Dumping with Examples and case studies

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Introduction The concept of ―dumping‖ in international trade has a long history. Dumping, less than one name or another has been part of the rhetoric of political economy for a long time. Jacob Viner, the first scholar to pull together previous writings on the subject of dumping, noted a sixteenth‐century English writer who charged foreigners with selling paper at a loss to smother the infant paper industry in England. Viner also noted an instance in the seventeenth century in which the Dutch were accused of selling at low prices in the Baltic regions in order to drive out French merchants. He further noted statements made by Alexander Hamilton in debates in the USA in 1791 warning about foreign country practices of underselling competitors in other countries so as to ―…frustrate the first efforts to introduce a business into another by temporary sacrifices, recompensed, perhaps by extraordinary indemnifications of the government of such country…‖ Hamilton further declared that the greatest obstacle encountered by new industries in a young country was the system of export bounties, which foreign countries maintained in order to ―enable their own workmen to undersell and supplant all competitors in countries to which these commodities are sent.‖

Definition:In economics, "dumping" is a kind of predatory pricing, especially in the context of international trade. It occurs when manufacturers export a product to another country at a price either below the price charged in its home market, or in quantities that cannot be explained through normal market competition.

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The definition of dumping according to GATT is: The sale of products for export at a price less than the normal value where normal value means roughly the price for which those same products are sold on the home or exporting market. The concept of dumping seems fair because it is recognized that producers may sell their goods in different markets at different prices and that prices of a goods are influenced by several market forces and may vary at different times. It may be a perfectly legitimized business activity like discounts offered by airlines to students or senior citizens etc. There may not seem anything intrinsically unethical or illegal about dumping.

Meaning:Dumping is an international price discrimination in which an exporter firm sells a portion of its output in a foreign market at a very low price and remaining output at a high price in the home market. Haberler defines dumping as: ―The sale of goods abroad at a price which is lower than the selling price of the same goods at the same time in the same circumstances at home, taking account of differences in transport costs.‖ Viner’s definition is simple. According to him, ―Dumping is price discrimination between two markets in which the monopolist sells a portion of his produced product at a low price and the remaining part at a high price in the domestic market,‖ Besides, Viner explains two other types dumping. One, reverse dumping in which foreign price is higher than the domestic price. This is done to turn out foreign competitors from the domestic market. When the product is sold at a price lower that cost of production in the domestic market, it is called reverse dumping. Two, when there is no consumption of the commodity in the domestic market and it is sold in two different foreign markets, out of which one market is charged a high price and the other market a low

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price. But in practice, dumping means selling of a product at high price in the domestic market and a high price in the foreign market.

Overview:A standard technical definition of dumping is the act of charging a lower price for a good in a foreign market than one charge for the same good in a domestic market. This is often referred to as selling at less than "fair value". Under the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement, dumping is condemned (but is not prohibited) if it causes or threatens to cause material injury to a domestic industry in the importing country. The term has a negative connotation, as advocates of competitive markets see "dumping" as a form of protectionism. Furthermore, advocates for workers and laborers believe that safeguarding businesses against predatory practices, such as dumping, help alleviate some of the harsher consequences of such practices between economies at different stages of development. The Bolkestein directive, for example, was accused in Europe of being a form of "social dumping," as it favored competition between workers, as exemplified by the Polish Plumber stereotype. While there are very few examples of a national scale dumping that succeeded in producing a national-level monopoly, there are several examples of dumping that produced a monopoly in regional markets for certain industries. Ron Chenow points to the example of regional oil monopolies in Titan: The Life of John D. Rockefeller, Sr. where Rockefeller receives a message from Colonel Thompson outlining an approved strategy where oil in one market, Cincinnati, would be sold at or below cost to drive competition's profits down and force them to exit the market.

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Objectives of Dumping:1. To enter into a foreign market dumping may be resorted to make an entry in a foreign market with subsidies being provided by the government

2. To dispose of occasional surplus at a lower price in foreign markets

3. To develop a market in foreign countries by selling at a lower price in the initial stages just as new markets van be developed in the country itself by selling at lower prices.

4. A monopolist also resorts to dumping for the expansion of his industry. When he expands it, he receives both internal and external economies which lead to the application of the law of increasing returns. Consequently, the cost of production of his commodity is reduced and by selling more quantity of his commodity at a lower price in the foreign market, he earns larger profit

5. The monopolist practices dumping in order to develop new trade relations abroad. For this, he sells his commodity at a low price n the new market, thereby establishing new market relations with those countries. As a result, the monopolist increases his production, lowers his costs and earns more profit.

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Effects of dumping:On the importing country

1. Domestic industry might be affected adversely by a decline in sales and profits.

2. If dumping is continued for a longer period, survival of the domestic industry may be threatened.

3. Dumping may create balance of payments problems for the country subjected dumping.

On the Exporting Country 1. It must be presumed that a producer who dumps benefits from doing so, although in the case of promotional and predatory dumping, there is an element of risk in that the ultimate benefits, on which the loss‐making export sales are premised, may not materialize.

2. Provided its home market is shielded against arbitrage or retaliation, and consequent price drop (which would neutralize the discrimination), dumping can have clear advantages for the individual exporter.

3. A profitable home market provides a platform which may be used to operate in export markets at prices much lower than could have been possible without market segregation.

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4. The low export prices generate further sales which in turn lower the cost of production, an advantage which benefits both export and home sales.

5. Dumping can still have beneficial effects on the dumper even in situations where home market sales are made at a loss.

6. As long as the dumper covers fixed costs, export sales can be priced as low as variable cost, a strategy which permits production and employment to be maintained in a recession or enables the dumper to obtain considerable advantages when going for economies of scale.

Advantages of Dumping:The main advantage of dumping is being able to sell at unfairly competitive lower price. Generally a country will have to give the exporting businesses a huge subsidy to enable them to sell the export below cost. The country is willing to take a loss on the product to increase its comparable advantage in that industry. It may do this because it wants to create jobs for its residents. It often uses dumping as an attack on the other country's industry, in the hopes of putting that country's producers out of business, and dominating that industry.

Disadvantage of Dumping:-

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The main disadvantage of dumping is that it's very expensive to maintain. It can take years for dumping to work. Meanwhile, the cost of subsidies can add to the export country's sovereign debt. The second disadvantage is retaliation by the trade partner. This can lead to trade restrictions and tariffs. The third is censure by international trade organizations, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the European Union (EU).

Types of dumping:-

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Sporadic Dumping: Occasional sale of a commodity at below cost in order to unload an unforeseen and temporary surplus of the commodity without having to reduce domestic prices.

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Predatory Dumping: Temporary sale of a commodity at below cost or a lower price abroad in order to derive foreign producers out of business, after which prices are raised to take advantage of the monopoly power abroad.

