

to a regiment, battery or

squadron must carry nothing but forage for the teams, cooking utensils and rations for the troops, hospital One wagon to each regi stores, and officers baggage. ment will transport exclusively hospital supplies, under the direction of the regimental surgeon; the one for regimental headquarters will carry the grain for the officers

horses,

and the three allowed for each battery

or squadron will be at least half loaded with grain for their own teams. Stores in bulk and ammunition will be carried in the regular or special supply trains. 4.

Officers

baggage

will be limited to blankets,

one

small valise or carpet bag, and a moderate mess kit. The men will carry their own blankets or shelter tents,

and reduce the contents of

their

knapsacks as

much

Officers baggage allowance -

as

possible.

Ext. No. 362.

ALLOWANCE OF WAGONS.

Allowance wagons.

o

f

144

Ext No.

wheeler has no

Atlanta Campaign 1864

Sherman

364.

march

s

Wheeler

to the

sea,

s

cavalry, while opposing had no wagons for five

months. (Lieut. Genl.

No. 365.

Ext.

Gettysburg

J.

Wheeler, R. R., Vol. 44, Stuart

s

p.

412.)

cavalry, while marching

around the Federal army during the Gettysburg cam paign, had no wagons or vehicles excepting six pieces of artillery with caissons, and a few ambulances.

1863.

(Maj. Genl. II, p.

Sheridan

ry S to lowest

limit.

E. B. Stuart, R. R., Vol. 27, Part

692.)

Ext. No. 366.

s

domi

J.

From February 27

1865, Sheridan marched

March

to

28,

and 3d Cavalry Divisions, 10,000 officers and men, from Winchester to Peters burg. Division headquarters had one wagon. The command had 8 ambulances, ammunition train, the 1st

The fifteen 16 wagons, a pontoon train of 8 boats. took 60 salt of and rations coffee, only sugar days wagons.

Each regimental headquarters had two pack mules.

Each squadran had one pack mule. 475 and 485.) Division commanders were directed

(R. R., Vol. 46, Part

Load by

Ext. No. 367.

carried

trooper.

I,

pp.

-11 was provided with five days light rations in haversacks, 24 pounds of grain, 100 rounds of ammunition and one pair of extra shoes for ,

1

r-

1

>

to see that every trooper

Load

carried

Load

carried

on wagons. 180

n

rounds per ken for

Se raid

that the pack animals were loaded with five hard bread, ten days sugar, coffee and salt, and days the wagons with 45 days coffee, 20 sugar, 15 salt and his horse

;

80 rounds of ammunition. These calculations were made on a basis of sixty days campaign, under the supposition that the command would be able to supply itself from

enemy s country with everything else in abundance. Only enough hard bread was taken to last through the

the

region of north Alabama. nt canvas pontoon train of 30 boats, with One train fixtures complete, transported by 50 six-mule wagons in sterile

Bridge

%

of a battalion of cavalry was got ready to acb/JTnmoun^ld charge Z ed intobattaHon s company the expedition. The entire train, in charge of

145 the Chief Quartermaster, numbered not far from 250 wagons, escorted by 1,500 dismounted men of the three divisions. These men were organized commanded by majors,

(Maj. Genl. p.

J.

H. Wilson, R.

into battalions

and

R., Vol. 49, Part

I,

356.)

Wilson

March

15,

s raid,

1865.

known also as the Selma raid, started It was composed of three divisions

and numbered about 17,000 men, 1,500 of which were without mounts. If

we deduct

the 50 bridge train wagons,

we have and equipage of 17,000 men and horses. Some of these wagons might have been hauling artillery supplies or might have been ambulances, but assuming that they were not so occupied, we have

only 200

left for supplies

about 12 wagons per 1,000 men for a sixty days This large number of wagons was taken campaign. along to assist the command in crossing the Alabama left

river, after

^j

do

"

which 30 wagons were destroyed.

Ext. No. 368.

One wagon

r

a g

The following should be allowed:

The amount

of

to each corps

two-wheeled vehicle to

and division headquarters; oneSSSylifoiad haveeach brigade and regimental head-

quarters.

Every officer should carry his kit and grain for both horses on his second horse, and a suitable pack saddle should be provided for that purpose.

Each troop should have one pack mule for cooking purposes,

(Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade, p. 76.) Ext. No. 369. In regard to the carriage of rations, the experience of a single campaign is sufficient to decide a thing that the haversack, as used in the United States while army, is a very good perhaps for infantry,

Haversackisno

*

poor

thing for cavalry.

(Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade, p. 35.) Ext. No. 370. To carry three days rations on the saddle, have a long bag slit in the middle, put grain in both ends and throw it across the saddle and sit on it.

How

to

carry

146

Tie the ends to the cincha rings.

Distribute the grain

to equalize the pack.

(Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade, -^ xt

r

i4,S)o

C 0rp8

me n

f

p.

35.)

There are just three things which viz., food, ammunition and and The forage part of the train provision baggage. raids. Great bulk and weight are should not be taken on Ammu necessary, and such cannot be moved rapidly. nition must be carried, so must a small quantity of bag ^o. 371.

are loaded in cavalry trains,

gage, the less of this the better.

The problem becomes,

ammunition and baggage in the small and most expeditious manner. Pack trains take an immense number of animals and make a Since cavalry must be always long and tedious train.

then, to carry the est space

and

safest

accompanied by

artillery,

as

wherever a gun can go a wagon six mules will carry

One wagon with

should follow.

much as twenty-four pack mules. The following is an estimate of

transportation for a cavalry corps of three divisions, each of three brigades of four regiments with an average strength of 400 men,

14,000 men. (Wilson s Corps in 1865 numbered 17,000) Forty rounds per man for

total strength of corps,

:

each battle, three battles during raid these three battles

man on wagons, each man should

;

ammunition for

on wagons makes 120 rounds per

total,

1,680,000 rounds.

carry enough on

his

Besides this

person for two

battles.

(Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade, p. 72.) Note. In 1910 forty wagons each carrying 3,500 be necessary to carry this ammunition. would pounds

COMMENTS. affecting the allowance of wagons are arms, but the comments will be confined

The orders quoted for

all

to the cavalry service.

G. O. 160, 1862, allowed 3 wagons per squadron of two troops each, one for regimental headquarters and one for hospital supplies, making a total of 20 for each

147

regiment of cavalry. G. O. 83, Army of the Potomac, August 21, 1863, allowed 6 wagons to each regiment of ber

5,

of the Potomac, Novem retained that allowance. G. O. 95,

and G. O. 100,

cavalry,

1863,

still

Army

W.

D. 1908, allows each regiment of cavalry 34 wagons. The two orders of 1863, allowing 6 wagons per regiment of cavalry, were issued after the Gettysburg campaign,

and were based on war experience. The allowance of 34 wagons

The maximum allowance

absurd.

ment of cavalry should be one mental

headquarters

wagon

to each

is

simply and

flatly

of

wagons per

regi

to each troop,

and band,

one to regi

and one ammunition

squadron of four troops, total of 16 Supplies will be carried on supply trains and

wagons.

issued as needed; but supply trains are no part of a regi mental equipment. (Ext. 362.)

Wheeler s cavalry, opposing Sherman s march to the no wagons for five months. (Ext. 364.) had sea, Stuart s cavalry, on the Gettysburg campaign, had no wagons and only a few ambulances. (Ext. 365.) Sheridan marched 10,000 cavalry for a month at the rate of one

wagon to 130 men. (Ext. 366.) Wilson s Selma raid started with 17,000 cavalry for a two months campaign with one wagon to 84 men. (Ext. 367.)

On

the Trevillian raid

ammunition

only.

Sheridan had wagons for

(Ext. 377.)

The recommendation contained

in

Extract 368, that

each officer should carry his baggage on his extra horse, is

a

good

one,

and sometimes practiced

in the regular

service.

A

single-track

railroad

60,000 to 70,000 men.

will

supply

an army of

(Ext. 373.) SUPPLIES.

Ext. No. 372.

I employed a brigade once a week How to gather f a * h 8 of duty collecting and bringing in forage, sending t?fe g u tr out sometimes as many as 150 wagons to haul the grain useof B cout. .

in the

which

my

scouts had previously located.

In nearly every

148

one of these expeditions the enemy was encountered, and the wagons were usually loaded while the skirmishers kept up a running

(Sheridan capacity of

an army

253.)

p.

A

single-track railroad can supply of 60,000 or 70,000 men with the usual num

Ext. No. 373.

a

road.

fire.

Memoirs,

s

ber of cavalry and artillery, but beyond that number or with a large mounted force the difficulty of supply is

very great. (Halleck to Grant, R. R., Vol. 31, Part Ext. No. 374.

in hostile counp receipts^regfy eD

I,

p.

668.)

will help themselves to corn,

They

meat and what they need, and take all good horses, givfor supplies. r ., taken. ing simple receipts to be settled at the end of the war .

,

.

,

or according to circumstances. (Genl. W. T. Sherman, R. p.

cavalry

Ext. No. 375.

I will avail

H to call the attention of the

ridge,Tenn!!jant

R.,

Part

Vol. 31,

I,

719.)

can

s

,

.

-,

^ act

tnat

$ or

myself of

this occasion

commanding general

nearly two months

my command

to the

has been

almost daily engaged with the enemy and compelled to live mainly on parched corn, most of which has been

gathered at a distance of from six to fifteen miles. The weather at times has been intensely cold and the suffer ing very great, most of them being without shelter of

any kind. (Brig. Genl. S. D. Sturgis, R. R., Vol. 32, Part p.

Ext. No. 376.

curing two days fight horses nothing to

get

Eapidan

to the

.

.

two

8

ried

on a

ow ax

S ar~ ra id.

r

fo iage

,

.,,

,

f

which we were engaged, without for,

age, the surrounding country affording nothing but grazing of a very inferior quality, and generally at such points as were inaccessible to us.

p.

of

In addition, the animals were, for .

entire days, in

(Genl.

Number

I,

138.)

P.

H. Sheridan, R.

R.,

Vol.

36,

Part

I,

785.)

Ext.

No.

377.

On

his

Trevillian raid

Sheridan

two divisions carrying three days rations *n naversacks, to last for five days, and carrying two are days grain on the pommel of the saddle. started with

149

They carried 100 rounds of ammunition per man, Af\ r ,1 x-^ 40 of which was on the person and the other 60 m 1

1

Amount of ammunition carried on a raid,

wagons.

The only other wagons were one medical wagon, eight ambulances and one wagon for each brigade and division headquarters.

(See Sheridan

s

R.

report,

R.,

Vol.

Part

36,

idan to the James, Jane, isw.

I,

795.)

p.

Ext. No. 378. .

I

made

application for

permission to gather

up corn and wheat and take

a mill five miles distant, where scantily for the next four days.

I, p.

I

supplied

2d Iowa Cav., R.

(Col. D. E. Coon,

Part

and obtained

.

it

to

cavalry gather

wheat and grind "

mil

at a

}-

my command Tennessee, NO.

Alabama and Oct. 64.

R., Vol. 45,

581.)

Two divisions of cavalry marched customary to e a on the morning of the 29th, the men, as usual, carrying tS, 3o ?ound s of forage and 40 r on their horses rive days rations, thirty pounds ot forage rounds of ammunition on horse. r and forty rounds of ammunition. Appomattox Ext. No. 379.

fi

,

,

,

,

-

,

,

.

,

.

.

.

a

(Maj. Genl. Wesley Merritt, R. I,

R., Vol. 46, Part29

1116.)

p.

Ext. No. 380.

Sheridan, on his march from

Win-

Chester to Petersburg, February 27 to March 28, 1865, started with five days rations in haversacks, and on each

horse 30 pounds of forage; he carried in wagons fifteen days rations of sugar, salt and coffee. The wagons also carried 100 rounds of ammunition, while each ried 75 rounds on his horse.

p.

aign>Mi

fe

man

Rations.

Forage,

Transportation,

Ammunition,

car

(Maj. Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 46, Part I, 475; also report of Maj. Genl. W. Merritt, p. 485.) Ext. No. 381.

had often seen bread baked upon improvised method of bakit around a ramrod ing bread, or stick and holding it to the fire, but one method of baking corn bread was practiced successfully on this march which I had never witnessed before. The men would take meal dough and fit it into a corn shuck, tying a

n

.

flat

I

.

rock or board, or by twisting

the shucks tightly. It would then be placed on the hot embers and in a short time would come out beautifully

~

150

browned.

The dough was worked up

an

in

cloth or

oil

a half pumpkin, thoroughly scooped out.

(Morgan Living off of a r y cau?eBs traggiin | ;

1863*

s

Cavalry, by Duke.)

can get no forage or rations; am The people give and sell the men something

Ext. No. 382.

ou t o f both.

to eat, but I can

t

I

stand that

of subsisting;

way

it

causes

dreadful straggling. (Genl. Buford, R. R., Vol. 27, Part subt80nthecoun

cavalry s

"

t jy

Cam

paigM^.

wheeler

p.

324.)

Ext. No. 383. During the campaign my brigade marched 520 miles, having subsisted ourselves principally on the country. (Col. Atkins, R. R., Vol. 44,

Ext.

cav-

s

I,

No. 384.

During

n

p.

393.)

the last five

months

my

command has been without wagons or cooking utensils, ?ranIpo?taTfon The food has subsist upon w ith orders to subsist upon the country. country. been limited to bread baked upon boards and stones and ,

meat broiled on on

sticks.

months.

During

n twelve

mSitLf

Average e five

r

mon th

16 y ***

supper at mid-

night, march at daylight.

r

rag e ca

in to

n io-ht fall

Details had then to be sent to procure forage .

stuart 8 car ?hree dafs

compelled

when going on

a

transporta-

412.

for

my

it

to be in the saddle before daylight. S.,

__

,

R. R., Vol. 44,

)

Ext. No. 385.

Stuart

s

raid

around Federal army

three days during the Gettysburg campaign carried only no with and the horse on rations transportation except

ambulances.

