18_RTO

Flight Operations Safety Awareness Seminar – Moscow, 10-11 March 2009

Presented by

Peimann TOFIGHI-NIAKI A300/A310 Family Flight Operations Engineer Flight Operations Safety Enhancement

Revisiting the Stop or Go decision Rejecting Takeoff Procedure & Training

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Content 

Background



Operational Standards



Factors involved in the decision-making



Prevention Strategies

Flight Operations Safety Awareness Seminar Moscow 2009 – Revisiting the Stop or Go decision

Slide 2

Background 

Improvement of the rate of RTO overrun accidents/incidents:

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Implementation of policies, training practices and operational guidelines developed by the Industry

Flight Operations Safety Awareness Seminar Moscow 2009 – Revisiting the Stop or Go decision

Slide 3

Background 

Split between high speed and low speed RTO

92% Low Speed (100 kt)

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Potential runway overrun accidents/incidents

Source: IATA Steades 2002 Flight Operations Safety Awareness Seminar Moscow 2009 – Revisiting the Stop or Go decision

Slide 4

Background 

Analysis of 94 RTO overrun accidents/incidents 1961 to 1999 revealed that more than half of RTO overrun accidents/incidents occurred at speeds greater than V1: Unknown 20% Greater than V1 54%

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Less than or equal to V1 26%

Importance of making the STOP or GO decision prior to reaching V1 and of a timely V1 callout Flight Operations Safety Awareness Seminar Moscow 2009 – Revisiting the Stop or Go decision

Slide 5

Background 

Experience has shown that rejected takeoffs at higher speeds, on a balanced field runway (i.e. accel/stop distance at V1 equals runway lenght), can be hazardous even if the performance is correctly calculated

WHY?

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Factors that may detract from a successful RTO …

Flight Operations Safety Awareness Seminar Moscow 2009 – Revisiting the Stop or Go decision

Slide 6

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Background 

Error in aircraft TOW determination (loadsheet…)



Error in T/O data calculation (V1, VR, V2, FLEX TEMP…)



Tire damage



Brake worn or not working properly



Too high residual brake temperature



Incorrect runway line-up technique



Delay in initiating the stop action during T/O roll if failure



Runway friction coefficient lower than expected

Factors that may detract from a successful RTO … Flight Operations Safety Awareness Seminar Moscow 2009 – Revisiting the Stop or Go decision

Slide 7

Background

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Performance Training

Flight Operations Safety Awareness Seminar Moscow 2009 – Revisiting the Stop or Go decision

Slide 8

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Content 

Background



Operational Standards



Factors involved in the decision-making



Prevention Strategies

Flight Operations Safety Awareness Seminar Moscow 2009 – Revisiting the Stop or Go decision

Slide 9

Operational Standards - Decision  STOP

or GO = Captain’s decision

• Split into low and high speed regime: 100 kt 

Below 100 kt – Any indication of system malfunction should result in a STOP decision PNF callout

THRUST SET

100

STOP or GO

Low

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Speed

Airspeed

0

80

100

Flight Operations Safety Awareness Seminar Moscow 2009 – Revisiting the Stop or Go decision

Slide 10

Operational Standards - Decision 

Above 100 kt – Be “go-minded” and do not delay the decision – Only major failures may justify a STOP decision

STOP

 Engine or APU fire warning

 Nose gear vibrations

 Sudden loss of thrust

 “Bang” without thrust loss

 ECAM alerts (refer to FCOM)

 Open sliding windows

 Indications that the aircraft will not fly safely

 EGT over limit

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STOP or GO

Airspeed

0

… STOP or GO …

STOP or

GO …

STOP

…

Low

High

Speed

Speed

80

100

Flight Operations Safety Awareness Seminar Moscow 2009 – Revisiting the Stop or Go decision

V1 Slide 11

GO

Operational Standards - Decision 

At V1 – CAPT must remove his hand from the Thrust Levers



Above V1 – Takeoff must be continued – No action below 400 ft A height of 400 ft is recommended as a good compromise between the time required to stabilize the flight path and the acceptable delay to initiate the procedure associated to the failure.

