1582-1635 sales Case Digest

CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PHILIPPINES  vs. SPOUSES ALFONSO and ANACLETA BICHARA G.R. No. 131074 March 27, 2000 DE LEON, JR., J.: Facts: Respondent sold a parcel of land located in Legaspi City to Petitioner at the amount of 500 pesos per square meter or a total amount of 405 thousand pesos. The deed of sale contained that the payment is to be effected only after the Deed of Sale shall have been duly registered and a clean title issued in the name of VENDEE. Also, the VENDORS will undertake at their expense to fill the parcels of land with an escombro free from waste materials compacte compacted d to t he street level upon signing of the Deed of Sale to suit the ground for the construction of the regional office of the Central Bank of the Philippines thereat. Despite the issuance of the title, petitioner failed to pay respondent. On its part, respondents did not fill up the lot with escombro despite several demands made by petitioner. Petitioner was thus constrained to undertake the filling up of the said lots, by contracting the services of BGV Construction. The filling up of the lots cost petitioner P45,000.00. Petitioner deducted the said amount from the purchase price payable to respondents. Petitioner, however, still did not pay the respondents. Consequently, respondents commenced an action for rescission or specific performance with damages, against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City. Respondents alleged that petitioner failed to pay the purchase price despite demand. They prayed for the rescission of the contract of sale and the return of the properties, or in the alternative that petitioner be compelled compelled to pay the purchase price plus interest at the rate of 12% per annum from July 19, 1983, until fully paid, and to pay the capital gains and documentary stamp taxes with the Bureau of Internal Revenue and registration fees with the Register of Deeds. Petitioner tendered payment to respondents in the amount of P360,500.00. Respondents refused the tender, however, in view of their complaint for rescission. After receipt of summons, petitioner filed its answer averring that it was justified in delaying payment of the purchase price in view of resp ondents' breach of several conditions in the contract. First, petitioner alleged that respondents failed to deliver to the former free and legal possession of the two properties, in view of the encumbrances noted in the title, in addition to the presence of squatters who were not evicted by respondents. Second, it claimed that respondents did not fill up the lots with escombro free from waste materials, as agreed Trial court ordered specific performance of Central Bank to pay for the property plus interest. Court of Appeals on the other hand ordered the rescission of the contract of sale hence this petition.

Issues: Issues: Issue 1: Whether respondents are entitled to the remedy of rescission despite of their non-compliance to their obligations to Central Bank. Issue 2: Whether Central Bank is justified in withholding the payment of the purchase price. Held: Issue 1:  Respondents should not be allowed to rescind the contract where they themselves did not perform their essential obligation thereunder which is to fill up the parcels of land with escombro. It should be emphasized that a contract of sale involves reciprocity between the parties. Since respondents were in bad faith, they may not seek the rescission of the agreement they themselves breached.

Issue 2: Aside from the instances mentioned under Article 1590 of the civil code, the vendee is likewise entitled to withhold payment of the purchase price if the vendor fails to perform any essential obligation of the contract. Such right is premised not on the aforequoted article, but on general principles of reciprocal obligations. Since respondents failed to comply with their obligation, Central Bank is justified in withholding its payment of the purchase price.

Conchita Nool and Gaudencio Almojera vs. Court of Appeals, Anacleto Nool and Emilia Nebre. G.R. No.116635. July 24, 1997 PANGANIBAN, J.: FACTS: Two parcels of land are the subject of dispute in this case. The first area was formerly owned by Victorino Nool and the other parcel of land previously owned by Francisco Nool. Both parcels of land located in S an Manuel, Isabela. Petitioner spouses Conchita and Gaudencio seek recovery of the parcel of land f rom defendant, Anacleto Nool, younger brother of Conchita and Emilia, respondents in this case Petitioners contend that they are the owners of subject of land and that it bought the same from Conchita’ s brothers, Francisco and Victorino. Because they are in need of money, they applied and were granted of a loan by DBP, secured by real estate mortgage on the said parcels of land. The title of the lands then was still in the names of the previous owners. Since the petitioners defaulted in paying the loan the mortgaged lands were foreclosed. The ownership of the lands was conveyed with DBP for being the highest bidder in the auction sale. As requested by Conchita, Anacleto, brother of Conchita redeemed the for eclosed property with DBP; as a result, the titles of two parcels of were transferred to Anacleto. That as part of their agreement (Conchita and Anacleto), Anacleto agreed to buy from the petitioners the parcels of land for 100,000, 30,000 of which price is paid to Conchita and upon payment of 14, 000 petitioners were to regain possession of the two parcel of land. which defendants failed to pay. Because of this another agreement was entered into by the parties, whereby respondents agreed to return the parcels of land at anytime when the petitioners have the necessary amount, When petritioners asked to return the parcels of land, respondents refused to return the same. Hence, petitioners filed this complaint to seek recovery of the disputed land. Lower court ruled in favor of the respondents. Court of Appeals affirmed Lower Court Decision. Hence this petition