(Maj. Genl.

ttt^urgoa,. paign,Jane,

midnight before supmen, and then they were

making

(Maj. Genl. Joseph Wheeler, C.

cav-

rl-

.

.

an(} rations, frequently

p.

when

five

has not been paid in twelve months it has averaged in direct has day, and having no wagons, It

marching 16 miles per been obliged to pack all forage and rations to camp on Our camps could not be designated before horseback.

a ck m p onper could be prepared

imSavannah CamP aign,i864.

No

sticks.

J.

E. B. Stuart, C. S, R.

R,

Vol. 27,

3.

Ext. No. 386.

cavalry

gade

at

Brist e

Merritt,

Station

commanding

October 17

reserve bri-

1863

reported:

The command is hard up for something to eat. They have not a thing to feed on; cannot rations be sent immediately?

151

Reply *

to

arrangements

necessary cars.

Meade

General

:

directs that

you make the

have rations sent out by

*

*

(R. R., Vol. 29, Part

I,

352.)

p.

A

Ext. No. 387. whole division has been twenty- NO wonder the Army of the Poone days without hay. No horses, however good, and toma c lost horses. Foras e bought at whatever price, can stand this kind of treat.

-

ment

where but

in a region

little,

if

any, grass can be

procured.

(Brig. Gen. Stoneman, R. R. Vol. 29, Part.

II., p.

4I9-)

Ext. No. 388. of

fall

G. O. 100,

63, prescribes

%

of the Potomac, a JS?^ or 01 the Po~ forage for horses, lO^S.

Army

maximum

pounds hay and 14 pounds grain; mules 10 pounds hay and 11 pounds grain. When short forage (no hay) only can be procured, horses, 18 pounds grain; mules,

When

15 pounds grain.

the

army

on the march the

is

above allowance will not apply. Marching ration, 10 animal Increased allow pounds average per per day. ance of grain intended to be fed only when animals are long marches, to recuperate them and when hay cannot be procured. at rest, after

(R. R., Vol. 29, Part

My

Ext. No. 389. r . field

420.)

II, p.

command was

kept on the battle

_

.

during the night of the 20th, and men and horses suffered greatly for want of water. The men were with-

...

out rations, and the horses had only received a partial feed once during the two days engagement. (General Forrest, C. S., Battle of Chickamauga, R. R., Vol. 30, Part

Ext. No. 390.

II, p.

e

s

horses

gerrt food and

"

Jy^

Ga., Sept. 20, 1863.

525.)

Having but ,

twenty days, and

Forrest

kept on the bat-

three days

rations in ,

,

soldiers remain cheerful under

of them nearly naked and several ad verse condiJ tions, without times exposed to a cold, drenching ram, yet they never regular rations. complained, but were always cheerful and ever ready to

many

.

,

11

j

r

1

duties required of them. (Brig. Genl. George Crook, R. R., Vol. 30, Part II,

perform p.

688.)

all

Oct., 1863.

152

A

Ext. No. 391.

very large proportion of my men, are ragged and barefooted, without effective without ciotwng or pay. blankets or overcoats. have drawn no clothing for Knoxville Cam- r 11 A ^1 fall or winter. 1863. The men have received no pay for six paign Deo., confederate cavalry find it

^

~~

,

^ V&n officers,

We ^

The extremely

months.

impossible for

me

(Maj. Genl.

W.

R. R., Vol. 31, Part

made

cold weather has

it

almost

move.

to

T. Martin, C.

I, p.

S.,

Jan. 8th, 1864,

549.)

COMMENTS. Cavalry must expect

Forage:

to live

on the coun

The way to obtain forage is to locate it by scouts and then either send wagons for it or impress wagons from the inhabitants and make them haul it. Usually, try.

however, the inhabitants of a hostile country will have disappeared; the forage will then have to be brought in troops. (See also Ext. 453. Ext. 372.) Receipts should be given, to be paid or not at the end of the war, depending upon the policy of the government. (Ext.

by

374.)

In going on raids each horse carried 30 pounds of

Cavalry was expected to from the gather forage surrounding country when the 30 pounds were exhausted. Wheeler s cavalry, for five months, had to pack all forage into camp on horseback. grain.

(Exts. 377, 379, 380.)

(Ext. 384.)

The forage allowance of the Army of the Potomac, was a maximum of 10 pounds of hay

G. O. 100, 1863,

and 14 pounds of grain. When no hay could be obtained, 18 pounds of grain were allowed when animals were at rest recuperating; when marching only 10 pounds were allowed. (Ext. 388.) Rations

Men

:

The

best single diet

known

is

Indian corn.

Corn (Ext. 375.) by parching in and and wheat should be gathered neighboring ground can

mills.

live

on

it

it.

(Ext. 378.)

Foraging (Ext. 382.)

in

a friendly country causes straggling.

153

During a battle soldiers can expect little except what on their persons or horses. (Exts. 376, 389.) Cavalry started on raids with from three (Exts. (Exts. 379, 377, 385) to five days rations on the horse. is

carried

The best 380.) extract 370. Emergency the war.

way rations

to carry rations

is

were unsuccessfully

described in

tried

during

(Ext. 395.)

Improvised methods of baking were frequently used, viz on a flat rock or by twisting it on the ramrod tied in corn shucks and baked in hot embers (Ext. 381) :

;

;

on boards and

Amount

stones. (Ext. 384.) of ammunition carried

:

The amount de

pended upon the length of the expedition. In the Selma raid the ammunition carried per man for 60 clays was 100 rounds on the horse and 80 in wagons. (Ext. 367.) Extract 371 recommends 80 rounds on the

man and

man

in the wagons as enough for five rounds 40 battles, allowing per man per battle. On the Trevillian raid each man carried 40 rounds on the horse and 60 per man in wagons (Ext. 377), but the Federal troops ran out of ammunition and Sheridan

120 rounds per

gives that as the reason Vol. I, p. 425.)

During

why

he retreated.

(Memoirs,

s march from Winchester to ammunition carried per man was 75 on

Sheridan

Petersburg the

the horse and 100 in the wagons. (Ext. 380.) During the war, then, cavalry carried from 100 to

180 rounds per man. Our cavalry can

now carry 80 rounds of rifle ammunition on the trooper, depending on the type of cartridge belt used. If each squadron of four troops has one ammunition wagon carrying 2,800 pounds, or 700 pounds per troop, each troop will have 8,400 rounds, or 84 per man, in the squadron wagon. It will be impos

more in the saddle pockets unless some thrown out. There is already carried one emergency rations, one day s field rations, two

sible to carry

thing else is

day

s

154

haversack rations, extra grain in the nose bag, extra horseshoes and other necessary articles. More ammuni

on the person in bandoliers. If each he will have on the person 140 the wagon 84 rounds, making a total of

tion can be carried carries

trooper

rounds and

in

one,

224 rounds, which should be ample for at least two ern battles.

AMMUNITION SUPPLY

p ld

fir-

TO THE FIRING LINE.

And

Ext. No. 392.

Ammunition supply to the ing line.

here

let

me

,

,

mod

call

your attention

.

t

having some organized system of ordnance sergeants, or men detailed whose duty it shall be

to the necessity of e

Janfe 9 May*i864.

to keep

cavalry

commands

nition during engagements.

well

supplied with ammu with the breech-

Men armed

loading weapon will necessarily fire a greater number of rounds than those armed with a muzzle-loading piece,

and

it

utterly impossible for a

is

cavalryman

to carry

more than from 60 to 80 rounds upon his person, and when dismounted and away from his horse this supply can easily be exhausted in a few hours firing.

At daylight Weeks, our own

details

were sent

to the train.

Captain

command

of detail, immediately started for some nine miles distant, making the trip train,

in

back to Hanover Court House, thence to Ashland, twen ty-seven miles, each man loaded with 85 pounds of

ammunition,

in

less

than one-half day and even then

hardly arrived in time, as three boxes were captured by the enemy before we could issue it to the men. (Lieut. Col. G. A. Purington,

Vol. 36, Part

Mounted tails

de-

Ext.

I, p.

R.,

895.)

No. 393.

distribute

2d Ohio Cav., R.

Through

the

kindness

of

Major

Dana, who furnished me with a mounted detail, I sucthe firing eavily cee ded in procuring a supply of ammunition, which was regaled Five Forks, Va., delivered and distributed to the men on the line of ammunition

Apr.

1,

to line

1865.

battle while heavily engaged.

(Col. A. C.

Vol. 46, Part

I,

M. Pennington, 3d N, p.

1136.)

J.

Cav., R. R.,

155

Forty rounds of ammunition ought Amount of ammunition neceec to be enough for any cavalry skirmisher if he rights sary for a cavalry .skirmisher to last from daylight to dark, and a regiment announcing itseli an day. 8 in the thick of a fight ought to be tJnTva. June ii"out of ammunition Ext, No. 394.

,

.

.

,

r-

-i

1

.L

.

11

"

,

severely censured in brigade, division and corps orders. But these "out of ammunition" fellows have often got

men

better

into

grave

peril

by falling back, and thus

leaving a gap for the enemy to occupy. I have seen the whole of a brigade forced into a retreat and the loss of

from the failure of a single regiment in was at Trevillian Station, near Gordonswe were ville, Va., fighting on foot, and before we were aware of it a force of the enemy was in our rear and

many this

prisoners

manner.

It

firing into the led horses.

Only the approach of dark

many of us, myself in the number, from cap and I lost my horse and had to foot it till I cap ture, ness saved

tured another.

(Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade,

p.

21.)

Sheridan claims that he had to withdraw from Tre villian Station because his

(Sheridan

s

ammunition had given

Memoirs, Vol.

I, p.

out.

425.)

COMMENTS.

A

enough ammunition on his A cavalryman may which horse, ammunition, under

soldier should carry

person to fight at least

one

have ammunition on his most circumstances, will be

battle.

available.

It will

seldom be

possible to bring ammunition from the squadron wagons to the firing line, but where horsemen can approach

the firing line from the rear under cover, can be so supplied. (Ext. 393.)

ammunition

Pack mules will usually be available to bring am munition from the wagons to some sheltered place, where the boxes can be broken open and the bandoliers dis If an organization is well controlled in fire tributed. the 80 rounds in the belt and one bandolier on discipline, the person, together with what can be obtained from the dead and wounded, should enable it to fight at least one pitched

battle.

(Ext. 394.)

156

EMERGENCY RATIONS. Emergency

Ext No.

ra-

395.

They have

also sent us

cakes which Lun, our mess cook, calls

compressed

"desecrated

vege have boiled, baked, fried, stewed, pickled, sweetened, salted it, and tried it in puddings, cakes and

We

tables."

pies,

but

it

boys break the

modes of cooking at defiance, so the up and smoke it in their pipes. They say

sets all it

Dutch of the

we

"Fourst

Missouri"

know how

to

cook

are too proud to learn. it, but (The Last Campaign, by E. N. Gilpin, 3d la. Cav., published in the Journal of the U. S. Cavalry Associa tion.)

157

CHAPTER

X.

ANIMALS ENDURANCE, CARE AND DISEASE. ENDURANCE.

From September 26

Ext. No. 396.

to

October

9,

s division, composed of Minty s and Long marched and fought 247 miles in six days.

1863, Crook brigades,

(Genl. D. S. Stanley, R. R., Vol. 30, Part

II,

s

mar-

^ivfcio^

x days

s*

Spnt Ont

p.

668.)

Ext. No. 397. The First Maine Cavalry marched chiflTm without rest. nrv 90 miles without rest. Bristoe (Va.) ..

.

,

(J. Irvin

Gregg, R. R., Vol. 29, Part

Ext. No. 398.

Mitchell

s

I,

p.

campaign,

366.)

Cavalry Division marched

Oct.,

Division mar ches 52 miles in hours.

^

52 miles in 24 hours.

e

d

(Brig. Genl. R. B. Mitchell, R. R., Vol. 30, Part R J?dey s 5aTd Oct., 1863. TT *(\\ II, p. 669.)

Ext. No. 399.

In the pursuit of Wheeler

s

cavalry,

six days forced

October 4th to 9th, 1863, there was scarcely an hour dur-ah-y out of busiing the whole pursuit that the horses were unsaddled, wheeierand Roddey s raid Tj ,1,1 ,1 11 For days and nights together the men were in the saddle, Oct., ises. almost constantly on the march, and some days making 1

1

1

A

A

as high as 53 and 57 miles. greater part of the time the troops were out of rations, our hasty movements giv ing them no time to forage on the country; the nights

were very cold and the men without overcoats.

It

is

positively necessary that a large number of horses be had before the command can be in working condition

again.

(Brig. Genl. R. B. Mitchell, R. R., Vol. 30, Part p.

II,

672.)

Ext.

No. 400.

marched 350 miles

First

Brigade

in 14 days.

Michigan cavalry Brigade

mar-

miles in

158

wheeler and Roddey s raid Oct., 1863.

(Col. A. P. Campbell, R. R., Vol. 30, Part II, p. ,-

x

678. )

Ext

ch^fef^ieTTn hours.

22^ Wheeler and

mil

Roddey

^A OQ

raid,

s

Oct., 1863.

No

-

The

401.

-

1 S^S 1C)00

M.

(Lieut. Col. R.

wheeler and Roddeys raid, Oct., 1863.

:00 p. M., October

R. R., Vol. 30, Part

Ex

t.

No. 402.

marched 750 miles

First Term. Cav.

m two mO nths. R., Vol. 30,

Part

had marched 41 miles that day. Genl. George Crook, 2d Cav. Div., R. R.,

Ext. No. 403. ay (

i

Bri

"-

-Vol. 30, Part

II, p.

I

686.)

Ext. No. 404.

Brigade mar-

Brownlow, R.

681.)

II, p.

WaSSf

Russell,

679.)

