00 Compiled Crimpro Digests (Arrest Part III)

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Facts:

People vs. Ramos 186 SCRA 184 (1990)

Rosalinda was found by the RTC guilty of violating sections 4 and 8 of the Dangerous Drugs Act and was given a separate sentence for each. Here’s what happened: According to the prosecution: -A civilian informer came to the Narcotics Command Ofiice in Olongapo City and reported that a cigarette vendor known as “Mama Rose” is selling marijuana. -Captain Castillo instructed the informant to conduct a testbuy. He gave the informant 2 5-peso bills, the serial number of which he took note of. The informant came back with marijuana. -He was instructed to conduct another test buy, and Captain Castillo did the same thing with another2-peso bills, but this time, a team of policemen went with him. They waited at a bar while the informant was buying from the cigarette vendor. -When the informant came back, the team went to where the accused was selling cigarettes and told her that she had been placed under arrest for illegal peddling of marijuana. She was asked to take out her wallet and inside it, the team found the four 5-peso bills.

-She signed a document at the Fiscal's Office; that she was asked if the contents of the document is (sic) true to which she answered 'No, sir; that she was not assisted by a counsel while being investigated. She also testified that she stayed at Narcom for five (5) days; that Capt. Castillo alone investigated her for four (4) hours and that she likewise was not assisted by counsel at the Fiscal's Office. She claimed that when she was told by the Fiscal to just sign the document, Fiscal Cabali did not say anything when she said that the contents of the document are not true. ISSUE: 1.WON the accused’s constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel were violated during the arrest. YES. 2.WON the sale of marijuana by the accused was proven in court. NO. (but possession was proven.) 3.WON the evidence obtained may be used against the appellant even though they were seized without a search warrant. (Yes, medyo connected siya sa issue 2 kaya parang tuloy-tuloy yung ratio) HELD/RATIO: 1.

-One of the policemen searched the stall and found 20 sticks of marijuana in the trash can. -She was taken to the station where she executed a statement to the Fiscal. According to the accused, -She was just selling cigarettes and fruits when the policemen came and invited her to the office for investigation to which she agreed.

As to right to counsel: Although the right to counsel is a right that may be waived, such waiver must be voluntary, knowing and intelligent (People v. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2 [1980]). To insure that a waiver is voluntary and intelligent, the Constitution now requires that the waiver must be in writing and in the presence of the counsel of the accused. There is no such written waiver in this case, much less was any waiver made in the presence of counsel. The extrajudicial confession of the accused is therefore inadmissible in evidence.

-Before she was taken to the station, the policemen searched her buri bags that contained fruits and the cigarette stand. She was asked to bring the cigarette stand along. -Inside her brown wallet, she has fifty (P 50.00) pesos consisting of five pesos and ten pesos and was told that the four (4) five peso bills are the same money which was used to buy marijuana from her; that she told the officer that the money was hers as she has been saving some for the rentals. She claimed that she affixed her signatures on the four (4) five peso bills because she was forced by Tahil Ahamad by saying 'Mama Rose', you sign this, if you are not going to sign this, something will happen to you, you will get hurt'; that because she is an old woman, she got scared so she signed. She said that she cannot remember having signed anything because she was nervous. She was the brought to the Fiscal’s office.

Yes. The recital of her rights falls short of the requirement on proper apprisal of constitutional rights. When the Constitution requires a person under investigation 'to be informed' of his right to remain silent and to counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. As a rule, therefore, it would not be sufficient for a police officer just to repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of the Constitution. He is not only duty- bound to tell the person the rights to which the latter is entitled; he must also explain their effects in practical terms, e.g., what the person under interrogation may or may not do, and in a language the subject fairly understands.

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The alleged poseur-buyer, who also happens to be the alleged informant, was never presented during trial and the presence and Identity of the poseur-buyer is vital to the case as his very existence is being disputed by the accused-appellant who denies having sold marijuana cigarettes to anyone Without the testimony of the poseur-buyer, there is no convincing evidence pointing to the accused as having sold

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marijuana. In this case, the alleged informant and the alleged poseur-buyer are one and the same person. We realize that narcotics agents often have to keep their Identities and those of their informants confidential. For a prosecution involving the sale or distribution of drugs to prosper in this particular case, however, the informant has to testify. The testimony of the poseur-buyer is rendered compelling by the fact that the police officers were situated three blocks away from where the alleged sale took place. For the culprit to be convicted, the element of sale must be unequivocally established. In this case, the alleged poseur-buyer who could have categorically asserted that she bought marijuana from the appellant was not presented by the prosecution. And Sgts. Ahamad and Sudiacal could not attest to the fact of sale because they were three blocks away. The sale of marijuana was therefore not positively proven. Despite the absence of the testimony of the poseurbuyer, the court a quo, however, relied on circumstantial evidence in concluding that there was indeed a sale. The Court found the circumstantial evidence relied on by the trial court do not establish beyond reasonable doubt that there was a sale of marijuana. More direct and positive evidence is essential. However, this Court upholds the lower court's finding that the appellant is guilty of possession of marijuana. The arresting police officers had personal knowledge of facts implicating the appellant with the sale of marijuana to the informant-poseur buyer (Captain Castillo gave the informant marked money to buy marijuana. The informant, now turned poseur-buyer, returned with two sticks of marijuana). Captain Castillo again gave said informant marked money to purchase marijuana. The informant-poseur buyer thereafter returned with another two sticks of marijuana. We hold therefore that the arrest was legal and the consequent search which yielded 20 sticks of marijuana was lawful for being incident to a valid arrest. The fact that the prosecution failed to prove the sale of marijuana beyond reasonable doubt does not undermine the legality of the appellant's arrest. The twenty sticks of marijuana are admissible in evidence and the trial court's finding that the appellant is guilty of possession is correct.

NOTE: The judge erred in imposing separate sentences for the possession of marijuana and for selling them. Possession is inherent in sale.