ISSUES: Whether or not the agreement entered into by the parties (Petitioners and respondents) with respect to the sale and period of redemption of the parcels of land valid and enforceable? Whether or not the Respondent is estopped in impugning the validity of the agreement with the petitioner? RULING: Supreme Court ruled affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals and the Lower Court. The SC held that the sellers (petitioners) no longer had any title to the parcels of land at the t ime of sale. And since delivery is not possible in this case without transferring ownership of such p arcels of land, the contract of sale between petitioners and respondent is void. Further since the right to redeem the property is dependent upon the validity of the sale of the parcels of land, such right to redeem is also void. The petitioners in this case cannot assert the right to repurchase the property with the respondents, since respondent Anacleto redeemed the property after the period of redemption given to the petitioners. Thus, the ownership of the parcels of land was transferred already to DBP and then conveyed to Respondent upon buying the said property to DBP. Moreover, respondent cannot be estopped from raising the defense of nullity of contract, since they acted in good faith, believing that petitioners are still the owners of the parcels of land. Article 1410 of the Civil Code provides that the action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe. Thus, respondent  Anacleto can impugn the nullity of the agreement at anytime.

State Investment House Inc. vs. CA Corazon Victoriano provided pieces of jewelry to Nora Moulic so that the latter may sell the same. As security for the jewelries, Moulic issued to Victoriano two post dated checks in the aggregate amount of P100,000.00. Moulic was not able to sell the jewelries so she returned the same to Victoriano. Victoriano was however unable to return the checks hence Moulic withdrew all her funds from the bank.  Apparently, the checks were negotiated by Victoriano to State Investment House. So when the checks were dishonored, State Investment demanded Moulic to pay. Moulic refused to pay because she said the checks were merely used as security for the jewelry. Moulic further averred that she received no notice of dishonor.

ISSUE: Whether or not State Investment House is entitled to be paid.

HELD: Yes. State Investment is a holder in due course as it met all the requirements to be one pursuant to Section 52 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. In particular, it is clearly shown that: (a) on their faces the post-dated checks were complete and regular: (b) State Investment bought these checks from Victoriano, before their due dates;

(c)

State Investment took these checks in good faith and for value, (d) State Investment was never informed nor made aware that these checks were merely issued to Victoriano as security and not for value. Further, there is no need to issue a notice of dishonor to Moulic. After Moulic withdrew her funds, she could not have expected her checks to be honored. It would only be futile for State Investment to be sending her notices of dishonor for the two checks.

CASE TITLE : MOLINA VS. COURT OF APPEALS CITATION : 398 SCRA 97 (2003) TOPIC : EQUITABLE MORTGAGE (ART. 1602-1604) FACTS: Petitioner Pedro Molina and his siblings Felisa, Felix and Tomas Molina were co-owners of a parcel of land. Pedro, by Deed of Absolute Sale, conveyed to his sister Felisa his share in the co-owned property. The sale was not, however, registered. A few years later Pedro executed another Deed of Sale over his share over the property Felisa’s son and daughter -in-law, private respondents Margarito Flores and Nerisa Herrera. Pedro later filed an action before the RTC to reform or annul the Deed of Absolute Sale he executed in favor of respondent spouses because allegedly it does express the true will and intention of the parties. Respondent spouses maintained that their acquisition of petitioner’s share was valid, legal and binding. The trial court ruled in favo ur of Pedro and ordered the annulment of the Deed of Sale. On appeal the CA, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision.

