00 Admin Finals

1 Administrative Law Finals reviewer Dean S. T. Carlota 2 Semester A.Y. 2010-2011 nd

Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano I.

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Historical and Constitutional Considerations A. Development of Administrative Law as a distinct field of public law 1. Factors responsible for the emergence of administrative agencies Past: no need for regulatory agencies because problems were simple and straightforward Modern Age: Government was no longer able to employ its powers under the doctrine of separation of powers, hence, there was a need for delegation of powers  birth of administrative agencies. Factors (Laurel, J. Pangasinan case):  Growing complexity of modern life  Multiplication of subjects of governmental regulation  Increased difficulty of administering laws Factors (Stone): [ all have references to the 3 branches; the idea was that all 3 used to be able to effectively address the problems/issues in times past when societies weren’t this complex.  Lack of Time o On the part of government, to respond to problems o Trichotomy can no longer cope with complexities o Obvious solution: create admin agencies and delegate powers  Lack of Expertise o New problems require expertise to solve technical and specific issues (eg pollution, energy, labor, telecomm, IPR)  Lack of organizational aptitude for the effective and continuing regulation of new developments in society o The trichotomy is too unwieldy to be able to concentrate on specialized areas 2. The doctrine of separation of powers and the constitutional position of administrative agencies Doctrine of separation of powers  3 branches of government not encroaching on the powers of each other  A system of checks and balances A more hospitable interpretation of the doctrin – The trichotomy can no longer take care of the problem because society has become too complex thereby preventing the 3 branches from responding to the problems effectively.  Delegation of powers emerged because of the necessity under the modern condition o Administrative afencies became the catch basin for the residual powers of the 3 branches o Without the agencies, the system will collapse and there would be chaos, confusion and anarchy.  Agency v. Trichotomy o Agency has expertise and time o Trichotomy lacks expertise, time and organizational aptitude  Aim of delegation: to prevent absolutism/tyranny  Admin agencies o Fuses legislative (rule-making), administrative (implementing rules), and judicial functions o Hybrid functions do not endanger separation of powers B. Definition of terms Administrative Law – the law governing the powers and procedures of administrative agencies, including especially the law on judicial review of administrative actions  Powers – corresponding to executive, legislative, judicial  Procedures: in adjudication, licensing and rule-making Administrative Agency – any governmental authority, other than the court and other that a legislative body, performing rulemaking and adjudicative functions, which affects the rights of private parties  Any governmental authority: other than a court or a legislative body; can assume many labels (commission, board, authority, office) o Based on the constitution o Sovereignty resides in the people and all governmental authority emanates from them Types of Agencies  Statutory agencies – created by law/Congress (NLRC, SEC)  Constitutional agencies – created by the Constitution o COMELEC, COA, CSC, CHR, Ombudsman o Insulated from the influence of the 3 branches; cannot be abolished by Congress o Independent, can only be abolished or modified through constitutional amendment o Protective devices: security of tenure, impeachment as method of removal ,fiscal autonomy, prohibited from holding another office C. Cases Pangasinan Trans. Co v. PSC. Administrative function, involving the use of discretion, to carry out the will of the legislature can be delegated to administrative agencies. | The theory of the separation of powers is designed by its originators to secure action and at the same time to forestall overaction which necessarily results from undue concentration of power, and thereby obtain efficiency ad prevent despotism. MERALCO v. Pasay Trans. Co. The Supreme Court exercises judicial, NOT administrative, functions. The SC and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial function. Noblejas v. Teehankee. The legislature could not have intended for the Land Registration Commissioner and other similarly ranked officials to hold same rank as a judge of the CFI, because it would place upon the SC the duty of investigating and disciplining these officials, who are performing executive functions and thus under the supervision and control of the President. It would be unconstitutional, being violative of the separation of powers, and would diminish the control of the Chief Executive over executive officials. Garcia v. Macaraig. The practice of judges collaborating with other offices should be discontinued [although in this case, the judge was allowed to take on the other work, since technically it doesn’t conflict with his duties as a judge] In Re: Rodolfo U. Manzano. Again, the Supreme court is not allowed to perform administrative functions. | Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice discharges adminitratvie functions = violation of the constitution. Puyat v. de Guzman. Members of the National Assembly are prohibited by the Constitution to appear as counsel before any administrative body. Control of Administrative Action A. Administrative agencies and the executive power of the president 1987 Const., Art. VII, Sec. 1. Executive Power – The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines. 1987 Const., Art. VII, Sec. 17. Control over Administrative agencies – The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.  Executive power  to promulgate or execute laws  Control  the power to alter, modify or overturn the judgment of a subordinate o See to it that the subordinate is doing his/her job o Limited to executive departments, bureaus, offices  Supervision  ensure that the laws are faithfully executed

Copied verbatim from UP Law D2012 Administrative Law Finals Reviewer Addition: new cases, some class notes

2 Administrative Law Finals reviewer Dean S. T. Carlota 2 Semester A.Y. 2010-2011 nd

Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano

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o More encompassing than control; no qualification Question: Can the President control all administrative agencies? >>> It depends on whether the enabling statute has given the power of review to the President  Under Sec. 17 Art. VII, President has control over agencies created by statute; the power of the legislature over such agencies must be subordinate to Sec. 17  If the law is silent, there’s a presumption the Congress intended for the President to have control  Constitutional agencies are NOT controlled by the President because they are independent constitutional creations. Congressional Oversight Power  See to it that the agencies follow the legislative intention  Part of Congress’ prerogative in delegating powers of Congress to agencies  Scrutiny, investigation, legislative supervision Macalintal v. Comelec. Puno, J. (concurring and dissenting). The power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted.  Oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress (a) To monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives (b) To determine where agencies are properly administered (c) To eliminate executive waste and dishonesty (d) To prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority; and, (e) To assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of public interest  Categories of congressional oversight functions o Scrutiny – primary purpose is to determine the economy and efficiency of the operation of government activities. Based primarily on the power of appropriation and power of confirmation o Investigation – recognized under Sec. 21, Art. VI of the Constitution [“may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published notes of procedure”] o Supervision – connotes a continuing and informed awareness regarding executive operations in a given administrative area; exercised thru the veto power Carlota, Legislative and Judicial Control of Administrative Decision-making Legislative control over administrative agencies:  Power of creation, appropriation and investigation o Creation – Congress creates rather than abolishes as society becomes more complex; the state is compelled to create admin agencies to deal with problems brought by social and economic change o Appropriation – Congress has the power to withhold funds for the agencies, but at the end of the day, it is reluctant in wielding such power because it recognizes that if it does, it will affect public interest o Investigation – limited tool to provide as effective control of improper exercise of administrative power  Non-delegation doctrine and the requirement of legislative standards o The more specific the standards, the greater the chances of confining administrative discretion within proper limits. If the standards are too broad or vague, the administrator is virtually left to his own devices, thereby allowing him to exercise discretion in the performance of his functions o A review of the cases decided by the SC shoes that in many instances of delegation, the legislature is unable to provide definite specific standards  Administrative procedure as a mode of control o There are certain factors to be considered in prescribing rules: (a) Admin agencies are not bound by the same technical rules of procedure and evidence followed in regular courts (b) Agencies are created to deal with specific problems o Even if it is possible, which is not, to impose uniform rules of procedure in all levels of all agency operations such a move is clearly unsound. o Legislature should only provide minimum procedural guidelines and general principles to be observed by all agencies in the performance of their rule-making and adjudicative functions. This will assure sufficient room for the agencies to come up with supplementary rules that may be needed from time to time, while at the same time, it will provide adequate protection to the individual’s constitutional right to due process. Judicial review of administrative decision-making:  The purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect substantial rights of paties affected by its decisions  It is part of the system of checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestall arbitrary and unjust adjudications  Most effective from of control – provides immediate relief to complainant  Part of police power of the state  Channel for adversely affected parties to vindicate constitutional rights  Judicial review is limited or restrained – general rule: courts do not interfere with agencies, unless GAD Carlota, the Ombudsman: Its effectivity and visibility amidst bureaucratic abuse and irregularity  Essential characteristics of an Ombudsman  Political independence – fiscal autonomy, prohibition to practice profession, removable only by impeachment, can appoint all officers and employees of his office  Accessibility and expedition – within the reach of ordinary citizens, as opposed to the court which are not easily within the reach of the poor  Investigatory power – the Ombudsman not only has the power to investigate but also the power to prosecute on his own initiative or upon complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient  Absence of revisory jurisdiction – Ombudsman cannot modify or overturn decisions of admin agencies performing rule making or adjudicative functions. He may not exercise the function of an appellate or reviewing court.  Is the Ombudsman institution workable in the Philippines? NO. o The perception that the Ombudsman’s role as Protector of the People has not been satisfactorily performed – but, can be reversed by adopting measures designed to correct perceived shortcomings. Cases Concerned Officials of MWSS v. Vasquez. The Constitution and the Ombudsman Act did not intend to confer upon the Ombudsman veto or revisory power over an exercise of judgment or discretion by an agency or officer upon who that judgment or discretion is lawfully vested. Lastimosa v. Vasquez. The Ombudsman’s power to investigate and prosecute crimes committed by public officials covers those acts and omissions which are related to and even those NOT related to the performance of the public official’s duties. It is enough that the act or omission be done by a public official.