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CrimPro (Arrest) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio | Vien

PEOPLE v. NICANDRO

141 SCRA 289 Plana, J; February 11, 1986

FACTS  Upon receiving complaints from concerned citizens regarding the illegal sale of prohibited drugs by one alias “Nel”, officers of the Drug Enforcement Unit of Police Station 5 placed Commodore Pension House at Ermita under surveillance. After the complaints and reports were verified to be true, an entrapment with the informant acting as the buyer of marijuana was organized. The informant bought marijuana from Nelia Nicandro using the marked bills and after the transaction the police immediately nabbed Nicandro. The police frisked Nicandro and found the marked bills and marijuana flowering tops wrapped in a piece of newspaper.  She was charged with violating Section 4, Article II, in relation to Section 2(e), (f), (1), (m), and (o) Article I DDA (selling or offering to sell 4 sticks of marijuana cigarettes, marijuana flowering tops wrapped in a piece of newspaper, 1 roach marijuana cigarette and marijuana seeds and ashes contained in a white plastic bag, which are prohibited drugs).  The prosecution relied principally on Pat. Joves, who testified that he saw the accused sell marijuana cigarettes to the unnamed police informant, which allegedly the accused verbally admitted when she was under custodial investigation.  Pat. Joves is the lone witness to the sale of the prohibited drugs.  The trial court convicted Nicandro and imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of P20,000.00. ISSUE 1. WON the trial court erred in giving probative value to the testimonies of police officers which are hearsay. YES 2. WON the trial court erred in admitting the prosecution evidence which were obtained in violation of Nicandro’s Constitutional rights. YES HELD: YES 1. Uncertain whether any prosecution witness really saw the alleged sale of marijuana cigarettes.  Pat. Joves allegedly was an eyewitness. He testified that he saw Nicandro sell marijuana cigarettes to the informant, as the transaction took place openly just outside room 301, in the presence of several persons "passing by or walking in the place". But when his attention was called to the improbability that an illegal merchandise would openly be sold, he qualified his story by saying that Nicandro handed the marijuana cigarettes "secretly".  Pat. Joves was not certain as to what he saw. At first, he said that after the police informant had paid appellant, the latter handed to the former "one small plastic bag containing suspected marijuana leaves." Then he corrected himself by saying: "I think it was four sticks of marijuana cigarettes sir. It is not a plastic bag sir."  It is probable that Pat. Joves really did not see either the alleged delivery of the marijuana cigarettes or the supposed payment therefor. After all, according to him, the transaction was effected "secretly". On the other hand, if the sale was made within the view of Pat. Joves and his companions, there would have been no need for them to wait for a signal from the police informant to indicate that the transaction had been completed, before closing in and arresting appellant.

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With the testimony of Pat. Joves seriously placed in doubt, there is not much left of the prosecution evidence. Note that the police informant was not presented as a witness, prompting the accused to invoke with reason the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced. [Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 5(e).]

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Nicandro’s alleged oral admission is obtained in violation of Sec. 20, Art. IV, Const.1 the right of a person under interrogation "to be informed" implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective communication that results in understanding what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be said that the person has been "informed" of his rights. since the right "to be informed" implies comprehension, the degree of explanation required will necessary vary, depending upon the education, intelligence and other relevant personal circumstances of the person under investigation According to Pat. Joves, he informed Nicandro of her constitutional rights when she was under custodial investigation. What specific rights he mentioned to Nicandro, he did not say. Neither did he state the manner in which Nicandro was advised of her constitutional rights so as to make her understand them. This is particularly significant in the instant case because Nicandro is illiterate and cannot be expected to be able to grasp the significance of her right to silence and to counsel upon merely hearing an abstract statement thereof. As it is the obligation of the investigating officer to inform a person under investigation of his right to remain silent and to counsel, so it is the duty of the prosecution to affirmatively establish compliance by the investigating officer with his said obligation. Absent such affirmative showing, the admission or confession made by a person under investigation cannot be admitted in evidence

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DISPOSITION the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the appellant is hereby ACQUITTED on the basis of reasonable doubt.

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence. 1

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CrimPro (Arrest) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio | Vien

People v. Decierdo May 7, 1987 Sarmiento, J. Facts:  Sept. 28 -- Emilio Montillano, a former barangay captain of Barrio Ebarle, Tambulig, Zamboanga del Sur was shot dead. No one saw the crime happen.  A day after the killing (Sept. 29), an autopsy was made. Also, Ernesto Cortes, desk sergeant of the Tambulig police, commenced Criminal Case No. 629 in the Municipal Court of Tambulig against one Felipe Cedilla for preliminary investigation. On the same date, Judge Gualberto Bacarro, Sr. of the Tambulig Municipal Court issued a warrant of arrest against Cedilla.  Finding a prima facie case against Cedilla, Judge Bacarro, on March 18, 1972, issued an order forwarding the case to the then Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur for trial. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 905 of the Zamboanga del Sur Court of First Instance. The charge: murder of Emilio Montillano.  Cedilla was duly arraigned, after which the government presented its evidence.  Meanwhile, on January 11, 1973, Rufino Fernandez, Chief of Police of Tambulig, on the strength of a statement given by Adelita Decierdo pointing to Pedro Decierdo, Adelita's husband, and Regino Duhay lungsod as Montillano's killers, filed a complaint against Decierdo and Duhay lungsod. Judge Bacarro, who conducted the preliminary examination, issued a warrant for the arrest of both Decierdo and Duhay lungsod on January 15, 1973.  Decierdo was apprehended in his residence at Matingon, about 30 kilometers from Tambulig, on May 23 or 24, 1973, by Patrolman Alfredo Bopadora of the Tambulig police.  He was brought to the Tambulig municipal building on May 25, 1973, where he supposedly executed a written confession admitting responsibility for the shooting of Montillano on September 27, 1971.  He likewise allegedly fingered Duhay lungood as the mastermind. It was a confession Decierdo was supposed to have reiterated before Baldomero Fernandez, Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Zamboanga del Sur, who investigated Criminal Case No. 905. Issue: W/N Decierdo’s extra-judicial confession is admissible in court. Held/Ratio: NO.  There is no doubt that the accused's alleged extrajudicial confession is in the nature of an uncounselled confession and hence, inadmissible in evidence. Section 20 of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution applies2.