(Lieut. Col. J. P.

wh

1

-

>

II, p.

n

9th Perm. Cav. marched 61

October 2d, to

2 ;30

f

Although

ches 30 miles per

my

horses and

men were

eightweai~i e d with marches, which for eight weeks had aver-

01*

weeks

w heeler

and

de id sept o cCi863

aged 30 miles a day, I obeyed the order. (Col. G. B. Hodge, C. S., Comg. Brig., R.

R., Vol.

30, Part II, p. 726.) Division marches 52 miles in 24 hours. ha oct

,

m

er>s

Ext

My command

No. 405.

having-

marched 52

miles in 24 hours.

raid

i8 63

(Col.

Edward Hatch, Comg. Cav.

Div., R. R., Vol.

30, Part II, p. 741.)

15 hours.

After making a march of 50 miles

Ext. No. 406.

Brigade marches 50 miles in

m .

.

r

15 hours. (Col.

31,

Parti,

J. J.

Morrison, Comg. Cav. Brig., R. R., Vol.

12.)

p.

We

Ext. No. 407.

Division marches 30 to 40 mile*

marched 30

to

40 miles

1

r

1

for six days, during which a great deal of

mond^May!

fallen,

ife?"

some places work done, comparatively few of

and the roads

sidering the

We

failed.

in

captured as

many

(Brig. Genl. A. V. Kautz,

Vol. 36, Part TWO h

Sive

consec days

"

jatfA^rr 1864.

Ext No

divisions

dan

two

s (

II, p. -

408.

divisions

R R VoL -

->

daily

ram hadj very heavy. Con

.

.

daily for six days,

horses as

we

Comg. Cav.

1

the horses

lost.

Div., R. R.,

174.)

During the Trevillian raid Sherimarched fifty-six consecutive days.

36 Part >

J >

159

Ext. No. 409.

If such is their expectation, it is Division marthat can know that this command has Sis day* they impossible marched 1,400 miles since the 1st of May, without a Vasnhe Bc *J "

remount, and without a halt sufficiently long to shoes on

my

set the

^- Jnl ^ 1864

-

horses.

(Report of Brig. Genl.

Wm. W.

Averill,

Comg. 2d

Cav. Div., dated Aug. 3d, 1864, R. R., Vol. 37, Part I,

330.)

p.

Both men and horses of

Ext. No. 410.

my

division

Division stay in the saddle 18

They have been in the saddle from eighteen Atlanta eamsince the 2cl of this month. to twenty hours each day J paign May, 1864. need

rest.

(Col. E.

Part

M. McCook, May

20, 1864, R. R., Vol. 38,

752.)

II, p.

Ext. No. 411.

I

move

received orders to

to Gil5

lem

s

Bridge

(five miles)

and

at a gallop

This five-mile gallop rendered bridge at all hazards. horses unserviceable. about 300 (Col. Robt. Vol. 38, Part II,

H. G. Minty, Comg. p.

Ext. No. 412.

R.

R.,

to this time

had

Brig.,

III,

p.

Ga.,

19, 1864.

My command

up

com-

cavalry &

S mn eT without Quanta cam-

955.)

Ext. No. 413. thia to the

Kingston,

May

811.)

traveled about seventy miles without having halted. (Maj. Genl. Jos. Wheeler, C. S., R. R., Vol. 38,

Part

Brigade gallops miles and ren-

to hold the

The march

Cumberland

river

of 470 miles from Cyn-

and back .

cavalry march 1

to

,

n

B

?, a nd i20 Lexington inaay miles in less than

perhaps, the most rapid and trying known 60 hours. r the war, especially that from Irvine to the Cum-intoifenta cVy, during berland, a distance of 120 miles, in less than sixty hours,

eleven days

is,

with stock the most of which had already traveled nearly a thousand miles. (Col. P-

Chas.

S.

Hanson, R.

R.,

Vol.

39,

Part

I,

42.) Morgan con The forces under Generals Burn- cedes that enemy and Hobson, who were at Pound Gap and Mud

Ext. No. 414.

bridge

Morgan s raid Creek, finding that the state was invaded, immediately. J into Kentucky June 1864 and their into intended gave up Virginia expedition .

-

>

pursued

my command.

They reached Mount

Sterling

160 daylight on the 9th, twenty-four hours. at

(Brig. Genl.

Part

I,

f

June, 1864.

H. Morgan, C.

S.,

R. R., Vol. 39,

p. 68.)

^xt. No.

^^

During this interval of eighty-one from marching and fighting not to excee d six hours. During these eighty-one hours the Division marched 135 miles. (Maj. Genl. J. H. Wilson, R. R., Vol. 40, Part I, p.

d uand ucho hours

Cam-

J.

having marched 90 miles in

the

command

rested

624.) 16 days.

Grierson

s

raid,

Apr., 1863.

Curing Grierson s raid, April, 1863, two regiments of 111. Cav. marched 600 miles in less than 16 days. The last 76 miles was marched in 28 hours. This command was enabled to replace broken-down horses from the country passed through. (R. R., Vol. 24, Parti,

p.

528.)

ENDURANCE IN THE CHARGE. Ext. No. 417.

charge unsuc-

cessful with

We

charged up to the enemy over

-

1

<

t

c

a long stretch of marshy ground, intersected by a difVa "ficult ditch and JuteHse! terminating in a hill of plowed ground. The charge was unsuccessful, the most of the horses

blown

horses, .

being so blown that it was impossible to bring or keep them for such a distance at a charging pace. (Capt. Cram, 6th U. S. Cav., R. R., Vol. 27, Part I,

Regiment

charges

for

line

s

-

cM B n Tenn

oc t

947.)

Ext.

No. 418.

5

miles and breaks

through enemy

p.

v

Long- at their head,

The 2d Kentucky, with Colonel r made a most ~gallant charge of some ^

breaking through his lines, etc. (Brig. Genl. George Crook, R. R., Vol. 30, Part

five miles,

4, i863:

p.

II,

685.)

COMMENTS.

to

These extracts speak for themselves. There is little be said on the subject of endurance of cavalry on the

march, except that

all

recent marches, for the purpose

of determining what can be done, serve no purpose other than breaking down, unnecessarily, horses which are very difficult to replace.

The war of

the Rebellion sufficiently

161 tried out the subject,

and

if

anybody

is

not satisfied with

the above reports, the Rebellion records furnish

many

more. OARE. Ext:.

Here we drew

No. 419.

five

pounds of

for-

cavalry get

t

no care or for

age and removed our saddles for the first time in six a e e days, during which period we had marched from the ba d

-

f or

reat

S

Rappahannock to Chancellorsville, doing duty both day 3 Sr 8eg8 and night, and had been under the command of rAae different officers.

(Lieut. Col. G. A. Purington,

Vol. 36, Part

place

we had

R.,

893.)

I, p.

Ext. No. 420. is

2d Ohio Cav., R.

The

thirteen days the only time during the whole

we

lay at this

FUII forage cane

campaign that

forage for our horses. Atlanta ( Campaign, Col. R. H. G. Minty, R. R., Vol. 38, Part II, p. 815.) full

Ext. No. 421. The men have taken excellent care of their horses and have uncomplainingly marched on foot a considerable portion of each day s march in order

a

during P&

un

At paign

t

a

]

veteran

to save them.

H. Peters, 4th la. Cav., R. 499. Wilson s Selma raid.)

(Lieut. Col. 49, Part

I,

p.

J.

The

Ext. No. 422. ,

R., Vol.

horses subsisted almost entirely

.

upon green corn during our absence, but returned

in

Grierson

Apr May "

fair condition.

(Brig. Genl. B. p.

use of green corn as forage.

H. Grierson, R.

R., Vol. 39,

Part

s raid 1868

I,

388.)

Ext. No. 423.

My horses are much worn down, Green been fed for the last ten days on green corn. having G Many of them are foundered by the injudicious manner Ap ^ in which they are fed. (Col. Joseph Karge, 39, Part

I,

p.

Comdg. Cav.

Div., R. R., Vol.

392.)

Ext. No. 424.

The

horses of the battery have suf- Green they have had to undergo been greater than animals can stand with no other forage AP^ than green corn at this season. fered most, as the

toil

com

162

W.

(Col. J.

Noble, R. R., Vol. 39, Part

The following reading

is

a

I,

p.

396.)

of a report well worth

summary

:

The 7th Pa. Cav. started April 30, Ext. No. 425. 1864 with 919 horses fresh from the corral at Nashville; u e depl rable rl su its

were unused to military duty and the majority were young. Of the enlisted men 300 were raw recruits; some had never been on a horse before. The regiment traveled 48 consecutive hours and during that time the horses were without food. Then we received 23 pounds of corn the y

for three

days"

and carried

feed,

it

and

five

days rations

on the horses.

Out of 72 hours 60 hours.

May

of starvation.

the horses were under the saddle

22d the

May

loss of

26th to

76 horses reported as died June 2d the horses were

without feed and actually starved.

One

battalion lost in action trying to procure for

age, 33 horses, and 101 starved to death.

A

detail traveled 30 miles after forage and returned without any. Another detail traveled 26 miles and re turned with one quart per horse.

June 13th to 18th, received half forage. June 19th to 22d, received no forage. June 23d to July 17th, received half forage. sore backs a ing forageon fhe 6 8

much harm

as

the forage does good.

J u ty 27th to 30th, foraged on the country for twenAll was packed upon ty miles around Stone Mountain. the withers of the horses, doing as much harm as the .

...

.

,

.

feed did good, causing sore backs, August 1st to 15th the command cavalry in trenches means c .,11 gross neglect of and separated from the horses. .

was

in the trenches

,

August 15th and 16th, received one quart per head. August 17th and 18th, received one pint of feed. August 19th to 24th, marched 120 miles, feeding but once upon green corn. August 24th to September 9th, half rations. September 9th to llth, no feed and no grazing. Stock received no

salt or

hay during the campaign.

163 Recapitulation

:

Horses 919 42

Started with

Captured

961

Loss

:

Abandoned and died

230

Killed and captured

171

401 Present September 13

Marched 902

560

miles, not including picket

duty and

company scouting. The horses were without food 26 days and food 27 days; they were 7 consecutive days without of any kind.

The majority doned were Part

scant

March from

f ood to

^SA^

g&

A

p

-

to

AH ^

:

of horses that died and were aban

literally starved.

(Maj.

Wm.

II, p.

832.)

Jennings, 7th Pa. Cav., R. R., Vol. 38

Ext. No. 426.

The men are in good health and Nea ri y half of but want clothing badly. I have sent back toSWgffiSK spirits, e e f aat endeavor to procure a supply of both, and also horse- of hoJs e 8 ho5 want of which nearly half our cavalry is ,&$?}" iffi! shoes,^for unserviceable. As soon as these necessary articles are obtained, we shall be prepared to resume operations. (General R. E. Lee, R. R., Vol. 27, Part II, p, 302.) COMMENTS.

The frequent change of rimental to any organization.

commanders

is

highly det

(Ext. 419.) Constant night picket duty will soon render cavalry unserviceable. (Ext. 419.) Full forage can seldom be expected during a cam paign.

(Ext. 420.)

Veteran cavalry save their horses.

Green corn 423, 424.)

is

will

frequently walk on

foot

to

(Ext. 421.) a very unsatisfactory forage.

(Exts.

164

Deplorable results can be expected from recruits mounted on young, untrained and unseasoned horses

which receive scant forage. (Ext. 425.) Sore backs caused from packing forage on the horse does cavalry as

much harm

forage does

as the

(Ext. 425.) placing of cavalry in trenches means gross of their horses. (Ext. 425.) neglect The want of horseshoes will render cavalry tem

good.

The

porarily unserviceable.

(Ext. 426.)

FIELD DISEASES.

Ext

Hoof-rot

Bristoe

(Va.)

ampaign Oct 63

-

N

-

haVC Sent t0 the Q uartermaster S Washington City 471 disabled horses.

427.

-

*

Department in There are at least 100 more

among

frightful loss

in

the

command.

The

horses owing to a disease which in the army hoof rot) from the

resembles tetter (called effects of which the finest appearing horses in the com mand become disabled in a few days march. The dis

ease seems to have been contracted in the quartermas ter s corrals in

Washington.

(Brig. Genl. I,

p.

Wesley Merritt, R.

Part

353.)

Ext. No. 428.

Hoof-rot.

R., Vol. 29,

My

cavalry was

much reduced by

recent active operations, and particularly by the appear ance with the last few days of hoof disease, which is

now

spreading rapidly. Part (Genl. Meade, R. R., Vol. 29, Ext.

Hoof-rot.

No. 429.

His horses are not

service, and the disease called its

II,

p.

fit

"rotten-hoof"

376.) for hard

has

made

virulence. appearance in that division with great Pleasanton, R. R., Vol. 29, Part II, p. 382.)

(Genl.

Hoof-rot and swelled tongue.

Within the last three days I have dismounted camp 265 men been ^({^ and horses, the horses having been affected with hoof disease and swelled tongue. Ext.

No

-

430.

to send into the

Vol. 29, Part (Genl. Kilpatrick, R. R.,

II, p.

401.)

165

The remedy used

Ext. No. 431.

at the depot

is

chloride of antimony for sore feet, and a decoction of

white oak bark for the mouth.

Another is borax and alum, half and half, pulver- Another remedy, and mixed with sweet oil and applied with a swab to the tongue; and still another, common salt crisped on a hot shovel and applied to the feet and mouth. ized

Prevention

Give the horses

:

all

the salt they can

Prevention,

eat.

(R. R., Vol. 29, Part II, 27th to

From February

419.)

p.

March

28th,

1865, Sheri

dan, with two divisions of cavalry, marched from

Win

chester to Petersburg. He says "There perhaps never was a march where nature offered such impediments and shrouded herself in so much gloom as upon this; inces :

sant rain, deep and almost impassable streams,

mud were

and

"Our

tirely

from

swamps

overcome.

loss in horses

was considerable

almost en-

LOSS from hoof-

hoof-rot."

Ext. No. 432.

A

troublesome disease,

known

as

Grease-heei.

"grease heel," had prevailed among the horses, and the number of men for duty in this brigade had been re duced to less than 1,000.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. p.