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STOP or GO

Airspeed

0

… STOP or GO …

STOP or

GO …

STOP

…GO

Low

High

Speed

Speed

80

100

Flight Operations Safety Awareness Seminar Moscow 2009 – Revisiting the Stop or Go decision

PNF callout

V1

or auto-callout

V1 VR

V2 Slide 12

Operational Standards - Stopping procedure

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

Task sharing & Stopping procedure

Flight Operations Safety Awareness Seminar Moscow 2009 – Revisiting the Stop or Go decision

Slide 13

Operational Standards - Stopping procedure 

“DECEL”: the deceleration is felt by the crew, and

Review of the procedure

confirmed by the speed trend on PFD. It can also be confirmed by DECEL light

1

A320/A330/A340

2

CAPT 1

F/O

Calls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "STOP"

1

Calls . . . . "REVERSE GREEN"

Trust levers . . . . . . . . . . IDLE

2

"DECEL"

Reverse thrust . . . MAX AVAIL

1

ATS . . . . . . . . . DISCONNECT

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A300 Family

ex: A320

Flight Operations Safety Awareness Seminar Moscow 2009 – Revisiting the Stop or Go decision

Slide 14

Operational Standards - Stopping procedure AUTO BRK does not activate below:



Review of the procedure

 72 kts (GS) for A320-A330-A340  80 kts (GS) for A300 Family

1 2

4

3

CAPT 1

F/O

Calls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "STOP"

1

Calls . . . . "REVERSE GREEN"

Trust levers . . . . . . . . . . IDLE

2

"DECEL"

3

"70 kts" ("80 kts" for A300 Family)

Reverse thrust . . . MAX AVAIL

1 3

Cancels any audio warning

Aircraft stopped

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2 3 4

Reverse thrust . . . . STOWED Parking brake . . . . . . . APPLY PA call . . "ATTENTION CREW AT STATION" Calls for . . . . "ECAM ACTION"

2 ex: A320

Flight Operations Safety Awareness Seminar Moscow 2009 – Revisiting the Stop or Go decision

Advises ATC Locates EMERGENCY EVACUATION C/L Completes ECAM ACTIONS

Slide 15

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Content 

Background



Operational Standards



Factors involved in the decision-making



Prevention Strategies

Flight Operations Safety Awareness Seminar Moscow 2009 – Revisiting the Stop or Go decision

Slide 16

Factors Involved in the Decision Making 

Unexpected conditions during takeoff roll: – Atmospheric conditions – Indicated airspeed discrepancy at 100 kts or before – Aircraft tendency to pitch up – Loss or difficulty to maintain lateral control – Malfunction of engine system – Unusual noise and/or vibration (e.g.: nose gear vibration, tire burst, engine stall, suspected bomb explosion …) – System failure(s) triggering ECAM warnings/cautions and/or cockpit indications

– Broken crew-seat latch – Bird strike – Traffic conflict / Runway Incursion (particularly on congested airports) – Open windows, doors © AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved.

– Any type of indication that the aircraft is unsafe or unable to fly – Lack of proper communication between flight crew (e.g.: untimely power check, speed callout, …) Flight Operations Safety Awareness Seminar Moscow 2009 – Revisiting the Stop or Go decision

Slide 17

Factors Involved in the Decision Making

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

Stop or go? 

Severity of the malfunction



Aircraft speed



Atmospheric conditions



Runway characteristics and condition



Dispatch under MEL

Flight Operations Safety Awareness Seminar Moscow 2009 – Revisiting the Stop or Go decision

Slide 18

Factors Involved in the Decision Making 

Performance of the decision-making is affected by: 

Limited decision-making time



Recognition time of unexpected conditions (i.e. unusual or unique situations)



Lack of understanding of cues associated to problems which may occur during takeoff roll



Non-adherence to published callouts (e.g. 80kts thrust set,

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100 kts, V1…) 

Crew coordination



Complacency



Inadequate/Incomplete pre-flight briefing

Flight Operations Safety Awareness Seminar Moscow 2009 – Revisiting the Stop or Go decision

Slide 19

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Content 

Background



Operational Standards



Factors involved in the decision-making



Prevention Strategies

Flight Operations Safety Awareness Seminar Moscow 2009 – Revisiting the Stop or Go decision

