16.Tenebro vs. CA (with concurring opinion of Vitug and Dissent of Carpio)_Tolentino.docx

G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004 Tenebro vs. CA Bigamous an !o"ygamous #arriages $nares%&an'iago, ( FACT&) *n A+ri" 10, 10, -eronio eronio Tenebro /res+onen' an e'iia  e'iia Anaas 3ere marrie an "ive 'oge'er on'inuous"y. uring 'e "a''er +ar' o6 1 1, res+onen' in6orme Anaas 'a' e is marrie 'o a er'ain i"a -i""areyes, -i""areyes, an even so3e er a o+y o6 'e #arriage Con'ra'. A6'er 'a', res+onen' "e6' 'eir onuga" aboe an  sai 'a' e 3i"" be oabi'a'ing 3i' 3 i' -i""areyes. *n (anuary 25, 1, re'i'ioner on'ra'e ano'er marriage 3i' a er'ain Ni"a -i""egas. -i""egas. Anaas 6rom -i""areyes -i""areyes 3e'er +e'i'ioner + e'i'ioner an er /-i""areyes /-i""areyes are marrie. 9n a an3ri''en "e''er, -i""areyes -i""areyes on6irme 'a' +e'i'ioner is er usban. Anaas 6i"e a om+"ain' 6or bigamy agains' ag ains' +e'i'ioner. !e'i'ioner as:e is bro'er 'o veri6y is marriage 3i' -i""areyes -i""areyes i6 i' is voi. 9' 3as 6oun ou' ou ' 'a' 'ere 3as no reor o6 marriage be'3een im an -i""areyes. RTC) RTC) !e'i'ioner is gui"'y 3i'ou' reasonab"e oub'. 9&&;2 !i". 24>, 248@ #ere vs. on. ie?, 10 !i". 155@ a+an'a vs. #on'esa, 114 !i". 1227. We hold that the finding in the annulment case that the second marriage contracted by  Milagros de la Cru with !ergeant "accino was a nullity is determinative of her innocence and precludes the rendition of a verdict that she committed bigamy . To 'ry 'e rimina" ase in 'e 6ae o6 su a 6ining 3ou" be un3arran'e. /0%4>2.

The principle of statutory construction that penal laws are liberally construed in favor  of the accused and strictly against the 2tate is deeply rooted in the need to protect constitutional guarantees. 7 This principle serves notice to the public that only those acts clearly and plainly prohibited in penal laws are subject to criminal sanctions. To e'pand penal laws beyond their clear and plain meaning is no longer fair notice to the public. Thus, the principle insures observance of due process of law. The principle also prevents discriminatory application of penal laws. 2tate prosecutors have no power to broaden arbitrarily the application of penal laws beyond the plain and common understanding of the people who are subject to their penalties. Hence, the principle insures eual protection of the law. The principle is also rooted in the need to maintain the separation of powers by insuring that the legislature, and not the judiciary, defines crimes and prescribes their  penalties. "4 As aptly stated by the @.2. 2upreme +ourt, spea1ing through +hief 8ustice 8ohn Barshall, in #nited $tates v. %iltberger."" Te ru"e 'a' +ena" "a3s are 'o be ons'rue s'ri'"y, is +era+s no' mu "ess o" 'an ons'ru'ion i'se"6. 9' is 6oune on 'e tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals, an on 'e +"ain +rini+"e 'a' 'e +o3er o6 +unismen' is ves'e in 'e "egis"a'ure, no' in 'e uiia" e+ar'men'. It is the legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its  punishment. /