J.

E. B. Stuart,

169.)

Ext. No. 433. The hardships of the expedition had been so extreme and prolonged that it had perceptibly affected them, leaving them jaded and footsore. Many also were now taken with the "scours" and "cramp,"

which proved so fatal in a few moments that of the 550 with which the command reached Rome, not more than

scours,

CrampB

-

250 remained. (Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest p.

Cavalry,

279.)

Ext. No. 434. ,

s

. <

A

slip

of old blanket

made

into a

11

bandage, carefully and closely

around the legs, beginning at the pastern, will save every horse s heels

from

scratches.

Four such

rolled

strips,

warmed and

dried at

HOW to keep horses from getting scratches.

166 the

put such comfort into the animal as to to go through a mud raid unharmed. The

will

fire,

enable him heels

and pasterns should be hand rubbed after cleansing, little grease rubbed in now and then. Such a plan save the whole force from scratches if the use of

and a will

is combined therewith. (P. 39.) quarters will save your horses from scratches. (Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade, p. 54.)

bandages

Dry

COMMENTS.

The disease called hoof-rot amounted, at times, to an epidemic. It comes from constantly standing in the mud. It was common in the cavalry camp at Huntsville, The prevention is to stand the horse in a dry place and bandage their pasterns with flannel ban The cure is very difficult. (Ext. 434.) dages. Ala., in 1898.

The Forrest

scours and cramps which proved so fatal to horses seemed to be very rare. (Ext. 433.)

s

LED HORSES. Led horses causes confusion to troops in rear,

The confusion occasioned by getr number of led horses 1^-111 hastily back on one

Ext. No. 435. ,

.

i

<

ting a large

1

1

1

road was communicated to the

men and

caused the

men

to break badly.

(Col. G. 36, Part

^

an assault

in

man shoui^be cre dit the

fir

To>

f or

action, leaving only 1

A

( Col

*"

Part

Brig., R. R., Vol.

Col.

Lieut.

Briggs deserves great man possible into eight with horses.

his efforts to bring every

"

Fngiine

Apises/

^^

^

xt>

7

H. Chapman, Comg. 2d 897.)

I, p.

-

-

one

Miller,

man

in

Comg.

Brig.,

R. R., Vol. 49,

448.)

I, p.

This extract refers to the assault of Selma, Ala., dismounted by cavalry.

^

Led horses d edbyareg ~

fmen t S

2 i86?

2d >

a Ala

Apr

Long Ohio.

^

xt>

1865 s

^

^ n t ^ie

attac ^

on Selma,

Ala., April

the led horses and

pack mules of General division were guarded by a regiment, the 3d They were found necessary to keep off the Con >

federate cavalry, which was attacking them in rear. (Col. Robt. Minty, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 461.)

167 (Brig. Genl. Eli Long, R. R., Vol. 49, Part

I,

p.

438.)

So

Ext. No. 438.

commandj many

r

when disenemy press my mounted cavalry br eats, press men were unable to mount their them

,1

closely did the

.

of the

.

closely.

.

horses; the enemy, capturing and mounting- the horses, j, repeatedly charged my rear as I continued to retreat. i

.

stoneman

s

raid

July 27,-Ang.

6,

1864-

H. Capron, R. R., Vol. 38, Part II, p, 927.) Ext. No. 439. Gregg decided to retreat when he in a retreat the all his led horses got fairly on the way, and such of sent aSSS with (Col.

,

the

,

wounded

right flank

,

,

.

,

as could be transported, he retired in some confusion, it is true, but

by

the wounded.

his

wounded

A11 e

stubbornly S5??d B hSuid bl to Hopewell Church, where Hampton ceased resisting ross TaiC^c 0a d S Va Jnne to press him. ?2 i 8 k "

(Sheridan Ext. 440.

Memoirs,

s

The

p.

435, Vol. I.)

rebel brigade

up the hollow, colors

in

front,

came

and

in

double quick another instant at

when mountn a

e

%avy

fil

?s

fire

was in line of battle. Three hundred Spencers from the the command mounted under 00 zd Iowa drove them back in confusion but a moment, fSSS^SSd however, intervened when the rebels rallied. Major Hor- On e battalion ton in the meantime retired and mounted, TthSrs by battalions, &* "

;

"hi

under the me

fire,

leaving one officer and five

men wounded on withdrawal*

1

Campbellsville,

field neia.

Tenn

(Col. D. E. Coon, R. R., Vol. 45, Part

I,

p.

Nov

,

24>

64

;

588.)

Ext. No. 441.

A sudden dash Wheeling with his escort (about 75 into a battery men) and a detachment of some 50 strong, the Conf ed- f a e 8 .

j

erate

commander now made one of

his

characteristic

dashes at their pieces, dispersed their gunners and threw their infanty support into such confusion as to materially aid his

command

at the

moment

to

regain and

mount

their horses.

(Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest p.

s

Cavalry,

214.)

COMMENTS. If a large

road,

number of

much confusion

often happen that there

can

travel.

led

horses go back on one

will result. is

(Ext. 435.)

It will

no other road over which they

If possible, led horses should be in rear of

p

Ro 30>

rk

s

^ ^nn s

1862

168 the units to which they belong and maintain that relative position.

When

horses do not need to be moved, they can be tied in a circle, and thus bring more men into the fight.

(Ext. 436.)

A

guard should always be

with the led horses.

left

(Ext. 437.)

Extract 438

a case of led horses being cap to charge their former riders.

cites

mounted and used

tured,

When a retreat is decided upon, the led horses be sent to the rear with the wounded. (Ext. 439.) Dismounted troops may regain under cover of a vigorous attack. value

of being a e ]umpfng horse. little

Ext. No.

*

442.*

*

horses

led

their

may

(Exts. 440, 441.)

through which flows a

stream whose steep banks form a ditch from ten to feet wide and from three to four feet deep.

Pa

fifteen

jun?8o!i863.

Stuart, with his staff and couriers,

on the

side next the

enemy.

The

occupied this field position soon became

whose retreat by the remained but to leap the Nothing favorite his mare, Vir ditch. Splendidly mounted on at a running leap and landed ginia, Stuart took the ditch several feet to spare. Some with other side the on safely with of the party made the leap equal success, but a few

one of extreme road was cut

failed

peril to

off.

and landed

w hence by r

Stuart,

their

riders

in

the

shallow water,

energetic scrambling they reached the safe

side of the stream.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. p.

pact

J.

E. B. Stuart,

328.)

Ext. No. 443.

trains

I

directed

McCook

to

strengthen

the battalion previously ordered to Centerville by a regitherefore machine guns on me nt and to follow at once with LaGrange s entire bnroE

,

cannot packs u cavli?y making a forced march Wilson

s

Raid,

Mar,A P r.,i865.

.

,

i

i

,

.

the main leaving all pack trains and wagons with co i umn so t hat he could march with the utmost celerity. T Wilson, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, (Mzj. Genl j acle

>

H

p.

358.)

169

Ext. No. 444.

I found it I Mules as necessary to retreat. m the command gave immediately fours, right about, JonTsborongii Ga Augl 81 This movement, owing to the narrowgallop, march." ness of the lane and the many obstinate mules on which one-fourth of the men were mounted, was executed with some confusion. (Capt. M. Choumee, Comg. 5th la. Cav., R. R., "

:

1864>

Vol.

38.,

Part

II, p.

873.)

170

CHAPTER XL MISCELLANEOUS INTERESTING FACTS.

Artillery

by

wheel

ng

Ext. No. 445.

team

disabled

tanon

f

guns.

A

K>?6e!

McNutt Te

s

Bridge,

his

Seeing our force so small, a batformed and advanced to retake the enemy horse in each wheel team was shot to hinder

tne

moving them. (Col. O.

H. LaGrange, R.

R., Vol. 32, Part

I,

p.

144.)

See also Ext. 119. Ext. No. 446.

Killing of lead

and swing horses

.

,

,

,

does not prevent drivers and horses the gun from being moved. killed or wounded, .

May

Before the guns could be moved, the r

1

1

1

of the lead and swing teams were and Ryan, the driver of the wheel

had his arm shattered by a bullet. Breathed jumped from his horse, cut loose the teams that were struggling on the ground, mounted a wheel horse, and team,

e, 1864.

off the

brought

gun almost

as

by a

miracle.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. p.

J.

E. B. Stuart,

408.)

COMMENTS.

The foregoing

way bison s

Raid

Mar.-Apr., 1865.

General

team

go is

to

The plan of that constructed by and afterwards occupied by Upton s regard the best arrangement of a cavalry can

tonment yet devised. (Maj. Genl. J. H. Wilson, R. "

355.)

that the best

wheel horse.

Hammond

di v j s i on j

p.

show

to kill a

No. 447.

Ext.

Model canton-

extracts

to stop an artillery

R., Vol. 49,

Part

I,

171

172

Yards

astt oa DO oa oa DO a DO DO oa oa DO sO DO DO-,Da DO DO ^Q DO DO DO DO DO -a DO DO DO Da DO 43 DO DO oa DO oa }

to

o D

D D D D

oo oo oo oo oo o

a a a a a a

oa oa DO D-D DO DO oa Da^oa oa DaDa DO DO oa DO DO DO

oa oa oa DO oa DO

DO DO DO DO DO OO

D D o D D D

o oo oo QQ oo oo o

H

O a o CD a a

DO oa DO DO oa DQ

DC DO DO Da DO-DO oa^oa DO DO DO DO

DO oa oa oa DO DO

DO oa oa DO DO oa

O

o o o D o

a oo oo oo oo oo o

a

?

Waterloo and CrieallvaTn s Ferry Road

Plan of the Cantonment of the 1st Brigade, 7th Division, Cavalry Corps, Military Divi sion of the Mississippi, at Gravelly Springs, Ala., in January and February, 1865. Accom panying report of Bvt. Maj. Gen. J. H. "Wilson, U. S. A., June 29, 1865.

NOTE A.

NOTE

:

End Elevation

of Stables. B. Side Elevation of Stables. C. Side Elevation of Cabins. D. Front Elevation of Cabins. E. Plan of Cabins. F. Stables. G. Men s Quarters.

a. b.

Bunks.

c.

Chimnej and Fireplace.

d.

Door.

e.

Vacant place

to

sit.

Figures denote the dimensions in feet

H. Regimental Headquarters. I.

:

Table.

and inches.

Brigade Headquarters.

Treatment civilians

Ext. No. 448.

of

when

secrecy is desired.

The enemy made

a forced

march .

o f 35 miles on the 3d instant, and picked

way

all

An

who might

give information of their important scout was captured twelve miles

persons

approach.

up on their

from

the post, and the enemy avoided my infantry pick ets near the town and in advance of the bridge by dis

mounting and moving through the fields with negro Their sudden and unexpected appearance at guides. TUSof the capture bridge and overwhelming numbers dispersed the caloosa, Ala., Apr. 4,1865. militia guard after but a faint show of resistance. Poor

outpost

.

(Capt. A. B. Hardcastle, C. I, p.

505.)

.

.

S.,

R. R., Vol. 49, Part

173 OOLOB8.

Ext.

No

states by the

We

449.

men

missed the colors, taken

discharged, to rally the

to>

the

regiment on,

engagement than at any other time since on account of the small number of officers present.

more

in this

(Maj. W. G. Cummings, 43, Parti, p. 549.) (See also

neces

Cedar Creek,Va., 12, ISM.

NOV.

1st Vt. Cav., R. R., Vol.

Summer Night s Dream.") In our own cavalry sets, at

"A

Ext. No. 450.

colors

sary to rally regiment on.

the

com-

u?e of

lariats

were issued with iron These were soon disused. Their intention picket pins. was to confine the horse at night and permit him to

mencement of

the

war

lariat ropes

graze while tethered. In practice it was found that the horses were certain to get entangled in the ropes and cut their hind pasterns very dangerously.

(Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade,

p.

66.)

AN EXPLOIT. At about 3:00

Ext. No. 451.

A. M.

February 21,

Lieut.

McNeil

Lieutenant

with Federal generals McNeill, Confederate cavalry, J without firing a entered Cumberland, Maryland. They cap- an0t a ?arrmreating thirty men, tured the picket and rode quietly to the headquarters Cumberland, 1865,

Md., Fed. 21, 1865.

of Generals Crook and Kelley, overpowered the guards, and without disturbing the occupants of the adjoining

rooms, compelled the generals to dress and mount led horses waiting at the door and made off at a rapid rate, making good the capture and escape without firing a shot.

The alarm was not given

was an hour before

for ten minutes and

it

a pursuing party could be started.

469 and 470.) Ext. No. 452. About thirteen miles from Macon I Treatment of was met by a flag of truce under the rebel general, Rob- Wilson s Raid, -PU n r Apr. 20, 1865. ertson. Ihe force we were pursuing passedj *i the flag of truce and thus saved themselves. The flag of truce de (R. R., Vol. 46, Part

I,

tained us about half an hour.

pp.

I

then received orders to

give them five minutes to get out of the way, and then to drive everything before me. After going about two miles he

came

in sight of the flag of truce party

the rear of about

250 men.

covering

They were moving very

174

slowly and evidently trying to delay us.

Seeing

this,

the adjutant charged them, causing the flag of truce to run into the woods, capturing three of the officers that

were with

it

and driving the

rebels pell-mell along the

road. (Lieut. Col. F. White, 17th Ind. Mtd. Inf., R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 458.)

FOBAGING HOW DONE. HOW

The only J proper

Ext. No. 453.

to collect

and distribute

L

people to attend

of the quartermaster s made to be to attend to it the department. They ought same as regular issues, the corps quartermaster mapping to

forage.

foraging parties are

officers

out the ground for his division quartermasters, who, All in turn, assign to each brigade its foraging ground. and the and be issued should collected brigade by forage

regimental

The

quartermasters

proportionately

and

justly.

impress wheeled vehicles of the way into the and forbid the carriage of grain service country The on the horses. quartermasters can then keep the best

is

to

grain more easily under their own control, and six or seven times as much can be brought in for distribu tion without any distress to the horses.