Section 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence. 2

 In the case at bar, Pedro Decierdo was not assisted by a lawyer when he signed his supposed confession. Judge Bacarro himself so admitted.  Furthermore, there is no showing that the accused in fact waived his constitutional rights when he executed, or more precisely, was made to execute said statements  It is claimed, however, that Decierdo reiterated his confession before Fiscal Baldomero Fernandez upon the reinvestigation of Criminal Case No. 905, before whom he allegedly. declined anew the assistance of a lawyer. -- But assuming that this amounts to a waiver, still, it is an invalid waiver, Decierdo not having been assisted by a lawyer. o “Whenever a protection given by the Constitution is waived by the person entitled to that protection, the presumption is always against the waiver. Consequently, the prosecution must prove with strongly convincing evidence to the satisfaction of this Court that indeed the accused willingly and voluntarily submitted his confession and knowingly and deliberately manifested that he was not interested in having a lawyer assist him during the taking of that confession. That proof is missing in this case (PP v. Jar)”

BASICALLY, THE COURT JUST QUOTED PRIOR CASES --SEE PEOPLE V. CAGUIOA, PEOPLE V. DUERO, PEOPLE V. GALIT, MIRANDA V. ARIZONA, PEOPLE V. NICANDRO, PEOPLE V. ALEGRE, AND PEOPLE V. JIMENEZ. [lucky me, then. :P]

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CrimPro (Arrest) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio | Vien

Parada v. Veneracion 269 SCRA 371 (1997) Facts: 

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Parada was accused of Estafa. He notified the court through his attorney of his change of address but the notifications were still sent to his old one so the Veneracion(judge) held the trial in absentia. A warrant of arrest was issued with no bail. His nonappearance also was construed as waiver to present evidence. He was convicted and he now files a complaint against judge for gross ignorance of the law when he did not follow the legal requirements of a valid trial in absentia which led to his conviction and premature incarceration, that the order of his arrest with no recommendation for bail was erroneous, and that respondent Judge abused his authority when he issued the June 8, 1994 order denying the motion of Paradascounselde oficio to allow him to present his evidence upon his arrest.

Did was judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law? YES 

Section 14 (2), Article 3 of the Constitution provides, inter alia, that trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. The requisites then of a valid trial in absentia are: (1) the accused has already been arraigned; (2) he has been duly notified of the trial; and (3) his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

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In the subject criminal cases, requisite numbers two (2) and three (3) of a valid trial in absentia are clearly wanting. Parada had not been duly notified of the trial because the notice of hearing dated April 27, 1994 was sent to the former address of Paradas counsel despite the fact that the latter formally notified the court of his change of address. His failure to appear therefore in the June 3, 6, 7 and 8, 1994 hearings is justified by the absence of a valid service of notice of hearing to him. As a rule, where a party appears by attorney in an action or proceeding in a court of record, all notices required to be given therein must be given to the attorney of record. Accordingly, notices to counsel should be properly sent to his address of record and unless the counsel files a notice of change of address, his official address remains to be that of his address of record. Judge should have taken cognizance of new address when it sent the notice of hearing after they were notified of change of address. Due Proccess- accused must be given a change to be heard. This is guaranteed by the constitution. The warrant of arrest with no recommendation for bail that was issued by respondent Judge on June 3, 1994 is a downright violation of Paradas constitutional right to bail. The rule is clear that unless charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua and the evidence of guilt is strong, all persons detained, arrested or otherwise under the custody of the law are entitled to bail as

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a matter of right. It should be noted that the crime with which Parada was charged is estafa which is undoubtedly a bailable offense. This circumstance could not have escaped the attention of the respondent judge when he issued on June 3, 1994 the order of arrest of Parada with no recommendation for his bail. In so doing, respondent judge exhibited that degree of ignorance so gross which the Court can not countenance. Judges are required by Canon 3, Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct to be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence. They are called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles.

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ILAGAN V ENRILE MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