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Persistent Dumping: Continuous tendency of a domestic monopolist to maximize total profits by selling the commodity at a higher price in the domestic market than internationally (to meet the competition of foreign rivals). For international price discrimination to take place, conditions must be met: o

Domestic and foreign markets must be separated.

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Demand elasticity of the product must be different in two markets. The good can be sold with a lower price where the demand elasticity is high; and with a higher price where demand elasticity is low.

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Historical Dumping Country wise

Dumping by Germany:-

There is general agreement that before 1914, export dumping was more widespread and more systematically practiced in Germany than any other country. The resort to export dumping by Germany seems to have been facilitated by the high tariffs and by the complete organization of large scale industry into cartels or industrial selling and buying combinations. These two factors monitored price competition in the domestic market. Cartels monitored price competition from outside Germany and the combinations monitored the German producers themselves. In concert, they made it possible for many of the cartels to adopt as a definite price policy the maintenance of domestic prices at the foreign level plus the full amount of the German import duties and the sale for exports at best prices obtainable, even if these should be substantially below domestic prices. It is obvious that systematic and continued dumping is not likely to arise if the dumping concern must share the higher domestic prices with the competitors and must bear by itself the cost of the export dumping.

The cartel method in Germany provided the machinery whereby, without the loss of individuality of the separate concerns, the benefits and burdens of export dumping could be equitably distributed among the domestic producers. The effects of the protective tariff were such that foreign competitors were prevented from sharing in the high domestic prices resulting from the price fixing activities of the cartels. However, export dumping by German industries and especially by the iron and steel trade began in the nineteenth century, long before the establishment of cartels. Since 1914, writers have always made the charge hostile to Germany and all her works that much of the German dumping was actuated by predatory motives. Some writers have gone so far as finding ―a manifestation of a deep laid conspiracy

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between the German government and industry to destroy the competing industries of foreign countries.‖

Dumping in the United States of America:Since the late eighties of the nineteenth century, export dumping on a continued and systematic scale has been a common practice of American manufacturers. There is according to Viner, immeasurable evidence available both in official and nonofficial sources, which is conclusive in this respect, and which further demonstrates beyond doubt that a substantial fraction of the American export trade in manufactured commodities had, before 1914, been developed and maintained on the basis of sale at dumping prices. The abundance of evidence is more significant and convincing because American exporters who resorted to dumping generally endeavored to conceal their export prices from the general public. Export price lists and quotations were carefully kept out of domestic circulation. In 1902, a Committee of the Democratic Party seeking campaign material succeeded in obtaining from a foreign subscriber a copy of the discount sheet of an American journal, which contained the lowest export prices. A New York Tariff Reform pamphlet, published in 1890, presented many instances of dumping. What followed was a buildup of evidence of the prevalence of dumping.25 In the USA, the systematic and continued practice of dumping appears to have been largely either confined to the dominant concerns (trusts) of the staple industries or to manufacturers of specialties. In other countries, and especially Germany, even the smallest concerns participated in exportation at reduced prices through their membership in cartels or producer’s combinations and through the use of export bounties.

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Antidumping and Its purpose on International trade (For Reference):

Dumping is said to occur when the goods are exported by a country to another country at a price lower than its normal value. This is an unfair trade practice which can have a distortive effect on international trade. Anti dumping is a measure to rectify the situation arising out of the dumping of goods and its trade distortive effect. Thus, the purpose of anti dumping duty is to rectify the trade distortive effect of dumping and re-establish fair trade. The use of anti dumping measure as an instrument of fair competition is permitted by the WTO. In fact, anti dumping is an instrument for ensuring fair trade and is not a measure of protection per se for the domestic industry. It provides relief to the domestic industry against the injury caused by dumping.

While permitted by the WTO, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (Article VI) allows countries the option of taking action against dumping. The Anti-Dumping Agreement clarifies and expands Article VI, and the two operate together. They allow countries to act in a way that would normally break the GATT principles of binding a tariff and not discriminating between trading partners—typically anti-dumping action means charging extra import duty on the particular product from the particular exporting country in order to bring its price closer to the ―normal value‖ or to remove the injury to domestic industry in the importing country. There are many different ways of calculating whether a particular product is being dumped heavily or only lightly. The agreement narrows down the range of possible options. It provides three methods to calculate a product’s ―normal value‖. The main one is based on

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the price in the exporter’s domestic market. When this cannot be used, two alternatives are available—the price charged by the exporter in another country, or a calculation based on the combination of the exporter’s production costs, other expenses and normal profit margins and the agreement also specifies how a fair comparison can be made between the export price and what would be a normal price.

Procedures in investigation and litigation:Detailed procedures are set out on how anti-dumping cases are to be initiated, how the investigations are to be conducted, and the conditions for ensuring that all interested parties are given an opportunity to present evidence. Anti-dumping measures must expire five years after the date of imposition, unless a review shows that ending the measure would lead to injury. Generally speaking, an anti-dumping investigation usually develops along the following steps: domestic producers make a request to the relevant authority to initiate an anti-dumping investigation. Then investigation to the foreign producer is conducted to determine if the allegation is valid. It uses questionnaires completed by the interested parties to compare the foreign producer's (or producers') export price to the normal value (the price in the exporter’s domestic market, the price charged by the exporter in another country, or a calculation based on the combination of the exporter’s production costs, other expenses and normal profit margins). If the foreign producer's export price is lower than the normal price and the investigating body proves a causal link between the alleged dumping and the injury suffered by the domestic industry, it comes to a conclusion that the foreign producer is dumping its products. According to Article VI of GATT, dumping investigations shall, except in special

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circumstances, be concluded within one year and in no case more than 18 months after initiation. Anti-dumping measures must expire five years after the date of imposition, unless a review shows that ending the measure would lead to injury. Anti-dumping investigations are to end immediately in cases where the authorities determine that the margin of dumping is, de minimis, or insignificantly small (defined as less than 2% of the export price of the product). Other conditions are also set. For example, the investigations also have to end if the volume of dumped imports is negligible (i.e., if the volume from one country is less than 3% of total imports of that product—although investigations can proceed if several countries, each supplying less than 3% of the imports, together account for 7% or more of total imports). The agreement says member countries must inform the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices about all preliminary and final anti-dumping actions, promptly and in detail. They must also report on all investigations twice a year. When differences arise, members are encouraged to consult each other. They can also use the WTO’s dispute settlement procedure.

Measures of Antidumping:-

Dumping must be distinguished from simple practices of low-price sales resulting from lower costs or greater productivity. The key criterion in this respect is not, in fact, the relationship between the price of the exported product and that on the market of the country of import, but the relationship between the price of the exported product and its normal value. A product is therefore considered to be dumped if its export price to the European Union (EU) is less than

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the comparable price for a like product established in the ordinary course of trade within the exporting country.