(See also Forage under heading of "Supplies.") (Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade, p. 65.)

Safeguards should in all cases be at houses that have supplied the troops to protect Ext. No. 454.

safeguards.

left

them from future

-

Marching cav-

Sov?

n f an r y ve r y e x

ftmOttw iss "

l5S?i8w.

to Jttly

pillage.

(Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade, p. 65.) Ext No 455. Next morning I was ordered to -

move my division dismounted, and did so, marching the men about two miles and as there was S0me chan ge in the orders about our position after we came upon the >

field,

there

was consequently marching and counter

marching, which proved very exhausting to customed to marching on foot.

men unac

of Forrest s (Brig. Genl. J. R. Chalmers, C. S., 326. Part I, p. cavalry, R. R., Vol. 39,

175

No. 456. And so at last our cavalry was Advantages of gathered together from its places of contempt and banded organized into*! Its progress together in one corps, as it should be. Ext.

moment was positively marvelous. Not a dis aster befel the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac from the day it was first drawn into the cavalry corps. It from

that

went on from victory to

victory.

(Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade,

p.

24.)

should Any scheme of military service notcavalry be at a peace which requires long drilling and costly preparation i s a11 the eminently unfitted for the United States. \?

No. 457.

Ext.

.

(Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade,

p.

27.)

COMMENTS.

The extracts referring to organization are very few, but very important. The lessons illustrated should not be forgotten. At the time Sheridan took charge of the cavalry of the

Army

of the Potomac,

an infantry camp on a

wagon

trains.

it

was picketing

60 miles and guarding the Confederate Although cavalry had line of

been an object lesson for three years, not much was learned from the lesson till Sheridan, with Grant s sup port, was enabled to break away from the established

custom of using cavalry as above described. Extract 457 is very short, but Captain Whittaker might have written a book and not have said more. In substance is

it

means

that a peace organization

to be increased in time of

No

war

is

system could be more vicious.

It

to be

which condemned.

was

tried out in

the Spanish war, and conclusively demonstrated that cav alry in time of peace should be at inflation except

block to

its

by trained

men At

effectiveness.

be needed badly or not at all. by such eminent authority as Ext. No. 458. sition of

The

its

war

strength.

will operate as a

Any

complete

the beginning cavalry will

The

Von

principle is supported Bernhardi and others.

transfer of Torbert to the po- cavalry left Merritt in command of 1<3SC

Chief of Cavalry

the First Cavalry Division.

He

had been

tried in the

need.

*

176

from the day he was

place before, and

selected as one

of the young men to be appointed general officers, with the object of giving life to the cavalry corps, he filled the measure of expectation.

(Sheridan

s

Memoirs,

p.

474, Vol.

I.)

PRISONERS.

March 3d to 8th, 1865, Sheridan risoners captured at Waynesborough, under conP ni 8 tiie c o untr shenandoah voy commanded by Col. John L. Thompson, N. H. Cav., strength of

Ext. No. 459.

a

guard of convoy ne n a sent p

ey

Winchester, number of prisoners l,3oo. The escort consisted of dismounted men and those with poor horses from all the cavalry, about 600 men, together with seven to

i865.

small organizations numbering 600 men in all ranks. The march was through a hostile country infested

by Rosser

The

s

and Mosby

s

men.

strength of the guard

was about one

soldier

one prisoner.

to

Thompson, R.

(Col. J. L.

R., Vol. 46,

Part

I,

p.

528.) Advance troopi leave prisoners to

We had no men to spare to guard and they were ordered to the rear as fast as captured, and were gathered up bv parties of our own ^ and other commands. Ext. No. 460.

.

,

be gathered up prisoners, by other troops in rear.

Selma, Apr.

Ala.,

2, 1865.

,

(Col. J. G. Vail, 17th Ind., R. p.

command

not

prisoners.

Apr.

2,

1865.

I,

Ext. No. 461. I moved forward as fast as possible toward the city, passing squads of the enemy who had

thrown away their arms, and whom I ordered to the rear, but on account of the paucity of my command I could

men

to

guard them.

(Lieut. Col. E. Kitchell, 98th

Part

I,

p.

111.,

R. R., Vol. 49,

452.)

Here the column turned to the right double-quick moved down the line of entrench-

Ext. No. 462.

victorious

Columbus, Ga., Apr. 16, 1865.

Vol. 49, Part

450.)

not spare

troops pay no at tention to prison-

R,

and

at the

ments on the principal fort, running over scores of the enemy and paying no attention to prisoners. (Lieut. Col. J.

H.

498.)

Peters, 4th la. Cav., R.

R., Vol. 49,

Part

I,

p.

177

The capture of prisoners was com- prisoners ignorignored in the eagerness of the men to press Inem? stniihoJS forward so long as there was an enemy still showing re- EbeneezeTchnrch Ext. No. 463.

pletely

Aia., Apr. i, 1865.

sistance.

(Col.

Parti,

p.

J.

Morris Young, 5th

la.

Cav., R. R., Vol. 49,

503.)

COMMENTS.

Where

there

is

danger of prisoners becoming no attention should

little

organized to offer effective resistance, be paid to them by advanced troops. It

true that troops in rear will gather them;

is

and claim the honors, but advanced troops

up

have to

will

suffer the injustice rather than fail to administer a de cisive

To

defeat to the enemy.

victorious troops of

men

to

deplete the advanced

guard prisoners would be

to

relinquish the fruits of victory.

The advanced there

is

(Exts. 460, 461, 462.) troops should press forward as long as

an enemy

still

Ext. No. 464.

to

show

resistance.

(Ext

463.)

attempted to fall back upon the f support above referred to, but finding this in full retreat, I

.

the regiment

nearly two resistance.

was swept

to the lines of the First Brigade, miles, without being able to offer any effectual It

will

be borne in mind that

recruits in ranks that never before

had

I

had 150

drilled

a day

or heard a shot in earnest. (Lieut. Col. J. p.

W.

Bennett, R. R., Vol. 43, Part

I,

545.)

COMMENTS.

The commander who depends on recruits will lean on a broken reed. They are useful only at their own fireside, which they will fight to defend. Even then they are useful only on the defensive. Ext. No. 465. field

Heaven grant

In sending re-enforcements into the may not be organized into

that they

fresh regiments, as they were at ruinous and suicidal costs in 1864. Sent as recruits to fill up gaps of the

men pick up their duty in a very short time under the teaching s of their comrades. veterans, such

Recruits are not to be depended on -

n

a

naee, va.! oct

a 7",

178

(Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade, Recall gives notice to the of

a re ta

Ma

9~

Ext. No. 466.

La Grange,

Col.

rinding the

p.

32.)

enemy

massing heavily upon him, ordered the recall sounded. e enem y becoming aware of our situation, rushed for-

^

ward

overwhelming numbers, capturing many of the dismounted skirmishers and driving the remainder in

1864>

in

confusion to the woods. (Lieut. Col. II, p.

H.

P.

Lamson, R.

R., Vol.

38,

Part

781.)

COMMENTS.

Trumpet calls in the presence of the enemy only The serve to give them notice of intended movements. value of trumpet calls may well be questioned. If they cannot be used in the presence of the enemy, of what good are they in time of peace? There are a few that it

will

make no

enemy knows or The enemy can see

difference whether the

does not know, such as the charge.

and

the charge,

hear the

call.

rear, assemble,

it

will

Such by

make no

calls,

difference if he does

however, as the

the flank,

etc.,

might

recall, to the

as well be dis

pensed with.

RUSE OK STRATAGEM. A

ruse.

Jam?s!

jSA K

In order to deceive the enemy still more, I sent during the night one of my divisions to the opposite side of the James, first covering the bridge with moss and grass to prevent the tramp of the horses being Ext. No. 467.

heard, and at daylight marched it back again on foot in full view of the enemy, creating the impression that a large and continuous still

p.

Aruse Grierson s Raid, Apr. 17,-May 2, bo.

movement

to the north side

going on. (Maj. Gen. P. H. Sheridan, R.

R., Vol. 36,

was

Part

I,

800.)

Ext. No. 468. During Grierson s raid, Captain He Forbes with Co. C, 1st 111. Cav., was detached. s to Gnerson later reached Enterprise in an effort rejoin command. Here he found 2,000 rebels just getting off He promptly raised a flag of truce and rode the cars. ,

boldly forward and

demanded

the surrender of the place

179

The

to Colonel Grierson.

Good

rebel officer, Colonel

win, asked one hour to consider the proposition, which was granted. Captain Forbes then moved out of sight

and then moved

with

off after Colonel Grierson

all

pos

sible speed.

(History of U.

S.

Cavalry, Brackett,

296.)

p.

Fortunately Young had with him he moved rapidly from point to music tended to exaggerate in its in and rear, point by the enemy s estimation the force at his disposition.

A

Ext. No. 469.

a regimental band

this

;

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. p.

J.

ruse,

m

e pafg",

"

Vet i863

E. B. Stuart,

384.)

BOUT PANIC.

The enemy

Ext. No. 470.

s

retreat finally

became

Rout.

Panic,

a rout; led horses, mounted men and artillery all fled gre\T Scutioen n r treatiIlg Williston, with hisE r 00 ps. together in the wildest confusion. l

>

battery, took position near

with his guns, planting

a by and did elegant practice tJn*va" juneii

midst of the con-

shells in the

,

181

fused mass of the retreating enemy. (Brig. Genl. Wesley Merritt, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I,

p.

850.)

In this attack the enemy was driven .. in confusion from his position and simultaneous with

cavalry when defeated in front

Merritt and Averill, under Torbert, could be distinctly seen sweeping up the Martinsburg pike, driving the en ~

to the

Ext. No. 471. .

.

it,

emy

s

cavalry before them

the broken infantry. (Maj. Genl. P. p.

in a

of infantry,

com-

mn n cat ea i

its

ggjgjj"

qu s e t"^^

>pe

V{J

confused mass through

H. Sheridan, R.

R., Vol. 43, Part

I,

47.)

Ext. No. 472. ~, troops.

I

found

They would not

it

impossible to rally the

,.

the

A

terror of the enemy s cavalry appeals of any kind. ,. had seized them and there was no holding them. They ,

^

fled in the greatest confusion.

(Lieut. Genl.

Part

I, p.

562.)

J.

Defeated troops

seized with a

listen to entreaties, threats orgerat

A. Early, C.

S.,

R. R., Vol. 43,

terror of s cav-

enemy

alr y.

Cedar

Creek,

va.,oct, 19,1864.

180

COMMENTS.

is

The psychology of the battle field is a subject which The commander who receiving much consideration.

can

utilize

it

to

its

have a great ad

fullest extent will

vantage over one who cannot. In time of panic cavalry will certainly fill a defeated enemy with terror. (Ext. 472.) Then will be the time reap the reward in trophies and prisoners.

to

(Ext.

471.)

Ext.

Macademized

The roads macadamized and

No. 473.

the

with horseshoes, and being compelled cavalry J unprovided T r J on Shenandoahto subsist mostly young grass without salt, 1 found m gn May-7une\ ffl my -command in a most deplorable condition. Our SpMvairy

witn-

out shoes.

1

work had been fire

p. soldiers

on the

sleep

ground

holding bridles, -

day and

eternal,

1

We

night.

were under

twenty-six days out of thirty. Part (Col. T. T. Munford, C. S., R. R., Vol. 12,

I,

733.)

men

on their to he means arms, which for our arm of the service in upon the ground, holding the bridle, and keeping Ext. No. 474.

I

allowed the .

to sleep

.

readiness to leap into the saddle at a moment s notice. R. R., Vol. 29, (Col. E. B. Sawyer, 1st Vt. Cav.,

Part stragglers

get

Expedition to Oxford, Miss., Aug. 6,1864.

I, p.

393.)

A

party of foragers sent out from the 1st Miss, lost two of their men who straggled from

Ext. No. 475.

the column. (Lieut. Col.

J.

C. Hess, R. R., Vol. 39, Part

I,

p.

393-)

campaign I was at times Ind\e e?!mlnl annoyed by guerrilla bands; the most formidable was under a partisan chief named Mosby, who made his Guerillas

pre-

Ext. No. 476.

During

this

s

of headquarters east of the Blue Ridge, in the section refused I had constantly the country about Upperville. to operate against these bands, believing them to be, sub as they prevented straggling stantially, a benefit to me, and kept my trains well closed up, and discharged such other duties as would have required a provost guard of at least two regiments of cavalry.

181

Part I (Maj. Gen. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 43, p.

55.)

Ext. No. 477.

July

9,

Colonel N. P.

Richmond

of the brigade, and the Frederick to went City, Md., for regiment, by order, and the purpose of doing provost duty arresting all stragglers, and to form a stragglers camp.

was

relieved of the

command

(Maj. C. E. Capehart, R. R., Vol. 27, Part 1020, After the Battle of Gettysburg.)

I,

p.

COMMENTS.

Americans think that we are so brave that straggling as an item can be ignored. The After the battle of records show just the contrary. to be established to had a stragglers camp Gettysburg

Some

patriotic

collect the skulkers.

(Ext. 477.)

MOBALE. Ext. No. 478. brigade.

*

*

*

I

was ordered

As soon

as the

to support Custer s

enemy opened

his

guns

* Yell w

upon General Custer, the latter charged with his brigade, mostly mounted. In pursuance to my instructions, Chap man with his brigade charged at the same time. * * *

The charge was

*

*

*

It was in and the melee which followed that the rebel charge E. B. Stuart, was killed, and from it cavalry leader, J.

entirely successful.

this

be dated the permanent superiority of the national cavalry over that of the rebels.

may

p.

(Brig. Genl. J. H. Wilson, R. R., Vol. 36, Part 879. Yellow Tavern, May 11, 1864.)

Under efficient arm

Ext. No. 479.

has become the

in other countries,

and

is

gallant leaders your cavalry in this war that it has proved

winning by

its

exploits

admiration of the government and the country. (Stanton to Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, Ext. No. 480.