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FACTS: Attorney Laurente C. Ilagan was arrested in Davao City by elements of the PC-INP and detained at Camp Catitipan on the basis of a Mission Order allegedly issued by the Ministry of National Defense. On that same day, fifteen lawyers from the IBP Davao Chapter visited Atty. Ilagan. One of the visiting lawyers, Atty. Antonio Arellano, was also arrested and detained on the basis of an unsigned Mission Order. On May 13, 1985, the military sent word to the IBP Davao Chapter that Attorney Marcos Risonar would likewise be arrested. The latter went to Camp Catitipan to verify his arrest papers and was detained on the basis of a Mission Order signed by General Echavarria, Regional Unified Commander. PETITIONERS: their arrests were illegal and violative of the Constitution, since arrests cannot be made on the basis of Mission Orders. and that there appears to be a military campaign to harass lawyers involved in national security cases. On May 16, 1985, the Court issued the Writ, required a Return, and set the petition for hearing on May 23, 1985. RESPONDENTS: contended that the detained attorneys were arrested on the basis of a PDA issued by the President on January 25, 1985; that the Writ of habeas corpus is suspended as to them by virtue of Proclamation No. 2045-A; and that pursuant to the ruling in Garcia-Padilla vs. Ponce Enrile, et al, 1 Courts lack the authority to inquire into the cause and validity of detention of persons held pursuant to the suspension. Respondents further expounded on the state of rebellion in Davao City on the basis of seized subversive documents, implying that the detained attorneys played active roles in organizing mass actions of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. Respondents then prayed for the denial of the petition. Due to lack of evidence linking the detained attorneys with the alleged subversive activities, the Court resolved to order the temporary release of the detained attorneys on the recognizance of the principal counsel of petitioner's, namely, retired Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and retired Associate Justice J.B.L. Reyes. The Court further resolved to give petitioners ten days within which to file a traverse to the Return of the Writ and the respondents ten days to file a Reply thereto. The next day, or on May 24, 1985, petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion stating that the detained attorneys had not yet been released and praying that they be released to the custody of the principal counsel of petioners at the Supreme Court. RESPONDENTS: filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's Order of Release reiterating that the suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus has the effect of ousting the Court of its jurisdiction to hear the case, and attached thereto classified documents consisting of the Report of respondent Brig. Gen. Tan-Gatue stating that the detained attorneys "were arrested not on the basis of their 'lawyering' but for specific acts of rebellion and economic sabotage as well as for their leadership in the CPP" ... "even to the extent of attending CPP and NPA rites and using their profession as lawyers as cover-up for their activities in furtherance of CPP goals and objectives;" and that the detained attorneys were involved in the Welgang Bayan in Davao City, a mass action "with demands for the armed overthrow of the government." Sworn statements of several persons also implicated the detained attorneys in alleged subversive activities. Respondents added that, while there is a Court Order directing release, they, too, are under orders, pursuant to the PDA, to hold in custody the detained attorneys

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until ordered released by the President or by his duly authorized representative, and that the PDA, when issued, constitutes authority to preventively detain them for a period not exceeding one year. filed an Urgent Manifestation/Motion stating that an Information for Rebellion was filed on May 27, 1985 against the detained attorneys before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City,; that a Warrant of Arrest had been issued against them; and praying that this Petition be dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic. ISSUE: DID THE FILING OF THE INFORMATION AGAINST PETITIONERS BAR THE APPLICATION OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS- YES (WHAT A BULLSHIT CASE, KAYA PALA NIREREVISIT TO IN LIGHT OF THE MORONG 43 CONTROVERSY) RATIO:

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The function of the special proceeding of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's detention. Now that the detained attorneys' incarceration is by virtue of a judicial order in relation to criminal cases subsequently filed against them before the Regional Trial Couravao City, the remedy of habeas corpus no longer lies. The Writ had served its purpose. SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.-If it appears the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment, or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize to discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment. (Rule 102) If the detained attorneys question their detention because of improper arrest, or that no preliminary investigati• n has been conducted, the remedy is not a petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus but a Motion before the trial court to quash the Warrant of Arrest, and /or the Information on grounds provided by the Rules or to ask for an investigation / reinvestigation of the case. Habeas corpus would not lie after the Warrant of commitment was issued by the Court on the basis of the Information filed against the accused. So is it explicitly provided for by Section. 14, Rule of 102 of the Rules of Court, reading: SEC. 14. When person lawfully imprisoned recommitted and when let to bail.- If it appears that the prisoner was lawfully committed, and is plainly and specifically charged in the warrant of commitment with an offense punishable by death, he shall not be released, discharged, or bailed. If he is lawfully imprisoned or restrained on a charge of having committed an offense not so punishable, he may be recommitted to imprisonment or admitted to bail in the discretion of the court or judge. . ON ISSUE OF LACK OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION Pursuant to the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, no Information for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court shall be filed without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, except as provided for in Section 7 of Rule 112. 7 The Information filed by the City Fiscal before the

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CrimPro (Arrest) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio | Vien

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Regional Trial Court of the City of Davao fell within the exception. Thus, the Verification reads: VERIFICATION I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am filing this Information in pursuance with Rule 112, Section 7 of the 1985 Rules on criminal Procedure, wherein after examining the affidavits of the government witnesses and other documents attached to the records, I found sufficient ground to hold respondents for trial. (SGD.) EMMANUEL E. GALICIA City Fiscal Section 7, Rule 112, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure above referred to provides: SEC. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant.- When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the complaint or information may be filed by the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without preliminary investigation having been first conducted on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arrested officer or person. However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception. If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, the accused may within five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of the information, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his favor in the manner prescribed in this Rule. Section 5, Rule 113 of the same Rules enumerates the instances when an arrest without warrant is lawful. Paragraphs (a) and (b) of this Rule refer to cases when a suspect is caught in flagrante delicto or immediately thereafter, while paragraph (c) refers to escaping prisoners. As to whether the detained attorneys fall under either of the first two instances enumerated is a question of fact, which will need the presentation of evidence and is more properly within the province of the trial Court. The question of absence of a proper preliminary investigation is also better inquired into by the Court below. When so raised, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, has held that the trial Court is called upon "not to dismiss the information but hold the case in abeyance and conduct its own investigation or require the fiscal to hold a reinvestigation. As stressed in People vs. Casiano, 1 SCRA 478 [1961], this is the proper procedure since the "absence of such investigation did not impair the validity of the Information or otherwise render it defective. Much less did it affect the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance". 9 The right to a preliminary investigation, being waivable, does not argue against the validity of the proceedings, the most that could have been done being to remand the case in order that such investigation could be conducted. 10 The Nolasco case, which petitioners invoke, 12 wherein this Court ordered the release of two of the accused, is not on all fours with the case at bar as, in that case, the accused were charged only with Illegal Possession of Subversive documents under Presidential Decree No. 33, which is punishable by prision correccional in its minimum period, and the trial Court had granted bail; whereas in this case, petitioners are charged with the capital offense of Rebellion, and the trial Court has not allowed bail.