The normal value to be taken into account to determine if there is dumping is usually based on the prices paid or payable, in the ordinary course of trade, by independent customers in the exporting country.

However, where the exporter in the exporting country does not produce or does not sell a like product, the normal value may be established on the basis of prices of other sellers or producers. In addition, when there are no or insufficient sales of the like product in the ordinary course of trade (for example, sales by a company with a monopoly) or where because of the particular market situation such sales do not permit a proper comparison, the normal value may be calculated on the basis of the cost of production in the country of origin.

In the case of imports from non-market economy countries, the normal value is determined on the basis of the price or constructed value in a market economy third country, or the price from this country to other countries, or where those are not possible, on any other reasonable basis.

The second basis of comparison, the relationship with the normal value in the country of origin which determines the dumping margin, is the export price. This is the price actually paid or payable for the product when sold for export to the EU.

In cases where there is no export price or where the price is set under an association or a compensatory arrangement between the exporter and the importer or a third party, any reference to the export price becomes impossible. It may therefore be constructed on the basis of the price at which the imported products are first resold to an independent buyer, or, if the products are not resold to an independent buyer, or are not resold in the condition in which

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they were imported, on any reasonable basis. In these cases, adjustments are made to take account of all costs incurred between importation and resale as well as for profits accruing.

India tops list of Final anti-dumping measures: WTO India initiated the largest number of fresh anti-dumping investigations and final measures while there has been a sharp drop worldwide in the number of new probes during January and June 2007, a WTO report has said.

Among the 150 WTO members, India tops the chart of applications of final anti-dumping measures with 16 cases, which is exactly the double of eight new measures it reported during the corresponding period in 2006, the WTO report said.

Even in the case of new initiations of investigations, India reported with the maximum number with 13, followed by New Zealand (6), South Korea (5) and Brazil, China and Japan (4 each).

However, the total number of new initiations declined for all these countries. China is far below India in terms of imposing final measures with five cases.

In the developed world, EU reported six such cases and the US three. "Products exported from China remained the most frequent subject of new measures accounting for 22 of the 57 new measures reported for the first half of 2007 compared with 15 new measures on products from China during the corresponding period of 2006," the report said.

Anti-dumping measures are resorted to by a nation when it finds that an country is dumping its goods at a price that is much less than a fair price and could be injurious to the domestic industry. PTO

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India, Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand each were subjected to three new measures during the first half of 2007.

Sector-wise, products in the chemicals sector are the most frequent subject of fresh measures accounting for 12 of the 57. Products in the textiles sector are in second place, with 11 new measures. The base metals sector was in third place, with nine new measures .Of the 12 new measures on products in the chemicals sector, India applied eight, China three and the US one. Reflecting a drop in the anti-dumping measures, 13 WTO members reported initiating 49 new investigations, compared with 92 initiations in the corresponding period of 2006.

A total of 16 members applied 57 new final anti-dumping measures during the first half of current calendar yeast compared to 71 new measures reported by 15 members a year ago

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Case Study, Questionnaires and Answers Through this project, the researcher plans to bring to light the two sides of dumping and answer the following question:

1. Chapter I: An economic analysis on dumping: Why do firms dump products? What are the benefits of dumping?

2. Chapter II: A legal perspective on anti-dumping: Why are Anti-dumping laws enacted and what is the reasoning behind the legislations of the WTO/GATT to curb predatory pricing and dumping?

3. Chapter III: The concluding chapter shall deal with the EC Bed Linen Case: A case of antidumping filed by the EU against India. Here, all the legal loopholes and economic issues that this landmark case has raised in the Anti-dumping agreement under GATT and how does it affect the Indian producers shall be questioned and answered.

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Chapter I An economic analysis on dumping: Why do firms dump products? What are the benefits of dumping? Answer: The rhetoric of anti-dumping is that it disciplines unfair trade practices. The agreement specifies that price discrimination is an unfair trade practice if it causes injury to domestic industry. However, economists argue that without showing predatory intent, price discrimination cannot be held to be an unfair trade practice. Since there is no such pre-requisite of anti-dumping use, it itself is an unfair trade practice that blocks fair competition.

Benefits of dumping on the exporting country:1. It finds market for its surplus production

2. By exporting more, it is able to strengthen its balance of payments position

3. Consumers in the importing country benefit as they have to pay lower prices for whatever they purchase of the commodity dumped.

4. Dumping benefits the consumers in the importing country who can buy the products at cheaper rates. The losers are the consumers in the exporting country.

5. Dumping may also be caused by what is known as transitional dumping. It occurs when an exporter needs to price below marginal cost in order to maximize sales and

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expand market share. In this case below cost-pricing is a kind of investment in the marketing of the product to reap profits in the long run. Because this may require fixing price below marginal cost, it may be treated as predatory pricing. Yet, clearly it is not.

6. Originally designed as a weapon against predatory and powerful companies, the role of anti-dumping measures has changed from ensuring fair competition to protecting inefficient competitors. They are being increasingly used against efficient producers; especially from developing countries.

7. Confronted with such situations developing countries like China are formulating their own anti-dumping legislations.

The bias in the definition of dumping favors the party imposing anti-dumping duties. Dumping is considered to exist if the export price of a product is less than the comparable price of the product or like-product in the domestic market in the ordinary course of trade. However, when the average export and product prices of a product are calculated, domestic sales prices below total cost are considered beyond the ordinary course of trade and therefore excluded, while all export prices are included, thus artificially raising the level of domestic price. This is a discrepancy in the calculation of dumping, and thus even in cases where there is no dumping, according to the strict definition of dumping as per the GATT Anti-dumping agreement, it will be considered as dumping and anti-dumping measures will be unfairly levied on the producer; whilst in true cases of dumping, a producer might be exempted from the anti-dumping measures. Thus this arbitrariness in the calculation of dumping makes anti-dumping an unfair mechanism that randomly levies duties on innocent producers or exempts the real dumping producers, due to non-

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uniformity in the application of the anti-dumping rule.

Also, if no home market price can be found, the sales price in a third country surrogate country can be used for comparisons. Since different countries have varying levels of economic development and comparative advantages in different sectors, the arbitrary choice of a third country may easily lead to the definition of dumping.

Furthermore, when neither home country nor a third country price is available, a constructed value is used which is the sum of material and labor costs of production plus administrative, selling and general costs plus profit. As items such as administrative costs and profits vary greatly among countries and companies, it is not difficult to see the inherent subjectivity of the approach.