Copied verbatim from UP Law D2012 Administrative Law Finals Reviewer Addition: new cases, some class notes

3 Administrative Law Finals reviewer Dean S. T. Carlota 2 Semester A.Y. 2010-2011 nd

Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano

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BIR v. Office of Ombudsman. The power of the Ombudsman to investigate encompasses ALL kinds of acts or omissions committed by any public official. Ombudsman v. ENOC. The Ombudsman has the power to investigate and prosecute graft cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and also those cognizable by regular courts Fuentes v. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao. Under the Ombudsman Act, the Ombudsman has NO power to initiate or entertain criminal or administrative complaints against the judiciary (i.e. judges). SC has the power to investigate such complaints Ledesma v. CA. The Ombudsman’s decision in administrative invesitigations in not merely advisory but in fact has a binding effect upon the officer to which the decision is directed. [interpretation of the word “recommend” as used in Sec. 13(3), RA6770. Estarija v. Rañada. The powers of the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory. Under RA 6770 and the Constitution, the Ombudsman gas the constitutional power to directly remove from government service an erring public official other than a member of Congress and the Judiciary. Ombudsman v. Masing. The law gives the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority over erring officials || Ombudsman to play a more acrtive role in the enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices, etc. Powers and Functions of Administrative Agencies A. Legislative Function 1. Non-delegation doctrine Potestas delegate non delegare potest -- What has been delegated cannot be delegated. The Completeness Test:  Policy already clearly enunciated  Standard to be observed already fixed Cia General de Tabaco v. BPUC. The provision complained of does not “lay down the general rules of action under which the commission shall proceed,” nor does it itself prescribe in detail what those reports shall contain. Practically everything is left to the judgment and discretion of the Board. US v. Ang Tang Ho. Act 2868 which authorizes the Governor-General to fix the price at which rice should be sold constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power People v. Vera. Requirements for proper delegation: (1) Clear Policy – whether or not the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature (2) Fixed Standards Policy – as a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not law down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided un the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. Pelaez v. Auditor General. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of Government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement, or administration of law, it is essential to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself, and (b) fix a standard. Edu v. Ericta. Standards could be implied from the policy and purpose of the law considered as a whole. [CAB: “public safety” as the implied standard] Agustin v. Edu. The statute is a valid exercise of police power in so far as it promotes public safety. Early warning devices have a clear emergency meaning, whereas blinking lights are equivocal and would increase accidents. The petitioner’s contention that the devices’ manufacturers may be abusive does not invalidate the law. Petitioner’s objection is based on a negative view of the statute’s wisdom-something the court can’t decide on. FTWU v. Minister of Labor. BP130 insofar as it empowers the Minister of Labor to assume jurisdiction over labor disputes causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest thereafter decide it or certify the same to the NLRC is NOT on its face unconstitutional for being violative of the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative power. PhilComm Satellite Corp v. Alcuaz. In case of delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just  When such rules are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind, it is a legislative function  When the rate-fixing applies to one entity only: quasi-judicial function Chiongbian v. Orbos. With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the standard is to be found in the same policy underlying the grant to the President in RA 5435 of the power to reorganize the Executive Department, to wit: “to promote simplicity, economy and efficient in the government to enable it to…” = sufficient standard. Santiago v. COMELEC. COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. Panama Refining v. Ryan. The Constitution has never been regarded as denying to Congress the necessary flexibility and practicality which will enable it to perform its function in laying down policies and establishing standards, while leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the policy as declared by the legislative to apply. There is a distinction between (a) delegation of power to make the law and (b) conferring authority/discretion as to its execution.  Cardozo, J. dissent: There has been no grant to the Executive of any roving commission to inquire into evils and then, upon discovering them, do anything he pleases. Discretion is not unconfined and vagrant. It is canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing. Abakada Guro v. Ermita. In this case, there is simply a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increased rate under the law is contingent. Review Center Assoc v. Ermita. EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power by the President as it expands CHED’s regulatory coverage to include review centers, despite the fact that RA 7722, the law defining CHED’s authority, only limits such coverage to “public and private institutions of higher education and degree-granting programs in all post-secondary educational institutions.” || a “review center is not an institution of higher learning as contemplated by RA 7722…[i]t does not offer a degreegranting program that would put it under the jurisdiction of the CHED.” ALA Schecter Poultry Corp v. US. In view of the scope of that broad declaration, and of the nature of the few restrictions that are imposed, the discretion of the President in approving or prescribing codes, and thus enacting laws for the government of trade and industry throughout the country, is virtually unfettered. Federal Energy Administration v. Al Gonquin. Sufficient standard = “…in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security” White v. Roughton. Personal standards cannot be used to determine whether or not to terminate welfare assistance. Such a procedure, vesting virtually unfettered discretion in Roughton, is clearly violative of due process. 2. Permissible delegation a. Ascertainment of fact Panama Refining Co v. Ryan, supra. Lovina v. Moreno. Determination of findings of fact may validly be delegated to administrative agencies. | Delegation by Congress to executive or administrative agencies of functions of judicial or at least quasi-judicial in character, is incidental to the exercise by such agencies of their executive or administrative powers. It is not in violation of the separation of powers nor is it in violation of due process. b. Filling in of details

Copied verbatim from UP Law D2012 Administrative Law Finals Reviewer Addition: new cases, some class notes

4 Administrative Law Finals reviewer Dean S. T. Carlota 2 Semester A.Y. 2010-2011 nd

Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano

c.

Alegre v. Collector. The authority to “fill in details” in carrying out the law is not legislative power and may thus be validly delegated to administrative agencies. | The law provides in detail for the inspection, grading and baling of hemp and by whom and how it shoud be done, and creates the Fiber Board with power and authority to devise ways and means for its execution Administrative rule-making Book VII, Administrative Procedure, Sec. 1-9, Administrative Code of 1987. SECTION 1: SCOPE – This Book shall be applicable to all agencies as defined in the next succeeding section, except the Congress, the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, military establishments in all matters relating exclusively to Armed Forces personnel, the Board of Pardons and Parole and state universities and colleges. SECTION 2: DEFINITIONS – As used in this Book: (1) “Agency” includes any department, bureau, office, commission, authority or officer of the National Government authorized by law or executive order to make rules, issue licenses, grant rights or privileges, and adjudicate cases; research institutions with respect to licensing functions; government corporations with respect to functions regulating private right, privileges, occupation or business; and officials in the exercise of disciplinary power as provided by law. (2) “Rule” means any agency statement of general applicability that implements or interprets a law, fixes and describes the procedures in, or practice requirements of, an agency, including its regulations. The term includes memoranda or statements concerning the internal administration or management of an agency not affecting the rights of, or procedure available to, the public. (3) “Rate” means any charge to the public for a service open to all and upon the same terms, including individual or joint rates, tolls, classifications, or schedules thereof, as well as commutation, mileage, kilometerage, and other special rates which shall be imposed by law or regulation to be observed and followed by any person. (4) “Rule making” means any agency process for the formulation, amendment, or repeal of a rule. (5) “Contested case” means any proceeding, including licensing, in which the legal rights, duties or privileges asserted by specific parties as required by the Constitution or by law are to be determined after hearing. (6) “Person” includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, public or private organization of any character other than an agency. (7) “Party” includes a person or agency named or admitted as a party, or properly seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as a party, in any agency proceeding; but nothing herein shall be construed to prevent an agency from admitting any person or agency as a party for limited purposes. (8) “Decision” means the whole or any part of the final disposition, not of an interlocutory character, whether affirmative, negative, or injunctive in form, of an agency in any matter, including licensing, rate fixing and granting of rights and privileges. (9) “Adjudication” means an agency process for the formulation of a final order. (10) “License” includes the whole or any part of any agency permit, certificate, passport, clearance, approval, registration, charter, membership, statutory exemption or other form of permission, or regulation of the exercise of a right or privilege. (11) “Licensing” includes agency process involving the grant, renewal, denial revocation, suspension, annulment, withdrawal, limitation, amendment, modification or conditioning of a license. (12) “Sanction” includes the whole or a part of a prohibition, limitation or other condition affecting the liberty of any person; the withholding of relief; the imposition of penalty or fine; the destruction, taking, seizure or withholding of property; the assessment of damages, reimbursement, restitution, compensation, cost, charges or fees; the revocation or suspension of license; or the taking of other compulsory or restrictive action. (13) “Relief” includes the whole or part of any grant of money, assistance, license, authority, privilege, exemption, exception, or remedy; recognition of any claim, right, immunity, privilege, exemption or exception; or taking of any action upon the application or petition of any person. (14) “Agency proceeding” means any agency process with respect to rule-making, adjudication and licensing. (15) “Agency action” includes the whole or part of every agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief or its equivalent or denial thereof. SECTION 3: FILING (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any part or persons. (2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action. (3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to public inspection. SECTION 4: EFFECTIVITY -- In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them. SECTION 5: PUBLICATION AND RECORDING – The University of the Philippines Law enter shall: (1) Publish a quarter bulletin setting forth the text of rules filed with it during the preceding quarter; and (2) Keep an up-to-date codification of all rules thus published and remaining in effect, together with a complete index and appropriate tables. SECTION 6: OMMISSION OF SOME RULES (1) The University of the Philippines Law Center may omit from the bulletin or the codification any rule if its publication would be unduly cumbersome, expensive or otherwise inexpedient, but copies of that rule shall be made available on application to the agency which adopted it, and the bulletin shall contain a notice stating the general subject matter of the omitted rule and new copies thereof may be obtained. (2) Every rule establishing an offense or defining an act which, pursuant to law, is punishable as a crime or subject to a penalty shall in all cases be published in full text. SECTION 7: DISTRIBUTION OF BULLETIN AND CODIFIED RULES – The University of the Philippines Law Center shall furnish one (1) free copy each of every issue of the bulletin and of the codified rules or supplements to the Office of the President, Congress, all appellate courts and the National Library. The bulletin and the codified rules shall be made available free of charge to such public officers or agencies as the Congress may select, and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover publication and mailing or distribution costs. SECTION 8: JUDICIAL NOTICE – The court shall take judicial notice of the certified copy of each rule duly filed or as published in the bulletin or the codified rules. SECTION 9: PUBLIC PARTICIPATION (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule. (2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon. (3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.