I,

Fe derai

cav-

d

6

Gob* e a S er s

the^e a ley i 8 64

p.

62.)

and men, as they saw the Military spirit sun appear bright and glorious above the horizon, felt ex^ mplified; upeqiion trpen. a consciousness of renewed strength, a presentiment of Va Sept 19 1864 fresh glory to be added that day to their already unfadOfficers

-

->

-

-

182

men who were

willing to do and die; that they were not deceived the history of the

ing laurels.

felt like

They

day proves. (Brig. Genl.

16

va

r

pe

In this fight I had already defeated infantry, and could have continued to do so,

Ext. No. 481.

in

tuILTh^scr"

sep? i9 i864

R., Vol. 43, Part

443.)

I, p.

superiority

Wesley Merritt, R.

the

enemy s enemy

great superiority in cavalry and the conv parative inefficiency of ours turned the scale against us. (Lieut. Genl. Jubal A. Early, C. S., R. R., Vol.

but the

s

43, Parti, p. 555.)

COMMENTS.

Morale plays a very important part in the winning or losing of a battle. Troops that feel conscious of their superiority are difficult to defeat, while those that feel their inferiority are half defeated at the beginning. This feeling of inferiority

may

lery, leadership or cavalry.

(Ext. 481.)

The

artil

effect of

478 and 479. Troops mentioned in Extract are superiority

shown

is

be in the arms, morale,

leadership conscious of their

in extracts

480.

!

UNMOUNTED CAVALRY. mounted cavalry.

Ext. No. 482.

mand

of

the

In obedience to orders,

division, designated as the

organized the

I

took com-

dismounted (unmounted) men

command

of

this

Fourth Brigade Cavalry.

into three regiments, the

I

men

of each brigade forming a regiment, and numbered after their respective brigades as the First,

Second and Third

Each regiment was formed

into companies officer and the commissioned one with of fifty each, each proper number of non-commissioned officers to

Regiments.

men

company. (Lieut. Col.

MX

Vol. 47, Part 8Bald .

Wm.

I, p.

B.

Way,

9th Mich. Cav., R. R.,

902.)

(See also Vol. 49, Part

I,

p.

356.)

183 All dismounted cavalry belonging Unmou nted of the Potomac, and the dismounted cav- JJd 2a?8r82

Ext. No. 483. to the

army

airy belonging to the Middle Military Division not required for guarding property belonging to their arm of

the service will report to Brigadier General be used in the defenses of City Point. (Sheridan s Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 128.)

Benham

6 pofnt.

c

to

COMMENTS.

Unmounted

may be

used to guard wagon trains, convoy prisoners (Ext. 459), to defend important cavalry

guard property belonging to their of the service (Ext. 483), or, better yet, as Forrest used them, namely, take them along and capture mounts points, as infantry, to

arm

for them.

FRUITS OF VICTORY.

We

Ext. No. 484.

from

May

5,

War

Department

1865, 205

battle flags

sent to the

1864, to April 9,

captured in the open field, and captured between and 170 pieces of artillery. In

all

Fruits tory>

of

vic-

Trophies

160

the operations the 1percentage of cavalry J cas-

Percentage

of

cavalry losses.

ualties was as great as that of infantry, and the ques tion which had existed, "Who ever saw a dead cavalry man?"

was

set at rest.

H. Sheridan, Report of Cavalry Opera tions of the Army of the Potomac.) Ext. No. 485. The part that I expected the cav(Genl. P.

..

i

,

-,-,.

.

-r-T

f

11

M

cavalry

fails to

secure the fruits

was a complete failure, of victory. command. Instead of val ley "campaign, following the enemy when he was broken at Fisher s Hill so that there was not a cavalry organization left, he went into camp and left me to pursue the enemy for airy to accomplish at P isher s Hill I have relieved Averill from his

a

distance

of

fifteen

miles with

infantry

during the

night.

(Maj. Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R, Vol. 43, Part p.

I,

29.)

Ext. No. 486.

When

attacked the enemy, Mer- Pursuitweii e ritt and Custer, under the direction of Torbert, fiercely of victo?y gatherattacked the enemy s flanks and when he broke, closed I

184 cedar creek,va.,

in after

dark and secured the

artillery, trains, etc.

The cavalry pursuit was kept up to a point between Edenburg and Mount Jackson. We captured fourteen battle flags, 50 pieces of artillery, 1,600 prisoners, ambu in large numbers, etc. Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 43, Part (Maj. 33. Battle of Cedar Creek or Winchester.)

lances,

p.

Trophies

I,

During and after the Battle of Stannary: Captured by Hatch s Division,

No. 487.

Ext.

of

a6hviiie,Teim.

wagons

N&shville.

2 redoubts, 17 guns, 2 battle flags, 2 droves of beef cat tle, 35 wagons (including the headquarters train of Chal mers Division), one brigadier general and 701 pris 5 battle flags, 350 prisoners, oners; Knipe s Division of and 2 piece caissons; Johnston s Division artillery

1

56 prisoners; Croxton brigade, 184 prisoners; 4th U. S. 1 cavalry gun and 25 prisoners. In addition, John ston s and Knipe s Divisions should be credited with the wounded taken in hospitals at Franklin, 2,000 men. Total, 2 redoubts, 19 guns, 7 battle flags and 3,316 prisoners.

(Maj. Genl. p.

eima 22>

Apr<

H. Wilson, R.

R., Vol. 45,

Part

Selma

raid:

I,

554.)

Ext. No. 488.

of a

1*1866^

J.

Results of Wilson

s

Twenty-two colors, 210 pieces of artillery, 34,500 stand of small arms, 18 locomotives, 563 coal, flat and box cars, 6,820 prisoners, 255,000 bales of cotton de stroyed, military uniforms

and supplies too numerous to

mention.

(Provost Marshal C. L. Greeno, R. R., Vol. 49, Part

I,

p.

413.)

COMMENTS.

The victory

is

possibility of cavalry at the time of a general

here well illustrated.

at last discovered,

was

A

dead cavalryman was

and the percentage of cavalry

as great as that of infantry.

cavalry commander who puts his cavalry in at time of a general victory should be given an

The camp

losses

(Ext. 484.)

other job, as was Averill.

(Ext. 485.)

185

There

will

be times

when

cavalry will secure a great

trophies as a result of their own prowess. In cases, however, they reap the reward of a victory

number of

many

brought about by other troops.

(Ext. 487.)

WOUNDED.

wounded Morgan always made it a point to should not be carry off every wounded man who could be safely moved, abandoned to the In this way he prevented much of the demoralization attending the men felt of falling, when wounded, into Ext. No. 489. .

1

.,

1

1

r

1

t

the hands of the enemy.

(Morgan

s

Cavalry, by Duke.)

wounded It was very soon evident that the should always be removed if possithat and was to ours, they superior enemy were supported by infantry. * * * It became evi- st. Mary s Church, Va., June dent that the contest was too unequal to maintain it 24 186 The led horses, and wounded for whom there longer. was transportation, and caissons were started on the Ext. No. 490.

force of the

.

*-

>

road leading to Charles City Court House, 8 miles dis tance. These fairly under way, our division began to re tire by the right. Our men continued fighting on foot, but were mounted from time to time.

was made without confusion or (Brig. Genl. D. I,

McM.

The movement

disorder.

Gregg, R. R., Vol. 36, Part

856.)

p.

COMMENTS.

Wounded when

it

is

should not be abandoned to the enemy Not only does the possible to remove them.

abandonment

wounded of war.

seriously affect the morale, but such of the as get well are subject to exchange as prisoners In the end, then, it amounts to surrendering

It is usually the case that wounded can not be removed from the firing line, but, as the line passes on, the wounded should be removed by a special organ

fighting troops.

it is safe to do so. The fighting men should, under no circumstances, be allowed to leave the

ization as soon as

firing line to assist or carry

wounded

to the rear.

186

Qualities needa valry

commaude r

glP

Ext

^

-

gagements

*"

jiSy"?i8&3

491

Jt

-

was in one of tnese brilliant enand gallant Farnsworth fell,

that the noble

heroically leading a charge of his brigade against the rebel infantry. Gifted in a high degree with a quick

perception and correct judgment, and remarkable for his daring and coolness, his comprehensive grasp of the of battle and the rapidity of his actions had already distinguished General Farnsworth among his comrades in arms. In his death was closed a

on the

situation

field

career that must have

won

the highest honors of his

profession.

(Genl. A.

Pleasonton, R.

R.,

Vol. 27, Part

I,

p.

916.)

what

to do *8

Pft

"

Ext No 492. During the night of July 3, the manding general withdrew the main body to the ridges west of Gettysburg and sent word to me to that effect, con>

-

-

I repaired to his head the night and received of latter the part quarters during instructions as to the new line.

but the messenger missed me.

(Genl.

J.

E. B. Stuart, R. R., Vol. 27, Part

II, p.

699.) sleeping in the d ttysi>urgCam.

ain, Jane,

1873.

After a series of exciting combats and night marches, it was a severe tax on their endurance whole regiments slept j n t h e saddle; their faithful Ext. Nto. 493.

.

animals keeping the road unguided. they

fell

from

their horses,

In some instances

overcome with physical fa

tigue and sleepiness. (Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, C. S., R. R., Vol. 27,

Part

fm hoSel ^ duty JVl^n.

sleep

is

in.

II, p.

696.)

Ext. No. 494. in the saddle,

Five days and nights of constant to fourteen days rapid march-

added

would shake even the most robust constitution. Men fell from their horses, and the most persistent efforts of their officers could not keep them awake.

m

>

R. R., Vol. (Lieut. Col. F. A. Jones, 8th Ind. Cav., 38, Part II, p. 875.)

187

The 6th Regiment was in the rear Men who ride hr and our men were completely worn down and most of u uve dayswif Ext. No. 495.

them sleeping on their horses. * * * Many of the fn Uestddie.p men were nearly exhausted from hunger and loss of VaSifey We had been in the saddle and had no regular 1862 sleep. rations for three days. (Col. T. T. p.

Munford,

C. S., R. R., Vol. 12, Part

I,

730.)

COMMENTS. It is

evident from the foregoing that cavalry, un is going to sleep in the saddle.

der exceptional conditions,

A

saddle for this purpose must have a high cantle. In combat the trooper will have to jump ditches, fences

the

and other

obstacles. The saddle with a high cantle is not adapted to this use. The McClellan tree is adapted to the former rather than to the latter purpose. It should

be modified so as to

fulfill all

the conditions of combat,

rather than those of sleep, which are to be regarded as exceptional.

M

INDEX.

ADVANCE GUARD.

In general, Exts. 244 to 247, p. 100.

Comments

on, p. 102.

Formation

of,

Morgan

s

Ext. 247, p. 101.

system

Ext. 246, p. 100.

of,

AMBULANCES

Exts. 305, 366, p. 144; 385, p. 150.

AMMUNITION

Amount carried on the

horse, Exts. 367, p. 144

;

371, p. 146

;

377, p. 148

;

379, p. 149; 3SO, p. 149.

Amount carried on wagons, Exts.

367, p. 144; 362, p. 142; 366, p. 144;

367, p. 144; 371, p. 146; 377, p. 148; 380, p. 149.

Comments on

Amount

ARMAMENT

amount

carried, p. 153.

necessary, Ext. 371, p.

line, Exts. 133, p. 54; 392 to 394, p. 154.

Supplied to the firing

line,

comments

S.

s

Cavalry, Ext.

6, p.

Comments

7.

to 76, p. 36.

revolvers, Ext.

Of Cavalry from the

119 p. 51

;

445, 446, p. 170.

77, p. 37.

rear, Ext. 229 p. 93.

Of river crossing, Exts. 207 to 211,

Should play during the

battle,

p. 77.

Exts. 101, p. 44;

p. 179.

BARRICADES

Exts. 142, p. 56; 154, p. 61.

BATTLE

Of Booneville,

BATTLEFIELD Selection BOLDNESS

16.

p. 14.

on, p. 37.

Charged by Cavalry, Exts. 73

Use

16; Introduction,

Cavalry, Introduction, p.

How to charge, Ext. 78, p. 37. How to disable horses of, Exts.

BANDS

on, p. 155.

Of Confederate Cavalry, See Introduction, pp. 12 and

Of U.

ATTACK

146.J

Supplied to the firing

Of Forrest

ARTILLERY

the

of

p. 82.

by Cavalry, Ext.

145, p. 57.

Eesults in small losses, Exts. 50, 51, p. 30.

Takes the place of numbers, Ext.

79, p. 38.

223,

p.

90; 469,

Will often succeed

when

timidity will

BOWIE KNIVES Use

of,

BRANDING

For

pillage, Ext. 330, p. 131.

BREAD

How Made

of,

fail,

Ext. 143,

p. 56.

4, p. 16.

made, Exts.

BREASTWORKS Attack

BRIDGES

Ext.

381, p. 149; 384, p. 150.

Exts. 143, p. 56; 147, p. 58; 154, p. 61.

for Infantry, Exts. 133, 134, pp. 54

Attack and defense Attack and defense

of,

Exts 213 to

of,

comments

Construction and repair

and

55.

218, pp. 78-80.

on, p. 126.

Exts. 307 to 316, pp. 123-126.

of,

Pontoon, Exts. 312, 314, 315, p. 124; 366, 367, p. 144. Rate of crossing, Ext. 316,

CALLS

Trumpet, Ext. 466,

CANTONMENT Model, CARBINE

Use

of

p. 126.

comments

p. 178;

on, p. 178.

Ext. 447, p. 170.

dismounted, Exts.

1,

12, p. 17;

p. 12;

74, p. 36; 90, p. 41

113 to 151, pp. 50 60.

Use

of

13, p. 17; 24, p. 20; 101 to 111,

mounted, Exts.

pp. 44-49.