Sometimes, selling below total cost is a normal business practice, and not necessarily dumping. According to the theory of micro-economics, so long as the price is above average variable cost of production, a firm has incentives to continue production in the short run, in order to minimize losses on fixed investment, in the hope that the market situation will improve later to bring it back to profit. The duration of these short periods may vary from firm to firm. When a product enters a foreign market the exporting firm may have to sell below total cost of production to attract consumers or to meet the existing competition without any intention to dominate the market, especially if the product does not enjoy the same established reputation as similar products in the market. It is unreasonable to subject such business practices which are normal within many countries to anti-dumping charges when foreign companies are involved.

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According to the Uruguay Round of anti-dumping code, an importing country can only apply for anti-dumping duties when it is demonstrated that the dumped imports have indeed caused injury to domestic industries.

Yet too often in reality either due to the complexities of the issues involved or to protectionist considerations, anti-dumping authorities determine dumping without carefully considering whether the difficulties of domestic producers resulted from their own efficiency or inefficiency or from the allegedly dumped products. The consequent imposition of anti-dumping duties tends to penalize the most efficient foreign producers.

The problems associated with anti-dumping rules are also related to the rules of origin. In a world with increasingly globalizing tendencies and production, a product may be the result of production in many countries. As there is no substantive multilaterally agreed rules of origin, the same product can be considered to have different origins by different countries. Therefore even if dumping has been correctly determined it may be difficult to find who the party at fault is.

The application or abuse of lax anti-dumping rules penalizes foreign producers who enjoy comparative advantages, to the benefit of inefficient domestic producers. It also increases uncertainty in international trade, thus acting as a deterrent against potential foreign competitors.

But foreign producers are not the only victims. The importers and industrial users of the product in the country imposing the anti-dumping duties may become less competitive

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due to higher prices caused by such measures. Consumers have to pay more for similar products. As anti-dumping rules vary for different countries, their complaints may not be adequately represented. Even if some anti-dumping legislation requires consideration of the views of these groups, the theory of political economy tells us that it is unlikely for these diverse groups to be as vociferous as the concentrated producers of an industry in lobbying activities.

The abuse of anti-dumping rules hits the developing countries harder whose exports are increasingly subject to such measures in recent years. Due to their less diversified economies, the developing countries enjoy comparative advantage in only a few sectors. If the export of their competitive products is obstructed by anti-dumping measures, their foreign exchange earnings and even economic development may be negatively affected.

Furthermore, as they lack financial resources and experienced personnel on antidumping law, the expenses that their exports have to pay for dealing with anti-dumping cases increases. For developing or transitional economies undertaking economic reforms, anti-dumping duties on exports already priced by market forces only serve to hinder their painful process towards a full market economy and to create cynicism about the western preaching of free trade.

If an importing country finds that a trade partner subsidizes its exports, it can invoke multilaterally agreed countervailing measures designed for this purpose. If due to some unforeseen developments an industry of an importing country is seriously injured with a flood of imports, the country can take measures to protect domestic producers in accordance with WTO agreement on safeguards. Anti-dumping measures are not an

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effective cure for difficult market access in another country either, because they do not tackle the problem at its source.

A number of economists argue for scrapping the anti-dumping agreement altogether. They maintain that unless the anti-dumping laws seek to check predatory pricing the application of the laws is welfare reducing. By seeking to protect domestic producers who cannot face foreign competition the consumers are put to a loss. They argue that domestic consumers benefit from low prices and if the import market is perfectly competitive, the benefits to consumers outweigh the losses to domestic producers.

The current anti-dumping agreement imposes no substantive obligations on the authorities to take the broader public interest into account. Many countries have recommended that investigating authorities must consider public interest before imposing anti-dumping duties. It is not fair that the consumers be asked to pay the price for no commitment on the part of the domestic producers even in the future to be able to take care of their interests.

However, it must be noted that public interest is not consumer interest alone. It is a much wider term which covers in its ambit the general social welfare taking into account the larger interest of various stake holders.

Sporadic dumping is when the producer intends to dispose of the casual overstock of the producers. Sales in the specified period may not be as good as expected and the producer finds himself with surplus stock. He finds it difficult to either dispose it off in the domestic market or to hold it for the next season for various reasons. He therefore

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tries to sell it in the foreign markets at lower prices to recover some cost, which results in dumping. Sporadic dumping may be unintentional. It could be due to currency fluctuations or due to inexperience of the exporters.

Also, in sporadic dumping there is an occasional sale of a commodity at lower costs abroad to unload an unforeseen and temporary surplus of the commodity without having to reduce domestic prices, and persistent dumping which may prove to be benefit to a nation since if the producer faces different marginal cost and marginal revenue lines in each market, then it pays to charge different prices in each market. Thus, even though the foreign markets will not be monopolized, the anti-dumping duties will cause severe losses of producer surplus.

Also, in countries like USA, according to their Robinson-Patman Act, selling of goods at unreasonably low prices to drive out competition is prohibited and anti-dumping duties are slapped on firms even if the impact on these competing firms is negligent and temporary. Thus, even though antitrust laws are meant to protect competition, antidumping laws are wrongly used for the same purpose because of the simple reason that any firm would be better off without competition.

An important reason why anti-dumping laws are abused is to obtain protectionist outcomes is the definition often used to label acts as acts of dumping. According to this definition, a firm is dumping if it sells its products abroad below fair market value i.e. the average price of the product in its home market. Thus, even if it charges a competitive price for its products in the foreign country, just because they may be lower than their home market prices because of several price determining factors such as markets,

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demand, tariffs, advertising and selling costs, domestic taxes, skewed market functioning and corruption amongst producers leading to artificial deviances in prices or the company simply having lower cost of production than its foreign counterparts, a company is allegedly dumping. The principal argument against this practice is that if price discrimination is accepted as a valid measure domestically, how can it be called dumping merely because it is done internationally?

Also, the definition of dumping doesn’t consider the fact that normal values of goods may differ from time to time. Thus, one cannot just compare the face value of the prices of the good in the two countries to determine the dumping margin and impose a similar anti-dumping duty on the imports. Additionally, because it is often difficult to prove that foreign firms charge higher prices to domestic than export customers, many a times a supposedly fair price based on estimates of foreign production costs is used to calculate the dumping margins. This a fair price can interfere with perfectly legal business practices such firms willingly incurring losses to sell its goods and simultaneously reducing its costs through experience or making an entry into a new market. The WTO rules do not define market economy conditions. Thus, each member has broad discretion in setting the conditions in antidumping allegations and taking advantage of these loopholes to demand protection.

Since, anti-dumping duties are discriminatory, it implies that the domestic industry can use this instrument to their benefit and target only those foreign firms it views as market rivals. Also, in case of multinational firms, the definitions of domestic and foreign firms are often blurred. Since they produce diverse products, one company may be treated as a domestic firm that seeks protection from dumping, while for another product it may be

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treated as a foreign firm.