Copied verbatim from UP Law D2012 Administrative Law Finals Reviewer Addition: new cases, some class notes

5 Administrative Law Finals reviewer Dean S. T. Carlota 2 Semester A.Y. 2010-2011 nd

Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano 1)

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Limits on rule-making power Olsen & Co v. Aldanese. The authority of administrative agencies to make rules and regulations is confined to the specific purpose provided in the law. Syman v. Jacinto. Administrative regulations must not be inconsistent with the law. | Therefore, if the law does not give the Commissioner the power to review and revise unappealed decisions of the Collector of Customs in seizure cases, then the memorandum order even if duly approved and published, would equally have no effect for being inconsistent with law. People v. Maceren. Administrative regulations should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and should conform to the standards that the law prescribes. Toledo v. CSC. Administrative regulations cannot amend an act of Congress. | By its administrative regulations, the law itself cannot be extended; said regulations cannot amend an act of Congress. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. CA. Administrative issuances must remain consistent with the law they seek to apply. | Administrative rules and regulations are intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the law. Land Bank v. CA. The conclusive effect of administrative construction is not absolute. Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment. In this regard, it must be stressed that the function of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect. The power of administrative agencies is this confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect. GMCR v. Bell Telecomm. Administrative regulations derive their validity from the law that they were intended to implement. Assoc. of Phil. Coconut Dessicators v. Philcoa. Administrative agencies cannot dismantle a legislative policy. | Any change in policy must be made by the legislative department of the government, the regulatory system gas been set up by law. it is beyond the power of an administrative agency to dismantle it. Ople v. Torres. Administrative orders should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. Phil. Bank of Communications v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. By changing the prescriptive period of 2 years to 10 years, the circular created a clear inconsistency with the provisions of the law. in so doing the BIR did not simply interpret the law; rather it legislated guidelines contrary to the stature passed by Congress. CBC v. Members of the Board of Trustees, HDMF. It is well settled that the rules and regulations which are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. Department zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute. Maxima Realty v. Parkway. An AO, to be valid, must conform to the provisions of the enabling law. Publication and effectivity PP v. Que Po Lay. As a rule, circulars and regulations which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective.  The circular in this case is not a statute or law, but issued in the implementation of the law; therefore, it has the force and effect of law  In general, rules must not provide penal sanctions, UNLESS: agency is given rule-making authority; law itself provides that the act is criminal. PBM v. SSS. Publication of laws in the OG is material for the purpose of determining their effectivity, only if the statutes themselves do not so provide. [repealed] Tañada v. Tuvera. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual 15-day period shall be shortened or extended.  We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity…  Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.  Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.  Also: city charters; Monetary Board circulars if they are meant not merely to interpret but to “fill in details” Phil. Assoc. of Service Exporters v. Torres. Circulars issued by an administrative agency, though a valid exercise of police power as delegated to the executive branch of the government, may be held legally invalid, defective of unenforceable for lack of proper publication and filing in the Office of National Administrative Register. De Jesus v. COA. An administrative circular issued to enforce or implement an existing law and affects the rights of certain people must comply with the publication requirement. Republic v. EXPRESS Telecomm. Publication in the OG or a newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine qua non before statutes, rules or regulations can take effect. The fact that rules or regulations were filed and published by the UP Law Center in the National Administrative Register does not cure the defect related to its effectivity. NASECORE v. ERC. Publication of implementing rules of statutes is mandatory and may not be dispensed with altogether. Publication in the OG or a newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine qua non before statutes, rules or regulations can take effect. GMA Network v. MTRCB. Administrative issuances which are not published or filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register are ineffective and may not be enforced. Republic v. Pilipinas Shell. Strict compliance with the requirements of publication cannot be annulled by a mere allegation that the parties were notified of the existence of the implementing rules concerned. | These requirements of publication and filing were put in place as safeguards against abuses on the part of lawmakers and as guarantees to the constitutional rights to due process and to information on matters of public concern, and therefore, require strict compliance. Penal regulations PP v. Que Po Lay, supra. PP v. Maceren, supra. Interpretative Rules Hilado v. Collector. A regulation that is merely an interpretation of the statute when once determined to have been erroneous becomes a nullity. Victorias v. SSC. A rule which purports merely to advise the people of amendments of the law does not require presidential approval and publication on the OG for its effectivity.  When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it “makes” a new law with the force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law.

Copied verbatim from UP Law D2012 Administrative Law Finals Reviewer Addition: new cases, some class notes

6 Administrative Law Finals reviewer Dean S. T. Carlota 2 Semester A.Y. 2010-2011 nd

Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano

B.

Peralta v. CSC. Administrative interpretation of the law is not necessarily binding upon the courts. | The administrative interpretation of the law is at best advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means. 5) Examples of rule-making in various agencies Director of Forestry v. Muñoz. When an administrative agency is empowered by Congress to issue regulations, such regulations issued will be valid provided that these are germane to the objects and purposes of the law. Sand v. Abad Santos Educ. Insti. Board of Examiners was plainly granted by statute the authority to conduct periodic inspections of nursing schools in order to discharge its supervisory and regulatory functions vested in it under the Philippine Nursing Act. American Tobacco Co. Dir. Of Patents. While the power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency vested by law, this does not preclude a delegation of power to hold a hearing on the basis of which the decision of the administrative agency will be made.  Administrative flexibility necessary for the prompt and expeditious discharge of his duties in the administration of said laws  “sub-delegation of power”  justified by the sound principles of organization which demand that those at the top be able to concentrate their attention upon the larger and more important questions of policy and practice, and their time be freed, so far as possible, from the consideration of the smaller and far less important matters of detail. Rabor v. CSC. The standards for subordinate legislation can be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. The Conference of Maritime Manning v. POEA. Administrative agencies may promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation so long as the regulation is germane to the objects and purposes of the law. that is the principle of subordinate legislation. Realty Exchange Venture Corp v. Sendino. A statute may vest exclusive original jurisdiction in an administrative agency over certain disputes and controversies falling within the agency’s special expertise. | In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the agency’s enabling act. Soriano v. La Guardia. Administrative agencies have powers and functions which may be administrative, investigatory, regulatory, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial, or a mix of the five, as may be conferred by the Constitution or by statute. They have in fine only such powers or authority as are granted or delegated, expressly or impliedly, by law. And in determining whether an agency has certain powers, the inquiry should be from the law itself. But once ascertained as existing, the authority given should be liberally construed. | A perusal of the MTRCB’s basic mandate under PD 1986 reveals the possession by the agency of the authority, albeit impliedly, to issue the challenged order of preventive suspension. And this authority stems naturally from, and is necessary for the exercise of, its power of regulation and supervision. Dagan v. PRC. The validity of an administrative issuance, such as the assailed guidelines, hinges on compliance with the following requisites: (1) its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature; (2) it must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; (3) it must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; (4) it must be reasonable. | All the prescribed requisites are met as regards the questioned issuances. Philracom’s authority is drawn from P.D. No. 420. The delegation made in the presidential decree is valid. Philracom did not exceed its authority. And the issuances are fair and reasonable. d. Fixing of rates, wages and prices  Requirements: publication in a newspaper of general circulation for at least 2 weeks + public hearing  If the requirements were not complied with, the party can go to court [rate is void]  Admin. Code  rate-fixing provision = quasi-judicial, because it is based on a finding of fact Panay Autobus v. PRC. The Public Service Commission cannot delegate the power to fix rates because the Commission has to determine, prior to approval, whether or not the rates applied for is just and reasonable. KMU Labor Center v. Garcia. The power of rate-fixing delegated to the LTFRB cannot be delegated to provincial bus operators. All that the administrative body may do to the delegated power is to implement the policies laid down in the statue by filling in the details which the Legislature may neither have time nor competence to provide. Ynchausti SS Co. v. Public Utility Comm. What constitutes a reasonable rate is a judicial question. Vigan Electric Co. v. PSC. Rate-fixing power partakes a legislative character when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines. However, when it is made to apply exclusively to one party, it becomes quasi-judicial and character and the party becomes entitled to notice and hearing. PCSC v. Alcuaz. A rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as well as the requirement of reasonableness. MIA Authority v. Airspain. The power to fix rates must be authorized by statute. e. Licensing function General rule: these permits/licenses are mere privileges. Privileges can be unilaterally revoked by the giver, as opposed right can’t be taken without DPL. Sec. 17-18, Book VII, Administrative Code of 1987. Section 17. Licensing Procedure. (1) When the grant, renewal, denial or cancellation of a license is required to be preceded by notice and hearing, the provisions concerning contested cases shall apply insofar as practicable. (2) Except in cases of willful violation of pertinent laws, rules and regulations or when public security, health, or safety require otherwise, no license may be withdrawn, suspended, revoked or annulled without notice and hearing. Section 18. Non-expiration of License. - Where the licensee has made timely and sufficient application for the renewal of a license with reference to any activity of a continuing nature, the existing license shall not expire until the application shall have been finally determined by the agency. Gonzalo Sy Trading v. Central Bank. A license is in the nature of a special privilege. It is not in any way vested, permanent or absolute. Judicial Function Sec.10-15, Book VII, Admin. Code of 1987. Section 10. Compromise and Arbitration. – To expedite administrative proceedings involving conflicting rights or claims and obviate expensive litigations, every agency shall, in the public interest, encourage amicable settlement, comprise and arbitration. Section 11. Notice and Hearing in Contested Cases. (1) In any contested case all parties shall be entitled to notice and hearing. The notice shall be served at least five (5) days before the date of the hearing and shall state the date, time and place of the hearing. (2) The parties shall be given opportunity to present evidence and argument on all issues. If not precluded by law, informal disposition may be made of any contested case by stipulation, agreed settlement or default. (3) The agency shall keep an official record of its proceedings. Section 12. Rules of Evidence. - In a contested case: (1) The agency may admit and give probative value to evidence commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs.

Copied verbatim from UP Law D2012 Administrative Law Finals Reviewer Addition: new cases, some class notes

7 Administrative Law Finals reviewer Dean S. T. Carlota 2 Semester A.Y. 2010-2011 nd

Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano

  a.

b.

c.