ISSUE: Whether the Deed of Sale executed by Pedro in favour of private respondents is an equitable mortgage. HELD: The Supreme Court says NO. Petition denied. RATIO: For the presumption of an equitable mortgage to arise under Art. 1602, two (2) requisites must concur: (a) that the parties entered into a contract denominated as a contract of sale, and (b) that their intention was to secure an existing debt by way of a mortgage. In the case at bar, the second requisite is conspicuously absent. That the alleged loan was received in installments of P1,000.00 per month for ten months or a total of P10,000.00 in fact indicates that the transaction was not one of a loan but of sale on installment. The alleged inadequacy of the price harped upon by petitioner does not by itself support the conclusion that the property was not at all sold or that the contract was one of a loan. In any event, no proof was presented to show that the value of the 92 sq. m. property located in Naic, Cavite was, at the time the Deed was executed in 1988, considerably higher than the therein stated purchase price P8,000.00.  As for petitioner’s continued receipt of rentals due on the property from its current lessee this Court finds the same as did the appellate court, to be a gesture of generosity, kinship and leniency from his relatives, he being jobless and without visible means of support.

Oscar Fernandez vs. Spouses Carlos and Narcisa Tarun November 14, 2002

G.R. No. 143868

Third Division

PANGANIBAN, J .: FACTS: A fishpond located in Arellano-Bani Dagupan City is co-owned by brothers Antonio, Santiago, Demetria and Angel Fernandez, together with their uncle Armando.  Antonio and Demetria sold their respective shares to Spouses Tarun. T hese sales were registered and annotated in the OCT. Lat er, the said co-owners executed a Deed of st nd Extrajudicial Partition of two parcels of registered land with exchange of shares. This involved the fishpond (1 ) that was co-owned and another fishpond (2 ). It was also nd stipulated in the deed that the parties recognize and respect the sale earlier made. Angel B. Fernandez exchanged his share in the 2  fishpond to the shares of his co-owners st on the remaining portion of the 1  fishpond. From that time on, they had been paying the realty taxes thereon. However, it was Angel B. Fernandez and later on his heirs, [petitioners], who remained in possession of the entire fishpond. The Spouses Tarun sought the partition of the property but Angel Fernandez refused. When he died, Spouses Tarun again sought the partition of the property but Angel F ernandez’s heirs [petitioner] again refused. Hence, this actio n for partition. RTC: in favor of petitioners. They are entitled to redeem the property. CA: REVERSED.

ISSUE: Whether or not the transaction is one of absolute sale or equitable mortgage. HELD: AFFIRMED. The transaction is an absolute sale. On its face, a document is considered a contract of equitable mortgage when the circumstances enumerated in Article 1602 of the Civi l Code are manifest, as follows: (a) when the price of the sale with the right to repurchase is unusually inadequate, and (b) when the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise. Although it is undisputed that Angel Fernandez was in actual possession of the property, it is important to note that he did not sell it to respondents. The sellers were his co-owners - Antonio and Demetria Fernandez -- who, however, are not claiming that the sale between them was an equitable mortgage. For the presumption of an equitable mortgage to arise, one must first satisfy the requirement that the parties entered into a contract denominated as a contract of sale, and that their intention was to secure an existing debt by way of mortgage. Furthermore, mere alleged inadequacy of the price does not necessarily void a contract of sale, although the inadequacy may indicate that there was a defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended a donation, mortgage, or some other act or contract. Finally, unless the price is grossly inadequate or shocking to the conscience, a sale is not set aside. In this case, petitioners failed to establish the fair market value of the property when it was sold in 1967. Hence, there is no basis to conclude that the price was grossly inadequate or shocking to the conscience.

Carlos Alonzo vs IAC GR Number + Date: G.R. No. 72873 May 28, 1987   Petition: P e t i t i o n f o r r e v i e w b y w a y o f c e r t i o r a r i: Appeal from a decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court Petitioner: CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO Respondent: INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA Ponencia: Cruz, J. DOCTRINE: Statutory Construction: Legislative Intent: The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its construction, hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit or intent. For what is within the spirit is within the letter but although it is not within the letter thereof, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute. Stated differently, a thing which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter; and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers. FACTS: 1. 5 Brothers and Sisters inherited qual pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in 'the name of their deceased parents. 2. One of them, through an absolute deed of sale, transferred to petitioners, his undivided share of the land. A year later, his sister sold her share in a “Con Pacto de Retro Sale”. 3. Petitioners occupied the two fifths of the land representing the portions sold to them and thereafter enclosed it with a fence. 4. The son of the petitioners, Eduaro Alonzo and his wife, then built a semi-concrete house with the consent of the petitioners. 5. One of the heirs to the land sought to redeem the portions that were sold but was subsequently denied due to him being an American citizen. 6. Another co-heir, filed her own complaint invoking the same right of redemption claimed by her brother. 7. The trial court also dismiss this complaint, now on the ground that the right had lapsed, not having been exercised within thirty days from notice of the sales. Although there was no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law. 8. IAC, in reversing the trial court, the respondent court declared that the notice required by the said article was written notice and that actual notice would not suffice as a substitute