The WTO does mandate that the above factors be taken into consideration when determining whether or not dumping is occurring. However, many developing nations and some industrialized nations believe that the most nations do not carry out this obligation in order to gain or keep the political favor of specific groups of voters.

There is still much confusion as to whether countries are actually using WTO standards or not in their dumping investigations. There are many theoretical problems with some anti-dumping procedures. Allegations of unfair investigations abound. The WTO's Antidumping Agreement was made very complex to help to deal with these problems. However, it has become too opaque to be able to correctly determine the validity of some anti-dumping measures; thus arbitrarily imposing anti-dumping charges on efficient and innocent producers, posing to be a serious threat to the international market and jeopardizing the concept of free trade.

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Chapter II A legal perspective on anti-dumping: Why are Anti-dumping laws enacted and what is the reasoning behind the legislations of the WTO/GATT to curb predatory pricing and dumping? Answer:Political reality suggests that any government that attempts to establish or maintain an open import regime must have at hand some sort of pressure valve - some process to manage occasional pressures for exceptional or sector-specific protection. Since the 1980s anti-dumping has served this function. An anti-dumping petition is the usual way in which an industry, plagued with troublesome imports, will request an anti-dumping investigation. It is the way in which the government then provides protection.

Anti dumping is a measure to rectify the situation arising out of the dumping of goods and its trade distortive effect. Thus, the purpose of anti dumping duty is to rectify the trade distortive effect of dumping and re-establish fair trade. The use of anti dumping measure as an instrument of fair competition is permitted by the WTO. In fact, anti dumping is an instrument for ensuring fair trade and is not a measure of protection for the domestic industry. It provides relief to the domestic industry against the injury caused by dumping.

Adam Smith noted that by restraining, either by high duties, or by absolute prohibitions, the importation of such goods from foreign countries as can be produced at home, the monopoly of the home market is more or less secured to the domestic industry employed in producing them. It can be inferred from his writings generally that he was of the view that by imposing duties, imports that harm domestic industries should be discouraged.

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Anti-Dumping is a reactionary measure to the dumping of goods into a foreign market. When a country feels that another country is dumping goods into its economy it may institute anti-dumping measures to protect the interests of the domestic producers of that good. The exponents of anti-dumping justify it on the ground that it is a defense mechanism in the hands of the importing country to safeguard their domestic producers.

The primary justification for anti-dumping measures is the perceived threat of predatory dumping. In an imperfectly competitive and segmented market i.e. where the prices of goods are controlled by firms and not by the market forces, and consumers have minimum access to goods meant for export purposes, respectively, dumping can prove to be profit-maximizing strategy for a monopolist firm. Firms may indulge in predatory dumping, wherein the prices of their goods in the foreign markets are reduced temporarily. The lower price imports could decrease the amount of domestic products purchased, and domestic companies may not be able to lower their prices in order to compete with these imports, driving these local firms out of business. These foreign firms then command the prices, taking advantage of their newly acquired monopolistic status and cause material injury in the form of economic retardations of the locally established industries.

The cumulative effect of these injuries, it is contended, will finally lead to job losses, slowdown of economic growth and spread of non-competitiveness. In such cases it is argued that anti-dumping measures are justified as they protect domestic industries from unfair competition from abroad, help in restoring the domestic economies and may thus prove to be prudent measures. By imposing anti-dumping duties,

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dumped imports are discouraged and domestic firms maximize their own production and profits.

It must be recorded however, that predatory dumping is a rarity because it assumes capital market imperfection and an irregularity in financial resources that favor foreign producers. It also assumes an impossible coordination between firms to precisely calculate when and how much to dump to drive domestic industries out of business. Additionally, since it is difficult to determine whether dumping is predatory or not, domestic producers demand protection against any form of dumping even if it actually not harmful.

From a petitioner point of view, anti-dumping stand out since it is a good instrument to obtain protection because imposing other restrictions like import tariffs or voluntary export restraints are inconsistent with the norms of the WTO and most governments are not open to help domestic producers with protection. Also, anti-dumping producers can disguise their fear of being destroyed by gigantic foreign rivals by asking for protection and accusing these foreign competitors of unfair trade practice.

The main argument advanced for taking an anti-dumping measure against foreign producers is that such a step ensures that national producers get better experience than the foreign firms. It is frequently argued that such industries bring special advantages to a country, either because they enable domestic factors of production to earn higher returns than in other sectors of the economy or because they generate externalities or spill over benefits for the rest of the economy. Anti-dumping policy is the best instrument for achieving these objectives.

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According to them, anti-dumping is an instrument that is necessary as it acts as a safety valve that ensures domestic political support to trade liberalizing initiative. Anti-dumping in their view is the price paid for the maintenance of an open trading system among nations. Anti-dumping is a trade remedy for domestic producers injured by cheap imports.

It is a tool that discourages predatory dumping. Anti-dumping is a GATT/WTO legal tool that is used to grant protection to the import competing domestic industry, which is adversely affected by free trade.

Government imposed trade barriers and government-tolerated anti-competitive practices permit domestic producers to create monopolies in their home market. This enables them to charge a low price in export markets and compensate the loss by charging higher process in the domestic market without attracting foreign entry.

Producers in the importing countries fail to expand capacity, to improve productivity and to use all resources efficiently. The distorted price signals in the market thus stimulate overproduction of the exportable goods and underproduction of importable goods. This in turn leads to a chronic oversupply by inefficient producers on one hand and the closure of otherwise competitive facilities on the other, reducing worldwide efficiency. Antidumping duties restore relative pricing to prevailing world market conditions and hence efficient resource allocation.

The main reason why international price discrimination is usually considered unfair is that a dominant firm, exporting its surplus over domestic profit-maximizing sales at lower

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prices, can benefit from economies of scale in production which its competitors abroad are not able to achieve. Such a system could be sustained as long as its home market remains protected. However, such conduct enhances competition in the export market as long as the firm sets export prices at or above cost. Selling abroad at a loss could only be rational for predatory purposes.

Chapter III The concluding chapter shall deal with the EC Bed Linen Case: A case of antidumping filed by the EU against India. Here, all the legal loopholes and economic issues that this landmark case has risen in the Anti-dumping agreement under GATT and how do it affect the Indian producers? Answer:EC BED LINEN CASE

Possibly the most egregious distortion of dumping, is the practice known as "zeroing."

Zeroing is a concept whereby non-dumped sales are not permitted to offset dumped sales, essentially by setting the value of a negative dumping margin to zero. This is not something dealt with in article VI of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement.