(2) Documentary evidence may be received in the form of copies or excerpts, if the original is not readily available. Upon request, the parties shall be given opportunity to compare the copy with the original. If the original is in the official custody of a public officer, a certified copy thereof may be accepted. (3) Every party shall have the right to cross-examine witnesses presented against him and to submit rebuttal evidence. (4) The agency may take notice of judicially cognizable facts and of generally cognizable technical or scientific facts within its specialized knowledge. The parties shall be notified and afforded an opportunity to contest the facts so noticed. Section 13. Subpoena. - In any contested case, the agency shall have the power to require the attendance of witnesses or the production of books, papers, documents and other pertinent data, upon request of any party before or during the hearing upon showing of general relevance. Unless otherwise provided by law, the agency may, in case of disobedience, invoke the aid of the Regional Trial Court within whose jurisdiction the contested case being heard falls. The Court may punish contumacy or refusal as contempt. Section 14. Decision. - Every decision rendered by the agency in a contested case shall be in writing and shall state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. The agency shall decide each case within thirty (30) days following its submission. The parties shall be notified of the decision personally or by registered mail addressed to their counsel of record, if any, or to them. Section 15. Finality of Order. - The decision of the agency shall become final and executory fifteen (15) days after the receipt of a copy thereof by the party adversely affected unless within that period an administrative appeal or judicial review, if proper, has been perfected. One motion for reconsideration may be filed, which shall suspend the running of the said period. Why the general rules on evidence and procedure do not apply to administrative agencies to expedite proceedings; administrative agencies are expected to act with flexibility. Agencies must however comply with procedural due process because such is constitutionally guaranteed Power to issue subpoena, declare contempt 1. General statutory provision Sec. 13, Book VII, Admin. Code of 1987, supra. 2. Special Statutory Grant PD 902-A. – Reorganization of the SEC with Additional Power and Placing the said Agency under the Administrative Supervision of the OP Section 6. In order to effectively exercise such jurisdiction, the Commission shall possess the following powers: (e) To issue subpoena duces tecum and summon witnesses to appear in any proceedings of the Commission and in appropriate cases order search and seizure or cause the search and seizure of all documents, papers, files and records as well as books of accounts of any entity or person under investigation as may be necessary for the proper disposition of the cases before it Evangelista v. Jarencio. Administrative agencies must issue administrative subpoenas in the course of investigations, whether or not adjudication is involved and whether or not probable cause is shown. [because the purpose of the subpoena is to discover evidence, not to prove a pending charge]  Note the 3 tests for the validity of exercise of subpoena power: o Inquiry is within the agency’s authority [granted subpoena power by law] o Information sought is reasonably relevant o Demand is not too indefinite  not a fishing expedition Guevarra v. COMELEC. The agency must exercise its power to punish for contempt in cases calling the agency to exercise quasi-judicial functions and not merely ministerial duties. | its exercise by administrative bodies has been invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit testimony. And the exercise of that power by an administrative body in furtherance of its administrative function has been held invalid.  COMELEC’s contempt power can only be exercised as an incident of quasi-judicial functions  to try, hear and decide controversies in connection with elections ::: this power cannot be used in connection with its ministerial duties: preparatory processes for elections] Catura v. CIR. Investigative power would be inutile if the agency exercising such power cannot require the parties to produce the documents needed in the investigation. Tolentino v. Inciong. Contempt power granted by charter can be abused or wrongly used. Agency cannot cite in contempt a party availing himself of judicial remedy, nor the judge for taking cognizance of the case. Warrants of arrest, administrative searches 1987 Consti, Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Vis-à-vis 1973 Consti, Art. IV, Sec. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and whatever purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as maybe authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board. Probable cause upon which a warrant of arrest may be issued, can be determined ONLY by a judge. | The contention of the Solicitor-General that the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation is valid only when there is already an order of deportation. But, during the investigation, it is not indispensable that the alien be arrested. Vivo v. Montesa. The power to determine probable cause for warrants of arrest is limited to judges exclusively. | The issuance of warrants of arrests by the Commissioners of immigration, solely for the purpose of investigation and before a final order of deportation is issued, conflicts with the Bill of Rights. Santos v. Commissioner. The President’s power to conduct an investigation leading to deportation does not imply the authority to order an arrest. Harvey v. Defensor-Santiago. The requirement in Qua Chee Gan need not be followed where probable cause had been shown to exist before the warrants of arrest were issued. Lucien Tran Van Nghia v. Liwag. The requirement of probable cause to be determined by a judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings. There need be no “truncated” recourse to both judicial and administrative warrants in a single deportation proceeding. Salazar v. Achacoso. The Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants Board of Commissioners (CID) v. de la Rosa. A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of investigation only is void. Camara v. Mun. Court. In non-emergency situations, search warrants (issuable only by a neutral magistrate) must be obtained if entry to private residence is refused. || Probable cause is the standard by which a particular decision to search is tested against the constitutional mandate of reasonableness See v. Seattle. Administrative entry, without consent, upon the portions of commercial premises which are not open to the public may only be compeeled through prosecution or physical force within the framework of a warrant procedure. Imposition of Fines and Penalties

Copied verbatim from UP Law D2012 Administrative Law Finals Reviewer Addition: new cases, some class notes

8 Administrative Law Finals reviewer Dean S. T. Carlota 2 Semester A.Y. 2010-2011 nd

Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano

IV.

Oceanic Steam Navigation v. Stranahan. A fine which is not a criminal penalty may be validly imposed by an administrative agency. Civil Aeronautics Board v. PAL. CAB has the power to impose administrative fines on erring airlines. | To deprive the CAB of the power to impose fines in the nature of civil penalty for violations of its rules and regulations would amount to an absurd interpretation of the pertinent legal provision because the CAB is given full power on its own initiative to determine whether to impose, remit, mitigate, increase or compromise fines and civil penalties, a power expressly given to the Civil Aeronautics Administrator. Scoty’s Dept. Store v. Micaller. The power to impose penalties for ULP is lodged in ordinary courts and not in the CIR. US v. Barrias. The fixing of penalties for criminal offense is an exercise of legislative power which CANNOT be delegated to subordinate authority. RCPI v. Board of Communications. It is the courts of justice, and not the Board, which have jurisdiction over breach of contractual obligation and tort liability. Perez v. LPG Refillers Assoc. Where the violation of an administrative regulation is made a crime by the enabling law and the penalty is also provided in said law, the administrative regulation is valid. C. Judicial Determiniation of Sufficiency of Standards 1. Interest of Law and Order Rubi v. Prov. Board of Mindoro. The purpose of the statute is to promote law and order in Mindoro, and to encourage development of resources in the island. 2. Public Interest PP v. Rosenthal & Osmena. Public interest is a sufficient standard to guide the Insular Treasurer in issuing or cancelling a permit. 3. Justice, Equity and substantial merits of the case Int’l Hardwood & Veneer Co. v. Pangil Federation. The CIR has the power to determine minimum wages for an individual employee in connection with an industrial dispute which said court might take cognizance of, and such grant of power is constitutional. 4. What is moral, educational or amusing Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission. The terms of the statute get precision from the sense and experience of men and these become certain and useful guides in determining what is educational, moral, or amusing. 5. What is sacrilegious Burstyn v. Wilson. No definite meaning of sacrilegious, thus, invalid standard. 6. Adequate and efficient instruction PACU v. Sec. The regulation of private schools by the Secretary which has as a standard the maintenance of a “general standard of efficiency and adequate standard of education to the public” is a VALID standard. 7. Reasonableness as an implied standard Wisconsin Inspection Bureau v. Whitman. The rule of reasonableness inheres in every law, and the action of those charged with its enforcement must in the nature of things, be subject to the test of reasonableness. 8. To promote simplicity, economy or efficiency Cervantes v. Auditor General. Valid standard in delegating reorganization powers – to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in operations. 9. Maintain monetary stability, promote rising level of production and real income PP v. Joliffe. Valid standard in the delegation of legislative power, as contained in the charter of the Monetary Board. Administrative Procedure A. Book VII, Administrative Procedure, Sec. 1-26. [Sec. 1-15, supra] Section 16. Publication and Compilation of Decisions. – Every agency shall publish and make available for public inspection all decisions or final orders in the adjudication of contested cases. It shall be the duty of the records officer of the agency or his equivalent functionary to prepare a register or compilation of those decisions or final orders for use by the public. Section 17. Licensing Procedure. When the grant, renewal, denial or cancellation of a license is required to be preceded by notice and hearing, the provisions concerning contested cases shall apply insofar as practicable. Except in cases of willful violation of pertinent laws, rules and regulations or when public security, health, or safety require otherwise, no license may be withdrawn, suspended, revoked or annulled without notice and hearing. Section 18. Non-expiration of License. Where the licensee has made timely and sufficient application for the renewal of a license with reference to any activity of a continuing nature, the existing license shall not expire until the application shall have been finally determined by the agency. CHAPTER 4 ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL IN CONTESTED CASES Section 19. Appeal. – Unless otherwise provided by law or executive order, an appeal from a final decision of the agency may be taken to the Department head. Section 20. Perfection of Administrative Appeals. – Administrative appeals under this Chapter shall be perfected within fifteen (15) days after receipt of a copy of the decision complained of by the party adversely affected, by filing with the agency which adjudicated the case a notice of appeal, serving copies thereof upon the prevailing party and the appellate agency, and paying the required fees. If a motion for reconsideration is denied, the movant shall have the right to perfect his appeal during the remainder of the period for appeal, reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial. If the decision is reversed on reconsideration, the aggrieved party shall have fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution of reversal within which to perfect his appeal. The agency shall, upon perfection of the appeal, transmit the records of the case to the appellate agency. Section 21. Effect of Appeal. The appeal shall stay the decision appealed from unless otherwise provided by law, or the appellate agency directs execution pending appeal, as it may deem just, considering the nature and circumstances of the case. Section 22. Action on Appeal. The appellate agency shall review the records of the proceedings and may, on its own initiative or upon motion, receive additional evidence. Section 23. Finality of Decision of Appellate Agency. In any contested case, the decision of the appellate agency shall become final and executory fifteen (15) days after the receipt by the parties of a copy thereof. Section 24. Hearing Officers. Each agency shall have such number of qualified and competent members of the base as hearing officers as may be necessary for the hearing and adjudication of contested cases. No hearing officer shall engaged in the performance of prosecuting functions in any contested case or any factually related case. Section 25. Judicial Review. – Agency decisions shall be subject to judicial review in accordance with this chapter and applicable laws. Any party aggrieved or adversely affected by an agency decision may seek judicial review. The action for judicial review may be brought against the agency, or its officers, and all indispensable and necessary parties as defined in the Rules of Court. Appeal from an agency decision shall be perfected by filing with the agency within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy hereof a notice of appeal, and with the reviewing court a petition for review of the order. Copies of the petition shall be served upon the agency and all parties of record. The petition shall contain a concise statement of the issues involved and the grounds relied upon for the review, and shall be accompanied with a true copy of the order appealed from, together with copies of such material portions of the records as are referred to therein and other supporting papers. The petition shall be under oath and shall how, by stating the specific material dates, that it was filed within the period fixed in this chapter. The petition for review shall be perfected within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the final administrative decision. One (1) motion for reconsideration may be allowed. If the motion is denied, the movant shall perfect his appeal during the remaining period

Copied verbatim from UP Law D2012 Administrative Law Finals Reviewer Addition: new cases, some class notes

