14 - Kulayan v Tan

Kulayan v. Tan (3 July 2012) 675 S 482 Facts: 1. 3 members from the International Committee of the Red Cross were kidnapped in Patikul, Sulu y the Abu Sayaf Group (ASG). 2. Respondent Governor Tan organized the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF), a group of armed male civilians redeployed to areas of Patikul. 3. Threatening that one of the hostages will be beheaded, the ASG demanded evacuation of military camps in Jolo. 4. Tan issued Proclamation 1-09 declaring a state of emergency in Sulu province and calling upon the PNP with the assistance of AFP and CEF to set up checkpoints and chokepoints and conduct general search and seizures. Issue/Held: 1. WON Proclamation 1-09 is valid. NO. Ratio: 1.

a. Petitioners: Proclamation 1-09 violates the Constitution, Article 7, Sec 1 and 18, which grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency powers and calling-out powers. Respondent: Proclamation 1-09 is consistent with the LGC, Sec 16 and 465, which empowers the Provincial Governor to carry out emergency measures during calamities and disasters, and to call upon the national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder. SC: When the Constitution, Article 7, Sec 1 speaks of executive power, it is granted to the President and no one else. Corollarily, it is only the President who is authorized to exercise emergency powers (Article 6, Section 23) and calling-out powers (Article 7, Section 7). The power to declare a state of martial law is subject to the SC’s authority to review the factual basis thereof. The calling-out powers, which is of lesser gravity than the power to declare martial law, is bestowed upon the President alone. The framers never intended for local chief executives to exercise unbridled control over the police in emergency situations. This is without prejudice to their authority over police units in their jurisdiction, and their prerogative to seek assistance from the police in day to day situations. But the police is subject to the exercise by the President of the power of executive control. b. Respondent: Nowhere does it limit the authority to declare a state of emergency to the President alone. David v. Arroyo limits the authority to declare a national emergency, and does not include emergency situation in LGUs. SC: It is the clear intent of the framers that in all situations involving threats to security, it is still the President who possesses the sole authority to exercise calling-out powers. c. Respondent: LGC, Section 465 in relation to Section 16 allows the governor to carry out emergency measures and call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies for assistance. Petitioners: General search and seizure in the pursuit of kidnappers violates the Bill of Rights, Sec 2. SC: Respondent cannot rely on Sec 465, par 1 (vii)1 as the said provision expressly refers to calamities and disasters. Kidnapping cannot be considered as a calamity or disaster. Par 2 (vi) 2 is equally inapplicable. First, the AFP does not fall under the category of a national law enforcement agency. Its mandate is to uphold the sovereignty of the country. Second, there was no allegation

1 The provincial governor shall: (vii) Carry out such emergency measures as may be necessary during and in the aftermath of manmade and natural disasters and calamities;

2 (vi) Call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder, riot, lawless violence, rebellion or sedition or to apprehend violators of the law when public interest so requires and the police forces of the component city or municipality where the disorder or violation is happening are inadequate to cope with the situation or the violators;

that the local police forces were inadequate. If they were, the recourse was to ask assistance from the DILG Secretary. The LGC does not involve the diminution of central powers inherently vested in the National Government, especially not the prerogatives solely granted to the President. The intent behind the powers granted to LGUs is fiscal, economic, and administrative. The LGC is concerned only with powers that would make the delivery of basic services more effective and should not be unduly stretched to confer calling-out powers.