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It is a significant cause of the systemic overestimation of dumping margins and subsequent application of inflated anti-dumping duties. Certainly, the impact of zeroing varies from case to case. If every comparison generates a positive dumping margin, then the prohibition of zeroing will have no impact. But if there are many comparisons generating negative margins, or if there are only a few generating large negative margins, the prohibition of zeroing can have a very substantial impact on the amount of anti-dumping duties ultimately applied.

The EU50 and the US argue that zeroing should be authorized by the WTO. Zeroing of course makes dumping easier to find. But that is an unsatisfactory rationale. The European commission explains that zeroing is needed to combat targeted dumping.• A dumper, it says, may conceal dumping by selling at high prices at other times or places.

However, even if targeted dumping is accepted as a plausible possibility, moreover, the ADA51 allows national authorities to follow unusual trade practices if export prices differ significantly among different purchasers, regions or time periods.•

But, to justify zeroing under that provision of the ADA(Article 2.4.2), the authorities need to explain that zeroing is necessary and helps in tackling issues of targeted dumping.

The practice of zeroing had the effect, in almost every case, of increasing the dumping margin. In many cases, the practice of zeroing also resulted in a dumping margin of more than the threshold of 2 per cent required to maintain an anti-dumping

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proceeding. In fact, in many cases, zeroing generated a margin of dumping where there would otherwise not have been any.

The WTO Appellate Body has now conclusively determined in multiple cases that zeroing is contrary to member countries commitments under the WTO Anti- Dumping Agreement (ADA). Article 2.4.2 of the ADA requires that an investigating authority take into account all comparable export transactions in the calculation of dumping margins.

The WTO Appellate Body held that, by converting negative dumping margins to zero, an investigating authority is not taking into account all export transactions. The Appellate Body thus said that it was impermissible to ignore the effects of negative dumping, i.e., those sales made at un-dumped prices.

Hence, the current stand of the WTO is that zeroing is not a practice in accordance with the provisions of the Anti-dumping agreement, and thus should be not be followed. It is a measure that is fundamentally flawed in many respects and tends to give an unfair disadvantage to innocent producers.

The EC Bed Linen Case:

In September 1996 the European Communities (EC) initiated an anti-dumping case against imports from India of cotton-type bed linen. However, the European Union was split about the case. The reason for support for the action was clear protecting the EU’s fabric weaving sector from low-priced import competition. Equally obvious was

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the reason for opposing the anti-dumping action: jobless companies that consumed the imports which incurred or faced redundancies as a result of the protective remedy.

Because there were so many Indian exporters and producers of the subject merchandise, cotton-type bed linen, the EC elected to analyze dumping from a sample of Indian companies. In determining the home (Indian) market price for bed linen sold by investigated respondents, the EC took the constructed value as a substitute for Normal Value. The reason for using constructed value as a proxy for normal value was a lack of sales made in the ordinary course in the Indian market (the market was not viable). The EC identified five types of cotton bed linen exported to it and also sold in representative quantities in India. However, not all five types were sold in India in the ordinary course of trade. Thus, the EC could not base normal value on prices from these sales, and had to use the constructed value.

The EC established export price from prices actually paid or payable for cotton-type bed linen in the EC market and compared constructed value with export price, computed for each Indian respondent with the dumping margin being the difference between the weighted average constructed prices. In this computation EC applied a zeroing methodology. It deemed any negative dumping margin as zero.

The EC calculated dumping margins for different models (for example- pillowcases and sheets) finding negative dumping margins on a number of them. It then zeroed these to obtain a dumping margin for bed linen.

The panel ruled that the calculation did not take into account of all transactions, as

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WTO rules require it to. The WTO appellant body said that a comparison between export price and normal value does not fully take into account the prices of all comparable export transactions such as the practice of zeroing is not a fair comparison between export price and normal value (the price in the exporters home market)

The Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization has faulted the methods adopted by the European Union in anti-dumping investigations and calculations of dumping and found them to be violative of the WTO’s Anti-Dumping (AD) agreement, and ruled in favor of India, in the EC’s actions against imports of cottontype bed linen from India.

In its ruling, the Appellate Body found fault with the EU Commission, AD investigations and measures such as:

1. The practice of zeroing; i.e. investigating the existence of margins of dumping taking account of the averaging of positive dumping margins in investigated products, but ignoring the cases where there are negative margins and giving a zero value to them instead;

2. Calculating the administrative, selling and general (SG&A) costs and profits by using a method where data applicable to one other exporter or producer is used to apply to all others, and

3. Calculating the amount of profits by excluding sales by other exporters or producers not made in the ordinary course of trade; and

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4. Using all types of bed-linen products - bed sheets, duvet covers and pillow cases, packaged for sale either separately or in sets, and made of cotton-type fibers, pure or mixed with man-made fibers or flax, and bleached, dyed or printed - as a single product competing with like products of the domestic industry, for certain purposes of investigation, but using the various components of the imported product for calculating export price and normal value and averaging them, to establish dumping.

As a final observation about the bed linen cases, the appellate body exposed the hypocrisy of the EC’s argument that bed linens were a single product, but different dumping margins had to be calculated and zeroing had to be used, for different product types.

Despite the considerable leeway provided to the importing countries to invoke the Anti-dumping agreement’s instruments to protect their domestic industry - the WTO dispute settlement panels issuing the rulings shows, the extent of the abuse of the powers and trade harassment by the major industrialized countries, and the long timeperiod before any relief can be obtained by the exporters in such cases.

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Examples of Dumping and Anti-Dumping Dumping EXAMPLE-I Dumping occurs when a surplus of a product exists in one country, allowing exporters to be able to sell that product at a deep discount in other countries, often far below what a local farmer must sell his crop for in order to make a profit. Thus, while a farmer in Chiapas, Mexico may be able to grow corn for, say, $3 a bushel, a U.S. company can export it to Mexico and sell it for $2.20 a bushel (25% below the cost to produce it), allowing the corn to sell on Mexican markets cheaper than domestic corn. Corn is Mexico’s de facto national crop, yet in post-NAFTA Mexico over 25% of the country’s corn market is now imported from America: an eighteen fold increase since the implementation of NAFTA. Under NAFTA, a yearly cap was placed on the amount of allowable amount of corn that the U.S. could export to Mexico. The amount was supposed to increase yearly until by the year 2008 when all limitations are removed. This was intended to facilitate the price of corn in Mexico, which had been above world average, to fall slowly until it was more in line with the price of corn in America and Europe. Unfortunately for the Mexican farmer, this did not occur. Instead of a gradual decrease in the price of corn over fifteen years, the market price collapsed at an astonishing rate until, by 1997, it was equivalent to the world market average—having decreased over 70 percent. In a little over two years, the bottom fell out from beneath the feet of Mexican corn farmers.