9 Administrative Law Finals reviewer Dean S. T. Carlota 2 Semester A.Y. 2010-2011 nd

Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano

B. C.

for appeal reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial. If the decision is reversed on reconsideration, the appellant shall have fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution to perfect his appeal. The review proceeding shall be filed in the court specified by statute or, in the absence thereof, in any court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions on venue of the Rules of Court. Review shall be made on the basis of the record taken as a whole. The findings of fact of the agency when supported by substantial evidence shall be final except when specifically provided otherwise by law. Section 26. Transmittal of Record. Within fifteen (15) days from the service of the petition for review, the agency shall transmit to the court the original or a certified copy of the entire records of the proceeding under review. The record to be transmitted may be abridged by agreement of all parties to the proceedings. The court may require or permit subsequent correction or additions to the record. In rule-making, price, wage or rate fixing In adjudication of cases 1. Rules of Procedure 2. Due Process a. Cardinal primary rights Ang Tibay v. CIR. 1. Right to a Hearing  includes the right of the part interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. The liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play. 2. Tribunal must consider the evidence presented 3. Decision must be supported by evidence  while the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity. 4. Evidence must be substantial  not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be “substantial.” It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 5. Transparency  evidence to be considered must be those presented at the hearing or on record. 6. CIR must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts  judges must not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. 7. Decision must be rendered such that the parties know the issues involved and reasons for the decision Asprec v. Itchon. Failure to be heard because of non-appearance in hearing is not a denial of due process. Vinta Maritime v. NLRC. Submission of position papers provides adequate opportunity to be heard. Bachrach Motor v. CIR. The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right which is part of due process. UP BOR v. CA. Trial-type proceeding not required so long as given opportunity to be heard. Zambales Chromite v. CA. A review of one’s own decision is a mockery of administrative justice. Rivera v. SCS. [same doctrine as Zambales] American Inter-Fashion Corp v. OP. Non-disclosure of evidence on which decision is based = denial of due process Pefianco v. Moral. A party is entitled to a copy of the decision of his case (with facts and the law used as bases) but not to an internal investigation report. NAPOLCOM v. Bernabe. Failure to conduct hearings is NOT a denial of due process, so long as respondent is given the opportunity to be heard. Montemayor v. Bundalian. Active participation in the proceedings cured procedural deficiency. Shoppes Manila v. NLRC. A full-blown hearing is NOT a matter of right in labor cases, so long as parties are given an opportunity to be heard [labor cases = position papers] Autencio v. Manara. No denial of due process since accused filed an Answer and submitted affidavits. Samalio v. CA. Technical rules of procedure may be applied suppletorily, if it will result in justice and fairness in the resolution of the case. Medina v. COA. Hearing and formal investigation is discretionary on the part of the hearing officer in Ombudsman cases, as provided by law.  Note: if the law specifies the procedure applicable in certain cases, that procedure is the due process requirement. If such procedure is not followed, there is denial of due process.  Look at the law applicable for a particular case; if the law is silent, apply the general rule: requirement is met so long as there is opportunity to be heard. Domingo v. Rayala. That Rayala committed the acts complained of – and was guilty of sexual harassment – is therefore, the common factual finding of not just one, but three independent bodies: the Committee, the OP and the CA. It should be remembered that when supported by substantial evidence, factual findings made by quasi-judicial and administrative bodies are accorded great respect and even finality by the Courts. Goss v. Lopez. Students to be suspended are entitled to be heard, but an informal hearing is sufficient. Matthews v. Eldridge. No need for a full-blown evidentiary hearing, since the nature of the issue makes it determionable by just considering document/reports submitted. | Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands b. Notice and hearing 1. When required NDC v. Collector. The fact that the set in question was claimed by the customs authorities not to be within the exception does not automatically make the vessel liable. It is still necessary that the vessel, its owner or operator, be given a chance to show otherwise. Bautista v. WCC. When a party is not given notice and a reasonable time to prepare for a hearing, there is denial of due process. Equitable Bank v. NLRC. Notice and hearing required in termination of employement cases, as provided for by law [2notice requirement] Felix Uy v. COA. Governor should be notified and given opportunity to be heard, before being held personally liable for the claim of terminated employees. 2. When not required Suntay v. PP. No notice and hearing required when the decision is based on an undisputed fact Bishop v. Galang. Hearing not necessary in making decisions which are purely discretionary as specifically granted by law [e.g. law specifically grants discretionary power on the part of immigration authorities to decide on applications for extension of the stay of an alien.] PAB v. CA. Notice and hearing not required when urgen emergency measures are needed, as provided by law. c. Form and Promulgation of judgment Indias v. PIM. Discussion of the evidence or findings of facts is not needed when it is substantially discussed by the lower tribunal, andf the reviewing court fully agrees with such findings. Serrano v. PSC. Quasi-judicial tribunals should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to a proceeding can know the issues involved and the reasons for the decisions rendered.

Copied verbatim from UP Law D2012 Administrative Law Finals Reviewer Addition: new cases, some class notes

10 Administrative Law Finals reviewer Dean S. T. Carlota 2 Semester A.Y. 2010-2011 nd

Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano

3.

Solid Homes v. Laserna. The constitutional mandate that, “no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based,” does not preclude the validity of “memorandum decisions,” which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals. In fact, in Yao v. Court of Appeals, this Court has sanctioned the use of “memorandum decisions,”• a species of succinctly written decisions by appellate courts in accordance with the provisions of Section 40, B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, on the grounds of expediency, practicality, convenience and docket status of our courts. This Court likewise declared that “memorandum decisions” comply with the constitutional mandate. DOH v. Camposano. The disciplining authority must make an independent assessment of the facts and the law in order to inform the respondents of the bases of the sanctions, as part of administrative due process. American Tobacco v. Dir. Of Patents. While the power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency vested by law, this does not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the basis of which the decision of the administrative agency will be made. Albert v. Gangan. The decision of a government agency must state the facts and the law on which the decision is based. The COA cannot just perform its constitutional function of disallowing expenditures of government funds at sheer discretion. Arocha v. Vivo. The powers and duties of boards and commissions may not be exercised by individual members, separately. Neria v. Com. Of Immigration. The date of the agency action is the date when decision was made and not the writing of said decision. Go Yu Tak Wai v. Vivo. The period within which to review the decision of the BSI must be 1 year from the promulgation of the decision. Sichangco v. Board of Commissioners of Immigration. The notice of reversal may be sent even after a year from the date of the promulgation of the judgment. Realty Exchange Venture v. Sendino. Rules of procedure are as a matter of course construed liberally in proceedings before administrative bodies. Jurisdiction  Administrative agencies may only exercise powers that are either: explicitly conferred to them by law; or, by necessary implication from the law.  Jurisdiction conferred by law: the enabling law must be carefully examined  Effect on decision on matters not within their jurisdiction: VOID. [ultra vires] Feliciano v. Dir. Of Patents. [guy claiming he owned patent as per contract] Contract validity is a civil law question which has to be resolved in a regular court, not by the Director of Patents who has no jurisdiction over the same. Syquia v. Board of Power & Waterworks. [dispute over electricity charge] Conditions of lease between landlord and tenant are purely civil in character, hence, they are to be adjudged exclusively by the regular courts. Go Tek v. Deportation Board. [Chinese who was accused as head of a guerilla unit] Under existing law, the deportation of an undesirable alien may be effects (1) by order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to Sec. 69 of the Revised Admin Code or (2) by the Commissioner of Immigration upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners under Sec. 37 of the Immigration Law. Go v. Ramos. Carlos and Jimmy’s claim that the cause of action of the Bureau has prescribed is untenable. Cases involving issues on citizenship are sui generis. Once the citizenship of an individual is put into question, it necessarily has to be threshed out and decided upon. In the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, we said that decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person’s future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter, lose his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose. Indeed, if the issue of one’s citizenship, after it has been passed upon by the courts, leaves it still open to future adjudication, then there is more reason why the government should not be precluded from questioning one’s claim to Philippine citizenship, especially so when the same has never been threshed out by any tribunal. Vera v. Cuevas. [skimmed milk label] Repeal of tax law means the law has lost its tax purpose, and devoid of said purpose, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue necessarily lost his authority to enforce it. De la Fuente v. de Veyra. Exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture cases vested in the Collector of Customs precludes a regular court from assuming cognizance over such cases. Carino v. CHR. [DECS teachers rallying] CHR may investigate, but fact-finding is not adjudication, and the latter the CHR has no power to do. Simon v. CHR. CHR’s power to cite for contempt must not arise from; adjudicative power it does not have. | Though it has the power to investigate, which bears some kind of a resemblance to adjudication, the resemblance can in no way be synonymous to the adjudicastory power itself. LLDA v. CA. The fundamental rule is that an admin agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it be law, but it is also settled rule that an admin agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. Union Bank v. HLURB. Failure to acquire the necessary consent of an admin agency and the buyer by a subdivision developer constitutes an unsound real estate business practice. AMA v. Factoran. Specific performance of contractual obligations against condo owners filed by buyer fall within the competence and expertise of the HLURB. Osea v. Ambrosio. Generally, the extent to which an administrative agency may exercise its powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency. Mateo v. CA. employees of GOCCs with original charter fall under the jurisdiction of the CSC. PAL v. CAB. The trend of modern legislation is to vest an admin agency with the power to regulate and control the operation of public services under reasonable rules and regulations, and as a general rule, the courts will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion. ERB v. CA. an agency tasked with the rate-fixing function does not necessarily have jurisdiction over non-rate fixing issues, since the law may vest the latter to another agency. Eristingcol v. CA. A scrutiny of the allegations contained in Eristingcol’s complaint reveals that the nature of the question subject of this controversy only superficially delves into the validity of UVAI’s Construction Rules. The complaint actually goes into the proper interpretation and application of UVAI’s by-laws, specifically its construction rules. Essentially, the conflict between the parties arose as Eristingcol, admittedly a member of UVAI, now wishes to be exempt from the application of the canopy requirement set forth in UVAI’s Construction Rules. Significantly, Eristingcol does not assail the height restriction of UVAI’s Construction Rules, as she has readily complied therewith. Distinctly in point is China Banking Corp. v. Court of Appeals, which upheld the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) over the suit and recognized its special competence to interpret and apply Valley Golf and Country Club, Inc.’s (VGCCI’s) by-laws. || Applying the foregoing principles in the case at bar, to ascertain which tribunal has jurisdiction we have to determine therefore whether or not petitioner is a stockholder of VGCCI and whether or not the nature of the controversy between petitioner and private respondent corporation is intra-corporate. Delta Ventures v. Cabato. A 3rd party claim incident to an issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of LA/NLRC is beyond the jurisdiction of a regular trial court. Cagayan Electric v. Collera. Power to fix rates doesn’t carry with it the power to determine whether or not petitioner is guilty of overcharging customers, an issue which falls within the jurisdiction of regular courts. Arranza v. BF Homes. HLURB has jurisdiction over complaint filed by subdivision homeowners against developer that is under receivership for specific performance regarding basic homeowners’ needs