ISSUES: 1. WoN actual knowledge satisfied the requirement of Article 1088 of the Civil Code. PROVISIONS: Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor. RULING + RATIO: 1.  Yes. a. While we admittedly may not legislate, we nevertheless have the power to interpret the law in such a way as to reflect the wi ll of the legislature. While we may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to "the letter that killeth" but to "the spirit that vivifieth," to give effect to the law maker's will. b. Was there a valid notice? Granting that the law requires the notice to be written, would such notice be necessary in this case? Assuming there was a valid notice although it was not in writing. would there be any question that the 30-day period for redemption had expired long before the complaint was filed in 1977? In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private respondents' pretense that they were unaware of the sales made by their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. By requiring written proof of such notice, we would be closing our eyes to the obvious truth in favor of their palpably false claim of ignorance, thus exalting the letter of the law over its purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to make sure that the redemptioners are duly notified. We are satisfied that in this case the other brothers and sisters were actually informed, although not in writing, of the sales made in 1963 and 1964, and that such notice was sufficient. c. The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended during the 14 years between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption. These are the justifications for this exception.

DISPOSITION 1. WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the respondent court is REVERSED and that of the trial court is reinstated, without any pronouncement as to

LEE CHUY REALTY CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARC REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION December 4, 1995 GR No. 104114 Bellosillo, J.: FACTS:  A piece of land is disputed by Lee Chuy Corp. and Marc Realty. Originally the property was co-owned by Ruben Jacinto to the extent of one- sixth and the Bascara’s and Ernesto Jacinto who collectively owned the remaining five-sixths. On April 30, 1981, sale bet. Ruben Jacinto, of his one-sixth  pro-indiviso share, and Lee Chuy was duly registered. The Bascara’ s and E. Jacinto sold theirs to Marc Realty. The same was registered on Oct. 16, 1989. Lee Chuy claims it was never informed of the other sale. Marc Realty claims it was verbally informed and was given a copy of the deed of sale. On 13 November 1989 LEE CHUY REALTY filed a complaint for legal redemption against MARC REALTY and consigned in court a manager's check for 614,400. In its  Amended Answer with Counterclaim with Motion to Dismiss , MARC REALTY insisted that the complaint be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action there being no allegation of prior valid tender of payment nor a prior valid notice of consignation. The trial court ruled in favour of Lee Chuy and decreed that neither a separate offer to redeem nor a formal notice of consignation are necessary for the reason that the filing of the action itself, within the period of redemption, is equivalent to a formal offer to redeem. In respondents appeal to CA, CA reversed trial court’s judgment and decreed in contrary that a prior tender or of fer of redemption is a prerequisite or precondition to the filing of an action for legal redemption. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE: W/N THE FILING OF THE ACTION ITSELF IS EQUIVALENT TO A FORMAL OFFER TO REDEEM RULING: Petition Granted. SC sustains LEE CHUY REALTY. Arts. 1620 and 1623 of the Civil Code on legal redemption provide:  Art. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the other co-owners or of any of them are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.  Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners. There is actually no prescribed form for an offer to redeem to be properly effected. Hence, it can either be through a formal tender with consignation, or by filing a complaint in court coupled with consignation of the redemption price within the prescribed period.  A co-owner desirous of exercising his right of legal redemption is given a period of thirty (30) days from notice of the sale within which to avail of the right to redeem. Under the free patent or homestead provisions of the Public Land Act a period of five (5) years from the date of conveyance is provided, the five-year period to be reckoned from the date of the sale and not from the date of registration in the office of the Register of Deeds.The redemption of extrajudicially foreclosed properties, on the other hand, is exercisable within one (1) year from the date of the auction sale as provided for in Act No. 3135.