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DISPOSITIVE: petition for Habeas Corpus is hereby dismissed for having become moot and academic. Petitioners are now detained by virtue of a Warrant of Arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City in relation to the criminal case for Rebellion filed against them before said Court. Makasiar, C.J., Plana, Escolin Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur. Aquino, J., concur in the result

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PEOPLE v. ALOJADO

J. Panganiban (1999)  In two separate Complaints, JULETTE Peñaranda and GERRA Rustia, both assisted by their mothers, charged appellant Edgar ALOJADO with statutory rape. Both Complaints were later amended to include the allegation that the accused used a deadly weapon in committing the offense  After preliminary investigation, said Complaints were subsequently treated as Informations. ALOJADO pleaded “not guilty” on arraignment and the two cases were jointly tried  The FACTS as presented by the prosecution are as follows: That, on Oct 1994, complainants JULETTE and GERRA (both Grade III pupils of Amsic Elem School) during recess, went to the house of JULETTE to get a dress  On their way back to school, they met ALOJADO who talked to them, showed them a picture of a woman and asked them if they knew the woman in the picture  They told ALOJADO that they did not know said woman but ALOJADO prevailed over them to help him look for her as they were all on their way back to the direction of the school  The two girls acquiesced and accompanied ALOJADO who was then riding a green bicycle. The three of them rode towards Amsic Elem School  Upon reaching a grassy/bushy area along the way, ALOJADO stopped and brandished a knife at the girls  Scared, the girls scampered but ALOJADO prevented them from escaping. He tied their hands and feet and taped their mouths. Thereafter, ALOJADO made both girls suck his sex organ and proceeded to rape them one after the other  After sating his lust, he told the two victims to stay as he would just rest.3 ALOJADO then left  Fortunately, the girls managed to untie their hands and feet at that point and were able to walk toward the nearest house to ask for help. The owner of the house saw them from her gate as they were approaching wearing barely any clothes and bleeding. She and her neighbors immediately brought the girls to the hospital  At the hospital, the physician who attended to the victims found blood clots and lacerations on the genital area of both girls, which, as he noted in their medical records, could have been caused by an erect penis  ALOJADO was later accosted and subsequently brought to the hospital where he was positively identified by JULETTE as the person who raped them  For the DEFENSE, ALOJADO interposed an alibi where he claimed to be somewhere else at the time of the commission of the crime. He said he was at his youngest son’s Day Car Center. The DEFENSE also presented a witness who testified that, being near the site of the crime at that time, she allegedly saw a man emerge from the bushes with bloody arms and legs but it was not ALOJADO  Ultimately, RTC Angeles City was swayed by the prosecution’s case and rendered herein assailed judgment convicting ALOJADO of two counts of rape and sentencing him to two terms of reclusion perpetua; hence, this appeal raising the following ISSUES:

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At balak pang mag-round 2 ng punyetang rapist!

1. WON the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction of rape beyond reasonable doubt 2. WON his arrest was invalid such that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over his person HELD: Appeal is devoid of merit. Of course the prosecution has adduced sufficient evidence to maintain the conviction for rape beyond reasonable doubt, which, among others includes the positive identification of the appellant by the victims as their rapist and their respective testimonies therefor. As to the illegality of his arrest, the same has been belatedly raised. The assailed decision is AFFIRMED. RATIO: 1. YES. This, however, is not a relevant issue for our purposes. I won’t provide a detailed exposition of the ruling anymore. Suffice it say that the testimonies of the victims positively pointed to ALOJADO as their assailant and being of tender age, they could not have concocted the crime of rape committed against their persons. Their testimonies, as observed by the RTC, were straightforward and honest. ALOJADO’s alibi cannot defeat the positive identification made by the victims of him being their assailant, there being no showing that the girls were prompted by improper motives to impute the crime to him. It was also not physically impossible for ALOJADO to be at the site of the crime considering his alibi. He also did not present any witness to bolster such claim. In the same vein, the defense’s witness’s testimony cannot also be given weight to tilt the balance in ALOJADO’s favor. For starters, she did not actually witness the rape. Her testimony is also dented by some inconsistencies as contrary to human experience. Finally, her testimony cannot likewise defeat the positive identification by the victims of ALOJADO as the assailant. 2.

NO. Anent the validity of his arrest, ALOJADO maintains that he was illegally arrested. This argument, however, comes too late in the day, because appellant failed to allege it prior to his arraignment. The Court has previously emphasized that an objection to the legality of an arrest must be submitted to the trial court before the accused enters his plea. ALOJADO is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest

 Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived.  Any defect concerning his arrest was cured by his voluntary, submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court when he entered his plea during his arraignment, and when he actively participated in the trial thereafter  Finally, ALOJADO avers that the police did not have reason to arrest him because he did not match the “description” provided by the victims in their affidavits. This is of no moment because when he was presented to the victims, they positively identified him as their assailant. The “description” in questioned is couched on highly subjective terms. Hence, it matters not that he fit said description. The material fact is that the victims were able to recognize him as their assailant upon presentation. This positive identification was repeated on trial.

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CrimPro (Arrest) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio | Vien