CARE

Of horses, Exts. 419 to 426, pp. 161-163; comments on,

CAVALRY

Confederate, Stuart

Introduction,

s,

Wheeler Forrest

s,

s,

Introduction,

Improper use

Needs young Strategic use

Introduction,

lines, Exts. 53, p. 30; 471, p. 179.

Ext.

of,

Exts. 227 to 231, pp. 93, 94.

officers, of,

2, p. 13.

Ext. 456, p. 175.

Exts. 295 to 306, pp. 118-121. 176. used, Exts 482, p. 182; 483, p. 183; 459, p.

Against Artillery, Exts.

73, p.

36

;

Against bridges, Exts. 215 to 217,

Against

field

75, p. 36

;

76, p. 36.

p. 79.

works, Exts. 87 to 91, pp. 41-42.

Against Infantry, Exts.

As

3, p. 14.

p. 14.

of,

Unmounted, how

CHARGE

14.

Introduction, p. 14; Ext.

Driven through Infantry Fight, picture

p. 12.

Introduction, p.

s,

Morgan

Mosby

s,

p. 163.

p. 11.

55, 56, p. 30-31

foragers, Ext. 24, p. 20.

Boot to boot, Ext.

81, p. 38.

By

brigade, Exts. 65, p. 32; 69, p. 33.

By

division, Ext. 65, p. 32.

;

79 to 83, p. 38-39.

By regiments,

Exts. 63, p. 32; 64, p. 32; 66, p. 33.

Comments on

the charge,

p. 34.

Distance over which charge can be made, Exts. 411,

159;

p.

418,

p. 160; 95, p. 43.

Impetuosity of the, Exts.

48, p. 29; 50, p. 30; 51, p. 30; 60, p. 31; 216,

p. 79.

In column of fours, Exts.

86, p. 40

;

92, p. 42

;

96, p. 43

97, p. 43

;

;

112, p. 49; 143, p. 56; 168, p. 64.

In column of squadrons, Exts.

24, p. 20; 76, p. 36;

93, p. 43; 98, p.

43; 101, p. 44.

In column of close column of squadrons, Ext.

56, p. 31

;

59, p. 31

;

94, p. 43.

In column of regiments, Exts. In flank, Ext.

Met by

charge, Exts. 34, p. 21; 57, p. 31; 58, p. 31; 66, p. 33; 92, 42 230, p. 93.

p.

Number

Repulse

Time

;

of

made, Exts. 63 to

to, Exts. 68, p. 33

Ready

99, p. 44; 100, p. 44.

79, p. 38.

of,

to,

66, pp. 32-33.

72, p. 34.

;

Ext. 95, p. 43.

Exts. 48, p. 29; 50, p. 30;

51, p. 30; 55, p. 30; 57, p. 31;

58, p. 31; 68, p. 33; 70, p. 34; 72, p. 34; 79, p. 38; 80 to 83,

pp. 38-39; 107, p. 48; 143, p. 59; 153 to 159, pp. 61-62; 181, p. 68.

With blown CIVILIANS

HOW

CLUBBED GUNS Ext COLORS

COMBINED ACTION

.

Uge

horses, Ext. 417, p. 160.

treated, Ext. 448, p. 172. 84, p. 39.

in

battle>

Ext

449>

173 p>

Mounted and dismounted, With

Exts. 152 to 170, pp. 61-65; 219, p. 82.

Artillery, Exts. 189, p. 72; 190, p. 72.

Infantry, Exts. 171 to 186, pp. 66-70.

COMMAND

Divided, Ext. 243,

COMMANDER

Duties

of,

Position

p. 99.

Ext. 348, p. 136.

of,

Ext. 267, p. 108.

Qualities needed, Ext. 491, p. 186.

COMMUNICA-Ext. TIONS,

268, p. 108.

CONFUSION

Caused

CONVOY

Of prisoners, Ext.

CORN

Green

to Infantry

by defeated Cavalry. Exts.

459, p. 176.

Railroad trains, Ext. 266,

p. 108.

as forage, Exts. 422 to 424, p. 161.

53, p. 30; 471, p. 179,

Parched as food, Ext.

CORPS

375, p. 148.

Cavalry organized into Correct use

How How

COURA GE COURIERS

Ext. 156, p.

marched, Ext. kept u p, Ext.

3, p. 50.

220 to 226, pp. 89-91. 192, p. 73; 260, p. 105; 261, p. 106.

Comments

on, p. 73.

Quick one

essential, Exts. 48, p. 29; 50, p. 30;

70, p. 34; 71, p. 34; 72, p. 34; 216, p. 70.

M

MKNT

75.

242, p. 99. 1 ]

COVERING Rear of retreating army, Exts.

DEC

1

Exts. 284, 285, p. 113.

WAY Exts.

CUTTING

of,

a,

Exts. 238 to 240, p. 98.

*

Exts 55

P-

-

s

51, p. 30; 68, p. 33;

107, p. 48; 156, p. 62; 164, p. 63;

68, p. 33; 70, p. 34; 72, p. 34; 82, p. 39; 83, p. 39; ; 153, p. 61 ; 156 to 161 , pp. 62 63 ; 181, p. 68.

-

;

107, p. 48

Cavalry driven through Infantry

Troops have fear

lines, Exts. 53, p. 30; 471, p. 179.

of Cavalry, Ext. 472, p. 179.

Of river crossing, Exts. 210 to

214, pp. 77-78; 297, p. 118.

DEI G AC Exts 191 to 206 PP- 73 7 6. T1oNl "

"

>

DEPLOYMENT Not made

DISEAS S OF THK HORSE -

enemy

s fire

it,

Ext. 219, p. 82.

on, p. 166.

Captured, Ext. 293,

p. 116.

Sent in duplicate, Ext. 294,

ENDURANCE

compels

Exts. 427 to 434, pp. 164-165.

Comments DISPATCHES

till

Qn

p. 116.

the march, Exts. 396 to 418, pp. 157-160.

Comments EXPLOIT

Ext. 451,

FENCE

As a

on, p. 160.

p. 173.

barricade, Exts. 115, p. 50; 122, p. 51.

FIELD WORKS Assault

of,

Exts. 148, p. 58; 149, p. 59; 179, p. 67; 181, p. 68.

Charging, Exts. 87 to

91,

p. 41;

148, p. 58;

Constructing, Exts. 133, p. 54; 134,

p.

150, p. 60; 211, p. 77.

55; 172, p. 66.

Holding

of

by cavalry, Exts.

178, p. 67;

Number

of

men

man, Ext. 172,

necessary to

186, p. 70; 249, p. 102. p. 66.

FIGHTING ON Exts. 2A, p. 14; 6, p. 16; 113 to 151, pp. 50-KO. FOOT Time consumed by, Exts. 123, p, 62; 129, p. 53; FIRE ACTION Chapter III, p. 47.

With carbine mounted,

132, p. 54.

Exts. 101 to 111, pp. 44-49; 219, p. 82.

With carbine mounted, comments

on, p. 49.

With carbine dismounted against Cavalry, Exts. 113 to

127, pp. 50-52.

With carbine dismounted against Cavalry, comments

With carbine dismounted against field works,

With carbine dismounted

against field works,

With carbine dismounted

against Infantry, Exts. 128 to 146,pp. 53-57.

comments

With carbine dismounted against Infantry, comments

FIRE

on, p. 53.

Exts. 147 to 151, pp. 58-60.

With

revolver, Ext. 112, p. 49.

With

revolver,

comments

on, p. 60.

on, p. 58.

on, p. 49.

Discipline, Ext. 394, p. 155.

Position, Ext. 214, p. 78.

Shoot down the enemy

When

Exts. 149, p. 59; 209 to 214, pp. 77-78.

s,

opened, Exts. 128,

p. 53; 146, p. 57; 151, p. 60; 219, p. 82.

FLAG

Of truce, how treated, Ext. 452,

FLANK

Attack

p. 173.

Exts. 128, p. 53; 176, p. 67

of,

Enveloping, Ext. 270,

;

272, p. 109.

p. 109.

Protection of by Cavalry, Exts. 272, 273, p. 109.

Turning, Exts. 124,

143, p. 56; 153, p. 61

p. 52;

;

165, p. 63;

180, p. 68;

198, p. 74; 219, p. 82.

Strengthening by regular troops, Ext. 125,

FLANK GUARD Cavalry used

FORAGE

as,

Comments

on, p. 107.

Allowance

of,

Green corn

How How

p. 52.

Exts. 262 to 265, p. 107.

Ext. 388, p. 151

;

comments

on, p. 152.

Exts. 422 to 424, p. 161.

as,

carried, Exts. 377, p. 148; 379, p. 149; 380, p. 149; 384, p. 150.

gathered in hostile country, Exts. 372,

p. 147; 384, p. 150;

453, p. 174.

In wagons carried, Exte. 362,

p, 142; 377, p. 148; 380, p. 149.

Packed on horses make sore backs, Ext.

Want

of,

425, p. 162.

Exts. 376, p. 148; 382, p. 150; 384, p. 150; 385, p. 150; 387, 425, p. 162. 389, p. 151 419, p. 161 420, p. 161

p. 151

;

;

;

FORAGERS

Ext. 86, p. 40.

FORDING

Swift streams, Ext. 325, p. 129.

FORMATION

Comments

;

on, p. 44.

For attack, Exts.

152, p. 61

;

155, p. 61

;

161 to 166, pp. 63-64

;

226, p. 91.

Successive, Exts. 191 to 206, pp. 73-76.

Used

in the charge, Exts. 74, p. 36; 76, p. 36; 42-44 143, p 56 144, p. 57,

pp.

;

f

;

86, p. 40;

92 to 101

>

6

GR UND

UTS GUERRILLAS

Exts. 68, p. 33; 86, p. 40; 101, p. 44.

SC<

Ext. 476, p. 180.

GUIDES

Use

HISTORY

Of U.

HOOF-ROT

Exts. 427 to 432, pp. 164-165.

HORSE

As a weapon, Ext.

of,

Exts. 219, p. 82; 244, p. 100.

Cavalry, See Introduction.

S.

Arriving, blown

67, p. 33.

at charging point, Ext. 95, p. 43.

Captured, Ext. 374,

Care

p. 148.

Exts. 387, p. 151; 419 to 426, pp. 161-163;

of,

comments on,

p. 163.

Diseases

Each man

Led

comments

Ext. 427 to 434, pp. 164-165;

of,

fires

own by

holding his

the reins, Ext. 127,

p. 52.

horses, Exts. 218, p. 80; 435 to 441, pp. 166-167.

Marines, Ext. 319,

As means

p. 127.

on the

of transportation

Recuperating of the, Ext. 227,

Ridden by

battle field, Ext. 113, p. 50.

p. 93.

recruits, Ext. 425, p. 162.

Unserviceable for want of shoes, Ext. 426,

Veteran troopers walk

Use

INFORMATION

Chapter VII, Exts. 277 to 294, pp. 111-116.

of

Cavalry to stop routed, Exts. 317,

Absence

of,

Exts. 280,

p. 163.

to save, Ext. 421, p. 161.

INFANTRY

By

on, p. 166.

p.

p.

127

;

318, p. 127

;

320, p. 127.

112; 351, p. 137.

blowing horns, Ext. 290, p. 115.

Should be

verified, Ext. 291 p. 116.

Comments

on, p. 117.

Received from country people, Exts.

277, p. Ill; 278A, p. Ill;

28",

p. 113.

Received from strategic use of Cavalry, Exts. 295 to 306, pp. 118-121.

JUMPING HORSE

Value

LANE

Attack

of,

in,

Ext. 442, p. 168. Exts. 153, p. 61

160, p. 62; 166, p. 64; 168, p. 64; 169, p. 64;

;

170, p. 65.

LANCE

As defensive weapon,

Comments on

p. 27.

use, p. 28.

Use in Mexican war, Ext. Use

in

U.

S.,

;

p. 8.

Ext. 45, p. 27.

6th Penn. Vol. Cav., pp.

LANCERS

Reg.

LARIATS

Ext. 450, p. 173.

of,

45, p. 27

8, 28,

LKADER

Good, needed, Ext.

Timid LED HORSES

479, p. 181.

will fail, Exts. 50, p. 30; 51, p. 31.

Capture

Ext. 438, p. 167.

of,

Cause confusion

to troops in rear, Ext. 435, p. 166.

Comments

on, p. 167.

Guard

Ext. 437, p. 166.

How

for,

mounted, Exts.

440, p. 167

In general, Exts. 218,

when

Sent ahead LINES

Of

441, p. 167.

;

p. 80; 435 to 441, pp. 166-167.

retreating, Ext. 439, p. 167.

battle, straight, Ext. 241, p. 98.

Successive, Exts. 239, 240, p. 98.

LOSSES

Of moving

target, Ext. 114, p. 50.

Per centage

of,

Ext. 484, p. 183.

Of retreating troops, Exts.

MARCHING

Of Cavalry, Exts. 231,

Comments

85, p. 39; 470, p. 179.

99; 396 to 418, pp. 157-160.

p. 94; 242, p.

on, p. 160.

Dismounted proves exhausting

to,

Ext. 455, p. 174.

Distance marched, Exts. 396 to 418, pp. 157-160.

Forced march, Ext.

Rate

of,

399, p. 157.

Exts. 396 to 418, p. 157-160.

MARINE CAV- Ext. 319, p. 127. ALRY MELEE Carbine vs. Revolver,

MOMENTUM MORALE

Qf the charge, Exts.

Exts. 13, p. 17; 478, p. 181.

47, p. 29

;

Of the saber in charging, Exts.

86 p. 40. 1,

p. 12

;

2, p.

13

;

41, p.

Of troops, Exts. 478 to 481, pp. 181-182.

MULES

As mounts, Ext.

NIGHT OPERA- Ext. 235 TIONS

Comments OBJECTIVE

444, p. 169.

to 237, pp. 96-97.

on, p. 97.

Strategic, Ext. 298, p. 119.

ORGANIZATION Of U.

8.

Cavalry, See Introduction, p.

Vol. Cavalry, See Introduction, p.

Comments on

6.

7.

p. 175.