DOMINICO ETCUBAN v CA 148 SCRA 507, G.R. No. L-45164 March 16, 1987 FACTS: Plaintiff Dominico Etcuban inherited a piece of land together with his co-heirs from their deceased father. Said piece of land was declared in their names as heirs of Eleuterio Etcuban and was the subject matter in dispute in CFI of Cebu. In said case, Dominico Etcuban the spouse of the decease Demetria Initan and Pedro, V icente, Felicitas,Anastacio, Froilan, Alfonso, Advincula, Anunciaciori Jesus, Aguinaldo, surnamed Etcuban were declared as co -owners of the property in question. Thereafter the II co-heirs executed in favor of herein private respondents Jesus and Guadalupe Songalia II deeds of sale of their respective shares in the co-ownership. Plaintiff alleged that his co-owners leased and/or sold their respective shares without giving due notice to him as a co-owner notwithstanding his intimations to them that he was willing to buy all their respective shares. He further maintained that even upon inquiry from his co-heirs/co-owners, and also from the alleged buyers (defendants) he elicited nothing from them. Plaintiff discovered for the first time the existence of these II deeds of sale during the hearing on January 31, 1972 of Civil Case No. BN-87, entitled Jesus C. Songalia vs. Dominico ETCUBAN in the CFI of Cebu, When he verified the supposed sales with his co-owners only 3 of them admitted their respective sales. Hence, the filing of Civil Case No. BN-I09 by petitioner for legal redemption. Private respondents, on the other hand, allege that the provisions of the law pertaining to legal redemption have been fully complied with in respect to the sale of the disputed land to them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff may exercise his right of redemption over the land in question. HELD: No. Article 1623 of the Civil Code provides that the right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty (30) days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the Ca5e may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners. The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners. Written notice was given to plaintiff-appellee in the form of an answer with counterclaim to the complaint in Civil Case No. BN-109. This notice is sufficient to inform the plaintiff about the sale and the reckoning date for the 30-day period commenced upon receipt thereof. No other notice is needed under the premises because it is the substance conveyed rather than the form embodying it that counts. The records reveal that on May 27, 1974, plaintiff-appellee deposited with the lower court the amount of P26,340.00 the redemption price. Since the answer with counterclaim was filed on March 18, 1972, the deposit made on May 27, 1974 was clearly outside the 30..day period of legal redemption. The period within which the right of legal redemption or preemption may be exercised is non-extendible. While it is true that written notice is required by the law (Art. 1623), it is equally true that the same Art. 1623 does not prescribe any particular form of notice, nor any distinctive method for notifying the redemptioner. So long, therefore, as the latter is informed in writing of the sale and the particulars thereof, the 30 days for redemption start running, and the redemptioner has no real cause to complain. The furnishing of a copy of the disputed deed of sale to the redemptioner is equivalent to the giving of written notice required by law in a more authentic manner than any other writing could have done.

Harrison Motors Corporation vs Rachel Navarro Facts: Harrison Motors sold two trucks to Navarro through its president, Renato Claros.Prior to the sale, Renato Claros represented to private respondent that all the BIR taxes and customs duties for the parts used on the two (2) trucks had been paid for. Subsequently, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), the Land Transportation Office and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) entered in a Memorandum of Agreement which provided that for purposes of registering vehicles, a Certificate of Payment should first be obtained from the BIR. Government agents seized and detained the two trucks of Navarro after discovering that there were still unpaid taxes. Private respondent went to Claros to ask for the receipts evidencing payment of BIR taxes and customs duties; however, Claros refused to comply. Private respondent then demanded from Claros that he pay the assessed taxes and warned him that he would have to reimburse her should she be forced to pay for the assessments herself. But wanting to secure the immediate release of the trucks to comply with her business commitments, private respondent paid the assessed BIR taxes and customs duties amounting to P32,943.00. Hence, the action for collection of sum was filed against the petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not the sale of the two elf trucks to private respondent relieves/releases the petitioner from unpaid taxes and cu stom duties.

Held: It is true that the ownership of the trucks shifted to private respondent after the sale but petitioner must remember that prior to its consummation it expressly intimated to her that it had already paid the taxes and customs duties. Such representation shall be considered as a seller’sexpress warranty under Art. 1546 of the Civil  Code which covers any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller which induces the buyer to purchase the thing and actually purchases it relying on such affirmation or promise. It includes all warranties which are derived from express language, whether the language is in the form of a promise or representation Under Art. 1599 of the Civil Code, once an express warranty is breached the buyer can accept or keep the goods and maintain an action against the seller for damages. This was what private respondent did. She opted to keep the two (2) trucks which she apparently needed for her business and filed a complaint for damages, particularly seeking the reimbursement of the amount she paid to secure the release of her vehicles.