PEOPLE v. RONDERO

Per Curiam (1999)  This is an appeal from a decision rendered by the Dagupan RTC finding herein appellant Delfin RONDERO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua  The FACTS are as follows: On the evening of March 25, 1994, the 9yo daughter of MAXIMO Doria named MYLENE went missing  MAXIMO sought the help of their neighbors to search for her. He also asked the Barangay Captain for assistance in the search. The search team looked everywhere but the it yielded nothing for hours  Tired and distraught, MAXIMO started his way back home when, at about 5 meters away from his house, he saw herein accused-appellant Delfin RONDERO pumping the artesian well. He had an ice-pick clenched in his mouth and was washing his bloodied hands  His suspicion aroused, MAXIMO hastily returned to the local elementary school where the search team was then conducting the search and told persons thereat what he saw  Then, the team proceeded with the search and after some time, they found MYLENE’s lifeless body near the canteen  Her right hand was raised above her head, which was severely bashed, and her fractured left hand was behind her back. She was naked from the waist down and had several contusions and abrasions on different parts of her body. Tightly gripped in her right hand were some hair strands  30mins later, policemen arrived at the scene and conducted a spot investigation. Thereafter, MAXIMO led the policemen to the artesian well where he had seen RONDERO earlier washing his hands. The policemen found that the artesian well was spattered with blood  After investigation, the policemen, acting on the lead as guided by MAXIMO, arrested RONDERO. Thereafter, appellant was formally charged with the special complex crime of rape with homicide and he pleaded “not guilty” at his arraignment  Meanwhile, the hair strands which were found on the victim’s hand, together with hair specimens taken from the victim and RONDERO, were sent to the NBI for laboratory examination  The NBI chemist, however, found it difficult to conduct the tests because the sample provided to her were not viable for comparison with the strands found clutched in MYLENE’s hand  hair from both MYLENE and RONDERO must be pulled, not cut  Thereupon, appellant RONDERO, who executed a “waiver of detention” including a waiver of his custodial rights (under Sec 12, Article III, Const.), was allegedly convinced by a police superior to give sample hair strands  Another police officer went to the Doria’s residence to get hair samples from MYLENE, who had not yet been interred  With viable samples now at hand, the NBI conducted the necessary tests and it found that the hair strands found on the right hand of the victim had similar characteristics to those of RONDERO’s  On trial, RONDERO did not testify. He instead presented his wife and father as witnesses to account for his whereabouts on the night of the crime4 The wife and the father corroborated RONDERO’s alibi. Accordingly, on the night of the crime, he and wife were quarrelling at their home. His father, irked by the shouting between the spouses, tried to go between them. When 4

 As earlier stated, the RTC ultimately found against RONDERO. Initially, however, it ruled to convict RONDERO of murder and sentenced him to death by electrocution. But upon reconsideration, it entered herein assailed decision convicting him of the crime charged (homicide) and sentencing him accordingly. The following issues were raised on appeal: 1. WON the RTC erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt 2. WON the verdict can be sustained violations of his constitutional rights and illegally of his arrest and detetention HELD: The appeal has no merit. However, the decision of the Dagupan RTC is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Delfin Rondero is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charge of special complex crime of rape with homicide and is accordingly sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH. (ayan, nag-appeal pa kasi! tsk… tsk…) RATIO: 1. NO, the RTC correctly found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. This issue is, again, not too relevant for our purposes. Suffice it to say that the pieces of circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution were more than enough to form a moral certainty in the mind of the judge of appellant’s guilt. Several circumstances which the prosecution proffered as evidence, when pieced together, all point to RONDERO’s guilt (e.g. MAXIMO’s testimony of him washing his bloodied clothes and hands, the hair clutched in the hand of MYLENE, etc.) 2. YES. Anent the second issue, RONDERO first questions the admissibility of some pieces of evidence, which according to him were taken without his permission and hence an affront to his right against self-incrimination. This refers to the hair samples taken from him  this allegation must FAIL  True, custodial rights under Sec 12 and the right against selfincrimination under Sec 17, all of Art III of the Constitution, are rights that must be upheld in favor of an accused, at all times. But, it must similarly be stressed that what is actually proscribed by said provisions of the Bill of Rights is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from an accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material5

RONDERO answered back (to the father), he supposedly hit his son in different parts of his body causing RONDERO’s nose and mouth to bleed and splattering the same to his clothes. This, accordingly, is the story why the artesian well was bloodied and how RONDERO’s cloths that night had blood stains on them. After the hitting, RONDERO was accordingly pacified and proceeded to eat supper with his family and they all lived happily ever after! (incredulous, really.) Fingerprinting, drawing of blood samples, etc are not procedures that are contrary to the right against selfincrimination or of custodial rights to counsel and to silence. Perforce, the collection of hair sample is likewise outside the ambit thereof. 5

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CrimPro (Arrest) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio | Vien  Consequently, although RONDERO here insists that hair samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the NBI for forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress  Finally, RONDERO questions the validity of his arrest. And indeed, it might be true that RONDERO’s warrantless arrest was not lawful  The police officers who arrested him had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that he was the perpetrator of the crime just committed. His warrantless arrest was not based on a personal knowledge of the police officers indicating facts that he has committed the gruesome crime but solely on MAXIMO’s suspicion  NEVERTHELESS, it is hornbook knowledge that any irregularity attending the arrest of an accused is deemed WAIVED when, instead of quashing the information for lack of jurisdiction over his person, the accused voluntarily submits himself to the court by entering a plea during the arraignment and actively participating in the proceedings

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CrimPro (Arrest) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio | Vien Non-Curability of Illegal Nature of Arrest