Copied verbatim from UP Law D2012 Administrative Law Finals Reviewer Addition: new cases, some class notes

11 Administrative Law Finals reviewer Dean S. T. Carlota 2 Semester A.Y. 2010-2011 nd

Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano

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CDA v. Dolefil. An agency which is to discharge purely administrative functions is not automatically vested with quasi-judicial authority to adjudicate. De Jesus v. COA. COA is specifically vested by the Constitution with the authority to determine whether government entities comply with laws and regulations in disbursing government funds and to disallow illegal or irregular disbursements. CSC v. Alfonso. As the central personnel agency of the government, the CSC has jurisdiction to supervise the performance of and discipline, if need be, all government employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters such as PUP. Accordingly, all PUP officers and employees, whether they be classified as teachers or professors pursuant to certain provisions of law, are deemed, first and foremost, civil servants accountable to the people and answerable to the CSC in cases of complaints lodged by a citizen against them as public servants. Admittedly, the CSC has appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary cases decided by government departments, agencies and instrumentalities. However, a complaint may be filed directly with the CSC, and the Commission has the authority to hear and decide the case, although it may opt to deputize a department or an agency to conduct the investigation. 4. Administrative and Judicial Proceedings arising from the same facts Galang v. CA. Though 2 proceedings [one criminal and one administrative] arise from the same set of facts, they are not incompatible with each other Co San v. Dir. Of Patents. The Director of Patents, in a cancellation proceedings, is not bound by the findings arrived at in a criminal case. Villanos v. Subido. A condemnatory decision in a criminal case, even if final, by itself alone cannot serve as basis for a decision in an administrative case involving the same facts. PNR v. Domingo. The RTC in a criminal case has no authority to order payment of back salaries in the event of an acquittal of an accused who is also charged in administrative proceeding. Tan v. COMELEC. An absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution or vice versa. Ocampo v. Ombudsman. In administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. Miralles v. Go. An administrative proceeding is different from a criminal case and may proceed independently thereof. Ferrer v. Sandiganbayan. Petitioners argue that the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the administrative case against them based on the same subject matter should operate to dismiss the criminal case because the quantum of proof in criminal cases is proof beyond reasonable doubt, while that in administrative cases is only substantial evidence. While that may be true, it should likewise be stressed that the basis of administrative liability differs from criminal liability. The purpose of administrative proceedings is mainly to protect the public service, based on the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust. On the other hand, the purpose of the criminal prosecution is the punishment of crime. 5. Rules of Evidence PMPWA v. Premier Production. An ocular inspection is merely an auxiliary remedy and may be resorted to only when the courts find it necessary to reach an enlightened determination of the case. Estate of Buan v. Pambusco. A survey may be conducted in order to verify the truth between conflicting claims but not to supplant actual trial Rizal Light Co v. Mun. of Rizal. The SC is not required to examine de novo the decision of an agency and determine for itself whether or nt the preponderance of evidence really justifies the decision. The only function of the SC is to determine whether or not there is evidence before the PSC upon which its decision might be reasonably based. Borja v. Moreno. A conclusion may not be justified if based on an administrative investigation conducted without following due process. Maceda v. ERB. Strict or technical rules of evidence governing court proceedings does not bind administrative agency in exercising quasi-legislative functions Bantolino v. Coca-cola. The rules of evidence are not strictly observed in proceeding before administrative bodies where decisions may be reached on the basis of position papers only. CSC v. Colangco. The CSC correctly appreciated the photocopies of PBET application form, picture seat plan and PDS (though not duly authenticated) in determining whether there was sufficient evidence to substantiate the charges against the respondent. Worth noting was that respondent never objected to the veracity of their contents. He merely disputed their admissibility on the ground that they were not authenticated. Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions A. Factors Affecting Finality of Administrative Decisions Switchmen’s union of North America v. NMB. There can be judicial review of the decisions of administrative agencies ONLY IF authorized by Congress Chevron USA v. NRDC. A corut may not construe or interpret a statutory provision when the Congress expressly delegated the agency to interpret a specific provision of a statute. Fortich v. Corona. Judgments or resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by law, rules and regulations for the orderly administration of justice. Antique Sawmill v. Zayco. Although technical rules may be relaxed in the interest of justice and equity, a period for appeal is not, merely mandatory, but also a jurisdictional requirement. Sotto v. Ruiz. Even if discretion in the determiniation of an administrative matter lies within the agency, the Court may review the same if there is an allegation of grave abuse of discretion or excess in the exercise of authority. Uy v. Palomar. Courts can review decision of the Director of Post Manuel v. Villena. The general rule is that courts will refuse to interfere with proceedings undertaken by administrative bodies or officials in the exercise of administrative functions. Exceptions: admin proceedings may be reviewed by the courts upon a showing that the board/official – (1) has gone beyond his statutory authority; (2) exercised unconstitutional powers; (3) clearly acted arbitrarily and without regard to his duty, or with GAD; or (4) the decision is vitiated by fraud, imposition or mistake. SMC v. SOL. Lack of enabling statute does NOT bar judicial review. UCPB v. Guanzon. Truly, there is nothing in Republic Act No. 7653 or in Republic Act No. 8791 which explicitly allows an appeal of the decisions of the BSP Monetary Board to the Court of Appeals. However, this shall not mean that said decisions are beyond judicial review. B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Pascual v. Prov. Board. Courts will not interfere where the law has delineated the procedure by which administrative appeal or remedy could be effected, the same should be followed before recourse to judicial action can be initiated. Alzate v. Aldana. The reason for its filing without awaiting the final action of the Director of Public Schools was the urgency of preventing the automatic reversion of the sum appropriated for the adjustment of salary of public school officials and teachers. If he waited for the final decision on his petition for reconsideration, whatever action may thereafter by taken by respondent, even if favorable to petitioner, would be of no avail. Cipriano v. Marcelino. The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not without exception, not is it a condition precedent to judicial relief. The principle may be disregarded when it does not provide a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. It may and should be relaxed when its application may cause great and irreparable damage. Corpuz v. Cuaderno. Doctrine does not apply where, by the terms or implications of the statue authorizing an administrative remedy, such remedy is permissive only, warranting the conclusion that the legislature intended to allow the judicial remedy even though the administrative remedy has not been exhausted. De Lara v. Clorivel. The rule is inapplicable if it should appear that an irreparable damage and injury will be suffered by a party if should await, before taking court action, the final action of the administrative official concerned on the matter.

Copied verbatim from UP Law D2012 Administrative Law Finals Reviewer Addition: new cases, some class notes

12 Administrative Law Finals reviewer Dean S. T. Carlota 2 Semester A.Y. 2010-2011 nd

Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano

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Paredes v. CA. courts should be reluctant to interfere with administrative action prior to its completion or finality, the reason being that absence of a final order or decision, the power of the admin agency concerned has not been fully exercised and there can be no irreparable harm. Quasha v. SEC. in view of the extremely limited time, petitioner properly filed the petition directly with this Court without going through the prescribed procedure was not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Republic v. Sandiganbayan. Administrative agency is in estoppel. Paat v. CA. party must avail all means of administrative processes afforded him before seeking intervention of court Lopez v. City of Manila. As a general rule, where the law provides the remedies against the action of administrative board, body or officer, relief to courts can be sought only after exhausting all remedies provided. The reason rests on the presumption that the administrative body, if given the chance to correct its mistake or error, may amend its decision on a given matter and decide it properly. This should be done not only to give the administrative agency the opportunity to decied the matter by itself correctly, but also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to courts.  Exceptions: 1. The question raised is purely legal 2. The admin body is in estoppel 3. The act complained of is patently illegal 4. There is urgent need for judicial intervention 5. The claim involved is small 6. Irreparable damage will be suffered 7. There is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy 8. Strong public interest is involved 9. The subject of controversy is private land 10. In quo warranto proceedings Garcia v. PCA Governing Board. When an adequate remendy may be had within the Executive Department, but nevertheless a litigant fails or refuses to avail himself of the same, the judiciary shall decline to interfere. DAR v. Apex. The “official indifference” of the agency involved to the cause of the petitioner is a circumstance which permits disregarding the principle of EAR. Smart v. NTC. Doctrine of EAR applies only where the act of admin agency was performed in its quasi-judicial function Estrada v. CA. the doctrine of exhaustion of admin remedies is flexible and may be disregarded in certain instances such as: 1. When there is a violation of due process 2. When the issue involved is a purely legal question 3. When the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction 4. When there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned 5. When there is irreparable injury 6. When the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the president, bear the implied and assumed approval of the latter 7. When to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable 8. When it would amount to a nullification of a claim 9. When the subject matter is a private land in a land case proceedings 10. When the rule does not provide a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy 11. When there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention 12. When no administrative review is provided by law 13. Where the rule of qualified political agency applies 14. When the issue of non-exhaustion of admin remedies has been rendered moot Regino v. PCST. An action for damages which calls for the interpretation of the Civil Code falls within jurisdiction of trial courts. Flores v. Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Pampanga. We have held that the "plain" and "adequate remedy" referred to in Section 1 of Rule 65 is a motion for reconsideration of the assailed Order or Resolution. Petitioner may not arrogate to himself the determination of whether a motion for reconsideration is necessary or not. To dispense with the requirement of filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioner must show a concrete, compelling, and valid reason for doing so. This, petitioner failed to do. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly held that petitioner should have first interposed a motion for reconsideration of the questioned Order issued by respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan. CSC v. DBM. The rule on EAR applies only where there is an express legal provision requiring such administrative step as a condition precedent to taking action in court. As petitioner is not mandated by any law to seek clarification from DBM Sec prior to filing the present action its failure to do so does not call for the application of the rule. Primary Jurisdiction of Preliminary Resort  The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts but have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body. The courts yield their authority but are not ousted of such authority.  Requisites 1. There must be a concurrence of jurisdiction between regular court and administrative agency 2. Question or issue involved requires the technical expertise of the agency 3. The legislative intent on the matter is to have uniformity in rulings 4. Administrative agency is performing a quasi-judicial function Texas & Pac. Railway v. Abilene. An action against a legislative act of an agency should not be initiated in a regular court where the agency involved has the authority and the power to approve the act. Though the regular court has jurisdiction, it must yield its jurisdiction to the said agency. If this is not done, a uniform standard of rates would be impossible as the standard would fluctuate and vary, dependendent upon the conclusions reached by the various courts. Phil. Global Comm. V. Relova. When the issue involved is legal and not technical such as the interpretation of law, the courts may take cognizance of the action. Viada v. RTC of Negros Or. Br. 42. [doctrine misapplied] Industrial Ent. v. CA. it may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise specialized skills, and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must be first obtained in an admin proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. Conrad & Co. v. CA. if there is a prejudicial question in the admin case that is determinative of the outcome in the civil case, the court may suspend the civil action pending outcome of the agency’s proceedings BUT this is not exactly an application of DPJ. In the application of DPJ, there must be a concurrence of jurisdiction and the civil court yields its jurisdiction to the administrative body. Phil. Veterans Bank v. CA. Dean’s note: SC was confused as DPJ is not applicable here because there was no concurrence of jurisdiction. Standing to challenge  A threshold issue; not on the merits  Legal interest test has been debunked in favor of injury-in0fact test which requires that injury must not be speculative but imminent  Doctrine of transcendental importance as an exception to requirement of standing is not intellectually satisfying Ursal v. CTA. Where the law provides an enumeration of who may appeal or bring an action, only such person may bring the action

