15. Rule 65 China Banking v. Cebu Printing

September 23, 2017 | Author: Tep Bontuyan | Category: Certiorari, Appeal, Separation Of Powers, Lawsuit, Public Law
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CHINA BANKING CORPORATION -versus- CEBU PRINTING AND PACKAGING CORPORATION, Facts: This is a petition for review of certiorari under Rule 45 from a CA decision. Cebu Printing (CEPRI or cepri) filed a petition for rehabilitation with the RTC. The petition was found sufficient in form and substance hence a stay order was issued. China Banking (Chinabank or chinabank) filed a comment/opposition. After the initial hearing, the RTC denied due course to the petition for rehabilitation. Cepri received the order denying the petition for rehabilitation on May 8, 2002. It filed an urgent motion for reconsideration on May 14, 2002. (6 days na ang nakuha sa 15-day period for appeal) It was denied by the trial court on May 23, 2002 on the ground that it is a prohibited pleading under the Interim Rules of Procedure for Corporate Rehabilitation (rules on corporate rehabilitation). June 4, 2002, past the period of appeal (2 days late), cepri filed a petition for certiorari (Rule 65) with the CA. It was denied. A motion for reconsideration was filed on September 27, 2005 which was granted (here the CA treated the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 as a petition for review based on some jurisprudence and that the rules on corporate rehabilitation treats a petition for certiorari as a petition for review under Rule 43). Chinabank filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Hence, this petition. Issue: WON the petition for certiorari filed by cepri with the CA was proper? Held: No. Under the rules on corporate rehabilitation, “a petition for review or an appeal from any order issued by the court under these Rules shall not stay the execution of the order unless restrained or enjoined by the appellate court. The review of any order or decision of the court or an appeal therefrom shall be in accordance with the Rules of Court” Considering that corporate rehabilitation is a special proceeding, in A.M. 00-8-10-SC, the period of appeal provided in section 3, Rule 41 [20] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure for ordinary civil actions shall apply to cases involving intra-corporate disputes. Corollarily, the period of appeal provided in paragraph 19 (b) of the Interim Rules Relative to the Implementation of B.P. Blg. 129 for special proceedings shall apply to petitions for rehabilitation. As clarified by A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC, an appeal may now be perfected by filing a petition for review within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision or final order of the trial court, directly to the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. This applies to cases formerly under the jurisdiction of the SEC, including corporate rehabilitation. Pertinent parts of A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC (see full text for the whole provision. The numbers below do not necessarily reflect the proper section/paragraph number of the law): (1) All decisions and final orders in cases falling under the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing IntraCorporate Controversies under Republic Act No. 8799 shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court (2) The petition for review shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision or final order of the Regional Commercial Court (3) These pending appeals or petitions shall be treated in the following manner: “ c. In case a petition appealing or assailing the decision and/or final order is filed directly with the Court of Appeals within the reglementary period, such petition shall be considered a petition for review under Rule 43.” A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC then emphasizes that the proper mode of appeal is a petition for review under Rule 43. What it means then when it says that “In case a petition appealing or assailing the decision and/or final order is filed directly with the Court of Appeals within the reglementary period, such petition shall be considered a petition for review under Rule 43” is that if the mode of appeal resorted to is an ordinary appeal, then it will be treated as a petition for review under Rule 43, which is an ordinary appeal. (so ordinary appeal jud ang proper mode of appeal.) Hence, a certiorari under Rule 65, as a special civil action, is not the proper mode of appeal, and cannot be treated as a petition for review under the rules on corporate rehabilitation. Further, the 15 day reglementary period to file the appeal is of utmost importance. On the argument of the CA that there are jurisprudence where a certiorari under Rule 65 was treated as a petition for review, this is wrong because in those cases, there were certain exceptional circumstances. This is not the general rule. Rather, the general rule is the remedies of appeal in the ordinary course of law and that of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court are mutually exclusive and not alternative or cumulative. The special civil action of Certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for a lost appeal where the latter remedy is available; especially if such loss or lapse was occasioned by one’s own negligence or error in the choice of remedies.

A certiorari under Rule 65 was treated as a petition for review when (1) if the petition for certiorari was filed within the reglementary period within which to file a petition for review on certiorari; (2) when errors of judgment are averred; and (3) when there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules. In another case, certiorari may still issue even if the aggrieved party has a remedy of appeal in the ordinary course of law where the exigencies of the case are such that the ordinary methods of appeal may not prove adequate either in point of promptness or completeness so that a partial or total failure of justice may result. In another case, the exception applies (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictate; (b) when the broader interests of justice so require; (c) when the writs issued are null; and (d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. None of these circumstances exist in this case. Petition granted.

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