157007507 Digest Agrarian

DAR V. APEX INVESTMENT AND FINANCING CORPORATION G.R. No. 149422, April 10, 2003 FACTS: Apex Investment and Financing Corporation (Apex) owns several lots located at Barangay Paliparan, Dasmariñas, Cavite which includes the land subject of this case covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) T90476. The Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) initiated compulsory acquisition proceedings over these lots but Apex denied having received any such notice; that it only learned of the compulsory acquisition proceedings in the December 11, 1997 issue of BALITA. Consequently, Apex filed a Protest with the PARO rejecting DAR's offered compensation asserting that the subject landholding had already been classified as residential even prior to the effectivity of the law. It was only after more than one year before the PARO forwarded to DAR the said protest together with the records of the compulsory acquisition proceedings. However, despite the pendency of the protest, the Register of Deeds still cancelled one of its titles and issued a new one in the name of the Republic of the Philippines under TCT No. CLOA-2473. This prompted Apex to

filed

a

Petition

for Certiorari and

prohibition

praying

that

the

compulsory acquisition proceedings be declared null and void and for TCT No. CLOA-2473 to be cancelled. DAR opposed on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of the Apex. DAR moved for reconsideration but the same was denied, hence, this Appeal. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Apex violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. 2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the subject parcels of land are residential and not covered by R.A. No. 6657

HELD: On the first assigned error, the Court has consistently held that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a relative one and is flexible depending on the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Jurisprudentially, it has been held that the aggrieved landowners were not supposed to wait until the DAR acted in their letter-protests before resorting to judicial process. Given the official indifference which, under the circumstances could have continued forever, the landowners had to act to assert and protect their interests. In this case, Apex could not be expected to wait for petitioner DAR to resolve its protest before seeking judicial intervention. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that on the basis of the circumstances of this case, Apex need not exhaust all administrative remedies before filing its petition for certiorari and prohibition. Anent the second assigned error, Apex maintained that its lots have been classified as residential prior to the date of effectivity of R.A. No. 6657, that the Municipal Engineer and Deputized Zoning Administrator of Dasmariñas, Cavite, certified that Apex's lands are within the residential zone of Dasmariñas, based on the Land Use Plan of that municipality duly approved by the HLURB in its Resolution. However, this factual issue was never determined by the lower courts. The Supreme Court held that it cannot conclude that Apex's parcels of land are residential; thus remanding the case to the lower court.

VICTOR G. VALENCIA VS. CA G.R. No. 122363, April 29, 2003 FACTS: Victor Valencia owns two parcels of land situated somewhere in Negros Oriental. He entered into civil law lease agreements with the respondents who include Fr. Andres Flores. The agreement was subject to a prohibition against subleasing or encumbering and against installing a leasehold tenant without Valencia's consent. Fr. Flores designated persons to cultivate the land. Upon the expiration of the lease agreements, Valencia demanded that the respondents vacate the premises but to no avail. He filed a letter of protest to no avail. Twelve years after the filing of the protest, an administrative investigation was finally conducted. The report revealed among others that some of the respondents have even subleased their properties despite the pending protest of Valencia. Valencia's protest was eventually dismissed. Valencia appealed to the CA but it was dismissed for having been filed out of time. His Motion for Reconsideration was also denied. Hence, Valencia elevated the case to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner's civil law lessee, Fr. Flores, may install tenants on the subject premises without express authority to do so under Article 1649 of the Civil Code, especially when the lessee is expressly prohibited from doing so, as in the instant case. HELD: A contract of civil law lease can prohibit a civil law lessee from employing a tenant on the land subject matter of the lease agreement. Section 6 of R.A. No. 3844, as amended, is interpreted to the effect that a civil law lessee cannot automatically institute tenants on the property. The correct view that must necessarily be adopted is that the civil law lessee, although a legal possessor, may not install tenants on the property unless expressly authorized by the lessor. And if a prohibition exists or is stipulated in the contract of lease, the occupants of the property are

merely civil law sub-lessees whose rights terminate upon the expiration of the civil law lease agreement. SPS. ELIGIO AND MARCELINA MALLARI V. IGNACIO ARCEGA, ET AL G.R. No. 106615, January 15, 2004 FACTS: Arcega, et al. are agricultural lessees of landholdings planted to sugarcane described as Lot 3364 of the San Fernando Cadastre. The lot was originally owned by the spouses Wijangco and mortgaged to PNB to secure a loan. For their failure to pay their loan, the PNB foreclosed the mortgage. In the auction sale that followed, PNB was the highest bidder. Later, the spouses Mallari purchased the two lots from PNB without any indication that the same was tenanted. Upon knowledge of the sale, Arcega, et al., who were occupying portions of the land, filed with the Court of Agrarian Relations a Petition for Redemption against the spouses Wijangco, PNB and the spouses Mallari. The case reached the RTC and the latter ordered Arcega, et al. to show cause why the petition should not be dismissed for the tenants' failure to make a tender of payment and/or consignation of the redemption price. Instead of tendering payment, Arcega, et al. presented a certification entitled "Certification to Finance Redemption of Estate under R.A. No. 3844, As Amended". The RTC dismissed the Petition ruling that the Land Bank certification does not constitute a valid tender of payment and/or consignation of the redemption price. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC and remanded the case for further proceedings. Aggrieved, the spouses Mallari filed a Petition for Review. ISSUE: Whether or not the tenants have validly tendered or consigned payment of the redemption price for the purpose of exercising their right of redemption under Section 12, Republic Act No. 3844. HELD: Paragraph 2 of Land Bank Circular No. 3 has made it a mandatory requirement that all proposals for Land Bank financing of land acquisition

through pre-emption or redemption must carry the favorable indorsement of the Minister (now Secretary) of Agrarian Reform. It is likewise required that the prescribed form must indicate that the certification has been issued pursuant to a letter-request from the (DAR Secretary) to the Land Bank of the Philippines. The right of redemption under RA No. 3844, as amended is an essential mandate of the agrarian reform legislation to implement the State's policy of owner-cultivatorship and to achieve a dignified, selfreliant existence for small farmers. Unfortunately, such laudable policy could not be effected in favor of Ignacio Arcega, et al. since they failed to tender or consign payment of the redemption price. Thus, spouses Mallari should be allowed to continue enjoying their right over the subject property as purchasers thereof, for the State's commendable agrarian reform policy is never intended to unduly transgress the rights of innocent purchasers of lands.