Copied verbatim from UP Law D2012 Administrative Law Finals Reviewer Addition: new cases, some class notes

13 Administrative Law Finals reviewer Dean S. T. Carlota 2 Semester A.Y. 2010-2011 nd

Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano

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Acting Collector v. CTA. The collector has no standing to bring a case because the enabling law (RA 1125) gave an enumeration of those who may appeal Lozada v. COMELEC. A taxpayer’s suit must involve disbursement of tax money. Oposa v. Factoran. The SC affirmed the standing of minors, represented by their parents, to challenge the validity of logging concessions on the basis of the concept of intergenerational responsibility for and right to a balanced and healthful ecology. Joya v. PCGG. Petitioners must be owners of property being sold; taxpayers’ suit must involve disbursement of tax money Kilosbayan v. Guingona. A party’s standing is a procedural technicality which SC may in the exercise of its discretion set aside. Kilosbayan v. Morato. Standing issue is applicable only if constitutional issues are involved. KMU v. Garcia. Transcendental importance invoked. Domingo v. Carague. Petitioners have not shown any direct and personal interest in the COA Organizational Restructuring Plan. There is no indication that they have sustained or are in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its implementation. Assn of Data Processing Service Org v. Camp. The “legal interest” test goes to the merits. The question of standing is different, it concerns, apart from the “case” or “controversy” test, the question whether the interest sought to be protected by complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question. Sierra Club v. Morton. “Injury-in-fact” test requires that the party seeking review be himself injured. Simon v. Easter Kentucky. To establish standing, it must be shown that their injury is a consequence of petitioners action. Lujan v. NWF. “zone of interest” test = recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment are among the sorts of interest that FLPMA & NEPA are designed to protect. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife. 3 elements of the constitutional minimum of standing: 1. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury-in-fact,” an invasion of a legally protected interest which is concrete and particularized; and actual or imminent and not conjectural or hypothetical 2. Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury an the conduct complained of. The injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and not the result of an independent action of some 3 rd party not before the court. 3. Third, it must be “likely” as opposed to merely “speculative” that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision  The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements E. Ripeness  Ripeness v. EAR o Ripeness – question deals with rule-making and policy-making functions of an admin agency o EAR – question applies only to QJA functions  Ripeness may by views as an exception to the applicability of EAR.  Tests: o Fitness test – legal issue involved o Hardship test – petitioner will suffer injury Abbott v. Gardner. The ripeness doctrine’s basic rationale is to prevent courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over admin policies and also to protect the agencies from judicial interferences until an admin decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging party  Fitness for judicial decision  the issues are appropriate for judicial resolution ::: (1) all parties agree that the issue tendered is a purely legal one; (2) the regulations are ‘final agency action’ within the meaning if the APA.  As to effect of withholding court consideration  the impact of the regulations upon the petitioners is sufficiently direct and immediate as to render the issue appropriate for judicial review at this stage. NALCC v. Schultz. The issue of ripeness not only involves an inquiry into the finality but also to the presumption of reviewability.  General Ripeness Considerations: (1) WON there is congressional intent negative to judicial review (2) The possibility of the courts entangling themselves in abstract disagreement over admin policies due to premature adjudication (3) The fitness of issues for judicial determination and hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration Modes of Judicial Review A. Provisions 1987 Const. Art IX-A Sec. 7. Constitutional Commissions -- Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members, any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. BP 129, Sec. 9. Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals 1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction; 2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgements of Regional Trial Courts; and 3. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commission, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social ecurity Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, Except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph 4 of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or Appeals must be continuous and must be completed within three (3) months, unless extended by the Chief Justice. Book VII, Sec. 25, Admin Code of 1987. Rule 43. Section 1. Scope. – This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law. Sec. 2. Cases not covered. – This Rule shall not apply to judgments or final orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines. Sec. 3. Where to appeal. – An appeal under this Rule may be taken to the Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner herein provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. Sec. 4. Period of appeal. – The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the award, judgment, final order or resolution, or from the date of its last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a quo. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket fee before the

Copied verbatim from UP Law D2012 Administrative Law Finals Reviewer Addition: new cases, some class notes

14 Administrative Law Finals reviewer Dean S. T. Carlota 2 Semester A.Y. 2010-2011 nd

Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano

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expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days. Sec. 5. How appeal taken. – Appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition for review in seven (7) legible copies with the Court of Appeals, with proof of service of a copy thereof on the adverse party and on the court or agency a quo. The original copy of the petition intended for the Court of Appeals shall be indicated as such by the petitioner. Upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner shall pay to the clerk of court of the Court of Appeals the docketing and other lawful fees and deposit the sum of P500.00 for costs. Exemption from payment of docketing and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs may be granted by the Court of Appeals upon a verified motion setting forth valid grounds therefor. If the Court of Appeals denies the motion, the petitioner shall pay the docketing and other lawful fees and deposit for costs within fifteen (15) days from notice of the denial Sec. 6. Contents of the petition. The petition for review shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the case, without impleading the court or agencies either as petitioners or respondents; (b) contain a concise statement of the facts and issues involved and the grounds relied upon for the review; (c) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies of such material portions of the record referred to therein and other supporting papers; and (d) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42. The petition shall state the specific material dates showing that it was filed within the period fixed herein. Sec. 7. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. – The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. Sec. 8. Action on the petition. The Court of Appeals may require the respondent to file a comment on the petition, not a motion to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice, or dismiss the petition if it finds the same to be patently without merit, prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration. Sec. 9. Contents of comment. The comment shall be filed within ten (10) days from notice in seven (7) legible copies and accompanied by clearly legible certified true copies of such material portions of the record referred to therein together with other supporting papers. The comment shall (a) point out insufficiencies or inaccuracies in petitioner’s statement of facts and issues; and (b) state the reasons why the petition should be denied or dismissed. A copy thereof shall be served on the petitioner, and proof of such service shall be filed with the Court of Appeals. Sec. 10. Due course. If upon the filing of the comment or such other pleadings or documents as may be required or allowed by the Court of Appeals or upon the expiration of the period for the filing thereof, and on the basis of the petition or the records the Court of Appeals finds prima facie that the court or agency concerned has committed errors of fact or law that would warrant reversal or modification of the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to be reviewed, it may give due course to the petition; otherwise, it shall dismiss the same. The findings of fact of the court or agency concerned, when supported by substantial evidence, shall be binding on the Court of Appeals. Sec. 11. Transmittal of record. Within fifteen (15) days from notice that the petition has been given due course, the Court of Appeals may require the court or agency concerned to transmit the original or a legible certified true copy of the entire record of the proceeding under review. The record to be transmitted may be abridged by agreement of all parties to the proceeding. The Court of Appeals may require or permit subsequent correction of or addition to the record. Sec. 12. Effect of appeal. The appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to be reviewed unless the Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just. Sec. 13. Submission for decision. If the petition is given due course, the Court of Appeals may set the case for oral argument or require the parties to submit memoranda within a period of fifteen (15) days from notice. The case shall be deemed submitted for decision upon the filing of the last pleading or memorandum required by these Rules or by the Court of Appeals. Certiorari  Function – to set aside a judgment or final order as null and void  Requisites: o There must be grave abuse of discretion o It must pertain to performance of adjudicative and not ministerial functions o Ther must be no SPA remedy in the ordinary course of law.  Rule 45 v. Rule 65: R45 involves purely questions of law. St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC. Special Civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for the judicial review of NLRC decisions Police Commission v. Bello. While findings of fact of administrative bodies are entitled great weight and should not generally be disturbed, there is grave abuse of discretion justifying the issuance of the writ of certiorari when there is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgments as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility amounting to an evasion of positive duty, or to virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. Purefoods v. NLRC. Certiorari will only lie if there is no appeal or any other PSA remedy in the ordinary course of law | An error of juedgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctible through the original civil action of certiorari. Azores v. SEC. in a petition for certiorari, inquiry is into errors of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion, not errors of judgment. Villaruel v. NLRC. Certiorari does not include a correction of its evaluation of evidence but is confined to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Gen. Foods, Inc. Policy and practice of the Court  to respect conclusions of QJA sans an abuse or improvident exercise of authority. Cruz v. Gangan. Findings of fact of an administrative agency must be respected so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Hadji-Sirad v. CSC. As we have held in numerous cases, a special civil action for certiorari is not a substitute for a lost or lapsed remedy of appeal. Prohibition  Function – to bar an action  Grounds are the same as certiorari [GAD, no PSA remedy]  Character of proceedings: o Certiorari – acts in the performance of QJ Functions o Prohibition – acts both in the performance of QJ and admin/ministerial functions Chua Hiong v. Deportation Board. Exception to the general rule that defense of citizenship must be proven in the deportation proceeding. || general rule: present evidence to support defense of citizenship in the deportation proceeding || Exceptions: He can immediately seek judicial intervention when: (a) there is GAD; (b) there is absolute or substantial evidence to prove Filipino citizenship; (c) only in sound discretion of a competent court in a proper proceeding. Co v .Deportation Board. [reiteration of Chua Hiong] Simon v. CHR. Prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done. Paredes v. CA. Prohibition is granted only in cases where no other remedy is available which is sufficient to afford redress. Mandamus  Function – to compel performance of an act enjoined by law or to abstain from an act.