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This results in the Mexican farmer, whose field is likely less than five acres in size, not being able to sell his crop for a profit. In turn, this will lead to forced sale of his farm. These former farmers often attempt to cross into the US in hopes of finding a way to earn money. Ironically, they often end up working for the very farm corporations that put them out of business. Thus from the above example of Dumping we can see how it can affect a country’s economy and their residents and the Domestic Market.

EXAMPLE – II Salmon: USA & EU/Chile: Chilean sales of salmon (Salmon is the common name for several species of fish in the family Salmonidae) to the USA are huge–US $2 billion in 2002, and a major contributor to Chile’s economy. Chile is now the second largest salmon and trout farmer in the world, after Norway. The USA is Chile’s most important market, and so trade relations with the USA are critical. The first anti-dumping challenge occurred in mid 1997, when US salmon producers claimed that Chilean government subsidies were allowing producers there to sell below true production cost. This was rejected by the ITC after the Chilean government was able to prove no such distorting subsidies existed. However, fighting this allegation was very expensive though estimated at $22 million, which was paid by Chilean farmers. Chilean companies had to harmonize their accounting systems to accord with US government standards for greater transparency. A further anti-dumping challenge followed, but this time was

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company-specific, setting tariffs at various levels around 5%. However by February 2003, a third US government review had concluded that 90% of Chilean producers should not be subject to duties, and this challenge has now been officially terminated completely. In the EU, there has been a similar claim made against Chilean salmon. In July 2002 Irish and Scottish salmon farmers claimed that Chilean frozen salmon was being sold in the EU at below production cost, so causing a fall in fresh salmon prices. This claim had some difficulties since: (i) Chile accounts for only 5% of EU supplies. (ii) The fall in fresh salmon prices preceded a fall in those of frozen salmon by 6months In February 2003 the Fisheries Commission of the European Parliament terminated the investigation finding no grounds to proceed. Latterly, this issue has been reopened, though, this time the emphasis is on a ―safeguard‖ approach, the arguments being that material damage to the Scottish and Irish salmon farmers has occurred, and that this warrants action against third country imports.

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Anti-Dumping: EXAMPLE - I US beef imports to Mexico While Mexico exports more live cattle to the U.S. than it imports, the U.S. exports beef products back into Mexico in large numbers accounting for over 18% of the U.S. beef market which amounted to over $450 million worth of beef products. The Mexican government, in response to complaints from its farmers, instituted anti-dumping tariffs on US beef products. However, the four major U.S. beef packers are being charged anti-dumping tariffs ranging from zero to 7.6% on bone in and boneless beef products exported to Mexico while all the other U.S. packers must pay 75% on boneless beef and 13% on bone-in beef. In addition, beef offal is hit with a 215% anti-dumping tariff for all American packers except the big four who pay anywhere from 3% to 26% duty on the same products. The measures still exist and American beef packers are still seeking a decision by international trade courts. Some countries institute de facto anti-dumping measures involving packing standards, health standards, or manufacture standards that would prove extremely costly, if not impossible, for some countries to maintain.

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These measures have the same result of monetary anti-dumping measures: they usually result in the decrease of importation of those products into the domestic market. The countries being affected cannot fight such measures as these standards are matters of internal domestic affairs, and the WTO has ruled that countries have to right to enact such laws as ways to ensure the health of citizens.

EXAMPLE-II Imports of Steel Pipes from India to USA The US has imposed a preliminary anti-dumping duty on import of certain types of steel pipes from India, about a month after New Delhi lodged a complaint with WTO against the US for imposing anti-subsidy duties on import of certain Indian steel products. The US Department of Commerce said it has "preliminarily determined" that Indian firms were selling the pipes -- circular welded carbon-quality steel pipe in the US at 48.43 per cent below the fair market value of the product.

"Commerce preliminarily determined that producers/ exporters from India ... sold certain steel pipe in the United States at dumping margins, or margin ranges, of 48.43 per cent," it said.

In the India investigation, the Department said, the mandatory respondent Zenith Birla

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(India) (previously known as Zenith Steel Pipes and Industries) received a preliminary dumping margin of 48.43 per cent.

"There is an existing anti-dumping (AD) order on certain steel pipe from India. Therefore, this investigation covers only merchandise manufactured and/or exported by Zenith Birla...," it said.

The pipe is generally known as standard pipe, fence pipe and tube, sprinkler pipe, and structural pipe.

In 2011, the US imports of pipes from India were estimated at USD 64.6 million. As a result of the preliminary affirmative determinations, the Department "will instruct" US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to require a cash deposit or bond based on these preliminary rates from importers. Last month, India had requested consultations with Washington under the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement system concerning the latter's countervailing duties on certain steel products from India.

In March, the US had imposed preliminary countervailing duties of about 286 per cent on certain steel pipe from India.

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CONCLUSION

The use of anti-dumping measures as a trade protection tool has increased phenomenally during the last decade. One significant aspect of this new trend is the increasing involvement of developing countries. India is one such country which has emerged as a frequent user of anti-dumping measures.

Those in favor of anti-dumping duties argue that it is a tool of protection in the hands of the domestic producers against the cheaper foreign imports. Critics of anti-dumping duties though find it difficult to prove the fact that the imposition of anti-dumping duties results in economic benefits to the domestic industry. Consumers are aggrieved as well, as they feel deprived of the lower costs and availability of variety of goods. The role of the government in tackling the problem of anti-dumping should be to protect the smaller industries rather than concentrating on the major industries. This is because; it is these small scale industries which suffer the most as a result of imposition of anti-dumping duties.

However, safeguarding competition in domestic industry is not the only purpose that antidumping laws serve and in the present situation, they are acting as barriers for free trade and domestic producers are concerned about avoiding competition.

In case of allegations and anti-dumping duties slapped on economically weaker nations, it could result in a stunt of economic growth for these developing countries, as they are unable to develop secure and stable long term industries. Even the threat of imposition of antidumping duties has a serious adverse effect on the functioning of small and medium size firms, resulting in a fall in production, heavy unemployment and declines in incomes and

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increases in poverty levels.

Anti-dumping duties were imposed by developed countries to protect their industries against the low priced imports. Right from the beginning there was a clear division between the fundamental aims of those countries whose exports were most commonly exposed to antidumping action (developing countries) and those which took such action (mostly developed countries). Developing countries wanted anti-dumping rules to be tight and explicit as possible, allowing minimum transparency. Developed countries wanted to retain and even expand their discretion to meet what they saw as being used by companies to get around the present rules of anti-dumping code and thereby cause injury to domestic industry, their proposals tended to be the most radical and controversial.