DAR V. DECS G.R. No. 158228, April 27, 2004 FACTS: Two lots of Hacienda Fe, Escalante, Negros Occidental were donated by the late Esteban Jalandoni to DECS and consequently transferred to DECS under TCT No. 167175. DECS in turn, leased the subject landholdings to Anglo Agricultural Corporation for 10 agricultural crop years. Subsequently, the lease was renewed for another 10 years. Later, Eugenio Alpar and several others, claiming to be permanent and regular farmworkers therein filed a petition for Compulsory Agrarian Reform Program Coverage. Finding that the land is now covered by CARP, a "Notice of Coverage" was issued with the approval of the Regional Director. DECS appealed to the Secretary of DAR, seeking emption from CARP coverage on the ground that all the income derived from its contract of lease with Anglo Agricultural Corporation were actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes, such as for the repairs and renovations of schools in the nearby locality. Its appeal being denied, DECS elevated the case to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the properties owned by DECS are exempt from the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) HELD: No. Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the types of land which are exempted from the coverage of CARP as well as the purposes of their exemption as follow: c) Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for national defense, school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes, xxx shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act.

It is clear from the above provision that, in order to be exempt from the coverage, the land must be "actually, directly, and exclusively used and found to be necessary" and the purpose is "for school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes." This is not obtaining in this case. The lease of DECS of the subject property is not for education purposes but for the furtherance of business.

SAMAHAN NG MAGSASAKA SA SAN JOSEP V. MARIETTA VALISNO, ET AL G.R. No. 158314, June 3, 2004 FACTS: Dr. Nicolas Valisno, Sr. is the registered owner of a 57-hectare property situated in La Fuente, Sta. Rosa, Nueva. Dr. Valisno mortgaged 12 hectares of his property to the Angelo and Renato Banting. Thereafter, the property was subdivided into ten lots and individual titles were issued in the name of the eight children of Dr. Valisno, to Angelito Banting and to Renato Banting. The mortgage on the 12 hectare portion was foreclosed and the property sold at public auction. Four grandchildren of Dr. Valisno redeemed the property. At the time of the redemption, only one was of legal age, the others were only minors. Subsequently, petitioner SMSP filed a petition for coverage of the subject property. The petition was dismissed but DAR Secretary ultimately held that the property was covered by CARP subject to the retention rights of the heirs of Nicolas, Sr. The Valisno heirs including the four grandchildren-redemptioners filed a consolidated Application for Retention and Award under R.A. No. 6657. The Regional Director approved the retention of the Valisno children. The request for the award to the grandchildren-redemptioners’ retention rights of three hectares each was approved on appeal to the CA. Petitioners

filed

a

Motion

for

Reconsideration

holding

that

the

redemptioners are not entitled to retention rights. The said motion same was denied. Hence, this Appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the grandchildren of the landowner are still entitled to retention rights? HELD: As owners in their own right, the redemptioner-grandchildren enjoyed the right of retention granted to all the landowners. This right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to qualification by balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant and by implementing the doctrine that social justice was not meant to

perpetrate an injustice against the landowner. A retained area, as its name denotes, is land which is not supposed to leave the landowner's dominion, thus, sparing the government from the inconvenience of taking land only to return it to the landowners afterwards, which would be a pointless process. The fact that the grandchildren are minors at the time the redemption was made does not make the contract void but only voidable or valid until annulled. Under the Civil Code, the action to annul the minors' redemption could only have been initiated by the minors themselves, as the victims or the aggrieved parties in whom the law itself vests the right to file suit. This action was never initiated by the minors.

JULIANA SUDARIA V. MAXIMILIANO QUIAMBAO

G.R. No. 164 305, November 20, 2007 FACTS: Maximilliano Quiambao filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer against Juliana Sudaria before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Miguel, Bulacan. He alleged that he was the owner of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-113925. He also averred that, in 1965, by virtue of a Kasunduan, his predecessor-in-interest, Alfonsa C. Vda. de Viola, leased the said piece of land to Sudaria's late husband for a monthly rental. Quiambo alleged that in the same year, Sudaria who took over the lease after her husband's death stopped paying the rentals on the property. Thereafter, Quiambao made a demand for Sudaria to pay the overdue rentals and vacate the premises but the latter refused to pay. Sudaria maintained that she refused to pay the lease rentals to Quiambao because he was not the registered lessor, and that as bona fide tenantsuccessor of her deceased husband, she was entitled to security of tenure, as well as to the home lot which formed part of the leasehold under agrarian laws. Sudaria however, did not adduced proof to show that the Department of Agrarian Reform had awarded the property in her favor as her home lot. Upon on the other hand, Quiambao presented for his case a Torrens title covering the lot in his name. ISSUE: Who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises or possession de facto? HELD: Rightful possession belongs to Quiambao. Sudaria failed to show that the Department of Agrarian Reform had awarded the property in her favor as her home lot. Instead, the clear preponderance of evidence is on the side of respondent. He presented the Torrens title covering the lot in his name. It must be stressed, however, that the Court has engaged in this initial determination of ownership over the lot in dispute only for the purpose of settling the issue of possession.