Into corps, Ext. 456, p. 175.

Peace and war, Ext. 457,

ORDERS

What

OUTPOSTS

In general, Exts. 254 to

to

p. 175.

do when none are received, Ext.

492, p. 186.

261, pp. 104-106; 275, p. 110.

22

;

480, p. 181,

8

Comments

the, Ext. 448, p. 172.

Evading Far

on, p. 106.

out, Exts. 219, p. 82; 256, p. 105.

Resistance required by, Ext. 219, p. 82.

Support

PACK TRAINS PARTISAN

WARFARE

E xts.

of,

p H4;

366>

T?xt 42 J

Exts. 254 to 258, pp. 104-105.

3^ p

144;

37^ p

Exts. 27], p. 109; 470 to 472, p. 179.

PAY

Exts. 384, p. 150; 391, p. 152.

PICKETS

Resistance required

PICKETING PICKET DUTY PIL

PLUNDER

of,

443>

p

m

of,

Ext. 219, p. 82.

Exts. 254 to 259, pp. 104-105.

Infantry camp, Ext. 227, xt

.

n oo

PANIC

Use

UQ

419>

p

p. 93.

161>

In General, Exts. 330 to 336, pp. 131-132.

Comments Effect

on

on, p. 132.

discipline, Exts. 331, p. 131

;

332, p. 131.

Stops pursuit, Ext. 336, p. 132.

Turns victory into

defeat, Ext. 334, p. 132.

Victory neutralized by, Ext, 333, p. 131.

PIONEERS

Cavalry do the woik

PISTOL

In general, Exts. 3 to

Comments on Collective

of,

Exts. 307 to 316, pp. 121-126.

11,

pp. 14-17; 112, p. 49.

use, Exts. 41, p. 22; p. 24.

fire of,

Exts.

5, p.

16; 6, p. 16; 112, p. 49.

In individual combat, Exts. 13 to

Used

19,

pp. 17-19; 22, p. 19; 36, p. 21.

by Artillery, Ext. 77, p. 37.

Use dismounted, Exts.

7 to 10, pp. 16-17.

Use in the woods, Ext. 38,

p. 22.

PONTOONS

Exts. S12, p. 124; 314, p. 125; 315, p. 126; 366, p. 144; 367, p. 144.

PONTONIERS

Ext. 312, p. 124.

POSITION FIRE Ext. 214,

p. 78.

POSITIONS

Selected by Cavalry, Exts. 127, p. 52; 133,p.54; 175,p.67; 184,p.69.

PRISONERS

In general, Exts. 459

Comments

to 463, pp. 176-177.

on, p. 177.

How

captured, Exts. 460 to 463, pp. 176-177. Strength of guard for, Ext. 459, p. 176.

PURSUIT

In general, Exts. 337 to 343, pp. 133-134.

Comments

on, p. 135.

By dismounted men,

How

Exts. 338,

kept up, Exts.

far

p. 133; 343, p. 134.

107, p. 48; 123, p. 52; 181, p. 68; 337, p. 133;

486, p. 183. Parallel, Exts. 339, p. 133; 340, p. 134; 342, p. 184.

Rear, Exts. 339, p. 133; 341, p. 134.

Stopped by plundering, Ext. Vigorous, Ext.

RAIDS

336, p. 132.

49, p. 29.

In general, Exts. 344 to 351, pp. 135-137.

Comments

on, p. 138.

Conditions favorable

Ext. 344, p. 135.

to,

of to railroads temporarily, Ext. 349, p. 137.

Damage

Leave Cavalry unserviceable, Exts.

Morgan Object

s

method, Ext.

346, p. 136.

of, Ext. 347, p. 136.

Strategic, Exts. 303, p. 120; 347, p.

Successful,

RAILROADS

Capacity

How

350, p. 137; 351, p. 137.

must

of, P^xt. 373, p. 148.

guarded, Ext. 266,

RAPID FIRE

Carbines, Exts.

RATIONS

Comments

Amount

13rt.

rejoin in safety, Ext. 548, p. 186.

p. 108.

74, p. 36;

133, p. 54; 141, p. 56;

151, p. 60.

on, p. 152.

carried, Exts. 366, 367, pp. 144; 377, p. 148; 379, p. 149; 380, p. 149; 385, p. 150.

Carried on the trooper, Exts. 367,

p. 144; 370, p. 145; 369, p.

145;

377, p. 148; 379, p. 149; 380, 385, pp. 149-150.

Carried on wagons, Exts. 366, 367, p. 144; 371,

p. 146; 377, p. 148;

380, p. 150.

Emergency, Ext.

How

395, p. 156.

obtained, Ext. 374, 375,

p.

148

Given

RECRUITS

Bad

for horses, Ext. 425, p. 162.

Not

to

be depended upon, Ext. 464,

RECRUITING

Ext. 465, p. 177.

RECONN

In force, Ext. 301, p.

Made by R ECU

PER AT- Of

378, p. 149

;

381 to 383, pp. 149-160.

for supplies, Ext. 374, p. 148.

RECEIPTS

A is-

;

p. 177.

119.

the commander, Ext. 219,

p. 82.

horses, Ext. 227, p. 93.

REINFORCING Of Infantry by Cavalry, Exts. 173,

174, p. 67.

(

See Combined Action.)

1(1

REPORT

By

staff officer, Ext. 305, p. 120.

Made

in duplicate, Exts. 289, p. 115; 294, p. 116.

Model, Ext.

RESERVES

278, p. 111.

Carry forward the firing Last formed, Exts. 66,

Kept mounted, Ext.

No time RETIRING

to

line, Ext. 126, p. 52.

p. 33; 95, p. 43.

152, p. 61.

form on, Ext.

Across a bridge, Ext. 218,

By

153, p. 61. p. 80.

successive formations, Exts. 191 to 206, pp. 73-76.

Troops stopped by Cavalry, Exts.

Under the cover

317, 318, 320, p. 127.

of a vigorous attack, Exts. 191, p. 73; 218, p. 80;

440, p. 167; 441, p. 167.

RETREAT

Costly, Exts. 170, p. 65.

Covered by mounted men, Exts.

REVOLVERS

See

REVOLVING

Ext. 74,

167, p. 64;

191, p. 73.

pistol.

p. 37; (See rapid fire carbines.) RIFLES RIVER CROSS Attack and defense of, Exts. 207 to 218, pp. 77-80. ING Macadamized cut up Cavalry without shoes, Ext. ROADS

ROUT

Exts. 470 to 472, p. 179.

RUSE

Exts. 467 to 469, pp. 178-179.

SABER

Against Artillery, Exts.

473, p. 180.

73, 75, p. 36.

Against foot troops, Ext. 83, p. 39. Against revolver, Exts.

As

12, p. 17;

17 to 23, pp. 18-19; 38, p. 22.

cutting weapon, Exts. 16, p. 18; 20, p. 19; 21, p. 19; 28, p. 20; 55, p. 30; 83, p. 39. 40, p. 22 29, p. 20; 37, p. 21 ;

;

As final weapon, Ext. 33, p. 21. As shock weapon, Exts. pp. 29-30; 60, p. 31

AH thrusting weapon, Exts.

26, p. 20; ;

27, p. 20; 31, p. 20; 46 to 51,

168, p, 64. 22, 23, p. 19.

Capture of prisoners with, Ext. 35, p. 21.

Comments on

use

of, p. 24,

Ext. 41, p. 22.

Dismounted, Ext. 39, p. 22. Individual combat, Exts.

In open country, Ext.

14, p. 18.

In partisan warfare, Ext.

In pursuit, Ext.

15, p. 18; 36, p. 21.

49, p. 29.

42, p. 23.

11

Need

of,

Exts.

13, p. 17; 34, p. 21.

Opinion of by Stuart, Ext.

Use

Use by SAFE GUARDS Ext. SCOUTS

32, p. 21,

in woods, Exts. 38, p. 22

454, p. 174.

Ground, Exts.

68, p. 33; 86, p. 40; 101, p. 44. p. 113.

Scouting parties, Exts. 292,

p. 116; 372, p. 147.

Of main body, Exts. 248 to

Comments

Formation

Against

253, p. 103

p. 100.

II, p. 29.

comments

artillery,

on, p. 37.

Against Cavalry, comments on, Against

field

p. 34.

works, comments on,

Against Infantry, comments on, p.

By

299, p. 119.

;

of screen, Ext. 253, p. 103.

Chapter VII,

SHOCK ACTION Chapter

253, pp. 102-103; 295, p. 118.

on, p. 137.

Breaking of screen, Exts.

SECURITY

44, p. 24.

reserves, Ext. 61, p. 32.

Organization, Ext. 283,

SCREENING

;

p. 42.

40.

successive blows, Exts. 52, p. 30 54, p. 30 57, p. 31 65, D. 32; 66, p. 33; 84, p. 39; 233, p. 95. ;

SHOT GUNS

Ext.

SIGNALS

Prearranged,

SKIRMISHERS

Exts. 101, p. 44

SLEEPING

On

SPIES

Exts. 281, 282, p. 112.

SQUADRON

Definition

;

25, p. 20. p. 86. ;

110, p. 48

;

(

See Fire Action Mounted

the ground holding the reins, Ext. 474,

).

p. 180.

In the saddle, Exts. 493 to 495, pp. 186-187.

STEAMBOATS

Capture

STONE WALLS Exts.

STRAGGLERS

of, p. 5.

by cavalry, Exts. 352

86, p. 40; 90, p. 41

;

to 354, p. 139.

91, p. 42;

122, p. 51

;

154, p. 61.

Exts. 320, p. 127; 382, p. 150; 475 to 477, pp. 180-181.

How

prevented, Ext. 476, p. 180.

Camp STRATEGIC

of

Use

for,

of,

Ext. 477, p. 181.

Exts. 295 to 306, pp. 118-121.

Comments

on, p. 121.

STRATEGY

Exts. 297, p. 118; 302, p. 119.

STRATEGEM

Exts. 467 to 469, pp. 178-179.

;

64, p. 32

12

STREET FIGHT Exts. 109, p. 48; 232 to 234, p. 95. ING Of enemy, how determined, Exts.

STRENGTH

286, 287, p. 113; 288, p. 115; 293,

p. 116.

SUBSISTENCE

In general, Exts. 374 to 384, pp. 148-150.

SUCCESSIVE

Formations, Exts. 191 to 206, pp. 73-76.

On the

Blows

country, 372 to 384, pp. 147-150.

in charging, Ext. 233, p. 95.

SUPPLIES

In general, Exts. 372 to 395, pp. 147-156.

SUPPORTS

Of dismounted by mounted troops, Exts. 152 to

170, pp. 61-65; 219

p. 82.

Of Infantry by Cavalry, Exts. p. 69

;

138, p. 56; 173, p. 67; 174, p. 67; 183,

188, p. 70.

Of Infantry follow weak Cavalry, Exts. p. 69

;

SURPRISE

Exts. 216, p. 79; 275, 276, p. 110.

SURRENDER

Good Cavalry should

SWIMMING

Streams, Exts. 321 to 329, pp. 128-130.

Comments

By men,

not, Exts. 220 to 226, pp. 89-91.

on, p. 130.

Ext. 322, p. 128.

By animals, Exts. 321 TACTICS

Of Cooke, 1862,

Of Upton, 1873,

to 329, pp. 128 to 130.

p. 10.

Of Poinsett, 1841,

Of

177, p. 67; 182, p. 69; 184

185, p. 70.

p. 9.

p. 11.

Scott, 1826, p. 8.

Of Wheeler, 1863,

p. 12.

TARGETS

Moving, Ext. 114, p. 50.

TOWNS

Exts. 109, p. 48; 232 to 234, p. 95; 245, p. 100; 335, p. 132.

TRAINS

In general, 355 to

Comments

361, pp. 140-141

;

384, p. 150.

on, p. 141.

An incumbrance

to Cavalry, Exts. 356, p. 140; 358, p. 140; 384, p. 150,

Disposition of during battle, Ext. 357, p. 140.

How

guarded, Exts. 359,

p. 141

Marching Cavalry in rear

of,

;

367, p. 144.

Ext. 231, p. 94.

Pontoon, Exts. 366, 367, pp. 144. Sent ahead

when

retiring, Ext. 218, p. 80.

Should not be guarded by Cavalry, Exts.

When

to attack, Ext. 361, p. 141.

228, p. 93; 360, p. 141.

13

Where marched,

Ext. 355, p. 140.

TOUCH

Keeping, Ext. 279,

TRENCHES

Occupied by Cavalry, Exts.

p. 112.

TRANSPORTA- In General, Exts. 362 TION Comments on, p. 146. Allowance

of,

425, p. 162; 483, p. 183.

to 371, pp. 142-146.

Exts. 362, 363, p. 143; 366 to 368, pp. 144-145; 371,

p. 146; 377, p. 148.

Cavalry with no, Exts. 364, 365,

Of

p. 144.

baggage, Exts. 362, p. 142

officers

;

368, p. 145.

TROPHIES

Exts 484 to 488 PP- 183-184.

TRUMPET

Calls, Ext. 466, p. 178.

TURNING

Movements

VICTORY

In general, Exts. 484 to 488. pp. 183-184.

-

>

Comments on

p. 178.

Exts. 124, p. 52; 128, p. 63; 153, p. 61; 171,

Comments on

of,

66; 180, p. 68.

p. 184.

Causes increased confidence in leaders, Ext. Fruits

p.

gathered by

1

15, p. 50.

Cavalry, Exts. 143, p. 66; 181, p. 68.

Fruits of failing to secure, Ext. 485, p. 183.

WOODS

Cavalry

in, Exts. 38, p. 22; 44, p. 24; 83, p. 39;

For camp grounds, Ext.

WOUNDED

348, p.

1H(>.

In general, Exts. 489, 490,

p. 185.

Comments on p. 185. when retiring,

Ext. 439,

Sent ahead

Should not be abandoned, Ext.

p. 167.

489, p. 185.

16(5, p.

64.

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