The wage rate differs from country to country, the economies differ and the demand levels are also different. It is a settled economic fact that firms are guided by profitmaximizing motives. The profits keep increasing till the time that marginal revenue is greater than marginal cost. To allow marginal cost based pricing to adversely affect industry in other countries cannot be justified on social welfare grounds. The capital dumped in the concerned industry and the employment generated by that industry cannot be allowed to go nonfunctional. This is not to say that the industry should be protected at all costs.

The negotiating stance of developing countries like India should be for tightening the agreement. This is because India is a victim if the costs and benefits to different industry segments are assessed at an aggregate level. Even though abolishment of these anti-dumping laws will lead to increased competition, lower prices for consumers, more efficient production, and higher national income, it is unrealistic to hope that the WTO will remove

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this trade device in the near future. But before things become worse, an immediate reform is necessary and the WTO anti-dumping rules need to be amended to allow a more transparent process of investigation and to determine correctly whether the material injury caused is because of dumping or higher competition. The WTO rules need to be formulated so as to target only predatory dumping and not persistent or sporadic dumping. All countries need to have the uniform standards for determination of the dumping margins so as to maintain fairness. While aiming at consumer welfare, it is necessary to justify the use of anti-dumping laws as tools against unfair trade, to reconsider its definition and analyze as to what is essentially fair and what is not and keeping in mind the gross abuse of anti-dumping laws answer the very fundamental question of whether these laws are necessary at all.

As economics, anti-dumping action looks at only half of the economic impact on the domestic economy. It gives standing to import competing domestic interests, but not to domestic users, be they user enterprises or consumers. As politics, it undercuts rather than supports a policy of openness; by giving voice to only the negative impact of trade on domestic interests and by inviting such interests to blame their problems on the "unfairness" of foreigners.

The key characteristic of a sensible safeguard procedure is that it treats domestic interests that would be harmed by an import restriction, equally with those domestic interests that would benefit. The "morality" of the foreign interest is irrelevant - the issue is the plus and minus on the domestic economy. Operationally, this suggestion means simply that what is done in an "injury test," - identification of impact on import competing interests - is repeated for users of imports.

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Some argue that there must be more rigorous anti-dumping rules that must be formulated at the domestic and international level. The notion of predatory pricing must be clearly incorporated in the definition of dumping. The burden of proof of dumping must be placed squarely on the party initiating dumping cases. The implementation of anti-dumping measures should be subject to the close inspection of the WTO. Countries should more amply inform their public of the costs and benefits of anti-dumping measures so as to promote an unbiased and fair public opinion on this matter. These measures would ensure that antidumping laws are fairly applied and assist only those producers who suffer as a result of the low prices, and not arbitrarily affect the production of efficient producers who are not in error.

Bibliography

BOOKS:

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See: Directorate General of Anti-Dumping & Allied Duties Ministry of Commerce, Government of India. INFOFISH: INFOFISH International 4/2003 Charles Woodhouse: Fish Farming International, September, November December 2003 ML Jhingan, International Economics , Vrinda Publication, 2001 Bhala, Raj, International Trade Law: Theory and Practice, Lexis Nexis, 2003

Jackson, John; The World Trading System - Law and Policy of International Economic Relations, The MIT Press, New York, 2nd Edn., 2000

Krugman R. Paul, Maurice Obstfeld, International Economics: theory and policy, 6th ed., Pearson Education: Delhi, 2004.

Vermuslt Edwin, The WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement, Oxford University Press, United Kingdom, 2005

ARTICLES:

From Wikipedia/ Dumping (Pricing Policy)

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From: http://useconomy.about.com/od/glossary/g/Dumping.html See: http://unctad.org/en/docs/edmmisc232add14_en.pdf See: http://www.expressindia.com/latest-news/india-tops-list-of-final-antidumping-measureswto/234827/ , Nov 01, 2007 See: http://www.nri.org/projects/fishtrade/issues-dumping.pdf See: www.globalpolitician.com/23989-business See: http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/us-imposes-antidumping-duty-on-steel-pipe-imports-from-india/articleshow/13491165.cms A. Smith, The Wealth of Nations, sourced online http://www.memoware.com/?screen=doc_detail&doc_id=8811&p=category%5E!Philosophy ~!&sort_by=downloads&start=0 ,

Hindley, Brian, Edwin Vermulst, Zeroing in on Zeroing: Anti-dumping in WTO dispute settlement.

Ikenson, Dan, Zeroing In: Antidumping's Flawed Methodology under Fire, sourced online

M. S. Knoll, Dump Our Anti-Dumping Laws• sourced online from R.L. Varshney, Antidumping duties and WTO, Chartered Secretary, 1, Vol. 32, 2002

S. Wittayarungruangsri, Antidumping: A Villain in International Trade sourced from http://economics.about.com/cs/moffattentries/a/antidumping.html.

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Zhu Xiaohua, Anti-dumping measures: time to roll them back, Economic and Political Weekly, 18, Vol. 32, 1997

Anonymous, Dump Anti-dumping, sourced online

http://www.ogilvyrenault.com/en/ResourceCenter/ResourceCenterDetails.aspx?id=1011&pId =3

http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm#introduction

http://commerce.nic.in/Anti-Dum.PDF

See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm#introduction, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

Zhu Xiaohua, Anti-dumping measures: time to roll them back, Economic and Political Weekly, 18, Vol. 32, 1997, at p 936

Goel, Ravinder, Reforming the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement in National Interest, Chartered Secretary, 12, Vol. 32, 2002, at p 1685

S. Wittayarungruangsri, Antidumping: A Villain in International Trade sourced from http://economics.about.com/cs/moffattentries/a/antidumping.html.

Anonymous, Dump Anti-dumping, sourced online

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A. Smith, The Wealth of Nations sourced from http://www.memoware.com/?screen=doc_detail&doc_id=8811&p=category%5E!Philosophy ~!&sort_by=downloads&start=0 ,

M. S. Knoll Dump Our Anti-Dumping Laws sourced from http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-011.html

See Rai, Sheela, Anti-dumping measures under GATT and WTO, Eastern Book Company: Lucknow,2004

Dan Ikenson, Zeroing In: Antidumping Flawed Methodology under Fire sourced online from, European Union

Anti-dumping agreement

Brian Hindley, Edwin Vermulst, Zeroing in on Zeroing: Anti-dumping in WTO dispute settlement.

See:http://www.ogilvyrenault.com/en/ResourceCenter/ResourceCenterDetails.aspx?id=1011 &pId=3

Bhala, Prof Raj, Modern GATT law a treatise on the general agreement of Tariffs and Trade,

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S. Wittayarungruangsri, Antidumping: A Villain in International Trade,• sourced from http://economics.about.com/cs/moffattentries/a/antidumping.htm ,

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