Copied verbatim from UP Law D2012 Administrative Law Finals Reviewer Addition: new cases, some class notes

15 Administrative Law Finals reviewer Dean S. T. Carlota 2 Semester A.Y. 2010-2011 nd

Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano

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 Requisites: o Act must be ministerial, not discretionary o Petitioner must show a clear legal right to the relief o There is no other PSA remedy in the ordinary course of law. Blanco v. Board of Examiners. Mandamus is not proper when act sought involves discretionary duty of public officer. Ng Gioc Liu v. Sec. of Foreign Affairs. Issuance of VISA not a ministerial function, therefore, not controllable by mandamus. Policarpio v. Phil. Veterans Bd. Mandamus does not lie to review or control the action or decision of a pension board or other board or officer having authority over pension matters, where the action or decision is one resting in the discretion of such board or officer or where it involves the construction of the law and the application of the facts thereto. Tan v. Veterans Backpay Commission. Duty becomes ministerial after certain facts are established; therefore, they may be subject to Mandamus. Province of Pangasinan v. Reparations Commission. R65S3: Mandamus will lie (1) in case any tribunal unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty; (2) in case any corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station and (3) in case any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is legally entitled and there is no other PSA remedy in the ordinary course of law. MERALCO Securities v. Savellano. Mandamus only lies to enforce the performance of a ministerial act or duty and not to control the performance of a discretionary power. Cruz v. CA. petitioner must have a clear legal right that may be enforced by mandamus. PRC v. de Guzman. Writ of mandamus = legal remedy for a legal right. E. Declaratory Relief Azajar v. Ardalles. Citizenship cannot be determined in a complaint for declaratory judgment or relief. De Borja v. Villadolid. General purpose of declaratory relief: provde for adjudication of the legal rights, duties, or status or respective parties. NDSC v. Meer. Petition for DR not proper where taxpayer questions his liability for payment of any tax, duty or charge collectible under any law administer by Customs or BIR. Mirando v. Wellington. Requisites for declaratory relief to be proper: 1) justifiable controversy 2) between persons with adverse interest 3) where party seeking declaratory relief must have legal interest in the controversy 4) which is ripe for judicial determination F. Habeas Corpus Mejoff v. Dir. Of Prisons. Too long a detention may justify the issuance of WHC. What constitutes reasonable time depends on the circumstances. Co v. Deportation Board. Exception to primary jurisdiction enjoyed by Deportation Board (or when WHC may be issued) = when judiciary believes there is substantial evidence supporting claim of citizenship Lucien Tran Van Nghia v. Liwag. General rule = release of detained person renders petition for habeas corpus moot and academic; exception = there are restraints attached to his release which precludes freedom of action G. Injunction as provisional remedy Collector v. Reyes. Injunction may be granted by CTA without filing a bond or making a deposit. Pineda v. Lantin. CFI has no jurisdiction to grant injunctive reliefs against the SEC. that power rests exclusively with the SC. Lemi v. Valencia. Instances when courts should grant injunction: in cases of extreme urgency; where petitioner’s right to the writ is clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience are strongly in his favor; where there appears to be a willful invasion of petitioner’s right, the injury inflicted upon him being a continuing one; and where the effect of the mandatory injunction would not be to create a new relation between the parties but solely to re-establish a pre-existing relation between them recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the respondent. Honda v. San Diego. Writ of injunction may be issued against a court only by another court superior in rank to the former. Nocnoc v. Vera. CFI does not have jurisdiction to entertain cases impugning the validity of an award/decision of the WCU, and in the process, enjoin its execution. Extent of Judicial Review  3 major issues on judicial review 1. Availability  General rule: if congress states that the courts should not review, then judicial review is not available  Exceptions: if what the agency did is unconstitutional; if it involves purely questions of law 2. Mode of review 3. Extent or scope of review  Dominant role of substantial evidence rule: findings of fact of an admin agency, when supported by substantial evidence with record considered as a whole, will be respected by the Courts  General rule on questions of discretion: reviewing court will not intervene in the exercise of discretion except when there is GAD  General rule: courts will not review policy questions and political questions [questioning the wisdom of the law], but the courts will review when it is alleged that the acts of the agency are not authorized by law or are inconsistent/goes against the enabling statute A. The Law-Fact distinction Dauan v. Sec. Where circumstantial evidence had to be introduced…the conclusion drawn from the facts is a conclusion of law which the courts may review Reyes vda de Santiago v. Reyes. The employee is presumed to have complied with his regular obligation where the employer provides no proof to the contrary. Aboitiz v. Pepito. Non-controversion of a fact that a person is missing is an admission of that fact, but not of fact of actual death, which is a conclusion of law. B. Question of Law Ortua v. Singson-Encarnacion. Decisions upon a question of fact is conclusive and not subject to review by the courts so long as there is substantial evidence upon which the finding in question could be made. Mejia v. Mapa. Erroneous conclusions, even if affirmed by the Secretary, are subject to judicial review. PP v. Santos. A decision made pursuant to an administrative order which was issued in excess of authority granted is void. Japanese War Notes v. SEC. The interpretation of JWNCA’s Articles of Incorporation involves a question of law reviewable by the courts Ysmael v. CIR. The conclusion of the CIR, drawn from the facts of the case, as to the existence of an ER-EE relationship, is a question of law that may be reviewed by the Court on certiorari O’Leary v. Brown Pacific-Maxon. The standard is that findings are to be accepted unless they are unsupported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole.  “Zone of Special Danger” Test: if the obligations or conditions of employment create a zone of special danger out of which the injury arose, such is deemed as arising out of employment, and therefore, compensable. Okeeffe v. Smith. Inferences are to be accepted unless supported by substantial evidence taken as a whole. C. Question of Fact Gonzales v. VLU. In some cases, the court needs to go over the evidence to determine its substantiality and credibility. Suarnaba v. WCC. Substantial evidence, not conclusive evidence, is sufficient to prove the claim for workman’s compensation.

Copied verbatim from UP Law D2012 Administrative Law Finals Reviewer Addition: new cases, some class notes

16 Administrative Law Finals reviewer Dean S. T. Carlota 2 Semester A.Y. 2010-2011 nd

Janz Hanna Ria N. Serrano

VIII.

Acting Commissioner v. MERALCO. Only errors of law and not rulings on the weight of evidence are reviewable. Banco Filipino v. Monetary Board, BSP. Where the decision is merely based upon pieces of documentary evidence that are not sufficiently substantial and probative for the purpose and conclusion they are presented, the standard of fairness mandated in the due process clause is not met. PAL v. Confessor. Where the issue is the survival of the company, the Court is inclined to review the findings of the Secretary. MERALCO v. NLRC. In admin proceedings, the substantial evidence rule governs, even where the misconduct charged also constitutes a criminal offense. Lameyra v. Pangilinan. It is axiomatic that such findings of fact be supported by substantial evidence German Marine Agencies, Inc. v. NLRC. Findings of fact of NLRC are accorded great respect particularly if they coincide with those of the LA when supported by substantial evidence. Velasquez v. Hernandez. The quantum of proof required in admin proceedings is only substantial evidence. CSC v. Cayobit. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied where there is a reasonable ground to believe that a conclusion is adequately supported, even if the evidence may not be overwhelming. Ombudsman v. Santos. Admin proceedings are governed by the substantial evidence rule. UCC v. NLRB. Upon review, substantial evidence on record must be considered as a whole.  Most important thing in this case: the reviewing court should not be selective in its review of the cases brought before it, but must refer to the entire records as a whole D. Questions of Discretion Laguna Tayabas Bus v. PSC. General rule = court will not substitute its judgment for that of the admin agency | Exceptions [when Court will reverse order]  order is 1) w/o reasonable support in evidence; 2) rendered against law; 3) issued w/o jurisdiction. An erroneous application of the significance of the competing facts does not mean that the agency has abused its discretion. Manila Trading v. Zulueta. An employer cannot be legally compelled to employ a person whose continuance in the service is inimical to the former’s interest. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa La-Suerte v. Noriel. The determination of an essentially factual matter by the BLR Director is entitled to respect. FFW-BM sa UTEX v. Noriel. Where the law sets limits to the exercise of discretion, such must be observed. PLDT v. NTC. Courts should not intervene in the admin process, except upon a very clear showing of serious violation of law or of fraud, personal malice or wanton oppression. Enforcement of Agency Action A. Res Judicata Requisites: 1. The former judgment must be final 2. It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties 3. It must be a judgment on the merits 4. There must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action Ipekdjian v. CTA. Defense of res judicata extends to decisions of bodies upon who judicial powers have been conferred. Nasipit Lumber Co. v. NLRC. Principle of res judicata may not be invoked in labor relations proceedings [non-litigious and summary] Dulay v. Minister of Natural Resources. Res judicata applies as well to judicial and QJ acts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards. PAGIC v. CA. one of the requisites of res judicata is that there must be, among other things, identity of subject matters and causes of action between the 1st and 2nd cases in order that the judgment in the prior case may be a bar to the subsequent one. MERALCO v. Phil. Consumer’s Foundation. Res judicata means a matter adjudged, a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. In res judicata, the judgment in the first action is considered conclusive as to every matter offered and received therein, as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose, and all other matters that could have been adjudged therein. For a claim of res judicata to prosper, the following requisites must concur: 1) there must be a final judgment or order; 2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; 3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and 4) there must be, between the two cases identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action. All requisites are present in the case. B. Writ of Execution; Mandammus Apolega v. Hizon. Duly deputized officials in the Regional Offices of the DOLE have NO authority to issue writs of execution [OLD LAW.] Vda. de Corpuz v. Commanding General, Phil. Army. Mandamus is a proper remedy, when there is no PSA remedy. Ambrosio v. Salvador. CFI cannot issue an injunction against NLRC (same rank) Merano v. Tutaan. NLRC has jurisdiction to review decisions of the LA. Mandamus will not lie. GSIS v. CSC. CSC has the power to enforce or order execution of its decisions, resolutions or orders. Clavano v. HLURB. Execution must conform to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive part of the decision | Where the order or decision is not in harmony with and exceeds the judgment which gives it life, the order has pro tanto no validity.

Copied verbatim from UP Law D2012 Administrative Law Finals Reviewer Addition: new cases, some class notes