Ledonio v. Capitol Development Corporation Chico-Nazario, G.R. No. 149040 July 4, 2007 Facts: Edgar Ledonio obtained from Patrocinio S. Picache two loans with the amount of P60,000.00, and covered by promissory notes duly signed by him. Later on, Picache transferred his due from Ledonio to Capitol Development Corporation . However, Ledonio failed to pay any of the loans covered by the promissory notes when they became due. The corporation demanded payment from him but refused to do so. He denied that he made such promissory notes in favor of Picache and he further alleged that he only signed the promissory notes as a result of intimidation and fraud. He alleged that when he made the promissory notes, they were only used by Picache by taking advantage of his signature. Prior to the case, Ledonio was engaged in a garment business where he leased a real property from Mission Realty and Management Corporation. An incident happened where a group of Meralco employees cut-off the power supply of the plant of Ledonio due to non-payment of electric bills. This made foreign investors to desist transacting with him. He blamed the MRMC for not notifying him with the unpaid bills but he failed to obtain any of his claim s. The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent corporation finding its version of the facts more credible. The Court of Appeals affirmed the same.

ISSUE: whether the assignment of debt by Picache, the creditor, to another party such as the CDC, requires his consent being the debtor. RULING: Petition is denied for lack of merit. The transaction between Picache and CDC was an assignment of credit and does not require petitioner’s consent as debtor for i ts validity and enforceability.  An assignment of credit has been defined as an agreement by virtue of which the owner of a credit known as the assignor, by a legal cause - such as sale, dation in payment or exchange or donation  – and without need of the debtor’s consent, transfers that credit and its accessory rights to another who is the assig nee, who acquires the power to enforce it, to the same extent as the assignor could have enforced it against the debtor. The law does not require any formal notice to bind the debtor to the assignee, all that the law requires is knowledge of the assignment. Even if the debtor had not been notified, but came to know of the assignment by whatever means, the debtor is bound by it.

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and SECURITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, respondents. REGALADO, J .:  Facts: On various dates, defendant Security Bank and Trust Company issued 280 certificates of time deposit in favor of Angel dela Cruz who deposited of time deposit therein the aggregate amount of P1,120,000.00. Angel dela Cruz delivered said certificate of time deposit to plaintiff-petitioner Caltex in connection with his purchase of fuel products from the latter. Thereafter, dela Cruz informed defendant Bank that he lost all the certificates of deposit and ask for the replacement of said last CTP where it was granted by the bank. Soon after said grants, dela Cruz negotiated and obtained a loan fr om defendant bank in the amount of Eight Hundred Sev enty-Five Thousand Pesos (P875,000.00). On the same date, said depositor executed a notarized Deed of Assignment of Time Deposit which stated, among others, that he surrendered to defendant bank “full control of the indicated time deposits from and after date” of the assignment and further authorizes said bank to preterminate, set -off and “apply the said time deposit to the payment of whatever amounts may be due” on the loan upon it maturity. the loan of Angel dela Cruz with the defendant bank m atured and fe ll due and on August 5, 1983, the latter set-off and applied the time deposits in question to the payment of the matured loan. Plaintiff filed the instant complaint, praying that defendant bank be ordered to pay it the aggregate value of the certificates of time deposit of P1,120,000.00 plus accrued interest and compounded interest ther ein at 16%  per annum

Issue: whether or not Caltex Philippines has a better right over the Certificate of time deposits?

Held: Security Bank has a better right because the assignment of the CTDs made by Angel de la Cruz in favor of respondent bank was embodied in a public instrument. Art. 1625.  An assignment of credit, right or action shall produce no effect as against third persons, unless it appears in a public instrument, or the instrument is recorded in the Registry of Property in case the assignment involves real property. Respondent bank duly complied with this statutory requirement. Contrarily, petitioner, whether as purchaser, assignee or lien holder of the CTDs, neither proved the amount of its credit or the extent of its lien nor the execution of any public instrument which could affect or bind private respondent. Necessarily, therefore, as between petitioner and respondent bank, the latter has definitely the better right over the CTDs in question.