BAGCAL v. VILLARAZA

J. Abad-Santos (1983)  This case stemmed from a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus by herein petitioner Jose BAGCAL in Oct 1982, who alleged that he was illegally arrested and detained  The Court issued said Writ returnable to the Executive Judge of the CFI Cagayan de Oro (Judge Rosete) for proper hearing on the petition for release  The FACTS are as follows: BAGCAL was arrested on Feb 28, 1982, by the Philippine Constabulary. The arrest was without warrant. He has been detained at Camp Alagar, Cagayan de Oro City, since his arrest to the present  On Aug 6, the City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro filed an “information” for murder against petitioner Bagcal with the MTC of Cagayan de Oro presided by herein respondent Judge Rolando VILLARAZA  Said “information” was accompanied by the several affidavits from different persons. However, said affidavits were not subscribed before Judge VILLARAZA who did not ask the affiants to ratify their oaths nor did he ask them searching questions  Also, the “information” submitted before the MTC has no certification by the City Fiscal that he had conducted a preliminary investigation  Indeed, if preliminary investigation was duly conducted, the information should have been filed in the CFI (not MTC) which had jurisdiction to try the case on its merits  From the forgoing, it is quite obvious that the information was filed with Judge VILLARAZA so that he would conduct the preliminary examination and thereafter issue a warrant of arrest  Ultimately, Judge VILLARAZA issued a warrant for the arrest of petitioner BAGCAL  As a result of the issuance of said warrant of arrest, taken together with BAGCAL’s actuations in response thereto, Executive Judge Rosete (tasked to hear BAGCAL’s petition for release pursuant to the writ of habeas corpus previously issued) was constrained to rule that BAGCAL should remain in custody pending hearing and resolution for bail  BAGCAL now questions the legality of such warrant under the attendant circumstances, raising the same as the sole issue of this petition – WON issuance of warrant of arrest cured the illegality of his previous warrantless arrest meriting his immediate release from detention HELD/RATIO: NO! At the outset, it must be stressed that herein respondent Judge VILLARAZA should not have issued the subject warrant of arrest to begin with. Judge Rosete and BAGCAL are in agreement, and now, the Court as well, on this point. As provided in the records, it was never refuted that Judge VILLARAZA did not “personally” examine the witnesses of the prosecution before issuing the questioned warrant of arrest. This is a glaring mark of the irregularity in Judge VILLARAZA’s actuations. But does this mean that, under the circumstances, BAGCAL should be released?

attendant

 NO. The above discussion notwithstanding, the denial of BAGCAL’s petition for release is hereby UPHELD. As provided in Judge Rosete’s decision in the petition for release (pursuant to the writ of habeas corpus issued), although the warrant of

arrest was irregularly issued, any infirmity attached to it was cured when petitioner submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by applying for bail, submitting a memorandum in support thereof, and filing a motion for reconsideration when his application was denied6 DISPOSITIVE:  Judge Rosete’s decision is affirmed with modification that the hearing for bail be heard by him, the Executive Judge of CDO RTC and not by Judge VILLARAZA of the CDO MTC. If evidence of guilt is strong, the petition for bail should be denied, otherwise, the same must be granted.

I personally did not get much from this case. It is a one-page resolution, for crying out loud! Sir’s citation, again, required this and not the original decision. I don’t know why... In any case, from the few things that I gathered here, as far as noncurability of the illegal nature of an arrest is concerned, it appears that the irregular warrant of arrest issued by VILLARAZA, although not explicitly stated in the ratio, did not in itself “cure” the illegal arrest of BAGCAL. Hence, BAGCAL’s release pursuant to the writ of habeas corpus issued in his favor should have been in order on the ground of the irregularity of said warrant. Unfortunately for BAGCAL, instead of assailing said subsequent warrant of arrest, he filed a motion for bail, argued therefor and even submitted an MR upon its denial. All these acts on the part of BAGCAL are deemed as voluntary submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court, in spite of the irregular warrant of arrest against his person issued by the same judge, Judge VILLARAZA. Thereby, any infirmity of the questioned warrant of arrest has been effectively cured. He could not be released now by force of the writ of habeas corpus precisely because he had voluntarily surrendered; he could, however, still be released but ONLY on bail. (NB: this is just my opinion) 6

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CrimPro (Arrest) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio | Vien Motion to Quash Information; Preliminary Investigation/Reinvestigation

LUNA v. PLAZA

J. Zaldivar (1968)  This is an appeal from the decision of CFI Surigao del Sur dismissing the petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by herein petitioner-appellant Simon LUNA who was charged with murder  This petition stemmed from a criminal action commenced by the Phil. Constabulary investigator of Tandag, Surigao del Sur when he filed with respondent MTC Judge Lorenzo PLAZA a criminal case charging LUNA with the crime of murder  Supporting the complaint/information were sworn statements of the witnesses for the prosecution, subscribed and sworn to before the respondent Judge at the time of the filing of the complaint  Judge PLAZA examined the prosecution witnesses by reading to them "all over again the questions and answers" in their statements in writing, and the witnesses-affiants declared before said Judge that the averments contained in their affidavits were made by them. They also swore to the truth thereof. Thereafter, they signed their respective affidavits in the presence of Judge PLAZA, who also signed after the usual procedure of administering the oath  Considering the averments in these affidavits, the stipulation in the complaint/information and on the strength of other documentary evidence submitted to him (medico-legal report, sketches of the crime scene, etc.), Judge PLAZA found probable cause and issued the warrant of arrest, specifying therein that no bail is fixed for the provisional release of the accused  However, upon motion from LUNA, Judge PLAZA granted bail at P30,000, which, however was later revoked, in effect again denying LUNA bail  Thereafter, LUNA waived his right to PI. Hence, the case was remanded to the CFI of Surigao del Sur for hearing after the Provincial Fiscal filed the necessary information charging LUNA with the crime of murder  On April 1967, LUNA filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the CFI of Surigao del Sur, claiming that he was being deprived of liberty without the due process of law, on the ground that the imprisonment and detention was the result of a warrant of arrest issued by respondent Judge in violation of RA 3828, and praying for the annulment of the order for his arrest and his discharge from confinement  Herein respondents (Judge PLAZA, the jail warden and the city fiscal) all answered said petition and alleged that the provisions of RA 3828 (Amendment to the Judiciary Act) have been complied with  Respondents also averred that a motion to quash, and not a petition for habeas corpus was the proper remedy for LUNA; but that LUNA's application for bail constituted a waiver of the right to question the validity of the arrest  As stated, the CFI ruled against LUNA and rendered herein assailed decision denying his petition for habeas corpus, hence this appeal – ISSUE: WON CFI erred in denying the writ of habeas corpus HELD: NO! LUNA’s appeal is devoid of merit. Perforce, the decision of the CFI of Surigao del Sur is AFFIRMED. RATIO: On Compliance with RA 3828 and the Constitution