Slide 20

Prevention Strategies 

Objective: 

When an event occurs during the takeoff roll, the crew’s reaction must be automatic (“instinctive”) and correct – Airline’s policy and procedures

• Captain’s decisions, low/high speed philosophy, standard callouts, task-sharing, SOP, who has the authority to reject…

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– Education and Training

Flight Operations Safety Awareness Seminar Moscow 2009 – Revisiting the Stop or Go decision

Slide 21

Prevention Strategies 

Standard callouts: Develop the proper stop or go mindset:

STOP or GO … STOP or GO … STOP or GO …

STOP

…

GO

low speed / high speed

Airspeeds 0

80

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Power set …

100

High speed regime!

Flight Operations Safety Awareness Seminar Moscow 2009 – Revisiting the Stop or Go decision

V1 VR

V2

Timely V1 callout

Slide 22

Prevention Strategies 

Each takeoff is unique!

Standard Operating Procedures: 

Pre-flight preparation – Takeoff data (high weight, high V1, …), aircraft’s technical status (MEL item, …), runway conditions, bird activity, windshear …



Exterior inspection – Tire conditions, brake wear…



Takeoff briefing: – Includes all essential data associated to the T/O with present conditions

• P/F and PNF role during take off roll – Includes an ”abnormal condition” briefing

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• Captain’s decision in case of malfunction – STOP or GO -, PF/PNF respective role in case of GO decision, and Captain/F/O respective role in case of STOP decision 

Line-up technique

Flight Operations Safety Awareness Seminar Moscow 2009 – Revisiting the Stop or Go decision

Slide 23

Prevention Strategies 

Education and Training:

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Example of takeoff safety training program

Flight Operations Safety Awareness Seminar Moscow 2009 – Revisiting the Stop or Go decision

Slide 24

Prevention Strategies 

Education and Training: 

Ground training – Meaning of V1, understanding of reasons for RTO, technical understanding of takeoff performance, contaminants, reverse thrust, flap selection and reduced V1, influence of line-up techniques, power setting technique, …



Simulator sessions – Handling of engine failure

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– Simulator excercises, when practicable, where the crew have to recognize situations that are not the result of a clear and distinct loss of thrust:

• • • •

Engine stall accompanied with loud bang (without loss of thrust) Tire burst Traffic conflicts (“Abort”) Engine oil low pressure close to V1

Flight Operations Safety Awareness Seminar Moscow 2009 – Revisiting the Stop or Go decision

Slide 25

Prevention Strategies 

Education and Training: 

Simulator sessions (cont’d) – Maximum braking techniques, RTO on balanced field, tire failures, warnings/cautions that may be triggered at high speeds, timely V1 callout, …



Items to be discussed and reviewed during recurrent training: – Engine failure very close to V1: what are the consequences in case of a go decision? … – Advantage of a go decision and immediate return, but also potential problems … – Nose gear vibration, opening sliding windows should not lead to a stop decision above 100 kt – Tire burst within the 20kts range from V1: stop or go? …

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– Birdstrike at high speed … – Windshear or uneven aircraft acceleration during T/O roll …

Flight Operations Safety Awareness Seminar Moscow 2009 – Revisiting the Stop or Go decision

Slide 26

Conclusion

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

Develop airline’s policy to define: 

Who makes the decision to stop or go (i.e. Captain’s decision)?



When is a stop decision recommended pending upon the speed regime and the nature & severity of the malfunction?



What are the actions in case of stop or go decision during the takeoff roll and the respective task-sharing?



Enhance the stop or go decision mindset and task-sharing, during the takeoff briefing based on the present conditions and on potential abnormal situations



Practice during training, and/or review the conditions that may validate a stop or go decision



Educate a proper understanding of the aircraft’s stop or go performance, and outline proper operational interpretation of V1 (i.e. V1 is a decision/action speed)

Flight Operations Safety Awareness Seminar Moscow 2009 – Revisiting the Stop or Go decision

Slide 27

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FOBN: Revisiting the Stop or Go Decision

Flight Operations Safety Awareness Seminar Moscow 2009 – Revisiting the Stop or Go decision

Slide 28