 In this appeal, LUNA assails the conduct of the “preliminary examination” by Judge PLAZA as being irregular as far as RA 3828 is concerned, hence, the warrant of arrest which issued therefrom is also irregular  this is UNTENABLE  According to RA 3828 (Judiciary Act), judges doing preliminary examination for purposes of issuing warrants of arrests are required to personally “examine” (i.e. ask searching questions) the complainant and her witnesses under oath; and then reduce the same into writing (i.e. to make part of the records such examination)  On the other hand, Art III, Sec 1 (3) of the 1935 Const. provides that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce  A perusal of the records of the case would lead to the conclusion that Judge PLAZA substantially complied with the preceding requirements of the Constitution and the law (refer to statement of facts) No Denial of Due Process and Waiver of Rights  Preliminary examination/investigation is not an essential part of due process of law. This is evidenced by the fact that our rules of criminal procedure allow its waiver. Therefor, when it is forgone for the reason thus stated, the same does not constitute a denial of due process. It is merely a statutory right  As borne by the records, LUNA waived his right to the preliminary examination when he filed a petition for bail  Consequently, this conduct of LUNA indicates that he had waived his objection to whatever defect, if any, in the preliminary examination conducted by respondent Judge PLAZA prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest  Also, no substantial right of LUNA had been violated precisely because he has waived his right to preliminary investigation after he was arrested, and that he took the step of applying for bail before respondent Municipal Judge constitute an implied admission on his part that here was a probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest against him. Those acts of the petitioner constitute a waiver of whatever irregularity, if any there was, that attended his arrest Quashal and not Habeas Corpus is the Proper Remedy  The remedy available to the petitioner LUNA, under the circumstances of this case, is not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus but a petition to quash the warrant of arrest or a petition for a reinvestigation of the case by the respondent Municipal Judge PLAZA or by the Provincial Fiscal

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CrimPro (Arrest) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio | Vien

ALIMPOOS v. CA

(1981)

[Al: This is not my digest. I merely lifted this from a SpecPro reviewer I found in Scribd. Material facts are omitted and the ruling is not specific. I’m sorry, I couldn’t find a copy of the full case online. So, I had to improvise. If, however, we don’t reach this part, I will make another one better suitable for recitation purposes.]

FACTS: Reynaldo Mosquito has been accused of Robbery w/ less Serious Physical Injuries. He was detained by virtue of a warrant of arrest which was issued without the observance of the legal requirements for the issuance thereof. Mosquito filed a petition for Habeas Corpus before the Trial Court. Mosquito named as defendants in the case the Prov. Fiscal and the private offended parties. He also filed a claim for damages premised on Art 32 (4) and other applicable provisions of the Civil Code. ISSUES: 1. 2. 3.

WON the writ of Habeas Corpus if the proper remedy for Mosquito? WON damages may be awarded in a Habeas Corpus case? WON private offended party may take part in the case?

HELD: 1. The Habeas Corpus is not the proper remedy. When a warrant of arrest is being assailed for improper preliminary investigation, the remedy is a petition to quash the warrant of arrest or petition for reinvestigation of the case. It is the general rule that Habeas Corpus should not be resorted to when there is another remedy available. 2. No. Damages cannot be awarded. The sole function of the writ is to relieve fr. unlawful imprisonment and ordinarily it cannot be properly used for another purpose. 3. While the issuance of the writ connotes the commencement of a civil action, the proceeding for Habeas Corpus is technically not yet a suit between private parties. The proper party is the Chief of Police or the person having the accused in detention and not the private offended party. It is also only the fiscal who may appeal the order granting the writ as mandated by Sec. 19, Rule 41 of the ROC

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CrimPro (Arrest) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio | Vien

Brown v Illinois 422 US 590 (1975) 

 

Police officers broke into Browns apartment, searched it, and arrested Brown without a warrant or probable cause in connection with a murder investigation. He was acquaintances with the victim. He gave to statements after he was informed of his Miranda rights. He was then formally charged with the murder He now tries to suppress the statements as evidence, which was used in his trial and resulted in his conviction.

Did the fact that he was informed of his Mirada rights break the causal chain of his illegal arrest and subsequent confession making it admissible as evidence??? NO 

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In Wong Sun, the Court pronounced the principles to be applied where the issue is whether statements and other evidence obtained after an illegal arrest or search should be excluded. – Fruit of the Poison Tree the exclusionary rule, however, when utilized to effectuate the Fourth Amendment, serves interests and policies that are distinct from those it serves under the Fifth. It is directed at all unlawful searches and seizures, and not merely those that happen to produce incriminating material or testimony as fruits. In short, exclusion of a confession made without Miranda warnings might be regarded as necessary to effectuate the Fifth Amendment, but it would not be sufficient fully to protect the Fourth. Miranda warnings, and the exclusion of a confession made without them, do not alone sufficiently deter a Fourth Amendment violation. In order for the causal chain between the illegal arrest and the statements made subsequent thereto to be broken, Wong Sun requires not merely that the statement meet the Fifth Amendment standard of voluntariness, but that it be "sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint. Brown's first statement was separated from his illegal arrest by less than two hours, and there was no intervening event of significance whatsoever. In its essentials, his situation is remarkably like that of James Wah Toy in Wong Sun. [We could hold Brown's first statement admissible only if we overrule Wong Sun. We decline to do so. And the second statement was clearly the result and the fruit of the first The illegality here, moreover, had a quality of purposefulness. The impropriety of the arrest was obvious; awareness of that fact was virtually conceded by the two detectives when they repeatedly acknowledged, in their testimony, that the purpose of their action was "for investigation" or for "questioning." The arrest, both in design and in execution, was investigatory. The detectives embarked upon this expedition for evidence in the hope that something might turn up. The manner in which Brown's arrest was effected gives the appearance of having been calculated to cause surprise, fright, and confusion. We emphasize that our holding is a limited one. We decide only that the Illinois courts were in error in assuming that the Miranda warnings, by themselves, under Wong Sun always purge the taint of an illegal arrest.